673 toward Hill 749 . . . oursupply and evacuation routewas four miles of mountain-ous foot trails. The only wayto keep supplies movingwas by using Korean ServiceCorps porters. . . . [They]could not keep up with thelogistical demands imposedby heavy casualties and highammunition expenditure [so]HMR-161 was called in to fillthe. . . gap.

be carefully integrated into aMarine air-ground combat team,not just used as a "nice-to-have"aviation adjunct as was sometimesthe case with VMO-6's light heli-copters. One of the first steps inthis process was to train elementsof the 1st Shore Party Battalion forhelicopter operations. Shore par-ties had been formed during WorldWar II to handle supplies comingashore by landing craft. The logicalextension of this mission to land-ing zones as well as landing beach-es eventually led to the formationof specially trained helicopter sup-port teams. In addition, the ener-getic division chief of staff, ColonelKrulak, held a series of planningconferences with the 1st MarineDivision staff even before HMR-161 was in Korea to draw up ten-tative standard operating proce-dures. Ground units needed tolearn the intricacies of helicoptermovement and their leaders wereencouraged to apply the uniquecapabilities of helicopters in tacti-cal situations. Before HMR-161 leftKorea, its helicopters had per-

formed virtually every missionenvisioned under operational con-ditions. The squadron's main func-tions, however, were to test thepracticality of vertical envelopmentand to practice assault support byferrying troops and delivering sup-plies to units in the field. The latterwas the most exercised missionwhile on the East-Central Front.After moving to western Korea in1952, emphasis eventually shiftedto vertical envelopment using acontinuing series of amphibiousexercises. These exercises andcombat operations were the foun-dation of the sophisticated airmo-bile tactics and techniques stillused by the U.S. Army and MarineCorps of today.

In September 1951, Marineswere clearing the enemy from aseries of ridges around an extinctvolcano called the Punchbowl.The ground battalion commander,Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B.Nihart described the difficult tacti-cal situation:

We were attacking from Hill

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On 12 September, the first com-bat helicopter support team—a pla-toon from 1st Shore PartyBattalion—attended briefings a-bout proper loading techniquesand learned how to transmit land-ing signals to incoming aircraft.The next morning was devoted toarranging supplies into 800-poundbundles. The first flight consistingof four helicopters made its wayabout seven miles and thendeposited the shore party landingpoint section to enlarge andimprove the landing zone, directlanding operations using hand sig-nals, unload arriving helicoptersand collect cargo bundles, establishsupply dumps, and load battlecasualties. In mid-afternoon, sevenHRS-ls began lifting off with cargoloads suspended from belly hooks.The ingress and egress routes fol-lowed a deep valley that maskedthe helicopters from direct enemyobservation. A restrictive fire planwas in effect to avoid friendly fire.The landing zone was marked withfluorescent panels, hut the firstincoming aircraft could only placetwo of their four wheels on thelanding platform, which was situat-ed on the reverse slope of a steephill. The first supply helicopterdropped its sling at 1610 and thenpicked up seven battle casualties(two stretcher cases and five walk-ing wounded). Operation Wind-mill I comprised 28 flights that

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A156768

Vital supplies are transferred from a truck to a helicopter for delivery tofrontlinetroops. Helicopters often offered the only practical way to supply positions in thetrackless mountain terrain near the Punch bowl.

delivered 18,848 pounds of sup-plies and evacuated 74 seriouslywounded men. The elapsed timewas two hours and 40 minuteswith a total of 14.1 flight hourslogged. Lieutenant Colonel Nihart'sfinal evaluation of HMR-161's firstcombat action in support of hisbattalion was that "they . . . per-formed admirably."

Continued fierce fighting in thevicinity of the Punchbowl, particu-larly for an outcropping dubbed"the Rock," led to the second trans-port helicopter assault support

mission. Spurred on the unques-tioned success of Windmill I aswell as the need for heavy fortifi-cation materials such as sand bags,timber, barbed wire, and landmines, it was decided to conduct afollow-on aerial supply operation,Windmill II. The need to movebulky fortification materials to anearly inaccessible position droveoperational planning. Sand bags,barbed wire, land mines, and tim-ber were all too cumbersome andheavy to be moved forward byKorean laborers so General

Thomas turned to his rotary-winged "mule train" for the secondtime in a week. The formalrequest was made on the morningof 19 September, approved beforenoon, and underway before night-fall. Ten HRS-ls delivered morethan 12,000 pounds of cargo using16 flights in about one hour. Thesame operational procedures forWindmill I were used: an advancehelicopter support team wasinserted to operate the landingzone; the helicopters used coveredand concealed routes; and materialwas delivered using sling-loadedbundles for speed and ease of han-dling. The major difference wasthe rapid planning process, thistime preparations took only a fewhours instead of several days.Once again, the helicopters ofHMR-161 did within a few hourswhat would have taken the trail-bound South Korean porters sever-al days.

With the ability of HMR-161 todeliver supplies fully established,the next evolution was to lifthuman cargo. This was OperationSummit. The mission was for the1st Marine Division reconnaissancecompany to replace a SouthKorean unit occupying Hill 884, akey observation post located atopa rugged mountain. It was estimat-ed that it would take a Marine riflecompany about 15 hours to scalethe roadless heights with all resup-ply thereafter accomplished eitherby foot or by helicopter. GeneralThomas decided instead to mountthe first combat helicopter trooplift in history.

Once again, careful planningand preparation were the hall-marks of this operation. Lieuten-ant Colonel Herring and MajorMitchell coordinated their tacticalplans with Major Ephraim Kirby-Smith (the ground unit comman-der) and worked out the loadingplans with First Lieutenant Richard

Marine transport helicopter "HR-1O," one of 15 HRS-ls assigned to HJVIR-161,lands to deliver supplies near the Punchbowl. Detachments from the 1st AirDelivery Platoon loaded the supplies while helicopter support teams from the 1stShore Party Battalion controlled the unloading at forward area landing zones.

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forces, General Thomas turned toHMR-161 to help solve his timeand distance problems. He decid-ed to test-lift a single rifle compa-ny. In addition, since mostChinese attacks occurred undercover of darkness, this helicopterlift would take place at night.

Once again careful planningand detailed rehearsals were con-ducted. Fortunately, the HRS-1,unlike the light utility helicoptersof VMO-6, had flight attitudeinstruments, albeit not the sophis-ticated instrumentation found onfixed-wing aircraft. Daylight recon-naissance of the operational area,

daytime practice inserts, and nightindoctrination flights were con-ducted. The helicopter embarka-tion zone was a dry riverbedsoutheast of Hill 702, and the land-ing zone was located near thenorthwest rim of the Punchbowl.The straight-line five-mile ingressroute, however, actually became a13-mile round trip due to tacticalconsiderations.

A daylight rehearsal on themorning of 27 September gotOperation Blackbird off to aninauspicious start. Six helicopterslifted more than 200 men into a50-by-lOU-foot area cleared by a

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provisional helicopter supportteam. This practice lift took abouttwo hours. During the march out,however, a rifleman detonated anantipersonnel mine, and subse-quent investigation revealed thatthe proposed route to the mainline of resistance was seeded withunmarked mines. It was decidedto change the ground scheme ofmaneuver hut to keep the heli-copter landing zone the same.

At 1930 on the 27th, OperationBlackbird, the first night combathelicopter troop lift in history, gotunderway. Departing at three-minute intervals as they shuttled

All veteran World War Ilfighter pilots, the officers of MarineHelicopter Transport Squadron 161 pose with their corn- Mitchell.manding officer, LtCol George W Herring, kneeling in front

Nitiona1 Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A13254()

left, and the squadron's executive officei Ma] William P.

A Sikorsky HRS-l transport helicopter delivers supplies using"sling loading" techniques. Sling loading employedprepackaged materials that were carried in nets, lifted by a

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A156727

powered winch, and dropped by a remotely controlled hookthat allowed helicopters to rapidly deliver vital supplies with­out landing.

C. Higgs, representing the divisionembarkation section. Aerial recon­naissance indicated the landingwas going to be a tight squeeze.The only two available spots werelocated some 300 feet below thetopographical crest about a foot­ball field length apart, and eachwas less than 50-feet square with asheer drop on two sides. Terrainlimited each landing zone to onearrival at a time. Operational plan­ning was based upon the dictatesof Phib-31 and practical experi­ence during the Windmill opera­tions. The landing force wouldconsist of a reinforced reconnais­sance company. Helicopter sup­port teams from the 1st Shore PartyBattalion would control loadingand unloading. Landing serialswere compiled and rehearsals

began on 20 September. H-hourwas slated for 1000 the next day.

Several problems soon becameapparent. First was the number oftroops each helicopter could carry.The HRS-1 was rated to carry eightcombat-loaded troops but practicalexperience in California and Koreaquickly showed this figure to beoverly optimistic. The actual safeload was six men carrying onlysmall arms and personal equip­ment. A second problem wasweather. The threat posed by highwinds and the possibility of limitedvisibility or rain influenced opera­tions. An additional problem in themountainous region was reliableradio communications. The solu­tion was to earmark one helicopteras a radio relay aircraft, the firstuse of a helicopter for air-to-air

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command and control duringground operations.

Operation Summit was delayedon the morning of 21 Septemberby dense ground fog. Finally,about a half-hour later thanexpected, the first wave of threehelicopters at landing field X-83departed for the 14-mile run to Hill884. They approached their objec­tive flying low along a streambedbetween the ridgelines and thenhovered over Hill 884's reverseslope. A security element wenthand-over-hand down knottedropes and then fanned out. Next inwere two landing site preparationteams. About 40 minutes later,idling helicopters at X-83 receivedword to begin loading. Each car­ried five riflemen. Two hundredand twenty four men, including a

heavy machine gun platoon, andalmost 18,000 pounds of equip­ment were brought in using 12helicopters requiring a totalelapsed time of about four hours.The bulk of the equipment andsupplies were delivered by sus­pended cargo nets, which had tobe released on top of the mountainbecause the hillsides were sosteep. This took place in full viewof the enemy, but no helicopterswere hit by enemy fire. The finaltouch was the airborne laying oftwo telephone lines in about aquarter hour from Hill 884 to theground command post more thaneight miles away. This would havebeen a daylong task for a wireparty on foot. The event was head­line news in the States, and con­gratulations from higher headquar­ters poured in: General Shepherdnoted Operation Summit was "a

bright new chapter in the employ­ment of helicopters"; and X Corpscommander Major General ClovisE. Byers claimed: "Your imagina­tive experiment with this kind ofhelicopter is certain to be of lastingvalue to all the Services."

Holding the Minnesota Line

In late September 1951, theUnited Nations Command onceagain halted offensive operations.All across the trans-peninsularfrontline troops began digging in.Soon, a series of interconnectedtrenchlines reminiscent of WorldWar I extended from the Sea ofJapan in the east to the Yellow Seain the west, and the U.S. EighthArmy was prohibited from launch­ing new attacks. Ground activitieswere limited to conducting dailyfoot patrols, mounting tank-

infantry raids, manning small out­posts, and setting up nightlyambushes. The overriding tacticalconcern was a penetration of themain line of resistance by theCommunists. The war in Koreahad once again entered a newphase; but, unlike the others, thisone would last from the fall of1951 until the ceasefire almost twoyears later.

