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PPROVED FORRELEASE - HISTORICAL

*L LCOLLECTION DIVISIONHR70-14 DATE:

ti l I 07-18-2012

DIRECTORATE OFINTELLIGENCE

SOVIET OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES:

A PRELIMINARY REASSESSMENT

Top SecretSR WP 70-3

June 1970

Copy No. 8

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYDirectorate of Intelligence

Office of Strategic ResearchJune 1970

WORKING PAPER

Soviet Offensive. Chemical Warfare Capabilities:A Preliminary Reassessment

Introduction

This study was undertaken by the Office of StrategicResearch in response to recommendations made .by theCritical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC) in itsreport of 16 October 1969. There is little direct evi-dence bearing on Soviet chemical warfare technology sinceWorld War II and no evidence which will permit a con-fident assessment of CW production, stocks, or militaryavailability. Much remains to be done in both collectionand analysis before the uncertainty in these areas canbe narrowed. In the interim this report suggests oneapproach to assessing the quantity of stocks the Sovietscould have available and outlines the state of our knowl-edge concerning Soviet CW capabilities in general,

Note: This paper was produced solely by.CIA in theOffice of Strategic Research.

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Contents

Page

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 3

Policy and Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Chemical Weapons and Delivery Systems . 6

Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Storage Sites . . . .. .. . . . . . . .. .. 10

Planning Requirements . . . . . .. . . . . . 19

Eastern Europe. . . ... . . . . . . . . . 22

Appendixes

I. Storage Installations in the USSR asReappraised for CW Activity . . . . . . . 25

II. Evidence for Reappraisal of SovietStorage Installations for CW Activity. . . 27

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Summary

Soviet interest in the.development.of chemicalwarfare (CW) weapons has continued since the dis-astrous World War I chemical attacks on the Russiansby the Germans. Although no chemicals were usedduring World War .II, there: is ample evidence thatthe Soviets intended to be prepared. for the eventu-ality of their use by. producing chemical agents atseveral sites. Soviet knowledge of more modernnerve agents. was assured by expropriation of Germanproduction equipment and personnel at the end ofWorld War II; although there is no evidence thatthis equipment was ever~used.for production of agenton a significant scale.

The sum of evidence currently available will notsupport a confident estimate of the Soviet Union'scapabilities for chemical warfaxe_.

_ Intelligenceon all types of delivery systems is sparse, and thereis no information on the possible composition of achemical stockpile. 1 .a storage site or sites couldbe confirmed, the fact remains that there is insuf-ficient evidence to confirm production of agent sinceWorld War II, and there is virtually no evidence ofproduction since the early Fifties. Nine storagesites which show some evidence of CW activity havebeen identified.

The maximum total storage capacity of these ninesites is 37,000 to 48,000 tons of agent, depending

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on the assumed proportions of bulk agent and filledmunitions. This estimate assumes that all buildingsestimated to be capable of chemical storage do indeedhold toxic chemicals and nothing else.

Such an estimate is relatively meaningless, how-ever, without better knowledge of the compositionof the stockpile. Not only is the percentage ofmodern nerve agent as opposed to World War I typeagent unknown but, more important, the amount ofagent in filled munitions as opposed to that inbulk storage is unknown. Although a higher pro-portion of bulk agent would result in a larger stock-pile, bulk agent is useless as a military topl untilit has been converted into filled munitions, a time-consuming process requiring special facilities.

An estimate based on analogs of US. requirementssuggests that the Soviets would probably calculatetheir own chemical requirement for a 30-day operationagainst the central region of NATO at close to25,000 tons of agent. This would, of course, haveto. be in filled munitions readily available. to theforces. At the present time the Soviets probably.cannot meet such a requirement. The initiation ofchemical action against NATO by the Soviets in that.context seems unlikely in view of the extreme militaryand political hazards involved.

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Policy and boctrine

Most of the available intelligence on Sovietpolicy and doctrine regarding chemical weapons datesfrom the early Sixties. This information is in theform of theoretical discourses on military strategyand doctrine. No official policy or planning doc-.uments on Soviet offensive chemical warfare areavailable. The small amount of information dating.-from later in the Sixties is mostly from East Europeansources, and reflects no apparent significant changes.

