Understanding Belarus: Belarusian Identity

8/13/2019 Understanding Belarus: Belarusian Identity

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University of Glasgow

Understanding Belarus: Belarusian IdentityAuthor(s): Grigory IoffeSource: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No. 8 (Dec., 2003), pp. 1241-1272Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3594506.

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GRIGORYIOFFEsecond reaction is a rhetoricalquestion: the difference is indeed small and so theattainmentof separate dentityhinges on whetherthe goal of becomingtrulydifferentfrom Russians can become truly mobilising.According to Hroch, 'linguistic assimilation [does] not always strike a decisiveblow againstthe furtherdevelopmentof a nationality:one need only cite the examplesof IrelandandNorway'.2In the case of Ireland, he religiousdifferencefromEnglandhistorically played an importantrole.

Religion and identityIndeed, accordingto Smith, 'organisedreligion supplies much of the personnelandcommunicationchannels for the diffusion of ethnic myths and symbols. The priestsand scribes not only communicateand record and transmit hese legends andbeliefs,but they also serve as the chief guardiansand conduitsof the symbolismwhich canlink feudal or imperialelites to the peasantmasses ...'However, it is probably in the area of organised religion that one of the mostacutely perceived vulnerabilities of the Belarusian identity lies. For Belarusiannationalism to assert itself vis-a-vis two older and aggressive nationalisms,RussianandPolish, it had to changethe historicalpatternof ethnicmobilisationthathad longdominated the area. In this pattern Belarus was viewed as the Polish-Russianborderland, n which the Orthodox associated themselves with the Russians andCatholics with the Poles, andafterthe collapse of the Uniate(GreekCatholic)Churchthere was no or at any rate little room for Belarusiansper se.Most residents of Belarus belonged to the Uniate Church from 1569 to 1839.Belarusian nationalist writings suggest that its collapse more than anything elseundermined he Belarusians' sense of being differentfrom the neighbouringethnicgroups. Indeed, the Uniates (Greco-Catholicswho abided by Orthodox rites butrecognisedthe supremacyof the Pope) essentiallyrepresenteda transitional,half-waycreed between Roman Catholicism and RussianOrthodoxy.One may say that it wasjust as transitionalas local vernaculars were between Polish and Russian. Twotransitional eatures(languageandcreed) superimposedmighthave led to somethingqualitativelynew. However, blaming Belarusians'blurredidentity on the Uniate'sdemise would invoke the chicken andegg conundrum-if only because the Uniates'supremeclerics shifted to Orthodoxyvoluntarily4and most Belarusiansfollowed intheir footsteps.

It is tempting to assume, though, that in today's Belarus the issue of religiousunderpinningsof identityis no longer important.First,thereis confessionalpeace inBelarus wherein the Orthodox ostensibly have no problems with their Catholicneighbours. In Novogrudek, for example, a major kosciol with its many Polish-language posters and prayerbooks5 is just 100 metres away from a majorOrthodoxChurch where they preach in Russian, and there does not seem to be any majortension between the two at all. Second, most Belarusians are atheists and do notcare much about organised religion anyway. Third, protestantdenominations,nottraditionalchurches,are growing the fastest in today's Belarus.All of this being said, however, the traditionalreligious divide appearsto linger.People may not attend services but most are keenly aware of their backgrounds,

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BELARUSIANIDENTITYwhich in manycases is imprinted n theirfirstnameswith, say, Stanislawor Jadwigaidentifyingsomehow as Catholics,while Ivan and Nadezhdaidentify as Orthodox.Itis symptomatic that AlyaksandrLukashenkaspeaks of himself as an 'Orthodoxatheist' (an atheist with an Orthodoxbackground),makes friends with Filaret,6 heOrthodoxsupreme eaderof Belarus,andis suspiciousof Catholics. Those of Catholicbackground,on the otherhand,refer to Filaret as the biggest imposterand wheeler-dealer,7and Stanislav Shushkevich,whose background s Catholic, said that in hischildhood he associated Orthodoxclerics with heavy drinking,while Catholicpriestsand monks appeared o him as decent, spiritualand clean.8

Location, ethnonymand identityThe settingof YankaKupala's 1922 play Tuteishiya Locals) is the city of Minsk in1914-19. There are 15 characters,14 of whom are local Slavs. Only three-Yanka,a rural teacher, Alenka, much influenced by Yanka's preaching, and her father,Garoshka-refer to themselves and are referredto by the rest as Belarusians. Othercharactersdo not subscribe to this ethnonymand are nationallyindifferent.Mikita,whose proclivityto mimicryof Polish, Russian,Germanand, in the end, Belarusianways dependingon the political convenience of the moment, is scathingly parodiedby Kupala.Nasta, a woman of indefiniteprofession, says that, as she 'learnedfromreliable sources', Belarusiansare 'very pliable'.9Of particularnterestare the two comical scientists who repeatedlybumpinto oneanother and whose identically-wordedverdicts in regardto Belarus and Belarusiansare expressedin Russian and Polish. The Russian-speakingEasternScientistwears akosovorotka,a Russian-styleshirt andhigh boots andhas a tousledbeard,whereasthePolish-speakingWestern Scientist wears a kontusz (suit) and konfederatka(hat),which are recognisablyPolish, and he shaves his beardbut has a waved moustache.It is characteristic hatin a Belarusian-language lay Polish andRussianmonologuesare given without translation, as Belarusian speakers, for whom this play wasintended,routinelyunderstoodboth.Both scientists 'examine' a self-proclaimedBelarusianman and write down hisresponses. For example, asked about the regional nature and political borders ofBelarus, Yanka, a Belarusian,has this to say: 'Well, our nature,Mr. Scientist, isnature-like,you know; we have fields, woods, mountainsand valleys, we even usedto have our own sea, but the occupiers mixed it with dirt and so only the Pinskmarshes remain. As for political borders,we have none, for we do not have politicsof our own so we join in the politics of others. 0Having heardthis answer,EasternScientist reflects it in the following way in his field diary: 'Nature in Russia'sNorthwesternprovince is great and bountiful: there is dry land and there arewatersheds;they even used to have their own sea, but due to adverse climaticinfluences rom the west, the aforementioned ea has sunkinto the Pinskmarshes.Asfor political frontiers,they are perceived as foggy. Yet there appearsto be a desireto extend themwest'.1 The sameresponsein Western Scientist'srendition s: 'Naturein Poland's easternkresy [a Polish toponymfor much of Belarus,Lithuaniaandpartof westernUkraine] s greatand bountiful: here is drylandandthere arewatersheds;they even used to have theirown sea, but due to adverseclimatic influences rom the

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GRIGORYIOFFEeast, the aforementioned ea has sunkinto the Pinskmarshes.As forpoliticalfrontiers,they are perceivedas foggy. Yet there appearsto be a desire to extend them east'12Obviously, the above reflects Kupala'ssatirical attackon his fellow countrymen'slasting anonymityand Russian and Polish claims on Belarus. Of prime importancewould be theway in whichthose few in possessionof Belarusian dentityreact to theseclaims-by which I mean the de facto mass response, not just that of Kupala'sself-identifiedBelarusiancharacterswho findnothingbetter han to repair o theirruralvillages away from the corruptcity.Smithwrotethat 'geo-politicallocation[maybe] moreimportantor ethnic survivalthan autonomy, providedthat we underline the symbolic and sociological aspects oflocation.' 3 In what follows, I will pay attention to both aspects as they typifyBelarusians.One thing,however,is clearfrom the outset:for a critical mass of peoplewith Belarusianidentity to squeeze in between Russians and Poles has been andcontinues to be entirely within the realm of possibility. This possibility cannot bediscarded on the sole basis that Russian and Polish nationalisms are older andaggressive and the respectiveheartlandsare not far apart.In Europeand aroundtheworld, younger nationalisms have succeeded despite overwhelming odds, and thedistancesbetween separatenational cores in partsof WesternEuropeare often muchsmaller than those between Moscow, Minsk and Warsaw. In other words, there isplenty of 'room' for Belarusians, provided of course that Belarusian nationalismsucceeds in its crucialsurvivaltest:effectively rallyinglocals aroundvarious markersof Belarusian dentity. This, however, has not been at all a smooth process.Perhaps the most phenomenal feature of Belarusians has been the long-lastingabsence of a geographicalnamethat wouldbe perceivedas the token of theircollectiveidentity. The words 'Belarus' and 'Belarusian' were embracedby most indigenouspeople of the areaonly in the wake of the formationof the BelarusianSoviet SocialistRepublic (BSSR). Among otherthings, this effectively means that the Soviet periodwas the longest time span of the Belarusians'nationallyconscious existence. Underthe BSSR, Belarusian became one of the official languages. Also, 'Belarus' and'Belarusian'becamepartof therepublic'snationalemblemandanthem,and the wordscirculatedwidely in regionalprintmedia and state documents,including, above all,internalpassports nitially issued for urbanresidents and residentsof borderregions.These personalIDs included not only the mention of Belarus as the holder's place ofresidence but also the person's natsional'nost' or ethnicity.Prior to that essentiallytop-down imposition of the toponym 'Belarus' and ethnonym 'Belarusian', mostregionalresidents of Slavic backgroundntroduced hemselves as simply 'tuteishiya',which in the Polish languagemeans 'locals','4 hence the title of Kupala'splay.The term'Belorussia' or 'WhiteRussia/WhiteRus' ' firstappearedn chroniclesbythe end of the fourteenthcentury,'5and the originof the term is not quiteclear. Thereare two most believable interpretations.Accordingto one, White Rus' meant a partof Rus' which had no obligationto pay tribute to the Tatarsin the twelfth century,as opposed to Black Rus', which did pay tribute to the Tatars.16According to thesecond interpretation-by Oleg Trubachev,a Russian linguist who, incidentally,didextensiveresearchon Belarusian-there were the following divisions of Rus' at large:MalayaRus'-the ancestralRussianland,from which the expansionstarted;VelikayaRus'-land being colonised (land underexpansion, for which Malaya Rus' was the

