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Stockholm University Department of Political Science Political Science III PSIII 379: Security and Strategy in IP (Fall Semester 2012) Independent Research Project (15 ECTS) Research Essay Title: Understanding the failure of the peace initiative: “Plan Colombia(“Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State” 1998-2002) Supervisor: Masako Ikegami Student: Isabel Wester Date: 13/01/2012 Key words: latifundium, initiative, incompatibility, transcendence, peace, recognition. Word count: 11852

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Page 1: Understanding the failure of the peace initiative: “Plan

Stockholm University

Department of Political Science

Political Science III

PSIII 379: Security and Strategy in IP (Fall Semester 2012)

Independent Research Project (15 ECTS)

Research Essay Title:

Understanding the failure of the peace initiative: “Plan Colombia” (“Plan for

Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State” 1998-2002)

Supervisor: Masako Ikegami

Student: Isabel Wester

Date: 13/01/2012

Key words: latifundium, initiative, incompatibility, transcendence, peace, recognition.

Word count: 11852

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Table of Contents

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….…3

Background

Research Problem

Research Question

Literature Review .....................................................................................................................6

Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………………………....11

Phase 1 : Agreement

Phase 2: Implementation

Negative & Positive peace

Method, Tools, & Research Material………………………………………………………..17

Methodology

Research Material

Empirical Analysis……………………………………………………………………………19

Units: Plan Colombia - Common Agenda - Ten years of Plan Colombia.

- State/socio-economical reinforcement

- Security reinforcement

Discussion……………………………………………………………………………………..28

State and socio-economical reinforcement

Security reinforcement

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………….34

References…………………………………………………………………………………….36

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Introduction

Research Problem

Peace remains elusive in Colombia. After four decades of fighting and a multitude of

failed attempts at negotiating peace, Colombia remains home to the largest conflict in the

Western Hemisphere; a conflict that has killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, and

displaced millions of people. Although disproportionately impacting the poorest and the most

vulnerable Colombian citizens, all spheres of society have been affected by the violence that

the conflict has entailed (Meltzer, 2005:1). The intensity of the conflict and its consequences

has created strong domestic and international pressures inducing the Colombian government to

find rapid solutions to this conflict.

Back in 1964, the Colombian National Army attempted to take control over a

communist community which retaliated after the known period of La Violencia, where the

liberal and conservative parties fought for power to death, strongly inducing the peasants

originals of this community to join in an ideological cause in need for recognition and political

participation. FARC1 was born within these motivations to resist the opposing ideological

forces of the oligarchies that sought after their stability and convenient distribution of the

latifundium2. Since then, FARC has been driven by the ideal to overcome this doctrine wishing

to reform the agrarian policies into opportunities where peasants are capable to obtain either,

the most of the benefits from the land or its control, for the socio- economical and physical

well being of the communities. The struggle is claiming then to represent the interests of all

Colombian Peoples; therefore, its voice is to be heard at any cost. Clearly, we are aware that a

battle to overthrow a government during this long time is neither the simplest nor the low-

priciest task; for that reason, FARC has relied on important economical boosts from

kidnapping practices, illegal taxation and narcotics which have incited the endurance of the

conflict, turning it into a blurred and more complex panoramic.

1 (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

2 The latifundia were enormous farms administered by wealthy landed aristocrats, known for their wide use of

slaves. Latifundium resulted in agricultural intensification as the wealthy landowners took or bought poor peasant

farms. Concentration of landownership began during the Conquest, with sizeable royal grants establishing a

system of land concentration that persists in much of Latin America.

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During this time, deprivation forces by the Colombian government have fueled the

frustration of the thousands of rebels, resulting in a massive bloodshed of civilians and

multiple violations of human rights on behalf of both commands. In the aftermath of these

broken relations, a report by the government office estimates that “around 600.000 people have

been assassinated by the different guerrillas and the public force” (Ministry, 2012). Another

report published by the research team of the National University of Colombia on violence

evidences that “there have been 602,364 homicides in the 33 years between 1975 and 2008.

That is, 18,253 each year, 50 daily and one every half hour” (Páez, 2012). Respectively,

“during 2010 and 2011, 15.856 and 14.374 assassinations were reported in the Col. Forensic

Department” (INMLCF, 2010-2011).

As a matter of fact, the Colombian government has focused most of its activities in

finding solutions to this conflict by peaceful and military strategies, this last one requiring

large investments in armament and technology sacrificing around 3.5% of the GDP by

20123(Ministry, 2012). Certainly, this issue has been a stimulant to linger behind the coverage

of social and educational demands provoking other groups of society to rise up in guns,

seeking for daily sustenance or other ideological satisfactions; however, not being this directly

the only cause of the risings and the violence.

Since 1984 until present, around 26 initiatives have been originated and designed

within the government’s agenda with the purpose to resolve this conflict. At best, only 7 of

them concluded with a provisional ‘peace’ that relied on the demobilization of different militia

fronts, such as: M-19, EPL, and PRT among others. These agreements facilitated a temporary

cease of fire between the parties as well as they implemented processes of reintegration to the

civil society, processes of political participation and lately, policies offering benefits for

militants, who were sentenced or absolved. Among the agreements we can include; ‘La Uribe’

(1984-1987) and ‘the final agreement PRT’ (1991).

3 (Estimation by the Ministry of Treasury)

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Other initiatives pertained to natures of humanitarian actions consisting in the trade of

kidnapped victims for imprisoned leaders of the guerrilla, in order to open options to the armed

groups for a negotiated solution, a possible surrender or the beginning of a dialogue. The

Humanitarian Agreements of; ‘Los Remolinos del Caguan’ (1997), ‘Santa Ana’ (1997) ‘Los

Pozos’ (2001) and others until the year of 2003, were part of this strategy and were designed

with special needs of time and space for these types of circumstances. Moreover, ‘The

dialogues in Caracas y Tlaxcala’ (1991-1992) and ‘Quintin Lame’ (1991), were initiatives that

included foreign participation involving roles of supervision and advice, or designating budgets

for the implementation of military aid and counter-narcotics. Indeed, “since 1989 the U.S. has

provided $322 million in military aid to Colombia, nearly all on a grant (give-away) basis”

(HWR, 1996).

Unfortunately, neither of these initiatives has achieved to resolve the conflict nor a

sustainable peace regardless its different natures. Evidently, the dissatisfaction of the parties

and the endured violence display the crisis of the state’s integrity without accounts of a

legitimate government or a guerrilla of the people. As a result, after 50 years of a civil war and

frequent failures, Colombia continues suffering. Sponsors come and go over the years but no

victory or agreement seems to impede the 9200 combatants joined by the guerrillas to put

down the guns4 (Ministry, 2012).

Research Question

Inevitably, we are urged to search for explanations that justify the failure of these

events in order to explore other alternative solutions to this conflict. Hence, that a question still

remains concerning why these initiatives have failed and the conflict still endures. This study

will focus then on the understanding of the failure of one of the largest initiatives proposed to

resolve the conflict by the Colombian government during the period of presidential mandate

(1998-2002). The initiative used during this time frame is crucial for this analysis due to the

extensive studies realized upon its strategies, its controversial agenda, and that several of its

main objectives continue in the current presidential agenda.

4 (Estimation by the Security Ministry)

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Furthermore, their significance is well contributed to their reliance upon powerful

military strategies, international support and significant monetary investment under the name

of a peace initiative.

