The Ploughshares Monitorploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Ploughshares... · 2016-02-29 · The Ploughshares Monitor | Summer 2015. 3. A. s a slow but steady stream of mostly

Talking about outer space Oudated metaphors limit efforts to tackle space security

Building trust Canada’s latest counterterror measures

Witness for peaceCanadian churches and the history of activism

2015 NPT RevCon No outcome document better than a weak one

Ploughshares MonitorThe

SUMMER 2015 | VOLUME 36 | ISSUE 2

A quarterly publication of Project Ploughshares • Available online: www.ploughshares.ca

with

Putting the spotlight

By Cesar Jaramillo

Canada’s arms deal

Saudi Arabia

on

The Ploughshares MonitorVolume 36 | Issue 2

The Ploughshares Monitor is the quarterlyjournal of Project Ploughshares, the peace centre of The Canadian Council of Churches. Ploughshares works with churches, nongovernmental organizations, and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that prevent war and armed violence and build peace. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the MSCU Centre for Peace Advancement, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo.

Office address: Project Ploughshares140 Westmount Road NorthWaterloo, Ontario N2L 3G6 Canada519-888-6541, fax: [email protected]; www.ploughshares.ca

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We are particularly grateful to The Simons Foundation in Vancouver for its generous support.

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ContentsSummer 2015

PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES STAFF

Debbie HughesAnna JaikaranTasneem JamalCesar Jaramillo

Matthew PupicWendy StockerBarbara Wagner

John Siebert Executive Director

3

8

12

14

19

Resilience and the politics of trustThe Canadian government’s new counterrorism strategy.by Jessica West

Canada lowers bar on arms exportsOttawa brokers $15-billion deal with Saudi Arabia.by Cesar Jaramillo

Outer space and metaphor dragOutdated metaphors hamper efforts to tackle space issues.by John Siebert

No outcome better than a weak oneNPT RevCon lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many.by Cesar Jaramillo

Witness for peaceChronicling 40 years of church activism.by Paul C. Heidebrecht and Jennifer Wiebe

COVER: The Department of National Defence receives the first modernized LAV III from General Dynamics Land Systems Canada in London, Ont., on January 24, 2013. Dan Pop/DND

23 Books etc.Books about diplomacy, peacebuilding and war resistance.

cover story

The Ploughshares Monitor | Summer 2015 3

As a slow but steady stream of mostly young Can-adians continue to be drawn to the cause of violent extremism, we are

faced with the question of what more can

be done to stop the flow. In the shadows of the political spotlight on Bill-C51, which is aimed at disrupting terrorist threats and efforts to recruit Canadians (see PMC 2015a), is a quiet and ongoing effort to intervene earlier in the radical-

Resilience and the politics of trust

Building public confidence has emerged as a central component of Ottawa’s counterterrorism strategy

By Jessica West

above: RCMP tactical officers attempt to enter the Langevin Block as police respond to a terrorist attack in Ottawa in October. Wayne Cuddington/Ottawa Citizen

The Ploughshares Monitor | Summer 20154

DOMESTIC RADICALIZATION

ization process, including a new Coun-tering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to work with parents, youth, mosques, and Muslim community leaders to facilitate early identification and inter-vention into the radicalization process (Hall 2015).

This strategy flows from the concept of resilience in Canada’s counterterrorism strategy: an approach aimed at preventing terrorism by fostering societal resistance to violent extremism and mobilizing civil society to support and contribute to security measures (PSC 2013, espe-cially pp. 10, 13). To this end, the RCMP claims that “it will work with families of ‘vulnerable youth’ who are experiencing behavioural changes” as well as educate Canadians “on the role of law enforce-ment and the responsibilities that they, in

turn, have in safeguarding Canada” (Cul-len 2014).

Although relatively uncontroversial, this plan, when scrutinized, raises con-cerns, not for what it does, but for what it does not do: create a trusting political space in which long-term protective meas-ures can be effective.

The double-edged sword of fearTrust is critical to efforts to prevent and disrupt radicalization. The Air India case has been recognized as an example of the problems that can arise when com-munities have insufficient trust in policing and intelligence (Senate of Canada 2011). Thus building public trust and confidence has emerged as a central component of the government’s prevention and resili-ence strategy (PSC 2013).

Emphasis is placed on clarifying public

A Message from Ploughshares’ Executive Director After 10 years and 40 issues of The Ploughshares Monitor, I am leaving on June 30, 2015 to take up new challenges. Thank you to Monitor readers and to all of our supporters for working with us and for your encouragement. What we are doing together to advance peacebuilding and disarmament will continue under the capable direction of Cesar Jaramillo, who has been part of the staff team here since 2009.

Here’s the challenge: Canada’s role in the world has changed since 2005. The balance of official resources has decisively tilted away from active diplomacy to resolve armed conflicts coupled with development assistance that addresses primary causes of conflict toward increased defence expenditures and overseas military engagements that shun United Nations peace operations. Canada and the world are poorer for it.

We need the strong voice of Project Ploughshares more than ever to hold up a vision of a more peaceful world and to articulate practical options borne of research and direct engagement with policy makers. Thank you for your continuing support and encouragement.

– John Siebert


understanding of how the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) function in the effort to win over the “hearts and minds” of communities perceived as vulnerable to extremism (Quan 2013), and encourage informa-tion sharing so that law enforcement can identify extremists earlier (Gendron 2006; Toews 2010). Indeed, such community intelligence has been critical to counter-terrorism successes, including identifica-tion of the Via Rail plot, as well as the recent disruption of plans of 10 young Montreal residents to travel to Syria.

However, trust is a relational concept and community trust in government is only one side of the coin. The govern-ment must also extend trust to com-munities. This has not happened. Instead, there is an over-reliance by government on the use and promotion of fear to achieve counterterrorism goals. The use of imagery that includes “jihadist mon-ster’s tentacles” reaching into the heart of Canada (PMC 2015b), as well as ongoing references linking Islam to jihadis and ter-rorism, breed suspicion and alienate the communities from whom cooperation is sought (Arsenault 2015; Plecash 2015).