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BELARUSIANIDENTITY'point of departure');and White Rus'-part of the ancientcolour orientationpattern,accordingto which 'white' means west.17 One can see that in neitherinterpretationwas 'Belarus' an ethnichomeland,at least originally.Otherknown interpretations fthe term18do not change this conclusion.Even the staunchestBelarusiannationalistsdo not believe that 'Belarus'became amarkerof collective identitybeforethe end of the nineteenthcentury.19As mentionedabove, for most residentsof Belarusthis occurredeven later.In 1972 SolomonBrook,the late Soviet experton ethnology,revealedin his Moscow University guest lecturethat,even in the 1950s, on ethnographic xpeditionsin Polesie (southernBelarus)andother areas of ruralBelarusmany people still introduced hemselves as tuteishiyaormiejscowi.Accordingto Sadowski, 10% of the Orthodox n Podlaskiewojew6dztwo(northeasternPoland) identified themselves as tuteishiya as recently as the mid-1990s.20Other self-identifications ncluded miejscowi (which also means 'locals'),Ruscy, OrthodoxPoles etc.

This enduringanonymity s trulyexceptionalbecause a commonname is the mostbasic indicator of belonging to a group. When Uladzimir Arlou and GennadzSaganovichwrite thatprincedomsthat existed in what is now Belarusand Smolenskprovinceof Russia 'formed an ethnicallyand linguisticallyhomogeneousregion'21 asearly as the eleventh-twelth centuries,they may be on target.But even seven-eightcenturies later a common verbal denominatorof this homogeneity, one that wouldtranscendlocalism, was missing, and that is puzzling. Even the many large-scalemilitary campaigns that affected the region apparentlyfailed to foment a trulycollective sense of insecuritythatwould be conducive to sharedidentity.Some, likeMikola Ermalovich,believe that the originalname of what is now called 'Belarus'was 'Litva' (Lithuania),which was subsequentlyusurped by a neighbouringethnicgroup,albeit by mistake.22Sergei Markov,a Russianpolitical scientist,wrote in thisregard: If one is havingtea togetherwith membersof the Belarusianopposition,theywouldputbluntlywhatthey still hesitate to formulatepublicly. Belarus ,hey wouldsay, is a colonial fabrication of Moscow, we are a separatepeople, ancient anddifferent from Russians, we are successors of the Great Duchy of Lithuania .23Accordingto Vitaut Kipel, most people of the region used to identify themselves asLitsvinyor residents of Lithuania.24This may not be quite accurate:according toMikhas Bich, as recently as the mid-nineteenthcentury, 'Belarusian'as the ethnicname was widespreadbut limitedto the easternmostpartof modernBelarus;Litsviny,on the otherhand,was a typical ethnonymfor western and centralBelarus,while inPolesie (southernBelarus) the term Palyashchukwas used.25All in all, the absenceof a single ethnonymfor the Slavic populationof the region-prior to the commence-ment of the Soviet period-is undeniable.

Social structureand identityThe social compositionof Belarusiansmay have inhibited the manifestationsof theirseparateand unique ethno-national dentity. Currently,67% of Belarus' populationlive in cities, but urbanisationwas grossly delayed, and as recently as 1926 theproportionof urban dwellers among ethnic Belarusians(8%) was less than that ofother ethnicities within the republic, notably Jews and Russians. A middle-class

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GRIGORYIOFFEintelligentsiathat 'wouldinvite masses into history'26was late in coming. As a result,at the beginning of the twentienth century, residents of Belarus had the leastdiscernible sense of separateethnic identity,andBelarusiannationalistsdid not seemto have much following among predominantlypeasant Belarusian masses. Mostimportantly,no sense of shared identitybetween the social classes had been forgedin Belarus before the communist revolution in the Russian Empire.The upperandeven middle (merchantandcraftsman)stratapledgedallegiancealmostexclusively tothe Russian,Polish and Jewish causes.

However, to present social structureas the root cause of the blurredidentity ofBelarusians would probablybe short-sighted.Hroch studied in depth the nationalistmovements of Europe's so-called non-dominantethnic groups, such as Czechs.Lithuanians,Norwegians etc. and defined a non-dominantethnic group as onedistinguishedby the following 'three deficiencies: it lacked its own nobility orrulingclasses, it possessed no state,and its literary radition n its own languagewasincomplete or interrupted'.27Belarusians fit this definition impeccably. AmongBelarusians, as in other non-dominantethnic groups, the majorityof the nationalmovement's most active participantswere of ruralorigin. In Lithuania,this share,accordingto Hroch's estimate,was as high as 90%.28One of the principaltasks ofthe national movementwas then to ensure that separate dentitywould not fall preyto verticaland horizontalmobility in which ruralvillagersbecome involved, so that,say, a Czech would not stop identifyingwith people of his stock when promoted nthe ranks and/or moved to an urban area. This outcome, however, could never betaken for granted n Belarus,and so it is not by chance thatas recentlyas the 1970sZaprudnikaverredthat urbanisation n Belarus spelled loss of national character.29

Birth of identityIn Belarus, awareness of ethnic distinctiveness began to develop among Catholicintellectualsof peasant origin in the mid-nineteenthcentury.In a narrowlydefinedlinguisticsense it was an awakening,as contemporaryBelarusianvernacularwas nowconstrued as deriving from the Ruski language of the GrandDuchy of Lithuania(GDL). Ethnicawareness was an entirelynew thingbecausethose writingin westernRussianin the GrandDuchy had not defined themselves in oppositionto Russia; infact, it was affinity to Russia that was important,while weakened contacts andgrowing Polonisation had ultimatelyundermined he Russianness of the GDL. Theidea of a separateBelarusianidentity grew out of folklore researchby some VilnaUniversity professorsand students,notably Jan Barszczewski (1790-1851) and JanCzeczot (1796-1847), whose languageof everydaycommunicationwas Polish. Later,Vincent Dunin-Marcinkiewicz 1809-84) and some otherscontributed o Belarusianself-awareness.On the basis of linkingtheirfolkloreresearchwith literaryandofficialdocuments of the GDL (1253-1569), they came to the conclusion that they hadinheriteda cultural-historicalegacy thathadall the trappingsof a traditiondistinctivefromthatof the Poles. Uncoveringthe historicalpastof the LithuanianandBelarusianpeoples and, on the otherhand, an awarenessof the culturalrebirthof other 'smallnations' such as the Czechs, Serbs, Croats,Bulgarsand Slovenes, began to convincethese Catholic intellectuals that the formula 'gente Rutheni,natione Poloni' (a Pole

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BELARUSIANIDENTITYof Russiandescent)did not quitefit their ethnic domain.30This idea was subsequentlyrefinedby FrantsyszekBoguszewicz (1840-1900), a poet, who in 1891 appealedtohis fellow countrymen o recognise that they were Belarusiansand that their land'sname was Belarus.31

The emergence of a Belarusian national idea (a step forwardcomparedwith theawarenessof ethnicdistinction)matured n the 'Nasha Niva' literarycircle, which in1909-15 published heeponymousnewspaper n Vilna.It is essentialto emphasisethatthis circle was also entirely composed of Catholics, a minority among Belarusianspeakers.The city of Vilna played a significantrole as their meeting place, and so,from the perspectiveof Belarusiannationalism,Vilna was the most significantcentre.Its subsequent oss, first to Polandandthen to Lithuaniaas a resultof the 1921 Rigatreatyandthe 1939 borderrearrangements espectively,was hurtful or the Belarusiannationalcause.EarlyBelarusianwriterscalledVilna 'BelarusianZion'32 Z. Byadulya)and 'KrivitskayaMecca' (UladzimirZhylka).33Accordingto MikhasBich, 'if WilnoUniversityhad enduredfor one or two decades longer, it would have become moreBelarusian hanPolish: dominantBelarusianelementsin its environswould have wonthe tug of war with Polish influences,whose sourceswere on the ethnographic paceof Polandperse'.34This prediction s impossibleto verify. However,it does not seemlikely that the Vilna metropolisin the early 1900s would ever have become the corearea for the Belarusiannationalcause. Poles and Jews dominated he city, its culturallandscapeandthe iconography architecture, illboards,publicsigns, attireetc.) of theplace. Polishnesswas promotedby the Catholic Churchandthe characterof the localuniversity,one of the principalcentres of Polish nationalism.While Jews could notpossibly raise any national claims to the city, it was in Vilna thatBen Yehuda(bornas Eliezer Perelman n a shtetle of Luzhki,currentlyn Vitebsk oblast' of Belarus)setout to revive Hebrew.Later,his son, Ben-Zion,who becameknownby his pen-name,ItamarBen-Avi, became the first person in moder times speaking Hebrew as hisnative languagebecause it was the only language spoken in Ben Yehuda's family.Vilna thus meant many things to many people.Today's Vilnius is no longer a majorcentre of Belarusiannationalism,although tsmost active leaders have long enjoyed the sympathy and support of Lithuanianauthorities.Thus in 1988 a congress of the BelarusianPopularFront convened inVilnius. There are also some Belarusian-language ublishersand one Belarusian-lan-guage monthly.About 60,000 people in Lithuaniaare believed to be ethnic Belaru-sians; at least they had a record of Belarusian ethnicity in their Soviet internalpassports.Yet aside from Belarus itself and a few personalities n Europeand NorthAmerica, the only area where nationally conscious Belarusians can be found isnortheasternPoland.

