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SUBCOURSE EDITIONSS0134 A
US ARMY SIGNAL CENTER AND FORT GORDON
OFFENSIVE ELECTRONIC WARFARE(SC 25C-RC)
EDITION DATE: SEPTEMBER 1994
OFFENSIVE ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Subcourse Number SS0134
EDITION A
United States Army Signal Center and Fort GordonFort Gordon, Georgia 309055000
6 Credit Hours
Edition Date: September 1994
SUBCOURSE OVERVIEW
This subcourse is designed to teach the basic concepts andapplications of electronic warfare, including the evolution ofelectronic warfare and the methods employed in conducting offensiveelectronic warfare operations.
The prerequisite for this subcourse is that you are a graduate of theSignal Officer Basic Course or its equivalent.
This subcourse reflects the doctrine which was current at the time itwas prepared. In your own work situation, always refer to the latestofficial publications.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns andpronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
i SS0134
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE
ACTION: You will identify the components of electronic warfare,describe the concepts of offensive electronic warfare,and the methods electronic warfare may apply to disruptthe electromagnetic environment or otherwise confuse theability of commanders to interpret the battlefieldsituation.
CONDITION: Given this subcourse.
STANDARD: To demonstrate competence on this task, you must achievea minimum of 70 percent on the examination.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Page
Subcourse Overview...................................................i
Administrative Instructions..........................................v
Grading and Certification Instructions...............................v
Lesson 1: Introduction to Electronic Warfare..................11
Practice Exercise.............................111
Answer Key and Feedback.......................114
Lesson 2: Electronic Warfare Operations.......................21
Practice Exercise.............................212
Answer Key and Feedback.......................214
Lesson 3: Jamming, Frequency Controls, and ElectronicDeception...........................................31
Practice Exercise..............................39
Answer Key and Feedback.......................312
iii SS0134
Section Page
Appendix: Acronyms and Abbreviations.............................A1
Examination........................................................E1
Student Inquiry Sheets
SS0134 iv
LESSON 1
INTRODUCTION TOELECTRONIC WARFARE
LESSON 1
INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Critical Tasks: 015701.070001015701.070002015701.070003
OVERVIEW
LESSON DESCRIPTION:
In this lesson, you will learn about the history of electronicwarfare (EW), some EW accomplishments, and the components of EW.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:
ACTION: Define and explain EW.
CONDITION: Given this lesson.
STANDARD: To demonstrate competence, you must achieve a minimum of70 percent on the subcourse examination.
REFERENCES: The material in this lesson was derived from thefollowing publications: FM 341, FM 3410, and FM 3480.
INTRODUCTION
In the early years of the 20th century, the navies of the worldexpanded their use of radio for command and control. They also beganto search the spectrum to identify and locate other nations' ships.As the threat of a major war in Europe grew, so grew the efforts ofground forces to include radio in their modernization efforts. Radiobecame a means of communicating between ships and shore and betweenmilitary units. By the end of this century's first decade, mostmajor nations' fleets had continuous wave radios. Those radiosallowed ships at sea to
1-1 SS0134
communicate with other ships and with shore stations. At about thesame time, major military headquarters were provided radios toimprove communications and provide a quick method of interfacing withnational military commands. EW closely followed the development ofradio.
1. Evolution of Electronic Warfare. Early EW was primarily a toolused to identify ships and military units. As nations improved theirintelligence gathering systems, they also introduced methods tothwart their adversaries' means of collecting intelligence. Codesand ciphers were developed, and the periodic changing of call signsand frequencies was made a part of everyday communications. Thedisrupting of communications (jamming) and the creation of deceptivecommunications practices became a very sophisticated and artfulpractice.
a. World War I. During this period, EW was mostly limited tocasual monitoring of radio and some attempts at wiretapping. Someradio direction finding was conducted; however, these early attemptswere very crude, and the results were unreliable. The expanded useof codes and ciphers for diplomatic cables continued with thedevelopment of military radio use during and after World War I.
b. World War II. The period between the two world wars sawdramatic breakthroughs in the development of radio. The use of radioin the military became commonplace. Radios were found as far down asbattalion level. Signal operations became more disciplined. Codesand ciphers provided transmission security, and call signs andfrequencies were regularly changed. By the start of World War II,most nations had positions for EW functions within their staffelements. Jamming of radios became a component of EW, along withcollecting, locating, and analysis. Some major breakthroughs in codebreaking took place. Several countries, including Great Britain,Poland, the USSR, and the USA, were able to read the radio messagesof other nations.
(1) By the end of World War II, radios could be found atcompany level. Transmission security continued to be a major item ofconcern, as the radio passed from the exclusive charge of the trainedsignal soldier to the less securityconscious frontline soldier.
(2) The use of deception became an integral part of planning.An interesting example of deception took place in England during thetime of the Allied invasion of France. It was well known to theAllies that the German high command felt the main invasion would beat Calais. The Germans believed the landings in Normandy were only aruse to draw its forces away from Calais. To
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keep the Germans thinking along those lines, the Allies set up adeception plan that included the communications structure of anentire army. The ruse worked so well that a large part of the Germantank force remained in the Calais area, rather than being usedagainst the Allies at Normandy. Deception operations, which arehighly believable to an enemy, are likely to be more successful thanless believable deceptions.
(3) Another example of deception was the Japanese attack onPearl Harbor. The Japanese Fleet sailed across the Pacific incomplete radio silence. At the same time, dummy radio nets in thehome islands simulated the fleet's normal radio activity. This useof simulative electronic deception (SED) denied the U.S. the truelocation, intentions, and activities of the Japanese fleet.
