THE CIVIL CONCORD: A PEACE INITIATIVE WASTED · CIVIL CONCORD: A PEACE INITIATIVE WASTED I. INTRODUCTION The recent civilian massacres in Algeria are evidence of the failure of the

THE CIVIL CONCORD:

A PEACE INITIATIVE WASTED

9 July 2001

Africa Report N° 31(Original Version in French)

Brussels

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. i

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................1

II. THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL CONCORD..........................................................................3

A. THE AIS TRUCE (1997) AND THE SECURITY STANCE OF THE ANP ..............................................4

B. THE ELECTION OF BOUTEFLIKA AND THE CIVIL CONCORD (1999)..............................................5

III. THE FAILURE OF THE LAW ON CIVIL CONCORD AND THE SENSE OF BETRAYALAMONGST ISLAMIC SUPPORTERS OF THE CONCORD ...............................................8

IV. THE ARMY’S STRATEGY: MILITARY VICTORY, POLITICAL DEADLOCK .........10

A. ERADICATE AND "TERRORISE THE TERRORIST"..........................................................................11

B. DIVIDING THE ISLAMISTS ...........................................................................................................12C. MISTAKES MADE .......................................................................................................................12

1. Interruption of the Electoral Process in December 1991................................................................132. Sant’Egidio: A Failed Initiative .....................................................................................................133. A Closed Presidential Election in 1999..........................................................................................14

D. THE INTERESTS OF THE ARMY IN MAINTAINING A STATE OF WAR. ..............................................14

V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SINCE 1988..................................16

A. FROM FIS TO WAFA PARTY: POTENTIAL REINTEGRATION OF THE ISLAMISTS INTO THEPOLITICAL ARENA .....................................................................................................................16

B. THE MAQUIS: PERSISTENT VIOLENCE........................................................................................16

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLITICAL OPTIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY ...........................................................................................................................18

A. WORKING TOGETHER TO RESUME THE DIALOGUE ......................................................................18

B. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OR FINANCIAL CONDITIONS? .................................................................18

C. CONCRETE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN ACTION .........................................................................19

D. KEEPING ALGERIA ON THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA’S AGENDA..................................................19

E. ESTABLISHING LINKS BETWEEN WESTERN ARMIES AND THE ANP .............................................19

APPENDICESA. INDEX OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS..............................................................................21

B. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS .........................................................................................................22

C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP..............................................................................24

D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS........................................................................................25

E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS..............................................................................................................29

ICG Africa Report N° 31 9 July 2001

THE CIVIL CONCORD:

A PEACE INITIATIVE WASTED(Original Version in French)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The civil war between the Algerian army andIslamist guerrillas, sparked by the refusal of themilitary to recognise the electoral victory of theIslamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1991, is not over.The Civil Concord Law, proposed by PresidentBouteflika in April 1999, approved by referendumin September the same year, and supported by theleaders of the FIS, has failed to convince themajority of the guerrillas to give up their arms andseek peace. No lasting political solution to thisIslamist-military conflict has been found and thecrisis threatens to spread to other parts of thecommunity.

The Civil Concord law did create a genuinedynamic for peace in 1999. At first, the leaders ofthe FIS gave their public support to the President’sinitiative, in exchange for certain promises by themilitary regime, notably the release of prisonersand the possibility of creating a new political partyin accordance with the 1996 constitution. But inNovember 1999, Abdelkader Hachani, numberthree in the FIS leadership, was assassinated andtwo other FIS leaders were put under house arrest.To date the regime continues to refuse to legalisethe Wafa party, regarded as the political heir to theFIS.

Despite their military superiority and the evolutionof the Islamist position, Algeria’s rulers have notaltered their security strategy and continue toregard the Islamists more as defeated enemies thanpolitical interlocutors. For the regime, however,the rehabilitation of a popular Islamist party wouldbe the best strategy for combating the radicalism of

armed groups such as the GIA (Armed IslamicGroup) and the GSPC (Groupe salafiste pour laprédication et le combat), while also regaining alittle legitimacy by playing the democratic game. Ifit did so, the last of the armed Islamist groupswould likely progressively lose support from theex-FIS electorate and could be gradually alienatedwith the possibility, like the Shining PathMovement in Peru, head towards self-destruction.In exchange for the regime’s acceptance of theIslamists’ return to the political scene, the leadersof the ex-FIS would have to engage in publicdebate, playing by democratic rules.

There are few options for the internationalcommunity to pressure the Algerian government toaccept the political liberalisation needed to bringpeace to the country. Comfortably supported byoil industry income, the elite leadership is almostimpervious to economic or political pressure.Fiercely protective of their sovereignty, they rejectany external interference in their affairs.Moreover, international institutions have statedthat Algeria’s recent economic performancecorresponds surprisingly well to their financialcriteria.

Yet the political, economic and social crisis isomnipresent, and the status quo cannot continue.Long defined as an “Islamist-military” problem,the violence now threatens to take other forms. Therecent riots in Kabylia (Berber dominated area)show that there is a risk of resurgence of ethnicconflict which could exacerbate the socio-economic turmoil, and which could in turn lead to

The Civil Concord : A failed peace initiativeICG Africa Report No. 31, 9 July 2001 Page ii

regional instability. In this context, it is clear thatthe security rhetoric of anti-Islamist repression bythe army cannot function, and populardissatisfaction with the inability of the regime toface its other political, economic and socialresponsibilities will do nothing but improveconditions for the armed groups. If the problemsposed by the armed Islamist groups cannot besolved soon with courageous political choices byboth sides, the “sub-conflicts” stemming from theapparent lack of political prospects will be evenmore difficult to resolve.

The international community must abandon theillusion that an authoritarian regime can,successfully, respond to the desire for changeexpressed by the population, with repression. Alasting solution to the crisis must be foundurgently. Algeria is a social and economic time-bomb, capable of generating huge waves ofmigration and regional destabilisation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

1. When President Bouteflika visits Washingtonon 12 and 13 July 2001, strongly encouragehim to liberalise political activity and improverespect for human rights, and in particular tolegalise the Wafa party. Such encouragementshould not be made hostage to the desire toachieve Algerian diplomatic and securitycooperation on Western Sahara and MiddleEast peace process issues.

2. Create training programs for young AlgerianArmy officers.

TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

3. Make a declaration denouncing andunambiguously condemning the recentviolations of human rights committed by theAlgerian security forces, mainly in Kabylia,since April 2001.

4. Put pressure on Algeria as a signatory to theBarcelona Charter to continue the negotiationsand conclude a partnership accord based on theCharter. Through the accord, put pressure onthe Algerian government to establish clear lawsand commercial practices to create greatereconomic transparency.

5. Support a meeting of political actors to restartthe Sant’Egidio dialogue interrupted in 1995.

6. Invite members of the Algerian democraticopposition to the West and give them theopportunity to express their views publicly.

7. Support the inclusion of the case of Algeria atthe next session of the UN Commission onHuman Rights.

8. Encourage national jurisdictions to use orextend their powers to prosecute seriousviolations of human rights committed inAlgeria, and accelerate procedures for layingcomplaints.

TO THE ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP

9. Accept the return of the Islamists to thepolitical scene

The Civil Concord : A failed peace initiativeICG Africa Report No. 31, 9 July 2001 Page iii

(a) Recognise the Wafa party of Ahmed TalebIbrahimi, which was banned without legalgrounds by the Minister of the Interior.This party would enable the regrouping ofall the Islamist factions within a frameworkof subject to constitutional rules.

(b) Release Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadjand ask them to launch a national appealfor a cease-fire of all armed Islamists whohaven’t yet handed in their weapons.

(c) Initiate a public and transparent nationaldialogue to establish a timetable for newmunicipal, legislative and presidentialelections.

10. Establish a political party to represent theinterests of the army.

11. Establish a Truth and ReconciliationCommission with the participation of allpolitical and social actors. This commissionmust be guaranteed total independence as wellas the ability to publicly identify guilty parties.Also, its mandate must permit it to compel allprotagonists to give evidence.

TO THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

12. Respond to calls for a cease-fire and respect fordemocratic rules, in exchange for therecognition of the Wafa party by the regime.

Brussels, 9 July 2001

ICG Africa Report No. 31 9 July 2001

CIVIL CONCORD:

A PEACE INITIATIVE WASTED

I. INTRODUCTION

The recent civilian massacres in Algeria areevidence of the failure of the Civil Concord policypromoted by President Abdelaziz Bouteflikafollowing his election in April 1999. The Law onCivil Concord offered immunity from prosecutionto members of the Islamic armed groups, providedthat they surrendered before 13 January 2000, andhad not committed any crimes or acts of terrorism.Despite widespread popular support for this policy,as demonstrated by a referendum held inSeptember 1999, the Civil Concord andgovernment policy in general over the past twoyears have not succeeded in bringing to an end thecivil war which has raged in Algeria for 10 years1.

The war started when the Algerian Army refusedto recognise the results of the legislative electionsheld in December 1991, which the IslamicSalvation Front (FIS) won in the first round. Thisrejection immediately led to confrontation betweenFIS supporters and the national security forces.The following year, 1992, the assassination ofPresident Mohamed Boudiaf, the dissolution of theFIS, the incarceration of its militant members inSaharan camps and the repression of itssympathisers all sharpened the sense of popularrevolt against the regime. From 1993 onwards, thesupporters of an Islamic State organisedthemselves into armed groups and waged real waragainst the established authorities. Between 1993and 1995, this fighting seriously weakened theregime, which seemed likely to collapse under thesevere blows struck by the armed groups. Between 1 For the text of the Civil Concord, seehttp://www.algeria-watch.de/infomap/infom09/concorde1.htm.l

1995 and 1998 however, the Army regained theinitiative and launched a "total war" against theIslamic armed groups. Its anti-guerrilla strategyweakened the armed groups considerably, forcingthe armed wing of the FIS, the Islamic SalvationArmy (AIS), to declare a ceasefire on 21September 1997. Despite its military superiorityhowever, the Army failed to restore civil peace toAlgeria. During 20002, several thousand peoplelost their lives and massacres, arbitrary executionsand disappearances continued, with the authoritiesmaking no attempt to bring their perpetrators tojustice.

The Presidential election campaign in April 1999offered the prospect of reconciliation between theIslamists and the military authorities for the firsttime since the electoral process had been brokenoff in 1991. The exiled FIS leaders had nohesitation in calling the presidential election "thereal start of a political solution"3. Certainly theelection of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the onlycandidate actually eligible following the abstentionof the remaining six candidates, highlighted theweakness of his claim to legitimacy, and was asign of difficulties to come in his attempt to breakfree from the power of the military. In April 1999the IEFE stated that like Presidents Chadli,Boudiaf and Zéroual before him, "the newPresident faced the same problems which had beenresponsible for the failure of his predecessors and

2 2,500 according to the US State Departmenthttp://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/index.cfm?docid=644; 9,000 according to the Algerian Free OfficersMovement (MAOL). Information available on the MAOLsite : www.anp.org.3Communiqué of the Executive Body of the FIS Abroad(IEFE), 28 December 1998, See :http://members.aol.com/algFis/ribat/indexF.htm.

The Civil Concord : A Peace Initiative WastedICG Africa Report No. 31, 9 July 2001 Page 2

which could cause a similar fate to befall him"4. Tomake up for his lack of legitimacy, PresidentBouteflika immediately announced his intention tomake frequent use of the referendum process, butalso to do his utmost to limit the powers of themilitary. Directly after his election, he declaredthat he enjoyed the "inestimable privilege of beingthe President of the Republic, Minister of Defenceand Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces"and that "the Army [was] only an institution of theRepublic which in exceptional circumstances hadhad to exercise police powers. In good time it willresume its rightful role"5.

Two years after coming to power, the promisesmade during the presidential election campaign in1999 have not been kept and Bouteflika’sreconciliation policy is discredited. The Presidentis accused of betrayal by the FIS leaders and of"treason" by the families of victims of terrorism.The population is complaining more and moreopenly about the regime’s persistent brutality, asdemonstrated by the riots in Kabylia in April 2001.The President’s position is weakening in the faceof an Army which is careful not to allow him toomuch freedom of action, at the same time being alltoo aware that his policy has failed.

Throughout the Nineties the Army justified itsfight against the FIS, then the Islamic armedgroups of the various guerrilla organisations, bymaintaining that they threatened "democracy" andthe "Republican" nature of the State. The anti-democratic talk of the ex-FIS leaders between 1989and 1991 and the policy of massacres of civiliansby Islamic armed groups strengthened the Army’sresolve to eradicate the political and armedtendencies of Algerian Islam.