Further, elements of Bill-C51 (HofC Canada 2015), such as an expansion of pre-criminal activities linked to terrorism, including elements of speech, and plans for greater information-sharing between the RCMP and CSIS send a chilling mes-sage to those who might seek help if they suspected a friend or family member were being radicalized. While the CVE strategy is supposed to apply “only to those who have not yet crossed the line into terror-ism” (Bell 2014), it is not clear where that line is, and who decides when it has been crossed. When questioned about “how to distinguish between teens messing around in their basements and someone who is radicalized,” Prime Minister Stephen Harper clearly indicated that it would be “a serious offence” in either event (Payton 2015).

Although sometimes effective in the

short run, fear as a tool of policy is a double-edged sword that over time causes suspicion, cynicism, and disengagement among citizens, destroying the very trust that successful prevention of terrorism depends on (see Furedi 2005, p. 2).

Creating a safe political spaceTo encourage individuals to share con-cerns with police and intelligence author-ities and to confront violent ideals, it is imperative for the government to foster a safe political space within which civil so-ciety can act. Fear must be replaced with trust. Specifically, the government must demonstrate its own trust in the public by sharing information, by allowing civil society to take responsibility for initiatives, and by encouraging and engaging with legitimate dissent.

Trust communities with information: For com-munities to effectively resist violent ex-tremism and intervene in suspected cases of radicalization, the government must trust them with information regarding specific threats. While many efforts are made to facilitate the flow of information from particular communities to police and intelligence agencies—indeed, both the Via Rail plot and the Montreal 10 case emerged as a result of this type of sharing—this flow does not travel both ways. Information provided to the public is frustratingly inadequate. Indeed, often the family and friends of those suspected of terrorism learn about the radicalization in their midst only after it is too late to intervene and provide the type of positive influence envisioned by the RCMP’s pre-vention program (Clancy 2015; Arsenault 2014; Lofaro 2014).

Trust civil society to act: If interventions aimed at protecting people from violent radicalization are to succeed, then civil society must be trusted to help steer these initiatives. However, to date communities have been relegated almost exclusively to the role of provider of information


Jessica West is a PhD candidate in Global Governance at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in

Waterloo, Ontario. She is a former research associate with Project Ploughshares.

[email protected]


to police and intelligence operations. A prominent example of the current lack of trust in community initiatives is the adversarial stand that the RCMP took toward a counter-radicalization handbook for parents that was developed by a group of national Islamic associations (Globe and Mail, 2014). Civil society responses to extremism cannot be micro-managed. Indeed, lessons learned from similar in-itiatives indicate that it is critical that they exist as more than an extension of gov-ernment views and programs if they are to maintain legitimacy (HofC UK 2010; Helmus, York & Chalk 2013).

Trust the public to engage in debate and legitim-ate dissent: The battle of ideas will not be won through policing and intelligence, but only through open, public debate. Debate and activism must not be used as reasons for greater police scrutiny. Individuals and organizations will hesitate to engage in the community-based responses to extrem-ism envisioned by resilience if they fear that they are casting themselves under the watchful eye of counterterrorism enfor-cers (Helmus, York & Chalk 2013).

• Anecdotal evidence suggests that the fear and animosity currently being whipped up in the political realm are dulling debate by encouraging self-censorship (Arsenault 2015). Like-wise, it is critical that the government not use the fear of counterterrorism surveillance to quell legal and legitim-ate avenues for political protest and dissent. When trusted and respected, these key elements of the democratic process provide a nonviolent arena in which disaffected individuals can express themselves, engage civically, and seek change.

• Indeed, this is the very goal of a flagship project to prevent extrem-ism—the Common Ground Project run by the Canadian Council of Muslim Women—which seeks to build a sense of citizenship among

Muslim youth by developing skills for nonviolent civic engagement “to prevent the further alienation of Muslim youth and provide alterna-tives for them that are more attractive than those drawing them to disen-gagement from mainstream society” (CCMW 2010, p. 4.) But this will only work if there is a safe political space in which to exercise civic and political activism.

A return to protectionThese arenas of trust and political free-dom speak more to the long-term desire for Canadians to withstand and chal-lenge violent ideologies than to the more immediate goal of seeking community assistance in policing and intelligence ef-forts. But the two reinforce one another when there is mutual trust. While fear can be seen as a double-edged sword, trust operates like compounding interest. Pla-cing greater trust in civil society to be re-silient and providing a safe political space to exercise it will in turn foster the trust that will lead communities to work with policing and intelligence agencies when confronted with a specific threat.

But being able to extend this trust to the public requires a deeper shift in how the government thinks about prevention. The one-sided view of trust is itself a symptom of an interpretation of preven-tion as almost exclusively pre-emption: on stopping Canadians from becoming terrorists. This approach presumes an eventual emergence of enmity from so-called vulnerable communities (Anderson 2011): it casts Canadians as both friends and enemies, as citizens and suspects. And this constant fear and uncertainty make it difficult to extend trust to those com-munities.

But resilience—the logic that currently drives much of Canada’s counterterrorism efforts—is not about prevention through anticipation and pre-emption, but rather the “capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest”



(Wildavsky 1988, p.77). In terms of rad-icalization and the threat posed by violent ideals, this involves placing trust in the long-term protective capacities within society to withstand, resist, and challenge: of seeing all Canadians as citizens to be protected rather than potential future enemies to be feared.

It is common wisdom that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. But when it comes to domestic counter-

terrorism efforts, the need to replace fear with trust necessitates a shift in focus to protection.

Resilience is messy. And never perfect. It does not eliminate the need for police and intelligence capabilities to disrupt those intent on violence. Some will slip through the cracks of whatever protec-tion is put in place. But protection based on trust will shelter many who are vulner-able. □


References

Anderson, Ben. 2011. Facing the future enemy: US counter-insurgency doctrine and the pre-insurgent. Theory, Culture and Society (December

2011), 28:7-8, pp. 216-240.

Arsenault, Adrienne. 2015. Muslim Canadians worry about effects of anti-terror talk. CBC News, March 4.

-----. 2014. Mother of dead Canadian jihadi launches de-radicalization effort. CBC News. September 9.

Bell, Stewart. 2014. RCMP set to tackle extremism at home with program to curb radicalization of Canadian youth. National Post, March 24;

updated January 25, 2015.

Canadian Council of Muslim Women. My Canada: Finding Common Ground TOOLKKIT. 2010.

Clancy, Natalie. 2015. ISIS recruited Canadian woman to join fight in Syria. Huffington Post, February 22; updated April 26.