(4) Code breaking was another major effort in this period. Asuccessful example was Operation Magic (19371940), conducted by theU.S. against the diplomatic codes of Japan. This effort gave theU.S. information about Japanese military and national intentions.Later EW efforts against Japan led to the destruction of the Japanesecarrier fleet at Midway. In Europe, the British success in breakingthe German code system ULTRA allowed the Allies to read German highcommand and naval traffic. The success in defeating the submarinethreat to Allied convoys crossing the Atlantic can be attributed, inpart, to the breaking of the German codes.
(5) The development of radio detection and ranging (radar)affected the outcome of World War II. Radar was used for both theearly detection and location of aircraft and naval surface forces.The development of systems and techniques to locate and identifyradar sets grew into separate activities. They would eventually begiven the names electronic intelligence (ELINT) and electronicsecurity (ELSEC). Many years later, ELINT and ELSEC would play amajor roll in the Persian Gulf War of 1991.
c. Korean War. During the Korean War, EW was used by both UnitedNations (UN) and North Korean forces. The Soviets supplied the NorthKoreans with groundbased radars that were used against Americanbombers. U.S. forces responded by jamming enemy radars with tinfoilstrips, called chaff.
(1) Both sides intercepted and analyzed radio signals. UNforces jammed enemy communications nets. Enemy jamming capabilitieswere not as effective; however, they could locate UN positionsthrough the technique of direction finding (DF).
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(2) The Chinese used radio silence during their move into Koreain 1950. Thus, the UN forces were denied data on the location andintentions of the Chinese.
d. Vietnam. Both sides used EW in Vietnam. ELSEC and deceptionbecame an integral part of U.S. battle planning. For the firsttime, EW units directly supported units at the brigade and separateregiment level.
(1) In North Vietnam, Chinese and Vietnamese air defense unitscaused the U.S. to use EW to protect its aircraft from radarcontrolled; surfacetoair missile.
(2) In South Vietnam, both the U.S. Army and the Army of theRepublic of Vietnam (ARVN) used EW support measures (ESM) to aidtheir ground forces. Captured enemy documents showed that the VietCong and the North Vietnamese Army were both very involved incollecting U.S. and ARVN communications.
(3) Vietnam also saw the first largescale use of airborneplatforms to collect enemy communications and locate enemy units.However, jamming was not a major factor in this war.
e. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Persian Gulf Warprovides an example of battlefield deception. The undetectedpositioning of the coalition forces showed how an effective use ofradio silence and deception can influence a battle's outcome. ModernEW technology was also used to seek out major communicationsfacilities, determine their use, and provide targeting informationfor their destruction.
(1) ELINT was heavily used to locate and destroy the Iraqi airdefense capability. U.S. Air Force systems suppressed radar sites.The coalition forces used jamming and lethal attacks with highspeed,antiradiation missiles.
(2) The coalition forces used ESM to support the planning ofdeception operations. The U.S. Marine Corps portrayed an amphibiousassault on Kuwait from the sea. EW was used to support rehearsedlandings and to monitor the Iraqi forces' reaction (determining unitlocations and monitoring radio traffic) to the deception.
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f. The future.
(1) There is little to indicate that the use of EW willdiminish in the postCold War era. In fact, the size of the world'sarmies grows smaller, the need for EW as a force multiplier willgrow. The signal officer's role will become more difficult, asnations probe for weak spots in their adversaries' communications.
(2) Directed energy weapons will be used in future battles.Radio frequency and microwave energy weapons are the most likely tobe developed to disrupt or destroy communications. They couldpotentially attack target emitters as super jammers to destroyelectronic components. Nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse generatorsor transmitters are potential EW weapons. If constructed, thesedevices would generate an electromagneticpulse effect similar tothat of a highaltitude nuclear detonation.
2. Electronic Warfare Components. EW is a command responsibility.It is a significant force multiplier when integrated and used withfire and maneuver. When used properly, it exploits enemy weaknesses,protects friendly freedom of action, and reduces security andcommunication vulnerabilities. EW significantly contributes tocommand, control, and communications countermeasures (C3CM). Figure11 shows the three components of EW.
Figure 1-1. EW components.
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a. ESM provides the capability to intercept, locate, and identifyenemy emitters (Figure 12). This information is needed for planningjamming, deception, electronic countercountermeasures (ECCM), andtargeting operations. It is integrated with the commander's overallfire and maneuver plan. The Assistant Chief of Staff G2,Intelligence (G2), who coordinates with the Assistant Chief of StaffG3, Operations (G3), has staff responsibility for ESM operations.
Figure 1-2. ESM components.
(1) Interception operations provide EW planners withintelligence about the enemy's location, activity, possible futureoperations, and electronic disruption capabilities. Thisintelligence is passed to the G3 for planning electroniccountermeasures (ECM) and ECCM operations. Special EW equipment isorganic to military intelligence (MI) units at corps and division.This provides the means to intercept enemy electronic communicationsand noncommunications emissions in the high frequency (HF), very HF,ultra HF, and super HF ranges. This interception capability providescombat information for the analysts to determine the pertinentintelligence the commander needs.
(2) Identification operations help to identify the size(personnel and equipment), type, echelon, and function of enemyunits. This information has great significance in the commander'sfire and maneuver plans. By identifying the enemy unit, thecommander and his staff can better prepare combat operations.Signals analysts at the MI battalion operations center perform thisfunction. They use automated support to collect, manage, analyze,and report intelligence data. This intelligence is provided to thecommander and his staff for planning purposes.
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(3) Location operations help planners to identify likely orpossible enemy intentions. The data gathered can indicate if anenemy is in an offensive, defensive, or retrograde posture. The sizeof the area an enemy is occupying is a factor in determining theenemy unit's type and size. MI units at corps and division useairborne and groundbased sensors to locate enemy positions throughDF of electronic emissions. The location and movement of enemyforces tells the commander and his staff what the enemy is doing orpreparing to do. In addition to situation development, locationintelligence is also used in planning the targeting of enemypositions.
b. ECM is offensive action taken to prevent or reduce an enemy'seffective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Effective ECMoperations can degrade an enemy's combat effectiveness by degradinghis electromagnetic operations. ECM, a staff responsibility of theG3, includes both electronic jamming and deception.