Within the theoretical framework of conflict resolution, the inquiry will pertain to two

specific topics; State/socio-economical reinforcement and security reinforcement. The topics

comprise the unit of analysis covering this study under the name of; ‘Plan Colombia’, “Plan for

Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State”. This unit is a policy initiative directed to

resolve the conflict and guarantee peace, democracy and security. The theoretical model of

conflict resolution and what it entails will be fundamental for the understanding of this inquiry.

Therefore, it is necessary to make a brief recognition of the agencies facilitator in this field

along with their contributions before presenting the framework in detail that will later enclose

this study.

Literature Review

Conflict analysis made its first steps in becoming a field of studies after the World War I’s

experience. However, with the tensions raised during the Cold War, world scholars put great

interest to disentangle this situation from different points of view that supplied with significant

contributions the spectrum of conflict analysis and resolution. As a result, we can identify

“three major headings that yield perspectives in which conflict can be analyzed; Conflict

dynamics, basic needs, and rational strategic calculations. Each of them carry different

understandings of why conflicts emerge, have a particular dynamic and thus find a distinct

resolution” (Wallensteen, 2012:50)

An initial heading attends to explain a perspective of conflict based on its dynamics by

employing two instruments. Game theory is included in order to understand conflict as a

situation that depends upon the response of actions by the respective parties, and continues as a

sequence until the scarcity of options reaches the escalation into violence and so on.

Wallensteen (2012:34-35) stresses that, “if parties follow the rules in a game, the outcomes are

predictable. However, if one actor begins to act on its own by making particular moves, the

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other might follow, thus the dynamic created in the conflict can change direction, suggesting

that credible de-escalating steps could lead to positive responses.”

A second instrument supports on the idea of a conflict triangle by Johan Galtung to

explain three corners of conflict dynamics; (A) conflict attitudes, (B) conflict behavior, (C)

conflict contradiction (Galtung, 1996:72). The observations advocate that a conflict’s starting

point could be motivated at any stand of the conflict’s triangle, however; the conflict

contradiction’s corner represented a more logical approach for a first stand in conflict

understanding. Contradiction alludes to a type of discrepancy between conflicting parties, also

named as incompatibility. “Five mediating options examine the different conflict’s outcomes in

which two actors A and B might encounter in regards this contradiction; (I) where A wins and

B loses, (II) B wins A loses, (III) A and B loses and perhaps a C party wins, (IV) A and B

compromise but none wins, and (V) where A and B agree and wins” (Galtung, 1996: 72, 81-

90, 96). So that, option (V) stresses Galtung’s contribution in inviting parties to arrive at a

meeting point or a mutual negotiation where the discrepancies can be settled and both parties

are satisfied with the arrangements.

An alternative perspective uses instead the contributions of several authors and theories

that explain the logics of conflict with a main focus on basic needs. Lewis Coser (1967: 103-

106) in his work Continuities in the study of Social Conflict argues that “the causes of violent

actions steam from not being accepted in society, a matter of dignity, political access and

power”. In addition to that, Edward Azar and his work International Conflict Resolution

(1986:29) describes that, “the causes of conflict are commonly related with the need of

recognition and participation, security, and identity”. With this idea in mind, the authors enable

the possibility to consider that these types of difficulties possess a political and structural

nature that can only be channeled through the same type of mechanisms in order to avoid the

exacerbation of individuals. In this sense, Edward Azar affirms that “conflict resolution

requires decentralized structures and ways in which physiological, economic and relational

needs can be satisfied” (Azad and Burton 1986: 30-9). The creation of institutions capable to

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handle these difficulties is central for the solution of a conflict because they permit the

transformation of violent expressions into communication via dialogue and participation.

Moreover, this perspective depicts a version of conflict behavior expressed in terms of

frustration-aggression. The premise is provided by the theorist John Dollard and his work

Frustration and aggression (1939) arguing that, “not only basic needs are met in a particular

society; but instead they could also be out of reach for a group, which thus becomes

frustrated.” It is possible to notice that the rise of violent behavior refers not only to the lack of

access to political participation but also to the denial of representation. In the same manner,

this perspective discloses a distinct approach to the resolution of a conflict which would be of

interest for our theoretical framework.

Within the last heading, conflict is illustrated by a course of rational calculations that

actors make to pursue specific interests in which violent behavior is only understood by

pointing at them. At best, outcomes with rational actions involved are suited into two

categories: victory and defeat. In this sense, a rational perspective assumes that “parties initiate

wars to win them. At least the initiator makes internal calculations showing that benefits

outweigh the losses when escalating a conflict to violent confrontation. The potential benefits

of victory are reduced as the cost of the resources increases, therefore; the energy invested –

destructed- makes it difficult not to continue until victory is reached” (Wallensteen, 2012:45).

This condition is the result of a closed decision-making that positions the parties in a

situation where de-escalating is not regarded as an option and what Zartman (1989)

denominates a ‘hurting stalement’. A conflict outcome with these characteristics can contribute

positively to resolution practices if parties enter into a state of strategic rethinking. Zartman

(1995a:3) explains that, “parties in this state see the cost of concessions as being greater than

the cost of continuing conflict”.

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As a result, the contributions of each major perspective converge into a complete

definition of conflict resolution. De-escalating events, substance agreements on discrepancies,

channels of open participation, and transformation of conflict are a few of the multiple

contributions that these theories and explanations have further to offer. In this review, we have

made an attempt to cover the major advances of the field and theorists. The definition and what

it implies, additionally, has been supported with studies on conflicts that embrace victories,

peace agreements, negotiated settlements and other types of outcomes that have been objects of

deeply analysis by conflict scholars whom wish to gather evidence that determine successful

conflict resolution’s practices.

For instance, ‘A recent review of conflict terminations shows that peace agreements’

events have become more frequent since 1990 (27 compared to 12 for the 1946-89 period) and

even more common than victories’ (Kreutz, 2010). Researchers have as well favored peace

events in consequence of the difficulties to achieve and sustain victory. “Since 1989, after

concluding multiple agreements and preventing war in all worlds’ regions, peace agreements

have gained a global meaning” (Wallensteen, 2012:30-31). Furthermore, research has also

inspired academics in coining terms like peacemaking, peace building, and peacekeeping

which maintain to enlarge the spectrum of conflict resolution.

Under these circumstances, significant contributions frequent the forms of data

programs and databases which track the manifestations of conflict and ending conflicts, the

nature and the intensity of a conflict, peacemaking events, and lastly the permanence of the

type of outcome in order to make findings and conclusions for peaceful practices. Some of

these data programs or projects involve a number of institutions in the process of gathering

data and analyzing: The Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Life and peace institute (LPI), University of Michigan with

the COW dataset, the project of the University of Hamburg AKUF, and the Uppsala Conflict

Data Program (UCDP) are a few. Particularly, the evidence related to these projects

compromises events where the state is seen implicated in numerous cases of conflict.

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The state is considered to play roles of high responsibility in society as for instance: the

collection of taxes. This activity provides the state with the authority to organize and distribute

power and tasks but most importantly the authority to use force. Thus, that since the end of the

cold war most of the evidence gathered relies on the types of conflicts where the state is

involved, however, conflict’s academics has recently concerned in investigating conflicts

where no-state actors are involved as well. As mentioned, “this research has made the data

useful for systematic studies of the origins of conflict, conflict dynamics and conflict

resolution” (UCDP, 2012).