The 1st Marine Division wasaSSigned 22,800 yards of frontalong the northern edge of thePunchbowl with orders "to orga­nize' construct, and defend" theMinnesota Line. Much of the mainline of resistance ran through road­less mountains, and the re-serveregiment was located almost 17miles to the rear. With his man­power stretched to the limit andterrain and distance limiting rapidoverland reaction by reserve

An aerial view of aUXiliary airfield X-83 located nearChodo-ri, not far from 1st Marine Division headquarters.

Both helicopter squadrons (VMO-6 and HMR-161) sharedthis forward airfield situated near the Punchbowl.

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between the departure and arrivallanding zones, each aircraft carriedfive riflemen. Different altitudeswere used for ingress and egressto avoid collisions, and runninglights were switched on for twominutes as aircraft neared thelanding zones. Only two hoursand 20 minutes were required tolift all 223 men, a movement thatwould have required at least ninehours by foot.

Unfortunately, there were manyproblems. Rotor wash blew outmany of the flare pots that illumi-nated the embarkation area, bat-tery-powered lanterns in the land-ing zone were inadequate, wind-shield glare temporarily blindedthe pilots, artillery flashes distract-ed the pilots as they wormed theirway through the high mountainridges, and many in-bound pilotsneeded radio assistance to find thelanding zone. As the squadron'safter action report candidly stated:

"Night lifts are feasible with pre-sent equipment [but they] shouldbe limited to movements withinfriendly territory." Although theoperation was a marginal successthat affirmed the possibility ofemergency night reinforcementand intermittent night indoctrina-tion flights continued, OperationBlackbird was the only major nighthelicopter troop lift conducted inKorea.

The next day, HMR-161 lost itsfirst helicopter to an operationalmishap. A dozen light helicopters(HO3S-ls and HTLs) had beenpreviously lost to enemy fire andoperational mishaps, but this wasthe first HRS to go down. TheHRS-1 piloted by Major Charles E.Cornwell and First LieutenantFrederick D. Adams came into thelanding zone too low. The heli-copter struck the ground, bouncedinto the air, canted on its side los-ing all lift, and then careened to

the ground and caught fire. Theflaming helicopter was a totalwreck, but both pilots escapedwithout injury.

The ability to rapidly move asingle rifle company had beenestablished by Operations Summitand Blackbird, so Thomas andKrulak were eager to see if thesame principles could be appliedto a larger lift. On 9 October, awarning order for OperationBumble-bee, the lift of an entirerifle battalion, was issued. SecondLieu-tenant Clifford V. Brokaw III,at that time an assistant operationsofficer with the 7th Marines,recalled that the genesis of theoperation actually occurred muchearlier when Colonel Krulakinquired if helicopters could sup-port a frontal attack. ColonelHerman Nickerson, the regimentalcommander replied with a firm"no!" While in reserve, however,the regiment was tasked to pre-pare an amphibious contingencyplan including a helicopter lift.Then, at Krulak's insistence, thatplan was adapted to provide forthe heliborne relief of a rifle bat-talion on the main line of resis-tance. Well aware that such amajor helicopter event wouldbecome headline news, the divi-sion public relations officer askedwhat the operation was going tobe called. Sergeant Roger Hanks, aformer University of Texas footballplayer, mindful of the many vocif-erous skeptics who questioned theviability of helicopters for combatduty, quickly piped up: "Bumble-bee because supposedly they can'tfly either."

Colonel Krulak headed theplanning group that includedLieutenant Colonel Herring andMajor Mitchell from HMR-161,Lieutenant Colonel Harry W.Edwards, the rifle battalion com-mander, and Lieutenant ColonelGeorge G. Pafford, the shore party

HMR-161 pilots and crewmen attend a pre-mission brief for OperationBlackbird, the first major night helicopter troop lift. Careful planning andrehearsals were conducted to test the feasibility of night helicopter operations;after action reports noted it was possible in an emergency, but Blackbird was theonly night helilft actually carried out.

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battalion commander. Bumblebeewas planned as if it were anamphibious operation. Assign-ment and loading tables werecarefully constructed, detailedarrival and departure scheduleswere prepared, and helicopterloading and unloading serialswere established with each personassigned a specific spot in the heli-

copter, and order of embarkationand debarkation charts were dis-tributed. Lieutenant Brokaw re-called that this time eight troops,carrying only small arms and limit-ed ammunition loads, weresqueezed in and only one pilotflew each helicopter to test if such"surge loading" was practical in anemergency. Familiarization classes

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and rehearsals were held on 10October.

Operation Bumblebee kickedoff at 1000 on 11 October. TwelveHRS-1 helicopters, working atabout 30 second intervals and fly-ing nap of the earth 15-mileroutes, carried 958 passengers andmore than 11 tons of supplies fromairfield X-77 to Hill 702 using 156individual flights in a total elapsedtime of a little more than six hours.Two debarkation zones, Red andWhite, were used. In each, pas-senger manifests were used tocontrol loading. The men movedfrom an assembly area to the"standby" box to the "ready" boxand then into the helicopter. If anyserial was short, additional passen-gers were summoned from a near-by "casual" area. At the offloadspots shore party personnel "vig-orously assisted the passengers bygrasping their arms and startingthem away from the aircraft." Thefirst man out was the team leaderand the last man out checked tosee if any gear was adrift. Guidesfurnished by the ground units hur-ried the debarking men on theirway to keep the landing zonesclear for the oncoming waves.Bumblebee made the statesideheadlines, hut more importantlyfor the Marine Corps it was a giantstep toward turning vertical envel-opment theory into reality.

Four days later, the helicoptersof HMR-161 again demonstratedtheir flexibility by mountingOperation Wedge, a short noticelift of 10 tons of ammunition andthe evacuation of two dozen seri-ously wounded South Korean sc)l-diers. Upon learning that aRepublic of Korea unit was sur-rounded and in need of ammuni-tion and medical assistance, MajorMitchell led six HRS-1 helicoptersto the rescue. Captains Albert A.Black and James T. Cotton eachmade four flights into the embat-

tied landing zone. At the end ofthis ad hoc operation IX Corpscommander, Major General ClaudeF. Feren-baugh, USA, personallythanked each pilot for his effort insupport of an allied nation.

While the main focus of effortwas defense of the main line ofresistance, several incidents be-hind the lines led to the use ofHMR-161 helicopters for antiguer-rilla activities. The first of these,Operation Bushbeater, used heli-copter-borne teams to sweep theSoyang River Valley in late Oc-tober. Unfortunately, the uneventerrain and lack of emergencypower combined to make thisoperation the most costly in Koreain terms of aircraft lost. Three HRS-is went down on 22 October whiletrying to insert ground units using

knotted ropes for debarkation dueto rough terrain. The pilots had dif-ficulty maintaining station at thespecified landing site. It was virtu-ally impossible to hover above theridge because inconsistent windconditions sometimes caused thesudden loss of ground effect.When an aircraft is near the surfacea thick layer of air builds upbetween the rotor and the surface.This cushion is known as "groundeffect," and it creates additional lift.The loss of ground effect requiresquick action by the pilot, whomust either add power or go intomotion before the helicopter plum-mets. Most pilots were able toavert a crash by gaining forwardspeed, making an abrupt turn, ordiving into the valley. Unfortu-nately, three helicopters were

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unable to take such actions andcrashed; two were lost and thethird badly damaged its tail rotor;fortunately, only one man wasinjured. The follow-on salvageoperation became another pio-neering effort. Supervised by MajorEdwin E. Shifflett, and led byTechnical Sergeant Thomas M.McAuliffe, Marine working partieswere able to dismantle the injuredaircraft so all usable parts and oneairframe could be recovered.Major Mitchell used his HRS as a"flying crane" to lift out an entirefuselage secured by ropes and har-nessed to his cargo hook. Despitethe initial setback, the operationcontinued when more suitablesites were used. Forty insertionswere made and more than 200men landed. Post-crash investiga-

HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo supplement, Nov-Dec5l

Troops load on board an HRS-1 at Airfield X-77 during troop 4ft was actually made to test contingency plans inOperation Bumblebee in October 1951. The Bumblebee case Chinese Communist forces cracked the Minnesota Line.

tors determined that similar opera-tions should continue but onlyafter a careful study of the pro-posed terrain and evaluation ofexisting atmospheric conditions.

Several other heliborne anti-guerrilla operations followed.Operation Rabbit Hunt used heli-copters for systematic patrols ofthe vast wilderness area behind themain line of resistance. This oper-ation was not unlike those mount-ed by the 1st Marine Division tocontrol the An Hoa Basin south-west of Da Nang in the Republic ofVietnam 15 years later. OperationHouseburner was mounted on 26October to deprive enemy irregu-lars hiding behind friendly lines of

much-needed shelter as winterapproached. Two helicopters eachcarried four-man destruction teamsarmed with demolitions,flarnethrowers, and incendiarygrenades. Initially, one ship pro-vided cover while the other hov-ered and sprayed the target areawith a flammable mixture prior todropping incendiary grenades.Later, both helicopters landed andlet the destruction teams do theirwork from the ground. OperationHouseburner II used four heli-copters to destroy 113 dwellingson the last day of the month. Thisaction also featured the firstextended firefight between heli-copters and ground troops when

an airborne automatic rifle teamengaged an enemy position.Although the helicopter itself wasnot armed, this incident was prob-ably the forerunner of the heli-copter gunship.

Operation Switch, the relief andreplacement of a full regiment atthe frontlines, was the largest heli-copter effort so far. On 11

November, nearly 2,000 combatloaded troops swapped positionsbetween Hill 884 (unofficiallydubbed "Mount Helicopter" be-cause so many helicopter lifts tookplace there) and airfield X-83 inabout 10 hours. Standard operatingprocedures included a three-planeflight that dropped off the ad-vanced helicopter support team tosupervise operations at the landingzone, departure teams controlledoperations at X-83, and naval gun-fire kept enemy heads down dur-ing flight operations.

Operation Farewell on 19 1)e-cember saw the rotation of OflCbattalion for another and markedthe last flight by HMR-161 com-manding officer Lieutenant Colo-nel George Herring. After thatflight, he departed Korea toassume duties as commanding offi-cer of HMX-1 at Quantico. Ilisreplacement was that unit's previ-ous commander, Colonel Keith B.McCutcheon. The holder of anadvanced degree in aeronauticalengineering, McCutcheon hadbeen a proponent and pioneer ofMarine close air support duringWorld War II before learning to flyhelicopters. Major Mitchell re-mained as squadron executive offi-cer.

After only two months in thecombat, HMR-161 had loggedmore than 1,200 flight hours com-prising more than 1,000 sorties todeliver 150 tons of supplies andcarry out 192 medical evacuations.The "flying windmills" of HMR-161participated in morale building as

A helicopter-borne Marine destroys a potential enemy guerrilla hideout duringOperation Rabbit Hunt. In addition to troops on the ground, Marine demolitioncrews on board helicopters sprayed gasoline on huts serving as enemy cover andthen set them ablaze with phosphorus grenades.

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well as tactical operations: theydelivered large cakes so the front-line Marines could celebrate theMarine Corps birthday on 10November; on Thanksgiving theybrought turkey dinners to thefront; a heavy snow storm inter-rupted plans for Christmas feasts,but the arrival of several UnitedService Organization entertainersaround the new year helped raisemorale. The New Year also sawimplementation of an additionalduty that would last until the endof the war. After ice destroyed abridge spanning the Imjin River,one HRS-1 and its crew were dis-patched on a weeklong rotation tothe United Nations Commandadvanced headquarters at Munsan-ni to ferry United Nations peacedelegates to and from Panmunjom.