In ten years however, the Islamist movement hasundergone significant political changes, due in partto their military weakness. Civil war produced achange in the Islamist stance, resulting in supportfor some of the ex-FIS leaders in the Wafa party ofTaleb Ibrahimi, regarded as the heir to the FIS, butrenouncing the use of violence. The AIS, thearmed wing of the FIS, dissolved, and its memberstook advantage of an amnesty.

After ten years of fighting the Islamists, themilitary leaders have two options: to maintain a 4 IEFE communiqué, 30 April 1999.5Interview with President Bouteflika, Radio AfricaNuméro un, 10 July 1999.

war logic indefinitely until they win "total victory"against the groups that are still active such as theIslamic Armed Group (GIA) and the SalafistGroup for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), or toinitiate controlled rehabilitation of the ex-FISIslamists by legalising the Wafa party. The ex-FISIslamists have lost the war but the crisis persistsand risks becoming diversified.

Despite their military superiority and the change inthe Islamic stance, the Algerian authorities havenot altered their policy, as demonstrated by theirrefusal to legalise the Wafa party. Butrehabilitating a popular Islamist party would be theregime’s best policy for combatting the radicalismof the GIA and the GSPC, at the same timeregaining a degree of credibility by playing thedemocratic card. The last Islamic armed groupswould be certain to gradually lose the support ofpart of the ex-FIS electorate and would beincreasingly marginalised. It is even possible thatthey could be driven to self-destruct, like theSendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. Theneed for a change of policy is urgent. The riots inKabylia clearly show that the Army’s talk ofsecurity will not carry conviction for very muchlonger and that popular dissatisfaction with theregime’s inability to handle its other political,economic and social responsibilities can onlyincrease, eventually leaving the field wide open tothe armed groups. It remains for the ex-FIS leadersto publicly accept the rules of the democratic gameand for the military leaders to accept the return ofthe Islamists to the political arena.


II. THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVILCONCORD

Elected to restore civil peace in Algeria, PresidentAbdelaziz Bouteflika very soon faced the limits ofhis powers. . Following his election in April 1999,and as the regime’s official candidate andpresidential winner by default, he promised to putan end to the civil war and to initiate a policy ofreconciliation : "You know I don’t expectcongratulations for performing a miracle. I amtrying to act with a modicum of good sense to getto the bottom of a tragedy which will soon havelasted for eight years. My personal feeling is that itis time for all this to stop. Life is not going toimprove if we have 200,000 or 300,000 dead andthree million victims of terrorism. The accountshave to be settled some time or other. I am tryingto steer a narrow and tricky course through all theobstacles"6.

However, the lack of common objectives betweenthe President and the military leaders soonparalysed the decision-making process.Bouteflika’s objective was to successfully end thecivil war by defining acceptable conditions for thereintegration of those Islamists willing to lay downtheir arms. As far as the military High Commandwas concerned, the objective of Bouteflika’selection was to restore the lustre to an armyentangled in a "dirty war"7. With his considerablediplomatic experience under the presidency of H.Boumediene8, Bouteflika was the man whosewords were most likely to make people forget the"terrorist state" accusations made against theAlgerian regime.

In fact during 1997-1998, under the presidency ofLiamine Zéroual, a series of massacres of civilianscaught the attention of the international communityfor the first time since the beginning of theconflict. The latter immediately called forexplanations of the drama taking place behindclosed doors in Algeria. To the military leaders, therisk of Algeria’s problems coming under theinternational spotlight was perceived as a majorthreat. These massacres undermined the authorityand credibility of the military establishment and 6 Interview with President Bouteflika, APS, 10 July 1999.7 Reference to book by Habib Souadia, La sale guerre,Paris, La Découverte, 2001.8 Houari Boumediene was President of Algeria between1965 and 1978.

placed the Army at the centre of an internationalcampaign of criticism over its responsibility in thecivilian drama. The National People’s Army(ANP) perceived this development as a genuinestrategy of war being waged against it by "occultforces": "the third phase of the attack by therelentless enemies of our country targeted ourmilitary institution, the ANP" announced an Armyeditorial at the time9.

Behind the scenes the military High Commandimmediately organised an unprecedented mediacampaign against the entourage of LiamineZéroual, highlighting his failure and implying thata new Head of State was now needed. The timehad come for a new President and theannouncement of an early presidential electionfocused attention on the new Staff requirements. Itwas stated at the outset that the future Presidentwould be a civilian, with a view to lowering theArmy’s profile in the power hierarchy. The taskassigned to Bouteflika, nominated as the Army’sofficial candidate, was thus to transform theregime’s image from "terrorist State" to"democratic State", to silence the criticism of themilitary establishment and to make Algeriasufficiently attractive to foreign investors.

Naturally the leaders of the FIS had different hopesfor the new President from those of the generals.As far as the FIS was concerned, "the priority ofthe next President of the Republic must be toreunite the Algerian nation, rather thancontributing to its division and dispersal likeLiamine Zéroual. Unless a candidate for thepresidency of the Republic includes the followingthree policies in his program: a halt to thebloodbath, support for national unity and a returnto national stability, there is no chance of himwinning the vote of the majority of Algerians"10.The Islamists of the FIS expected the newPresident to recognise the violence they hadsuffered and their right to freedom of expression.

But the Concord was a compromise attempting toreconcile positions without proper negotiationbetween the various protagonists in the conflict.Too many of the interests at stake were leftunresolved and consequently neither the decision-

9El Djeich, January 1998.10"A Chance for Algeria", El Ribat, No. 241, 25 December1998, See : http://members.aol.com/algFis/ribat/indexF.htm.


making generals, the FIS nor the Algerian peoplegained any real advantage from it.

A. THE AIS TRUCE (1997) AND THESECURITY STANCE OF THE ANP

The 1999 Law on Civil Concord was based on"agreements" negotiated between the Army and theAIS in 1997 and in the words of PresidentBouteflika, was "a political expression"11 of theseagreements.

In 1995 President Liamine Zéroual promulgated alaw offering government clemency to armedIslamists who agreed to surrender. In May 1996discussions began between the emir of the AIS andthe Army, still headed by Liamine Zéroual andAhmed Ouyahyia’s government, with the sameobjective. General Boughaba, at that time in chargeof the 5th military region (Constantinois) initiatedcontact with Madani Mezrag, emir of the AIS.Scarcely had negotiations begun when GeneralBoughaba was replaced by Major General SmaïnLamari, head of Internal Security. GeneralLamari’s importance in the power hierarchy lentcredibility to the discussions in the eyes of theIslamists and provided reassurance to the emir ofthe AIS on the future application of theundertakings made. This initial contact wasfinalised by an agreement during 1997, against abackground of civilian massacres in the Mitidja.The newspaper Echarq El Awsat reported that theagreement between Madani Mezrag and GeneralSmaïn Lamari was signed on 20 August 199712. On21 September 1997, Madani Mezrag issued acommuniqué "ordering all company commandersfighting under his command to halt combatoperations from 1 October and (urging) the othergroups attached to regional and national interests torally to this call"13.

The impact of the truce on the scale of the violencewas considerable. During 1998-1999 Algeriaexperienced the most peaceful period of the decadewith "only 200 victims" a month. As an AIScommuniqué stated, "the first months of the truceallowed progress to be made in developing theorganisation and discipline of AIS troops. In the 11Speech by President Bouteflika, 9 July 1999, APS,http://www.algeria-watch.de/boutefspeech.htm.12 "Echarq El Awsat publishes what it claims are thePower-AIS agreements", La Tribune, 20 December 1999.13 AIS communiqué, 21 September 1997.

field the benefits of the ceasefire soon madethemselves felt. Hesitant to begin with,independent armed factions or those which hadsplit from the GIA quickly realised the advantagesof joining the truce. Over thirty armed groups notinvolved in the massacres of civilians, i.e. over3,000 soldiers, joined the truce whilst still retainingtheir autonomy"14.

However, the "agreements" between the AIS andthe Army have never been made public to this day,despite the insistence of the Socialist Forces Frontpolitical party (FFS). In December 1999, thenewspaper Echarq El Awsat published only a"summary" of a five-page document thought to bethe agreement between the AIS and the Army. Theagreement set out a list of terms: "general amnestyfor all groups joining the truce; concentration of allAIS factions and other armed groups in preciselocations under the control of the ANP; integrationof ex-servicemen in special ANP units; drafting ofa law to provide a legal framework for the truce;release of ex-FIS leaders within 18 months; Statecompensation for all victims, etc…"15, but aboveall they culminated in a promise to the effect thatthe ex-FIS would be allowed to return to thepolitical arena (under another name, with a newdirection "totally unconnected with "the past" and"in accordance with the provisions of the 1996constitution")16.

14 "Making the truce count", El Ribat, No. 229, October1998, See :http://members.aol.com/algFis/ribat/indexF.htm.15 "Echarq El Awsat publishes what it claims to be thePower-AIS agreements", op. cit.16 The agreement contained 13 points:

1 "General amnesty for all groups observing thetruce"2 "To regard all those who died during the years ofviolence as victims of the national tragedy"3 "Full assumption of responsibility andcompensation by the State of all victims"4 "Creation of a mixed committee to monitor contactsbetween the ANP and the AIS"5 "Creation of an interministerial committeecomprising the Ministries of Justice and the Interiorcharged with supervising the release of ex-FISleaders within 18 months"6 "Concentration of all AIS factions and other armedgroups at precise locations under the control of theANP"7 "Integration of these elements into special combatunits against terrorist groups"8 "A list of all weapons and ammunition in thepossession of the groups joining the truce"


Two months before the communiqué on the trucewas issued, the authorities made several gestures ofappeasement. For instance, on 8 July 1997,Abdelkader Hachani, the FIS’s number three man,who had been held in detention awaiting trial since22 January 1992, was released. On 16 July it wasthe turn of Abassi Madani, President of the FIS, toleave prison. The negotiations begun between themilitary authorities and the AIS seemed at the timeto offer the likelihood of peace.

However, Madani’s release in July 1997 wasquickly followed by the Raïs massacre during thenight of 28-29 August, then that of Béni Messouson 5 September, officially attributed to the IslamicArmed Groups (GIA). Madani was immediatelyplaced under house arrest following his "appeal foran end to the bloodshed". Today some analystssuspect this chain of events of having been stagedby the regime. The investigation into the Bentalhamassacre by Nesroulah Yous17 and the testimonyof Habib Souaïdia in his book: "The Dirty War"18

clearly implicate certain State departments in themassacres. One explanation put forward was thatfollowing the surrender of the AIS, thesemassacres were blamed on the GIA in order tocompletely destroy the credibility of this group,thereby disqualifying all the Islamic armed groups.If such was the objective of the departmentsinvolved, it has to be said that this policy failed.On the contrary, for the first time since thebeginning of the civil war, it drew the attention ofthe international community to the violence inAlgeria. The only way to clearly determineresponsibility for these massacres would be to givea mandate to an international commission ofinquiry.

9 "Evacuation of the families of the groups joiningthe truce to safe locations far from the anti-terroristoperation zones"10 "Drafting of a law providing a legal framework forthe truce"11 "Recognition by the AIS of the ANP as the onlyArmy in Algeria"13 "Decisive halt to all armed actions and anundertaking not to lend any direct or indirect supportto any terrorist faction or group across nationalterritory". Ibid.

17Nesroulah Yous, Qui a tué à Bentalha ? Algérie,chronique d’un massacre annoncé, Paris, La Découverte,2000.18Habib Souaïdia, La sale guerre, op. cit.

B. THE ELECTION OF BOUTEFLIKA ANDTHE CIVIL CONCORD (1999)

The announcement of President Liamine Zéroual’sresignation on 11 September 1998 and theorganisation of an early presidential election inFebruary, subsequently postponed until April 1999,temporarily distracted the media from the civiliankillings and the politicians from the application ofthe truce agreements. The announcement by theoutgoing President that the presidential campaignwould be "free and transparent" implied thatAlgeria was embarking on a process ofdemocratisation and reconciliation. But thepromise of a free and transparent election wasbroken: Abdelaziz Bouteflika, "the predictedPresident" was elected by default in April 1999.The other six candidates effectively denounced theadministration’s decision in favour of Bouteflikaand boycotted the election. Despite this abstention,the new President received the support of MadaniMezrag (emir of the AIS), Abassi Madani(President of the ex-FIS) and Rabah Kébir(President of the IEFE). Similarly, despite havingappealed to the ex-FIS electorate to vote forAhmed Taleb Ibrahimi19, the Wafa party’sindependent candidate, the IEFE lent its support toPresident Bouteflika and his Bill on Civil Concord.The support of these three Islamist leaders lentclear credibility to Adbdelaziz Bouteflika’s"peacemaker" speech.

