Marines about the breakup of thecombat-proven Marine air-groundteam. These concerns wereacknowledged, but GeneralPartridge insisted that a vastlyincreased enemy air threat andplans to initiate a deep air interdic-tion campaign demanded new aircontrol measures. Unfortunately,Marine reservations about this sys-tem were soon justified by eventson the battlefield. After the jointoperations center took over,Marine air and ground comman-ders chafed at what they consid-ered inordinate delays and inap-propriate use of aircraft. The prob-lems were so serious that everycommander of the 1st MarineDivision (Generals Smith, Puller,and Thomas) filed formal com-plaints about the quality, quantity,and timeliness of close air support.

Late January and early February1951 were devoted to mainte-nance, training, and movementback to Korea. General Harrisopened his command post at Itamiand MAG-33 completed its tempo-rary move to Bofu during the thirdweek of January. The only Marinecombat sorties during the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing stand-downfrom 16 to 23 January were con-ducted by VMF-212 on board theBataan. When the land-basedCorsair squadrons returned toaction, most sorties were flown in

support of Eighth Army units con-ducting Operations Thunderboltand Roundup in western Korea.This was because the 1st MarineDivision needed few air strikesduring the "guerrilla hunt" atPohang, but on 26 January MAG-12 aircraft flying from K-9 (PusanEast) did manage to conduct closeair support strikes for the divisionfor the first time since the Chosincampaign.

The next month saw the returnof the wing to Korea. In mid-February, K-i at Pusan became thenew home of MAG-12, and MAG-33 moved from Japan to K-3 atPohang. The night fighters ofVMF(N)-513 and -542 moved to K-1 and K-3 respectively. MajorDonald S. Bush's task-organized"Marine Photographic Unit" oper-ated its reconnaissance planesfrom K-i under the auspices of theAir Force's 543d Tactical SupportGroup. Thus, all Marine tacticalsquadrons were back in Korea intime for the upcoming U.N. springoffensives.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wingflew most of its sorties in supportof Eighth Army units duringOperation Killer, but OperationRipper found the Marine air-ground team once more in actionas wing aircraft cleared the way forthe 1st Marine Division's rapidadvance from Hoengsong to

Hongchon. Responding to intensecriticism from ground comman-ders, General Partridge reluctantlygranted General Harris at least 40sorties per day in support of thegravel-crunching Marine infantry.In the way of organizationalchanges, VMF-312 became the car-rier squadron when it replacedVMF-212 on board the Bataan,VMR- 152 established a five-planeforward echelon at Itami, and anadditional Marine Air ControlSquadron (MACG-2) was sent toKorea. The efficient performanceof Lieutenant Colonel John F.

Kinney's refurbished Panther jetsof VMF-311 for armed reconnais-sance and close air support was apleasant surprise after their inaus-picious introduction to combat.

There were several importantcommand changes in April andMay. Lieutenant Colonel Fontanadeparted MAG-33 on 31 March andLieutenant Colonel Richard A.

Beard, Jr., became acting comman-der until Colonel Guy M. Morrowarrived on 9 April. When MajorDonald P. Frame was killed inaction on 3 April, the"Checkerboard" executive officer,Major Frank H. Presley, assumedcommand of VMF-312. MajorDavid W. McFarland took overVMO-6 on 5 April. On 3 May,Major Charles M. Kunz replacedMajor Donald L. Clark who hadcommanded VMF-323 since 1

March. On 16 May, LieutenantColonel James W. Poindexter tookthe reins of VMF-214 from MajorEdward Ochoa and ColonelStanley W. Trachta assumed com-mand of MAG-12. On the 28th,Brigadier General Thomas J.Cushman became commandinggeneral of the wing when GeneralHarris rotated back to the UnitedStates. Cushman was a veteran avi-ator who had commanded the 4thMarine Base Defense Wing in theCentral Pacific during World War II

Panther jets qf VMF-31 1 are gassed up at K-3 (Pohang). Refueling operationswere a slow and laborious process. Fuel had to be transferred ashore in landingshps, hand pumped into fuel trucks, and then hauled out to the airfield.

National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A130478

399

and brought MAG-33 to Korea inAugust 1950.

Marine air was used all alongthe U.N. front during the CCFSpring Offensive, and close airsupport played an important, if notdecisive, role during that hectictime. Fifth Air Force regularly usedMarine planes not earmarked tosupport the Marine division forarmed reconnaissance and battle-field interdiction beginning in lateApril. On 20 April, a pair of VMF-312 pilots flying off the Bataan,Captain Phillip C. Delong and FirstLieutenant Harold D. Daigh,encountered four North KoreanYakovlev YAK-9 fighters over cen-tral Korea. Delong, a double acewith 11 kills during World War II,shot down two of them. Daighknocked one YAK out of the skyand left the other one trailingsmoke as it fled north. These werethe first Marine aerial victories inKorea, and they were among thevery few kills scored by Marinesnot on exchange duty with the U.S.Air Force or flying a night interceptmission. Seventy-five Marine air-craft, Panthers and Corsairs, partic-ipated in the largest air raid to dateas part of a 300-plane sweep thathit Communist airfields at Sinuijujust south of the Yalu River on 9May.

One reason for pulling the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing away fromthe 1st Marine Division was thatthe Fifth Air Force instituted an all-Out effort to halt enemy trafficsouth with a deep interdictioncampaign codenamed OperationStrangle. The goals of the cam-paign were to cut enemy supplyroutes, which were channelized bythe mountainous terrain, and todestroy supply columns halted byswollen streams. Bomb damageassessments credited the wing withthe destruction of more than 300enemy troops, more than 200trucks, about 80 boxcars, and 6

during much of World War II.

locomotives. The price of this suc-cess was, however, high; theMarines lost a plane a day duringthe first week. Much to the dismayof ground and aviation Marinesalike, close air support became asecondary mission. This change inpriority abruptly cut the number ofsorties allocated to ground unitsalmost in half. In addition, cum-bersome joint operations centerrequest procedures often delayedair strikes for excessively long peri-ods of time. Generals Puller andThomas successively complaineddirectly to the Fifth Air Force com-mander, and Lieutenant GeneralLemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Com-manding General, Fleet MarineForce, Pacific, took the issue upwith the theater commander, all tono avail. The controversial jointoperations center control and allo-cation procedures remained inforce. The official Marine Corpshistory describes the questionablesuccess of the Operation Strangledeep interdiction campaign:"There can be little doubt[Operation Strangle] added enor-mously to the Communists' logisti-cal problem. It is equally certainthat . . . . their combat units werenever at a decisive handicap for

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lack of ammunition and other sup-plies [so] air interdiction alone wasnot enough to knock a determinedadversary out of the war."

Despite these problems, manyinnovations were instituted inKorea. In addition to well-prac-ticed daylight air-ground combatprocedures, new techniquesimproved nighttime close air sup-port. Marine R4D transport planeswere put to use dropping flaresthat illuminated the battlefield andallowed VMF(N)-513 to deliveraccurate night close air support.This experiment was so successfulthat the U.S. Navy provided thewing with four-engine, long-rangePB4Y Privateer bombers, nick-named "Lamplighters," whose big-ger payloads and longer lingertime were put to good use.

In characterizing Marine air sup-port from January to May 1951,Marine aviators provided crucialsupport to their ground brethrenthroughout. Venerable per-formers—both aircraft and person-nel—from World War II once againproved their mettle, and new typesof aircraft and pilots were intro-duced to combat. The groundMarines were well served by theattached observation squadron,

lstMarDiv Historical Diaiy Photo Supplement, Jan-Feh5i

A Marine 105mm howitzer sets up for afire mission in the Andong area. Thetrusty "105" was the backbone of the 11th Marines in Korea, just as it had been

Gulf

which directed artillery fire andclose air support, evacuatedwounded, and brought in emer-gency supplies. Transports deliv-ered badly needed replacementsand carried returning veteranssafely home as well as droppingvital supplies by parachute to for-ward units. Aerial reconnaissancekept ground commandersinformed of enemy movementsand locations. The pilots of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing relentlesslyattacked the enemy at every possi-ble opportunity, and Marine closeair support was the envy of everyUnited Nations Command com-mander. The appearance of Marineair on the scene almost alwaysforced the enemy to rush for cover,and occasionally caused him tosurrender or abandon key posi-tions. It was with great reluctancethat Marine fliers were divertedfrom their close air support mis-sion, and all Marines becameextremely frustrated when thatvital support was gradually dimin-ished due to circumstances beyondtheir control.