Cullen, Catherine. Anti-radicalization program being developed by RCMP. CBC News, August 29.

Furedi, Frank. 2005. The Politics of Fear. Bloomsbury Academic.

Gendron, Angela. 2006. Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment. ITAC Presents: Trends in Terrorism. Integrated Terrorism

Assessment Centre.

Globe and Mail. 2014. RCMP steps away from Islamic booklet about youth radicalization because of ‘adversarial tone’. September 30; updated

October 1.

Hall, Chris. New counterterrorism bill to override certain privacy limits. CBC News, January 14/15.

Helmus, Todd C., Erin York & Peter Chalk. 2013. Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Corporation.

House of Commons of Canada. 2015. Bill C-51 An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to

amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and

consequential amendments to other Acts. First reading, January 30.

House of Commons [U.K.] Communities and Local Government Committee. 2010. Preventing Violent Extremism. Sixth report of Session 2009-10,

March 16.

Payton, Laura. 2015. Muslim groups ‘troubled’ by Stephen Harper’s mosque remark. Huffington Post, February 2; updated April 4.

Plecash, Chris. 2015. Political rhetoric on Islam risks giving extremists a platform, say Muslim diplomats. Embassy, 4/10 March.

Prime Minister of Canada. 2015a. PM announces anti-terrorism measures to protect Canadians. January 30.

-----. 2015b. PM welcomes German chancellor Angela Merkel to Ottawa. February 9.

Public Safety Canada. 2013. Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Quan, Douglas. 2013. The changing face of terrorism. Montreal Gazette, April 26.

Senate of Canada. 2011. Security, Freedom and the Complex Terrorist Threat: Positive Steps Ahead. Interim report of the Special Senate

Committee on Anti-terrorism.

Toews, Vic. 2010. Promoting peace and preventing youth radicalization worldwide. Public Safety Canada, Speeches, December 6.

Wildavsky, Aaron. 1988. Searching for Safety. Transaction Publishing.


Perhaps Bob Marley said it best: “you can fool some people sometimes, but you can’t fool all the people all the time.” And so, in the eyes

of a growing number of nations and civil society organizations around the world, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—as currently structured and im-plemented—is simply no longer a credible path to nuclear abolition.

The failure to agree on an outcome document at the month-long 2015 NPT Review Conference was an accurate re-flection of the profound inadequacies and disagreements permeating the global nuclear disarmament regime. The lack of a consensus document constitutes a ne-cessary shock to an ailing system.

As the conference drew to a close, it became clear that any language allud-ing to specific and effective measures to implement nuclear disarmament had been removed from successive drafts of the outcome document because of stiff pushback from nuclear-weapon states. Agreement on a weak outcome document would have been disrespectful to abolition

efforts and would have presented a dis-torted view of the dysfunctional nuclear disarmament regime.

The NPT—both as a normative frame-work and as a deliberation forum—has been instrumental in addressing concerns related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But it has failed to deliver on the goal of nuclear abolition, itself a foun-dational objective of the United Nations. Today the question is not only whether the world is a better place with the NPT than without it, but whether this treaty will actually lead to complete nuclear dis-armament.

A symptom of a graver illness The final stumbling block to consensus on an outcome document illustrates the dysfunction of the NPT. It came down to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada supporting Israel’s position on a conference to pursue a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Israel is one of only four states in the world with a rogue nuclear arsenal outside

NPT RevCon: No outcome better than a weak oneFor many, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is no longer a credible path to nuclear abolition

By Cesar Jaramillo


NPT REVCON

the NPT. In the final an-alysis, consensus on the NPT outcome document was thwarted by support for the objections of a non-state party, which has for decades resisted calls to join the treaty.

At issue were Israeli concerns about a pro-posed timeline and pro-cess for convening the Mideast conference. (In this context, a 1995 reso-lution [UN 1995], which called for “practical steps” toward a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, was widely considered critical for the indefinite exten-sion of the NPT at the time.) The 2015 draft outcome document called for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to con-vene a Mideast conference on this issue by March 2016. This already represented a lengthy delay from the undertaking in the outcome document that was unanimously agreed to in 2010, which specifically called for the conference to be convened by 2012.

While claims by the United States that the proposed plan “set an arbitrary dead-line for holding the [Middle East] confer-ence” (Gottemoeller 2015) seem to imply that this would somehow be a rushed en-deavour, in reality the international com-munity has had this objective for 20 years.

Under the plan, no state would be in a position to block the conference. While all states in the region would be urged to participate, the conference would proceed even if one or more states decided not to attend. This drew the ire of Israel and its triad of NPT advocates, who insisted on strict consensus as a prerequisite for mov-ing forward with the long-delayed effort. This approach effectively gives Israel veto power to prevent the process toward a WMD-free zone in the Middle East from even getting off the ground.

The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada also argued that the security interests of Israel had to be taken into account in such a process. No state or international organization has claimed otherwise.

What is perhaps the key stumbling block, though, has remained mostly unspoken. Should Israel agree to at-tend a regional conference, it would be compelled to come clean about its never-confirmed nuclear weapons program (see Lewis 2014)—and thus end the unjustifi-able and anachronistic opaqueness that many in the international community have tolerated for decades.

The long-unfulfilled promise While the Middle East disarmament question was the official—and widely reported—reason why there was no outcome document at the NPT Review Conference, the disagreements straining the nuclear disarmament regime run much deeper (see Jaramillo 2014).

On the eve of the 70th anniversary of the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima, 45 years after the NPT entered into force, and more than a quarter-century after the end of the Cold War, many states

above: Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson addresses the opening of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on April 27. UN Photo


are frustrated by the blatant disregard of nuclear-weapon states of their obligation to disarm. The status quo was challenged in the statements of a majority of NPT states parties during the 2015 Review Conference.

Tired arguments over the purported value of nuclear weapons possession have been replaced by a renewed emphasis on the humanitarian imperative for nuclear disarmament (see Jaramillo 2015). The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear-weapons use outweigh any al-leged benefits.

The widespread rejection of the status quo, however, has done little to persuade nuclear-weapon states to change course.