Colonel McCutcheon's first full

month as squadron commanderwas the most ambitious helicopter-borne effort thus far; HMR-161flew the most missions (820) in asingle month so far and logged themost combat missions (506) in asingle month during the entirewar. Three major efforts werelaunched in January 1952—Mule-train, Changie-Changie, andMouse Trap. Each exercised a dif-ferent capability. Muletrain andChangie-Changie were assaultsupport (helicopter-borne resup-ply and troop transport), whileMouse Trap was an exploration oftactical vertical envelopment.Operation Muletrain (named for apopular song of the day) called forthe complete supply of a battalionlocated on the main line of resis-tance for one week. The destina-tion was once again Hill 884.

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McCutcheon's squadron used a"flying crane" technique devel-oped by Major Charles E. Cornwellwhereby the HRS-ls mountedunderslung nets carrying about850 pounds and controlled fromthe cockpit to deliver cargo ratherthan pallets as had been previous-ly done. Tentage, stoves, rations,fuel oil, and ammunition com-prised the various loads. Four heli-copters, operating on a rotatingbasis, were so effective that theyactually flew in more cargo thancould be handled by the shoreparty during the first week ofJanuary; 219 loads equaling150,730 pounds were ferried about10 miles from the supply dump toMount Helicopter.

Operation Changie-Changie(pidgin Korean-English meaning"exchange") was a troop lift that

HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov-Dec5l

Col Keith B. McCutcheon, left, shakes the hand LtCol George The squadron's last troop lift under Herring was dubbedW Herring, the departing commanding officer of HI VIR-1 61 . "Operation Farewell" in his honor.

began on 10 January. The essentialdifference between this troopmovement and previous ones wasthat this time the helicopters flewinto company-sized positions locat-ed within a few hundred yards ofthe frontline. In addition, the 35-man 1st Air Delivery Platoon tookover helicopter ground supportoperations, relieving the hard-pressed 1st Shore Party Battalion ofthat duty. This realignment of mis-sions was more in line with eachunit's stated missions; FirstLieutenant William A. Reavis' 1stAir Delivery Platoon was thereaftertasked "to prepare and deliver sup-plies by air, whether by parachute,air freight, or helicopter."Operation Mouse Trap, conductedfrom 14 to 17 January, tested theability of Marines to launch a

counter-guerrilla reaction opera-tion on short notice. The squadronwas not notified until just aftermidnight to be prepared to mounta two-company lift by mid-morn-ing on the 14th. the operation wentoff with only minor difficulties and

was so smooth that three similarlifts were made by the 17th.

For the most part, HMR-161ceded deep search and rescueoperations to VMO-6. The most

notable such mission occurred inearly February when the EighthArmy-Fifth Air Force Joint Opera-tions Center requested help tobring back a fighter pilot and heli-copter crew downed in enemy ter-ritory. Two previous attempts hadbeen turned away by the timeMajor Mitchell's HRS-1 departed X-83 for airfield K-50 where it wouldpick up fighter escorts. Divertedenroute, the helicopter landed onthe cruiser Rochester (CA 124) for apre-flight brief before setting out.Fighter planes strafed the valleyand surrounding ridgelines as thehelicopter neared the crash site,but no activity was spotted soMitchell reluctantly aborted themission. The techniques used onthis mission became standardoperating procedure even thoughthe rescue attempt had come upempty.

February 1952 was a harbingerof trouble on the horizon. Anotherrelief in place, Operation Rotate,was successfully conducted on24th. That same day, however,

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A159212

Marines in Korea Jbr the first time are moved into frontline positions the "mod-ern way." Instead of climbing the steep trails, and spending hours to reach theridges' crest, helicopters airlift troops in a matter of minutes.

Hot chow is served at the HMR-161 forward operating base near the Punchbowlafter finishing their meal, Marines go through the wash line. Living and work-ing conditions were primitive, but the hard-working ground crews carried on.

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were installed in mid-March.After the end of the fighting at

the Punchbowl, VMO-6 continuedto support the 1st Marine Divisionflying from Sinchon in the X Corpssector of the East-Central Front.Indicative of the changing roles forlight utility helicopters, the squad-ron listed four HO3S-ls and fourHTL-4s in October 1951, but onlyone HO3S-1 remained on the rollsby March 1952 while the numberof HTL-4s had increased to 10. Thewisdom of combining helicoptersand fixed-wing aircraft withinobservation squadrons was con-firmed by combat experience. Awell-defined division of laborbetween the fixed-wing airplanesand helicopters of VMO-6 hadevolved since the early days of thewar. The nimble OY were bestsuited for reconnaissance, artilleryspotting, and airborne control ofclose air support while the heli-

HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jan52 copter niche combined combatThe Marine metal shop was located at K-18 airdrome near Kangnung in central search and rescue and medicalKorea. This major maintenance facility served HJVIR-161 which was flying from evacuation. Transportation andthe Jbrward strip X-83 at Chodo-ri, behind the Minnesota Line. administrative flights were divided

Captain John R. Irwin was enroutefrom Seoul to X-83 when heencountered severe vibrations. Al-ter putting down to locate thetrouble, he was amazed to discov-er the broken remnants of his tailassembly lying in the snow. Fourdays later, Captain Calvin G.Alston's HRS-1 began to buck andjerk without warning. Suspectinghe had been hit by enemy fire,Alston set down to inspect thedamage. Like Irwin, he quicklyfound that a broken tail assemblywas the culprit. Similar accidentsoutside the combat zone prompt-ing the Chief of Naval Operationsto ground all HRS-type aircraftuntil the problem could be isolat-ed, analyzed, and corrected. Thesquadron was not able to resumenormal operations until after newtail assemblies for each aircraft

Sikorsky representative, Louis Plotkin, left, explains the intricacies of an HRS-1aircraft engine to HMR-161 pilots. Representatives of the Bridgeport,Connecticut, company accompanied the squadron to Korea not only to assistwith technical problems, but also to report on how the aircraft performed incombat.

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about equally between fixed-wingand rotary-wing aircraft. Unfortu-nately, hopes for all-helicopterobservation squadrons still wereconsidered impractical. As timepassed, HTL-4s gradually replacedthe aging H03s-ls, and byFebruary 1952 the one remainingSikorsky was no longer flyingcombat missions. The helicoptersection's priorities graduallychanged to reflect the new tacticalsituation as well. Positional war-fare placed more emphasis onground support and administrativemissions while deep combatsearch and rescue had become thebailiwick of Navy and Air Forcehelicopter detachments. In Sep-tember 1951, medical evacuationand combat search and rescue hadbeen at the top of the list, but by

March 1952 the new prioritieswere: evacuation of wounded;reconnaissance and observation;liaison and transportation; admin-istrative and resupply flights; andcombat search and rescue, in thatorder. The vulnerability of heli-copters was an early concern, butthis proved not to be the case asfew helicopters were lost and thenumber coming back with bulletholes became all too common tomerit special mention.

Between October 1951 andMarch 1952, the helicopter sectionlogged 2,253 total flights (1,277combat and 976 non-combat mis-sions), including 637 medicalevacuations to deliver 1,096 seri-ously wounded men. Most trans-portation flights involved bringingdistinguished visitors to the front.

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Among them was Dr. CharlesMayo of the famed Mayo Clinicwho visited units of the 1stMedical Battalion. Liaison flightsincluded transportation of theCommandant of the Marine Corps,and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific,and IX Corps commanders. Thebulk of the administrative andresupply flights went for medicalsupport; the delivery of freshwhole blood or plasma, medicine,and medical records. After thefrontlines stabilized, very fewsearch and rescue missions werecalled for. Only seven such mis-sions were flown between 1

October 1951 and 15 March 1952.The helicopter section's only

combat casualty during that timeoccurred when Captain David T.Gooden's HTL-4 was shot down as

In March 1952, the 1st Marine Division moved from theMinnesota Line located in central Korea to the JamestownLine in western Korea. HJVIR-161 likewise relocated its for-

HMR-161 Historical Diaiy l'hoto Supplement, Jul52

ward base to A-i 7 (Yongpu-nO, while the rear echelonmaintenance facility was moved to A-33 not far from themassive supply base at Ascom City outside the capital of Seoul.

it wandered past friendly linesduring a medical evacuation mis-sion on 7 February. Neither thepilot nor the helicopter could berecovered due to their locationbehind enemy lines.

Defending the Jamestown Line

With both sides roughly equalin manpower and firepower onthe ground, the frontlines re-mained unchanged during thewinter of 1951-1952. In March, theUnited Nations Command decidedto realign its forces. The 1st MarineDivision moved from its positionsalong the Minnesota Line on theEast-Central Front to the James-town Line astride the Pyongyang-Seoul corridor on the westernflank. This move initiated the so-called "outpost war" which lastedfrom March 1952 until July 1953during which no significant chang-es of territory occurred. The major

actions of the outpost war includ-ed those at "Bunker Hill" in August1952, a temporary incursion of themain line of resistance at the"Hook" in October 1952, toughfighting for positions "Berlin" and"East Berlin" in early 1953, the"Nevada Cities" (Outposts Reno,Carson, and Vegas) battles inMarch 1953, and the last fight at"Boulder City" just before thearmistice in July 1953.

Although the generally flat ter-rain of western Korea simplifiedlogistical challenges, theJamestown Line was no tacticalbargain. Terrain and diplomaticconditions prohibited defense indepth and severely hampered theability of Marine commanders tomaneuver or commit reserveforces in case of a Communistbreakthrough. The 35-mile Marinesector was the longest defensivezone held by any Eighth Armydivision. The low-rolling hills on

the Marine side of the line weredominated by the high ground onthe far side of no-man's-land heldby the Com-munists. To make mat-ters worse, the Imjin River, withonly four crossing points, ranbehind the main line of resistance.Major waterways separated theline at two points, and a diplomat-ic demilitarized "neutral corridor"from Munsan-ni to Panmunjomdivided the defensive zone. TheUnited Kingdom's 1st Common-wealth Division anchored theMarine flank on the northeast atthe Samichon River, where the38th Parallel crossed the James-town Line. From there the mainline of resistance generally tracedthe Imjin for about 10 miles until itintersected that river; the main linethen followed the south bank ofthe Imjin estuary to where the HanRiver joined the Imjin, and acrossthe Han an isolated defense sectorwas located on the Kimpo Penin-sula. The main line of resistancewas extremely vulnerable and hadto be protected by a series of com-bat outposts scattered throughoutno-man's-land. The scrub-covered,low-lying areas that predominatedthe Marine sector were subject ofyear-round enemy observationand flooding each spring. Overall,the Jamestown Line was a tacti-cian's nightmare.

In late March, the 1st MarineDivision moved 180 overlandmiles from the Punchbowl toMunsan-ni, an urban rail junctionlocated near the Imjin River about30 miles from Seoul. LieutenantColonel William T. Herring's VMO-6 and Colonel McCutcheon's HMR-161 began displacing from Sin-chon in mid-March and had com-pleted their respective moves bythe end of the month. Each tookup residence at separate landingfields near the 1st Marine Di-vision's command post. The VMO-6 airstrip (A-9) was located in the

His predecessoi Maj William G. Maclean, righl welcomes LtCol William THerring on board as the new commanding officer of VMO-6. A graduate of theNaval Academy, Herring served as the commanding officer of Marine FighterSquadron 111 and operations officer of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing duringWorld War H.