The evidence indicates that the.Soviets.apparent-ly consider chemical weapons subject to the samerestrictions and controls as nuclear weapons. Theauthorization of the Ministry of Defense would haveto be secured for the initiation of action withchemical weapons, and the Ministry in turn would.have. to receive approval from the Central Committee.of the Communist Party. Once approval had been given.for the use of chemicals, the selection of targetsand procedures for the use of the weapons wouldprobably be determined by the army commander.

The Soviets regard chemical weapons primarily.as weapons for tactical rather than long range use,and they almost. invariably speak of them as beingused in conjunction with nuclear weapons. Theevidence suggests that the Soviets would use chemicalweapons- only- in a nuclear conflict. There is no

- evidence of weapons or planning for the delivery ofchemicals at strategic distances, although one writermentions the possibility of-using longer range tac-tical missiles for chemical attacks on "war factories,

- ports, and political and economic centers."

Specific tactical doctrine calls for use of.chemical agents against concentrations of personnel,such as units at missile launch positions, troopson the march or in concentrated thrusts, and commandposts. Note is made of the usefulness of chemicalsin areas where nuclear weapons cannot economicallybe used,.such as in mountainous terrain where thetopography would provide blast protection, and ofthe use of persistent agents to contaminate regions

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and deny them to advancing troops, or to cut offevasion or retreat routes

Chemical Weapons and Delivery Systems

There is -evidence that chemical units in theSoviet forces are strictly defensive in their mis-sion. Chemical defense units have been involvedin handling small amdunts of.World War I type chemicalagent to be used: in training and exercises, but theyare not trained in the offensive, use of chemicalweapons-. Apparently- such 'offensive capabilitiesas exist in the Soviet forcas are integrated into-.those units which are :tasked with conventional of-fensive operations: rocket battalions', missilebrigades artillery units- and the tactical air forces.

said that CBR (chemical,bacteriological, radiological) warheads were nevermentioned during the course.

Nonetheless, there is evidence for the existenceof some chemical weapons, and such weapons apparently'continue to be allocated to forces in certain exercises

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and are noted in some planning documents. Thesereferences often appear, however, to be in the formof an afterthought and chemical operations are oftenignored or given very short treatment in text. Despitethis, the fact that they appear in these documentsat all implies that such weapons are in the.arsenaland would under certain circumstances be made avail-able to the forces. The apparent lack of emphasismay imply either that the Soviets do not considerthe advantages to be gained by the.use of chemicalsgreat.enough to offset the political and militaryrisks involved, or that chemical.weapons may- notbe available in sufficient.quantity to produce ef-fective results.

No good technical information is available forCW delivery systems after World War II. At-thattime the Soviet Union.had in its arsenal chemical.shells for artillery, chemical land mines, multipleground-launched rockets, and grenades. Chemicalaerial.bombs and spray tanks for aircraft were alsoavailable.

Since that time,.Soviet military writings havecontinued to refer to the existence of most of these:conventional systems, with the addition of chemicalwarheads for tactical rockets and missiles. Littleis known, however, about the distribution of chemicalweapons to units, storage within units, or the per-centage.of chemical weapons in the total stockpile.Such detailed information would probably be.obtainableonly through a human source with access to classifieddocuments dealing specifically with.chemical weaponry.

There is good evidence that a chemical warheadoption exists for the-Frog tactical.rocket. Thereprobably is a chemical warhead for the Scud A tacticalmissile, but evidence for the Scud B is less- con-vincing.

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Scud B, introduced to the forces in t eearly Sixties; accounts for about 70 percent of theScuds in the USSR. Warheads are not interchangeablebetween the A and B versions.

Chemical munitions may be available for moststandard calibers of .artillery and for the 122mm,140mm, 200mm, and 240mm multiple rocket launchers.Intelligence is lacking for these munitions, however,and there is no information on the amount of suchmunitions that might be in the stockpile. Likewise,data on aerial bombs and chemical land mines arelacking in the postwar period. There are indicationsthat the Soviets consider aerial spray tanks im-practical for high performance aircraft.