Nuclear-weapon states extol the value of nuclear weapons in safeguarding their national interests, but expect no one else to embrace the same rationale. They de-mand immediate, consistent compliance with nonproliferation obligations, but dis-regard their own responsibility to disarm. They consider the pursuit and possession of nuclear weapons by some states un-acceptable, but seem content to accept the nuclear-weapons programs of military or economic allies, even outside the NPT framework. They continue to spend bil-lions of dollars modernizing arsenals and related infrastructure (see Priest 2012).

The irony that the sole possessors of nuclear weapons within the NPT are the five permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council— which are tasked with the maintenance of inter-national peace and security—has not been lost on many international observers. But the P5 are not the only ones obstructing progress in abolishing nuclear weapons. States that participate in nuclear alliances such as NATO are wantonly complicit. They agree with nuclear-weapon states when they claim that they maintain their arsenals not only for their own security, but also for the security of the alliance.

Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT refer, re-spectively, to the undertaking of nuclear-weapon states not to transfer nuclear

weapons to others, and the undertaking of non-nuclear-weapon states not to receive them. Within NATO, which has an overt policy of nuclear deterrence (see NATO 2012), a nuclear-weapon state can make its weapons available to the multilateral alli-ance and place weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon states.

For much too long, nuclear-dependent states have been allowed to reside in both camps. When it suits, they present themselves as responsible international actors that are non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT. At the same time, they are party to, and endorse, a security arrange-ment that runs contrary to the letter of the NPT and the broader goal of nuclear abolition.

Applying pressure The existential threat posed by nuclear weapons is so great that the international community must devise and implement every peaceful means of persuasion at its disposal to compel nuclear-weapon states to achieve verifiable abolition within a specified timeframe. The time has come for concrete actions that unequivocally convey not only the gravity of the threat, but the seriousness of the demand.

One proposal is to pursue a legal pro-hibition or ban of nuclear weapons (see Reaching Critical Will 2015), even if some or all nuclear-weapon states refuse to par-ticipate. Civil society organizations from around the world—notably those working with the International Campaign to Abol-ish Nuclear Weapons—and a growing number of supporting governments have done a formidable job in presenting the ban as a serious alternative. Its main at-tribute: it anticipates the continued recalci-trance of nuclear-weapon states and plans to move forward in spite of it.

Some skeptics have argued that pursu-ing a ban treaty would be a redundant effort, since nuclear weapons are already illegal under the NPT. But there is hardly universal agreement on that view. And it is hard to see why anyone who believes

NPT REVCON

Cesar Jaramillo is a Program Officer with Project Ploughshares.

[email protected]


NPT REVCON

the NPT already makes nuclear weapons illegal by implication would oppose un-ambiguously codifying that illegality under international law. There are numerous ex-amples of redundant international agree-ments. The actual use of nuclear weapons, for example, would contravene a host of overlapping security, human rights, and environment-related international laws and conventions.

Critically, the process of enacting a treaty that formally bans nuclear weapons will not only provide the international community with a legal reference point; it will also stigmatize a category of weapons, put pressure on those who possess them, and mobilize public opinion, particularly in nuclear-weapon states.

By the end of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, more than 100 nations had explicitly endorsed the “Humanitarian Pledge,” which affirms that the nuclear disarmament regime has a legal gap that needs to be filled. While there are differ-ing interpretations of what filling the legal gap entails, the coming together of the majority of the world’s nations around this demand for concrete progress rooted in humanitarian considerations constitutes a historic shift in the nuclear disarmament debate.

At the same time, the world is exhib-iting nuclear pushback in other realms: lawsuits filed by the Marshall Islands against all nuclear weapons possessors (see Jaramillo & Grisdale 2015); the May-ors for Peace 2020 Vision Campaign; ef-forts to continue the work of the Open Ended Working Group on Nuclear Dis-armament, which convened in Geneva in 2013 to “develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.” All of this is good news.

Anything but prematureThe goal is still a Nuclear Weapons Con-vention—by any name (see UNODA 2015). The need for it is not a matter of

opinion. If nuclear weapons are ever to be abolished, there must be a universal, non-discriminatory process, with provisions for the irreversible elimination of existing nuclear arsenals and a timeline for veri-fied implementation. Outstanding related objectives, such as the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the pursuit of a Fissile Materials Treaty, would, of course, be part of such a global multilateral undertaking.

The absence of an outcome document at the 2015 NPT Review Conference will not diminish the push for abolition, but a challenging path lies ahead. Nuclear-weapon states and their supporters will dig in their heels. They will continue to refer to any effort that challenges the nuclear disarmament status quo as a “distraction.” They will point to progress where there is none. Perhaps most problematic, they will continue to refer to any serious plan to initiate and conclude a process to elimin-ate nuclear weapons as “premature.”

Seventy years after Hiroshima, efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons are surely overdue. □

References

Gottemoeller, Rose. 2015. Remarks at the conclusion of the 2015 Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. U.S. Department of State, May 22.

Jaramillo, Cesar. 2015. The humanitarian and political struggle to ban the bomb. Project

Ploughshares, March 20.

-----. 2014. Nuclear disarmament: Time to focus on differences. Briefing 14-2. Project

Ploughshares, July 15.

Jaramillo, Cesar & Debbie Grisdale. 2015. Marshallese can rightfully claim a victory.

Embassy, March 25.

Lewis, Jeffrey. 2014. Fight club: Israel nuke edition. Foreign Policy, September 26.

NATO. 2012. NATO’s nuclear forces, May 11, online.

Priest, Dana. 2012. U.S. nuclear arsenal is ready for overhaul. The Washington Post,

September 15.

Reaching Critical Will. 2015. Filling the legal gap: The prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Article 36, April.

UN 1995. Resolution on the Middle East, Review Conference of the Parties to the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

UNODA 2015. The United Nations and security in a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Documents relating to the 2015 NPT Conference can be found on the website of Reaching Critical Will. Also visit UNFOLD ZERO, a platform for UN-focused initiatives and actions for the achievement of a nuclear-weapons-free world. This article first appeared in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 3, 2015.


By any modern standard, Saudi Arabia is a human rights pariah. Yet the Can-

adian Commercial Corporation, a Crown corporation, has brokered a deal to supply $15-billion worth of Canadian-made armoured vehicles to the autocratic kingdom over the next decade, in what is by far the largest military export contract in Canada’s history.