(1) Electronic jamming reduces or denies an enemy the effectiveuse of his electronic equipment. Jamming can assist the ESM team byforcing an enemy to transmit in the clear and for longer periods. Asa result, the ESM team can gather pertinent information about theenemy (intentions, location, size, etc.), which may assist thecommander and his staff in preparing operational plans. Denying anenemy the use of the electromagnetic spectrum at key times causeschaos, disrupts combat operations, and reduces combat effectiveness.
(2) Electronic deception is used to cause an enemy tomisinterpret what his electronic collection systems receive. It isusually conducted as part of a larger deception operation. It isassociated with friendly electromagnetic radiations (SED andmanipulative electronic deception (MED)) and with those of the enemyforce (imitative electronic deception (IED)).
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c. ECCM are defensive measures used to protect friendly command,control, and communications (C3) systems from enemy EW activities. Itis closely related to signal security (SIGSEC). The main differencebetween the two is the type of information being protected from theenemy. ECCM protects friendly emitters from enemy EW assets. SIGSECprotects the information friendly forces transmit. ECCM allowsfriendly forces the continual use of the electronic spectrum by antiESM (preventive) and antiECM (remedial) activities (Figure 13).ECCM falls under the direction of the G3.
Figure 1-3. ECCM components.
(1) AntiESM are actions taken to deny the enemy access tofriendly force's electromagnetic transmissions. This is done byavoiding the enemy force's EW operations. To deny an enemy access tofriendly electronic assets, several actions may be taken. An exampleis terrain masking, where a friendly radio station is placed, so anobstacle (such as a hill) is between it and the enemy. A secondexample is avoidance (using a directional antenna). A third exampleis emission control (operating at the lowest power needed, turning onthe transmitter only when needed, and using random scheduling forcommunicating, if possible).
(2) AntiECM are used against jamming, but cannot be usedagainst deception or ESM. AntiECM involve actions taken afterdiscovering that the enemy is using EW against friendly forces.Effective antiECM methods are determining the cause of interference,recognizing the difference between jamming and natural interference,changing frequencies, or shutting down communications and switchingto alternate frequencies.
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3. Summary.
a. The use of EW followed the development of radio. As nationsimproved their intelligence gathering systems, they also introducedmethods to thwart their adversaries' means of collectingintelligence. Codes and ciphers were developed. The periodicchanging of call signs and frequencies became a daily part ofcommunications. Jamming and the creation of deceptive communicationspractices became a sophisticated practice. EW has been usedextensively since World War II.
b. EW contributes much to C3CM. There are three components ofEW.
(1) ESM. Interception operations provide EW planners withintelligence about the enemy's location, activity, possible futureoperations, and electronic disruption capabilities. Locationoperations help planners to identify likely and possible enemyintentions. ESM identification operations help to identify the size,type, echelon, and function of enemy units.
(2) ECM. These offensive actions are taken to prevent orreduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.Electronic jamming reduces or denies an enemy the effective use ofhis electronic equipment. The objective of electronic deception isto deceive an enemy through his electronic systems.
(3) ECCM. These are defensive passive measures used to protectfriendly (C3) systems from enemy EW activities. ECCM and SIGSEC areclosely related.
(a) AntiESM are actions taken to deny the enemy access tofriendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
(b) AntiECM are used against jamming. AntiECM cannot beused against deception or ESM.
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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
SS0134 1-10
LESSON 1
PRACTICE EXERCISE
The following items will test your grasp of the material covered inthis lesson. There is only one correct answer for each item. Whenyou complete the exercise, check your answer with the answer key thatfollows. If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that partof the lesson which contains the portion involved.
1. The collecting, analyzing, locating, and identifying of enemyemitters falls under which EW component?
A. Electronic deceptionB. ECMC. ECCMD. ESM
2. Terrain masking is a technique used as part of what?
A. AntiECMB. AntiESMC. AntideceptionD. Antielectronic security
3. ECCM are closely related to what?
A. Signals securityB. Signal electronic deceptionC. EW support measuresD. Signal interface systems requirements
1-11 SS0134
4. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was an example of what?
A. Signal deceptionB. Imitative electronic deceptionC. Simulative electronic deceptionD. Correlation deception
5. Actions taken to deny an enemy entry into the friendlyelectromagnetic spectrum are part of what?
A. ECMB. ESMC. RECD. ECCM
6. Early EW was primarily a locational tool used to identify what?
A. Military units and shipsB Enemy intentionsC. Enemy combat postureD. Jamming ability
7. Interception operations provide EW planners with informationconcerning the enemy's location, activity, and possible actions.What else do they provide?