Combat and Service Support

The 11th Marines was the 1stMarine Division artillery regiment.

Commanded by LieutenantColonel Carl A. Youngdale andthen Colonel Joseph L. Winecoff,the regiment mustered 54 M2A1105mm towed howitzers (18 eachin the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions)while the 4th Battalion had 18 M2155mm towed howitzers. The105mm units were most often usedfor direct support with one artillerybattalion assigned to fire exclusive-ly for a particular rifle regiment,and the 155mm were most often ingeneral support so they could usetheir longer range and heavier fire-power to the best advantage. This

was not always true, because theU.S. Marines provided artillery sup-port for the 1st KMC Regiment aswell as its organic units, and whenall four rifle regiments were on themain line of resistance everyartillery battalion had to be usedfor direct support. The nature ofthe fighting in Korea dictated thatadditional firepower was neededso the 11th Marines had Battery C,1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battalion, per-manently attached. Marine unitswere often supported by U.S.Army artillery as well. It was com-mon for the corps commander tofurnish at least one self-propelledhowitzer battalion and a battery of8-inch heavy guns to the 1stMarine Division for additional fire-power. Army artillery units work-ing with the 11th Marines at vari-ous times included the 17th FieldArtillery, the 92d Armored FieldArtillery Battalion, the 96thArmored Field Artillery Battalion,and the 987th Armored FieldArtillery Battalion. Offensiveartillery missions included support-ing maneuver units, neutralizingenemy fire, and isolating the bat-tlefield. On defense, artillery firewas used effectively against CCFmass infantry assaults. Forward

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jan-Feb5l

A tank commander carefully scans the hills near Pohang for signs of the enemy.Pershing tanks like the one shown were the Jbre runners of the atton" tanks thatsewed as the Marines' main battle tanks in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian

Marine engineers construct a bridge near the Kansas Line. Road constructionand bridge building took the lion's share of the 1st Engineer Battalion effort inthe spring of 1951.

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51

401

called to remove enemy mines.

observation teams at the leadingedge of the battlefield controlledmost artillery fires, but airbornespotters flying in light observationplanes also sometimes directedthem. The main problems encoun-tered by the cannoneers of the11th Marines were transportingheavy guns over poor roads andintermittent ammunition shortages.Generals Ridgway and Van Fleetpreferred to "use steel instead ofmen" and artillery was the favoredcombat arm under both men.Ammunition expenditure wasmuch heavier in Korea than duringWorld War II, and shooting severalunits of fire on a single missionwas referred to as a "Van Fleetload" by Marine artillerymen.Unfortunately, this practice some-times drained carefully hoardedammunition caches that were noteasy to replenish, so orders todeliver specific amounts of unob-served ("harassment and interdic-

tion") fire became a bone of con-tention between the Eighth Armyand the Marines.

The 1st Tankthe commandColonel Harry T.vided excellent combat support.The battalion was divided into fourcompanies (A, B, C, and D) eachwith 17 medium tanks. These com-panies were usually placed indirect support of a specific rifleregiment. It was not uncommonfor five-vehicle tank platoons toaccompany combat patrols. Whenthe regiment they supported wasin reserve, the tankers tried to usethat time for maintenance and rest.The super-accurate 90mm guns ofthe M-26 Pershing tanks were par-ticularly well suited for long range"bunker busting" and were occa-sionally used to supplementartillery fires (much to the chagrinof the tankers who felt this practicewas a deplorable misuse of their

402

point target guns). Tanks were alsosometimes pressed into service asarmored ambulances In additionto the modern M-26 Pershing mainbattle tanks, there were also adozen or so World War IT-vintageM-4A3 Sherman bulldozer tankswith 105mm short-barrel guns andfront-mounted plows used formine clearing, hasty engineering,and tank recovery as well as firesupport. Although Korea's moun-tainous terrain was generallyunsuited for armor operations, fre-quent use was made of separateaxis attacks whereby the road-bound tanks in the valleys sup-ported infantry units as theyworked their way along ridgelines.During the CCF Spring Offensivetanks were used to protect lines ofcommunication and river crossingsor cover nearby flatlands with theirmachine guns and main guns.

The 1st Engineer Battalion, com-manded by Lieutenant ColonelJohn H. Partridge, provided ser-vices including rebuilding airstrips,constructing and repairing roadsand bridges, emplacing and clear-ing mines, demolitions, manningwater points, and preparing fieldfortifications. Although the 1St

Engineers did all of these things,Lieutenant Colonel Partridge'snumber one priority throughoutthe spring of 1951 was keeping themain supply route open. The 1stEngineer Battalion spent most ofits time and energy constructing,improving, and maintaining thesupply route. Korea's primitiveroadways were neither designednor built to meet the demands of amajor modern military force. Therewere few hard-surface roads, andthere was no true road network.Most roads were little more thannarrow dirt pathways that simplyran between local villages by themost direct route. Almost all road-ways were poorly drained, inade-quately bridged, and unpaved.

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51

Marine combat engineers remove a land mine on a road near Hongchon.Trained to install and maintain friendly minefields, the engineers were the first

Battalion, underof Lieutenant

Milne, also pro-

Snow and ice hampered move-ment in cold weather, the dry sea-son choked the roads with dust,and spring thaws and summerrains often turned them intoimpassable bogs. Unfortunately,the need for constant road mainte-nance sometimes required forego-ing other vital engineer functions,which were then left to the combatunits.

Logistics—the acquisition anddistribution of the means to wagewar—encompassed the supply,maintenance, medical, transporta-tion, and administrative servicesnecessary to support combat oper-ations. Although the efforts of themen who furnish the beans, bul-lets, and bandages are often over-looked, logistics are no less impor-tant than tactics in determining theoutcome of a battle because—according to an old militaryadage— "logistics set operationallimits." This was particularly true inKorea where Marine logisticiansfaced a wide array of challenges.Most short-term problems were theresult of Korea's poorly developedinfrastructure, rugged terrain,inhospitable weather, the rapidlychanging tactical situation (whichsaw the entire 1st Marine Divisiongo from offense to defense withina matter of hours on several occa-sions), and the wide physical sep-aration of Marine air and groundelements. Unfortunately, somenagging problems also stemmedfrom doctrinal shortcomings. In1951, U.S. joint operations did notfeature the smooth multi-Serviceintegration common amongtoday's branches of the ArmedForces. The Marine air-ground taskforce concept was not developed,hence, there was no single Marinecomponent commander in Koreaso the Marine air and ground com-bat elements had no commonsuperior below the theater com-mander. For the most part Marine

ground and aviation unitsremained separate logistical enti-ties operating without centraldirection because no equivalent ofVietnam's Force Logistics Com-mand or modern force service sup-port groups emerged in Korea.Luckily, Lieutenant GeneralLemuel Shepherd, the command-ing general of Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, was an energetic leaderwho took an active role. His force-ful suggestions and direct interven-tion unclogged many bottlenecksand kept the personnel and supplypipelines flowing smoothly.

Difficult terrain, bad weather,and the inadequate road and railnetworks were physical obstaclesnot easily overcome, but doctrinalissues and equipment shortagesalso created logistics problems.The 1st Marine Division, specifical-ly structured for amphibious war-fare, was neither organized norequipped for sustained inlandoperations like those on Korea'sCentral Front. Unfortunately, thissimple fact was either misunder-stood or ignored by the high com-mand. Repeated requests to keepthe Marines close to the coast inorder to minimize logistical con-cerns fell upon deaf ears at EighthArmy and United NationsCommand headquarters. Servicesupport challenges were furthercomplicated by the physical sepa-ration of the 1st Marine Divisionand the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.Additionally, during the spring of1951 the 1st Marine Division pro-vided much of the logistical sup-port for the Korean Marines.

Logistical support in Korea wasa massive multi-Service operation;it was a complicated logisticalmaze, one not easily traversed bythe uninitiated, that existedbecause Marine units had to drawupon the resources of all fourServices as well as indigenouslabor. At the lowest level the

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Marines relied upon their ownrobust organic service and supportunits. The 1st Combat ServiceGroup functioned as an intermedi-ate clearing house and establishedliaison with the other Services. TheMarines drew upon Eighth Armyfor theater-level support and fur-ther relied upon Navy and Marineservice support from PacificCommand. The Marines alsoobtained support from theRepublic of Korea.