While key details surrounding the deal remain shrouded in secrecy, what is known so far raises troubling questions about the effective applica-tion, and ultimate worth, of Canada’s export controls—which the govern-ment lauds as “some of the strongest in the world.” If a country with Saudi Arabia’s abysmal human rights record is eligible to receive Canadian military goods, it is hard to fathom what sort of record a country would need to have to be deemed ineligible.

Human rights assessment required stepCanada’s export control policy calls for a thorough human rights assess-ment to be conducted before a per-mit can be issued for a military ex-port deal. However, as The Globe and Mail has revealed, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Develop-ment was unable to produce any hu-man rights reports for the year when the deal was announced (2014) or the year before. Further, even if the necessary assessments had been con-ducted for the Saudi deal, DFATD has said that it would keep their con-

tents from the Canadian public, citing “commercial confidentiality.”

The lack of recent human rights reports for Saudi Arabia is in line with findings by Project Plough-shares, which reported in February that the necessary export permits had not been issued at the time the deal was announced.

Evidently, the announcement of the sale was made on the assump-tion that the export permits would eventually come through—a highly risky assumption for any reasonable observer, given what is known about the recipient nation.

The confidence evident in the announcement makes it hard to con-ceive that the export permits could

actually be denied. This raises ques-tions not only about the thorough-ness of the vetting process, but also about the extent to which it is prop-erly shielded from commercial and political interests. If the deal were found to contravene Canada’s export control safeguards after the official announcement, is there any realistic scenario under which it could actually be reversed?

Saudi Arabia “worst of the worst”To be sure, the bleakness of the hu-man rights situation in Saudi Arabia is hard to overstate. According to Freedom House, a Washington-based organization, the country is among the “worst of the worst” human rights offenders in the world. Year after year, authoritative organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch condemn the consistent, systematic repression of the Saudi civilian population by the governing regime.

Beheadings are a routine occur-rence; there have been more than four per week on average so far this year (an October 2014 feature story in Newsweek was entitled “When It Comes To Beheadings, ISIS Has Nothing over Saudi Arabia”). Post-ing online comments critical of the regime can result in the author’s be-ing publicly flogged. Women cannot drive.

At the same time, Canada’s export policy guidelines state that Canada “closely controls” military exports to governments with “a persistent rec-

Arms sale to Saudi Arabia lowers the bar on export controls

Cesar Jaramillo

Given Saudi Arabia’s well documented, poor human rights record, it is hard to see how there can be ‘no reasonable risk’ that the Canadian-made military goods will be used against the civilian population.


CANADIAN WEAPONS EXPORTS

ord of serious violations of the hu-man rights of their citizens.” Before export permits can be issued, the Canadian government must deter-mine that “there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.”

Given Saudi Arabia’s well docu-mented, poor human rights record, it is hard to see how there can be “no reasonable risk” that the Canadian-made military goods will be used against the civilian population. In fact, documentary evidence shows the Saudi government’s proclivity to use force against civilians.

In March 2011, Saudi Arabia sent armoured vehicles to help quell civil-ian protests in neighbouring Bahrain. Several media outlets referred to re-

ports of human rights abuses in the crackdown on peaceful protesters, including Britain’s Telegraph, which reported that Saudi troops were in Bahrain to “crush” the protests. Ac-cording to the Canadian government, however, they were there simply to guard buildings and “did not engage in suppression of peaceful protests.”

Oversight neededShould an Arab Spring-type upris-ing occur in Saudi Arabia, there is little doubt that Canadian armoured vehicles would be used to suppress the civilian population. Canadian considerations of human rights seem to have been lost in the pursuit of the lucrative deal with Saudi Arabia. But it is precisely when there is a pro-

spective deal with an oppressive re-gime that they become most relevant.

Oddly enough, one of the reasons that the Canadian government has given for not signing the historic international Arms Trade Treaty that came into force last December—un-like 130 signatories thus far, including all other NATO members—is pre-cisely that domestic export control regulations are among the strongest in the world. Perhaps on paper they are. But the known facts and pending questions about the deal with Saudi Arabia paint an entirely different pic-ture. □

This article first appeared in The Globe and Mail on May 27, 2015.

The bleakness of the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia is hard to overstate. Beheadings are a routine occurrence; there have been more than four per week on average so far this year. Posting online comments critical of the regime can result in the author’s being publicly flogged. Women cannot drive.


Outer space warfare and metaphor dragOutdated metaphors, laws, treaties and norms hamper efforts to deal with the realities of space security

above: The USSR exhibit at the Messehall in Vienna was organized in connection with the Outer Space Conference in 1968. UN Photo


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Our topic today is the inadequacy of current space governance instru-ments—laws, treaties, norms, institutions. It

isn’t simply that we have inadequate inter-national legal instruments developed in the 1960s and 1970s, which technological advances and proliferation have now out-paced.

The problem is that thinking about outer space is afflicted by metaphor drag. This has left us ill-equipped to even consider the appropriate response to the physics of outer space for space govern-ance conversations that will yield appro-priate and widely agreed results.

Metaphor drag Metaphor drag is the application of old ways of perceiving and measuring to new circumstances. Consider the measure of mechanical power. We still use the term “horse power.” Adopted in the 18th century by Scottish engineer James Watt, horse power compared the work output of a steam engine with the output of draft horses. There are mechanical, elec-trical, boiler, and hydraulic measurements of horse power. Few of us have intimate knowledge of horses or the power they can exert, and yet the metaphor is still popularly used for automobile engines.

A metaphor can be a drag not only be-cause it refers to previous technology, but also because it can be a drag on coming to grips with new realities and discontinuities with the previous technology and its oper-ating environment. This is the case with how we think and talk about outer space.

Outer space metaphors and analogiesConsider some of the metaphors com-

monly used about outer space. It’s the Wild West or ungoverned territory where rogues can act without discipline or ac-countability. Donald Rumsfeld, in a report written prior to his last U.S. government appointment as Secretary of Defense, re-ferred to the vulnerabilities of outer space assets as the United States opening itself to a “space Pearl Harbor.”

By analogy, rather than metaphor, out-er space as a domain is compared to the Antarctic. No single nation owns it, but all can use it or visit it for agreed scientific and other purposes. Access to outer space also is compared to travel on the high seas. Again, no single nation owns the high seas but we agree, by and large, to follow certain rules of the road--another example of metaphor drag since clearly there are no roads in the sea or in outer space—or, more accurately, navigational and operational guidelines to maintain safety and extend humanitarian assistance to those in peril.