A. FunctionB. CommandersC. Unit sizesD. Electronic disruption capabilities
SS0134 1-12
8. When integrated and employed with fire and maneuver, EW becomesa significant________.
A. Combat powerB. Force multiplierC. DistractionD. C3CM
9. Who has staff responsibility for ESM operations?
A. G1B. G2C. G3D. Signal officer
1-13 SS0134
LESSON 1
PRACTICE EXERCISE
ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK
Item Correct Answer and Feedback
1. D. ESM.
The EW component in which enemy signals are collectedand emitters are located and identified is ESM. (page16, para 2a)
2. B. AntiESM.
Terrain masking is a technique employed as part ofantiESM. (page 18, par 2c(1))
3. A. Signal security.
Electronic countercountermeasures (ECCM) are closelyrelated to signal security (SIGSEC). The maindifference between the two is in the type ofinformation being protected from the enemy. (page18, para 2c)
4. C. Simulative electronic deception.
The Japanese carried on radio traffic in the homeislands, simulating normal activity of the fleet.(page 13, para 1b(3))
5. D. ECCM.
Electronic countercountermeasures (ECCM) aredefensive measures used to protect the use of theelectromagnetic spectrum from hostile farces. (page18, para 2c)
SS0134 1-14
Item Correct Answer and Feedback
6. A. Military units and ships.
Early EW was primarily used for identifying ships andmilitary units. (page 12, para 1)
7. D. Electronic disruption capabilities.
Interception operations provide EW planners withinformation concerning the enemy's location, activity,possible actions, and electronic disruptioncapabilities. (page 16, para 2a(1))
8. B. Force multiplier.
A command responsibility, EW is a significant forcemultiplier when integrated and employed with fire andmaneuver. (page 15, para 2)
9. B. G2.
The G2 has staff responsibility for ESM operations.(page 16, para 2a)
1-15 SS0134
LESSON 2
ELECTRONIC WARFAREOPERATIONS
LESSON 2
ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS
Critical Tasks: 015701.070001015701.070002015701.070003
OVERVIEW
LESSON DESCRIPTION:
In this lesson, you will learn about using electronic warfare (EW) onthe battlefield.
LESSON TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:
ACTION: Define and explain electronic warfare on thebattlefield.
CONDITION: Given this lesson.
STANDARD: To demonstrate competence, you must achieve a minimum of70 percent on the subcourse examination.
REFERENCES: The material in this lesson was derived from thefollowing publications: FM 1130, FM 241, FM 2418, FM341, FM 3410, FM 3423, FM 3480, TC 341, and TC3441.
INTRODUCTION
EW is used to exploit, disrupt, and deceive enemy command, control,and communications (C3), while protecting friendly use ofcommunications and noncommunications systems. It is a significantforce multiplier when integrated and used with fire and maneuver. Itis also a significant contributor to C3 countermeasures (C3CM).Offensive C3CM is the integrated use of jamming, physical destruction,and military deception to disrupt enemy C3. Defensive C3CM includesEW and operations security to protect friendly C3 and deny an enemyinformation of intelligence value.
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1. Divisional Military Intelligence Battalion. The mission of thedivisional military intelligence (MI) battalion is to providededicated intelligence and EW (IEW) support to the division. Thebattalion is organic to the division. It operates under the commandand direction of the division commander and his staff. The battalionresponds to missions assigned by the division Assistant Chief ofStaff, G2 (Intelligence) and Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operationsand Plans).
a. The MI battalion in a heavy division has four companies(Figure 21). It is authorized approximately 300 personnel at fulltables of organization and equipment (TOE).
Figure 2-1. MI battalion organization (heavy division).
(1) The headquarters, headquarters and service company (HHSC)provides command and control (C2) for all elements, including thoseunder the battalion's operational control. It manages battalionassets in support of IEW operations, and supplies technical controland analysis for EW operations. Personnel and equipment to supportthree IEW support elements are assigned to the HHSCone for eachmaneuver brigade in a threebrigade division.
(2) The collection and jamming (C&J) company providescommunications intelligence (COMINT) collection, lowlevel analysis,and communications jamming support for the division.
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(3) The intelligence and surveillance (I&S) company providesground surveillance for the division. It also provides enemyprisoner of war (EPW) interrogation and limited counterintelligence(CI) capabilities.
(4) The EW company provides EW support measures (ESM) to thedivision. It intercepts, locates, and identifies sources of radiatedenergy on the battlefield in support of the EW plan. It alsoconducts initial analysis and prepares reports to support thecommander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and informationrequirements (IR).
(5) The long range surveillance detachment (LRSD) collectsinformation by human intelligence (HUMINT) means within thedivision's area of operations and interest. For planning purposes,this area extends to a depth of 50 kilometers beyond the forward lineof own troops.
(6) The QUICKFIX flight platoon provides aerial COMINTcollection, direction finding, and jamming support to the division.
b. The MI battalion assigned to an airborne or air assaultdivision has four companies (Figure 22). At full TOE, thisbattalion is authorized approximately 360 personnel.
Figure 2-2. MI battalion organization (airborne/air assaultdivisions).
(1) The headquarters, headquarters and operations company(HHOC) provides C2 for all battalion elements. The HHOC is the homeof the QUICKFIX flight platoon.
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(2) The C&J company performs communications and noncommunications intercept and direction finding operations. It alsoperforms communications jamming.
(3) The I&S company provides ground surveillance,interrogation, and CI support. In an airborne division, it also hasremotelymonitored, battlefield sensor system assets. These provideadditional ground surveillance capability.
(4) The service support company provides maintenance (vehicularand signal), food service, and signal support to the battalion.
(5) The LRSD collects information by HUMINT means within thedivision's area.
c. The MI battalion assigned to a light division is organizedwith the same philosophy as its parent division. It is easy totransport and relies on additional assets from higher echelons forsupport during combat operations. The battalion receives corpsaugmentation for groundbased jamming and electronic intelligencesupport. When the division is in a low intensity conflictenvironment, additional CI and EPW interrogation augmentation isprovided. This battalion has three companies (Figure 23). It isauthorized approximately 295 personnel at full TOE.
Figure 2-3. MI battalion organization (light division).
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(1) The HHSC provides C2 for all elements within the battalionand supporting units. It provides administrative, logistics,maintenance, and communications support for the battalion.
(2) The collection (COLL) company provides COMINT collection,lineofbearing (LOB) information, and analysis support for thedivision.
(3) The I&S company provides counterintelligence, EPWinterrogation, and ground surveillance support for the division.
(4) The LRSD collects information by HUMINT means within thedivision's area of operations and interest.