Identity rustrations:pendulumeffectSituated between Poland and Russia both geographically and linguistically, thepromotersof the Belarusiannationalidea identified themselves in oppositionto oneor the other of Belarus' expansionist neighbours.Today, for obvious reasons, thebogeymanto dissociateoneself fromis Russia,buthistoricallybothRussia andPolandwere used in thatcapacity intermittently, s springboards f sorts.In fact, Polandwas

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GRIGORYIOFFEto play this role first because the Belarusiannationalidea developed amidst Polish-speakingintellectuals who began to define themselves in oppositionto that country.That way, however, they stood a chance of falling into the embraces of Russia.Similarly,rebounding rom Russia at a differentpoint in time, Belarusiannationalistthinkershad to be on the look-out lest they became too Polish: a peculiarpendulumeffect. It is important o point out in this regardthat the Catholic intellectualswhodeveloped a kind of a Manifest Destiny for Belarus earmarked his blueprintforOrthodox, if only because the majority of Belarusian speakers were Orthodoxpeasants.However,almostfromthe outset,the aforementioned xpressionof Belarusian-nesswas to confront the alternativeblueprint.This was the so-called West-Rusism, atheory that emphasised Belarusianpeculiaritybut only within the confines of theRussianculturaluniverse.These two perspectiveson what it meant to be a Belarusianfought each otherfrom the time Belarusianethnic awarenessemerged.For example,Konstanty(Kastus)Kalinowski (1838-64) rankshigh in the pantheonof prominentBelarusians:he was anti-Russianand pro-Polish,and he was executed as an activeparticipant n a Polish uprising. In contrast to Kalinowski, his alter ego, MikhailKoyalovich (1828-91), anothermember of the Belarusian nobility, embracedtheideology of West-Rusism. So did some other prominentBelarusians,for example,MikhailBobrovsky,one of the earliest researchersof the Belarusianvernacular,andEvfimi Karsky,the premierBelarusianlinguist of all time.To see the pendulumeffect still at work,one has to heed not only whatBelarusiannationalistssay (or rather,used to say) about Lukashenka,calling him a Russianvassal and other names, but also what some rank-and-fileBelarusians say aboutZyanon Paznyak,who is a devout Catholic and vehemently anti-Russian.'If thosePolacks come to power, whetherPaznyakor somebodyelse, they will give us hell',a ruralpensionerfrom around Brest was quoted as saying in 2001 to a MoskovskieNovosti correspondent.35nterestingly,at that time Paznyakhad been out of Belarusfor the sixth straight year. Some 80% of today's Belarusians are of Orthodoxbackground,and most of them are prone to follow West-Rusism,even though theymost probablyhave never heardthe term 'West-Rusism'.The pendulumeffect comes with some othercomplications.In particular, here isa denominationalpatternof ethnic mobilisation.This means that in what used to bethe Polish-Russian borderland,Catholicstended to identify with the Poles, whereasthe Orthodox identified with the Russians, effectively leaving no room for Belaru-sians. Indeed,as mentionedabove, in Catholicchurches n BelarusPolish is routinelyused. And likewise in the Orthodoxchurches the languageis Russian.This explainswhy in the annals of the Belarusian nationalmovement, from its very inception totoday, one comes across the same refrain:'it is wrong to determinenationalitybyreligion, and most self-proclaimedPoles in Belarus are actually Belarusians'. Thefollowing identicalpronouncements ome from publicationsdated between 1921 and2001.

FedorTuruk 1921):In Belorussia,Catholicsromancient imes(izdrevle)dentifiedwithPoles,whileOrthodoxwithRussian.36hesurvivingBelorussianobilitiesusuallyassignthemselves to the Poles because of theirPolish and Catholicupbringing.37

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BELARUSIAN IDENTITYTat'yana Mikulich (1996): The old principle of assigning nationalityaccordingto one'sreligionhas survived to these days. In quite a few cases, in Belarus,people call themselvesPoles, who do not have anythingin common with the Polish nationalityexcept religion.38WojtekKosc (1999): Since the words 'Orthodox' and 'Belarusan'39re synonymousin theminds of Bialystok authorities,both groups are discriminatedagainst equally. However,those two words are not synonymous ..40L. V. Tereshkovich(1991): Denominationalproblemsare extremely painfulfor the Belaru-siannational movement. InBelarus,Catholicismbears a distinctlycolonial imprint,whereasthe attitude of Orthodoxy to the national movement is chilly, although Orthodoxyhasabsorbed some regional features ... The overwhelming majorityof Catholic priests areethnic Poles who considerall BelarusianCatholicsto be Poles. The Polonisationconductedby the priests is also reinforcedby widespreadPolonophileviews among youths.41JanZaprudnik1993): The Uniateclergy ... spokePolish and Latin betterthan the languageof their flock. Conceptsof religionandnationalitywere inseparablywelded:OrthodoxywasRussian,Catholicism was Polish, and Uniatismwas plebeian,associatedwith easternritesbut western ecclesiastical allegiance.42JanZaprudnik1993): Strivingsfor Belarusianseparatenesswere seriously hamperedby thegeneral identification of Catholicism with Polishness and Orthodoxywith Russianness-apsychological heritageof the age-old Russo-Polish competitionin the Belarusianlands.43Jan Zaprudnik(1993): [In Belarus] identification of Orthodoxy with Russianness andCatholicismwithPolishnessis deeply seated in the popularmind.In fact, Belarusianrenewalis an uphill struggle precisely because it has to deal with the heavy burden of pastcenturies-a burden not easily discarded.44Jan Zaprudnik 1993): The Polish minorityin Lithuaniaconsists fundamentallyof indige-nous inhabitants who consider themselves Poles exclusively because of their Catholicreligion (the everydaylanguageof these 'Poles' is a dialect of Belarusian).45JanZaprudnik 1993): Old cliches inheritedfrom history are being reanimatednow in theatmosphereof free expression:whereas eastern Orthodoxyis identified by many, eithersubconsciouslyor overtly,as the Russianfaith,Catholicism s presentedas the Polish faith.Officially, Moscow and Warsaw are both content with this twist of mind and have beenusing it for their own expansionistpurposes.46Zaprudnik'sexceptional tenacity in fighting the denominationalpatternof ethnic

mobilisationmay be self-defeating.First,if one fightsan alleged mythso persistentlyone actuallylends it additional egitimacy. Second and most important,objectingtothe denominationalpatternon the groundsthat it is rooted in the popularmind isillogical. Ethnicallegiancesand/or shared dentitycan exist only in popularmentality,which is their sole possible agent or substratum.There could hardlybe a DNA orotherobjective scientifictest thattells Belarusians rom Russiansor Poles. Criticisingpopular mentalitymay make sense when it propagates'truths'rejected by science,such as that the Earth s flat or that motor vehicle tyres can save one from lightning.But if people identify themselves in a certainway over and over again for a periodof 200 years, then telling them that they are wrong after all constitutes a strangemessage at best. While physicalanthropology e.g. facial types) andlanguagemay in

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GRIGORYIOFFEexceptionalcases cast doubt on self-proclaimedethnicidentity,this is highly unlikelyin a racially homogeneous region with gentle language gradients, over-lappingcultural nfluencesand unstablenational borders.After all, the people in questiondonot claim to be Mongols, Arabs or AmericanIndians.They do not even claim to beFrenchor German.The people in questionare Slavs who live in what has been forcenturies the Russian-Polish borderland and who just cling to one of its flanks.Having lived all their lives in between Russian and Polish nationalcores, all theywant is to be identified with one of the two. Apparentlythe third alternative, .e.espousing Belarusian-ness,has not swayed some of them.Zaprudnik's ase aboutthe spuriousPolishnessof quitea few Lithuanian esidentsseems particularlybizarrebecause the identificationof the 'true' national niche ofthese people is attributed o Lithuanianand Belarusianauthorities,namelyto VitautasLandsbergis(then the presidentof Lithuania)and Stanislau Shushkevich(then theleader of Belarus), who happened to meet in the early 1990s in Lithuania anddiscussed the issue.47The patternof ethnic mobilisation described has other expressions as well. Forexample, moder Belarusianhistorianswho live in the republicof BelaruspraisethesuppressedUniate Churchbecausethey see it as an attempton the partof local Slavsto dissociate themselves from Russia. At the same time, Belarusianhistorians inPoland are dismissive of that Church because to them it looks like a vehicle ofPolonisation.48

'Passportnational awareness'There areapparentlya sizable numberof Belarusianspeakerswith whom the positivemessage of the Belarusiannationalmovement(that s, the message definingwho 'we'are rather than who 'we' are not) has not struck a cord. Yet quite a few Russianspeakers appear to declare themselves Belarusians apparently just because theyhappento live in Belarus.When Sadowski,a researcher romBialystok(Poland),studiedthe communitiesonboth sides of the Belarus-Polandborder,his survey includedone questionthat wasconsidered entirely normal on the Polish side but raised many eyebrows on theBelarusianside:Whatnationalitydo you belong to in your deepestconviction?Peopleeast of the border were surprised(whereas those west of it remained unruffled)because Soviet-style internalpassportscontained a clear-cut record of nationality.Unavailable in Poland but available and required n Belarus, these IDs helped instiland fix the notion of belonging to a certain ethnic group-in fact, so much so thatthere appeared o be no need to doubt it, which is why the words 'in your deepestconviction' seemed grossly redundant o many on the Belarusian side of the border.Sadowski aptly dubbed this phenomenon'passportethnic awareness'.49

How manyBelarusians?Internalpassports may indeed have done more to enhance ethnic awareness ofKupala's Tuteishiya han the entire Belarusiannationalmovement.One side effect of

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BELARUSIANIDENTITYthis is that morepeople in Belarus than in Poland believe thatbelonging to a certainethnic group is preordainedby one's ancestry.50Because the most eminent promotersof the Belarusian national idea 'becamefinallyconvincedthatthey wereBelarusians'only in the late 1890s51andwere unableto sway more than a couple of hundredof their fellow countrymen prior to thecommencementof the Soviet era, the above hypothesis does not seem implausible.But if this is true,it is next to impossibleto say how manyself-identifiedBelarusiansthere are.