National Archives Photo (U5Mc) 127-N-A133046

723

village of Tonggo-ri about threemiles south of the division com-mand post. The airfield was quick-ly named Bancroft Filed to honorthe first Marine helicopter pilotkilled in action. HMR-161's forwardflight echelon was located atYongpu-ni's A-17, while its rearechelon including advanced main-tenance personnel was at airfieldA-33 (Taejong-ni, a well-developedairdrome that served the massiveEighth Army supply base known asAscom City, which should not beconfused with airfield K-5 locatedat Taejon in south-central Korea).

For the most part, VMO-6 con-tinued flying missions as beforewith medical evacuation as its

number one priority. During thistime the squadron's executive offi-cer, Major William G. MacLean, Jr.,developed a plan to station evacu-ation helicopters, crews, and main-tenance personnel at the commandpost of the centrally located, front-line infantry regiment on weeklongrotations. This "forward evacuationechelon" was on-call around-the-clock and could reach any part ofthe frontline within a few minutes,cutting evacuation time in halfthereby keeping severely injuredmen within what the surgeonscalled "golden minute"—the peri-od during which immediate treat-ment could save a man's life.These operations began in June,

724

and they included the first routine-ly scheduled night evacuations.The normal forward evacuationechelon complement was five offi-cers, nine enlisted men, and twohelicopters. In addition, close liai-son with American and other alliednations' medical stations and hos-pital ships was maintained. Othermissions performed by VMO-6'shelicopter section were liaisonflights and visual reconnaissance.The former usually brought impor-tant visitors to the front while thelatter flew commanders along themain line of resistance and offeredhigh altitude glimpses into enemyterritory.

Major General John T. Selden,

Department of Defense I'hoto (usMc) A134463

A badly wounded Marine receives life-sustaining plasma dark. Night evacuations were hazardous afftiirs becauseand will bejiown to an advance medical care facility in the early helicopters lacked instrumentation and back lighting.

the commander of the 1st MarineDivision, required that a strongdefensive line be established butwas still nervous because it wouldhe difficult to quickly reinforce theJamestown Line. Accordingly, twoexisting "fallback" lines, Wyomingand Kansas, were strengthened,and a series of rapid deploymentexercises by the division reserveregiment were planned. Primaryamong them were those conduct-ed by HMR-161 in the spring andsummer of 1952.

The first test of the ability tomove across water obstacles wasOperation Pronto. On 5 April, a662-man battalion and about10,000 pounds of supplies were

the Han River to the KimpoPeninsula. Ironically, OperationPronto was both the longest dis-tance and the shortest notice heli-copter-borne troop lift so far.Colonel McCutcheon was not noti-fied until about 0210 in the morn-ing, yet, the first helicopter liftedoff only about three-and-a halfhours later. The initial wave carriedspecialists from the 1st Air DeliveryPlatoon to two landing zones.Thereafter, nine helicopters (sevenof them manned by pilots freshfrom the United States) were used.The hour-long round trips werealmost 60 miles because of flightrestrictions in the vicinity of thePanmunjom "neutral corridor." Thesquadron logged 99 flights in more

725

than 115 flight hours with a totalelapsed time of 14 hours, an all-time high. After the operation,Colonel McCutcheon noted: "Thisairlift . . . proved that a Marinetransport helicopter squadron cansuccessfully operate as an 'on call'tactical tool." The operation wascarried out with only minimal liai-son between flight and groundunits and virtually none of thedetailed planning previously em-ployed. Helicopter operations,which only a few months earliermade front-page news in theUnited States, had by that time,become routine.

An intermittent series of trooplift exercises were interspersedwith several tactical and logisticaloperations over the next year anda half. Pronto was promptly fol-lowed by two-day OperationLeapfrog, the helicopter-borne ex-change of one South KoreanMarine battalion for another on 18and 19 April. Operation Circus, thelift of a U.S. battalion closed outthe month. All operations, exceptfor emergencies, were discontin-ued on 27 April after the Chief ofNaval Operations grounded allHRS-ls due to structural problems.By the middle of May, HMR-161'shelicopters were back in action.Two more short notice troop lifts,Operation Butterfly and EverReady, were conducted in Juneand a third, Operation Nebraska,took place in November. The lastsuch exercise was OperationCrossover II held the followingspring.

Although combat search andrescue was not a primary missionof HMR-161, one dramatic episodeoccurred in late May. Two heli-copters were dispatched from A-17to look for a downed Navy pilotnear Hapsu, North Korea. Duringthe airborne search, the HRS-1flown by Major Dwain L. Lengeland Captain Eugene V. Pointer

transported from Munsan across

Western KoreaI Corps Sector 1952-1 953

© AIRFIELD ,—,—, MLR

9

with crew chief Technical SergeantCarlyle E.J. Gricks on board lostflight control due a combination oflow speed and high altitude.Flying low to the earth, the heli-copter was unable to gain enoughpower to maneuver around astump. The aircraft crashed and noone was seriously injured, but thewould-be rescuers now needed tobe rescued. The crew quicklymoved to a pick up location buthad to wait almost two days due tobad weather. Squadron matesCaptain Robert J. Lesak, First

Lieutenant Wallace Wessel, andTechnical Sergeant Elmer DuBreyflew the rescue mission. It was acomplicated pick-up procedure. Inorder to keep from repeating theprevious crash, Captain Lesak hadto keep his aircraft in motion tostay aloft. This required thedowned crew to grab a trailingrope ladder as the HRS passedoverhead. Fortunately, the rescuewas a success, if not a frustratingone.

One of the primary purposes ofrushing HMR-161 to Korea was to

726

test vertical envelopment conceptsas they applied to amphibiousoperations under wartime conch-tions. This was not possible at firstdue to geographic restrictionswhen the Marines manned theEast-Central Front. The move towestern Korea brought theMarines close to the sea, hut initialoperational tempo and subsequentgrounding of the HRS-ls delayedthe opportunity until June. At thattime as series of Marine landingexercises (MarLExs) were held at arate of about two each month for

LtCbl John F. C'arey, left, bids farewell to his predecessor ascommanding o/jicer of HMR-161, Col Keith B. McCutcheon,both men had previously commanded H/I'IX-l at Quantico.McCutcheon made his reputation as a close air support

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A134367

advocate in the Pacific and eventually commanded allMarines in Vietnam; later he was slated to become the Jirsiactive duty Marine aviator to receive a.fourth star hut illnessintervened.

the remainder of 1952 with twomore held the following year.Although there were minor varia-tions in each MarLEx, they general-ly followed a similar pattern: adetachment of a half dozen HRS-lsfrom HMR-161 would lift one bat-talion of the division reserve fromone small island to a larger oneduring a simulated amphibiousassault. The purpose of these exer-cises was twofold. First, tactics andtechniques were perfected witheach passing exercise as lessonswere learned and assimilated.Second, aircraft and ground per-sonnel became familiar with thestandard operating procedures forhelicopter-borne operations. The

main problems were the lack of anescort carrier and helicopters.Untested Marine amphibious doc-trine envisioned individual trans-port helicopter squadrons and riflebattalions embarked on boardescort carriers during the move-ment to the amphibious objectivearea. Once there, the helicopterswould conduct one portion of theship-to-shore movement then beon call to deliver supplies andevacuate casualties until the beach-head was secured and operationscould safely move ashore. Thetrouble was that the Navy did nothave enough carriers or crews toimplement this policy, and noescort carrier was readily available

to support most MarLEx opera-tions. In addition, the demands onHMR-161 prohibited the entiresquadron from participating in theexercises.

MarLEx I was held on 10 and 11June with its announced purposeto gain experience in verticalenvelopment as part of anamphibious operation. Because noescort carrier was available, theisland of Sung Bong-do about 40miles southwest of Inchon wouldstand in for the missing ship.Nearby Tokchok-to, a five-mile-long island with two broad sandybeaches located about six milessoutheast, was selected as theobjective. As was standard practice,

assault in the many landing exercises conducted during theKorean War.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A 134628

An HRS-1 helicopter of I-IMR-161 approaches the escort car-ncr Sicily (CVE 118). The Marine transport squadronexperimented with the newly developed concept of vertical

727

ed from hovering helicopters usingrope ladders to prepare landingzones. Seven aircraft delivered 236fully equipped troops the first dayand another 236 the following day.Unfortunately, the exercise did notgo well. Communications wereunsatisfactory, and the time re-quired to land troops by helicopterwas "too great in comparison tothe time needed to land troops.by boat." It was decided to use acloser island the next time toreduce the strain on the heli-copters and the time in the air.MarLEx II was held later thatmonth. This time Soya-do, two

miles from Tokchok-to, was usedas the simulated carrier. Fourinstead of seven aircraft were usedto lift 235 men, and the exercisewas deemed a success.

The Marines finally got to trainwith an actual aircraft carrier inSeptember. The escort carrierSicily (CVE 118) was available to

support MarLEx VII. This exerciseoffered the most realistic test ofamphibious doctrine as envisionedby planners at Quantico. On 1 and2 September, the bulk of HMR-161's12 HRS helicopters were usedto lift 964 troops from the carrierdeck to Landing Zones Able andBaker on Tokchok-to. Five more

728

MarLEx operations were held in1952. They were followed by a six-month break, then two moreamphibious exercises were held inthe summer of 1953 before theceasefire took effect.

On 30 July, HMR-161 received arequest to launch a humanitarianeffort in support of the U.S. Armyand South Koreans. More than 600American soldiers and about 150Korea civilians had been strandedby flash flooding of the PukkanRiver. Six Marine helicopters flewto the rescue. This spur-of-the-mo-ment evacuation was made with-out written orders or advancedscheduling. The squadron mount-

Col Harry N. Shea, right, commanding officer of the 11thMarines, briefs from left, lstLt Donald L. SelleiCommanding Officer, 1st Air Delivery Platoon, lstLtWilliam B. Fleming, Executive Officer, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket

helicopter support teams descend-

1st Air Delivery Platoon Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Feb53

Battery, Capt Edwin T. Carlton, Commanding Ojjicer, 1st4.5-inch Rocket Battery, and LtCol John F. Carey,Commanding Officer, HMR-161, prior to a fire mission insupport of Korean Marines.

ed 182 flights over about threehours. The squadron after actionreport noted: "The average load wasfive men and gear [but we lifted] asmany as nine small children com-plete with dogs and chickens. . . inone trip . . . . The Army and AirForce . . . marveled at the expedi-tious way our helicopters carriedout the operation."

The month of August saw achange of command when Lieu-tenant Colonel John F. Carey, yetanother veteran of HMX-1, re-placed Colonel McCutcheon ascommanding officer of HMR-161.September was the busiest monthof the war for HMR-161. Thesquadron flew 1,195 missions.Included in that total were thelargest aerial supply operation thusfar, the first of many regularlyscheduled helicopter-borne trooprotations, the only amphibiousexercise supported by an aircraftcarrier, and the tactical lift of arocket artillery battery.

The first of two large logisticalsupport operations took placefrom 22 to 26 September. Opera-tion Haylift was designed to com-pletely support a frontline regi-ment for five days. Included in the

loads were rations, water, ammuni-tion, fortification material, andfuel. These supplies were carriedinternally or suspended below thehelicopter frame in wire basketsand cargo nets. The distance fromloading zone to landing was about20 miles, depending upon whichloading zone was used. The 1stService Battalion supplied LoadingZone Able while the 1st OrdnanceBattalion did so at Loading ZoneBaker; air delivery platoon person-nel supervised loading operationsand shore party personnel un-loaded the incoming aircraft. Morethan 350,000 pounds of cargo and75 passengers were lifted despiterainy weather. This effort tripledthe output of Opera-tionMuletrain, the previously biggestlogistical operation. Op-erationHaylift was summed up in a singlesentence in the squad-ron report:"No unusual problems wereencountered and the operationprogressed smoothly and continu-ously throughout."