Until this point, we have cautiously gathered enough information to state three formal

considerations introduced by conflict analysis that will influence the framework of this study in

regards resolution. Firstly, we have considered that the resolution of a conflict depends upon

the redirection of the conflict’s dynamics and actions into peaceful de-escalating events.

Secondly, we have moved to the recommendation that peaceful arrangements based on the

resort of parties’ incompatibilities are common and positive approaches to the resolution of a

conflict. And thirdly, that conflict is a source of development in which parties are more

benefited and satisfied by getting into an agreement where A and B can win. ‘From this it

follows that the resolution of a conflict, conflict transformation, is a never-ending process, in

which giving up violent expressions is important and finding a mutually acceptable process

may be a necessary precursor to a solution’ (Wallensteen, 2012:35).

Conflict resolution sets out to develop a theoretical social framework based on the

considerations of conflict analysis and related theories, evidence upon the experience of

conflict and war, as well as the institutional influence of the democratic experience.

Particularly, in order to guide our framework we have decided to employ the text

“Understanding Conflict Resolution” by Peter Wallensteen (2012), which offers a profound

explanation that compiles the propositions about conflict resolution and so on, while

additionally, it exemplifies how these transformations and implications are carried out so the

hazards occurred in previous processes are avoided. This text engages in the provision of

detailed advice to guarantee and understand the appropriate considerations involving peace

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processes, hence, the relevance of this framework for our study in understanding the failure of

the peace processes in Colombia. Moreover, Wallensteen’s text (2012:141) “emphasizes in the

presence of democracy as a central element in the settlement of a conflict. This is a way of

handle the participation of parties in a society: to give space to a host of actors who have

previously been suppressed or excluded from influence. A solution may encompass procedures

for transferring the struggle into constitutional and non violent forms.”

Therefore, in what concerns to this study the theoretical premises of conflict analysis

are embedded in this discussion. But specifically, within the components guiding our analysis

and facilitating the portrayal of the research problem we include: conflict resolution’s patterns,

and the concept of peace.

Theoretical framework

The standpoint that this analysis employs is depicted then by a social theoretical

perspective which sets a main focus on considering agreements and peace processes as more

frequent resorts for resolving a conflict, especially, after the evidence gathered on global armed

conflicts in the post-Cold War period, within an intra state dimension. “Peace agreements may

actually provide a greater chance for parties’ survival, and thus, there might be an incentive for

a peaceful solution” (Wallensteen, 2012:137). Departing from the past experiences and case

studies, conflict resolution’s analysis explains its suggestions not as a given formula stating

exact ways out of a conflict but instead, stating guidelines intending to explain ‘conflict

transformation’ as the resolution.

Conflict resolution expects parties to find a conciliatory agreement where a process of

transformation will take place and parties will be required to work on it indefinitely. “The

significance of entering in an agreement illustrates how ‘conflict resolution’ differs from other

concepts” (Wallensteen, 2012:53). “Transforming a conflict requires transcending the goals of

conflicting parties, defining other goals, dis-embedding the conflict from its original situation

and embedding it in a more promising place” (Galtung, 2000:1).

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For instance, redirecting the conflict’s course from violent to non-violent, from absence

of dialogue to open channels of participation and lastly; from injustices to democratic

mechanisms. In the attempt to converge the key premises for resolving a conflict in accordance

with the three major headings embracing the perspectives, conflict resolution provides a

definitional framework in which we will refer in our study. Then, Conflict Resolution implies

“a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a voluntary agreement resolve to live

peacefully with – and/or dissolve – their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use

arms against one another” (Wallensteen, 2012:50).

We will break down this conception into two essential phases in order to analyze the

initiative elaborated in the Colombian conflict. Besides, it will allow us to distinguish several

requirements or advices proposed for the process of resolution that will be soon disclosed.

Basically, in the first phase we are already aware that parties must enter into an

agreement voluntarily. Through this agreement, conflicting parties would determine which

differences and positions are incompatible, in which issues they agree and disagree, and how

its implementation will occur. By agreeing, parties are subjected to accept and compromise

with the terms and conditions of the agreement that may be resulting; in future compensation

laws and sentences for victims and criminals, for example. Compromised parties will also be

disposed to cease the fire while peace talks and processes are taking place. Wallensteen

(2012:50) points out that, “to the general public this is the sign that the situation has actually

changed”. The author suggests in the same way that “when parties take responsibility for the

accords they are also committing to their implementation and legitimation” (Wallensteen,

2012:50). Thus, signaling that the conflict has started to transform.

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Recognition is an additional characteristic that parties slightly accept by entering into

an agreement constrained by the conflict resolution’s framework. Indeed, according to the

requirements of this first phase, parties must enter into a legitimate pact where sides are

properly recognized in law instead of practice. Pacts can be of different categorizations

including: treaties, agreements, negotiations, act, summits, etc. but always, once within this

framework they must conserve the legal expressed recognition of the opponent and peaceful

behavior. “In the case of an intra-state conflict, governments are often reluctant to extend

recognition to an armed opposition movement; since as, they regard themselves as the

legitimate and solely use of force. It can also be that governments regard the opponents as

terrorists or bandits and, thus, they are not on equal footing”, argues Wallensteen (2012: 51). In

effect, when governments fail to recognize parties, who are pursuing political goals, there is a

significant possibility that conflict will rise or keep protracting. Therefore, recognizing

opponents in a conflict signifies a crucial argument for our analysis.

Moreover, one last characteristic but not less relevant advises that parties agree

voluntarily or at least in a partial absence of pressures from outsiders. “Secondary parties can

be extremely important to the primary parties, both militarily (by providing armaments) and

psychologically (making clear that they are not alone). Outside pressure may be a good tactic

to get support for an agreement at one stage, but when that constrain disappears, the settlement

may no longer hold”, affirms Wallensteen (2012:52-53). Therefore, secondary parties are

expected to be only a matter of transparent support which protects and guarantees

environments where creating trust among the parties is of high relevance. Even more, conflict

resolution characterizes external performance only with moderate influence and restraint of

persuasion for the endurance of the agreement.

As a result, the considerations on this first phase not only benefit the agreement’s

probability to survive; especially when expected difficulties from the implementation phase

will emerge, but also enhance the resorts to manage the violent side of the conflict. The author

in this case pinpoints the magnitude of the concept in use while he compares it with the

limitations of a concept like ‘conflict management’, which had been used interchangeably in

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the past. Wallensteen (2012:52-53) argues that, “conflict management focuses only on the

armed aspect: bringing the fighting to an end, limiting the spread of the conflict, and thus,

containing it. Such an action may even be regarded as successful but conflict resolution’s

concept is more ambitious”.

The previous premises are vital patterns for the development of the second phase as

well as for the intrinsic analysis of the agreements developed under the mentioned period of

Colombian governance. So that, we will continue exploring the array of conflict resolution’s

framework and we expect that the second phase will turn out less difficult for the parties but

not strictly trouble free.

Disclosing arguments can turn somewhat cumbersome sometimes; therefore, we would

like to address briefly some necessary justifications in order to portray clearly this second

phase. As we know, parties stipulate in the agreement how they will deal with their

discrepancies. The author suggests that parties decide either ‘to live peacefully with – and/or

dissolve’ their basic incompatibilities’ (2012:50). By recalling the significance of the term

incompatibility we are aware that the importance of this type of concern can’t be

underestimated and thus, we are required to count on pertinent procedures to overcome it.