On 4 June 1999, Madani Mezrag, emir of the AIS,sent a letter to President Bouteflika informing himof his desire to work towards a return to civilpeace20. Since October 1997 the AIS had been

19"After studying the platforms of the candidates for theforthcoming presidential election, we are very pleased tonote the positive steps taken by most of the candidatestowards reconciliation and the achievement of real peace…however, in our view the independent candidate, Dr.Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, is the man most likely to unite theAlgerians and lead the country out of tragedy", IEFEcommuniqué of 6 April 1999.20 «Oh honourable President, doubtless you have studiedthe file on the truce called by the AIS…the AIS hasworked to make this principle a reality (return of stabilityto the country as part of a legitimate and just solution),despite the obstacles … which has led to a clear reductionin the scale of human and material losses, of which no oneone can claim to be unaware … There are still activecontingents among the authorities who are trying toprevent this happening, through both ignorance anddistortion…We wish to inform you that we have delivereda project into the hands of Algeria’s decision-makers,


divided into sites allocated to its maquisards*(Texenna to Jijel for example). Unable tooverthrow the regime as they had promised in July1994 when it was established, the maquisards ofthe AIS had no choice but to accept anunconditional unilateral truce in 1997 and tosupport Bouteflika in 1999. In response to hisletter, Madani Mezrag received a dispatch from theAlgerian Press Service (APS) saying that his "letterwas a brave step" and that "the President wouldremain faithful to all the undertakings madethroughout his campaign".

However it was the letter of support to Bouteflikafrom Abassi Madani of the FIS on 12 June 1999which made the first overtures towards peace. Forthe first time since his arrest in 1991, AbassiMadani launched an explicit appeal to stop thefighting against the regime21. This faith in thePresident’s policy was also evident in the stanceadopted by the IEFE: "We call upon all officers,supporters and sympathisers of the FIS to give ittheir full support (the President’s policy); we wishto express our appreciation of and support for thePresident of the Republic’s position and hiscommitment to national reconciliation. In the faceof his determination to bring the process of aimed at putting an end to the crisis and stopping thebloodbath once and for all. This project contains clearobjectives and precise stages and we maintain that if theyhad been implemented and given all the necessary supportrequired of the authorities, the security situation wouldhave been improved …We put to you our views on theaction that should be taken by the next President in orderto resolve Algeria’s crisis:

- "find a legitimate and just solution capable of givingreligion its due place, the people their dignity and honourand the country security and stability"- "as soon as you take the initiative expected of you, assoon as you give the truce a legal basis and politicalstanding, as promised, and as soon as you reinforce yourpolicy by implementing the action plan agreed with theCommand of the National People’s Army, then wepromise you, on the word of Islam…that we shall issue anunequivocal communiqué clearly announcing our intentionto genuinely cooperate with you in finally putting an endto the crisis and abandoning armed action"- "it is easy for us to tell you that it will be simple todestroy the deviationist groups (GIA), neutralise the fire ofthe fitna (civil war) and put a stop to the bloodbath…"- "we have high hopes of you as regards achieving peaceand stability for the country. Letter from Madani Mezrag,emir of the AIS to President Bouteflika 4 June 1999,http://www.fisalgeria.org/.21 Letter from Abassi Madani to President Bouteflika 12June 1999, http://www.fisalgeria.org/.

national reconciliation to the desired end, weannounce our total support for the direction takenby the President with the objective of restoringpower and dignity to the people"22.

In his speeches the newly elected President wascareful to refer to the "wrong" and the "violence"done to the ex-FIS.23 Although following on fromthe truce agreements, symbolically AbdelazizBouteflika’s policy opened up a new perspectivefor Algeria. The new President had no hesitation instating that the revolutionary credibility of theregime inherited from the war of independence hadfailed and that the State must build on otherfoundations than those of the war ofdecolonisation. His calls for reconciliation werethus directed at the Islamists as much as atAlgerian-born Frenchmen and Jews.24 For the firsttime since independence, the Head of State wasattempting to redefine the identity of the Statewhich until now had been based on the trinity ofIslam, Arab and Nation. Obviously this policyimpressed the international community andparticularly France, which saw in it an opportunityfor its own reconciliation with Algeria. It alsoimpressed a large part of Algerian society, whowere willing to believe that the policy of the newHead of State had a sincere basis. The Law onCivil Concord was put to a referendum on 16September 1999, and gained widespread popularsupport (officially 98.6 per cent voted "yes" with aparticipation rate of 85 per cent), giving rise tohopes that after eight years of war, Algeria was onthe way to rediscovering stability and peace25.

To give added credibility to his civil concordpolicy, the new President introduced a series ofmeasures, notably issuing a decree in January 2000granting "amnesty to members of the so-called"AIS" organisation in return for their unilateraldecision to call a ceasefire in 1997, in order to helpunmask the enemies of Algeria and Islam and tomake an official transition to a definitive ceasefireafter the Presidential elections on 15 April 1999. 22 Rabah Kébir, IEFE communiqué 14 June 1999,http://www.fisalgeria.org/.23"I happened to say that breaking off the electoral processin 1991 was an act of violence. I say it again". Interviewwith President Bouteflika, Radio Africa numéro un, 10July 1999.24 Speech by President Bouteflika, 9 July 1999, APS.25The question asked at the referendum of 16 September1999 was: "Are you for or against the general policy of thePresident of the Republic aimed at achieving peace andcivil concord?"


And lastly, for having taken the decision toconclusively dissolve their organisation with aview to complete reintegration into Algeriansociety. These measures, which were takenpursuant to Article 41 of law 99-08 of 13 July 1999relating to the re-establishment of civil concord,resulted in immunity from prosecution26".

Promulgated three days after the deadline forsurrender laid down in the Law on Civil Concord,13 January 2000, this presidential decree backedup the President’s guarantees and desire for peacewith the members of the armed groups, alreadyexpressed in the Law on Civil Concord. Accordingto Amnesty International, "government sourcesconfirm that some 5,500 members of armed groupssurrendered [between July 1999 and January2000]. A little over 1,000 were members of theAIS and the Islamic League for the D’wa and theJihad (LIDD) who benefited from the presidentialamnesty; the others, who belonged to the GIA,were treated in accordance with the provisions ofthe Law on Civil Concord"27. According togovernment sources, 5,000 prisoners, sentenced for"acts of subversion and terrorism" were releasedthanks to a presidential decree, which seemed akinto a whitewashing of terrorists.

However, promulgation of the decree provokedcriticism, since contrary to the Law on CivilConcord28, it permitted an amnesty for crimes andterrorist acts. Thus Amnesty International pointedout the paradox that "other prisoners, alsosentenced since 1992 following unfair trials, andserving sentences extending to life imprisonment, 26The decree stipulated that "people belonging toorganisations who volontarily and spontaneously decidedto stop acts of violence and who placed themselvescompletely at the disposal of the State and whose namesare listed in appendix to the original of this decree…shallbe entitled to all their civic rights and have been grantedimmunity from prosecution". In theory the decree wasdirected at the AIS, which thus benefited from an amnesty,although the release of certain emirs of the GIA impliedthat the latter were benefiting from this decree when theyshould legally be subject to the regulations of the Law onCivil Concord which stipulated terms of imprisonment.Decree no. 2000-03 of 10 January 2000. For the text of thepresidential pardon: ttp://www.algeria-watch.de/farticle/ais/aisamnistiedecret.htm.27 Truth and Justice should not be Obscured by Impunity,Amnesty International, 8 November 2000,http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/MDE280142000?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\ALGERIA.28 See text of the Civil Concord, infra No. 1, and of thepresidential pardon, infra No. 26.

had been kept in detention…while individuals whowere active members of armed groups or led suchgroups for years, benefited from amnesty orimmunity from legal prosecution a few days aftersurrendering"29. Furthermore, six months afterpromulgation of the Concord Law, the Islamicmovement increasingly came to see it as a "policemeasure". The promises made in July 1999 had notbeen kept and the law never generated anynegotiation process between all the Islamists andthe authorities, as Madani had requested in hisletter to Bouteflika in June 1999.

In reality President Bouteflika had little room forpolitical manoeuvre in terms of proceeding beyondsimple promulgation of the law. Despite having an"official majority" in the National Assembly, thePresident could not rely on any political party tosupport his policies. Subjected to pressure from theArmy, the new President had no other links atnational level necessary to support his politicalaction. His many trips abroad demonstrated that hewas seeking to make up for this lack of internalsupport by winning over international opinion.This inability to influence internal politicaldevelopment led the Islamists of the ex-FIS todistrust the true power of the President.

29 Truth and Justice, op. cit.


III. THE FAILURE OF THE LAW ONCIVIL CONCORD AND THE SENSEOF BETRAYAL AMONGSTISLAMIC SUPPORTERS OF THECONCORD

Within the space of a few months, the leaders ofthe ex-FIS moved from "unconditional" support tototal rejection of the President’s policies.

Firstly, few of the undertakings made by thegovernment in July 1999 were kept. The supportersof the truce with the AIS felt that they had beenmanipulated by the authorities. Abassi Madani,Rabah Kébir and Madani Mezrag had given a clearindication of the means to achieve peace30,including the release of political prisoners and theinitiation of political dialogue between the partiesto the conflict. None of these measures wasimplemented.

Next, following the assassination on 22 November1999 of Abdelkader Hachani, number three in theFIS, who opposed Bouteflika’s reconcilationpolicy, doubts about the truth of the authorities’intentions of achieving "a just peace" intensified. Asense of betrayal emerged, particularly in the caseof Abassi Madani. He wrote a letter withdrawinghis support for the President’s policies31. Madani’s 30 1) Create a climate of trust through:

- release of political prisoners- return of exiles and captives- lifting of state of emergency

2) Initiate a "serious dialogue" bringing togetherAlgerians and foreigners- in the presence of all the responsible parties- at a venue meeting all objective conditions onissues of security, etc.

See IEFE communiqué of January 2000, letter fromMadani to Bouteflika 11 June 1999, letter from Mezrag toBouteflika 1 June 1999.31"Dear brother Sheikh Benhajar, and all the others. At thisprecise moment as I continue to suffer with as muchsadness as bitterness the tragic assassination of the dearestof my sons, snatched from the cause of the Algerianpeople, murdered and martyred ... the authorities haveproved themselves incapable of telling the differencebetween an appeal for a just peace which would allow thepeople to recover their rights, and the unhealthy anddespicable nature of the appeal by the authorities, anappeal which is nothing less than a betrayal of the pactsealed with Allah and a betrayal of the people. Bouteflikahad promised to deliver the country from the crisis througha political solution, a policy which we supported, with aview to reaching a conclusive solution in the interests of

withdrawal was accompanied by an appeal to theleaders of the AIS: "Dear brother, I ask you toforward this letter to all the brothers, heroes of theJihad for God and for peace, which guarantees tothe people their right and not their surrender, to ourbrothers known for their sincerity Madani Mezrag,Ahmed Bénaïcha and all the emirs and leadersamongst our brothers both inside and outside thecountry"32.

Furthermore, the Concord increasingly appeared tothe Islamists as a measure imposed by the victorson the vanquished rather than a gesture ofreconciliation. In fact, at the same time as theassassination of Abdelkader Hachani and Madani’swithdrawal of support for the President’s policies,the Army announced its intention to relaunch itsoffensives against the maquisards who had not laiddown their weapons after 13 January 2000. Thisdeclaration was followed by a clear escalation inviolence during 2000-2001.