The use of helicopters to rotatetroops between the rear and thefront had become routine by thesummer of 1952. So much so thatthe 1st Marine Division initiated

regularly scheduled replacementoperations intended "to effect therelief of a unit on the MLR andreturn the relieved unit to a reararea as expeditiously as possible,"using the codename "Silent Red-line." Silent Redlines were con-ducted at the rate of about one permonth during the rest of the year,but were only intermittently usedthe following year due to tacticalconsiderations (the 1st MarineDivision was either off the line orheavily engaged). The first of thesebegan on 11 September with thelift of a Korean Marine battalion.Because these operations werecarried out under enemy observa-tion, if they came under direct firesquadron aircraft were directed toseek landing spots in defilade andmaintain communications whilethe ground troops debarked andsought the best defensive terrain.Ten aircraft, each carrying six menor five men and a crew-servedweapon, transported 1,618 troopsin an overall time of six-and-one-half hours during Silent Redline I.

By the summer of 1952, thestrategy in Korea had developedinto positional warfare and artillerybegan to dominate tactical think-ing. Unfortunately, the Chi-neseactually began to outgun theAmericans as a result of massiveSoviet aid that furnished excellentweapons and plenty of ammuni-tion, and in western Korea theenemy controlled the TaedokMountain spur which gave themsuperior observation of the UnitedNations lines. The Marines coun-tered by adopting mobile artillerytactics using multiple gun posi-tions. One innovative solutioncame about as the result of a coop-erative effort between the pilots ofHMR-161 and the ar-tilleiymen ofthe 11th Marines. A particularlyvaluable weapon was the towedmultiple rocket launcher. Theproblem was that these mobile

Two rocket battery crewmen prepare the launcher for action as an air deliverplatoon signalman assigned by HMR-161 to direct incoming cargo-carrying air-craft to the landing site loads a rocket round into the tube.

1st Air Delivery l'latoon Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Feb53

729

rocker launchers were vulnerablebecause their back blast kicked updust and debris that was visiblefrom the Communist side. Therapid insertion of light artillery intodefiladed positions followed by arapid withdrawal, however, wouldallow the Marines to land, set up,fire a barrage, and then leavebefore enemy counterbattery firecould pinpoint the target. Experi-ments at Quantico, Virginia, andCamp Lejeune, North Carolina,proved the feasibility of lifting a4.5-inch rocket launcher alongwith a skeleton crew and a smallamount of ammunition in a singleload. On 19 August, HMR-161 putthis theory into practice duringOperation Ripple. Rehearsals inKorea tested new delivery meth-ods using a variety of externalhooks and release mechanisms,but there was some trouble duringthe initial lift of the 1st 4.5-inchRocket Battery. The problemswere solved that night and addi-tional operations the following daywent much more smoothly.Colonel Carey was able to recom-mend that helicopters were suit-able for rocket launcher trans-portation, and Operation Ripplewas followed by several more sim-ilar tactical operations over thenext few months. These were theonly operations in which heli-copters were directly responsiblefor putting rounds on the target.As such, they were the distantforerunners of the "fire base" con-cept that became a tactical main-stay in Vietnam.

Beginning in October, one heli-copter and a standby crew wereassigned to Marine Aircraft Group12 on a rotating basis to provideair-sea rescue and administrativetransportation. As a result of heavyfighting at the Hook the squadronlogged the most medical evacua-tions that month as well, 365.During the month, the squadron

also began receiving SikorskyHRS-2 helicopters. Although anewer model, the HRS-2 offeredno significant increase in perfor-mance because it used the sameengine as the HRS-1; the main dif-ferences were that the HRS-2 wasabout a foot shorter and a fewinches closer to the ground.Operation Nebraska, conductedon the 13th, tested the ability ofHMR-161 to move troops from onephase line to another. Ten heli-copters lifted one rifle battalionand a heavy mortar platoon (820men) in only two-and-one-halfhours comprising 169 individualflights.

Activities in December includedOperations Crossover, the move-ment of a reserve rifle battalionfrom the Wyoming Line to theKansas Line; Silent Redline III, theby-then standard helicopter-bornerotation of a frontline battalion byone from the reserve area; MarLEx

730

XII-52, the last amphibious exer-cise of the year; and OperationSanta Claus during which heli-copter HR-69 was made up to looklike jolly old Saint Nicholas as itdelivered toys and food to about100 orphans adopted by thesquadron. Also during the month,Colonel Carey flew out to thenewly arrived Danish hospital shipJutlandia to test its helicopter-landing platform and to familiarizethe crew with helicopter landingprocedures. The cold, dampweather and fog continued tointerfere with flight operations, hutnew hangars eased the mainte-nance burden to some degree.Although few of the shiveringmechanics would have believed itat the time, conditions on theJamestown Line were far superiorto those encountered on the East-Central Front the previous year.

January 1953 witnessed the useof HRS helicopters as "flying squad

HMR-161 Historical Diary l'hoto SUpplCtflcflt, Dec52

Transport squadron's "HR-69" helicopter is decked out as Santa claus IC) delivertoys and food on christmas Day 1952. Although the visionaries at QuanhicoVirginia, before the Marines received helicopters jbresaw almost every possibleuse for rotary-winged aircraft and made up a potential task list it is douhtftlthat this humanitarian mission appeared on that list.

cars" as they carried members ofthe 1st Military Police Battalionsearching for Communist infiltra-tors. On the 23d, fire wasexchanged be-tween the airborneMilitary Police and guerrillas on theground. Three enemy troops werekilled while the helicopter sufferedonly minor gunfire damage.

February hosted the largest heli-copter supply operation in Korea,Operation Haylift II. While Haylift Ithe previous September had sup-ported one frontline regiment forfive days, Haylift II was twice asambitious. This time, two frontlineregiments would receive heli-copter-transported Class I (ra-tions), III (fuel), IV (constructionmaterials), and V (ammunition)supplies for five days, from 23 to27 February. The planning andexecution of Haylift II was similarto its forerunner, but on a muchlarger scale. Arid, this one wouldtake place in much more difficultweather conditions. One hundred

and thirty tons per day wererequired to support both regi-ments, but this total was actuallyexceeded on the first day. Theunloading time per load was lessthan one minute. On 25 February,HMR-161 brought in more than 200tons, a record. By the third day, thesupply build-up had actually sur-passed the ability of the groundlogisticians to cope with it.Fortuitously, emergency requestsfor ammunition by other units less-ened the backlog. Ground fog onthe last two days slowed opera-tions. Still, the final results wereimpressive, 1,612,406 pounds liftedwithout the loss of crew or aircraft.February also saw records set forthe number of combat hours (765),total flight hours (1,275.5), combatflights (575), and total flights(1,183), and the gross lift of morethan two million pounds thatmonth was the largest of the entirewar for HMR-161.

Sadly, that month also ended

HMR-161's streak of not losing aman. On the 12th, a three-planeflight departed A-33 for Pusan torendezvous with a carrier that wasto take them to Japan. Along theway the HRS-1 carrying CaptainAllen W. Ruggles and TechnicalSergeant Joe L. Brand, Jr., becameseparated and crashed into the seaabout 25 miles south of Pusan.The cause was believed to havebeen mechanical failure, but thiswas never confirmed becausethere were no survivors andwreckage was never located.

On 15 March, Colonel Owen A.Chambers took over HMR-161.Ten days later, a second HRS-1went down with three crewmem-bers on board. Major Doil R. Stitzelwas making a test hop Out ofAscom City with mechanics MasterSergeant Gilbert N. Caudle, Jr., andSergeant Richard L. Parsell whentheir aircraft suddenly lost power,crashed, and burned. All three menwere lost.

Only two major operations wereconducted that spring, both weretroop lifts from the reserve area tothe Jamestown Line, OperationCrossover II and Silent Redline VI.On 27 March, all HRS-2 helicopterswith more than 200 flight hourswere grounded because of rotorblade problems. This was a pre-cautionary move due to statesideincidents, and no HRS-2s in Koreawere lost to this cause.

Beginning on 26 April, HMR-161participated in Operation LittleSwitch, the six-day exchange ofprisoners of war. The UnitedNations released 6,670 NorthKorean and Chinese prisonerswhile the Communists returnedonly 684 captives, including 15

Marines and three Navy corpsmen.From the middle of the month,HMR-161 provided transportationfrom Freedom Village nearMunsan-ni to Panmunjom for vari-ous international delegates and

A helicopter from I-IIVIR-161 prepares to lift bundled supplies from the 1st AirDelivery Platoon area to frontline troops. The air delivery platoon signalmanholds the hook while the other Marine holds the net in a hook-up position.

1st Air Delivery Platoon Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Feb53

731

American negotiators. During theactual prisoner exchange, heli­copters stood by to transport theseriously ill or wounded Marinesfrom Panmunjom to one of threehospital ships, the ConsolationCAB 15), the Haven CAB 12), or the

]utlandia, riding at anchor inInchon harbor. Four Marines hadto be evacuated.

In May the 1st Marine Divisioncame off the line for the first timesince the Masan interlude ended inJanuary 1951. While this represent-

ed a relief from the rigors of com­bat, it was not exactly a time ofrest and relaxation. The divisionstaff ordered HMR-161 to get busyon the first Marine landing exerciseof the New Year CMarLEx I-53). On13 May, after careful planning and

Sikorsky ROSS

The HOS h licopter, de eI ped fr m ikorsky''; s­52 d ign begun in 19'-1 , was the purpose-builtrepla ment obse"'ation h licopt r for the I T03, .

Th -~2 wa first on eived as a compact two placemach in , but it ventually inc rf'orated recommenda­tion from th fighting front under the de. ignation L -52­_. The H05 was more compact than it prede essorand featured several new design feature to overcomete hnical pr blen~ id ntifi d in th 1103. FOlly-eightI I 5 -1 er ordered for the Marine Corp in 1951 andacce ion began in January 19-2,

Alth ugh iL'i th oretical performan e ,tatistic app aronly marginally hetter than its pred ces or, the I I 5,wa, a lUally a much-improv d air raft that address dmany of the H03 's short mings. The H05, wa. thefir t .'. h licopt r fined with all-metal blade . couldmount two ,tretcher int mally, and wa. much more. ta­ble on the ground due to it. I w center of gra\'ity LIndfour-whe I landing gear. The mo'l unique practi alinnovation was a hinged, two-piece, forward-mountedob e"'ation bubbl. Op ning the left eat side of thebubble allow d acce', to the cabin interior for two°tr t h r-born patient.. In addition, the HOS, couldcarry thr e omhat-loaded men over sh rt distan es.