The first option when answeringlogistics challenges, of course, wasto make the most effective possibleuse of organic assets. 1st MarineDivision logistics units includedCommander Howard A. Johnson's,and after 23 January, CommanderClifford A. Stevenson's 1st MedicalBattalion; Lieutenant Colonel OlinL. Beall's (Lieutenant Colonel JohnR. Barreiro, Jr., commanded after16 March) 1st Motor TransportBattalion; Lieutenant Colonel CarlJ. Cagle's 7th Motor TransportBattalion; Major Lloyd 0. Williams'1st Ordnance Battalion; the 1stService Battalion (commanded suc-cessively by Lieutenant ColonelCharles L. Banks, Colonel Gould P.Groves, Lieutenant Colonel HoraceE. Knapp, and Lieutenant ColonelWoodrow M. Kessler); and 1stShore Party Battalion (LieutenantColonel Henry P. "Jim" Crowe until10 May and thereafter commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Horace H.Figuers). The 1st Marine Divisionwas specifically tailored foramphibious operations, but inKorea the specific needs of themoment very often supersededdoctrine. Amphibious combat sup-port units, such as the 1stAmphibian Tractor Battalion andthe 1st Armored AmphibianBattalion, could not be fully uti-lized by the 1st Marine Divisionwhen it operated far from thecoast, so one amphibian tractorcompany provided ship-to-shore

Saving Lives

No cry for help on the battlefields of Korea carriedmore urgency than the plea "Corpsman up!"This chilling entreaty invariably meant that a

Marine was seriously wounded. Within moments, amedical corpsman would come scurrying forwardthrough a hail of fire to lend life-saving assistance, oftenconducted in full view of the enemy and done at greatperil to the caregiver.

The U.S. Navy provided medical (doctors, nurses, andcorpsmen) and morale (chaplains) personnel to theUnited States Marine Corps. The chaplains were knownby a variety of names that indicated their particular sta-tus or religious affiliation; "Father," Rabbi," "Reverend,"and "Padre" were among the most common nicknames.On the other hand, Navy medical personnel—from thelowest ranking hospital apprentice all the way up to thechief surgeon of the Medical Corps—were simplyknown as "Doc" to the Marines they served.

Most medical personnel assigned to the 1st MarineDivision in Korea came from the 1st Medical Battalion,which was successively commanded by NavyCommanders Howard A. Johnson and Clifford A.

Stevenson. That parent unit was divided into a

Headquarters and Service Company and five medical

companies—two hospital companies and three collect-ing and clearing companies. Heaclquarters and ServiceCompany (Commander William S. Francis andLieutenant Commander Gustare T. Anderson, succes-sively) provided administrative and support personneland functions. Hospital Companies A (CommandersBuron E. Bassham, Philip L. Nova, and James A.Addison, respectively) and B (Lieutenant CommandersJames A. Kaufman) were staffed and equipped to oper-ate one 200-bed hospital each. The three collecting andclearing companies were: Company C (CommandersHarold A. Streit and Lewis E. Rector), Company D(Lieutenant Commanders Gustare T. Anderson andDaniel M. Pino), and Company E (LieutenantCommanders Charles K. Holloway and John H.Cheffey). Generally speaking, Company C worked indirect support of the 5th Marines, Company D in sup-port of the 1st Marines, and Company E in support ofthe 7th Marines during the spring of 1951.

The lowest rung on the medical evacuation chain wasthe individual hospital corpsman. Generally, two juniorratings of the 40 corpsmen assigned to each infantry bat-talion accompanied each rifle platoon into action. Theprimary jobs of these men, most of whom had only six

404

National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-Al 55354

weeks of advanced medical training under their belts,were to stabilize wounded men and to supervise the ini-tial evacuation process. Under fire on the battlefieldthey would conduct a hasty exam and apply necessaryfirst aid measures (start the breathing, stop the bleeding,stabilize or bandage the crucial area, and treat forshock). Once this was done, the corpsman wouldarrange for evacuation. Usually, this meant four Marinesor Korean litter bearers would carry the wounded manto the nearest collection point (usually the companycommand post) for transportation to the battalion aidstation. The 28 chaplains assigned to the 1st MarineDivision often played a critical role in this stage as well.They frequently lent a hand as stretcher-bearers oradministered first aid in addition to performing last ritesor building up the sagging spirits of the wounded.

Two Navy doctors, usually lieutenants, manned thebattalion aid station (called the BAS), along with 10 orso enlisted corpsmen headed by a chief pharmacistsmate. Incoming casualties were quickly inspected by anexperienced corpsman so they could be categorized fortreatment precedence ("triage"). The BAS facility wassimple: usually an open air or tent operating arena,where rudimentary "meatball" surgery was performedwhile the patient's stretcher was placed upon a pair ofsawhorses. This procedure saved time and minimizedthe amount of uncomfortable shifting. The battalionmedics applied either life-saving surgery or gave justenough treatment to get the casualty ready for furtherevacuation.

The collecting and clearing companies then evacuat-ed patients from the BAS to one of the 60-bed mobilefield hospitals (in Army parlance, a MASH; to the navalservices, depending upon which letter company wasused, the nomenclature was something like "CharlieMed"). Here the facilities and care were moreadvanced. Surgical teams treated non-evacuablesrequiring resuscitation or immediate surgery then sentthem on their way to semi-permanent division hospitals,which provided definitive care and short stay hospital-ization. Extreme cases that were stable but could notreturn to duty in the near future were sent on to theater-level hospitals from whence they usually were returnedto the United States.

Two intermediate steps in the evacuation processcame into their own during the Korean War, use of hos-pital ships and aerial evacuation. Prior to the SecondWorld War, hospital ships were used only to transportbadly wounded men home. During World War II, how-ever, hospital ships could often be found waiting off thelanding beaches to provide a safe haven for treatingcasualties incurred during the opening rounds ofamphibious operations. In Korea it was common prac-tice to keep at least one hospital ship nearby at all times.These Haven- and Comfort-class vessels mustered about

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-5C358063

150 officers and more than 1,000 enlisted men to manthe operating rooms and healing wards which couldaccommodate several hundred critical short-termpatients at one time. This practice, combined with theincreasing use of helicopters for medical evacuations,ensured rapid advanced medical treatment was avail-able. Several Haven- and Comfort-class hospital shipsrotated station watches during the spring of 1951, andthe USS Consolation (AH 15) was fitted with a heli-copter landing pad—an adaptation that soon thereafterbecame standard practice.

Many view the advent of rotary-wing aircraft as themost important aviation innovation during the KoreanConflict. Inevitably, the nimble helicopters soonbecame an important means of medical evacuationbecause they could fly directly to the forward areas,pick up wounded men from previously inaccessiblelocations, then deliver them to an advanced care facili-ty within a matter of minutes rather than hours or days.Helicopters could land atop the mountains and ridgesthat dotted Korea eliminating the rough handling andlong movements necessary for overland evacuation.Unfortunately, the Sikorsky HO3S-1 could carry onlyone stretcher case at a time (and the patient's lowerextremities would have to extend out the rear hatch),limiting their utility as an evacuation machine. By thespring of 1951, the bubble-topped Bell HTL, whichmounted a pair of stretchers on each side and couldcarry a sitting evacuee as well, augmented these oldermachines. Eventually, even more capable evacuationhelicopters (Sikorsky HO5S and HRS) made their way toKorea. Fixed-wing observation aircraft were sometimespressed into service for emergency evacuations as well.Twin- and four-engine fixed-wing transport planes wereused to deliver men to in-country theater-level facilities,hospitals in Japan, or to take the badly wounded backto the States.

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transportation at Pohang while theremaining tracked landing vehicleswere used by Eighth Army for non-Marine support. The 1st EngineerBattalion often used Shore Partymotor transport and engineerassets. In addition, U.S. Armytransportation units or trucks ontemporary loan from other Marineunits often reinforced the motortransport battalions. Navy SeabeeConstruction Battalions regularlyfurnished construction engineersupport, Army engineer assetswere often temporarily attached toMarine units, the U.S. Air Forceprovided equipment and materialsfor air base construction and main-tenance, and the Korean ServiceCorps furnished laborers.

Colonel John N. Cook, Jr.'s 1stCombat Service Group at Masanfurnished Marine general logisticssupport. The 1,400-man group wascomposed of headquarters, main-tenance, supply, support, andtruck companies. It furnished mostservice support functions:advanced maintenance and repair,central storage, general administra-tion, and laundry services. ColonelCook coordinated inter-Servicelogistics efforts, requisitioned sup-plies and equipment from higherechelons, controlled and main-tained rear area depots, storedspare parts and high demanditems, and distributed these to thedivision and the wing. The groupalso mustered special support unitsincluding a bath and fumigationplatoon and an air delivery pla-toon. Although it provided supportto the wing, the 1st Combat ServiceGroup was actually attached to the1st Marine Division. Group detach-ments were located in Japan,Pusan, Pohang, and operated for-ward area supply terminals atWonju, Hoengson, and Chunchon.