It became obvious that for the "decision-makinggenerals", the policy of national reconciliation wasan attempt to give new credibility to their ownauthority rather than to negotiate with theIslamists. The Islamists realised that the militaryleaders had no intention of negotiating their returnto the political arena after having defeated themmilitarily. The Law on Civil Concord merelyoffered a way out for the Islamic maquisards,militarily weakened after eight years of guerrillawarfare33 and was a device that enabled themilitary to show that they had no wish to"eradicate" them completely, by allowing all thosewho accepted military defeat to be reintegrated intosociety. true reconciliation without injuring any parties whatsoever.Bearing in mind that reconciliation can only take placeopenly through balanced dialogue ... the stubbornnessshown by the authorities in their monologue is clear proofof their bad faith and their unwillingness to resolve thecrisis", letter from Abassi Madani dated 26 November1999,http://www.ccfis.org/cmnq/cmnq_15_trad.html.32Ibid.33A sense of victory had predominated since 1995 amongstArmy leaders, as illustrated by the interview with GeneralX (rumoured to be General Mohamed Lamari) in themagazine Politique Internationale: "In military terms, webroke their back (GIA) towards the end of 1994. The worstperiod was spring 1994, when the GIA and to a lesserextent the AIS took the initiative in several areas byattacking economic and military targets…But since 1995the wind has changed direction once and for all".Politique Internationale, No. 79, Paris, 1998.


There were already tangible signs of the Islamists’concern regarding this policy of reconciliationeven before the deadline of 13 January 2000.According to Abdelkrim Ould Adda, spokesmanfor the IEFE, the authorities had tried to changeapplication of the truce agreements into a"surrender" in December 1999. While PresidentBouteflika stressed his desire for a "just andequitable" reconciliation, the so-called“eradicators” among the "decision-makinggenerals" had "taken the lead within the regimeand was holding it hostage". In January 2000 thespokesman stated: "we want to integrate thepolitical arena into the Constitution. A new pagemust be turned, leading to national reconciliationinstead of this apartheid in which they are trying tokeep us confined. We are absolutely determined onthis reconciliation. If it fails, the authorities will beto blame"34. It was the same concern felt by theemir of the LIDD, Ali Benhajar, who had agreed toadd his support to the truce in October 1997. InNovember 1999 he stated: "But in reality we seethat this law – the Civil Concord - is an imposedlaw, imposed by the victor on the vanquished.Those who took up arms have become lost sheep,criminals, penitents who are pardoned, while theother party is treated as "undesirables” ".Consequently this is no longer a reconciliation buta security agreement, if it exists and isimplemented in this manner. And we reject thisapproach. This does not mean that we plan to wagewar. But this approach, whether it takes six monthsor six years, has nothing to do with us and is not atrue call for national reconciliation… It is simply atactic to keep us quiet"35. And in January 2001 thebalance sheet clearly did not endorse the Law onCivil Concord, with an average of 300 dead permonth since the start of the year, according to thepress.

To many FIS leaders, the Law on Civil Concordproved to be a "police measure", establishing ascale of sanctions against the Islamists fromamnesty for those with no blood on their hands toterms of imprisonment for others. Decisions onthese sanctions were shrouded in secrecy, allowingno controls over arbitrary action. Ali Benhajar,emir of the LIDD, said that the law "is not clear:the law itself excludes those who declared a halt toarmed action of their own free will before the law

34Le Soir, Brussels, 7 January 2000.35Libre Algérie, Algiers, 25 October - 7 November 1999.

was promulgated (…) in which case who is theconcord with? The members of Antar Zouabri andHassan Hattab’s groups, who have rejectedreconciliation and dialogue?"

This arbitrary and unilateral approach explainswhy the law failed to rally all the Islamic groups tothe cause of peace. With the exception of the AIS,which had already laid down its arms in October1997, the other armed maquisards effectivelyremained distrustful of the law and held to theirpositions.

It also reinforced the position of the radicalIslamists who had rejected the truce of October1997 and subsequently the Law on Civil Concord.According to Mourad Dhina, spokesman for theCoordination Council of the FIS (CCFIS)36: "theso-called civil concord policy, which the decision-making generals instructed it to promote, has notrestored peace to Algeria. The FIS has alwaysrejected this ‘Concord’ because it ignored thepolitical nature of the crisis, its sole aim being toabsolve the generals and their allies of the crimesthey are guilty of committing37".

In conclusion, it seems clear that the only people tobenefit from the Law on Civil Concord were themembers of the AIS and the LIDD. The politicalleaders of the ex-FIS did not benefit from thepolicy of reconcilation: Hachani, the FIS’s no. 3,was assassinated; Madani and Benhadj are stillunder house arrest; and T. Ibrahimi, theindependent candidate, was unable to obtain 36The CCFIS was created on 5 October 1997 and is chairedby Ahmed Zaoui. It is a rival faction to Rabal Kébir andmore radical than the IEFE. The objectives of the CCFISare: to unite FIS members and sympathisers abroad;support popular resistance within the country; work ondrafting the Islamic plan for society…"with regard to thetruce, the CCFIS notes with regret the persistence ofseveral signs that confirm the reservations it hadexpressed; the CCFIS feels that as a military decision thedecreed truce is the prerogative of the Jihad companies(armed groups) in the interior of the country. It points outhowever that such a truce will not achieve any strategicobjective unless the following minimum conditions are allmet: accord the truce a political dimension with clearannouncement of agreements and decisions; ensure that aneffective contribution is made to the negotiations bySheikhs M. Abassi and Ali Benhadj; allow an independentcommission to be set up to investigate the massacres, etc."CCFIS communiqué No. 3 30 March 1998.http://www.ccfis.org/dispcol.asp?art=26&HiddenPage=3.37 CCFIS communiqué No. 19, 5 July 2000,http://www.ccfis.org/dispcol.asp?art=14&HiddenPage=1.


approval for his party, the Wafa. With its militarywing defeated, split into several factions, and itsleadership neutralised, the FIS is seriouslyweakened. The Army is in a position of strength,but at the same time it has denied itself arecognised contact with whom to conduct vitalpolitical dialogue in the short or medium term.

IV. THE ARMY’S STRATEGY:MILITARY VICTORY, POLITICALDEADLOCK

Although it had succeeded in gaining the upperhand over the Islamic maquisards, the AlgerianArmy was still in political deadlock. Aftereliminating the FIS at political level and destroyingthe Islamists of the FIS-AIS pairing38 at militarylevel, the Army now lacked the resources and ideasto put an end to the persistent violence.Overwhelmed by the scale of popular protest whenthe FIS was banned in 1992, the military leaderstried, once they had regained the militaryadvantage, to reach an "agreement" with the leaderof the FIS, Abassi Madani. This agreement wassubsequently accepted by the AIS in 1997 on moreor less the same terms and complied with the spiritof the Law on Civil Concord in April 1999. Inother words the Army had defined its terms in1995 and had changed nothing since.

In May 1995, direct negotiations took placebetween the President and A. Madani. The regimeproposed disarmament and an amnesty for thesoldiers and the FIS’s return to the political arenaunder a different name. These negotiations failedowing to the refusal by the leader of the FIS to"appeal for an end to the acts of violence"39. The

38 The leaders of the ex-FIS probably underestimated theArmy’s ability to adjust to the conflicts and in particular tomodernise its combat units to make them more efficient. Itis possible that the Islamists’ negative perception of theArmy (corrupt, inefficient, etc.) prevented them frombelieving that the Army could change over the course ofthe decade.39 Abassi Madani was asked: "to launch an appeal himselffor an end to acts of violence. This would be followed bythe release of all the leaders of the dissolved party agreeingto participate in this solution; 2) Once this phase had been accomplished, a time limitwould be granted to the elements of the armed groups tolay down their weapons. 3) When this second phase was completed, the leaders ofthe dissolved party could return to political activity in anew group with a new name. 4) In order to consolidate the national reconciliationprocess, the elements involved in the violence would besubject to the legal provisions of rahma (clemency) and agraduated scale of clemency".In response to this proposal by the President, A. Madaniasked to meet with other FIS leaders and issued counter-proposals, including: "Exclusion of the institution of theANP from political affairs; 2) renunciation of force as a


reason for this refusal was doubtless his belief thatthe AIS would win the war militarily or that theArmy would not withstand a lengthy conflict.Madani probably expected that mass desertion ofconscripts together with the incompetence of themilitary leaders in anti-guerrilla warfare wouldresult in the Army’s defeat. This expectation wasillustrated in 1995 in the many communiquésissued by the Islamists, calling for young recruitsto desert in order to join the maquis *. Thus in1995 the military leaders were unable to imposetheir vision for an end to the war which set themagainst the Islamists. Furthermore they saw thecreation of "a political platform" at Sant’Egidio40

as foreign interference that was likely to weakenthem further. Unable to reach agreement with theleaders of the FIS, the Army planned to enter intonegotiations with the leaders of the AIS, but inorder to do so it would first try to regain the groundlost in order to be able to "negotiate" from aposition of strength.

A. ERADICATE AND "TERRORISE THETERRORIST"

Between 1994 and 1997, the regime was to apply asecurity policy based on the slogan : "Terrorise theterrorist". As an exiled soldier commented: "It wastherefore decided to liquidate many suspects insecret. Then, when the terrorists started tomassacre young conscripts, repression moved up alevel. Fearing desertions, the hierarchy decided tostrike blow for blow. It was then that the reprisalsbecame systematic: combing a district as soon asan offence was committed, summary execution ofthree, four or five young people selected atrandom…".41 The Army’s strategy of terror wasbased on its realisation that people were no longersufficiently afraid of the Algerian Army: theIslamists were challenging it and the population nolonger feared it. Consequently it launched a policy means of remaining in power or coming to power and theright of the people to defend their choice throughlegitimate channels; 3) compensation of all victims of thecrisis, etc.". Negotiations ceased in June 1995. See LaTribune, Algiers, 12 July 1995.40 In November 1994, a first meeting of representatives ofthe FLN, FIS and FFS, as well as other leaders, was heldin Rome, under the auspices of the Catholic community ofSant’Egidio. In January 1995 the main opposition partiesmet again and established a "platform for a peacefulpolitical solution to the Algerian crisis". Seehttp://www.algeria-watch.de/farticle/docu/platform.htm.41 Le Monde, Paris, 16 September 1994.

of mass repression that resulted in systematichuman rights violations.

In order to "make fear change sides"42 the Armyresorted to arming civilians. The use of self-defence to protect the villages but also to fightagainst the Islamic maquis forced part of thepopulation to choose sides, thereby layingthemselves open to reprisals by the Islamic faction.The creation of legitimate defence groups andcommunal defence brigades was accompanied by amovement of these militia against civilianssuspected of sympathy or even membership of theIslamic movement. The militia were soon beingaccused of violence, racketeering or assassinationof civilians, which they then blamed on the Islamicarmed groups43.

In 1997 the effects of this militarisation of societyhad become obvious: the Islamic armed groupswere losing control of many areas and had toretreat into the mountains, losing some of theircapacity to inflict harm. And the massacres ofcivilians again generated what the Army leaderswanted: respect based on fear. Thanks to thesystematic violation of human rights by the Army,its policy of terrorisation of populations suspectedof Islamic sympathies and its strategy ofabandoning civilians to massacres perpetrated bythe armed groups, the Army achieved itsobjectives: the armed wing of the FIS, the AIS,agreed to negotiations44.

42This Army slogan was based on the fact that between1989 and 1993, it was the opponents of the Islamists wholived in fear of the establishment of an Islamic state.43 In April 1998 Algerian newspapers revealed theexistence of a mass grave containing 79 bodies inRelizane; the mayor and a dozen members of the patriotswere arrested on suspicion of committing these killings.For the sanctions exacted by the militia, see the reportsubmitted in July 1998 by the International Federation ofHuman Rights Leagues (FIDH) to the UN Commission onHuman Rights , http://www.fidh.org/rapports/r263.htm.44 The emir of the AIS justifies his call for a ceasefire: "Inorder to thwart the plans of those waiting for anopportunity to harm Algeria and the Algerians…the emirof the AIS orders all the commanders of the combatcompanies under his command to cease combat operationsfrom 1 October and calls upon the other groups attached toreligious and national interests to rally to this call in orderto unmask the enemy hiding behind these appallingmassacres and to isolate the criminal remnants of thehardcore extremists of the GIA and those hiding behindthem amongst the enemies of Algeria and religion". AIScommuniqué of 21 September 1997.


A lasting link was established between MadaniMezrag and the ANP. It remained for the Army toeliminate those opposed to this policy among theIslamists of the ex-FIS, and it would attempt to doso by dividing the Islamic movement as far as itpossibly could.