“Incompatibility is defined as the inability to meet the demands of two or more parties at the

same time with the available resources. These resources may be something less tangible than

land, capital, natural resources, or military positions. They can also be the desire to obtain

recognition, respect, restitution or restoration. Their significance is likely to concern meeting a

historical mission” (Wallensteen, 2012:53).

Therefore, due to the difficult nature of incompatibilities it is easy to notice that there

are issues in which parties may not be able to agree. However, “Parties who have been

involved in deadly struggles have found ways to live with one another. Their partnership may

not be easy but is, by the parties themselves, defined as preferable to the struggled that

preceded it” (Wallensteen, 2012:53). In this sense, we understand that parties are also willing

to live with some difficulties under the statements or conditions of a peace agreement.

Historical experience then tells us that the management of these difficulties has regularly been

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conditioned to a framework implemented through democratic processes and justice.

Wallensteen (2012:144) stresses that “Democracy expand the political alternatives in society

and provide intermediate options such as: winning, but not gaining complete dominance, being

strong enough to play a role, and loose, but still keeping a position in society”. With the

premise of a democratic system as a monitor, we have selected two mechanisms suggested

under this framework which have for purpose the creation of circumstances of trust that benefit

the implementation process and the resolution of conflict. These two advices tackle the

dimension of an intra state conflict which is of relevance for this study.

In the first place, a party may ‘change its goals’ i.e. its priorities, circumstances, etc.

Parties may not easily change the reasons for their long struggle but they can swap the ranking

of their priorities. In this way, shifts create new solutions and open communication channels.

“However, the possibility for such changes should not be overestimated and it would be

outright dangerous for a party to hinge a negotiation policy on expectations of change in a

particular direction” (Wallensteen, 2012:54). Thus, the importance of acknowledge parties

about events where any priority has been replaced.

The second advice relates to the ‘physical security of the fighting parties’. During and

after a peace process, leaders of the insurgency face a transition into the civil life and political

representation. Its appearance in public may produce controversy in the society due to their

image being usually attached to vandalism and violent acts in the past. Hence, Wallensteen

agrees that, ‘Transition requires special measures to provide sufficient security for leaders and

to familiarize the general public to their presence in public life. Their freedom becomes a

symbol of a new reality of peace cooperation” (2012:145)

In summary, these observations have justified the importance of peace agreements

underpinned in democratic mechanisms, with the idea to assume the implementation process

when resolving a conflict, in particular, when the incompatibility is that of overthrow a

government. By now, the theoretical model has established two phases; one where parties

consent to a peace agreement, and second; where the agreement is better implemented through

an established democracy or peaceful processes. These last patterns do not navigate by

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themselves but instead they work in conjunction with the first ones, and without a specific

order they help to transform the conflict. The patterns will permit us to infer in which matters,

we are able to establish a connection and in which ones we are not, in regards the Colombian

initiative. The previous division into phases is with the idea to facilitate the reader a better

understanding of this framework; so that, conflict resolution is well considered.

So far, we have broadly discussed about ‘peace agreements’ and ‘peace processes’, but

we have stayed away from the notion of peace. A discussion about the theoretical premises of

conflict resolution would not be as significant and satisfying without covering one of the main

purposes of its development, thus; a discussion about peace as an ideal outcome is mandatory.

After a period of heavy conflict and violence, we expect that conflict resolution’s premises

have created an environment of human integration where individuals and groups are capable to

peacefully debate on interests and institute a balance of strengths in society. That is why in the

following paragraphs, we will undertake the concept of peace according to the considerations

recommended within the Social Science field by the same authors, and which will now become

useful for our analysis, as a building block.

By stating the dichotomy between a negative and a positive peace, (Grewal, 2003:3;

Galtung, 1964) denotes its major characteristics: “Negative peace refers to the absence of

personal or direct violence (this means .e.g. riots, terrorism, war, assault). Positive peace

constitutes the absence of indirect or structural violence (this means .e.g. hunger,

discrimination, social injustice, poverty, apartheid)”. In other words, negative peace

contemplates an environment that lacks weapons, that is absent of war and of conflict. This is

to say, that there is an absence of immediate violence. Moreover, a negative conception of

peace ignores any type of process or constructive relationship that can protect peace or enhance

situations to avoid conflict. By contrary, a positive relation of peace is loaded with optimistic

elements attempting to attack the reasons generating conflict, for instance; the presence of

conflict resolution processes and democratic organisms which prevent and control situations

where conflict may rise. Besides, a notion of positive peace agrees with the creation of

institutions that can handle conflicts and maintain positive relations and outcomes.

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In conclusion, it is convenient for our analysis to employ this propositional framework

because it engages constantly with the perceptions that of conflict resolution and the concept of

peace can entail, besides it concerns with the urgent social problem of conflict solving. By

adapting this outline to the peace processes and peace agreements realized in Colombia, we

will be able to reveal the reasons that underlie the failure of the peace initiative, since the

conflict is still latent.

Methodology

To address this revelation, we will be using three unit of analysis in a simultaneous

report. We will approach these units by using an analytical strategy that links explanatory

patterns in the empirical material to the propositional patterns of conflict resolution and peace

covered in Wallensteen’s text. By the presence and absence of this relationship, we will notice

in the first place if parties consented to a peace agreement, which incompatibilities were

chosen by the parties, how they were implemented, and if their implementation matched with

any of the mechanisms stated in the text, which will be called to emerge in the discussion only

when necessary. The information gathered would also permit us to evaluate if some events

occurred under any of the undesirable advices provided in the framework. These events

evidence some explanations relating the failure of the peace processes.

Additionally, to provide a deeper analysis not greatly driven by a deductive approach, the

methodological tools of discourse analysis will contribute with the search for explanations and

will examine the language used to create the respective narrative. As Bryman (2008: 500)

states, “language is depicted in discourse analysis as constituting or producing the social

world”. The justification for this is embedded in our social theoretical framework and choice of

research method that sees discourse as the creator of a reality. With Discourse Analysis as an

approach it is possible to engage in “a careful scrutiny of all the linguistic devices employed by

the persons who produced the discourse, taking into account the social and ideological setting

of the discourse, to examine the intentionality and significance of language and its context”

(Wilson, 1993;Costanzo, 2011). The material we are using is then not just a description of

social reality but essential in creating it according to this constructivist ontological position.

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Therefore, the tools of D.A will have as a main goal to reveal how the party has constructed

this narrative while we relate it to our framework patterns. As a result, they will lead us to

fructuous interpretations emerging directly from the empirical data which enables a clear

perspective and representation of the research problem.

The methodological tools that we will use consist of interpretative repertoires, which Potter

and Wetherell (in Bryman, 2008: 502) define as identifying “the general resources that are

used to construct discourse and enables the performance of particular actions”. We will also be

looking for quantification rhetoric, which is the way in which numbers are used to support or

disprove an argument and rhetorical detail, where we look at the way arguments are

constructed through terms and formulations (Bryman, 2008: 506). The narrative comprises two

different topics; State/socio-economical and Security reinforcements. The proper tools will

then be applied to each topic.