In current official U.S. documents—mimicked in the 2014 Canadian space policy—outer space is described as con-gested, contested, and competitive. The first is an example of metaphor drag. Congested like a road with a traffic jam or like my lungs with a serious flu or pneu-monia. Contested and competitive are states of mind or states of play between terrestrial human beings, rather than metaphors per se. All of these are projec-tions of terrestrial military, economic, or political dynamics to outer space.

The physics of outer space is its primary governance mechanismThe difficulty is that these metaphors and analogies are inadequate when applied to outer space, for the simple reason that

By John Siebert


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outer space is qualitatively and quanti-tatively different from the domains of earth, sea, and air. The most important factor affecting outer space governance is the physics of space itself.

Space is a uniquely harsh environment that threatens human beings and assets with the effects of naturally occurring phenomena such as space weather—radia-tion, corrosive space particles, the impact of occasional solar flares—and 60+ years of on-orbit human-sourced debris that can effectively destroy a billion-dollar sat-ellite in a collision with a $1.25 wingnut.

Human space travel is dependent every second on mechanical assistance to breathe and therefore live, but we also now know that prolonged stays in zero-gravity are highly detrimental to human health, entailing loss of muscle mass and bone density.

All of this means that it is both very costly and highly risky to get humans or human-sourced assets into orbit.

Civil and commercial versus militaryThe now proven benefits of space assets for civil and commercial terrestrial activity are considerable; therefore, the risks are worth the rewards for human space en-deavours. A governance regime—norms, laws, mediating institutions—promoting collaboration and dispute resolution in the realms of civil and commercial space should be relatively simple to define and to make function. In fact, this regime is largely in place, with ongoing mainten-ance required for more complex conflict

resolution.But facing off against the civil and

commercial space sectors are leading and regional national militaries tasked with defending the physical or existential secur-ity of nation states. They reserve the right to engage in shooting at and destroying the space assets of their adversaries in the event of war. In the absence of war they reserve the right to impede any normative or legal development that will restrict their ability to develop the means to engage in war in space.

The logic of terrestrial military impera-tives is incompatible with outer space se-curity—that is, with the integrity and use of, and access to, outer space as a global commons, as stated aspirationally in the Outer Space Treaty. The civil and com-mercial use of outer space by all nations and by private space actors is fundamen-tally at odds with the reservation of the militaries of these same nations to use space as a shooting gallery if required.

It’s the debris, stupidSuccessful retail politics sometimes is re-duced to the most minute of phrases such as, “It’s the economy, stupid!” or “Where’s the beef?” for U.S. examples; in Canada we might remember “Zap you’re frozen!” or “You had an option, sir.” In space everything can be summed up as: “It’s the debris, stupid.”

Since the dawn of the space age in the 1950s, the perils of space debris have in-creased to the point that high-value orbits are threatened by space junk. In 2015 we

Conducting war in outer space based on physical-effects weapons would create such a density of debris that it would deny one’s own military, others’ militaries, and all other space users the continued use of outer space.


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are on the threshold of self-replicating debris events as multiple high-velocity impacts in outer space produce cascad-ing debris clouds. Depending on its orbit, space debris can take a few days to be pulled into the earth’s atmosphere and burn up, or tens of thousands of years to clear from orbits.

Armed conflict in outer spaceIn 2007 Phil Baines, who worked in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (Chemical, Biological, Conventional) Division of what is now Foreign Af-fairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD), made an enlightening presenta-tion at the European Union Conference on Security in Space in Berlin that focused on the contribution of arms control to space security. Calling his talk “A chiv-alrous code of conduct for outer space security,” Baines walked through the in-herent vulnerability of space assets due to the physics of outer space.

To date armed conflict has only oc-curred on the land, on the sea, and in the air. Destroyed armoured vehicles, sunk naval vessels, and downed aircraft do not necessarily pose hazards to subsequent navigation of their operational media, since you can clean up the terrestrial en-vironment after even the most destructive conflict. The same cannot be said for out-er space, due to the behaviour of space debris and the space environment.

It is not possible to adequately armour space assets for protection, due to the high relative velocities of impacts, even for small objects. Conducting war in outer space based on physical-effects weapons would create such a density of debris that it would deny one’s own military, others’ militaries, and all other space users the continued use of outer space. Multiple kinetic wars in outer space could imprison humanity on the Earth with a gauntlet of orbital shrapnel.

Baines calls any victory in a space shooting war a pyrrhic victory if it ren-ders space unusable for current and future

generations. You could also call it space-icide, the killing of the domain.

As an aside, we should not be surprised that large-power militaries contemplate and are prepared to engage in this con-duct, since these are the same militaries that contemplate and are prepared to en-gage in nuclear weapons exchanges that, even in a limited form, would likely end the human project and effectively destroy Earth’s biosphere, ending non-human life as we know it as well.

The chivalrous code of conductBaines accepts that the dependence of large-power militaries on space assets for a variety of warfighting capabilities makes space assets obvious and necessary tar-gets. The trick is to attack military space assets without rendering space inaccess-ible or unusable. He proposed a chivalrous code of conduct for outer space security that essentially asks all capable militaries to voluntarily foreswear making space a shooting gallery and instead focus on:

1. Attacking the terrestrial links of space assets. All satellites must be launched and commanded from the Earth. All information col-lected or communicated by satel-lites is exploited on the Earth. As a result, warfighting can target launch and command facilities, as well as end-user terminals using physical-effects weapons from land-, sea-, and air-based platforms.

2. Using only temporary, reversible, and localized effects on space assets. All satellites depend on critical electromagnetic links and are connected to information net-works. Satellite links or informa-tion flows can be disrupted using electronic or information warfare means that do not physically de-stroy the on-orbit satellite. These means of attack are temporary, reversible, and localized and do not cause space debris.

John Siebertis ExecutiveDirectorof ProjectPloughshares.

[email protected]


In addition to these offensive war-mak-ing strategies, militaries could consider defensive means that would make kinetic attacks less successful and therefore less likely to be attempted. To make military space assets less vulnerable to success-ful kinetic or electronic attacks you can deploy constellations of small satellites, because a network of dispersed targets is more difficult to destroy. Also, by being able to respond rapidly by re-launching replacements for destroyed satellites, or hardening them against nuclear weapons effects, you can discourage opponents from attacking in the first place.