By the tim of the armistice in 19~ 3, alma, t aU MO-

732

6 heli opter W re H05:s. LTnfortunatel. plans toreplace light airplane,; with 110')S helicopter in larineob ervalion squadrons had to be put on hold due to p'r­formance f'rohlems and structural defect that came toth fore in Korea. It ~ a deckl d that the Marine Corf'sneeded a machine that orr'red hetter stahility and >asierin-flight ontral in addition to a mol' f'o\\erful engine.Thu . instead of becoming the backbon f Marin

b ervati n squadron , the JIS' \ a actually replacedby the Kaman IT K b ginning in 1954; the later aircraftremained in perational I icc for the next decade untilwas it in turn replaced b th~ Bell LlI-1 Iroquois(ooIIueyOO), whi h remains th' designated Marine ohse"'a­tion and utility h licof'ter t thi day. Marin ohserva­tion quadrons \yere equif'ped \"\ ith fi: ed-wing airplanesafter light h licopter. quadr n were created during the

ietnam- ra.Aircraft Data

Manufacturer: L ik rsky Dh'ision of nited AircraftCorp rationPower Plant: 2 S hp Franklin 0-125-1 engineDimeo ions: L ngth, 2 . 5"; height, 8' "; rotor, thre' 33'metal bladesPerformance: ruising p d, 9 mphLift: Pilot and three passeng 'rs or two internal stretch 'rs

rehearsals, HMR-161 brought a bat-talion landing team to Yongdong-ni, a beach area southwest ofSeoul. This exercise was followedin June by a special helicopterassault demonstration as part ofthe rehearsal for MarLEx 11-53.Similar to the previous amphibiousexercise in scope and purpose,MarLEx 11-53 actually turned out tohe the last major amphibious exer-cise during the Korean War. Thesquadron re-turned to the lines on10 July and thereafter continuedroutine operations delivering sup-plies to various outposts and trans-porting mail and personnel until

the ceasefire was declared on 27July 1953.

The Korean Conflict had finallyended, but HMR-161 was not yethomeward bound. Immediatelyafter the guns cooled off, HMR-161would support a massive prisonerof war exchange and then enter aperiod of "watchful waiting" be-fore returning stateside.

The intervening 16 monthsbetween the move to the James-town Line in March 1952 and thearmistice in July 1953 were busyones for the helicopter section ofMarine Observation Squadron 6.The last of the venerable HO3S-ls

733

(Bureau of Aeronautics number124343) departed VMO-6 in April1952. Bell HTLs carried the loadthroughout the spring until thearrival of replacement helicoptersthat summer. The first of the newSikorsky HO5S-1 helicopters ar-rived in July. This new machine,the first helicopter equipped withall metal rotor blades, was a three-seat utility aircraft that mounted athree-bladed overhead main rotorand a two-bladed tail rotor.Powered by a 245-horsepowerFranklin engine, it could carry a750-pound load at a cruising speedof 96 miles per hour. The most

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A169730A seriously wounded Marine near the Jamestown Line is falls of the HO3S-1, had become the Marines'primary med-loaded on board a Sikorsky HO55-1 helicopter from VIvIO-6. ical evacuation aircraft.By 1953, the HO5S-1, which was designed to remedy short-

The Innovators

The first rotary-winged flight machines were chil-dren's toys believed to have been developed inChina. Just after the end of World War I a rotary-

winged airplane, the autogiro, was developed andgained some popularity during the Jazz Age. True heli-copter technology, however, did not really take off untiljust before World War II. Pre-war helicopter enthusiastsin France, Italy, Spain, and Germany spread their gospelthroughout Europe and on to the United States. Of theearly American designers, three stand out: Igor I.

Sikorsky, Frank N. Piasecki, and Arthur M. Young. Eachof these men left an indelible mark on U.S. helicopterdevelopment, and their legacy lives on in the aircraftused by current Marine aviators.

IGOR I. SIKORSKYAmerica's preeminent helicopter advocate, pioneer,

and designer was a Russian émigré who moved to theUnited States to escape communism. He did not invent,nor was he the first to fly, a helicopter. He did, howev-er, formulate a solution to movement stability for rotary-wing flight that has since evolved into the most popu-lar modern helicopter configuration—a single, large,horizontal, overhead rotor stabilized by a small, vertical,

Inventor Igor I. Sikorsky, the father of American heli-copters visits HMX-1 at Marine Corps Air StationQuantico, Virginia. In the background is an H035-1

anti-torque tail rotor with forward movement controlledby varying the main rotor's pitch while using the tailrotor to determine direction. Igor Ivanovich Sikorskydeveloped a wide variety of helicopters that becameversatile aircraft equally suited for both commercial andmilitary use, aircraft able to perform unique tasks onland, at sea, and in the air. After World War II, Sikorskyworked closely with the U.S. Marine Corps to adapt hishelicopters to military use, a symbiotic relationshipbetween manufacturer and user that carried on evenafter his death. Today, Igor Sikorsky is rightfully con-sidered the "Father of American helicopters."

Although long interested in rotary-wing flight,Sikorsky actually first gained fame for his multiple-engine aircraft designs. Born in Kiev, Russia, on 25 May1889, his interest in, and aptitude for, aeronautical engi-neering became evident early in his life. He beganexperimenting with flying machines and the principlesof aerodynamics prior to entering the Russian NavalAcademy. After three years, Sikorsky left St. Petersburgto study in Paris and then returned to his homeland toattend Kiev Polytechnic Institute. He returned to Paris asecond time to learn more about rotary-winged flight.

helicopter, one of the first two "Whirlybirds" assigned tothe US. Marine Corps.

734

National Archives Photo (USMc) I 27-N-A322389

He built his first helicopter, a wooden box mountingtwo horizontal propellers powered by a 25-horsepowermotorcycle engine, upon his return to Kiev in 1909. Hecould never get this machine to fly and concluded thatthe technology of the day was not adequate, but healso remained convinced that in time rotary-winged air-craft would surpass fixed-wing airplanes as flyingmachines. Sikorsky continued his experiments usingengine-powered sleighs until he turned to designingmultiple-engine airplanes. In 1913, he designed andbuilt the world's first four-engine airplane. Thus, heembarked upon a new career path for the next 40years.

Driven from Russia by the Bolshevik Revolution, anearly penniless Igor Sikorsky fled to the United Statesby way of France. In America he eked out a livingteaching mathematics and consulting part time. Amonghis projects was a proposed, but never adopted, tn-motor bomber for the U.S. Army. After much hardship,he was able to live the American dream when he con-verted a Long Island, New York chicken farm into theSikorsky Aero Engineering Company in 1923. Six yearslater, the company joined Boeing, Pratt & Whitney, andChance Vought in forming the United Aircraft andTransportation Corporation. These humble beginningscomprised the genesis of one of America's most suc-cessful aviation enterprises. Sikorsky's first successfulU.S. design—an all-metal, twin-engine transport, the 5-29A—established his reputation for building aircraftnoted for their ability to withstand hard landings onrough surfaces, poor weather conditions, and continu-ous operations with only rudimentary maintenance. Byfar his most successful airplane to that time was hiseight-passenger, high-wing, twin-engine S-38 amphib-ian. Although designed for commercial use, 16 variantsbearing Bureau of Aeronautics "RS" designations werepurchased by the U.S. Navy, some of which saw servicewith the Marine Corps. Sikorsky next turned to large,long-range, four-engine, transoceanic passenger planes.His successive S-40,-41, and-42 models gained fame asthe "American Clippers," large flying boats that pliedtheir trade for Pan-American Airways in the Carribeanand across the Pacific Ocean. Economic troubles forcedthe shutdown of United Aircraft's Sikorsky Division in1938, but this setback fortuitously once again whettedhis long-standing interest in rotary-winged aircraft.

Heartened by technological progress and spurredinto action by recent European developments—notablyGermany's spectacular public exhibitions of HeinrichFocke's Fa-61—Sikorsky went back to developing heli-copters. By 1939 he had created the VS-300, an ungain-ly looking contraption consisting of a sprawling baremetal frame mounting a single main rotor for lift and asmall-tail rotor for control. Although this "flying bed-spring" was not aesthetically pleasing and performedmore like a bucking bronco than a steady workhorse,it became the first practical American helicopter after its

initial free flight on 13 May 1940. Not long thereafter,the U.S. military became interested in helicopter devel-opment. In early 1942, Sikorsky won an unofficialcompetition by producing the VS-316. This two-place,single-main rotor helicopter was given the military des-ignation R-4 (R-1,-2, and-3 were competing designs byother manufacturers). It was soon followed byimproved versions labeled R-5 and R-6. By the end ofthe war more than 400 Sikorsky helicopters had beenbuilt. The U.S. Navy procured its first Sikorsky heli-copter, an Army R-4 given the designation HNS upontransfer in October 1943. Sikorsky-built helicoptershave been a mainstay of naval aviation ever since.Marines currently fly the Sikorsky three-engine CH-53Eheavy-lift transport helicopter, one of the largest heli-copters in the world.

FRANK N. PIASECKIFrank Piasecki, the son of an immigrant Polish tailor

born in 1919, was considered the "wonder boy" of earlyhelicopter development. By his 21st birthday he alreadyheld degrees in mechanical engineering from theUniversity of Pennsylvania and aeronautical engineer-ing from New York University. He began working as amechanic for Kellet Autogyro while a teenager thenbecame a designer with Platt-LePage after collegebefore branching off on his own. Piasecki developedthe second successful American helicopter using castoffauto parts and an outboard motor. He endeared himselfto Marine helicopter proponents with his theories ofhow tandem rotors could support very large or heavyloads, an innovation that promised to make ship-to-shore movement of complete units and bulky equip-ment when other machines of the day could lift only apilot and one or two others. Piasecki co-founded P.V.Engineering Forum, a consortium of aircraft designersinterested in rotary-wing flight and was the drivingforce behind that firm's most successful project, the PV-3. The PV-3 was a large, elongated, bent fuselage, tan-dem rotor transport helicopter; the first of a series nick-named "Flying Bananas." The PV-3 was unique becausethe Flying Banana was rated for eight passengers aswell as a crew of two. After its first flight in 1945, theNavy purchased 22 PV-3s (designated HRPs by theBureau of Aeronautics). The HRPs quickly establishedthe practicality of tandem rotors for heavy lift, andorders for improved models quickly poured in.Piasecki's notable early success was the famous H-21Workhorse, which was used by the Air Force as a res-cue craft and by the Army ("Shawnees") to haul troopsand cargo. The P.V. Engineering Forum became thePiasecki Helicopter Corporation in 1947, then a divisionof Vertol Aircraft, which in turn became a division ofBoeing Aircraft. Venerable Boeing-Vertol CH-46 SeaKnight assault helicopters, lineal descendants of thefirst Flying Banana have been the backbone of Marinehelicopter aviation for more than four decades and con-tinue to serve with the fleet to this day.

735

ARTHUR M.YOUNGThe brilliant, but somewhat eccentric, scion of a

wealthy Pennsylvania family, Arthur M. Young inventeda rotor stabilizer bar that allowed two-bladed rotors topower light utility helicopters. His invention enabledBell Helicopter Corporation to produce the two mostprolific helicopter models in history, each of whichremained in production for more than 30 years.

Young began developing his idea while employed byLawrence D. Bell's aircraft company, the same firm thatproduced the first U.S-built jet (the P-59 BellAiracomet) and the first supersonic aircraft (the X-1rocket plane). After 15 years of building models andresearching rotary-winged flight, Young perfected hisrevolutionary new concept. He knew that Sikorsky's tailrotor concept eliminated torque, but he wanted toimprove flight stability and reduce weight. His solutionwas a small counter-weighted stabilizer bar linkeddirectly to the rotor that functioned like a flywheel, adevice that kept the rotor blades independent from themovement of the fuselage. In 1941, he assigned hispatents to Bell Aircraft with an agreement to oversee theproduction of a few prototype Model-30 helicopters.The first of these rolled out at Gardenville, New York,in December 1942, and then made its first untetheredflight the following June. The second prototype lookedlike an automobile with its fully enclosed cabin and fourwheels. That aircraft was the first helicopter used to

transport a doctor on an emergency call, and it also res-cued a pair of fishermen stranded on an ice floe in 1945.The third prototype featured an advanced instrumentpanel, a bare metal tubular tail boom, and a distinctivePlexiglas bubble canopy.