The Military Sea TransportationService, Military Air TransportationService, and Naval Air Transport

Service furnished inter-theater liftof supplies, personnel, and equip-ment. Army Brigadier GeneralCrump Garvin's 2d LogisticalCommand replenished commonuse items for all Services in Korea.Fleet Marine Force, Pacific'sService Command furnishedunique Marine equipment andsupplies. The situation was morecomplex with regard to aviation.The 2d Logistical Command pro-vided a few aviation-related itemsbut for the most part did not stocktechnical equipment such as air-craft parts, special maintenancetools, or aircraft ordnance. TheU.S. Navy Pacific Service Com-mand handled most of these,although Marine-specific itemscame from Fleet Marine Force,Pacific. Emergency resupply proce-dures allowed critical items to beflown to Korea from the UnitedStates.

Marine logistics problems mir-rored the tactical situation. InJanuary 1951, the major challengewas filling critical personnel andequipment shortfalls in the wakeof the costly Chosin Reservoir cam-paign. After that the major logisticschallenge became sustaining unitsalmost constantly on the move.

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Major equipment shortagesoccurred in communications andtransportation. The Marines hadonly half their authorized radiosand only 58 (of 1,162) EE8 tele-phones. The division was alsoshort 58 jeeps and 33 two-and-a-half ton trucks. Not revealed inthese statistics is the poor condi-tion of the trucks that survived theChosin campaign. Most were interrible shape and badly neededadvanced maintenance and newtires. The only significant combatarms shortfall was tanks; the 1stTank Battalion had only 78 of its97 authorized M-26 and M-4 tanks.

After the Marines left Masan inmid-January, resupply became theoverriding logistics concern. Thesupply pipeline ran from theUnited States to Japan then on toKorea. Cargo and transport shipsand long-range airplanes carriedmen, supplies, and equipmentfrom the United States to depotsand processing centers in Japan.The 1st Combat Service Groupmaintained an administrative pro-cessing center and a supply receiv-ing area at Kobe, Japan.Unfortunately, there was a poorsupply flow from Japan to Korea,partially due to labor and trans-

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51

A column of Korean Civil Transport Cois bearers brings supplies from a reararea to the main battle line. Rugged terrain and lack of roads often dictated thatman-packing supplies was the only way they would reach the front lines.

portation shortages and partiallydue to red tape. The Marines inKorea had few rear area storagefacilities and inadequate trans-portation assets. There was onlyone true deep-water seaport in allof Korea, Pusan, and it was locat-ed at the peninsula's southernmosttip, which was serviced by a verylimited road and rail network. Thiscreated a tremendous supply bot-tleneck. The Marines were ablemake some use of Pohang as aport of entry, but unloading therewas a cumbersome and time-con-suming process. The U.S. Army55th Quartermaster Depot whichhandled joint-Service requests didnot back-order most types of sup-plies, hence, requests were rou-tinely denied if a particular itemwas not on hand. Eventually, 1stService Battalion assigned a Marineliaison team to smooth out thisproblem. Regardless, there was aconstant shortage of expendableitems, such as steel wool or sta-tionery supplies, and individualrequests sometimes required afour-week lead-time before issue.The 1st Combat Service Group ranrailheads at Masan and Dalchon,the 1st Shore Party Battalion han-dled incoming supplies at Pohangand ran the railhead at Yodo-nae,and the division established truck-heads as far forward as possible.

The poor roads, inadequate rail-road system, and fluid nature ofthe fighting made resupply of for-ward units a never-endingheadache. Trains, trucks, and air-planes carried in-country suppliesfrom rear areas to forward supplypoints. From there, however, it wasdivision's job to get those suppliesto its troops in the field.Unfortunately, there was no railline north of Wonju, and therewere often too few trucks to movethe supplies that did arrive in atimely manner. The closing of for-ward supply points and ammuni-

tion storage areas during the CCFSpring Offensive also createdproblems. The closures createdtemporary ammunition shortagesand stopped the flow of "A" and"B" rations so the troops had torely upon less tasty and less filling"C" and "K" field rations. The onlysolution to this problem was to air-drop supplies and ammunition.Poor flying weather and limitedairfield facilities made air trans-portation an iffy proposition, andairdrops were inefficient in termsof equipment, manpower, and lossrates, but there was simply noother choice. The multi-ServiceCombat Cargo Command accom-plished airdrops. Marine transportplanes joined those of the AirForce and the Navy to deliver sup-plies all across the front. The mostunique air delivery was a singlesize 16 EEE combat shoe droppedover the 1st Marines headquartersfrom an OY light observation air-craft. This jocular package wasaddressed to Colonel Wilburt S.

"Big Foot" Brown and included a

note that the pilot did not have suf-ficient space in his small plane tocarry two such gigantic"Boondockers" at the same time.This joke, however, must havetried Brown's patience becausepilots in Nicaragua had first used itthree decades earlier.

One of the most difficult logis-tics challenges was overland trans-portation. Gasoline and tire short-ages often idled much-neededtrucks, jeeps, and weapons carri-ers. The Marines were also con-stantly hampered by lack of vehi-cles; for example, in April the divi-sion was short 1 tracked landingvehicle, 13 tanks, 18 jeeps, and 59trucks. Although the 1st MarineDivision had been augmented withan extra motor transport battalion,there were still insufficient trucksto move men and supplies in atimely manner. Heavy demands,combat losses, accidents, and harduse all contributed to the problem.Pooling Marine resources and bor-rowing U.S. Army trucks some-times addressed this concern, but

Marines line the rail as the attack transport General J. C. Breckinridge (AP 176)docks in San Francisco. These veterans, some with more than six months of com-bat, were among the first Marines to return from Korea.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-428299

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even additional vehicles could donothing to alleviate the majortransportation obstacle, the inade-quate Korean transportation infra-structure.

Food, clothing, ammunition,and other necessities slowly madetheir way forward to regimentaland battalion supply dumps intrucks, jeeps, and weapons carri-ers, but then most often had to behand carried to the front lines. Thiswas a labor-intensive process that

few combat units could spare menfor. The South Korean govern-ment, at the request of EighthArmy, organized a pair of quasi-military organizations—-theKorean Service Corps and theKorean Transportation Corps—-tofill this need. Members of theKorean National Guard and volun-teers from refugee camps mannedthese organizations. The KoreanService Corps included "Yoboe"construction gangs, and the

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Transportation Corps comprised"cargodore" companies consistingof about 200 "Chiggy Bear"porters. The Korean governmentprovided almost 300 laborers tothe 1st Marine Division. Yoboeswere used for roadwork and man-ual labor by combat and servicesupport units. The Chiggy Bearswere parceled out to each rifle reg-iment where they labored underthe supervision of a senior Marinenoncommissioned officer or juniorlieutenant. Organized as a unitunder a headman and a strawboss, these never-ending columnsof porters, called "Mule Trains"after a popular song of the day,kept frontline Marines suppliedunder the most trying circum-stances. There are no specific fig-ures as to how many of these loyalworkers were killed or woundedin action, but those numbers wereundoubtedly high. Although sacri-fices of the Chiggy Bears may havegone unrecorded, their tirelessefforts were certainly not unappre-ciated by the cold, thirsty, hungryMarines at the front.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing'smajor engineering headaches wereairfield renovation and upkeep.This was particularly difficultbecause the wing was almost con-stantly on the move. The wide dis-persal of Marine air units located atair bases in Japan (Itami, Itazuke,and Bofu) and Korea—Pohang(K-3), Pusan (K-i and K-9),Hoegsong (K-46), and Seoul (K-16). Marine Wing Service Squadron1 (successively commanded byChief Warrant Officer Aubrey D.Taylor, Lieutenant Colonel JamesC. Linsay, and Colonel Roger T.Carleson) was the Unit charged toprovide such support, but theoverworked Marines often had toask for help from Navy Seabeeconstruction units as well as Armyand Air Force engineers. Whensuch support was not immediately

forthcoming, as it often was not,Marine technicians had to bepulled away from other jobs topick up shovels. Fuel handling wasalso a problem. For example,Marine Aircraft Group 33 at K-3(Pohang) had to rely upon trackedlanding vehicles to haul fuel drumsashore, which then had to be handpumped into 1,200-gallon fueltrucks. This slow, inefficient, labor-intensive process siphoned offmen whose skills could have beenput to better use. Additionally,vehicles designed to handle WorldWar II ordnance were ill-suited toservice modern aircraft. The primi-tive conditions in Korea also tooka toll on wing motor transport.These problems required constantattention throughout the spring of1951.

