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The UCSD Network Telescope A Real-time Monitoring System for Tracking Internet Attacks Stefan Savage David Moore, Geoff Voelker, and Colleen Shannon Department of Computer Science and Engineering & Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (at SDSC) University of California, San Diego

The UCSD Network Telescope A Real-time Monitoring System for Tracking Internet Attacks Stefan Savage David Moore, Geoff Voelker, and Colleen Shannon Department

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The UCSD Network Telescope

A Real-time Monitoring System for Tracking Internet Attacks 

Stefan Savage

David Moore, Geoff Voelker, and Colleen Shannon Department of Computer Science and Engineering &

Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (at SDSC)University of California, San Diego

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

Context

• The Internet has an open communications model– Benefits: Flexible communication, application innovation– Drawbacks: Many opportunities for abuse

• The Dark Side to the Internet– Denial-of-Service Attacks– Network Worms and Viruses– Automated Scanning/Break-in Tools– Etc…

• Question: How big a problem is it really?

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

Media – “The sky is falling… every day”

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

Consulting Groups & Surveys

• Consultancy estimates– “Losses … could total more than $1.2 billion”

- Yankee Group report on yr 2000 DDoS attacks

– Cost of Slammer worm $750M-$1B- Computer Economics report on yr 2000 DDoS attacks

- Others say numbers are different- Data source, methodology, error, biases unknown

- Surveys- E.g. CSI/FBI survey reported 38% of respondents

encountered DoS activity in 2000- Summary of anecdotes = good data?

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

Why is this so hard?

• Quantitative attack data isn’t available

• Inherently hard to acquire– Few content or service providers collect such data – If they do, its usually considered sensitive

• Infeasible to collect at Internet scale– How to monitor enough to the Internet to obtain a representative

sample?– How to manage thousands of bilateral legal negotiations?

• Data would be out of date as soon as collected

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

Network Telescopes

• A way to observe global network phenomena with only local monitoring

• Key observation: large class of attacks use random addresses

• Worm’s frequently select new host to infect at random• Many DoS attacks hide their source by randomizing source

addresses

• Network Telescope– A monitor that records packets sent to a large range of

unused Internet addresses– Since attacks are random, a telescope samples attacks

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

Example: Monitoring Worm Attacks

• Infected host scans for other vulnerable hosts by randomly generating IP addresses

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

What can we infer?

• How quickly the worm is spreading?

• Which hosts are infected and when?

• Where are they located?

• How quickly are vulnerabilities being fixed?

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

Example: Monitoring Denial-of-Service Attacks

• Attacker floods the victim with requests using random spoofed source IP addresses

• Victim believes requests are legitimate and responds to each spoofed address

• Network telescope can infer that a site sending unsolicited reply packets is being attacked

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

What can we infer?

• Number of attacks?

• How big are they? How long?

• Who is being attacked?

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

unknown net com ro br org edu ca de uk

Top-Level Domain

Pe

rce

nt

of

Att

ac

ks

Week 1

Week 2

Week 3

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

What’s special about the UCSD Network Telescope?

• Our Telescope is very large and size does matter– The more addresses monitored, the more accurate,

quick and precise the results

• We have access to more than 1/256 of all Internet addresses (> 16M IP addresses)– Unprecedented insight into global attack activity– Can detect new attacks and worms in seconds with

low error

Special thanks to Jim Madden & Brian Kantor from UCSD Network Operations whose support makes this research possible

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

Summary

• High quality global estimates on Internet security events (Worms, DDoS)– ~4000 DoS attacks per week; attacks on network infrastructure– Have observed worms spreading faster than

50M hosts per second

• Collecting ongoing longitudinal data set (20GB/day)

• Impact of data & methodology– Research: widely used in modeling network attacks and designing

defenses– Operational Practice: identifies infected hosts and sites being

attacked; variant of backscatter analysis now used by top ISPs– Policy: helps justify and prioritize resources appropriately

Jacobs School of Engineering – Department of Computer Science and Engineering

UCSD CSE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS

Current Work

• Network Honeyfarm– Cluster of dummy servers whose sole purpose is to be

infected and observed– Collect detailed analysis of new attacks– Can be extended to capture non-random attacks (e.g.

e-mail, instant messenger) which is weakness of telescope

• Automated network defenses– Automatically detect, characterize and suppress new

network attacks or outbreaks– Respond orders of magnitude more quickly humans can