(5) The flight platoon provides aerial support to complementgroundbased EW systems.
2. Electronic Warfare Battlefield Operations. When integrated intothe overall operational scheme of maneuver, EW is a formidable forcemultiplier. It exploits enemy electronic capabilities and protectsfriendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Figure 24 depicts thevarious functions of EW. ESM acquires information about the enemy.Electronic countermeasures (ECM), the offensive component, prevent orreduce an enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electroniccountercountermeasures (ECCM), the defensive component, are actionstaken to retain friendly use of the spectrum.
a. The interception, location, and identification of enemyelectronic equipment can provide the tactical commander with vitalintelligence about enemy intentions, capabilities, and disposition.The type and quantity of equipment being used provides important datafor EW technicians to analyze and determine what types of units areopposing friendly forces. This information, combined with theequipment's location and frequency of use, provides information onpossible enemy intentions.
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Figure 2-4. EW functions.
b. EW provides the tactical commander with accurate informationthat is used to make estimates, reach decisions, prepare orders, andexecute operational plans. This information must reach the commanderin enough time to be used in the overall tactical scenario. Thecommander receives two types of data (intelligence reports and combatinformation). This is shown in Figure 25.
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Figure 2-5. EW provided data.
(1) Intelligence is data which results after analysis has beenconducted on gathered information (combat and other intelligencereports). It has immediate or potentially significant importance tomilitary planning and operations. It is given to the tacticalcommander in the form of responses to his PIR and informationrequirement (IR).
(2) Combat information is information given directly to thetactical commander before it is analyzed or evaluated. It is alsogiven to the EW team for analysis. This highly perishableinformation can have immediate impact on current combat plans andoperations. Its importance is such that it cannot be delayed for thenormal intelligence analysis. Combat information which is not ofcritical importance is integrated with other intelligence reportsreceived by the EW system. It is then analyzed for responses to thecommander's PIR and IR.
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3. Offensive Electronic Warfare Operations.
a. ESM allows the commander to know the type of enemy force he isfacing. It is the EW component that produces combat information andintelligence reports. This supplies the ESM team with the crucialinformation needed to answer the commander's PIR and IR. It alsoallows the EW staff to plan ECM, ECCM, and targeting operations.
(1) The five major ESM components are search, intercept,locate, identify, and report. These five components are part of acontinuous process (Figure 26). They are carried out using specialEW equipment.
Figure 2-6. ESM components.
SS0134 2-8
(2) In the search component, the ESM team uses special EWequipment to search for enemy electronic transmissions. Theintercept component occurs when the ESM team actually records thetransmissions for further analysis. Acquiring LOB on thetransmissions helps to locate the transmitter. It also helps toidentify where the equipment is located. Identifying the emitteroccurs when all information from the previous components are combinedand analyzed. This intelligence is given to the commander and hisstaff in various EW reports.
b. ECM are actions taken to prevent or reduce effective use ofthe electromagnetic spectrum by enemy forces. ECM operations candegrade an enemy's combat effectiveness by degrading hiselectromagnetic operations. ECM is the staff responsibility of theG3. It includes electronic jamming and deception.
(1) Electronic jamming reduces or denies an enemy the effectiveuse of his electronic equipment. It also permits exploitation byfriendly ESM teams. It allows them to gather vital information aboutenemy intentions, location, size, and other data which could help thecommander and his staff in preparing operational plans. Denying anenemy the use of the electromagnetic spectrum causes chaos anddisrupts his effective combat operations. This greatly reduces hiscombat effectiveness.
(2) Electronic deception causes an enemy to misinterpret whathis electronic systems receive. Normally, it is conducted as part ofa larger deception operation. It involves actions associated withfriendly electromagnetic radiations (manipulative electronicdeception (MED)) and simulative electronic deception (SED)), and withthose of the enemy (imitative electronic deception (IED)).Electronic jamming and deception are discussed in greater detail inthe next lesson of this module.
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4. The Electromagnetic Environment.
a. That battles are won depends in large part to the degree of C2
the commander exercises. Radio is the primary means for carrying outC2. The battlefield's electromagnetic dimension is where a uniqueform of warfare occurs. Friendly units strive to exploit the use ofthe electromagnetic spectrum, while denying its use to an enemy.
b. A battlefield is an extremely violent and exceedingly densesignal environment, with many devices producing signals. A singleU.S. division engaged in combat will have over 3,000 communicationsemitters working. In addition, thousands of enemy emitters and noncommunications emitters (radars, jammers, etc.) are propagatingsignals. This vast amount of electronic equipment causes a saturatedfrequency spectrum.
c. Communications systems are threatened by physical damage andenemy jamming. Friendly emitters may be targeted by enemy interceptor direction finding. Once an enemy gets an electronic fix, he canquickly target friendly forces with artillery and air assets. Abattlefield saturated with signals is not very userfriendly. Thereis much interference and many unpredictable outcomes due to thismessy environment, this electromagnetic "soup." Our forces must beable to operate with minimum communications. They must plan tocontinue operations without radio. Alternate means (messenger,visual signals, etc.) must be practiced to enhance combateffectiveness. Another practice is to reduce the dependence onradio. Too many voice messages relate to aspects of operations thatshould be addressed during the planning stage. Proper planning andcoordination result in fewer calls being made to inquire about whatis to be done. To effectively counter EW in combat, we must make ita continuing part of our combat preparations.
SS0134 2-10
5. Summary. In this lesson, you learned about using EW on thebattlefield.
a. EW is used to exploit, disrupt, and deceive enemy C3, whileprotecting friendly use of communications and noncommunicationssystems. It is a major force multiplier when integrated and usedwith fire and maneuver. It contributes much to C3CM. To beeffective, it must be fully integrated with the commander'soperational plans.
b. The divisional MI battalion provides dedicated IEW support toits division.
c. The five major ESM components are search, intercept, locate,identify, and report.
d. ECM are offensive actions that include both electronic jammingand deception.