Building on the lessons learned while improving theearly models, Young next developed the first full pro-duction Bell helicopter labeled the Model-47. Thismachine, first flown on 8 December 1945, was the firsthelicopter certified for sale by the Civil AeronauticsAdministration. It was quickly adopted as a training air-craft by the military under the Army designation H-13and the Navy designation HTL. The Navy Departmentpurchased 10 HTL-ls for evaluation in 1947. A dozenHTL-2s followed in 1949, with nine HTL-3s the nextyear. The HTL-4 was virtually identical to the HTL-3except for some internal mechanical improvements.Eventually, nine variants of the HTL saw naval service,and the Navy purchased more than 200 of thembetween 1947 and 1958. The Model-47 was so success-ful that the last HTLs were not stricken from the MarineCorps flight line until 1962, and H-13s were still in ser-vice with the U.S. Army well into the Vietnam War.

Modern-day Marines fly two descendants of the IITL,the Bell UH-1N Huey Twin utility helicopter and theheavily armed AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter.Both have rendered yeoman duty thus far and are slat-ed to continue naval service for the foreseeable future.

unique feature of the aircraft was aremovable forward canopy thatallowed access for two stretchersinside the cabin. This latter featureprotected injured passengers fromthe elements while enroute toadvanced medical care, a signifi-cant improvement over both theHO3S and HTL models. The HO5Salso possessed superior flight char-acteristics that made it a goodreconnaissance and observationaircraft. Unfortu-nately, its under-powered engine and some structur-al defects limited the aircraft's per-formance. By the end of July,VMO-6 mustered eight HO5S-ls inaddition to nine HTL-4s. Planscalled for the HO5S to completelyreplace the HTLs as soon as possi-ble. The number of HTLs steadilydeclined as time passed until onlyone HTL-4 remained when theceasefire was declared a little overa year later.

Throughout the remainder of its

tour, VMO-6 had a reputation forbeing a "happy ship." In the wordsof commanding officer Major Wal-lace J. Slappey, Jr.: "Morale wasextremely high. . . . The squadronwas loaded with gung-ho person-nel. Pilots were actually stealingflights from one another. . . . Theengineering department was out-standing, working round the clock

Every man pulled his weightby simply knowing what needed tobe done and doing it willingly."

From April 1952 until the arm-istice in July 1953 the helicoptersection of VMO-6 averaged about600 missions per month, usuallyflying Out between 200 and 300wounded. More than 1,000 mis-sions were mounted in two differ-ent months during the summer of1952 with the single month recordof 721 non-combat missions flownin September. Squadron recordsfor combat missions (375) andmedical evacuations (428) were

736

achieved in October 1952 duringintense fighting at the Hook whenthe Communists made their onlysuccessfl.il, albeit temporary, pene-tration of the Jamestown Line. InMay 1953, the helicopter sectionwas reorganized into three eche-lons: a liaison and medical evacua-tion flight assigned to the 1stMarine Division command post;the squadron headquarters andmost aircraft located at airfield A-9;and a maintenance crew in addi-tion to any "down" aircraft sta-tioned at Ascom City (A-33). In Mayand June, HO5S-1 helicopters fromVMO-6 served as standby planeguards in support of the MarLEx Iand II amphibious exercises.

Two HTLs and five HO5S-ls suf-fered major damage due opera-tional mishaps or crashed due tomechanical failures during thesquadron's stay in western Korea,and all HO5S-ls were grounded inJuly 1953 because of numerous

Aviator and Aircraft Losses in Korea, 1950-1953Crews Killed

btLt rrhur It Bancroft

TSgt .Joe L. Brand . .Ir.

\I.'gt Gilherr :\. Caudlt: . .Jr.

Capt David T. Gooden

lstLt Hohen . Longstaff

IstLI Charles B. ,\larino

Sgt Richard L. Parsdl

Capt Allen W. Huggles

J\laj Doil It Stitzel

Helicopter Losses

Date Unit Type BuAer 0 Cause

Operational mishap

Enemy rirc

Operational misha p

Operalional mishap

Enemy ri rc

Orerational i\lishap

perational mishap

Enemy fi re

peralional mish;tp

Enemy fire

Operational mish;tp

Opcr;nional mi,shap

Operational misha p

Operational mishap

Operalional mish;tp

Operalion;l! mi.shar

Operational mishap

1\ !ceha niea I fa ilu rl'

Operalional mishap

Operational mi.shap

En 'my rire

~lruClural failure

Operalional mi,shap

peration;l! mi,shap

perational mishap

J\!cehanieal failur '

Me °hanical failure

Enemy fire

1286r

12251Ll

l_r20

IInkno\\'n

12 8'-1

127 79H

127822

130112

12 92

122':;28

12 79

122521

1-2518

12251­

12 638

128032

121566

12'633

128902

121312

12 802

127781)

12 92

Unknown

11nknO\yn

UnknQ\'vn

11nkno\\'n

H03 -1

11035-1

H03 -1

1103S-1

H03 -1

IITL-ol

H03 -1

H03S-1

HTL-4

1ITL-Ll

HTL-3

IITL-Ll

HTL-4

H03S-1

HR -1

1IRS-1

HR -1

1103.'-1

HR -1

IITL­

HTL-4

IIRS-1

HTL-4

HTL-'-I

HRS-1

HRS-1

HR -1

IIO':;S-l

\'1\1 -0

HMR-161

Hlv1R-161

HMR-161

VMO-6

VMO-6

IILI-I (L'S ').

M -6\'1\10-6

Mo-6

VJ\IO-6

Mo-6

M -6VMO-o

MAG-33

VMO-o

VMO-6

VMO-o

HMR-161

II1\IR-161

HMR-161

1\IAlvIS-I_

HMR-161

V 10-0

Mo-6

12 ep 50

2':; cep .:;

29 ep 50

9 0\'':;0

3 Dec 50

27 Jan ':;1

12 Mar 51

13 pr':; 1

19 Apr -1

2 I Apr':; I

25 Aug 51

_8 Aug 51

17 ep 51

22 Sep ')1

28 ep-1

22 cl51

22 Oct 51

12Jan ')2

21 Jan 52

23 Jan ')2

7 Feb 52

1 rvbr ')2

14 Mar -2

17 lar,)2

27 May 52

12 Feb ')3

25 Mar 53

18 .luL 53

• lJ.S. avy hdicopter "on loan" lO VMO-6 -;\'ith one Navy pilot and one 1arine crewman on hoard.

737

stateside tail boom failures. Theonly combat loss occurred on 18July 1953 when an HO5S-1 pilotedby First Lieutenant Charles B.

Marino was hit by enemy antiair-craft fire while on an artillery spot-ting mission. The helicopter lostcontrol and crashed killing boththe pilot and the artillery observer.This was the last helicopter-relatedcombat casualty in Korea.

Ceasefire

At 1000 in the morning on 27July 1953, the United Nations andCommunist delegations sat downinside Panmunjorn's "Peace Pa-goda" to sign the formal ceasefireagreement that would bring an endto the fighting in Korea. The deedwas done in only a few minutes,and the guns fell silent a half-daylater, at 2000 that evening. It was,however, an uneasy peace.Neither side fully trusted the other.The fighting had stopped, but fewbelieved the war was really over.

The Marines did not stand downand were not going home tomarch in any victory parades asthey had in 1945. Instead, the 1stMarine Division was ordered toorganize post-armistice battle posi-tions and to establish a "no pass"line south of the DemilitarizedZone. The Marines were alsocharged with assisting in the finalprisoner exchange of the war,Operation Big Switch. This wouldhe a high-profile undertaking thatwould be conducted under thewatchful eyes of the internationalpress. Anticipating many of the for-mer prisoners would need medicalassistance, helicopters from HMR-161 stood by to carry litter patientsor those too weak to travel byambulance to the U.S. Army 11thEvacuation Hospital at Free-domVillage near Munsan-ni. Seriouslyinjured men were taken directly tothe hospital ships by helicopter or

were air evacuated to Japan byfixed-wing transport planes.

Even at this late date, Marinehelicopters in Korea were calledupon to perform another missionnever dreamed of by the earlyplanners at Quantico. This time theHRSs of HMR-161 provided thebest solution to a tangled diplo-matic knot. The Marines wereresponsible for the safety of non-repatriated enemy prisoners, Chi-nese and North Koreans, who didnot want to return home andwould instead be placed in thecustody of a neutral country, India.The problem was that Syng-manRhee, the president of the Republicof South Korea, refused permissionfor Indian troops to enter his coun-try. In the words of General MarkW. Clark, USA, the United Nationsfield commander: "We had to go togreat lengths to live up to ourpledge . . . that no Indian troopswould set foot on South Koreansoil. Therefore, we set up an airliftoperation, which carried morethan 6,000 Indians from the decksof our carriers off Inchon by heli-copter to the De-militarized Zone.It was a major undertaking whichjust about wore out our helicopterfleet."

Marine Helicopter TransportSquadron 161 carried on in Koreafor almost two more years. Its HRS-2s and-3s transported cargo, per-sonnel, and medical evacuees untilorders to prepare to leave Koreaarrived in late February 1955. Thesquadron moved from A-17 toAscom City and the helicoptersflew to Iwakuni, Japan, to preparefor the sea journey. On 12 March,HMR-162 officially as-sumedresponsibility for supporting the1st Marine Division in Korea. Bythat time part of the squadron hadalready departed on board theamphibious cargo ship Seminole(AKA 104) and the remaining per-sonnel, helicopters, and gear were

738

stowed on board the aircraft carri-er Wasp (CV 18) when it hid good-bye to the Far East and sailed forMarine Corps Air Station Kaneohe,Hawaii, on 26 March 1955.

Following the ceasefire, VMO-6's helicopter section continued toprovide liaison, observation, andmedical evacuation for the 1stMarine Division. The squadronalso supported training exercises.The last HTL-4 departed in August1953, and all HO5S-ls were backin action by October. Thesquadron reached a helicoptermilestone of note when Major JohnT. Dunlavy flew VMO-6's 55,000thflight hour in Korea during anHO5S-1 test hop on 14 May 1954.The squadron began standingdown on 4 Feb-ruary 1955, andfinally departed Korea when fourseparate increments sailed fromInchon for San Diego in April1955.

Contributions

The final accounting showednine Marine pilots and aircrewmen lost their lives during heli-copter operations in Korea, fourdue to enemy fire. Helicoptersproved to be generally moreresilient and far less vulnerable toenemy fire than most thought pos-sible prior to the test of combat—only six (all from VMO-6) of morethan two dozen helicopters de-stroyed during the war were shotdown while an uncounted numbersuffered some damage at thehands of the enemy hut returnedto base for repairs. The helicoptersection of VMO-6 flew 22,367 mis-sions including 7,067 medicalevacuations in 35 months of com-bat flying. During its time in thecombat zone, HMR-161 logged19,639 flights (4,928 combat and14,711 non-combat), transported60,046 people, evacuated 2,748seriously wounded, and offloaded

7,554,336 pounds of cargo.Marine Observation Squadron 6

was awarded a individual U.S.Presidential Unit Citation andshared two others as an organiccomponent of senior commands.In addition, the squadron receiveda Navy Unit Commendation, anArmy Distinguished Unit Citation,and three Korean Presidential UnitCitations for its actions in Korea.Marine Helicopter TransportSquadron 161 was recognized forits participation as a component ofcommands that were awarded oneU.S. Presidential Unit Citation, aNavy Unit Commendation, andone Korean Presidential Unit Ci-tation.