Baines’s chivalrous code of conduct for space security is, in itself, an example of metaphor drag that recalls knights on horses battling according to accepted rules—with all the limitations and pos-sibilities of gaining agreement by all relevant space powers—that would put limits on their behaviour in space to avoid catastrophic debris creation. It would re-quire states to agree to never under any circumstance:

1. Place in orbit around the Earth any weapon or any objects carry-ing weapons, or station weapons in outer space in any other man-ner (where “weapon” means any device, specially designed or modi-fied, to injure or kill a person, or damage or destroy an object, by the projection or occlusion of mass or energy);

2. Test or use any weapon against an artificial satellite (where “test” means flight test or field test in a manner observable by the national or multilateral technical means available to a Signatory State); and

3. Test or use any artificial satellite itself as a weapon.

A whole lot of trust is required for every nation capable of engaging in outer space warfare to decline from its use.

The Space Security IndexIn 2003 experts concerned about the potential impact of space warfare on the civil and commercial sectors attempted to reorient outer space metaphors and analo-gies through creation of the Space Secur-ity Index. They were deeply concerned that the outer space metaphors and analo-gies being used—Wild West, Antarctic, high seas, space Pearl Harbor—were caught in the drag of terrestrial military metaphors.

The Space Security Index puts out an annual publication using a definition of space security that prioritizes the preser-vation of outer space as a domain or en-vironment free of debilitating debris. The SSI reports annually on developments in space security from a definition of outer space that attempts to reorient space gov-ernance around the secure and sustainable access to, and use of, space by all and freedom from space-based threats.

The metaphors best suited to this definition of outer space governance are commons, connections, and zone of collaboration, in distinct contrast to con-gested, contested, and competitive.

The SSI provides civil and commercial space actors with a framework for coun-tering military rationale for preparation or engagement in outer space warfare. The SSI provides the metaphors, the vocabu-lary, the data, and the public policy direc-tion that would provide a basis for militar-ies to support proposals such as Baines’s chivalrous code to prevent space-icide.

Project Ploughshares has been the managing partner for the international research consortium that has produced the SSI since 2003. □

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This is an edited version of a presentation made at the 34th International Space Development Conference in Toronto, Ontario, May 20-24, 2015.


Canadian churches recently marked four decades of ecumenical coalition work for the pursuit of peace and justice. During that time,

Canadian Christians across theological traditions have come together—speaking to, and arguably shaping, public policy discussions on issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Canadian military intervention and spending, the humanitarian impacts of landmines and cluster bombs, and the regulation of small arms. This ecumenical witness for peace is part of a rich history of activism.

Project Ploughshares: The ecumenical voice on defence policy and disarmamentOne illustration of interchurch collabora-tion for peace in Canada is the work of Project Ploughshares. Established in 1976 as a project of The Canadian Council of Churches, Ploughshares emerged as the

ecumenical voice on defence policy and disarmament. Ploughshares has developed a depth of expertise on nuclear disarma-ment and nonproliferation, conventional arms control, the non-weaponization of space, and the reduction of armed vio-lence. Sought after by policymakers and civil society actors alike, Ploughshares re-search has served as a focal point over the years for broader church participation on the peacebuilding agenda.

As part of the anti-nuclear move-ment of the 1980s, Canadian churches were at the forefront of shaping public policy debates on nonproliferation and disarmament. Across denominations, the indiscriminate effects of nuclear weapons created “nuclear pacifists.” In December of 1982 and 1983, Project Ploughshares led church leader delegations to meet dir-ectly with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to articulate an ecumenical perspective on nuclear disarmament. The delegation articulated an unqualified rejection of

Witness for peaceChronicling the role of the Canadian churches in shaping public policy over the past 40 years

By Paul C. Heidebrecht and Jennifer Wiebe


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above: In December 1982 Project Ploughshares led church leader delegations to meet directly with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to articulate an ecumenical perspective on nuclear disarmament.

the moral validity of nuclear weapons and provided specific proposals aimed at reducing nuclear arsenals. This kind of church engagement, in the words of Can-ada’s current Governor General David Johnston, “helped to move the idea of a freeze on nuclear weapons from the mar-gins to the mainstream” (Johnston 2011).

In 1985, Brian Mulroney’s government conducted a major foreign policy review. Parliament created a special Joint Com-mittee on External Affairs and National Defence to gather input from Canadians on the values and objectives they be-lieved to be important. After releasing a Green Paper to generate discussion, the Committee conducted dozens of public consultations across the country. The Canadian Council of Churches submitted a document with more than 60 policy rec-

ommendations regarding Canada’s role on the international stage. Two years later, the Canadian government tabled its defence White Paper. The churches again offered a response through the leadership of Pro-ject Ploughshares.

The government’s foreign and defence policy during these years was broadly criticized for building Canada’s national security around very limited (and self-interested) notions of economic competi-tiveness, solidarity with the United States, and a sense of “armed fortress security” (Lind & Mihevc 1994, p. 186) or protec-tion from external military threats. At the heart of the churches’ response to this policy framework was the concept of “common security.” This concept—cham-pioned by Project Ploughshares through-out the 1980s—proposed that the path


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The greater dissonance between the agendas of the Canadian churches and the federal government in recent years provides a compelling motivation for advocacy.

to greater peace and security was not best achieved through increased militarization, but by focusing collective energies on the root causes of insecurity such as political, environmental, and economic injustice. As security paradigms shifted substan-tially at the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s the concept of “human security” began to take hold within the policies and programs of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Church coalitions and other civil society actors were afforded funding channels for peacebuilding work as well as opportunities to engage the government through various annual and biannual con-sultations.

In the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq inva-sion, the churches were very active in calling for Canada to stay out of the war. They reached out to the public—creating relevant worship materials, supporting ecumenical prayer vigils, and even pro-ducing a half-page ad in The Globe and Mail with the words, “Say NO to war in Iraq; say YES to building peace.” They wrote letters to U.S. President George W. Bush and to Canada’s Prime Minister Jean Chrétien.