Research Material

The main research material is the roadmap of the initiative performed to achieve peace

in Colombia and that it is currently in progress. The initiative refers to the “Plan Colombia:

Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State” proposed in 1998 during the

mandate of Pres. Andres Pastrana Arango (1998-2002). The roadmap’s initiative (Unit A)

discloses a set of objectives and procedures that articulate the fundamental topics in our

analysis; the state/socio-economical enforcement and security enforcement. We have selected

this unit as our main material due to the impact that the government generates in matters of

peace, conflict, justice and the general spectrum of the Colombian civil society. In the same

sense, the government is a main character commonly enrolled in peace strategies and one of

the generators of hopes for peace. Therefore, within our tasks it is included describing how it is

possible to comprehend and perceive a reality of peace for Colombia by analyzing this unit’s

discourse.

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Additionally, this unit comprises an essential piece called A Common Agenda for

Change toward a New Colombia, which exclusively focuses on the peace agreement conceived

between the Colombian government and FARC-EP’s head boards. In this roadmap, the parties

have met at a point where peace can be resorted by a mutual developmental process. We have

selected this relevant document due to the opportunity to reveal an additional actor’s point of

view as FARC guerrilla. This is possible because while the party stresses its consent to agree

along with this proposal, FARC has shared this peace agreement as an ideal outcome for

Colombia.

A supplementary document concludes our research materials for illustrating this case

study. Ten years of Plan Colombia: An analytical assessment (2008) by The Beckley

Foundation Drug Policy Programme. This document comprises in the same manner the chosen

topics covering the analysis meanwhile it approaches them with a more critical perspective on

the policy objectives and processes. The relevance of this material will emerge when we are

called to examine the continuous discourse’s stand by the government. The material will

present essential facts which will nurture the analysis of this peace initiative but at the same

time it will contrast the narrative the government wants to portray. For our study, this piece is

an essential contribution because it helps us to portray discourse as the creator of reality as well

as it will facilitate the understanding of the initiative’s failure when it is related to our

framework.

Empirical Analysis

In breaking down the discourse, the methodological tools of rhetorical detail, quantification

rhetoric and interpretative repertoire will be of assistance accordingly to each topic. The

matching patterns technique would be employed by connecting patterns with our framework.

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State and socio-economical reinforcement

In the paragraphs detailing the actions of the Colombian government to resolve the

conflict and seek after peace, we have identified two main focuses within this first topic. The

first focus comprises the establishment of the democratic law as well as economic and social

justice.

We are able to notice this emphasis through the arguments formulating the following

statements, “Colombia’s strategy for peace and progress also depends on reforming and

modernizing other institutions so the political process can function as an effective instrument

of economic advancement and social justice to reduce the causes and provocations of violence,

by opening new paths to social participation, full education access, better health care and

creating conscience which holds government accountable for results” (Plan Colombia, 2004:4-

5).

The methodological tool of rhetorical detail provides us with three devices terms and

statements, extreme case formulations and ambiguity in order to construct arguments. Through

the terms ‘effective’, ‘advancement’, ‘access’, ‘accountable’ the argument indicates an

association of democracy with peace . In addition, the term ‘modernizing’ and ‘reforming’ are

signaling for democratic settlement. An example of an extreme case formulation is perceived

with the use of the word ‘full’ which refers to a democratic and social goal that needs to be

spread.

The following argument maintains the initial focus which becomes evident in the

following formulation in the Plan Colombia (2004: 6) “The recovery of the rule of law, as a

capacity of the State requires a process of community and institution building. In this sense,

peace needs to be built up gradually, and therefore there must be a progress in the

institutionalization and strengthening of the State in order to guarantee security and respect for

rights and freedoms for all citizens, in every corner of Colombia”.

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Rhetorical details such as; ‘institutionalization’, ‘rule of law’, ‘strengthening’, ‘respect’

and ‘institution building’, clarify the association between peace goals and democratic reforms

as a legitimate claim. In this case, we also count with an example of an extreme case

formulation with the word, ‘every’, which overall justifies the requirement of democracy as an

essential condition for peace.

Within the general social justice’s ideals, there is an embedded agenda which points out

the initiation of a dialogue between the parties, “Central to the strategy are the negotiations of a

peace agreement with the guerrillas to put an end to the conflict on the basis of territorial

integrity, democracy, human rights and the fight against drugs” (Plan Colombia, 2004:6). By

making emphasis in a specific out, the rhetoric presented in this argument suggests to become

into actions. These include the key statements ‘put an end’, ‘fight against drugs’ and ‘central to

the strategy are the negotiations’.

In the description, at the core of this common agenda we have found that parties have

also formulated the interests and conditions commonly, “There is a compromise to build peace,

without any parties’ distinctions, conducting to a new Colombia through political, economic

and social transformations based on social justice and national unity.”(Common Agenda,

1999:1), and upon issues comprising “(…) representation of the opposition, a redistribution of

the non productive land, stimulation of the agrarian production, economic and fundamental

rights, distribution of natural resources, social inversion, foreign inversion benefiting the

Nation and democratic reform(…)” (Common Agenda, 1999:2).

With the devices provided by rhetorical detail we can introduce a necessary transition

in the statements formulating the previous argument. They include ‘compromise to build

peace’, ‘without parties’ distinctions’, ‘transformations’ and ‘new Colombia’. Moreover, the

next key terms convey several arrangements ‘redistribution’, stimulation’ and ‘inversion’.

In addition to the transition to a peace agreement, one of the goals suggested for

achieving social justice and development was the provision of assistance to victims as well as

the prosecution of criminals by reinforcing the judicial system.

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In an attempt to keep the judicial system accountable to the peoples, the following

statements entail a description in regards its reorganization and responsibilities, “the

government will seek to reduce impunity through improved prosecution, more effective

investigations and speedier trials. It will provide effective coordination of the judiciary,

including open communication and effective policy implementation between the branches and

offices responsible for judicial reform and administration” (Plan Colombia, 2004:21)

additionally it stresses that, “It has been created institutional committees to press for the

investigation and punishment of the most severe cases of human’s rights abuse as well as the

Witness and Threatened Person Program which supports human rights’ workers” (Plan

Colombia, 2004:22).

Here certain words are important to highlight due to their ambiguous nature and how

they frame the intended message through the terms: ‘impunity’, ‘punishment’, ‘severe’,

‘abuse’, ‘prosecution’, ‘effective’, ‘reform’, ‘support’ and ‘speedier’.

Perhaps in contrast with the previous lines, the following statement relates to

guarantees offered to the armed groups signifying an act of social justice while peace talks take

place. “A demilitarized area by law has also been created to guarantee the security necessary to

advance negotiations with the guerrillas. The law allows the President to create and eliminate a

distention zone, as an expression of the sovereignty of the state” (Plan Colombia, 2004:9)

The description entailing the assistance to victims is stated in the next statement. “ the

provision of adequate humanitarian assistance to the victims of the armed conflict includes the

insurance and compensation, physical and psychological rehabilitation, mechanisms to

quantify and determine the eligibility of victims and specially targeted programs for the most

vulnerable (children, women heads of household, the elderly and ethnic groups)” (Plan

Colombia, 2004:24). The key terms include ‘Sovereignty’, ‘guarantee’, ‘security’, ‘adequate’,

‘eligibility’ and ‘vulnerable’.

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The previous were statements regarding the intended compliances of the government

addressed to victims and abusers. The array of the terms in used is general and uncertain

therefore; the meaning conveying the argument turns doubtful and problematic when it refers

to those alienated with the reform.