(1) Electronic jamming reduces or denies enemy forces theeffective use of its electronic equipment.
(2) Electronic deception is used to cause an enemy tomisinterpret what is received by his electronic systems.
e. ECCM are defensive actions taken to retain friendly use of thespectrum.
2-11 SS0134
LESSON 2
PRACTICE EXERCISE
The following items will test your grasp of the material covered inthis lesson. There is only one correct answer for each item. Whenyou complete the exercise, check your answer with the answer key thatfollows. If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that partof the lesson which contains the portion involved.
1. ECM include electronic jamming and what else?
A. Electronic interceptionB. Electronic identificationC. Electronic avoidanceD. Electronic deception
2. Search, intercept, locate, identify, and report are componentsof what?
A. ECMB. ESMC. ECCMD. SIGSEC
3. Disrupting an enemy's emitters is achieved through which of thefollowing?
A. Communications interceptionB. Emitter locationC. Electronic jammingD. Signal analysis
SS0134 2-12
4. Information given directly to a tactical commander before beinganalyzed or evaluated is called what?
A. Intelligence reportB. Combat informationC. Tactical reportD. Priority information report
5. What can cause an enemy to misinterpret what his electronicsystems are receiving?
A. Electronic deceptionB. Electronic jammingC. ESMD. AntiESM
6. What provides the tactical commander with the capability to knowwhat type of enemy forces are on the battlefield?
A. ESMB. ECMC. ECCMD. SIGSEC
7. Which statement describes any divisional MI battalion?
A. It responds to missions from the division G3 and G4B. It has 290 or fewer assigned soldiersC. It has an HHSCD. It operates under the direction of the division commander
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LESSON 2
PRACTICE EXERCISE
ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK
Item Correct Answer and Feedback
1. D. Electronic deception.
The major components of ECM are electronic jamming andelectronic deception. (page 29, para 3b)
2 B. ESM.
The five ESM components are search, intercept, locate,identify, and report. (page 28, para 3a(1))
3. C. Electronic jamming.
Electronic jamming measures are taken to reduce ordeny enemy forces' use of their electronic equipment.(page 29, para 3b(1))
4. B. Combat information.
Combat information is given directly to the tacticalcommander before being analyzed or evaluated. (page27, para 2b(2))
5. A. Electronic deception.
Electronic deception causes an enemy to misinterpretwhat his electronic systems receive. (page 29, para3b(2))
6. A. ESM.
ESM provide information which allows the tacticalcommander to know what type of enemy forces are on thebattlefield. (page 28, para 3a)
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Item Correct Answer and Feedback
7. D. It operates under the direction of the divisioncommander.
The MI battalion is organic to the division. Itoperates under the command and direction of thedivision commander and his staff. It responds tomissions assigned by the division G2 and G3. (page22, para 1)
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LESSON 3
JAMMING, FREQUENCY CONTROLS,AND ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
LESSON 3
JAMMING, FREQUENCY CONTROLS, AND ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
Critical Tasks: 015701.070001015701.070002015701.070003
OVERVIEW
LESSON DESCRIPTION:
In this lesson, you will learn about the concepts and methods ofjamming and the frequency control methods applied to electronicwarfare (EW). You will also learn about the methods of deceptionused to confuse or distract enemy forces.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:
ACTION: Define and describe the methods of jamming, frequencycontrol mechanisms, and the methods of electronicdeception.
CONDITION: Given this lesson.
STANDARD: To demonstrate competence, you must achieve a minimum of70 percent on the module examination.
REFERENCES: The material in this lesson was derived from thefollowing publications: FM 2433, FM 341, FM 3410, andTC 3441.
INTRODUCTION
Offensive EW is the means commanders use to attack enemy electronicsystems. It combines the use of jamming and electronic deception.It provides combat information to elements able to physically attackenemy systems and equipment. Offensive EW is conducted in threemission areas (degrade, disrupt and deceive, and defend). Jammingdisrupts and degrades enemy electronic systems. Deception misleadsor deceives enemy analysis of the capabilities and intentions offriendly forces.
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1. Jamming Concepts. Jamming is the deliberate radiation orreradiation of energy to prevent or degrade the reception ofinformation by a receiver. The jamming function is tied directly tothe information provided by the EW support measures (ESM) componentof the EW program. The tactics for using jamming vary with thetactical situation and the commander's plan of action. Conceptually,the jamming transmitter is placed between the signal transmitter andthe receiver to which the transmission is directed. However, theability to place the jammer between the transmitter and the receiveris seldom possible. Thus, many jammers have enough power tocompensate for the additional range needed to jam signals effectively.
a. Three methods of communications jamming are commonly used onthe battlefield. Each is used to attack a different signal orsignals.
(1) Spot jamming is directed against a single or specificfrequency, while allowing adjacent frequencies to remain free of theeffects of the jamming. It applies the full radiated power of thejamming transmitter against enemy signals, one frequency at a time.
(2) Barrage jamming targets multiple frequencies. It may beused over a large portion of the frequency spectrum or the entireamplitude modulation or frequency modulation band. Barrage jammingneeds high power to operate. It cannot distinguish between enemy andfriendly frequencies.
(3) Sweep jamming is used to block several preselectedsequential frequencies. It moves from one frequency to another,remaining on each frequency for a predetermined period. It canaffect both friendly and enemy frequencies.
b. Various types of signal modulation can be used during jamming.These modulation types are selected based on their effectivenessagainst the transmission being attacked. In some cases, the jammer'ssignal generator can produce only a limited number of signals. Inother cases, the generator can produce a large number of signals orsounds. Some of the most commonly used modulation types arediscussed below.