Accordingto the 1999 census there were 8,159,073 Belarusians iving in Belarus.52According to the 1989 Soviet census, 2,127,000 Belarusianslived in other Sovietrepublics,53or the most part in Russia, Ukraineand Lithuania. But how many ofthese people are Belarusians 'in their deepest conviction' (as per Sadowski) isimpossibleto verify. In contrast o that,the dataavailablefor the northeastern artofPoland (former Bialystok wojew6dztwo,currentlypart of Podlaskie wojewodztwo)allow one to attributeethnicity to self-identification,the realm where ethnicityrightfully belongs, particularly n blurredcases where people face more than oneoption.The numberof Belarusians n Polandhas been debatedsince the reinstatementofPoland's statehood in 1919 up to this day. The last Polish census that recordednationality (narodowosc) took place in 1921. In 1931 only a question on nativelanguagewas included. Vakarshowed that in the census of 1921 all the natives ofRomanCatholicfaith were registeredas Polish and the total numberof Belorussianswas thus reducedfrom 3,700,000 to 1,041,760 on the assumption hat 'being RomanCatholicin faith, they would be completelyassimilatedwithinten years or so'.54 Theveracityof this assumptioncould not be tested at the time, and in 1939 Polandwaspartitioned or the fourthtime in its history,with Bialystok andits environsaccruingto Soviet Belarus. After the war Bialystok and its environswere returned o Poland,and a certainnumberof Belarusiansremainedwest of the border, n Poland.A countconducted soon after the war showed 125,000 Belarusians.It is believed, though,that the count was not carried out by competent statisticians and was influencedby the post-warchaos. Once again, only the Orthodoxwere recordedas Belarusians.In reality, a sizable numberof the Belarusian-speakingOrthodoxat that time didnot have a clear-cutethnicidentityand most identifiedthemselvesas tuteishiya,someas just Orthodox(in which case 'Orthodox'was not only a token of faith but ofethnicity as well), and there were also some self-proclaimedRussians and Polesamong them.55In lateryearsthe Polonisationprocessaccelerated,but the post-warPolish censusesdid not include entries on eithernationality(ethnicity)or native language.Accordingto Sadowski'ssurveyof the mid-1990s,no Catholics n northeastern olandidentifiedthemselves as Belarusians.56On the other hand, there were 286,000 people ofOrthodox faith in what used to be Bialystok wojew6dztwo, and these peopleaccounted for 40% of its entire population.Of these, 53% identified as Poles and28.2% as Belarusians.57Based on these data, there are about 80,000 self-identifiedBelarusiansin Poland. Other sources give lower or higher estimates for the overallnumber of people with the Orthodoxcreed, which may express itself in a lower orhigher numberof ethnic Belarusians.58

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GRIGORYIOFFEA case of trans-borderasymmetry

Mariusz Kowalski has added some human geographyinsights59 o the analysis bySadowski. The major findings with reference to both authors boil down to thefollowing.Accordingto Kowalski,the entirestudy region, includingGrodnooblast', Belarus,and Podlaskie wojew6dztwo,Poland, is a transitionalregion both linguistically and

culturally, which is particularlycharacteristic of the areas abutting the currentPolish-Belarusianborder.These include abouta dozen westernmostraionyof Grodnooblast' (notablyGrodno,Lida, Volkovysk, Voronovo and Shchuchin)and a similarnumberof gminyin the easternmostpartof formerBialystockwojewodztwo notablythe environs of Hain6wka,Bielsk, Siemiatycze and Sokolka).60A trans-borderymmetry s reflected n that therearepeople identifyingthemselvesas Poles to the east of the stateborder and as Belarusiansto the west of the border.Also, most Poles in Belarus and the overwhelmingmajorityof Belarusians n Polandalike are ruralvillagers.61Yet symmetry s limited in scope, and thereare important asymmetrical' eaturesthat also engage attention.First, the 1999 Belarus census recorded396,000 Poles,62whereas there are no more than 80,000 self-identifiedBelarusians in trans-borderregions of Poland. Available observations show that the latterfigure is significantlyshortof the actualnumberof Belarusianspeakersin Polish Podlasie. In Belarus,onthe contrary,the actual number of those using Polish in the everyday setting issignificantlyless than the numberof self-proclaimedPoles.63Accordingto Sadowski, in the borderregions of Poland all the Catholics identifythemselves as Poles, but so do a significantnumber(53%) of the Orthodox.On theotherhand, those who identify themselves as Belarusians are exclusively Orthodox.In the border areas of Belarus, 62% of the Orthodox identify themselves asBelarusians.Surprisingly,23% of those whose parentswere both Orthodox dentifythemselves as Poles, which Sadowski interpretsas testimony to the high status ofPolish culture n Belarus.64As for the Catholicson the Belarusianside of the border,they are divided: 36.5% of them identify themselves as Poles, but 40% as Belaru-sians.65Kowalski points to a geographicaldimensionof that divide: in the western-most partof Grodno oblast' most Catholics identify themselves as Poles, but in theeasternpartof the same oblast' most identify themselves as Belarusians.It is fromthese Catholic Belarusians that most active Belarusiannationalistsrecruit.66

On the Belarusianside of the bordermost secondaryschools areRussian-languageschools. Polish schools were terminated n 1948. Local Poles have long appealedtothe authorities o restorePolish-languageschools, andsome were re-opened n the late1980s. Currently,many schools with Polish as one of the languages of instructionexist in the westernmostpartof Grodnooblast'. Also, in the 1990s two exclusivelyPolish schools were opened:one in Grodnoand one in Volkovysk. Interestingly,notall the students who attend these schools are Poles according to their internalpassports.On the Polish side, no exclusively Belarusianschools exist, as no localdemand for such schools has been recordedin annualsurveys of parents.So all theschools here are Polish-languageschools but, in some. Belarusian is taught as aseparatesubject.Sadowskisurveyedtwo secondaryschools locatedin Hain6wkaand

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BELARUSIAN IDENTITYBielsk, linguisticallythe most Belarusianplaces in the area,and determined hat 39%of the students n one and 50%in the other identifiedthemselvesas Poles, while only23% in each identified themselves as Belarusians.67These findingsillustratehow spatial continuity s giving way to abrupt rans-borderchangesunderthe homogenising nfluenceof state-widetendencies.Indeed,accordingto Sadowski,43.6%of self-identifiedBelarusians n Polandnow use Polish in contactswithcolleaguesandfriends,and 24.8%use Polishin contactswithfamily.Onthe otherhand,in borderregions of Grodno oblast' 54.2% of Poles and 57.2% of Belarusiansnow use Russian n contactwith friendsandcolleagues; n contactwithfamily,Russianis used by 40.6% of Poles and 44.4% of Belarusians.68Like my Minsk intervieweesquotedin the first article,Kowalski stresses that 'nosignificantPolish colonisation waves' to Belarusversus Ukrainehave been recorded.That in Belarus, nevertheless,manypeople identifythemselvesas Poles is, accordingto Kowalski,due to the fact that theirancestors chose the Polishnationaloption'.Thisis attributedo thehighprestigeof the Polish languageand culture n the GrandDuchyof Lithuania;most members of the upper classes adopted them, and this hadimplicationsfor their descendantsandfor lower strataalike. Polish identity,however,was even 'chosen' by those who continued to speak Belarusian.69

Emphasison choice is what distinguishesKowalski's and Sadowski's pronounce-ments andreasoningfrom those embracedby my Minsk intervieweesandBelarusiannationalisthistoriansalike, whose attitude s avowedly defensive, as they seem to bewilling to honour choice only if and when it favours the Belarusiannationaloption.This is not to say that top-down, state-sponsoredpressureson people's choice arenon-existent. To his credit, Uladzimir Arlou recognises that the reduction in thepercentageof both Poles and Russians n Belarus70s due to suchpressures.Theyexiston both sides of the border. Thus, Soviet and today's Belarusian authoritieshave always been suspicious of the Polish minority in Belarus. Apparently,thehomogenisingpressureshave been significanton the Polish side too.That Belarusian national agitation is kept alive exclusively by the Orthodox inPoland and mostly by Catholics in Belarus finds many confirmations. n Poland, asshown above, Catholics never identify as Belarusians. In Belarus, most radicalnationalists are hostile to the Orthodox Church. For example, in the April 2002declarationof the BNF andChristianConservativeParty, he OrthodoxChurch s takenon directly: 'Active Russificationof the Belarusianpopulationis conductedby theOrthodoxChurch,which has traditionallyactedin Belarusas an anti-nationalorce'.71