Production

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Among agents which may be in the stockpile aresome World War I type agents, including mustard,phosgene, lewisite, and hydrogen cyanide. Moremodern nerve agents which are known to the.Sovietsare the G agents--so hamed because of their Germanorigin--and a newer, reportedly more toxic nerveagent called VR-55.

Tabun, or GA, is the least toxic of the G agents,and is now rarely mentioned in Soviet military

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literature. Sarin, or GB, is a highly volatile,nonpersistent agent of intermediate toxicity. Soman,or GD, a partially persistent agent, is the mosttoxic of the three G agents, and there is no ef-fective therapy for casualties caused by it. Al-though the captured German production eguipment forsarin and tabun was removedby the Soviets, there is no evidence of any morethan possible experimental or pilot production of.any nerve agents there.

References to the agent VR-55 have appeared inSoviet classified documents and, according to.onesource, it is 10 times as toxic- as soman and some25 times as toxic as sarin. No information has beenobtained on the specific chemical properties of thisagent, nor is there any evidence of its production.

There is some evidence of CW agent productionat two plants in the postwar period, but this hasnot been confirmed. At all other plants which havebeen suspected of CW agent production--usually onthe basis of their involvement with it in World WarII--there is no evidence to support any such activityafter World War II. Many of these plants have sub-sequently become involved in the production oforganophosphorous insecticides, which use many ofthe raw materials and some of the production processesused for nerve agent. The conversion of an insecticide

plant to nerve agent production, however, wouldinvolve major modifications of the facilities andproduction of both materials could not take placeinterchangeably.

was reported to pro-duce mus ard gas until-1949, when production wasterminated "because all the storage tanks were full."There is no information since then to indicate wargas production of any sort, nor has the plant beeninvolved in producing organophosphorous insecticides.Its chief outputs- are now ordinary industrial chemicals,mainly acids, and possibly explosives.

produced war gasin World War II, and captured German tabun production

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equipment and sarin pilot plant equipment were sentthere. _a part of the plant I I

w ere Iork with dangerous materialswas carried out, and of the German equip-ment there. that the area ofthe plant where this activity was. taking place wasnot large enough for an more than experimental orpilot production. now produces ordinaryindustrial chemicals an organophosphorous insecticides.No special security measures are in effect there,and no gas masks or protective clothing have beenobserved. Tank cars seen leaving the plant havebeen marked with their contents, which are not mili-tary in nature.

Three other chemical plants)

have -been suspected of involvement in CW agent pro-duction, mainly on the basis of their history ofagent production in World War II. There is no evi-dence of any CW activity since the war at any ofthese.plants, and there is good evidence of productionof ordinary chemical products or insecticides atall three.

An industrial facility which has been underconstruction at was formerlythought to be intended for the.production of CWagent. suggestthat the installation--which after 11 years is stillnot completed--may become a production facility formissile fuels.

Storage Sites

A confident estimate of total CW agent storagein the USSR is unlikely to be achieved withoutdocumentary evidence. Identification of. storagesites has been unusually difficult and, even whenthey are identified, it has not been possible todetermine which buildings within the site actuallycontain chemical agents. No information is- avail-able on Soviet storage practices or densities ofmaterial in storage sheds. Information is alsolacking on the percentage of bulk storage versus.

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8filled munitions, the percentage of World War IItype, agent versus modern nerve agent; and the amountof nontoxic, chemical munitions (incendiaries, smoke,tear gas, etc ) ,, or equipment such as gas masks,sensing devices, or decontamination kits that mightbe stored in the same sheds There is evidence,however, thatnontoxic chemical warfare materialsare sometimes stored in tihe same sheds as toxic:agents.

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indicators which are oftenobserved in conjunction with activity other than CWinclude lightning rods by storage sheds, specialventilation on storage buildings, and decontaminationvehicles. Lightning rods are present.when many kindsof dangerous substances are stored including ordinaryammunition or explosives.

'Although it is possible that there may be someconnection between unusual ventilation and CW storage,Soviet standards for the construction of storage.buildings for ordinary explosives call for some formof ventilation in all cases. US practice in..thisregard is inconsistent and appears to reflect localconditions and attitudes at the time of construction.