(1) The stepped tone signal is a series of varying tonesnormally sent in an ascending or descending order.
(2) The bagpipe signal is like the sounds produced by a bagpipe.
(3) The gulls signal is similar to the sounds made by sea gulls.
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(4) The spark signal is like that made by a spark gap Morsetransmission.
(5) Other popular and effective signals can be applied to thejammer's carrier. They include random Morse keying (onoff keying),random noise, static, and playback of previously recordedtransmissions.
c. Reradiation jamming normally uses special equipment. Normallydirected against noncommunications emitters, there are someapplications of reradiation against communications receivers. Themost widely used method uses the delayed retransmission of a recordedtransmission. To conduct this form of jamming, a very slight delayis used when rebroadcasting the recorded signal. The following areother forms of reradiation jamming:
(1) A repeater can intercept, alter, amplify, and retransmitsignals.
(2) Transponders are systems that automatically send apredetermined signal in response to the reception of a given signal.
(3) Reflection jamming uses devices, such as corner reflectorsand chaff, to confuse electronic systems by producing false signalsor images. It is sometimes called mechanical jamming.
d. The are three major systems for executing jamming missions.They are groundbased systems, airborne platforms, and expendablejammers. Determining the delivery vehicle is based on severalfactors. These include:
(1) Target link distance. This is the distance between theenemy transmitter and receiver.
(2) Jammertoreceiver distance. This is the distance from thejammer to the intended receiver.
(3) Terrain factors. The lineofsight factor between thejammer and the target receiver is important. A hill or mountain canmask the jamming signal.
(4) Effective radiated power quotient. This is the computationof the effective radiated power of the jammer and the enemytransmitter. It is used to determine the jammer radiated powerrequirement needed to defeat the transmitter.
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(5) Signal compatibility. This is the compatibility of themodulation, bandwidth, and enemy signal type.
(6) Environmental factors. The weather, terrain, andvegetation affect the considerations that apply to jammer selection.
2. Control Mechanisms. These are established to ensure the successof all jamming missions, the protection of friendly communications,and the direction of jamming against highvalue targets (HVT).
a. Positive control mechanisms ensure that the mission may bestopped at any time.
(1) The positive control list is a publication of authorizedfrequencies that can be jammed.
(2) Onoff control is a centralized method of controllingjamming. It provides for the immediate initiation or stopping ofjamming missions.
b. Negative control mechanisms protect specific frequencies frombeing jammed, except as authorized on a jamming restriction list.This method of control is executed through the development ofseparate listings of frequencies that are under any of the threeclassifications of frequencies.
(1) Taboo frequencies are never to be jammed for any reason.However, they can be timecontrolled, and the jamming restrictionsmay be removed during particular time periods.
(2) Protected frequencies are those frequencies used ordesignated for use by friendly forces for a planned or ongoingoperation. These frequencies are published in a protected frequencylist.
(3) Guarded frequencies are listed as enemyused frequenciesexploited by friendly force ESM or signals intelligence (SIGINT).Guarded frequencies can only be jammed when the potential operationalgain outweighs the value of the information they provide.
c. A combination of negative and positive controls can be used tokeep jamming missions under control.
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3. Electronic Deception. This is normally used to cause enemyanalysts to misread the situation and provide their commander withmisleading information and intelligence that appears to be accurate.The three types of electronic deception are manipulative electronicdeception (MED), simulative electronic deception (SED), and imitativeelectronic deception (IED). The signal officer plans and executesboth MED and SED. IED is primarily conducted by militaryintelligence (MI) personnel.
a. MED involves altering the electromagnetic profile of friendlyforces.
(1) MED tries to influence or alter enemy EW and SIGINTestimates of the situation. It does this by changing the technicalcharacteristics of specified friendly communications to create falseimpressions.
(2) MED can include false traffic levels, false peaks, routing,electronic cover, and controlled breaches of communications security.It can also use noncommunications devices.
(3) The deployment of various types of radar to misleadanalytic assessments of the location of airfields, air defensebatteries, and field artillery units can aid in applying MEDeffectively.
(4) To be effective, MED must be developed by those with acomplete knowledge of the operational concepts and procedures offriendly communications.
b. SED can counter an enemy's EW ability to accurately read thebattlefield. It does this by misleading the enemy about friendlyforce composition, deployment, and capabilities.
(1) The indication of additional friendly forces on orapproaching the battlefield is an example of SED. By matching thecommunications and noncommunications emitters of a friendly unit andduplicating the type and volume of radio traffic normally found inthat unit, an enemy can be misled into believing there are morefriendly forces on the battlefield than actually exist.
(2) The introduction of new or different electronic systems canindicate to an enemy that new systems or type units are available.
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(3) Another method of conducting SED is to create a falseelectronic signature which indicates that a friendly unit has moved.Such deception, coupled with suppressed communications at the unit'sactual location, can alter an enemy's estimate of friendly intentions.
c. IED can be conducted against both communications and noncommunications emitters.
(1) The function of IED may vary in the methods and techniquesused. IED injects false and misleading information directly into anenemy's communications nets. Thus, the activity may vary in scope,based on the sensitivity and sophistication of the techniques used.
(2) The scope of IED may include nuisance intrusion, deceptivejamming, planned message intrusion, and cryptographic intrusion.Nuisance intrusion requires language ability, a compatible radio, andlittle technical support. However, deceptive jamming, plannedmessage intrusion, and cryptographic intrusion need skilled operatorsto prevent the enemy from detecting the level of success thatfriendly EW and SIGINT are having in exploiting enemy communications.
d. The use of electronic, physical, and sonic (noise) deceptiontechniques is depicted in Figure 31. The main attacking force oftanks and armored personnel carriers (APC) uses radio silence andnoise discipline. A small deception portrays a large frontal attack.The two APCs have a small physical signature. Loudspeakers andequipment broadcast recorded tank and APC noise. With that and thetree line to hide in, the two APCs indicate a larger force. Thus,the enemy is fed false data.