The explanation of this particularasymmetry is twofold. First, the religiousaffiliationor backgroundof the Orthodox n Poland and Catholicsin Belarusis whatmakes them different from the overwhelmingmajorities n theirrespectivedomains,that is, Poland on the one hand, and Belarus plus Russia on the other. Second,mainstreamPoles' and mainstreamRussians' attitudesto Belarusianspeakersdo notseem to match.Based on Sadowski'sperceptiveaccount,prejudice oward hesepeoplein easternPoland was at times pervasive.72When in 1976 I first visited Bialystokandstayedwith an Orthodox amily, the two teenagegirls in thatfamily emphasisedthatthey spoke correctPolish, unlike their older relatives in Hajn6wka.Statements ikethese fromyouthsbearevidence of stronghomogenising pressures.Therehas been noBelarusian autonomy in Poland. Whereas rank-and-filePoles and indeed Polish

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GRIGORYIOFFEauthoritiesdesiredassimilationof minorities,mostRussians n thequasi-federalSovietUnionhardlysaw anymeaningfuldifferencebetweenBelarusiansand themselves. Thismay help explain rejectionof bonds with Poland by some of the Catholicsresidingeast of the Belarus-Polandborder: heirparentsandgrandparentsived in Polandandwere looked down on.73At the same time, rejectionof bonds with Russia amongtheOrthodox s not widespread.In fact, the overwhelmingmajorityof them enthusiasti-cally embracethose bonds.

Kupala's scientists and their real-life epitomesKowalski's position on the issue is meaningful:'Just like other groups, Belarusian-speakingCatholics faced the imperativeof choosing the nationaloption.And it is justin this community that the idea of separate Belarusian people was born ... [acommunity] whose initial orientationwas pro-Western.However, graduallyin theBelarusianmovementthe initiativewas wrestedby theOrthodox,which followed fromtheirdemographicpreponderance.This outcomeprecipitateda shift to closer associ-ation with Russiansociety, and that antagonisedBelarusianCatholics. This situationcould not help but influence identity. Linguistic (the difference between Polish andBelarusian s small), religious, and civilisationreasons led not only the upperclassesbut also Polonised Lithuanian easants o becomeintenton associating hemselveswiththe Poles'.74Note that the last two sentences of the above statementare entirely inline with whatKupala'sWestern Scientistsaid. His Easternalter ego would evidentlyreplace 'Polish', 'Polonised' and 'Poles' with 'Russian', 'Russified' and 'Russians'respectivelybut otherwisewould leave the statement ntact.

Following Kupala's pattern,a Russianoughtto be given the flooralongsidea Pole.Sergei Markov, a Russian political scientist, says: 'Apparently he members of theBelarusianoppositionconsiderthemselvesheirsof the GrandDuchy of Lithuania.Butthemajorityof Belarusianpeopledo not.Theybelieve theyare BelarusianandRussian,which explains their aspirationto be together with Russia. At the same time, aninsignificantminoritytakes cues from Lithuaniaand Poland.Herein,not in attitudestowarddemocracyand freedom,lies the principalschism in Belarus' politics.'75Thelast sentenceof Markov'sstatementhas far-reaching mplications.For example,if hisdiagnosis is correct,then the pivotal conflict in Belarus is haplessly misreadin theWest.

Not only both of Kupala's 'scientists' but their real-life counterpartsas well arecorrect(andtheirmessages deserve to be takenat face value) to the extent that,andas long as, nobody challenges thempersuasively-in the eyes of 'ordinary'people.Whenit comes to ethnicbonds,popularmentality s theonly consideration hatmatters.As Smithnotes, 'where ... meanings, myths and symbolscease to strike a responsivechord-because of other competing ones-there [lie] the cultural boundariesof thenation.'76A tug of war

'Passport ethnic awareness' notwithstanding,the existence of a fair number ofnationally conscious Belarusians is undeniable. Yet forces striving to flesh outBelarusian dentityhavebeen at warwitheach other.Who areethnicBelarusians?Are

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BELARUSIAN IDENTITYthey Russians' little brothers(whose peculiarity is quite real but falls within theRussian culturaluniverse)?Or are they proud descendantsof the GrandDuchy ofLithuania,whose formativeexperiencesderive from numerouswars againstRussia?It is temptingto portraythe evolving views on Belarusian dentity as a perpetualfight for its meaning. This assertioncan be called into question because much ofBelarusians'nationallyconscious history falls into the Soviet period. However,justas in Russia proper,where the rivalrybetween the Westerisers and the Slavophilesdid not vanish in the communistrevolutionbut was reducedto an undercurrent,o inBelaruscalling things by theirpropernames has been and still is an exception.Andyet the ongoing struggle for the meaning of Belarusian-nessappears to unfoldaccordingto the old script,firstwrittenin the last quarterof the nineteenthcentury.Throughouthe twentiethcenturyBelarusianWestemisers seldomrose to a positionof power. In fact, this happenedonly three times, and each period was brief andmarkedby externalsupervisionandcontroversy.The firsttime the Westemisers madea splash was in 1918-19, when the Belarusian People's Republic (BPR) wasproclaimedunderGermanmilitary occupation.The BPR introducedthe white-red-white flag anda coat of armsdepicting'pursuit' a knightmountedon a racinghorse).'As the emblem of the GrandDuchy of Lithuania,Rus' and Samogitia, the latterrepresenteda link to a proud period' in Belarusianhistory.77Also, underthe BPR theso-called First BelarusianCongress was convened but thwartedby the Bolsheviks.In the annalsof Belarusiannationalismthe BPR is cast as a pivotal episode in thenational history. However, few people took notice of the BPR in its time. VonBeckeret,the Germanadviseron Belarusianaffairs,reported o the militarycommandof the eastern front that 'the Belarusian secessionism, supportedby a few Vilnaarchaeologistsandjournalists,ought to be considereda local matterof no politicalconsequence'.78 nterestingly, he BPR foundersbecame mutuallyantagonisedwhenPolonophiliawas reportedlyembracedby several of them.79Foiled by the Bolshevik takeover, the Westernising ideas, however, staged acomeback in what soon became Soviet Belarus.There,however, they were perpetu-ally at war with the Russophile stance. Whereas the Westerisers gained reinforce-ment from the immigrationof a dozen prominentBelarusianactivists from Poland,the pro-Russiaorientationgrew strongeras more and more Belarusianpeasantswerepromotedto the helm of power. Just as in Russia proper,in Belarus the culturalaffinities of the upperstratawere at odds with those of the common folk. While theformer ooked up to the West, the latter were spontaneouslymore eastern n outlook,andthis revealed itself in the redistributive thos of peasantcommunities.Ultimately,the ideological Westerisers were crushed in the Stalinistpurges.The Westernisingplatform henbrieflyresurfacedunderthe supervisionof Germanoccupiersyet again,this time the Nazis. When Germany nvadedthe Soviet Union in1941 they treatedBelarusas 'nothingmore than a vague geographicalterm'.80Onlyafter the assassinationof Generalkommissar f occupiedBelarus8lWilhelm Kube inSeptember1943, andfollowing the overall success of the Soviet-led guerillaactivity,did the Germansdecide to play the card of Belarusianpatriotism.The white-red-white flag and the coat of armsof Pahonia were in use againby the local authorities,who were appointedby and workedunder the close supervisionof the occupiers.On27 June 1944 the so-calledSecondBelarusianNationalConventiongathered n Minsk

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GRIGORYIOFFEopera house with YaukhimKipel presiding. 'In his opening speech, he pointed outthat the variousBelarusianassemblies that had been called at differenttimesundertheSoviets were always 40% Jewish and consequently did not representBelarusianpeople'.82Soon thereafter,most Nazi collaborators eft Belarus with the retreatingGermanarmy.Some of the Nazi collaborators'activities in Belarusare describedby Vakar.83A detailed accountcan be found in a book by Loftus84and an informativewebsitecompiled on the basis of that book.85Loftus also describedthe successful post-warcareers of some of these people in US governmentagencies duringthe Cold War.Analternativeversionof the war-timeevents is given, very briefly,by VitautKipel, whowrites that 'as Germans ooked upon the Belarusiansas potentialallies', it 'was onlynatural hat some Belarusianswould look upon the Germansas theirpolitical allies.This point of view was reinforcedwith the outbreakof the Soviet-Germanwarwhenthe Germans ... encountered many Belarusians ... who had suffered under theSoviets'.86In Belarus Nazi collaboratorswere not nearly as numerous as in Ukraine. Verylittle informationon Belarusian collaborationistspercolated into Soviet historicalwritings,in markedcontrastwith what was divulgedto the generalpublic concerningthe Baltic States,Ukraineand indeed the occupiedsector of Russia itself.87 n Belarusthe collaborationistmovement apparentlyhad a meagre following and was dwarfedby the Soviet-led guerillamovement,which became one of the majorepic stories ofthe GreatPatrioticWar. Significantly,when ethnic Germanswere evicted from theirhomeland in East Prussia in 1947, the only non-Russian ethnic group that wasselected to participateen masse in what became the Kaliningradoblast' resettlementprogrammewas Belarusians.88 pparently, he Moscow authoritiesdid not doubttheirloyalty-even though the late 1940s and early 1950s marked one of the darkestperiods of Soviet history, when almost anybody's loyalty could be questioned.In 1988 Paznyakdiscovered a mass grave in Kuropaty,near Minsk, a grave thatwas traced to the Stalinist terror,89 ot to Germanoccupiers as the authoritiesofSoviet Belarus strove but failed to prove. In the atmosphereof Gorbachev'spere-stroika this discoveryushered n the thirdandmost recentperiodof the Westerisers'drive for power. The 1992-95 period was markedby a brief comeback of the samenational symbols (white-red-white flag and the coat of arms). Yet once again thetriumphwas short-lived,andthe backlashwas culturallyconditioned:most rank-and-file Belarusianssimplydidnot acceptthese allegedtokens of identityas theirown andwere swayed overwhelmingly by Lukashenka's 1995 attemptto discredit them. Inparticular,much was madeof the fact that Nazi collaboratorshad used the same stateemblem and flag.That all threeepisodes of the Westerisers' triumphwere so brief may, of course,be attributed o the ploys of Russian colonialists. Such reasoning,however, appearsshallow: it shifts attention away from the inherent weaknesses of the Belarusiannational movement itself, as well as from the fact that not one but different andopposingforces have been scrambling o flesh out Belarusian dentityfrom the outset.