In order to implement these objectives and reorganizations the Colombian government

has required the support of several foreign actors, but in specific The United States, which after

the contribution granted engaged closely with the plan’s interests. The methodological tools

that are used for this and the oncoming arguments consist of interpretative repertoire and

rhetoric quantification.

The following is a statement relating to the engagement of the international community,

“the assistance from the United States, the European Community and the rest of the

international community is vital to the success of the peace process and our economic

development” (Plan Colombia, 2004:5, 11). The key repertoires building this statement make

special emphasis and focus in the involvement of secondary parties. They incorporate the

words ‘assistance’, ‘vital’, ‘community’, ‘international’ and ‘success’.

This time wide used of rhetorical quantification is underlined in the next reports in

order to confirm the allocation of the budget designated to this and general objectives of the

plan, in specific by the United States as it is the main donor. Two kinds of quantifying devices

will be noticed in the following reports. “The total budget during the last ten years (1998-2008)

U.S. aid to Colombia has added up to US$ 6,495 million, and has included the following

allocations: Military and police aid (US$5.5 billion); economic and social aid (US$1.2 billion);

military equipment (US$1.3 billion); counter drug operations (US$176 millions); and

humanitarian and civic assistance (US$871,975)” (Acevedo, 2008:4).

Plan Colombia reveals that “only from 1999 to 2005 the aid was approximately U$2.8

billion. And the distribution of resources within the framework of contributions have been as

follows: the fight against illegal drug and organized crime (57.5%); the strengthening of

democratic institutions (26.6%); economic and social revitalization (16%)” (Acevedo, 2008:4).

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Security reinforcement

Several statements indicating the focus of this second topic relates to the reinforcement

of security bodies such as; the police, army, armament and intelligence. In addition, this

security enlargement is justified with arguments that circumscribe a counter-narcotics objective

or discourse in order to stop the resources supporting the conflict. By inspecting the facts and

the linguistics devices chosen by the author, we are aware that the discourse of this topic is

overreaching the relevance of the previous focus throughout the disclosure of arguments.

Therefore, the methodological tools that we will use for this topic in this Unit consist of

interpretative repertoires and rhetorical detail. While the repertoire in this section denotes a

negative and urgent issue that may be resorted, it also reflects the way the author construct

discourse to convert this issue in a main concern. Moreover, the tools of rhetorical detail will

provide the statements, terms and extreme formulations for our analysis which reveal the

course of actions. The convergence of these tools reveal a subtext in the present arguments in

regards the activities and roles of the actors.

The following is a statement relating to the security reinforcement’s topic, which is

seeking after military enlargement and control, “During the peace process, the army and the

police must necessarily continue to increase their capabilities so that they will be able to

maintain an effective presence throughout the country and ensure a peaceful settlement” (Plan

Colombia, 2004:11). Here, two formulations are important due to their influence to course

actions and frame ideas. These include ‘continue to increase their capabilities’, ‘ensure a

peaceful settlement’ and ‘maintain an effective presence’.

The government specifies that the presence of basic elements is necessary to ‘ensure a

peaceful settlement’. These reinforcements include, “consolidating control over national air

space by all necessary means. Improve and increase operational range of Colombian Air force,

the Navy and the Marines for interdiction. Increase the rhythm of operations and expansion of

geographic coverage (…) Increase the number of troops in operation, the capacity of mobility

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with emphasis on river, air, by night and in the jungle; besides to integrate the forces for

intelligence collections and analysis. (Plan Colombia, 2004: 19).

In the last report problematic devices emerged in order to underpin the message that the

author wants to transmit, which is that of a massive security reinforcement. It becomes evident

with the oncoming details: ‘Consolidate control’, ‘improve interdiction and range’, ‘increase

the number; the capacity’, ‘integrate the forces’ ‘coverage’ and ‘expansion’.

Certainly, all these improvements and operations besides of ensuring order, territory

and a peaceful settlement; they also demonstrate additional objectives in regards the conflict

and its supporters.

The following accounts entails the reference by the Col. Government in regards drug

matters, “The fight against drug production and trafficking is one of the top strategic priorities

(…) for this reason (…) the government must focus significant attention on this problem and is

determined to combat narcotics, in terms of drug trafficking, production, and any other element

supporting this illicit activity, which threatens our nation” (Plan Colombia, 2004:8). Even

though it is stated that is one of the top concerns, the text conveys constant focus and

arguments throughout the text which stand out in order to highlight the importance of this

issue. In this case extreme case formulations are crucial for this account. For instance:

‘priorities’, ‘significant’, ‘attention’, ‘top’, which are all signaling for its preference.

We can additional identify several interpretative repertoires that are used to reflect a

negative connotation of this issue which through these key words convince of its urgency.

Some of them are: ‘fight’, ‘problem’, ‘combat’, ‘illicit’, ‘threaten’. In general, when describing

‘drug trafficking’ a negative repertoire is usually present throughout the material, giving a

sense of this issue becoming an obstacle. Consequently through these terms this repertoire is

expressed: ‘challenge’, ‘a spread plague’, ‘frustration’, ‘generator of distrust’ and as ‘a

destabilizing and distorting force’ (Plan Colombia, 2004: 1-16)

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The following statement is in order to reveal the ambiguity of the previous argument

resulted from our alternative stand but at the same time to contrast the discourse. The author

argues that, “Plan Colombia was originally proposed as a peace programme, but soon became a

military strategy aimed at weakening the link between illicit drugs and insurgency. It has been

the principal strategy addressing the complex dynamics of illicit drugs production within

Colombia” (Acevedo, 2008:1)

To confirm it is stated that, “The results of this approach in terms of the decline of

illegal armies, particularly guerrilla groups, may be considered as a success” (Acevedo,

2008:1). The formulation ‘may be considered as a success’ supports the previous

argumentation but contrast the ideal of peace mentioned previously.

The following objectives stress the launching of the improved military activity and

organisms while the elimination of drug trade issues. However, an important call is made about

control settlement.

In the following account we will continue with the components of what rhetorical

detail has to offer. “Strengthen the fight against drug trafficking and dismantle the trafficking

organizations through an integrated effort of the armed forces, combat illicit cultivation

through continuous and systematic military and police actions, reinforce and train the police

investigating crops, establish military control of the south for eradication, and establish

government control over key drug production areas” (Plan Colombia, 2004:17). The key

statements detailing the assurance of this objective being eliminated are ‘dismantle the

trafficking organizations’, ‘strengthen the fight against drug trafficking’, and ‘combat illicit

cultivation’.

We mentioned that control over territory was pinpointed during this last account. The

following accounts clarify the importance of this finding due to its relation with earlier finding

in the first section of this unit. These arguments converge in revealing two claims which will

be later discussed in the next section but that by now we will just present them.

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“Guerrillas and illegal ‘self-defense’ groups threaten the state by endeavoring to

control sovereign territory, through the disruption of order by raids, kidnaps, roadblocks and

terrorist attacks” (Plan Colombia, 2004:17), the government continues to explain that “The

traffickers rely on poppy crops in remote areas beyond government control -both drug

trafficking and processing occur in southern Colombia where there is a strong presence of

guerrilla” (Plan Colombia, 2004:17). The rhetorical account provided in the argumentation

possesses implications that are naturally uncertain and present an ambiguous meaning. They

make presence through these key statements ‘in remote areas beyond government control’ and

‘southern Colombia’ ‘strong presence of guerrilla’.