B. DIVIDING THE ISLAMISTS

The unilateral truce adopted by the AIS forced thepolitical leaders of the ex-FIS to realignthemselves. In July 1997 Madani backed the truce,obtaining a conditional release in return, which helost after appealing - the day after civilianmassacres - for a firmer commitment from theinternational community in Algeria. SimilarlyAbdelkader Hachani, under house arrest since 22January 1992, regained his freedom but likeMadani, was placed back in detention shortlyafterwards following comments made to the press.In fact the Army’s strategy of politicallegitimisation of the truce came to rest on RabahKébir, President of the IEFE. Between 1997 and1999, the Army tried to reinforce the MadaniMezrag-Rabah Kébir link in the hope of reaching asolution. This policy provoked criticism from theCCFIS and Hachani, who felt that the Army wasonly trying to divide the Islamists in order toimpose its security solution. Kébir’s backing forthe Law on Civil Concord provoked bitternessfrom Hachani, who saw it as a "betrayal" of the"cause". Thus in an interview Hachani said ofKébir: "The person you are talking about does notsubscribe to the political ethos in which I believeand for which I am campaigning. When it comes tonational reconciliation, I have been campaigningpersonally since leaving prison for the restorationof peace and the total elimination of violence fromour country once and for all, while preserving thedignity and beliefs of all the parties. Resolving thephenomenon of violence depends however on truepolitical openness involving fair and equitabletreatment of the various excesses that haveoccurred on both sides. Personally I do not believein absolution by amnesty and it might be advisableto consider South Africa’s experience in thisarea"45.

Hachani was to pay for his scepticism with his life.The Army played the neutralisation card on the FISleadership by his assassination, placing Madani

45Le Temps, Geneva, 19 October 1999.

back under house arrest and isolating Ali Banhadj,another FIS leader.

However this reconciliation by force and divisionwas doomed to failure. Ali Benhadj’s absence fromthe negotiations following the truce probablyaccounts for the continuing violence of the Islamicresistance fighters. More than Kebir or Madani,Benhadj seemed to represent the face ofindisputable authority to the Islamic armed groups.Moreover the ban on political reconstruction of theIslamists through a new political party such asTaleb Ibrahimi’s Wafa party continued.

The Minister of the Interior’s refusal to this day torecognise the Wafa party, regarded as the heir tothe FIS, arguing that the direction taken by theWafa party was partly set by former FIS leaders,caused bitterness amongst the Islamic politicalleaders. According to Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi,President of the Wafa : "recent years have shownthat the dissolution by legal means of this politicalmovement (FIS), has in no way erased its politicalreality and here is the proof: the authoritiesnegotiated with the political management of theFIS in prison… Is it necessary to kill three millionAlgerians who voted for the FIS ? To deprive themof their civic rights in defiance of the Constitutionand the Law on Civil Concord ?"46. According toMourad Dhina, CCFIS spokesman: "We believethat Mr. Bouteflika could have a role to play alongthese lines if he breaks free from the grip of the"fifteen or so generals who are corrupting Algeria"and rallies to the true representatives of the people.If he does not have the courage to adopt such aposition, he would do better to tell the people soand "go home".47

Do the military’s inability to restore peace and thePresident’s inability to ensure compliance with hispromises favour the attrition strategy of the Islamicgroups opposed to the regime such as the GIA andthe GSPC?

C. MISTAKES MADE

After a decade of war against the Islamists of theex-FIS, a number of Algerian generals are startingto acknowledge the mistakes that have been made

46La Tribune, Algiers, 23 November 2000.47 CCFIS communiqué 19, 5 July 2000,http://www.ccfis.org/dispcol.asp?art=14&HiddenPage=1.


and to formulate other solutions to the conflict thanthe "eradication" of the Islamists.

1. Interruption of the Electoral Process inDecember 1991

According to General Attaïla, a very closeassociate of President Bouteflika, the Army’s firstpolitical mistake was to call a halt to the politicalprocess in 1991. Political responsibility for the warrested with those who, like General Khaled Nezzar(former Minister of Defence), encouraged thebreaking off of the legislative elections: "Thosewho worked to stop the electoral process must takethe blame, since this was the underlying cause ofthe Algerian crisis. If they had listened to me at thetime, we would have avoided disaster. I told themthat the FIS should be allowed to govern once thePresident possessed all the constitutional powers torestore the status quo if they went astray, since it isdifficult to pass judgement on a party which hasnot governed. One of our proverbs says: he who isfar from the battle knows how to lead it. If thisparty had been given an opportunity, the peoplewould soon have abandoned it because it wasresponsible for so many ill-considered actions48".By attacking the taboo of the FIS party ban,General Attaïla was the first to raise thefundamental question of the causes of the war.Similarly he questioned the whole policy of theregime since 1992, whose aim was to "close theFIS file once and for all". Recognition of thispolitical "mistake" is an encouraging sign, since itbreaks away from the eradication approach to theIslamic question in Algeria.

The balance sheet on the political and human costof suppression of the FIS supports General Attaïla.In fact the ban on the FIS was based on the need tosave democracy and prevent a civil war. Ten yearson it was hard to justify defending this line ofthought. General Attaïla went even further anddefended a position which was far from unanimousamongst Algerians - a general amnesty: "there areno other options. If we do this we shall resolve ourproblems 90 per cent, or maybe even 100 percent…those who are still in the maquis , whetherthey belong to the Hattab group or the others, needguarantees that only the President of the Republiccan give. I do not think that an armed element cantake risks unless it has concrete and realisticguarantees allowing it to be reintegrated into

48 Le Quotidien d’Oran, Oran, 26 March 2000.

society... the danger is still there, every day. Thetruce has been frozen because it only affected theAIS. The truce must be general and the amnestymust be general and fair"49.

And here is what General Benyellès had to say inan outspoken written profile on Bouteflika: "But itwas on the issue of peace, which he had made hisnumber one priority, that great things wereexpected of Bouteflika. He talked about it sopassionately that he ended up convincing thepopulation that he was not only determined toachieve this objective, but that he had the means todo so and a precise plan for achieving it. That iswhat his policy on peace implied… It will soon berealised that this ‘policy’ was merely a slogandesigned to package all the legal and policeregulations decided long ago… One would have tobe very naïve to think that Bouteflika had beenbrought to power in order to change the establishedorder" and to decide to organise "a real presidentialelection"50.

2. Sant’Egidio: A Failed Initiative

A meeting was held in November 1994 betweenthe representatives of the FLN, the FIS and theFFS and other leaders in Rome, under the auspicesof the Catholic community of Sant’Egidio, in orderto consider the options for peace. In January 1995,the main opposition parties met again and drew upa "platform for a peaceful political solution to theAlgerian crisis". But the Army’s High Commandviolently rejected this initiative. In a position ofmilitary weakness compared to the Islamists, itperceived the initiative as a threat ofmarginalisation. In an effort to counter it, the HighCommand organised a presidential election on 16November, followed by legislative and municipalelections in 1997, designed to show that the FISwas no longer the main player in the politicalarena. In 1995, the election of Liamine Zéroualsustained the illusion amongst the internationalcommunity that peace was possible and Islamicviolence could be reduced to "residual terrorism".This illusion lasted until 1997 when civilianmassacres revealed the full extent of the Algeriandrama to the international community.

Was the Sant’Egidio initiative premature? Perhapsit was. In fact in 1994-1995 the Army’s military

49Ibid.50 Le Matin, Algiers, 17 September 2000.


position prevented it from considering negotiationssince it was under military threat51. At that time theprevailing perception was that the regime was in astate of collapse. The armed groups were "at thegates of power". The Army’s acceptance of theSant’Egidio initiative during this period wouldhave been interpreted as capitulation in the face of"Islamic barbarism". First of all it had to regainmilitary control of the situation and above allinspire feelings of respect and fear in its enemy,which was convinced during this period thatvictory was close at hand.

3. A Closed Presidential Election in 1999

Despite its military superiority, the Staff could notrisk a free and open presidential election in April1999 and hence the risk of an Islamic victory.Within the Army the balance between the"eradicators" and the "reconcilers" remainedfragile. The fear that a candidate representing theIslamists would win the election was still seen as a"strategic threat" by all those who had encouragedthe stoppage of the electoral process in January1992. The ANP had been traumatised by the abilityof the Islamists of the ex-FIS to politically exploitthe liberalisation of the system that had occurredbetween 1989 and 1991. The prospect of theestablishment of an Islamic state through the"ballot box" and the fear of becoming thescapegoats partly accounted for the military’sradical attitude towards the Islamists of the ex-FIS.All the literature produced by retired generals overthe course of the decade mentioned this sense offear the day after the FIS victory in 1991. Theviolence of the remarks made against PresidentChadli Bendjedid by the military leaders of thatdecade was caused by fear of the "riskyexperiment" of opening up the political system.Between uneasiness at the political risk andassurance of a "victory" against the Islamic armedgroups, the military leaders felt it was in their bestinterests to maintain a security logic.

In 1999 the reconciliation candidate wouldprobably have been Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi,representing the Islamic-nationalist element. But asfar as the Army was concerned, allowing him to beelected would have risked triggering off a holyunion between all the armed organisationspassionately opposed to the Islamists. In short the"victors" of the anti-Islamic struggle (legitimate

51 See infra No. 31.

defence groups, self-defence brigades, special anti-terrorists combat units, etc.), united in hatred of theIslamists (political, armed, sympathisers), couldhave initiated a real scorched earth policy based onfear for the future, but also on a refusal to bowdown in "political capitulation" before theIslamists without "military capitulation". However,these paramilitary organisations occupied territory,applied their laws in the small towns and villages,were involved in racketeering and assassinatedanyone who did not approve of them.52

D. THE INTERESTS OF THE ARMY INMAINTAINING A STATE OF WAR.

In truth the refusal to truly democratise the systemwas partly due, as far as the Army was concerned,to the immaturity of the Algerian political class.The drifting of the FLN during the Eighties, itsinability to evaluate the political changes in theAlgerians and its incompetence in managing theregeneration of the political system between 1989-91 (choosing the electoral ballot for the legislativeelections in December 1991, a two-round majorityvote in the absence of proportional representation),were ample proof of this. The incompetence of theFLN and the puerility of the FIS left their mark onthe military decision-makers. This lack of apolitical contact partly explains the Army’s fearsconcerning the establishment of a civil democraticpower. The Army had no InstitutionalRevolutionary Party like Mexico’s and no NationalSecurity Council like Turkey’s, capable ofregulating the political game. Consequently itfocused on weakening the political parties (FFS,FIS) likely to play a political role in the absence ofany control mechanism or a party directlyrepresenting the Army. However the Army neededpolitical guarantees. And the Constitution was farfrom sacrosanct: each President wanted to createhis own Constitution and the Ministers of theInterior had no hesitation in breaking its laws. In1989 the Minister of the Interior recognised thelegality of the FIS despite its unconstitutionality; in2001 the current Minister of the Interior does notrecognise the Wafa party despite its compliancewith the Constitution! As Minister of the InteriorZehrouni said when he refused to legalise TalebIbrahimi’s party: "he would not be the one tosanction the return of the banned party".

52See infra No. 39.


Sustaining armed confrontation suits the regimebetter than political confrontation. The Ninetiesconfirmed that contrary to the warnings of disaster,the military conflict against the Islamists hadstrengthened its security apparatus and helped toneutralise the political arena.

We should not forget the financial benefits thatviolence has secured for the Army commanders.The civil war has brought real profits to a smallsector of the military authorities and the fightagainst the Islamists provides the necessarysmokescreen for embezzlement of public funds andseizure of new resources. The civil war does notcause unhappiness alone, on the contrary itprovides an opportunity to redistribute the wealthof Algeria without the application of any controls.The liberalisation of Algeria in the midst of civilwar has enabled 27,000 import-export companiesto secure a lucrative niche for themselves53.Similarly the privatisation of 17 holding companiesrepresenting national companies accounts for asizeable stake in the redistribution of economic andfinancial power in Algeria. Exchange rate controlsalso constitute one of the fastest ways ofaccumulating wealth. Currency speculation on theblack market has been one route to rapid wealthsince the time of Chadli Bendjedid. Lastly,contrary to popular belief, the oil sector is not thesector most liable to corruption: probably becauseoil revenue is the only financial sector that allowsthe regime to hold its own. It is true however thatopening this sector up to international companiesin 1991 has led to rapid growth, and over twentyinternational companies are now represented in theSahara, investing approximately 15 billion dollarssince 1991. Oil revenue (import of foodstuffs,pharmaceuticals, semi-industrial, etc.) partlyexplains why certain leaders find it to theiradvantage in maintaining the country on a warfooting since it provides the best cover for illicitactivities.