Accordingto AndreiEkadumov,a Minsk-basedresearcher, culturalRussification'of Belarus unfolded only in the Russian Empire,not under the Soviet regime.90 n

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BELARUSIANIDENTITYaudience,not so muchits scientificallytestedveracity.Even in recent(let aloneolder)historyone can come across recorded acts that lend themselvesto different nterpre-tations. Even so, youngernationalismshave to be carefulnot to over-exploitalreadyknown historical facts and cultural icons that other ethnicities have persistentlyclaimed as their own, and not to put such twists on those facts that their ownconstituency might not find them believable and therefore appealing. At issue,accordingto Hroch, is 'the relation between verbal demands and real interest:thebasic condition for any acceptanceof national demands[is] thatit roughlycorrespondto reality as perceived by those to whom the nationalagitationwas directed'.105

The clash of mythologiesToday Belarusiansare faced with two sets of national symbols. They are partiallyoverlappingand yet profoundlydifferent and backed by differentmythologies. Thefirst set of symbols is of Soviet vintage. Belarusian officialdom, some prominenthistorians e.g. AdamZalessky)andlinguists (A. I. Zhuravsky)andapparentlya largepartof rank-and-fileBelarusianscling to it.Accordingto a bitterlyironic pronouncementof an oppositionjournalist,this setincludes Zubrovka,Pesnyary, Viskuli and the 1941-44 partisan war106 or ratherlandmarks,films and memories of those years. Zubrovkais a Belarusianbrandofvodka featuringa bison (zubr in Belarusianand Russian,zubrz in Polish) from theBelavezha forest in western Belarus. Pesnyary is a Minsk-based rock group, ex-tremely popular in the 1970s and 1980s, which drew upon Belarusian musicalfolklore,performedquite a few songs in Belarusianand, if anything,contributedustas much, if not more, to Belarus' externalrecognitionthan tractorsandheavy trucksproducedin the republic.Finally, Viskuli is a governmentretreat n the Belavezhaforest, where in December 1991 El'tsin, Kravchukand Shushkevichterminated heUnion Treatyof 1922, and so the Soviet Union ceased to exist.The anti-Naziguerillawar is at the heart of this Russophilevarietyof Belarusiansymbols. It was indeed a majorepic story.At least until the late 1970s all of SovietBelarus' high-rankofficials had been recruitedfrom the Soviet-led network of the1941-44 anti-Naziunderground,107glorified group.Thoughtheir war-timeactivitiesunfoldedwithinBelarus, 'no namebearingreferenceto Belorussianhistoryor culturewas ever used or suggested'for guerilla brigades:priorto 1943, they hadbeen named'Suvorov,Kutuzov,Revengers, Victory, andthereafterordered o changetheirnamesto Stalin, Voroshilov, etc'. 08If even war-time,that is, relativelyrecent, history was not couched in nationalistterms, it was all the more so in regardto earlierhistory.Only the peasantunrestinearly 1860s Belarus under the guidance of Kastus Kalinowski was discussed insecondaryschool history textbooksas somethinginherentlyBelarusian.This unrest,of course, was not to be studiedin the context of anti-Russian,Polish-led uprisings.Only 20% of respondents in my 2002 pilot survey mentioned Kalinowski as aprominentBelarusian, fewer than, for example, Petr Masherau, one of Belarus'CommunistPartyleaders, who was mentionedby 23%.The Belarusianflag and national emblem of Belarus (introduced n 1995) are partandparcelof the same set of nationalsymbols.Belarusis the only post-Sovietnation

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GRIGORYIOFFEthat returned to its Soviet insignia. Along with the ruble as the unit of nationalcurrency and Russian as one of the official languages of Belarus, these symbolsunmistakablyreflect Belarus' closeness to Russia, the bulwarkof the formerSovietUnion-even as Russia itself disposed of its Soviet-eraflag andnational emblem. Acountrywhose all but most distinguishingfeatureis closeness to anothercountryisa questionableentity.109It is little wonder then that the leaders of the Belarus PopularFront (BPF) thatemerged in the final years of Gorbachev'sperestroika,and some intellectualsevenbefore that, found these symbols ill-suited for stirringup nationalfeelings, particu-larly those that would draw upon Belarus' alleged affinityto the West. First, basedon those symbols, Belarusians appeared as nothing more than Russians' littlebrothers.Second, Belarusians'knowledge of their own early history was foggy. Tome, the entire corpus of the Belarusian history exhibits in the State HistoricalMuseum in Minsk (or rather he way they looked in the 1970s) gave the impressionof a kitchen garden on hydroponics-when roots do not rise up from the soil butsomehow dangle in a transparent,man-made solution.It was only natural or nationallyconscious BelarusianWesternisers o be willingto rewrite and retroactivelyextend the available accountsof Belarusianhistory. Allthey had to fall back on was the annalsof the nationalmovementthat culminated nthe 1920s and was then brutally terminatedby Stalin's thugs. In accordancewiththese annals,they beganonce againto glorifythe GrandDuchy of Lithuaniaas a trulyBelarusian state and adopted the state symbols that had been used under twosuccessive German military administrations.In 1992 these became the officialinsigniaof independentBelarus,andthe Belarusian anguagewas proclaimed he onlyofficial language of Belarus.

Language and mythologyThe issue of the Belarusian anguagewas of particularmportance or the nationalistcamp because it was still regarded by all too many as a rustic, peasantvernacularwhich naturallyyielded to Russianas a personassumeda higher social position andwas refinedby an urbanway of life and education.However,the Belarusians' asting anonymityplayedits treacherous ole also in thecontext of language. In much of the existing literaturethe language of the GrandDuchy was referredto as Rusky.Thus, accordingto Zhurausky, it is appropriateoassign the languageof documents and treaties from the Belarusianterritorypriortothe first half of the fifteenthcentury... to ancientRussianliterary anguage'.110 akar,also a scholarwith Belarusianroots, scrutiniseda huge body of publishedresearchonthe language of the GrandDuchy.'In Moscow', writesVakar,'they describedthe languageas Lithuanian,n ordertodistinguishit from their own form of Russian. In the Ukraine,its written form wasknown as Russian, and the vernacularas Lithuanian.The Poles referredto both byeithername. The termLithuanian,of course,referred o the geographical ocation ofthe idiom,which in fact was Russian.Local scholarsLavrentiZizani (Vilna 1596) andMeleti Smotricki(Evje 1619) gave it a grammaticalorganisationwhich was used inall Russia until the Lomonosov reform(1755)'.11

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BELARUSIAN IDENTITYThis languagewas used in the GrandDuchy until it gave way to Polish and wasofficially bannedfrom courtsand offices in 1697. Accordingto Yevfimy Karsky,that

language had differed from both old Russian and modem Belarusian:'That was abookish language that only upper strata used as colloquial and it sustained someinfluence of Polish culture ... Because of this it could not become the language ofmass communicationeven though it had evolved on the basis of popularvernacu-lar'.12 This vernacular,however, was looked down on. According to Vakar, 'theWesternRussianliterarystandardhad long been dead before its burial. The educatedRussians in the Grandduchy saw in their mother tongue only the language of thelower social strata.An attemptby the Academyof PeterMohilain Kiev to restore tspurity and glory failed. The ecclesiastical writers continued in the Church Slavictradition,while the educatedsplit into two hostile camps, one following the lead ofWarsawand the otherthatof Moscow'.113 Thereis little roomfor anything nherentlyBelarusian in the above treatmentof the issue, which indeed requiredwhat Smithcalled 'creative recombination', that is, extensive reinterpretationof historicalfindings.