Some notable early Marine heli-copter pilots met mixed fates aftertheir combat service. First Lieu-tenant Gustave Lueddeke suc-cumbed to poliomyelitis not longafter returning to HMX-1 at Quan-tico, Virginia. Major ArmondDelalio was killed during a testflight when his specially config-ured HRS caught fire and crashedat Patuxent River Naval Air Station,Maryland. First Lieutenant LloydEngelhardt and Captain GeneMorrison each commanded MarineMedium Helicopter Squadron 161as lieutenant colonels in the 1960s.Morrison, in fact, got to put intopractice the helicopter combat tac-tics and techniques he pioneeredin Korea when he led thesquadron during its deployment toVietnam in 1965. BrigadierGeneral Edward C. Dyer andColonel Keith B. Mc-Cutcheonboth sat on the influentialHogahoorn Board that restructuredthe Fleet Marine Force in 1956.The board recommended that allMarine divisional equipment be airtransportable and entire assaultbattalion landing teams be helilift-ed ashore to secure beachheadsusing vertical assault techniques.Captain Victor Armstrong and

months of combat flying.

Colonel Mc-Cutcheon both rose tothe highest aviation post in theMarine Corps. McCutcheon wasthe director of aviation on the eveof the Vietnam era and then laterboth he and Armstrong held thepost of deputy chief of staff (air)as major generals—McCutcheonfrom 1966 to 1970 and Armstrongin 1975. Lieutenant GeneralMcCutcheon was actually slated tobecome the first Marine aviator towear four stars on active duty untilhe was tragically felled by cancerimmediately after commandingMarine forces in Vietnam.

Much like that first MarineHO3S that guided the rescue partyto the mired amphibious jeep inthe marsh at Quantico in 1948,VMO-6 and HMR-161 led the wayfor helicopters in the other

739

Services. The United States Armyowes a salute to the Marines forconceptualizing and testing theprinciples of modern airmobilewarfare. The Army had long beeninterested in rotary-winged aircraftand actually used some primitivehelicopters during World War II.The Marine Corps, however, pio-neered doctrine, employed fullhelicopter units in combat, anddeveloped hands-on tactical con-cepts in Korea. Phi b-31, written atQuantico, Virginia, before theMarines even had a helicoptersquadron, is arguably the forerun-ner of today's airmobile doctrine.According to Air Force historianRobert F. Futrell: "Army officerswere [so] impressed by the utilityof Marine helicopters in Korea[that] General Ridgway asked the

HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov-Dec5l

I-IIl'IR-161 conducted its first aerial medical evacuation on 13 September 1951.Although medical evacuation was a secondary mission, the squadron carriedmore than 2,000 seriously wounded men to various locations for advanced med-ical care. Its sister helicopters of VMO-6 evacuated more than 7,000 during 35

Department of the Army to pro-vide four Army helicopter trans-port battalions, each with 280 heli-

cantly scaled down (to only twocompanies), but within a decadethe Army went on to create an air-mobile division whose assault ele-ments could be helilifted intocombat. The Navy and the AirForce took their cues from VMO-6

whose light utility helicopters per-formed search and rescue, med-ical evacuation, liaison, and recon-

paralleled the needs of thoseServices.

Today the legacy of those earlyhelicopter pioneers of HMX-1,VMO-6, and HMR-161 lives onwithin the Marine Corps as well.Marine skeptics were silenced by

helicopter performance in combat,and helicopters thereafter becamea full partner in naval aviationrather than the "stepchildren" theyhad previously been. It is a tributeto the dedication, bravery, andskill of Marine helicopter air andground crews in Korea that heli-copters are vital components ofthe modern Marine air-groundteam. Current Marine helicopterpilots are mounted in the directdescendants of those simple ro-tary-winged machines that tra-versed the Korean skies from 1950to 1953: Bell UH-1 "Hueys" andAH-1 Sea Cobras were sired by theHTL "eggbeaters," the tandem-rotor Boeing-Vertol CH-46 SeaKnights are advanced develop-ments of Frank Piasecki's HRP"flying banana," and the massiveSikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallionsevolved from the much smallerHO3S-1 "pinwheels." Currently,the tilt-rotor Boeing MV-22 Os-prey is making true the vision ofdesigner Frank Piasecki about thefuture of rotary-winged flightvoiced a half century earlier: "Themost dramatic progress will heincreased speed of vertical-lift air-craft. This will come from twodirections: helicopter designerswill add speed to their machines;conversely, airplane designers willadd vertical-lift capabilities to theirhigh-speed aircraft. The result willbe a blending of flight intomachines fully capable of bothhelicopter flight as we know it andhigh-speed flight."

While we cannot be certainexactly what the future holds, wecan safely state that vertical as-sault and rotary-winged assaultsupport will remain mainstays ofMarine Corps doctrine well intothe 21st century. With this inmind, we should always remem-ber this is due to the achievementsof the Korean "whirlybirds" thatled the way.

copters." His request was signifi- naissance—missions that closely

Col Keith B. McCutcheon became one of the most versatile and best-knownMarine aviators during his career. He was an innovator and theoretician as wellas a doer, and, like his hero MajGen Roy S. Geiger, he commanded both air andground units in combat.

National Archives Photo (UsMc) 127-N-A132705

740

About the Author returned to teaching high school for the nextthree decades; intermittently, he served as an acti-

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald ]. Brown, USMCR vated reservist traveling to Korea among other(Ret), is a freelance writer, a high school foot- places. He is a combat veteran of both the

ball coach, and an educational consultant. The Vietnam and Persian Gulf conflicts. He spent 20author of several official histories (A BriefHistory years as a reservist with Mobilization Trainingof the 14th Marines, With Marines in Operation Unit DC 7, the Reserve unit that supports theProvide Comfort, and With Marine Forces Afloat History and Museums Division. Lieutenantin Desert Shield and Desert Storm), he was also a Colonel Brown commanded the training unitcontributing essayist for the best-selling book, The before retiring from the Marine Corps Reserve inMarines, and was the sole author of A Few Good 1996. He is the author of an earlier pamphlet inMen: The Fighting Fifth Marines. After almost four this series, Counteroffensive: U.S. Marines fromyears active duty from 1968 to 1971, Brown Pohang to No Name Line.

SourcesTh mo t important lIrce

u d in pr paring th pamphlelar the ariou official rvichi "tori and everal mon-graph produc d by the Marin

orp a' well a primaly doeu­m nt and ral hi tOIY inter-vi held by the Marin CorpHistori al C nt r locat d inWa hingron D.C. Ie ted e­onclary w rk were al 0 1I d topro ide ont xt and te hill alinformaLion.

Th tarting point for lhitudy of Marine Corp. h licopt r

operati n in K r a wa th fi evolum Hi tory of .. MarineOperatiolr in Korea 19 0-1953in luding: Lynn Montro and

apt i holas A. Canzona, ThePu al7 Perimeter, v. 1 (Wa hing­ton D. .: Hi torical Branch G-3Divi ion HQMC 1954· LynnMontro s and Capt ich la .

anz na The fnchon- eoulCampaign . 2 ( ashingtonD..: Hi tori al Bran h G-3Di . i n HQMC 19-5); LynnMontro and Capt i h la A.

anz na 77Je Cho in Re ervoirCampaigl7, v. 3 (Wa hington,D.. : IIistori al Bran h, -3Di i ion HQMC 195 . Lynn10nrro 1aj Hubard D.

Ku kka and Maj r orman .Hick The Ea t-Cel7tral Front, .4 a hington, D.C.: Hi toricalBran h G-3 Divi i n, HQM ,1962); LtCol Pat Meid and MajJam M. Yingling, Operation in\Vest Korea . 5 (Wa hing-lon,

D.C.: Hi. torical Di 1 Ion HQMC,19 2). Oth r official hi toriecon ulted w re: Rob rt F. FutrellThe 17 ited tate. Air Force inKorea, 1950-1953 a hing-lonD.C.: Office of Air Force Hi tory19 3); and Jam . Fi Id Jr.,History of l7ited Late avalOperations: Korea (Wa hingronD.C.: avy Hi tOlY Divi ion1962).

Monographs u. ed in Iud d:apt John C. hapin, Fire

Brigade: .. Marines in thePu an Perimeter a hingtonD.C.: Hi tory and Mu umDivi ion HQMC, 2000; LtColKenneth]. lifford Progr andPllrpO e: A DeuelopmentalHi tory of the U. . Marine C01p(Washington D. .: HistolY andMuseum Di i ion HQMC,1973); Maj n John P. Condon,Corsairs To Panther:Marine Aviation il7 KoreaWa hington D.C.: Hi t ry and

Mu um Di i ion, HQ C,2002)- LtCol Eugen . Rawlins,Marine' and Helicopters, 1946­1962 (Washington, D.C.: Hi 'toryand Mu ellm Divi i n, IIQMC,1976); LtC I ary . Parker, AHistory of Marine MediumHelicopter quadran 161 ( a h­ington, D..: Hi t ry andMu eum Di i ion IIQMC19 8) and LtCol Gary . Parkerand Maj Frank M. Barba, Jr., AHi lOry oj Marine Ob ervationquadron ix ( a hington D.C.:

Hi tOlY and Mu urn Di i ion,HQMC 1982).

741

Other b k re iewed incIud­d: dr Malcolm \1 . Cagle and

Cdr Frank . Manson, The ea\ ar in Korea (Annapoli : U..

aval In titut, 195)' 1R b It D. H inl oldiers of theea: The .. Marine Corp,

1775-1962 (Annapoli: U..aval In titut, 19(2); Rob It

Jack on, Air War KoreaOs la WI: Motorbooks 1m r-

national, 1998); Allan R. Mill tlemper Fideli : The Hi tory oftherUted tate Marine Corp

( ew York: Macmillan 19 0 .Lynn M n-tro Caval,:v of theky ( ew York: Harper and

Brother, 195)- ayne 111tza,H-13 ioux (Carrollton, TX:quadron/ ignal Book 1995)

Edwin H. humon, 77Je nitedtate Marines: The Fir t Two

Hundred Year. ( w York:iking, 19 ); Gordon an-

bor ugh and Pet r M. B w rUnited tate j avy Aircraft illce1911 (London: Putnam ero-nautical Book 1976); and

arr n R. Young TheHelicopter Alexandria, 'A:Tim -Life Book 19 2).

Hi tory and Mu urnDi i ion oral hi t ry tran riptsprovid d ob ervation b : LtColClifford . Broka III· Capl

orman G. E r' Maj in nt].G tt chalk; Capt Andre 1.

c i ar; Capt Gen .MorrL on; Maj Elton Mu Ll r'

apt lar n . Parkins; 1 tLtJohn L. cart; and 2dLt PatrickG. i err.

Back Cover: The device reproduced on theback cover is the oldest military insignia incontinuous use in the United States. It firstappeared, as shown here, on Marine Corpsbuttons adopted in 1804. With the starschanged to five points, the device has con­tinued on Marine Corps buttons to the pres­ent day.