That operations only intermit-tently suffered for lack of servicesupport is a tribute to Marine ser-vice and support personnel. TheMarines faced seemingly insur-mountable logistics challengesbetween January and May 1951,yet—despite a few hiccups—theonly serious long-term supplyshortfall was the lack of artilleryammunition caused by EighthArmy policies dictated from aboveover the strenuous objections ofMarine commanders. That this wasthe case is a testament to the hardworking, but too often unsung,Marines of the combat service sup-port units.

The 1st Marine Divisionreceived two replacement drafts inDecember 1950, but was still shortalmost 3,000 men on New Year'sDay. The initial personnel deficitwas partially alleviated by thereturn to duty of 945 men, most ofwhom had been frostbite evacua-tions, and the arrival of 700 veter-an Marines pulled from posts andstations in the Far East. Tworeplacement drafts were alsoformed at Camp Pendleton. The

ment draft with about 100 officers andeach month thereafter.

largest part of these drafts consist-ed of recalled reservists, but therewere also some veteran regularMarines included. Freshly mintedMarines from the recruit depotsand "shiny-bar" second lieutenantsjust arrived from officer trainingfilled out replacement rosters. Twohundred and thirty men with criti-cal military occupational special-ties were flown directly to thecombat zone. The 4th ReplacementDraft sailed for Korea on board thefast transport USNS GeneralWilliam 0. Darby (AP 127) andwas due in mid-January. The just-forming 5th Replacement Draftwas assigned to the USS GeneralJ.C. Breckinridge (AP 176) and wasslated to arrive in mid-February.Replacement drafts containingabout 1,700 men each continuedarriving on a monthly basis fromthen on. This personnel replace-ment system was adequate, but itwas not perfect. The adoption of acombat rotation system primarily

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more than 1,000 enlisted men arrived

based upon time served meant thatthe most experienced Marineswere constantly leaving Korea andtheir places taken by inexperi-enced replacements. The introduc-tion of new men, as individualsrather than units, created cohesionproblems in small units. Personnelshortages after major engagementsremained a nagging problemthroughout the spring of 1951,

Extraordinary Heroism

The period from January to May1951 encompassed three designat-ed U.N. campaigns: ChineseIntervention from 3 November1950 to 24 January 1951; the FirstU.N. Counteroffensive from 25January to 21 April; and the CCFSpring Offensive from 22 April to 8July 1951. It is ironic that thespring of 1951 is one of the mostoverlooked periods in Americanmilitary history because that periodfeatured some of the most intense

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A157778

Marine replacements come ashore from a Navy landing ship. Three replacementdrafts were rushed to Korea after the Chosin campaign, and about one replace-

and hard-fought Marine actions ofthe Korean Conflict. The anony-mous battles of that time were asdesperate and bloody as those atthe Pusan Perimeter, the Inchonlanding, and the liberation ofSeoul, yet they remain almostunknown except to those whofought there. Too often relegatedto the dustbin of history is the factthat some Marine units sufferedmore casualties during the drive tothe Punchbowl than they had dur-ing the legendary fighting at theChosin Reservoir. Indeed, theevents of that time might well becalled the "Forgotten Campaigns"of what is now often termed the"Forgotten War." What should beremembered is the key role playedby the Marines, both on theground and in the air. The 1stMarine Division rendered ineffec-tive one NKPA division at Pohang,spearheaded the United Nations'recapture of the HwachonReservoir during Operations Killerand Ripper, and stabilized the cen-ter of the U.N. line in the midst ofthe CCF Spring Offensive. The ver-satile 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flewa wide variety of missions; heli-copters proved their utility in com-bat and Marine close air supportwas unsurpassed in efficiency.These accomplishments did not gounrecognized at the time; both the1st Marine Division and the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing were award-ed Presidential Unit Citations fortheir actions in the spring of 1951.

Luckily, the military lessons ofthe day were not forgotten. TheMarines in Korea fought well, butthey were not employed in accordwith their envisioned inter-Servicerole. They, even more than theirantecedents in World War I,

became an integral part of a UnitedStates field army fighting far fromthe sea for an extended period.Instead of acting as a semi-inde-pendent combined arms team, as

had been the case in 1950, in thespring of 1951 the 1st MarineDivision was stripped of its directair support and became just onemore Eighth Army ground maneu-ver unit. Thus, contrary to thewishes of Marine commanders, the1st Marine Division was used as a"second land army." The forcedseparation of the 1st MarineDivision and the 1st Marine AircraftWing and the lack of an in-theaterMarine commander prompted thelater creation of permanent Marineair-ground task forces.

Another factor that affected thefuture of the Marine Corps was theperformance of the Marine CorpsReserve. Without the Reserve, it isdoubtful that the Marines wouldhave been able to deploy an entiredivision and aircraft wing to Korea.The character of the 1st MarineDivision underwent a drasticchange in the spring of 1951. Whenthe 1st Provisional Marine Brigadearrived in Korea in August 1950 itwas virtually an all-regular forma-tion, by the time of the ChosinReservoir campaign in Novemberabout one-third of the Marineswere reservists, but by the end ofMay 1951 almost two-thirds of theU.S. Marines in Korea werereservists. There were very fewregular officers below the rank ofcaptain and almost no regularenlisted men other than staff non-commissioned officers by the timethe 1st Marine Division reached theNo Name Line. Similar figures alsoapply to the list Marine AircraftWing. This proved that the MarineCorps could count on its Reservewhen the chips were down. Thislesson was validated in the PersianGulf some 40 years later whenMarine reservists once againanswered the call to the colors dur-ing the Gulf War and acquittedthemselves well.

The period January to May 1951was one of transition and tumult

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during which United Nations forcestraveled from the brink of defeat tothe edge of victory several times asfierce fighting ebbed and flowedacross Korea's midlands. Theenemy still remained a potent anddangerous foe after the spring of1951, but the United NationsCommand had become a seasonedforce that was not about to beejected from the peninsula. All talkof evacuating Korea due to enemypressure was silenced by the recentstellar performance on the battle-field. This favorable reversal of for-tunes in Korea between Januaryand May has been characterized bythe eminent military historianColonel Harry G. Summers, Jr.,USA, as "the single greatest feat ofarms in American military history,"and the Marines played a key rolein that amazing reversal of fortune.

The impact of that stunningturnaround was, however, not real-ized on the home front. By mid-1951 many Americans were dissat-isfied with "Truman's PoliceAction," and there was deeply feltsentiment across the country for anend to the fighting. The resultingpolitical pressure led to a funda-mental change in American foreignpolicy. A Joint Chiefs of Staff direc-tive stated that the military objec-tive was no longer to unify Korea,but "to repel aggression againstSouth Korea." In fact, both sidesunofficially accepted a mutual ces-sation of major offensive actionsafter the U.N. regained the modi-fied Kansas Line in June. TheKorean War then passed its firstanniversary without fanfare or cel-ebration, and not long after peacetalks began. The United NationsCommand briefly mounted a limit-ed offensive after the talks brokedown, but the Korean Conflictthereafter became a bloody stale-mate marked by two more years ofcontentious negotiations andinconclusive fighting.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR(Ret), is a freelance writer and scoring director

for Measurement Incorporated, an educationaltesting firm. The author of two monographs in thePersian Gulf series and two official unit histories,he was also a contributing author for the best-sell­ing book The Marines, and has been a frequentcontributor to professional journals. He is work­ing on a second Korean commemorative pam­phlet on Marine helicopter operations. LieutenantColonel Brown served as an active duty infantryofficer from 1968 to 1971 and saw combat in

Vietnam. He joined MTU DC-7 at its inception in1976 and served continuously with that unit untilhis retirement. He went to Korea during ExerciseTeam Spirit-84. Six years later he was activatedduring the Persian Gulf War and was assigned toI Marine Expeditionary Force. After OperationDesert Storm, he became the Marine componenthistorian for Combined Task Force ProvideComfort in northern Iraq. Lieutenant ColonelBrown, then commanding MTU DC-7, retired in1996. In civilian life, Ronald Brown was a highschool history teacher for three decades and is anominee for the Michigan High School FootballCoaches Hall of Fame.