Lastly, the ambiguous attitude of the militarydecision-makers is also due to their fear of beingaccused by international organisations of violatinghuman rights and the concern that politicalliberalisation will open the way for militarycommanders to be tried. These are the generalswho held office in the Nineties, some of whom arenow being referred to by name by Amnesty

53 Talahite F. "Corruption: the price of counter-reform,"Libre Algérie, Algiers, 9-22 November 1998.

International. The impact in Algeria of thePinochet affair should not be underestimated andthe fear that Bouteflika’s presidency could turninto a trial of the Nineties, witness the remarks ofGeneral Attaïla, is serious. It probably accounts forthe tough line adopted by the Staff with regard tothe initiatives taken by the President at politicaland military level54. In short the autonomisationdesired by the President is supported by part of theStaff but arouses fear in those who had toadminister "the dirty war" against the Islamists.This situation is described by Saïd Sadi, Presidentof the RCD and a member of the government, as"the death throes of the regime"55.

54Resignation of Prime Minister A. Benbitour, replaced bya friend of the President, Benflis, as well as appointmentswithin the Army Command, among others.55Le Soir, Brussels, 12 February 2001.


V. THE EVOLUTION OF THEISLAMIC MOVEMENT SINCE 1988

The leaders of the ex-FIS had no hesitation insaying it: the war had been fatal for them and yetparadoxically their hopes lay in a democratisationof the political system they had previouslyrejected. This represented their only opportunity toexpress their ideals once more.

A. FROM FIS TO WAFA PARTY:POTENTIAL REINTEGRATION OF THEISLAMISTS INTO THE POLITICAL ARENA

The fear conjured up in the early Nineties of therisk of an Islamic State under the flag of the FIS nolonger seems relevant. According to Redha Malek:"The State has a shape, the shape of the Republic,changing it is unthinkable. There is no question ofchanging Algeria into an emirate or a sultanate. Inorder to move forward we must condemnterrorism"56. In January 2000, the Islamists of theIEFE stated that they opposed an amnesty for"those who refused and chose to continue theirarmed action"57. In short, they considered it lawfulfor the ANP to fight those who rejected the Law onCivil Concord. Explicit recognition that thestrategy of violence had failed, both by the AISand the IEFE, formed the basis on which a newpolicy was drafted, culminating in therehabilitation of an Islamic party keen to respectAlgeria’s legality and multi-party politicalsystem58. The document published by the IEFE inMay 1997, entitled: "In favour of a strategy aimedat ending the crisis in Algeria" clearly illustratedthe new approach taken by the Islamists of the ex-FIS who put forward the "political solution" as the"only and best solution to the conflict". TheIslamists of the ex-FIS had begun their politicalreinvention: condemnation of the GIA and support

56L’Humanité, no. 295, 1995.57 IEFE communiqué, 13 January 2000,http://www.algeria-watch.de/farticle/ais/aiskebir2.htm.58 Remember that in 1991 the FIS wanted to establish anIslamic State and set little store by democracy. Thecomments of its leaders against women, France andpolitical freedom caused fears that if victorious they wouldestablish a regime based on virtue and as such likely toforce opponents to comply with its agenda. An anti-democratic party, the FIS profited from the democraticopening up of Algeria to become the country’s leadingpolitical force.

for the candidacy of Ahmed Tabel Ibrahimi in thepresidential elections demonstrated the concessionsmade by the exiled leaders of the ex-FIS comparedto the party’s claims during its infantile period(1989-91). The representatives of the IEFE nolonger demanded the establishment of an IslamicState. They appeared to have realised that theradicalism they had advocated had had fatal resultsfor them.

The Wafa party is probably capable of embodyingthese political changes in the Islamists of the ex-FIS, facilitating their socialisation in a politicalarena that has been reconfigured during the civilwar59 and creating a political outlet for theIslamists of the ex-FIS seeking reintegration intothe political arena. This need for a return to thepolitical stage by an Islamist people’s party is dueto the failure of the moderate Islamic parties ofMahfoudh Nahnah (Movement for Peace inSociety) and A. Djabballah (National ReformMovement) to win over this electorate. Thepolitical infiltration of these groups forced themtowards moderation on a large scale, particularlythe MSP. As A. Djaballah stated on television on 9March 1999: "it was precisely the quest for seniorposts that prevented our movement from makingprogress and which, on the contrary, led todissension and division".

B. THE MAQUIS: PERSISTENT VIOLENCE

The year 2000 provided confirmation that Islamicguerillas well and truly existed outside the AIS.The GIA and GSPC groups launched continuousmilitary actions against the security forces, causingthe loss of 607 soldiers and 113 reservists,according to the MAOL.60 The groups of HassanHattab and Antar Zouabri are radically opposed tothe policy of Civil Concord. Approached recentlyby, General Attaïla, a general close to Bouteflika,they allegedly repeated their refusal to follow thepath taken by the AIS and take advantage of thepolicy of reconciliation.61 Although unable tooverthrow the regime, these armed groups (whose

59 T. Ibrahimi’s platform aimed at promoting"reconciliation" between Algerians by "leaving behind theideological phobias which generated hatred andbitterness"; promoting "an emancipated society whichendorses pluralism and diversity, etc."60 Le Monde, Paris, 5 June 2001.61 Le Matin, Algiers, 2 April 2000.


numbers are estimated at 1,500) represent a seriousobstacle to the restoration of civil peace in Algeria.

What reasons lie behind the refusal of theseIslamist organisations? Several factors mightexplain the refusal of these groups to abandonviolence, but the two main ones appear to begeographical and political isolation. As refugees inthe mountains, their soldiers have gradually losttouch with political, social and culturaldevelopments in Algeria during the last decade.Like The Shining Path in Peru during the Eighties,they are living in a political world sealed off fromall outside links. At a military level this isolation isan asset, as it prevents infiltration by the Algerianservices and also betrayals, but on the other hand itpresents a real obstacle to negotiations. From amilitary point of view these guerillas are capable ofcontinuing for many years, since their objectivesare limited: they harbour no ambitions to occupy atown or terrorise the capital - which would exposethem to heavy losses - but rather to conduct a warof attrition against the security forces. Splinteredinto a huge number of armed groups, theseguerillas do not allow the Algerian Army to "strikeat their hard core", because no such core exists.The strength of these armed groups lies preciselyin their flexibility and their ability to sustainthemselves in isolated geographical areas.

The second factor that accounts for the persistenceof these guerillas is their ability to accumulatewealth through violence. The tax levied by themaquisards on the local populations certainlyprovides for the upkeep of the armed groups, but italso enables them to accumulate personal wealth.However it would be wrong to conclude that thesegroups are only fighting for money. The mainmotive of these guerillas is still the desire forestablishment of an Islamic state by Jihad. Theyremain convinced that the war of attrition whichthey are waging against the security forces willbear fruit in the long term. Although small innumber, they have a reservoir of young peoplelikely to join them. The "professionalisation" of theGSPC, which has been responsible for most of theattacks against the security forces over the last twoyears, demonstrates the resolve of its fighters tosettle down to a long war.

The persistence of these guerillas is responsible forthe continuing "eradication" element within theArmy, and consequently discredits the policy ofCivil Concord and marginalises the AIS. The latter,

convinced that the Algerian Army is incapable ofstamping out the GIA, offered its assistance to themilitary in January 2001: "With regard to thestruggle against the GIA and the otherorganisations which are committing massacres,stated Ahmed Benaïcha, we have said that both thestrategy and method of combat are beyond themeans of conventional armies; we have theresources, the methods and the strategy to stampout these mobile groups".62 The emir of theWestern District of the AIS in fact proposedincorporating his Islamic maquisards into theArmy in order to fight the GIA. It remains for theStaff generals to assess the risks inherent instamping out the GIA by forcing regular Armytroops to co-exist with former maquisards of theAIS! Added to this fear is a more cynical argumentciting the advantages of maintaining a "lowintensity" guerrilla force in a country whoseeconomy has been ravaged by corruption.

Legalisation of the Wafa party and integration ofthe AIS maquisards would be a serious option interms of reducing the violence of the GIA and theGSPD. However, an appeal launched by Benhadjto the armed Islamists would be even moreeffective. The latter - if he is still alive - is the manwith the greatest influence over the radical armedgroups. The political means of achieving such agesture have yet to be found. It is possible thatrecognising the Wafa party, releasing prisoners andinitiating a democratic process would enable AliBenhadj to finally play an important part in endingthe war in Algeria.

62 AFP, February 2001.


VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLITICALOPTIONS FOR THEINTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The failure of the Civil Concord is obvious: civilpeace has not returned to Algeria. Elected on aplatform of peace and a plebiscite to reconcile theAlgerian people, President Bouteflika remainsincapable of changing the attitude of the Army andhas hence become a target of criticism by all thosewho had placed their hopes in his policy. ThePresident recently announced that he planned toextend the Civil Concord into a National Concord.What real impact could this change have when theCivil Concord has failed? The diagnosis made byBouteflika in order to achieve peace was correct,but he has yet to find the political means ofapplying the remedy successfully.

This remedy can only be applied if the militaryengages in real dialogue with the Islamists andgrants them a role on the political stage.

A. WORKING TOGETHER TO RESUME THEDIALOGUE

The first two gestures required in order to buildtrust between the Islamists and the authoritieswould be to legalise a real political party capableof channeling Islamic demands. Recognition ofAhmed Taleb Ibrahimi’s Wafa party, banned forno legitimate reason by the Minister of the Interior,would promote a political regrouping of all theIslamic tendencies within a party bound by theconstitution.

Next, the authorities must be encouraged to releaseMadani and Benhadj and to ask them to launch anational appeal for a ceasefire to all the armedIslamists who have not yet laid down theirweapons. In return for such a gesture, the regimemust undertake to initiate a public and opennational dialogue aimed at establishing an electoralagenda to define a real democratic project forAlgeria that encompasses the whole politicalspectrum. This dialogue would also enable anelectoral timetable to be drawn up for newcommunal, legislative and presidential elections.

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission must beset up involving all the political and social players.This commission must be granted total autonomy

and the power to identify the guilty publicly.Furthermore, it must have a mandate to convene allthe protagonists.

In return, the Islamic movements must undertaketo call an immediate ceasefire, combat the residualviolence of the die-hard maquis and respect anduphold the rules of democracy.

B. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OR FINANCIALCONDITIONS?

How can the ANP be persuaded to drop its securitylogic towards the Islamists? Several methods ofaction were proposed over the course of the decadeas a means of "forcing" the ANP to change itspolicy towards the Islamists of the ex-FIS.

Are economic sanctions viable? Assessment of theimpact that embargoes have had on Cuba and Iraqshows the ravages wrought by economic sanctionson the population. An embargo against Algeriawould reduce Algerian society to a state ofpoverty, the immediate result of which wouldprobably be an escalation of violence.Furthermore, embargoes would result in hugemigratory exoduses to Europe and North Africa. Itis unlikely that European governments would bewilling to take this risk, since immigration is oneof the most sensitive political issues as far as theirelectorates are concerned. Lastly, Algeria is one ofEurope’s main suppliers of gas, and it wouldunrealistic to expect Europe to forgo this non-polluting energy source.

Reference has also been made to the conditionsimposed on financial aid in 1994, a period duringwhich Algeria was engaged in discussions with theIMF with a view to establishing a structuraladjustment plan. But in practice this option wouldbe difficult to implement in Algeria. Algeria is anoil-producing country rich in energy resources,which protect it against external financial pressuresor at least make it independent of external financialaid. Moreover, Algeria is a State with massivedebts (although the debt for 2001 has fallen from31 billion dollars to 25 thanks to the rise in oilprices) and imposing any conditions on financialaid would only penalise the countries which are itscreditors, should the Algerian State go bankrupt. Inreality, imposing conditions on financial aid wouldquite simply have no effect on the politicaldecisions of the military as long as revenue from


the sale of hydrocarbons provides them with amore than adequate income.

Internally in fact the regime is in a position ofstrength which allows it to follow its own agenda,as the Nineties demonstrated. Despite its "in-fighting", the ANP remains a solid institution ledby generals to whom the threat of a coup by youngofficers seems inconceivable in the short term.Financially speaking, owing to the rise in the priceof crude oil, the ANP has sufficient revenue toprotect the government from a financial crisis suchas the one in 1993. At the political level, apartfrom ambivalent relations with the President, theANP rules over a sterile political arena where,since the legislative elections in 1997, the partieshave accepted the fact that the military leadersremained the real political force. Lastly, at thesecurity level, the Islamic armed groups, althoughnot eradicated by the anti-guerrilla war, no longerpose a threat to the regime.