It may besignificant that two of the "better SovietCWstorage sitedshow no evidence of special provision for ventilation.Decontamination vehicles have several uses otherthan for chemical warfare applications, and may bepresent where many kinds of dangerous chemicals arehandled, such as missile fuel.

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Two CW storage sites in the USSR are currentlyestimated as probable eCW associated sites-, 6 aspossible, and 9 as suspect. No site is rated confi rmed.On the basis of a thorough examination of the evi-dence for CW activity, these 17 sites have beenreappraised for this study Almost all changeswhich have been made in classification of the siteshave involved downgrading or negating sites formerlyestimated to be CW associated. The sites as re-appraised are listed on the next page. and in Appendix I.The details of the evidence for CW activity appear inAppendix II.

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The total square footage in roof area of build-ings which could be used for CW storage breaks downas follows

Probable" sites 202,000P sible sites 552,000Suspect sites 681,000

Total 1,435,000

Negated sites 936,000

Assuming it possible to identify a storage shedas CW associated, and assuming it-to contain onlytoxic agent or munitions, a rough factor for the

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density of chemical agent stored in it might bedetermined by using analogs of US storage practice,modified by the small amount of data available onSoviet storage practices for ordinary ammunition,explosives, and pesticides. It is doubtful thatstandards for the storage of toxic chemicals wouldbe less rigid than for these other substances. Sucha rough factor could be applied to sheds suspectedof holding chemical agent to give an estimatedmaximum storage capacity. The actual amount ofagent stored might be considerably less than thisfigure.

A major weakness inherent in'any attempt todetermine the size of the Soviet chemical stockpileis that the ratio of bulk agent to filled munitions.is not known. This ratio not only affects the es-timated total size of the stockpile, but has seriousimplications for its military effectiveness.

The existence of agent in bulk storage--no matterhow large the stockpile--is meaningless unless itcan be converted into usable munitions. Severelogistics problems are created by the processes whichmust be gone through to convert bulk agent intofilled munitions. For instance, the conversion of12,000 tons of agent--approximately half the estimated30-day requirement (see page 21)--into artilleryshells would require filling some 2.5 million shells.Using the most efficient CW munitions filling plantin existence in the US, the process would take 13months.

If it is assumed that most agent in the USSRis in bulk storage--the most efficient means ofstoring it--the total amount of agent becomes largerby a factor of about 3 than if stored in filledmunitions. If, on the other hand, it is assumedthat the Soviet CW stockpile is militarily useful,with most agent in filled munitions, the difficultiesof storing such munitions make the result of anycalculation of the total stockpile significantlysmaller.

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Bulk storage may take several forms. It is notknown if the Soviets have an equivalent to the US"l-ton" container for CW agents. There is evidence,however, that they have used 200-liter steel drumsfor the storage of some types of toxic chemicals.Calculations indicate, however, that the amount ofagent that could be stored in a given floor area isabout the same for both types of containers, andwould average about 4.5 tons per 100 square feet ofroof area.

where three types of large tanks representa unique -kv'ca ofstora eassuminatheycontain CWa ent.

.There are five groupsof these tanks, with-eilit~ks per group. Onlytwo of the groups, however, appear to be in use;the rest are overgrown. One tank in one of the"active" groups appears to have its top removed.The capacity of the two active groups is estimatedat about 1,300 tons.

The third type of tank is horizontal

a maximum of 144thanks woua-~be available for storage. The totalcapacity of these tanks is estimated at about 5,300tons. If this type of bulk storage were calculatedon the basis of tonnage per 100 square feet of roofarea, the factor would be 6.3 tons.

An article in the open Soviet literature on thestorage of explosives gives several examples of theconstruction and layout of buildings for variouskinds of explosives. Analysis of these buildings

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and the materials they were intended to store pro-duced densities of 1.1 to 2.0 tons of explosivesper 100 square feet of roof area.