SourcesThe basic sour e for this pam­

phI twas th fourth volume inth . ri s U . Man'ne OperationsKorea, 1950-1953: Tbe Ea t­Central Front (Washington, D.C.:Hi torical Branch, G-3 Division,HQMC, 1962), written by LynnMontross, Maj Hubbard D.Koukka and Maj orman W.Hicks. Marine-specific booksconsulled were: Robert D. Heinl,oldiers of the ea (Annapolis:

aval Institute Pr 5, 1962);Alia n R. Millett, Semper Fidelis( Jew York: McMillan, 1980); J.Rob rt Mo kin The .. MarineCO/po tory (N w York: McGraw­Hill, 1977); LtCol Galy W. Parkerand Maj Frank M. Batha, Jr., AHi tOlY of Marine Observationqlladron ix (History and

Mus ums Division, HQMC, 1982);Col Gerald R. Pitzel, A History ofMarine Figbter Attack quadron323 (HistOlY and MuseumsDivision, HQMC, 1987); MajWilliam J. Sambito, A History q!Marine Atlack quadron 311(Hi'toty and Museums Divi ionHQM ,1978); 01 Fran is F.Parry, Three Marine War: ThePacifiC, Korea, Vietnam (Pacifica:Pacifica Press, 1987)' and BGen

Edwin H. Simmons The Unitedtates Marines: The First Two

Hundred Year:5 (Annapolis: avalIn'titute Press, 1998).

Over iew. of the KoreanConflict included: Roy E.Appleman Ridgway Duels ForKorea (College tation: TexaA&M Pres , 1990); Clay Blair, TheForgotten War: Amen'ca in Korea,1950-1953 ( ew York: Tim sBooks, 1987); Russell A. Gugel 1',

Combat Action in Korea(Washington, D.C.: Office Chiefof Military Hi tory, 1970); RobertL ckie, Conflict. The History ojthe Korean War, 1950-53 (N wYork: Putnam', 1962); Billy C.Mossman, Ehb and Flow--U .Army in the Korean War(Washington, D.C.: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1990); andMatth w B. Ridgway, The KoreanWar (Garden City: Doubleday,1967). Individual p rspectiveincluded Burke Davi', Marine!Tbe Life 0/ Ches~y Puller ( wYork: Littl -Brown, 1962); PaulMcCloskey, Jr., The Taking o/Hill610 (Woodside: Eaglet Book',1992); LtGen Matthew B.Ridgeway, Soldier: The Memoirsof Matthew B. Ridgway ( ewYork: Harper 1956); Allan R.Millett, In Many A [rife: Gerald

411

C. Thomas and tbe U . MarineC01p, 1917-1956 (Annapolis:

aval Institute Press, 1993);anel Morgan Brainard, Men inLow Cut Shoes: The tory oj aMarine Rifle Company ( wYork: Tood & IIoneywell, 1986).

Primary documents and mili­tary periodicals held by theHistory and Museums Division in\Va hington, D.C., includ unitdiaries, after action and specialaction reports, biographical files,subject files, comment files, per-onal diarie , and anicles in the

Marine Corps Gazette anel theUS. Naval In titute Proceedings.Among the oral interview con­sulted were those of Gen OliverP. Smith, LtGen Alpha 1. Bowser,Maj Martin J. xton LtCol John1. H pkins, Col Homer 1.Litzenb rg, Jr. LtCol Francis F.Parry, Maj William 1. Bates, Jr.,and MajGen Edward A. Craio.Tb author a1 0 used per 'onalfile ompiJed during Exerci 'eTeam Spirit-8 , and wishes racknowl dge the recoIl ctions ofretired BGen dwin H. immon,

M (Ret) 1stLt RobertHarding, SAR, and S gt EdwardHuffman, U MCR, all of whomserved with th 1 t MarineDivision in Korea in 1951.

DRWE NORTH

U.S. Marines at the Punchbowlby Colonel Allan R. Millett, USMCR (Ret)

he rumble of Ame-rican field artillerythrough the morningmists in the valley ofthe Soyang River

gave a sense of urgency to thechange-of-command ceremonyinside the headquarters tent of the1st Marine Division. Four days ofhard fighting in the withdrawalfrom the Hwachon Reservoir hadbrought the division safely to theriver on 25 April 1951. The trekaway from the Chinese 39th and40th Armies had not yet, however,brought the division to the NoName Line, the final defensiveposition 15 miles south of the riverdesignated by Lieutenant GeneralJames A. Van Fleet, commandingthe U.S. Eighth Army. In a simplerite that included only the readingof the change-of-command ordersand the passing of the division col-ors, Major General Gerald C.

Thomas relieved Major GeneralOliver P. "0. P." Smith and tookcommand of a division locked in abattle to stop the Chinese FifthOffensive.

The ceremony dramatized theuncertainty of the Marines in thesecond year of the Korean War.Understandably, General Smith did

AT LEFT: Marines quickly demol-ish enemy bunkers withgrenades and planted chargesbefore moving north.Department of Defense Photo (USMC)

A8504

not want to turn over command inthe middle of a battle. On the otherhand, General Van Fleet wantedThomas to take command of thedivision as soon as possible, some-thing Thomas had not planned todo since his formal orders from theCommandant, General Clifton B.Cates, designated 1 May 1951 asturn-over day. Thomas hadplanned to spend the interveningweek on a familiarization tour ofKorea and the major elements ofthe Eighth Army. He had thoughthis call on Van Fleet the day beforehad been simply a courtesy visit,but instead he found himselfcaught in a delicate matter of com-mand relations.

General Thomas arrived inKorea to face an entirely new war.The October 1950 dream of unify-ing Korea under the sponsorshipof the United Nations (U.N.) hadswirled away with the Chinesewinter intervention. The war stillhung in the balance as the UnitedNations Command attempted todrive the Communist invaders outof the Republic of Korea (ROK) forthe second time in less than a year.The U.S. Eighth Army and itsKorean counterpart, the HangukGun (South Korean Armed Forces)had rallied in January and February1951, under the forceful leadershipof Lieutenant General Matthew B.Ridgway, USA. United Nations

MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, right meets with MajGen Oliver P Smith prior to thespartan change-of-command ceremony witnessed by a handful of participantsdrawn from the 1st Marine Division's staff

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Marine corps Research center

413

Command had then driven backthe Chinese Communist Forces(CCF) and the North KoreanPeople's Army (NKPA). The allieshad advanced well north of the38th Parallel in central and easternKorea. Goaded by Mao Zedong,General Peng Dehuai ordered hisjoint expeditionary force of693,000 Chinese and North Koreansoldiers to mount one more grand

offensive. Eleven Chinese armiesand two North Korean corps (40divisions) would smash south justwest of Hwachon Reservoir in thesectors held by the U.S. I and IXCorps. At a minimum the Com-munist forces, about half of Peng'stotal army, would drive UnitedNations forces below the 38thParallel. The maximum objectivewould be to threaten the Han River

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valley and the corridors to Seoulwhile at the same time recapturingthe territory south of the SoyangRiver, which opened an alternativecorridor south to Hongchon.

When General Thomas calledon General Van Fleet on 24 April,the Eighth Army commander, acombative 59-year-old Floridianwith a World War II record of suc-cessful command from regiment tocorps in Europe, felt confident thathis forces had blunted the four-day-old Communist offensive.However, he had an organizationalproblem, which was that the 1stMarine Division should be shiftedback to X Corps and redeployed tothe No Name Line under the com-mand of Lieutenant GeneralEdward M. Almond, USA, the divi-sion's corps commander through-out 1950. The relationship be-tween 0. P. Smith and Almond,however, had become so ven-omous that Ridgway assigned theMarine division to IX Corps inJanuary 1951 and promised Smiththat he would not have to copewith Almond, whose style and sub-stance of command angered Smithand his staff. Van Fleet had hon-ored Ridgway's commitment, butthe operational situation dictatedthat the Almond-Smith feud couldnot take precedence.

Van Fleet explained the plan toshift the 1st Marine Division backto X Corps to Thomas withoutgoing into the Almond-Smith prob-lem. Van Fleet did not give Thomasa direct order to proceed immedi-ately to the 1st Marine Divisionheadquarters near Chunchon.Thomas believed, however, thatVan Fleet had sound reasons towant a change of command now,so he caught a light plane fur-nished by the 1st Marine AircraftWing and flew to the primitiveairstrip that served the division.Escorted by the new assistant divi-sion commander, Brigadier

General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller,Thomas went directly to Smith'svan and told him of Van Fleet'srequest and future plans. Smithrefused to relinquish command.Without mounting an argument,Thomas left the van and went tothe operations center to conferwith Colonel Edward W. Snedeker,

the chief of staff, and ColonelAlpha L. Bowser, the G-3, both ofwhom sympathized with Thomasbut thought Smith should remainin command. Thomas thought thedivision was well positioned torefuse the open left flank of XCorps, but he also felt the tensionin the command post.