Furthermore, the European States fear thatterrorism is the payback for their interference inAlgerian affairs. For example, the acts of terrorismcommitted in Paris in 1995 could be interpreted asa warning signal to the French government inreprisal for its widely advertised resolve to applypressure to the Algerian government.

C. CONCRETE AMERICAN AND EUROPEANACTION

It is therefore a matter of urgency for the Americangovernment and the European institutions to applyjoint pressure to the regime. During PresidentBouteflika’s visit to Washington on 12 and 13 July2001, he must be encouraged to liberalise politicalactivity, improve the human rights situation andlegalise the Wafa party. This encouragementshould not however be linked to negotiations ondiplomatic and security cooperation in the WesternSahara and the peace process in the Middle East.

Europe must drop its passive attitude as a matter ofurgency and show that it has imagination. TheEuropean institutions have several options when itcomes to applying pressure to the situation inAlgeria. Firstly, multilateral pressure as part of theBarcelona process could have a political impact.The European Union must put pressure on thesignatory governments of the Barcelona Charter toproceed with negotiations and reach a partnership

agreement based on this Charter. Through thisagreement it will be possible to insist that theAlgerian government establishes clear laws andcommercial practices, makes economicmanagement more open and complies with thecriteria for political stability.

Secondly, the European institutions can make jointdeclarations unequivocally denouncing andcondemning the recent violations of human rightscommitted by the Algerian security forces. Thirdly,on the issue of justice and the fight againstimpunity, several actions can be initiated: first theinitiative proposed by the Green party for a Euro-Algerian committee of inquiry in Gothenburg oncurrent events must be upheld. Next, it is necessaryto promote sponsorship by a specific country of theintroduction of Algeria’s case at the next session ofthe United Nations Commission on Human Rights.Lastly, the member States can encourage theirnational courts to use or extend their universaljurisdiction to rule on serious violations of humanrights committed in Algeria and to speed upproceedings concerning complaints already on file.

D. KEEPING ALGERIA ON THEINTERNATIONAL MEDIA’S AGENDA

Similarly the media and civilian organisations mustput pressure on the European governments andencourage national courts to use or extend theiruniversal jurisdiction to rule on serious violationsof human rights committed in Algeria and to speedup proceedings concerning complaints already onfile. They must obtain evidence from victims whohave suffered human rights violations and instituteproceedings against the leaders of both the camps(military, Islamist, militia) in which theseviolations occurred.

It is particularly important that the Algerian crisismaintains a high profile in the non-Frenchspeaking media.

E. ESTABLISHING LINKS BETWEENWESTERN ARMIES AND THE ANP

The ANP is a people’s army (60 per cent of itsmanpower) and the impact of such accusationsmay raise the awareness of young officers to theinternational condemnation of the generals’ policy.The example of Habib Souaïdia illustrates how


young officers are undoubtedly becomingincreasingly reluctant to apply a policy of warwhich has not succeeded in restoring peace in tenyears.

It is necessary to encourage the younger generationto break away from an ineffective war logic. It isalso extremely urgent for the authorities to put anend to the almost total impunity which is rife inAlgeria and to initiate transparent inquiries onhuman rights violations and ensure that thoseresponsible are brought to justice.

It is vital for the ANP to maintain contact withwestern military institutions. A total end to militarycooperation would indirectly have a devastatingeffect on the political training of Army officers,who would consequently maintain contacts withpariah countries (Syria, Iraq, North Korea, etc.),whose "People’s Armies" tend to repress thepopulation rather than protect the State.

Europe and the USA must therefore make strongerrepresentations with a view to forging relationswith the ANP, not in order to dispose of stocks of

weapons but to impart political know-how onArmy deployment. With this in mind, arapprochement between the ANP and NATOwould make Algerian officers realise that themodernisation of an army requires a peacefulsociety, a transparent economy and confidence innational institutions. Thus instead of bowing toprejudice and cutting links with the ANP becauseof its policy towards the Islamists, it would bepreferable to establish a real policy of cooperation,whose medium-term objective would be topromote the emergence of a generation of officerscapable of political reasoning and of avoiding thepolitical mistakes of the past decade.

These contacts with the outside world mightencourage the Army to create a political body torepresent the Army’s interests. This representationof military interests could serve to channel theArmy’s demands in both the public and politicalsectors.

Brussels, 9 July 2001


APPENDIX A

INDEX OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIS: Islamic Salvation Army

ALN: National Liberation Army

ANP: National People’s Army

CCFIS: Coordination Council of the IslamicSalvation Front

FFS: Socialist Forces Front

FIS: Islamic Salvation Front

FLN: National Liberation Front

GIA: Islamic Armed Group

GLD: Legitimate Defence Group

GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching andCombat

HCE: Senior State Committee

IEFE: Executive Body of the IslamicSalvation Front Abroad

LIDD: Islamist League for the D’wa andthe Jihad

MSP: Movement for peace in society(HAMAS)

NAHDHA: Party of the Renaissance

OUA: Organisation of African Unity

RND: National Democratic Assembly

Wafa: Party of Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi


APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

6 October 1988. Declaration of a state of siege,following bloody riots which left several hundreddead.

23 February 1989. Adoption by referendum of anew Constitution, opening the way to a multi-partysystem.

26 December 1991. Following its major victory inthe municipal elections of June 1990, the IslamicSalvation Front (FIS) won 188 seats in the firstround of the legislative elections against 15 for theNational Liberation Front (FLN), 25 for theSocialist Forces Front (FFS) and 3 for theIndependents.

11-14 January 1992. President Chadli Bendjedidis forced to resign and is replaced by a Senior StateCommittee (HCE) headed by Mohamed Boudiaf.The second round of the elections is cancelled,thereby robbing the FIS of victory.

9 February 1992. Declaration of a state ofemergency.

4 March 1992. Dissolution of the FIS.

29 June 1992. President Boudiaf is assassinated.He is replaced at the head of the HCE by Mr. AliKafi.

30 January 1994. The Senior Security Council, inwhich the Army Chief of Staff sits, appointsGeneral Liamine Zéroual, Defence Minister, as"State President". The latter would win thepresidential election in the first round, on 16November 1995, with over 60 per cent of the vote.

13 January 1995. The main opposition groups,including Islamists, sign a "national agreement" inRome, specifically calling for a halt to theviolence. The authorities reject this agreement.

15 July 1997. Release of Mr. Abassi Madani,leader of the ex-FIS and Mr. Abdelkaker Hachani,number three in the party.

21 September 1997. The Islamic Salvation Army(AIS) orders its troops to halt "combat operations"from 1 October.

23 October 1997. After winning the legislativeelections in June, Mr. Zéroual’s NationalDemocratic Assembly (RND) wins over 55 percent of the seats in the communal assemblies.

1997-1998. The massacres which have punctuatedthe confrontation between the Army and theIslamic groups for years, reach their peak.

End July-early August 1998 : A UN mission ledby former Portuguese President Mario Soares visitsAlgeria.

11 September 1998. Mr. Zéroual announces hisresignation as President.

15 April 1999. Mr Abdelaziz Bouteflika wins thepresidential election in the first round of votingwith 73.8 per cent of the vote, after the other sixcandidates withdraw, citing "massive fraud".

5 July 1999. The new President calls for nationalreconciliation and shows his desire for a newopenness by pardoning several thousand Islamists.

16 September 1999. Referendum on "CivilConcord" wins approval of 98.6 per cent of theelectorate.

22 November 1999. Abdelkader Hachani, numberthree in the ex-FIS, is assassinated in Algiers.

13 January 2000. Deadline for "Civil Concord"offering amnesty to all Islamists not implicated inmurder, rape or similar crimes.

13-17 June 2000. Official visit by PresidentBouteflika to France.

12 October 2000. Publication in France of "Qui atué à Bentalha?" by Nesroulah Yous, accusing theArmy of complicity and failure to intervene duringa massacre of 400 people in September 1997.


8 February 2001. Publication in France of "Lasale guerre" by Habib Souaïdia, ex-officer, anaccount of the practice of torture and serioushuman rights violations committed by Algerianarmed forces against civilians.

13 February 2001. Official visit to Algiers byFrench Minister of Foreign Affairs HubertVédrine.

18 April 2001. Riots break out in Kabylia.

__________________* Translator’s note : the terms "maquis" and"maquisards" refer to rural guerillas ; originallyused to denote resistance fighters of the FrenchUnderground during World War Two.


APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private,multinational organisation committed tostrengthening the capacity of the internationalcommunity to anticipate, understand and act toprevent and contain conflict.

ICG’s approach is grounded in field research.Teams of political analysts, based on the ground incountries at risk of conflict, gather informationfrom a wide range of sources, assess localconditions and produce regular analytical reportscontaining practical recommendations targeted atkey international decision-takers.

ICG’s reports are distributed widely to officials inforeign ministries and international organisationsand made generally available at the same time viathe organisation's internet site, www.crisisweb.orgICG works closely with governments and thosewho influence them, including the media, tohighlight its crisis analysis and to generate supportfor its policy prescriptions. The ICG Board -which includes prominent figures from the fieldsof politics, diplomacy, business and the media - isdirectly involved in helping to bring ICG reportsand recommendations to the attention of seniorpolicy-makers around the world. ICG is chairedby former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari;former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evanshas been President and Chief Executive sinceJanuary 2000.

ICG’s international headquarters are at Brussels,with advocacy offices in Washington DC, NewYork and Paris. The organisation currentlyoperates field projects in eighteen crisis-affectedcountries and regions across three continents:Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegroand Serbia in Europe; Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda,the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leoneand Zimbabwe in Africa; and Burma/Myanmar,Cambodia, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan in Asia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitablefoundations, companies and individual donors. Thefollowing governments currently provide funding:Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Norway, the Republic of China(Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom. Foundation and private sector donorsinclude the Ansary Foundation, the William andFlora Hewlett Foundation, the Charles StewartMott Foundation, the Open Society Institute, thePloughshares Fund, the Sasakawa Foundation, theSmith Richardson Foundation, the FordFoundation and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

July 2001


APPENDIX D

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS

AFRICA

ALGERIA

Algeria: The Press in Crisis, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999Algérie: La Crise de la Presse, Africa Report N°8, 11 January1999The People’s National Assembly, Africa Report N°10, 16February 1999Assemblée Populaire Nationale: 18 Mois de Législature, AfricaReport N°10 16 February 1999Elections Présidentielles en Algérie: Les Enjeux et lesPerspectives, Africa Report N°12, 13 April 1999The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La Crise Algérienne n’est pas finie, Africa Report N°24, 20October 2000La concorde civile : Une initiative de paix manqueé, AfricaReport N°24, 9 July 2001

BURUNDI

Burundi: Internal and Regional Implications of the Suspensionof Sanctions, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Le Burundi Après La Suspension de L’Embargo: AspectsInternes et Regionaux, Africa Report N°14, 27 April 1999Quelles Conditions pour la reprise de la Coopération auBurundi? Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Proposals for the Resumption of Bilateral and Multilateral Co-operation, Africa Report N°13, 27 April 1999Burundian Refugees in Tanzania: The Key Factor in theBurundi Peace Process, Africa Report N°19, 30 November 1999L’Effet Mandela: Evaluation et Perspectives du Processus dePaix Burundais, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the PeaceProcess in Burundi, Africa Report N°20, 18 April 2000Unblocking Burundi’s Peace Process: Political Parties,Political Prisoners and Freedom of the Press, Africa Briefing,22 June 2000Burundi: Les Enjeux du Débat. Partis Politiques, Liberté de laPresse et Prisonniers Politiques, Africa Report N°23, 12 July2000Burundi: The Issues at Stake. Political Parties, Freedom of thePress and Political Prisoners, Africa Report N° 23, 12 July 2000Burundi Peace Process: Tough Challenges Ahead, AfricaBriefing, 27 August 2000Burundi: Ni guerre ni paix, Africa Report N° 25, 1 December2000Burundi: sortir de l'impasse. L'urgence d'un nouveau cadre denégociations, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001

Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a NewNegotiating Framework, Africa Report N° 29, 14 May 2001Burundi: Cent jours pour retrouver le chemin de la paix, AfricaReport N°33, 14 August 2001

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

How Kabila Lost His Way, DRC Report N°3, Africa ReportN°16, 21 May 1999Africa’s Seven Nation War, DRC Report N°4, Africa ReportN°17, 21 May 1999The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic ofCongo, Africa Report N°18, 20 August 1999Kinshasa sous Kabila, à la veille du dialogue national, AfricaReport N°19, 21 September 1999Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, AfricaReport N° 26, 20 December 2000From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo,Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention,Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001