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Figure 3-1. Deception scenario.
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4. Summary. In this lesson, you learned about the concepts andmethods of jamming, the frequency control methods applied to EW. Youalso learned about the methods of deception used to confuse ordistract enemy forces.
a. Jamming is the deliberate radiation or reradiation of energyto prevent or degrade the reception of information by a receiver.Three methods of communication jamming are commonly used on thebattlefield. Each is used to attack a different signal or signals.
(1) There are several methods of communications jamming. Spotjamming is directed against a single or specific frequency, whileallowing adjacent frequencies to remain free of the effects of thejamming. Barrage jamming is targeted against multiple frequencies.Sweep jamming is used to block several preselected frequencies.
(2) Various types of signal modulation can be used duringjamming. Some of the common modulation types are stepped tones,bagpipes, gulls, and spark.
(3) Reradiation jamming normally uses special equipment and isdirected against noncommunications emitters.
(4) The three major systems for jamming missions are groundbased systems, airborne platforms, and expendable jammers. Severalfactors determine the delivery vehicle. They include target linkdistance, jammertoreceiver distance, terrain factors, effectiveradiated power quotient, signal compatibility, and environmentalfactors.
b. Control mechanisms are established to ensure the success ofall jamming missions, the protection of friendly communications, andthe direction of jamming against HVT. Positive control mechanismsensure that the mission may be terminated at any time. Negativecontrol mechanisms protect specific frequencies from being jammed,except as authorized on a jamming restriction list.
c. Electronic deception is normally used to cause the enemyanalysts to misread the situation and provide his commander withinformation and intelligence which, while in appearance is accurate,is actually misleading. The three types of electronic deception areMED, SED, and IED. The signal officer plans and executes both MEDand SED. IED is primarily an MI function.
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LESSON 3
PRACTICE EXERCISE
The following items will test your grasp of the material covered inthis lesson. There is only one correct answer for each item. Whenyou complete the exercise, check your answer with the answer key thatfollows. If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that partof the lesson which contains the portion involved.
1. MI personnel perform which form of deception?
A. Imitative electronic deceptionB. Collective electronic deceptionC. Simulative electronic deceptionD. Manipulative electronic deception
2. Altering the electromagnetic profile of friendly forces iscalled what?
A. Simulative electronic deceptionB. Imitative electronic deceptionC. Manipulative electronic deceptionD. Signal intelligence
3. Jamming control mechanisms include both positive and negativecontrols. Which of the following is a positive control?
A. Onoff controlsB. Taboo frequenciesC. Guarded frequenciesD. Protected frequencies
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4. Which of the following is normally directed against a specificfrequency?
A. Stepped jammingB. Barrage jammingC. Sweep jammingD. Spot jamming
5. Which form of jamming is most often used against noncommunications?
A. Radiation jammingB. Reradiation jammingC. Spot jammingD. Barrage jamming
6. The application of a modulation to a type of jamming is donebecause the selected modulation does what?
A. Provides a better ground waveB. Provides a more efficient sky waveC. Performs better against the signal being transmittedD. Is most effective for the distance between the jammer and
the receiver
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7. Which of the following describes jamming?
A. A repeater can intercept and amplify, but not modify, asignal
B. A mountain cannot mask a jamming signalC. Target link distance is the distance from the jammer to the
intended receiverD. Environmental factors affect the ability of a jamming
device to radiate a signal
8. What is the form of deception used to enter an enemycommunications net?
A. Imitative electronic deceptionB. Collective electronic deceptionC. Simulative electronic deceptionD. Manipulative electronic deception
9. Which scope of imitative electronic deception requires the leasttechnical support?
A. Cryptographic intrusionB. Deceptive jammingC. Nuisance intrusionD. Planned message intrusion
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LESSON 3
PRACTICE EXERCISE
ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK
Item Correct Answer and Feedback
1. A. Imitative electronic deception.
The signal officer plans and executes both MED andSED. IED is primarily conducted by MI personnel.(page 35, para 3)
2. C. Manipulative electronic deception.
Manipulative electronic deception is an altering ofthe electromagnetic profile of friendly forces. (page35, para 3a)
3. A. Onoff controls.
Positive control mechanisms includes the positivecontrol list and onoff control. (page 34, para 2a)
4. D. Spot jamming.
Spot jamming is directed against a single or specificfrequency while allowing adjacent frequencies toremain free of the effects of jamming. (page 32,para 1a(1))
5. B. Reradiation jamming.
Reradiation jamming normally uses special equipmentand is directed against noncommunications emitters.(page 33, para 1c)
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Item Correct Answer and Feedback
6. C. Performs better against the signal being transmitted.
These modulation types are selected based on theireffectiveness against the method of transmission beingattacked. (page 32, para 1b)
7. D. Environmental factors affect the ability of a jammingdevice to radiate a signal.
Weather, terrain, and vegetation affect theconsiderations that apply to jammer selection. (page34, para 1d(6))
8. A. Imitative electronic deception.
IED injects false and misleading information directlyinto an enemy's communications nets. The activity mayvary in scope, based on the sensitivity andsophistication of the techniques used. (page 36,para 3c(1))
9. C. Nuisance intrusion.
Nuisance intrusion requires language ability, acompatible radio, and little technical support.However, deceptive jamming, planned message intrusion,and cryptographic intrusion need skilled operators toprevent an enemy from detecting the level of successthat friendly EW and SIGINT are having in exploitingenemy communications. (page 36, para 3c(2))
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