Thomas decided that the issueof command could not be post-poned—and now at least Smithknew he faced the prospect ofagain serving under Almond.Thomas returned to Smith's vanwithin the hour and stated simply:"0. P., the table of organizationcalls for only one major general in

Major General Gerald C.Thomas

Gerald Carthrae Thomas spent a lifetime dealingwith challenging command relationships andoperational problems inside and outside the

Marine Corps. Born on 29 October 1894 on a farm nearSlater, a western Missouri railroad town, Thomas grewup as a working boy in a working family. He was also agood student and versatile high school athlete. Living inBloomington, Illinois, he attended Illinois WesleyanUniversity (1915-1917) before enlisting in the MarineCorps in May 1917 to fight the Germans. Thomas, age22, mustered in at five feet, nine inches and 160 pounds,strong of wind and limb from athletics and labor. Darkhair and heavy eyebrows set off his piercing blue eyesand strong jaw. He would need every bit of his emo-tional balance and physical stamina—lifelong traits—forthe Marine Corps placed him in the Germans' sights formost of 1918. As a sergeant and lieutenant in the 1stBattalion, 6th Marines, Thomas learned about war atBelleau Wood, Soissons, and the Meuse-Asgonne. Whenthe Silver Star and Purple Heart medals were authorizedin 1932, Captain Thomas, professional officer of Marines,pinned on one award for gallantry and another for beinggassed.

In the interwar years, Thomas had already foughtagainst Haitian guerrillas, served a second tour in Haitias a staff officer, and commanded a Marine detachmenton a Navy gunboat in the Caribbean and CentralAmerica. He also lost one wife to disease, married again(Lottie Capers Johnson of Charleston, South Carolina)and started a family of two sons and two daughters. TheMarine Corps recognized his potential value in wartimeby sending him to five different Army schools (includingthe prestigious U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth) and assigning him twice asan instructor in Marine Corps schools.

Between 1940 and 1950, Thomas proved that theMarine Corps had not wasted a minute or a dollar on hisprofessional education. In a decade that saw himadvance in rank from major to major general, Thomasprepared the Fleet Marine Force for war as an instructorat Quantico, military observer abroad, and a staff officerin the 1st Marine Division as the division conducted itslast pre-Pearl Harbor amphibious exercises. When the

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A132593

division deployed to the South Pacific, LieutenantColonel Thomas went to war as Major GeneralAlexander A. Vandegrift's operations officer (G-3), anassignment that made him one of the architects of victo-ry on Guadalcanal. A trusted intimate of Vandegrift's,

415

Thomas served as the general's chief of staff during thefinal months of the Guadalcanal campaign and thenplayed the same role in the I Marine Amphibious Corps'landing on Bougainville. He returned to Washingtonwith Vandegrift when the general became Commandantin 1944. As a brigadier general, his second "spot" pro-motion in a row, Thomas fought the battles of demobi-lization and postwar defense reorganization, 1944-1947,as the Director of Plans and Policies on theHeadquarters staff and played a critical role in winninglegislative protection for the Fleet Marine Force in theNational Security Act, 1947. He then spent two years ascommanding general, Fleet Marine Force, WesternPacific, a brigade-sized force that garrisoned theShantung peninsula and the city of Tsingtao until theChinese Communist military victories in North China in1948 made the American enclave irrelevant. Thomassuccessfully withdrew his force without incident inFebruary 1949 and returned to educational and devel-opmental billets at Marine Corps Base, Quantico.

Thomas' rich and exciting career had not, however,been without professional risks and cost. His aggressivepersonality, the force with which he defended his con-victions, and his unwillingness to tolerate leadershiplapses that endangered Marines had made him anathe-ma to some of his peers, two of whom stopped his firstpromotion to major general. Others thought him toodemanding a colleague. In 1951 only two opinionscounted, those of Commandant Clifton B. Cates andLieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, andCates' likely successor as Commandant. Although nei-ther Cates nor Shepherd were part of Vandegrift's"Guadalcanal gang," they knew Thomas well and rec-

ognized his special qualifications to go to Korea. Inaddition to his recent service as Commanding General,Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, Thomas had done apre-war China tour in the Peiping legation guard. Anddespite his dogged defense of the Marine Corps in theBattle of the Potomac, 1945-1947, he got along well withthe U.S. Army. As head of research and development,Thomas also understood the 1st Division's importanceas test bed for future techniques like vertical envelop-ment.

After his successful command of the 1st MarineDivision in Korea, April 1951-February 1952, Thomasreturned to Headquarters Marine Corps as a lieutenantgeneral and Assistant Commandant/Chief of Staff forGeneral Shepherd. For the next two years, Thomasfocused on reorganizing the Headquarters staff on func-tional general staff lines, on improving Marine Corpsrelations and representation within the Department ofthe Navy, and planning the postwar Fleet Marine Forceof three divisions and three aircraft wings, a force morethan twice as large as the Fleet Marine Force in June1950.

For his "twilight cruise" Thomas becameCommandant, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico (1954-1955), his favorite post and role as officer-instructor.Upon retirement he remained in government service asthe first executive director, Net Evaluation Committee,National Security Council staff from 1956 to 1958. Hethen entered private business in real estate and insur-ance in the Washington, D.C. area. He regularly attend-ed 1st Marine Division Association functions and eventsrelated to Marine Corps history; his four sons and sons-in-laws all served as Marines, two retiring as colonels.General Thomas died on 7 April 1984 at the age of 89.

a division. Either you turn over tome, or I'm going to leave." Smithdid not respond, and Thomasagain left the van. After severalminutes of more tension, Smithemerged from his van and toldThomas that the change-of-com-mand ceremony would be held at0800 the next morning. The 1stMarine Division had a new com-manding general as it entered anew era in its service in Korea.

The New Division

Although the last veterans of thecampaigns of 1950 did not leaveKorea until the autumn of 1951,the 1st Marine Division had starteda process of transformation in April

1951 that did not depend solely onCommunist bullets. HeadquartersMarine Corps now sent Outreplacement drafts not just to fillholes in the ranks from casualties,but also to allow the surviving vet-erans of longest service to return tonew assignments in the UnitedStates or for release from activeduty. The 9th Replacement Draftreached Korea in early June, bring-ing 2,608 Marine officers andenlisted men to the division and 55officers and 334 men to the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing. New navalpersonnel for both Marine organi-zations totaled six officers and 66sailors, mostly medical personnel.The incoming Marines had adeparting counterpart, the 3d

416

Rotation Draft, composed of 62Marine officers, 1,196 enlistedmen, and 73 sailors; the draftincluded 103 convalescing wound-ed. The 10th Replacement Draftarrived late in June, adding 74more officers and 1,946 men to thedivision and 12 officers and 335men to the aircraft wing. Onenaval officer and 107 sailors joinedthe division and wing.

Nevertheless, Thomas thoughtthat the manpower planners hadcut their estimates too close andrequested that subsequent draftsbe increased by a 1,000 officersand men. Despite the personneldemands of forming the new 3dMarine Brigade at CampPendleton, Fleet Marine Force,

Pacific, honored Thomas' request.The 11th Replacement Draft (14July 1951) brought 3,436 Marinesand 230 naval personnel to thedivision and 344 Marines to the air-craft wing, accompanied by 22sailors. Nevertheless, the divisionremained short of majors, compa-ny grade artillery officers, and offi-cers and enlisted men in almostevery technical specialization,especially communications andlogistics.

General Thomas had no com-plaint about the quality of theMarines he had inherited from 0.P. Smith or those sent to him byLieutenant General Lemuel C.

Shepherd, Jr., Commanding Gen-eral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.The senior officers and companycommanders were proven WorldWar II veterans, and the lieutenantswere an elite of Naval Academygraduates, NROTC graduates, andofficer candidate school productsthat more than matched the corn-

pany grade officers of World WarII. The enlisted Marines were asolid mix of career noncommis-sioned officers and eager enlistees.Thomas recognized that the divi-sion he now commanded was "insplendid shape" and prepared tofight and win in terrain and weath-er "never designed for polite war-fare." He wrote retired MajorGeneral Merritt A. Edson that the1st Marine Division was "the bestdamn division that ever wore anAmerican uniform."