RWANDA

Five Years after the Genocide: Justice in Question, AfricaReport N°11, 7 April 1999Cinq Ans Après le Génocide au Rwanda: La Justice enQuestion, Africa Report N°11, 7 April 1999Uganda and Rwanda: Friends or Enemies? Africa ReportN°15, 4 May 2000Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda: l’urgence dejuger, Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy,Africa Report N° 28, 11 April 2001

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe: At the Crossroads, Africa Report N°22, 10 July 2000Zimbabwe: Three Months after the Elections, Africa Briefing,25 September 2000Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a way Forward, Africa ReportN°32, 13 July 2001

* Released since January 1999


ASIA

BURMA/MYANMAR

Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?, AsiaReport N° 11, 21 December 2000

INDONESIA

Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control, Asia ReportN°9, 5 September 2000Aceh: Escalating Tension, Asia Briefing, 7 December 2000Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku, AsiaReport N° 10, 19 December 2000Indonesia: Impunity Versus Accountability for Gross HumanRights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20February 2001Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February2001Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, AsiaReport N° 15, 13 March 2001Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, IndonesiaBriefing, 21 May 2001Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, AsiaReport N° 17, 12 June 2001Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? ICG Asia Report No18, 27 June 2001Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,ICG Asia Report No 19, 27 June 2001Indonesia-U.S. Military Ties: Asia Briefing, 18 July 2001The Megawati Presidency, Indonesia Briefing, 10 September2001Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya: ICG Asia ReportN° 23, 20 September 2001

CAMBODIA

Back from the Brink, Asia Report N°4, 26 January 1999Cambodia: The Elusive Peace Dividend, Asia Report N°8, 11August 2000

CENTRAL ASIA

Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States, Asia ReportN°7, 7 August 2000Recent Violence in Central Asia: Causes and Consequences,Central Asia Briefing, 18 October 2000Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report N°14,1 March 2001Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty andSocial Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001Central Asia: Fault Lines in the Security Map, Asia Report N°20, 4 July 2001Central Asia: Uzbekistan at Ten – Repression and Instability,Asia Report N°21, 21 August 2001

Kyrgystan at Ten: Trouble in the Island of Democracy, AsiaReport N°22, 28 August 2001

BALKANS

ALBANIA

The State of Albania, Balkans Report N°54, 6 January 1999Albania Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 11 May 1999Albania: State of the Nation, Balkans Report N°87, 1 March2000Albania Briefing: Albania’s Local Elections, A test of Stabilityand Democracy, 25 August 2000Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans report Nº111,25 May 2001Albania Briefing: Albania’s Parliamentary Elections 2001, 23August 2001

BOSNIA

Brcko: A Comprehensive Solution, Balkans Report N° 55, 8February 1999Breaking the Mould: Electoral Reform in Bosnia &Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 56, 4 March 1999Republika Srpska: Poplasen, Brcko and Kosovo – Three Crisesand Out? Balkans Report N°62, 6 April 1999Why Will No-one Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina? BalkansReport N°64, 21 April 1999Republika Srpska in the Post-Kosovo Era: Collateral Damageand Transformation,Balkans Report N°71, 5 July 1999Rule over Law: Obstacles to the Development of anIndependent Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BalkansReport N°72, 5 July 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999Preventing Minority Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: TheAnatomy of Hate and Fear, Balkans Report N°73, 2 August1999Is Dayton Failing? Policy Options and Perspectives Four YearsAfter, Balkans Report N°80, 28 October 1999Rule of Law in Public Administration: Confusion andDiscrimination in a Post Communist Bureaucracy, BalkansReport N°84, 15 December 1999Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze, BalkansReport N°86, 23 February 2000European Vs. Bosnian Human Rights Standards, HandbookOverview, 14 April 2000Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress, Balkans ReportN°90, 19 April 2000Bosnia’s Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers,Balkans Report N°91, 28 April 2000Bosnia’s Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the InternationalCommunity Ready? Balkans Report N°95, 31 May 2000War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Balkans ReportN°103, 02 November 2000Bosnia’s November Elections: Dayton Stumbles, Balkans ReortN°104, 18 December 2000


Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate theCroats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N° 106, 15March 2001No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia,Balkans Report Nº110, 22 May 2001Bosnia's Precarious Economy: Still Not Open For Business;Balkans Report N° 115, 7 August 2001

KOSOVO

Unifying the Kosovar Factions: The Way Forward, BalkansReport N°58, 12 March 1999Kosovo: The Road to Peace, Balkans Report N°59, 12 March1999Kosovo Briefing: Atrocities in Kosovo Must be Stopped, 29March 1999Kosovo Briefing: The Refugee Crisis, 2 April 1999Kosovo: Let’s Learn from Bosnia, Balkans Report N°66, 17May 1999The New Kosovo Protectorate, Balkans report N°69, 20 June1999Kosovo Briefing: Who Will Lead the Kosovo Albanians Now?28 June 1999The Policing Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo, BalkansReport N°74, 6 August 1999Who’s Who in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°76, 31 August 1999Waiting for UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo, BalkansReport N°79, 18 October 1999Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom? Balkans ReportN°78, 2 November 1999Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth, Balkans Report N°82,26 November 1999Starting From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over,Balkans Report N°83, 10 December 1999Kosovo Albanians in Serbian Prisons: Kosovo’s UnfinishedBusiness, Balkans Report N°85, 26 January 2000What Happened to the KLA?, Balkans Report N°88, 3 March2000Kosovo’s Linchpin: Overcoming Division in Mitrovica, BalkansReport N°96, 31 May 2000Reality Demands: Documenting Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law in Kosovo 1999, 27 June 2000Elections in Kosovo: Moving toward Democracy? BalkansReport N°97, 7 July 2000Kosovo Report Card, Balkans Report N°100, 28 August 2000Reaction in Kosovo to Kostunica’s Victory, Balkans Briefing, 10October 2000Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001

MACEDONIA

Challenges and Choices for the New Government, BalkansReport N°60, 29 March 1999Toward Destabilisation? Balkans Report N°67, 21 May 1999Macedonia Briefing: Government Holds Together, Eyes Fixedon Upcoming Presidential Poll, 11 June 1999Macedonia Briefing: Update of Recent Political Developments,14 June 1999

Macedonia: Gearing up for Presidential Elections, BalkansReport N°77, 18 October 1999Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians: Bridging the Gulf, BalkansReport N°98, 2 August 2000Macedonia government expects setback in local elections,Briefing Paper, 4 September 2000The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, BalkansReport N°109, 5 April 2001Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report N°113, 20 June 2001Macedonia: Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, 15 August 2001Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum, Balkans Briefing, 8September 2001

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro Briefing: Milosevic to Move on Montenegro, 23April 1999Montenegro Briefing: Calm Before the Storm, 19 August 1999Montenegro: In the Shadow of the Volcano, Balkans ReportN°89, 21 March 2000Montenegro’s Socialist People’s Party: A Loyal Opposition?,Balkans Report N°92, 28 April 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: Testing the NationalTemperature, Background Briefing, 26 May 2000Montenegro’s Local Elections: More of the Same, BriefingPaper, 23 June 2000Montenegro: Which way Next? Balkans Briefing, 30 November2000Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans ReportN°107, 28 March 2001Montenegro: Time to Decide, Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock, BalkansReport N°114, 1 August 2001

SERBIA

Sidelining Slobodan: Getting Rid of Europe’s Last Dictator,Balkans Report N°57, 15 March 1999Milosevic’s Aims in War and Diplomacy, Balkans Report N°65,11 May 1999Yugoslavia Briefing: Wanted for War Crimes, 1 June 1999Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo,Balkans Report N°70, 28 June 1999Transforming Serbia: The Key to Long-Term Balkan Stability,Balkans Report N°75, 10 August 1999Serbia’s Embattled Opposition, Balkans Report N°94, 30 May2000Serbia’s Grain Trade: Milosevic’s Hidden Cash Crop, BalkansReport N°93, 5 June 2000Serbia: The Milosevic Regime on the Eve of the SeptemberElections, Balkans Report N°99, 17 August 2000Current Legal Status of the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) andof Serbia and Montenegro, Balkans Report N°101, 19September 2000Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’sMoment of Truth, Balkans Report N°102, 19 September 2000


Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Sanctions Briefing, BalkansBriefing, 10 October 2000Serbia on the Eve of the December Elections, Balkans Briefing,20 December 2000A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for regional Stability,Balkans Report N° 112, 15 June 2001Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution?, BalkansReport N°116, 10 August 2001Serbia’s Transition: Reforms Under Siege, Balkans ReportN°117, 21 September 2001

REGIONAL REPORTS

War in the Balkans, Balkans Report N°61, 19 April 1999Balkan Refugee Crisis, Balkans Report N°68, 1 June 1999Balkans Briefing: Stability Pact Summit, 27 July 1999After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting BalkansPeace, Balkans report N°108, 26 April 2001Milosevic in the Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia and theRegion, Balkans Briefing Paper, 6 July 2001

ISSUES REPORTS

HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, ICG Issues Report N° 1, 19 June2001Eu Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes forConflict Prevention and Management, ICG Issues Report N° 2,26 June 2001The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): CrisisResponse in the Grey Lane, ICG Briefing Paper, 26 June 2000


APPENDIX E

ICG BOARD MEMBERS

Martti Ahtisaari, ChairmanFormer President of Finland

Stephen Solarz, Vice-ChairmanFormer U.S. Congressman

Gareth Evans, PresidentFormer Foreign Minister of Australia

Morton AbramowitzFormer U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; former U.S.Ambassador to Turkey

Kenneth AdelmanFormer U.S. Ambassador and Deputy PermanentRepresentative to the UN

Richard AllenFormer Head of U.S. National Security Council andNational Security Advisor

Hushang AnsaryFormer Iranian Minister and Ambassador;Chairman, Parman Group, Houston

Louise ArbourSupreme Court Judge, Canada;

Former Chief Prosecutor, International CriminalTribunal for former Yugoslavia

Oscar Arias SanchezFormer President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize,1987

Ersin AriogluChairman, Yapi Merkezi

Paddy AshdownFormer Leader of the Liberal Democrats, UnitedKingdom

Zainab BanguraDirector, Campaign for Good Governance, SierraLeone

Alan BlinkenFormer U.S. Ambassador to Belgium

Emma BoninoMember of the European Parliament; formerEuropean Commissioner

Maria Livanos CattauiSecretary-General, International Chamber ofCommerce

Eugene ChienDeputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan

Wesley ClarkFormer NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques DelorsFormer President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-JensenFormer Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot ErlerVice-President, Social Democratic Party, GermanBundestag

Mark EyskensFormer Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi FunabashiJournalist and author

Bronislaw GeremekFormer Foreign Minister of Poland

I.K.GujralFormer Prime Minister of India

Han Sung-JooFormer Foreign Minister of Korea

El Hassan bin TalalChairman, Arab Thought Forum

Marianne HeibergSenior Researcher, Norwegian Institute ofInternational Affairs

Elliott F KulickChairman, Pegasus International

Joanne Leedom-AckermanNovelist and journalist

Todung Mulya LubisHuman rights lawyer and author

Allan J MacEachenFormer Deputy Prime Minister of Canada

Barbara McDougallFormer Secretary of State for External Affairs,Canada

Matthew McHughCounsellor to the President, The World Bank


Mo MowlamFormer British Secretary of State for NorthernIreland

Christine OckrentJournalist

Timothy OngChairman, Asia Inc magazine

Wayne OwensPresident, Center for Middle East Peace andEconomic Co-operation

Cyril RamaphosaFormer Secretary-General, African NationalCongress; Chairman, New Africa Investments Ltd

Fidel RamosFormer President of the Philippines

Michel RocardMember of the European Parliament; former PrimeMinister of France

Volker RuheVice-President, Christian Democrats, GermanBundestag; former German Defence Minister

Mohamed SahnounSpecial Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General

William ShawcrossJournalist and author

Michael SohlmanExecutive Director of the Nobel Foundation

George SorosChairman, Open Society Institute

Eduardo SteinFormer Foreign Minister of Guatemala

Pär StenbäckFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald StoltenbergFormer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O TaylorChairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van ThijnFormer Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; formerMayor of Amsterdam

Simone VeilFormer Member of the European Parliament; formerMinister for Health, France

Shirley WilliamsFormer British Secretary of State for Education andScience; Member House of Lords

Grigory YavlinskyMember of the Russian Duma

Mortimer ZuckermanChairman and Editor-in-Chief, US News and WorldReport


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