Skaryna-a potentially unifyingcultural iconA nationalistsearch for a major figureof prominence,a man who used the precursorof moder Belarusian n the past, led to FrantsiskSkaryna.Born around 1490 in theglorious city of Polotsk and educated in Vilna, Krakow,Pragueand Padua,Skarynahad been long known as a dedicated translatorof religious texts into 'the simpleRussian language'.114 According to Vakar, 'FrancisSkorynapublishedhis Russianversionof the Bible, using the famousVenetian edition for the vernacular ranslation.Since Skorynawas the first to introduce West Russian provincialisms nto religioustexts, he is considered the father of West Russian literature'.115Brockhaus& Efron,the most influentialencyclopediaof pre-revolutionaryRussia,defined Skorina(Russianisedspelling) as a 'Russian scientist of the early sixteenthcentury, a medical specialist (doctor of pharmaceuticalsciences), a printer,and atranslator of the Bible into Russian'.116Translationinto Russian, not any otherlanguage,is attributed o Skorina'sown evidence. 'All the texts publishedby Skorinawere intendedfor the OrthodoxRussianpeople ... By translatingbible-relatedbooksfrom ChurchSlavonic, Czech and Latin into Russian,Skorinalaid the foundationofliterary language of southwestern Russia. Skorina's language form is eclectic andcrude,but it reflects the elements of the Belorussian vernacular ..'.n7 So much forSkaryna'sBelarusian-ness,accordingto the authorof the Brockhaus article.A more consistent Belarusificationof Skarynawas first attempted n the 1920s,then thwarted in the 1930s with Skaryna being labeled 'a member of Polotskbourgeoisie'.118The efforts, however, eventually succeeded, not least due to thepopular Soviet Belarusian film 'Ya-Frantsisk Skaryna', produced in 1969. Thesuccess of Skaryna'sascendancyhas to be credited to the enthusiasmof Belarusianhistorians in the firstplace. But some auspiciouscircumstancesplayed their role aswell. First, Soviet Russian 'court' historiographersdid not lay claim to Skarynabecause the pantheonof cultural icons of Russia never lacked members. Second,whereas the Moscow-initiated intention to transferPolotsk and its environs from

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GRIGORYIOFFERussia to Belarus in 1924 did succeed, the 1944 idea to shift it back to Russia'sjurisdictiondid not come to pass-allegedly due to PanteleimonPonomarenko, henthe First Secretary of the Belarus' Communist Party.119Had that happened, thepromotionof Polotsk-bornSkarynato the position of great Belarusianenlightenerwould have been unlikely.

Today, SkarynaAvenue is the main street in Minsk (formerly Lenin Avenue,formerlyStalinAvenue, formerlyZakhar'evskayaStreet).In my pilot surveySkarynawas by farthe most frequentlymentionedprominentBelarusian.'20He was mentionedby 61.6% of respondents,with YankaKupalaa distantsecond with 41.7%, followedby Yakub Kolas (38.3%) and Vasil Bykau (31.6%).When I mentioned(above) that the two sets of Belarusiansymbols were partiallyoverlapping,I meant these prominentBelarusiansin the first place, as they havegained acceptanceon both sides of the divide121utthe espritde corpshardlyextendsto anythingor anybodyelse. The promotionof Skarynato the position of the primenational figure has been among the few success stories of the Belarusiannationalmovement to date.The movement succeeded much less in the 'appropriation'of other historicalfigures with roots in Belarus such as, for example, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, who wasonce proclaimed theworld'smost honourableBelarusian','22et aloneAdamMickie-wicz, Michal KazimierzOginiskiand StanislawMoniuszko,whose Belarusian-ness salso repeatedlystated in nationalist texts. In my pilot survey only 0.6% mentionedKosciuszko, and nobody mentionedMickiewicz, Oginski or Moniuszko. However,Vitaut(TheGrandDuke of Vilna who ruledthe GrandDuchy of Lithuania rom 1392and emerged victorious in the Grunwaldbattle of 1410) was referred to as anoutstandingBelarusianby 6.6% of respondents-a success, however modest, of theWesternising platform.

Who is to blame?In the words of Lindner, 'the neo-Soviet and the opposition memorialcults are inbitterconflict'.123The fightbetween the two had been unfoldingin the open since thelate 1980s, and it culminated n the 1995 referendumon languageand state symbols,in which 83.3% of voters rejected the white-red-white banner and the GrandDuchy-basednational seal and opted for the returnof the Soviet nationalsymbols ofBelarus.Althoughnationalists claim that the referendumwas anti-constitutional ndsubjectto manipulationor that 'everyreferendumn an authoritarianountry s to thesatisfactionof its organisers','24t seems thatvery few people in Belarushadacceptedthose GrandDuchy-relatedsymbols as their own.BPF leader Zyanon Paznyak's idea that all the deep-seatedunderpinningsof theRussophile leanings can be undone forcefully and swiftly througha state-sponsoredassaulton popular ways of thinkingdid not materialise.In 1996 Paznyakemigratedto the US; he currentlyresidesin Warsaw andtries to positionhimself as the spiritualleader of the nationalistoppositionfrom across the border.Having left the country,however, Paznyakhas lost his high moralgroundeven among intellectuals,the onlygroup to which he once had some appeal.Whereasthe leaders of the Belarusian nationalmovementroutinelyblame all the

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BELARUSIAN IDENTITYmajorsetbacks on 'carefullycrafted'Russificationand the perfidiousrole of Moscow,independentresearchers find some flaws in the national movement per se. ThusAndrei Okarabelieves that 'Belarusian ntellectualsdeveloped an understandingofBelarusas non-Polandand non-Russiabut failed to rise to the next level, that is, tospell out what Belarus' unique natureand commonly understoodhistorical missionare'.125Okara points to Ukraine, where alongside the westernising and the pro-Moscow ideological blueprints, 'the third alternative' is entertainedas well, whichdraws upon 'Kiev's unique role as the sacralcentre of the post-Byzantiumculturalrealm and a possible geopoliticalcentre of EasternEurope'.126No providentialrole ofthat or any other kind was ever proposed for Belarus. 'Every Orthodoxcountry',writes Okara, 'can't help but construeitself as the mystical centre of the world, bethatthe New Rome or the New Jerusalem.As for Belarus,it always saw itself as anadvance guard:within the GrandDuchy ... and Rzeczpospolitait was the easternforefrontof the West; within the Russian Empire,the Soviet Union, the CIS or theRussia-Belarus Union, it is a defence shield of a large space. Belarus thus is acorridor , transitspace , bridge between civilisations , it is an outskirts ,acountry ocated at a strategic rossroads '.127These images, accordingto Okara,arenot particularlyuplifting. As for Okara's conferring on Belarus the status of anOrthodoxcountry, his, as we know, is not accurate,althoughmost Belarusians ndeedhave an Orthodoxbackground.This misstatement,however, points to the problem:there is no single Belarusianidentity.Wlodzimierz Pawluczuk echoes Okara as he invokes a contrast between thenational ideas of Belarus and Ukrainebut highlights a differentaspect of the issue.Accordingto Pawluczuk,the 'Ukrainiannationalmythologyflows from the religioussourcesof easternChristianityand from the Cossack andpeasantethos ... As for theBelarusianmythology,it drawsfromotherreligioussources anda differentethos. Thereligion is Catholicism.The ethos is affection of landed gentry for peasants and amoral obligation to reveal peasant culturalvalues, thus fostering [sharedidentity]amidstmanyunrelatedpeople anddissociatingthem from the Russians.Belarus doesnot know martyrsof the nationalcause or heroes like Sagaidachny,KhmelnitskyorBandera.The nationalmystiqueof Belarushas to do with personalitiesthat are totaloutsiders with respect to the living and culturaluniverseof ordinarypeople. Such apersonality rom the past is KastusKalinowski,a currentpersonalityof the samekindis ZyanonPaznyak'.128awluczukberatesPaznyak's 1991 plan of BelarusificationofBelarus, described in the 1991 book Inshadumtsy,129s adventurous,coercive,top-downand elitist. In contrastto Okara,Pawluczukreaffirms he Catholicroots ofBelarusiannationalism and this points to the same problem:Belarusianidentity isJanus-faced.

Time or new pursuits: 'Tencenturiesof Belarusian history'After the new and painful setback of 1995 the BelarusianWesterisers have beenregrouping.Apparentlya lot of soul-searchinghas takenplace. Now many prefertodistance themselves from Paznyak and his radicalism.Aleh Trusau, for example,pointed out that, in contrast to Paznyak,he was not willing to assault the wall ofindifferenceandhostilityhead-on:'I have only one headandwould like to save it for