Thomas went ahead with plans,coordinated with Shepherd, toform his own team as the divisionstaff and to appoint new regimen-tal commanders. Thomas arrangedfor Brigadier General William J.Whaling, an old friend who hadbeen Thomas' alter ego onGuadalcanal, to become the assis-tant division commander on 20May. Whaling became his eyes andears on tactical issues with hissuperb knowledge of men,

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weapons, and fieldcraft. ColonelSnedeker remained chief of staffuntil he gave way on 23 May toColonel Francis M. McAlister,whose command of the 1stMarines was cut short by woundson the 18th. Since he had come toKorea in 1950 as the division G-4,McAlister rotated home, to bereplaced temporarily by ColonelRichard G. Weede, who had takenColonel Bowser's place as G-3 on8 May. Shepherd and Thomas hadsomeone else in mind for the divi-sion chief of staff's post, ColonelVictor H. Krulak, the G-3 of FleetMarine Force, Pacific, and a trustedcolleague of both generals throughWorld War II and the postwaryears. Krulak became divisionchief of staff on 29 June with aspecial charge to begin experi-ments with the Marine Corps' oneoperational helicopter squadron.

The rest of the division staffbrought enough character andexpertise to their jobs to pleaseThomas. The G-1, Colonel WesleyM. Platt, had spent World War II asa Japanese prisoner of war; hisleadership among the prisonershad won him the admiration of hispeers and great influence on thestaff. Thomas' two G-2s, LieutenantColonels Joseph P. Sayers andJames H. Tinsley, did a workman-like job. Like Weede, ColonelBruce T. Hemphill, and LieutenantColonel Gordon D. Gayle servedas Thomas' G-3s under the closeand critical scrutiny of ColonelsKrulak and Weede, who alsoserved as division chief of staff.Colonels Frank P. Hager and CustisBurton, Jr., performed the thank-less task of G-4 until they rotatedto the command of the 5th and11th Marines, respectively, al-though Burton later returned aschief of staff in February 1952 toreplace Weede.

The commanders of the infantryregiments were all tested veterans

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A156022

The command team of the 1st Marine Division stands outside a briefing tent atthe division headquarters. Pictured from left are BGen WilliamJ. Whaling, assis-tant division commander, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, division commander, andCol Victor H. Krulak, division chief of staff

of the Fleet Marine Force, and theirstyles varied more than their com-petence. After Francis McAlister fellin a precision Chinese mortar bar-rage on his command group,Thomas assigned his regiment tothe legendary Colonel Wilburt S."Big Foot" Brown, an artillery offi-cer sent out to command the 11thMarines. The irrepressible "BigFoot" Brown (whose homeric 14Fsized-feet required special supplyarrangements, including the air-drop of field brogans into thewilds of Nicaragua) took commandonly to issue an order to withdraw.As the 1st Marines trooped by hisjeep on the way south to the NoName Line, the files of men brokeinto chicken-like cackles, showingthat their "red leg" colonel looked"yellow" to them. Colonel Brownsoon showed that their judgmentwas a short round by a mile. Whenthe veteran of World War I,

Nicaragua, and World War II sur-

rendered command to anotherWorld War I veteran, ColonelThomas A. Wornham, Brown hadwon the affection of the 1stMarines, "Chesty Puller's Own," avery tough bunch of Marines toimpress.

The other two infantry regi-ments went to colonels of highability. Colonel Richard W. Hay-ward brought intelligence and per-sonal elegance (too much some ofhis troops thought) to the 5thMarines, succeeded by Weede on 7August whose energy and forceexceeded Hayward's. Almondliked them both, a dubious recom-mendation. Weede then turnedover command to Frank Hager on19 November. The 7th Marines bidfarewell to Colonel Homer L.Litzenberg, Jr., on 15 April andwelcomed Colonel Herman Nick-erson, Jr., no stranger to theKorean War since he had been inthe combat zone since the Inchon

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landing as the senior Marine liai-son officer from Fleet MarineForce, Pacific to Far EastCommand and Eighth Army. Noless professional than the otherregimental commanders, Nick-erson brought a driving, no-non-sense command style to the 7thMarines that made the regiment, inThomas' opinion, the best in thedivision. Nickerson appreciatedthe contributions of his two execu-tive officers, the incomparableLieutenant Colonel Raymond G.Davis, Jr., and Lieutenant ColonelJohn J. Wermuth. Promoted tocolonel, Wermuth assumed regi-mental command on 20 Septemberwhen Nickerson's extended over-seas tour ended.

The high level of competence atthe regimental level did not dropoff in the division's separate battal-ions. With an officer corps createdby service in six divisions in thePacific War, the Marine Corps

Clarence Jackson Davis: Every Marine

In the soft spring of his senior year (June 1950) atHillsboro High School, Nashville, Tennessee,Clarence Jackson Davis, called "Jack" by his family

and friends, discovered several reasons to join theMarine Corps Reserve. Going to war was not one ofthem. Jack Davis planned instead to go to VanderbiltUniversity, where his older brother Vince was already asophomore and a keen midshipman in the Naval ROTCunit. Jack admired Vince, but he did not fancy himselfa naval aviator like his older brother. On the otherhand, the local Marine Corps Reserve infantry companyhad some openings, and he and some high school foot-ball and baseball teammates liked the idea—advancedby some sweet-talking Marine sergeants—of keepingtheir baseball team together under the sponsorship ofthe Marine Corps. Marine training seemed little morethan another athletic challenge; the recruiters mentionedthat weekly drill often included a basketball game. Thenew recruits had no active duty requirement and thetwo weeks summer training sounded like a Boy Scoutcamp with guns. Besides, the recruiters insisted, partici-pating in reserve training made a young man draft-prooffrom the U.S. Army.

Jack also saw his enlistment as a potential way tohelp pay for his college education and, if all went well,become a Marine officer. More farsighted than many ofhis friends and counseled continuously by Vince, Jackhad already talked with the Marine major on theVanderbilt NROTC staff, who advised him that enlistedservice would strengthen his chances for selection forthe next summer's Platoon Leaders Class. Serving as anenlisted officer-candidate in the Marine Corps Reserveseemed a less-demanding way of helping pay for hiseducation than attempting to win a football grant-in-aidplaying for the hapless Commodores. The Davis broth-ers calculated that their military commitments wouldallow them to attend school without facing a demandingworking schedule, a financial relief they could stretch byliving at home to study and avoiding the temptations ofcampus social life.

Jack enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve at the ageof 17 in March 1950. If not quite a youthful lark, hisdecision did not seem very momentous, but a combina-tion of good planning, reasonable sense, and anticipat-ed adventure. He would try the life of a Marine, and hewould be paid to camp out and play sports for theMarine Corps. His life after high school, however, "didnot work out as planned." One night in June 1950, aftergraduation, Jack watched a newsreel at a local movietheater and learned about some distant war in Korea.His first reaction: "I was thrilled I was not there."

Lieutenant General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant ofthe Marine Corps and a fellow Tennessean, made surethat Jack Davis learned the true meaning of being a vol-

unteer Marine from the Volunteer State. After the Fourthof July the ground units of the Marine Corps Reservereceived a warning order that they would soon be mobi-lized, and on 20 July the Commandant made it official:Marine reservists in ground units would be called toactive duy "for the duration." Certainly most (if not all)of them would go to Korea as part of the 1st MarineDivision. After the confusion of in-processing, medicalexaminat: ons, and additional issues of 782 gear, theNashville Marines of Company C, 14th Battalion, MarineCorps Reserve, marched off to war from their reservecenter at Shelby Park down Broad Street until theyreached he 11th Street railroad siding off old UnionDepot. (urious spectators watched the young menmarch oft, their parade dominated by the blaring of highschool b2 nds at the front and rear of the column. WithM-ls and dressed in green utilities the Marines did notlook like their predecessors of the 11th TennesseeVolunteer Infantry, Confederate States of America, butthe spirit jf those young Nashvillians, equally perplexedand dete mined in 1861, stiffened the backs of their1950 successors.

WhateTer his expectations, Private Clarence JacksonDavis, U.:;. Marine Corps Reserve, did not go off to waruntrained —as did his Confederate ancestors and goodlypart of the U.S. Eighth Army in 1950. At CampPendletoii, his "station of initial assignment," Jack'sCompany C received the triage of personnel mobiliza-tion: true veterans of active duty were culled out forimmediat assignment to the Fleet Marine Force, proba-bly directLy to the 1st Marine Division; Marine reservistswhose dulls and summer camp more or less approxi-mated bcot camp went on to eight more weeks of pre-deploym nt field training and physical conditioning; andthe untrained true "boots" like Jack Davis went south tothe Marir.e Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, to begintheir life is real Marines.

The temporary mission of the Marine Corps Recruit

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