Furthermore, the characterization of the guerrilla as an allied of the drug trade,

‘kidnappers’, ‘terrorist attackers’ and ‘road blockers’ also makes it a target of the counter

narcotics objective and military action. Therefore, the following argument characterizes the

roles of the military forces upon these type of actors frightening the nation, “neutralize and

combat violence agents allied with the drug trade and increase security for citizens against

kidnapping, extortion and terrorism” (Plan Colombia: 2004:18)

Finally, the rhetorical detail’s devices used next are that of extreme formulations and

ambiguity. The following statement is employed in the description of a course of action in

order to eliminate violence, guerrilla and drug trafficking. “By bringing all elements of Police

and Armed Forces bear against the traffickers, the goal is to eliminate the large-scale

production, end large-scale violence and lawlessness by organized armed groups(…)” (Plan

Colombia, 2004: 20). Examples of extreme formulation are the use of ‘by all necessary

means’, ‘by bringing all elements’ and ‘end large-scale violence’. Some examples entailing

ambiguous terms are ‘bear against’ and ‘lawlessness’.

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Discussion

The discourse used in the previous report assign special connotations that accompany

certain practices, attitudes and laws referring to the situation of peace in Colombia. These

connotations and arguments attached to the report communicate and define a conception of

peace. This enables the author to perceive and interpret matters conferring to different senses

and meanings as in our case study regarding the state/socio-economical reinforcement, and

security reinforcement, thus designing a course of actions. Discourse analysis and the

methodological tools that we have employed allow us to approach and understand the

government discourse’s perspective when they address the peace initiative within a framework

of conflict resolution.

To help clarify our analysis and present a coherent argumentation we are going to look

for two components; how discourse constructs the concept of peace and how discourse is

related to the conflict resolution patterns presented.

State/socio-economical reinforcement

In the description of this unit we have found that repertoires indicating the presence of

reforms and the absence of violence are used in order to construct a discourse of peace. Here

we count with generous constructions given to the concept of peace which contains a fusion of

positive and negative connotations.

The presence of several devices denoting institutional reform and social compensation

as positive reforms in relation to this first topic, shows a conception of peace that is consistent

with the one used in our framework of conflict resolution by Galtung, and his idea of a Positive

peace. The presence of democratic institutions that improve the situation and opportunities of

individuals is a sign of social justice; therefore, it constitutes a positive one.

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However, the incidence of several devices with a negative connotation requiring the

absence of several issues, practices and behaviors exposed by the government, expresses a

direct link with that conception of peace that within this framework we have classified as

insufficient for idealizing the post-conflict. In effect, while the government imposes objectives

requiring the absence of violent acts such as; terrorism, kidnapping, activities relating to the

drug trade including all its performers and supporters, the initiative becomes suitable for the

characterization that pertains to the absence of direct violence. In this sense, the initiative for

peace reflects with these devices and actions that the absence of violent actions is only

containing the conflict and seeking after a negative conception of peace.

These justifications explain the mixture of the components used in the discourse’s

initiative that defines the conception of peace in which the course of actions is embedded.

Based on that, in the following discussion we would make emphasis in how and in which way

these arguments relate to the patterns exposed of conflict resolution. Eventually, this

association will exhibit the imposition of negative peace as the main conception to frame the

discourse and behavior of the government but also it will reveal the failure of the initiative in

reference to the understanding of our framework.

This first section goes then in great detail to depict the judicial laws and compensation

changes made in this initiative with special focus in socio-economical justice. The detailing of

arguments reveals that the changes undergone in the reforms contain ambiguous implications

that outweigh individuals obtaining grants and sentences. Certainly, the government

implemented laws and programs for guaranteeing the mental and physical security of the most

‘vulnerable victims of the conflict’. In the same sense, it also created programs and institutions

accelerating the prosecutions of criminals, protecting witnesses, human rights defenders and

threatened individuals. However, the guarantees for the opposition or armed groups were

greatly limited to the punishment and prosecution of a judicial system in accordance with the

negative connotation that defines them throughout the discourse. While employing this

negative description to refer to the individuals who are not victims, the ambiguous terms that

determine the accuracy of the victims compensated acquire a selective meaning.

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In an ideological conflict attempting to start a transformation process, especial laws

entailing significant compensation privileges in regards to the opposition parties are seriously

considered. The institutions must under these special circumstances concede generous benefits

in order to ensure the party’s representation and protection that by contrary would be

endangered. So that, if a social/judicial system presents the influence of the same negative

premises requiring the absence of rebels, the reforms generated within it develops irregularities

that makes the protection of individual insufficient without the proper accompaniment.

However, under the previous circumstances of a peace agreement it was argued that

besides the ensured political participation, an alternative guarantee was given to the FARC

guerrilla. Essentially, it included a distention area with the aim to advance a peaceful

negotiation.

The vague connotations used through the key devices in order to grant new

circumstances that benefited the peace process, as well as, the formulation supporting it caused

the scrutiny of this argument. In the discourse, a negotiated settlement was a purpose that

required to be ensured in a ‘sovereign territory’. Therefore, the government assigned by law a

geographical area that under subjective knowledge of the societal was already under the

informal insurgency’ influence but in discourse it was sovereign. Anyhow, what we want to

demonstrate is that by the choice of ambiguous devices; claiming two areas to be distinct but to

an end they coincide to be the same in the narrative’s description, the author presumes to

convince of a reality in which this guarantee is a benefit truly given.

The patterns of conflict resolution underline as positive, creative changes in the regular

circumstances of a conflict that could provoke a distention on the relations between the parties,

as the one undergone in the previous discussion. However, with the characteristics and

uncertain formulations embracing this justification for our discussion they do not give an

account of a truly benefit or change in the current situation, which isolates this argument from

the patterns of our framework.

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In general, the ambiguous devices supported formulations that constructed the previous

arguments conceiving ‘guarantees’ for the armed group in the negotiation, which under our

characterization they were the product of a negative state’s reform based on the absence of the

party and in the broader sense of a negative conceptualization of peace. As a result, we have

concerns in regards the government’s discourse of reform and their perspective about social

justice and participation.

Evidently, under this negative conception of peace embracing the actions of the peace

initiative, the arguments defining the author’s perspective in regards the recognition of the

other party as a political participant are rather pessimistic. In the description of the activities

and categorization of the armed groups, certain devices deny its presence as an equal actor but

at the same time they claim its presence as a threat that needs to be eliminated. Denying the

armed group as a political actor in the negotiation contradicts the will of a connotation which is

given to the device ‘without parties’ distinctions’ expressed in the peace agreement by both of

the parties meaning to be positive. This contradiction is of interest because it reveals a subtext

in the government’s discourse which demands either the total absence of an opposition group

or the appearance of a political actor that abides the actual discourse thus, presenting no

distinctions.

What is left unsaid is also an important feature of discourse analysis. The recognition of

the guerrilla as a threat has been emphasized substantially in the narrative although its

recognition as a political actor is absent. The discourse employed to refer to the opposition

party circumvents the pattern of equal recognition included in our framework and nourish the

understanding of the failure of this peace initiative.

In regards, the disposition of the parties to join in a voluntary agreement with the idea

to assess their difficulties is in general a positive fact despite their negative recognition. It is a

positive fact not only due to the event of parties willing to dialogue but mostly to the fact that

the parties’ expression of the incompatibility is stated. Within the peace agreement an agenda

based on the most problematic issues, that brought the two parties into a civil war, was

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produced in concordance with the democratic procedures that would contribute to resolve

them.