In January 2003, Project Ploughshares, The Canadian Council of Churches, and KAIROS wrote a joint statement to Prime Minister Chrétien entitled, “Prepare for Peace in Iraq.” This statement—officially endorsed by some 40,000 Canadians—outlined a rationale for why Canada should not participate in the “coalition of the willing.” In a chance encounter with Prime Minister Chrétien after the war started, an Evangelical Lutheran Bishop was told by the Prime Minister that the vocal testimony of Canadian churches

played an influential role in the Cabinet’s decision to stay out of Iraq.

Government’s new policy agendaCanada’s foreign and defence policy changed direction in notable ways with the election of a Conservative govern-ment in 2006. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has elevated the role, budget, and social prominence of the Canadian military. The recent posture of Canada on the world stage has left little room for projects such as United Nations peace-keeping operations or the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.

Canada’s “principled approach to for-

eign policy” has meant that the govern-ment refuses to “go along in order to get along” (Baird 2012). The lexicon of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development has been wiped clean of language that was commonplace in the 1990s, including terms such as “human security,” “public diplomacy,” and “good governance” (Davis 2004).

When the Canadian government has a different policy agenda than the propon-ents of peacebuilding, those proponents face acute challenges. Further, the kind of consultation process that the Canadian government embarked on in the 1980s is now difficult to fathom. Substantive White Papers have been replaced by sparse ministerial announcements or press releases. The expertise provided by church coalitions has become a product without a market in Ottawa.

Citizens have a new attitudeA change in government isn’t the only significant contextual change that Can-


adian churches have faced in recent years. Churches no longer speak with the same authority in public policy debates. Can-adian church membership and participa-tion have declined significantly. Moreover, Canadians do not trust leaders and ex-perts of any kind as much as they used to. With access to instant information, today’s citizens believe they can make up their own minds. It seems obvious that the attitude of Canadians to the political process has changed significantly since churches first began to collaborate on advocacy.

Where do we go from here?The greater dissonance between the agen-das of the Canadian churches and the fed-eral government in recent years provides a compelling motivation for advocacy. More than ever, it is clear that advocacy is long-term work. Perhaps coalitions have the freedom to once again step back and focus on shaping a larger counter-narra-tive, viewing themselves as performing an “enlightenment” function in setting the agenda for future policy actions, rather than acting as insiders engaged in short-term problem-solving or tweaking of gov-ernment policies (Weiss 1977). To borrow a phrase used by researchers in the field of policy influence, coalitions can em-brace the role of being “norm entrepre-neurs” (Clarke 2008).

Next, the centralization of power should not lead coalitions to overlook op-portunities to have an impact on policies and actions that fall outside the limelight set by the government’s own priorities or the media.

Finally, the decline of deference to authority figures means that individual voices matter more than ever. This pro-vides a clear rationale for increased atten-tion to public engagement efforts as an initial and primary mode of advocacy. It also seems clear that, in a post-secular context, there is new space for people of faith. While Canadians may distrust religious leaders more, they are also more

open to persuasive moral arguments in-formed by faith convictions.

The story of Canadian churches col-laborating to amplify their peace witness merits both celebration and further an-alysis. Let us hope that this rich history of ecumenical collaboration provides inspiration for those seeking to keep faith with that tradition in a rapidly changing political world. □

This article is derived from “Keeping the Faith? Tracing the struggle to amplify the peace witness of Canadian churches,” which can be found in The Ecumenist: A journal of theology, culture, and history, Vol. 52, No. 1, Winter 2015, pp. 1-10. Paul Heidebrecht is Director of the MSCU Centre for Peace Ad-vancement at Conrad Grebel University Col-lege, University of Waterloo. Jennifer Wiebe is Director of the Ottawa office of Mennonite Central Committee.

References

Baird, John. 2012. Address by Minister Baird at

Montreal Council on Foreign Relations Luncheon.

Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada,

September 14.

Clarke, Warren. 2008. Transnational advocacy

coalitions and human security initiatives: Explaining

success and failure. Hertie School of Governance

Working Papers, No. 35, July.

Davis, Jeff. 2009. Liberal era diplomatic language

killed off. Embassy, July 1.

Johnston, David. 2011. Presentation of the 2010

Pearson Gold Medal. The Governor General of

Canada, January 21.

Lind, Christopher and Joseph Mihevc. 1994.

Eds. Coalitions for Justice: The Story of Canada’s

Interchurch Coalitions, Novalis.

Weiss, Carol H. 1977. Research for policy’s sake:

The enlightenment function of social research. Policy

Analysis 3/4, pp. 533-34.

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Books etc.

Worth Fighting For: Canada’s Tradition of War Resistance from 1812 to the War on Terror Eds. Lara Campbell, Michael Dawson, Catherine GidneyBetween the Lines, 2015Paperback, 336 pages, $34.95

This collection brings together the work of 16 scholars on the history of war resistance in Canada. They explore resis-tance to specific wars (including the South African War, the First and Second World Wars, and Vietnam), the ideology and nature of resistance (national, ethical, political, spiritual), and organized activism against militarization (such as cadet training, the Cold War, and nuclear arms).

“Read this wonderful collection and be prepared for a totally new kind of Canadian war story—the anti-war story. Worth Fight-ing For uncovers, examines, and celebrates an essential but long neglected stream in Canadian war history. It’s a story of resistance and vision, and it’s been helping to shape Canada’s character since well before confederation.”

– Ernie Regehr, co-founder of Project Ploughshares

Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and PracticeBy Peter JonesStanford University Press, September 2015256 pages, paperback $36.50 Cdn, hardback $162.99

Track Two Diplomacy consists of informal dialogues among actors such as academics, religious leaders, retired senior officials, and NGO officials that can bring new ideas and new relationships to the official process of diplomacy.

Authors include Ovide Mercredi, Mubarak Awad, Stan McKay, Maxine Matilpi, and Karen Ridd.

“Simply wringing your hands over the state of the world is not going to change anything. It’s real action that changes the world, and this book gives the reader advice from people who wake up every day and do the hard work of building peace. Bravo!”

– Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Jody Williams

Voices of Harmony and Dissent: How Peacebuilders are Transforming Their WorldsEds. Richard McCutcheon, Jarem Sawatsky, Valerie SmithPaperback, $19.48; also available as an ebook.

Join our work to advance international peace and security by making a tax-deductible donation today.

Visit www.ploughshares.ca or call 519-888-6541.