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GRIGORYIOFFEfuture endeavours'. 0 Trusau drew a line between his gradualistapproachto theBelarusisation of Belarus and the approachrevealed in the above quoted 2002Declarationof the BNF, edited by Paznyak.The gradualistapproach adopted stems from renewed awareness of the sheerenormityof the task;and it involves much writingthatrecastshistoryin a way thatis amenable o the westernisingstance.I am not surewhetherBelarusianauthorshavescrutinisedWestern scholarshipon nationalism and national movements, but someauthorsproceed as though aided by a properroad map. For example, in Smith'stypology of national myths, one may find a myth of the Golden Age, a myth ofdecline anda mythof rebirth.A youngernationalism,writesSmith,would portray tsrespective communityas a 'Sleeping Beauty, pricked by external forces of evil andput to sleep until the nationalistdawn arrivesto restorethe community o its trueselfin a new golden age'.T3Unable to find 'Belarus' and 'Belarusians' in the annals of medieval history,nationalistauthorscontinue to cast the GrandDuchy of Lithuaniaas the precursorofmoder Belarus and its Golden Age. Some outwardlydub it the Great BelarusianPower;132thersare more cautious,averring hat 'althoughLithuaniansappropriatedthe Grand Duchy, life in that country unfolded in Belarusian national forms'.133Correspondingly,the language once spoken in the Grand Duchy (before it wasPolonised) is referredto as Old Belarusian. Externalforces of evil are Poles andRussians, with Russians being the greaterevil of the two, which is a retroactiveprojectionof the presentdangersas they are seen by the westernisingcamp.Some authorsattempted o separate he image of Belarusfrom thatof Russiain theeyes and ears of a foreign audienceby linguistic means. Vakarhad long statedthat'as a rallying point of the new nationalism,the term Belorussian presentedcertaininconveniences. Semantically, it was too close to Russia'.l34When in English thename of the country used to be transliteratedas 'Belorussia' the aforementionedinconvenienceswere all too obvious. While 'Belarus' sounds 'better'in this regard,it is the adjective 'Belarusian'thatremainstreacherousbecause in English it soundsnearlyidentical to 'Belorussian'.In his 1993 book Zaprudnikattempted o purgetheword of the 'i'; the resulting erm 'Belarusan'canbe traced o Rus', notby anymeansto Russia. However, Zaprudnik's lead does not seem to have generated muchfollowing.135A more important ask focuses on the interpretation f early Belarusianhistory.Accordingto Lindner's terse formula, 'the issue of the ethnic origins of Belarusianshas once again become, as duringthe 1920s, a historiographicquestionof faith'.136The majorbookshopsin Minsk now featuremonographsby westernisingnational-ist historians,notably Mikola Ermalovich and GennadzSaganovich,who set out torewriteRussianrenditions of regional history.137 hese books, however, inspirebutfew sophisticated readers and do not affect the man in the street. Apparentlyrecognising this, Arlou & Saganovichissued a well illustrated200-page book, Tencenturies of Belarusian history: 862-1918, intended for a mass audience andpublished n Belarusianand,separately, n Russianby a Vilnius-basedpublisher.Thisbook is as direct an attemptat lending popularlegitimacy to a certain version ofBelarus' nationalmythology as therepossibly can be, and may become a milestonein the Belarusian national movement.

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BELARUSIAN IDENTITYThe book's recurringtheme is dissociating Belarus from Russia by focusing ontheirallegedly inborndissimilaritiesand on woundsinflictedby Russia on the nationsof which today's Belarus was part.Arlou & Saganovich set out to challenge a situation where (in the words ofDrakokhrust& Furman) 'Belarusians and Russians do not share any negativehistorical memories about each other and do not have any negative or hostile

stereotypessimilar to those thatexist, for example,between the peoples of the BalticStates and Russia'.138 The authors try to resolve the monumental problem ofBelarusians' lasting anonymity by intermittently applying the token phrase 'ourcountry'to a) a set of tenth-twelfth century neighbouringprincedoms,b) the GrandDuchy of Lithuania,andc) the Rzeczpospolita.In the authors'view, 'nothingprovesthe existence of a single Great Russian ethnie','39and yet 'Polotsk, Turov, Brest,Grodno and Novogrudekand Smolensk princedomsformed a region of ethnic andlinguistic homogeneity [as early as] the eleventh-twelfth centuries'.140 'The nameRus' was appliedto the Vladimir-Suzdal'princedom[the Russianheartland]only inthe second half of the thirteenthcentury,by which time inhabitantsof Belarus hadalreadyformed a separateethnic community'.11In Vladimir-Suzdaland most otherRussian princedoms,elements of Asiatic despotism were incorporatedalmost fromthe outset, while Polotsk princedom was a paragon of democracy. This refrainsurfaces many times, especially in conjunctionwith setting the 'autonomism' (i.e.grassroots self-governance) of the Grand Duchy (a.k.a. our country) against thedespotismof Muscovy.142The Great Russianpantheonof cultural cons is addresseddirectly by relatingvivid episodes of the 1368 defeat of voivode Dmitry Minin by'our detachments',that is, by Olgerd, the GreatPrince of Vilna.Minin is a revered characterof Russianhistoricalchronicles.Accordingto them,Minin along with Pozharskyheaded a popular militia defending Russia from thePolish-Lithuanian nvaders.EveryRussianand for thatmatterBelarusianschoolchildknows somethingabout Minin andPozharskyfrom secondaryschool historyclasses.Arlou & Saganovich place the ancestors of today's Belarusians squarely in theanti-Russiancamp. The Grand Duchy's military campaigns against Russia com-menced in 1492 and culminated n the 8 September1514 defeat of the Russianarmynear Orsha. 'In 1992', write Arlou & Saganovich, 'on the day of this battle'sanniversary he Belarusianmilitarypledged allegiance to their people on Indepen-dence square n Minsk'.143n 1517 'FrantsishekSkarynapublishedthe first Belarusianbook in Prague thereby introducingBelarus into the fold of pan-Europeancivilis-ation'.144 'Just in the second half of the sixteenth century, so many books werepublished n Belarusthattheirtotal circulationexceeded thatof Muscovy throughoutthe entire sixteenth andthe beginningof the seventeenthcenturyby a factorof ten'. 45The authors paint a vivid picture of the cruelties that accompanied the 1563conquestof the enlightenedcity of Polotskby thebarbarian rmyof Ivanthe Terrible.Duringhis reign 'The bloody dictatorship nundated he countrywith informantsandthugs. Monarchismandmegalomaniawere implanted n the Russiannationalpsycheat thattime. It was that Moscow rulerthat conferreduponRussiathe legacy of a fullyaccomplished Asiatic autocracy, based on terror against fellow countrymen'.146Interestingly,only one element of the Polotskpopulation, he Polish knights,emergedas free people from Polotsk's demise at the hands of the Russians. This is how yet

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GRIGORYIOFFEanother refrainof the book emerges: tacit collusion between Russians and Poles intheir lingering anti-Belarusiangame. In the book, Poles, however, are spared thedismal treatmentto which the more perfidiousand deceitful Russians are subject.Having ultimatelyseized the entire country,the Russiansplay the Orthodoxcard,and many Orthodoxpriestsare lured into collaborationwith the occupiers.The warof 1654-67 between Russia and the Rzeczpospolita is characterisedas 'the mostdevastatingwar in our history'147 a direct shot at the neo-Soviet mythology thatconfers this status upon the 194145 Great PatrioticWar. According to Arlou &Saganovich,it was actuallythat seventeenthcenturywar that 'deprivedBelarusiansof their elite, lower middle class and entrepreneurs, s these stratasufferedmost ofall. The remainingpeasantrycould not rise to national consolidation.148rokendownby the war with the Russians, the region could no longer stage resistance to ...Polonisation'.149

Otherimportantepisodes featuredby the book concernthe abortivehistoryof theUniate (GreekCatholic)Church,which was not by any means a sellout to Catholics;Peter the Great's unspeakablepersonal cruelty duringhis 1710 visit to the PolotskUniate Cathedral;an unusually cautious (compared with some other nationalistauthors)Belarusisationof Kosciuszko, a leader of the 1794 Polish uprising ('theuprising which our compatriotheaded'), and the horrendousmission of AlexanderSuvorov,a Russiancommanderandyet another con of Russianhistory. 'ForRussia,he was really a great militaryleader,but for Belarus,he was the commanderof theoccupiers in the first place'.150 To appreciate he sensitivity of the issue, one has tobear in mind that in the town of Kobrin, Brest oblast', a Suvorov museum stillglorifies the heroic deeds of that commander.The final section of the book concerns the birth of the Belarusian nationalmovement.This part s the only one in which no attempt s madeto walk through heminefield of contestedidentities. The book's actual success remainsto be seen in thenumber of young converts to the westernisingstance.In the meantime,however, favourablesigns come from the least expected quarters.After June 2002, when President Putin of Russia offered to include the six Belarusoblasti in the Russian Federation,thus deprivingBelarus of statehood,Lukashenkauttered: 'We will not be either the northwesternor the northeastern egion of anystate'.151No Russian commentatorappreciatedthe symbolism of these words, andonly one newspaperquoted them, apparentlyby accident.

ConclusionThe subtitleof Kupala's Tuteishiya s 'tragic-comical cenes in four acts'. Its fifth actis being played now. Today, 80 years after Kupala'splay was written,there is stillno single Belarusianidentity, and the culturalelite of Belarus are split between theWesterisers (the heirs of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) and the people withpro-Moscoworientation thedefacto followers of West-Rusism).While these maybeconstruedas political movements,they transcendpolitics, and so does the differencebetween them reflecting the heart of hearts of what it means to be a Belarusian.Correspondingly,here are two competingsets of nationalsymbols andtwo differentmythologiesto back them.Whereas the Westerisers nurturenationalmyths that cast

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BELARUSIAN IDENTITYBelarus as a countryapartfrom Russia almost from antiquity,othersin the elite andmany in officialdom rely upon myths and symbols that evolved throughouttwocenturiesor so when Belarusand Russia lived side by side in a common home, firstin the Russian Empireand then in its successor state, the Soviet Union.The two visions of Belarushave not emergedduringthe post-independenceperiod.Rather, hey were articulatedanew, but they in fact have lengthyhistoricalroots.ThepreponderantRussophile orientationin Belarus stems from the Orthodox culturaltradition,Russiabeing the primeculturaldonorof Belarus,and Russia's pre-eminentrole in shapingBelarus' statehood.Still, the Westernisers rom amongthe BelarusianCatholics have been successful in producing heirbrandof nationalmythology anditmay yet gain new converts.In today's Belarus,however, 'Orthodox' and 'Catholic'are more indicativeof thehistoricalroots of ideas than of the immediatespiritualallegiancesof those activelyparticipatingn the political gambit.First, there are scores of non-believerson bothsides of the aisle. Second,people withOrthodoxand Catholicbackgroundsmay easilybe found on the 'wrong' side of th

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Understanding Belarus: Belarusian Identity