Nonetheless, with the purpose to express several conditions and situations in which

peace could be achieved the author includes in its discourse, under our framework’s

considerations, negative reforms and annihilating devices. They want to relate the presence of

peace only in an environment with the absence of conflict, guerrilla, illicit drugs and funding

as well as violence. Therefore, the peace agreement implies a dogmatic framework in which

the guerrilla had the opportunity to express its discrepancies while pragmatically was being

subjected; to the no recognition, to a forced or ‘ensured peaceful settlement’ and then to a

promising effective judicial system. In this sense, the struggle must be given up with no real

guarantees for the incompatibility or recognition.

Security reinforcement

The Colombian government suggests a reality of peace constructed in the absence of

conflict (which signifies the drug trafficking, direct violence and guerrilla) and the presence of

a self conception of democratic and social change. In order to bring this reality into action, it

has required the assistance of several secondary parties. Their role in this strategy is of

relevance because the author undergoes a transition in the discourse when he attempts to

validate their support. The discourse then encompasses repertoires of reform with enlargement

and urgency, both addressed to achieve a negative peace.

With these conceptions in mind we will disclose a connection that emerged from the

resources designated by secondary parties and its distribution. Statistical devices were greatly

used to illustrate how the initiative’s objectives were implemented. The rates revealed that

while designating a high value to the performance of counter-narcotics operations and the

military fight, the social investment’s rate was undermined and poorly motivated. In this sense,

rates that indicated the highest value represent the highest priority for the government which

shadows those rates of social justice’s development and display its late progress.

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Indices manifested then that there was a change of priorities although repertoires

presented in the discourse made possible to notice this transition. As the level of negative

connotations pointing the urgency of the conflict increased, the connotations of establishing the

rule of law decreased. This shifting in the priorities was more evident as the magnitude of the

repertoire used to describe the discourse (in charge of ‘increment’ the ‘capacity’ and ‘range’ of

the security operations dedicated to the ‘elimination’ of ‘the insurgency and drug trade’)

predisposed only to the search for a negative outcome. Thus, it is argued that the influence of

secondary parties, in the case of the .U.S., released forces restraining even more the

development of the objectives of the peace initiative that counted with a slightly ‘positive’

outcome.

We could argue then that although the parties entered in a truly voluntary agreement

where incompatibilities were met as presented in the analysis, during the process of

implementation the initiative was subjected to an unannounced shift of priorities partly with

the assistance of secondary parties that contributed with obstructing a ‘positive peace’.

Moreover, within the advices of conflict resolution, a change in the order of priorities of a

peace agreement has optimistic attributes because it ventilates new solutions to the process

only with the restrain that both parties have been aware of the implications of the shifting.

This second section has claimed through the choice of detailed devices, repertoires and

extreme case formulations that the conflict depicts such urgency, that its resolution can’t be

postponed. ‘The threat’ represents an obstacle for the ‘peace’ and integrity of the nation. Thus,

by raising the discourse detailed the author concludes to denominate the role of the armed

forces and their activities after the applied security reform. The discourse admits that the

compromise to continue ‘fighting’ in order to ‘neutralize’ ‘the large-scale violence’ and ‘secure

peace’ must be maintained. With this report we expose the presence of a constant cross fire by

the government without any initiative that considers desisting. Indeed, all the superiority of the

forces of the military services would be executed ‘by all necessary means’ to accomplish these

objectives. Crossfire is a practice that is not consistence with the demands of a peace

agreement because it neglects its protection and survival besides it is not a peaceful method.

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Therefore, the connotations associated with this behavior evoke the pattern of our framework

conveying the importance of a ceasefire while peace processes are in progress.

Conclusion

The reality of conflict in Colombia has not presented a peaceful variant during the last

50 years despite the multiple ‘peace initiatives’ by the government. This study has concerned

with the scrutiny of a Peace Initiative like Plan Colombia that counted with a great influence

in the Colombian society, in particular, in matters of socio-economical and security reforms

that we have covered in this unit.

The findings of our analysis reveal several differences that let us distinguish not only

what discourse is being promulgated but also how it is being constructed. The ambiguous and

implicit meanings discovered reflect the ideal assumptions embedded in this initiative, which

acquired strong significance for our analysis when accompanied by certain actions and

attitudes that defines a conception of peace. Indeed, several arguments charged with values and

repertoires were used to create a satisfying narrative of peace for the reader based merely on a

discourse of social and security reformation to contain violence which at the same time was

examined with the premises considered of our framework.

We encountered as well that the underlying differences in regards the patterns of our

framework determine several indicators of the failure of this initiative. The recognition of two

political parties in the intra-state scenario was evidently on denial and instead, the presence of

the same political leadership will be enforced after an ensured settlement of the guerrilla

without any given guarantees. In regards, the consideration of a mutual process of peace (and

incompatibility) stated in an agreement by both of the parties was in fact a positive fact.

However, its survival was constrained by an inherent compromise, to neglect the opposition

party, obtained in an agreement that was visualized upon the ideal of a negative peace which

through the glance of our framework disadvantaged the initial agreement. The will of such a

mutual agreement was shadowed as well, noticeably, by the poor implementation of the

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instruments creators of trust, pertaining in this study to; the continuous crossfire, the influence

of other parties with individual interests in the conflict and a defective judicial system.

Furthermore, we have provided an alternative material that gives account with

statistical measures of the focus on the superiority of a counter-narcotic and counter insurgency

strategies that dominated the aim of the initiative and which juxtaposed the ideal objectives of

the Colombian government. On the other hand, we provided an alternative document with a

small but significant point whereby the guerrilla’s perspective in matters of peace is stated.

This study could broad its scope by considering in depth a document where there is not mutual

agreement involved and uniquely, where the guerrilla exposes how an initiative of peace will

resemble or a more detailed statement for peace and conflict resolution. Employing a

methodology of qualitative content analysis or critical D.A could approach the effectiveness

and implications that such an initiative could entail. Additionally, to contemplate a broader

research of the failure of the peace initiatives in Colombia we could include a comparative

study of more than two initiatives. The assistance of one of these methodologies could help to

decipher distinct mechanisms or advices that represent any variation that may further explain

this phenomenon within the framework of conflict resolution.

Whereas, one of the strengths of this study is the choice of a social theoretical

framework that is capable to immerse in such a social multifaceted event, at the same time, its

nature subjects the reader to a wide contemplation of patterns decreasing the level of

abstraction. Therefore to compensate this pitfall, abstract conceptions of a theory peace which

relates directly to the conflict resolution’s framework were supplied. Lastly, we expect that this

study contributes with specific fundamentals that may be taken into account for future studies

on peace policies, in situations where a peace agreement is required within an intra-state

conflict, and especially under initiatives of government originations.

The fate of strategies like Plan Colombia, that are still in forced, as well as the fate of

new initiatives are prone to failure until the time that the actions and attitudes addressed to

resolve the conflict are constrained differently by both of the disputing parties so to

contemplate real actions of peace besides the recognition of the guerrilla as a political actor.

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36 Independent Research Project

Notes

1 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Abbreviation FARC

2 For information relating to landownership history and latifundium, direct to available

dictionaries and encyclopedias.

345 Additional details about indices and statistics is also found at

https://www.dnp.gov.co.

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