A Soviet article on the construction of facilitiesfor the storage of hazardous pesticides indicatesthat liquid pesticides are stored at a density ofonly about 1 ton per 100 square feet of roof area.The example given was, however, for a portion of astorage shed considerably smaller than most shedsthought to be used for the storage of toxic war gases,and the method of storage of the liquid within thebuilding was not described.

US Army chemical storage practices vary withlocal conditions and requirements. General guide-lines call for storage which will permit ready ac-cess for inspection of the munitions or containers,and observe normal regulations for the storage ofammunition when loaded munitions are involved.Allowances .are made for the configuration of existingstorage facilities, and for the use of mechanizedloading and unloading equipment when possible. Theonly limitation on the amount of chenical agent perse stored in a structure is imposed by the totalamount of materiel that can be fitted into it, limitedby the abovementaoned considerations. Figures derivedfrom examples of actuak US practice are consistentwith Soviet explosives storage densities and withdensities calculated from hypothetical storage con-figurations for various munitions.

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The density factors derived by the above methodswere combined, with weight given to each factor ac-cording to the relevance it was estimated to haveto the Soviet stockpile. The resulting averageswere 3-3/4 tons of agent per 100 square feet of roofarea for bulk storage, and 1-1/3 tons for filledmunitions.

Prior to the initiation in 1969 of the programto dispose of outdated agent and munitions, the USArmy chemical stockpile was about 30,000 tonso Ofthis, 57 percent was in bulk storage and 43 percentin filled munitions. As the composition of the Sovietstockpile is unknown, for purposes of this study thefactors for storage densities have been ranged from2/3 bulk and 1/3 filled storage, to 1/3 bulk and2/3 filled. The resulting composite factor for bothtypes of storage combined ranges from a high of 2.9tons per 100 square feet of roof area to a low of 2.1tons.

The application of these factors to the sitesnow estimated to be involved in CW activity producesthe following results:

Probable sites -- 202,000 square feet

4,200 to 5,900 tons

Possible sites -- 552,000 square feet

11,600 to 16,000 tons

Suspect sites -- 681,000 square feet

14,300 to 19,700 tons

A "best estimate" figure for CW storage has beenobtained by combining the probable and possible sites.This produces totals ranging from 15,800 to 21,900tons. A figure believed to represent an absolutemaximum can be derived by adding the suspect sites,producing a range of 30,100 to 41,600 tons of agent.To these figures might be added about 6,600 tons whichcould be contained in the storage tanks at

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Planriing Requirements

. Several documents, particularlyfrom the earlySixties, indicate an allocation of: chemical missilesin exercises of up to 60 percent of the total mis-siles allocated for the op'eration. Other planningdocuments for large -scale .operations *take no note*whatever of chemical weapors, while diverging at -great length on techniquea and tactics for nuclearweapons.

Some documents, mostly from the early Sixties,indicate a certain number or percentage of chemicalmissiles allocated to forces for ~an operation orexercise, while these missiles are never used in thecourse of the action. One possible reason for sucha situation may be .found in an Ironbark* document:"...the use of missiles with chemical *or conven-tional filling will have an appropriate effect onlyif they are used in great quantitiess,0 .the use ofeven 10 to 15 missiles with chemical filling in alimited interval of time is beyond the capabilitynot only of an army but also of a front**

*Designates materia .supplted by Colonel ekosi

** The fron is the highest Soviet wartie fieldheadquarters for the:joint oprtional control ofgeneraZ pufrpose forces. it wou d ccnsiAst of aboutthree fied armies and a racticai ar army pluscombat and service support

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The writer notes several reasons why enoughlaunchers could never simultaneously become avail-able in a given area to deliver a large enough chem-ical strike. He then says, "...this is preciselythe reason that frequently during front exercisesthe majority of missiles with chemical filling al-lotted for an operation remain unexpended; and, whenthey are used, the required reliability of destructionof targets is not attained...." Although the -pres-ent Soviet tactical missile strike capability isconsiderably greater than in the earl Sixties--when these words were written- plan-ning documents of the late Sixties con inue to sug-gest a low level of interest in utilizing chemicalwarheads.

Several sources mention a desired casualty rateof 60 to 80 percent, whereas current U flanningdocuments call for a casualty rate of percentamong troops under direct attack and percent forthe entire theater area. This disparity may be theresult of differing views of the utility of chemicalweapons. Whereas the Soviets appear to view chemicalweapons as a substitute form of ordinary artilleryor rocket weaponry, for destroying enemy troops,current US planning strives for a concentration ofagent just high enough to force the enemy to donprotective clothing and gas masks, thereby reducinghis combat efficiency.

Practical considerations, both in the amountof agent required and the availability of deliverysystems, would probably force the Soviets to adopta lower casualty rate in actual operations. Cal-culations made from US ammunition expenditure tablessuggest that under average conditions an increaseof five times the- amount of agent used against atarget will produce only 2-1/2 times the casualties.

In lieu of adequate knowledge of Soviet plan-ning philosophy, US planning for chemical operationscan provide an idea of how requirements are computed.A recent US study set forth calculations of CW agentrequirements for operations in the central region ofNATO. The following assumptions were made: that

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the desired effect could be had with an overallcasualty rate of L percent in unprotected troops,that all chemical operations would take place inthe 0-30 km zone along the front, that two-thirdsof the enemy troops--some 1,000,000 troops--wouldbe in the 30 km zone, that ac target would be ac-quired once a day, and that percent of all fireswould be chemical.

In any analogy between Soviet and US planning,certain differences in planning philosophy must betaken into account. The US requirement of percentcasualties must be considered an absolute minimum;a lower rate would probably be virtually ineffective.Soviet planning would probably take into considerationthe use of tactical rockets- and missiles to a depthgreater than 30 km. Thus, the Soviets would probablyview their requirements for agent and munitions ashigher, if anything, than US requirements.

A requirement of 780 tons per day would imply--assuming a reserve of about 30 days' supply throughfront level--a stockpile of some 23,400 tons of-agentin filled munitions and readily available to theforces.

There is no evidence that chemical munitions arestored with the Soviet combat forces; only thosestorage sites noted in this study show any evidenceof holding CW agent or munitions. Of these sites,almost all are located well to the interior of thecountry or near the Sino-Soviet border.

Thus, without extensive prior preparations, in-cluding large movements of agent and toxic munitionsand the filling of munitions--all hazardous and time-consuming--it is doubtful that the amount of chemical

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weapons available to the forces would be sufficientto support a full scale conflict against NATO. With-out a significant increase in ready munitions avail-able, the Soviets would probably not consider theirchemical capability significant enough to justifyrisking the political hazards involved in its use.

Eastern Europe

There is no evidence that chemical weapons ormunitions in militarily significant quantities arein Eastern Europe, either under control of the So etsor the Warsaw Pactfre

such weaponswoul be supplied to the Warsaw Pact forces by theUSSR in the event of an invasion, and that there

e weapons in Czechoslovakia. Otherindicated that CW training in the Pact

There are no confirmed stora a sites for CW inEastern Europe. storageor production at several p aces, but much of thisinformation is cont dt -

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and there is no evidence of chemical, storageat e five Soviet probable nuclear storage facilitiesnear airfields in Eastern Europe.

A recent report suggested that a central CWstorag ode~t undr _aviet control was to be estab-lished n cthis h s n-ein cTrfed.unloading 12 "warheads" allege to be chemical intosheds near in 1967. The descriptionof the warhea -eift--unclear their exact type, andthe fact that they were crated and not in specialcannisters suggests they may have been 240mm rocketsrather than warheads for tactical missiles.

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There is evidence that small quantities of oldertype CW agents are stored with defensive CW equipmentat some installations. This agent is used for train-ing and exercises, and is not stored in sufficient

quantities for military operations. There have beenreports of the production of small quantities of

agent for research purposes in Czechoslovakia.ksaid that allCW-training in Poiand was defensive in nature, butthat very small quantities of World War II typeagent--a few pounds per year--were produced for ex-perimental work.

It is not possible to arrive at definitive an-swers to the question of CW activity in Eastern Euro ewith the information presently available. As

coverage of the installationsby human sources is obtained, a clearer picture maye er.- A research effort

might in time provide ky oabteunderstanding of Soviet practices.

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