PLOUGHSHARES MONITORploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Monitor... · the language of civil society has been used—and abused—by industry and government. In this case, Lockheed

PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR

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2018VOLUME 39 | ISSUE 2

Deal undone

HuMaN-less OR HuMaN MOReLockheed attempts to change the language—and the conversation—when it comes to artificial intelligence.

WHaT’s aT sTake? Experts weigh in on the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement.

OWN yOuR OWN daTa And other key insights from RightsCon 2018.

space secuRITy A domain in which all the countries of Earth have a stake.

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The United States has withdrawn from a thorough, robust, and verifiable nuclear agreement with Iran.

The Ploughshares MonitorVolume 39 | Issue 2

The Ploughshares Monitor is the quarterlyjournal of Project Ploughshares, an operating division of The Canadian Council of Churches. Ploughshares works with churches, nongovernmental organizations, and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that prevent war and armed violence and build peace. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the KCU Centre for Peace Advancement, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo.

Office address: Project Ploughshares140 Westmount Road NorthWaterloo, Ontario N2L 3G6 Canada519-888-6541, fax: [email protected]; www.ploughshares.ca

Project Ploughshares gratefully acknowledges the ongoing financial support of the many individuals, national churches and church agencies, local congregations, religious orders, and organizations across Canada that ensure that the work of Project Ploughshares continues.

We are particularly grateful to The Simons Foundation Canada in Vancouver for its generous support.

All donors of $50 or more receive a complimentary subscription to The Ploughshares Monitor. Annual subscription rates for libraries and institutions are: $35 in Canada, $45 (U.S.) in the United States, $50 (U.S.) internationally. Single copies are $5 plus shipping.

Unless indicated otherwise, material may be reproduced freely, provided the author and source are indicated and one copy is sent to Project Ploughshares. Return postage is guaranteed.

Publications Mail Registration No. 40065122.ISSN 1499-321X.

The Ploughshares Monitor is indexed in the Canadian Periodical Index.

Printed at Waterloo Printing, Waterloo, Ontario.Printed with vegetable inks on paper with recycled content.

Summer 2018

PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES STAFF

Julia BanduraTasneem JamalBranka Marijan Sonal Marwah

Matthew PupicBenjamin SkinnerWendy StockerBarbara WagnerJessica West

Cesar Jaramillo Executive Director

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From the Director’s deskIran and nuclear weapons: A deal undone.by Cesar Jaramillo

Effective Arms Trade Treaty implementationStatement to the ATT Working Group.

Seven key insights from RightsCon 2018 And the inevitable questions.by Branka Marijan

Ploughshares PresentsThe Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement.by Sonal Marwah

Uncharted territory in outer spaceThe Space Security Index Working Group.by Jessica West

Human-less or human more?“DefenceTech speak” and autonomous weapons.by Branka Marijan

Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyStatement to the 2018 Preparatory Committee.by Cesar Jaramillo

“and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more.” Isaiah 2:4

The Ploughshares Monitor, the quarterly publication of Project Ploughshares, is available online at www.ploughshares.ca.

Funded by the Government of Canada

summer 2018 The Ploughshares Monitor 3

In a widely expected move, on May 8, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the immediate U.S. withdrawal from the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran nuclear deal) and the imposition of increasingly stringent economic sanctions against Iran.

Not once in a 10-minute address did he point to a single concrete instance of noncompliance by Iran with the terms of the deal. The reason: there was nothing to denounce.

The international community, including the U.S. intelligence community, agree that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the deal reached three years ago between Iran and the P5+1 (permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany). A thorough, robust, and verifiable agreement was reached.

Viewed skeptically by some (Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu labelled the agreement a “historic surrender”), the JCPOA constituted a redeeming victory for modern diplomacy.

A solid dealFollowing nearly two years of protracted negotiations, the JCPOA was the best the negotiators could achieve.

It addressed legitimate concerns about the

direction of Iran’s nuclear energy program—in particular, the possibility that it could be diverted to produce nuclear warheads. Iran had a growing stockpile of uranium, an increase in the number of centrifuges (including new-generation machines), a deeply bunkered enrichment facility, and a nearly completed research reactor.

Pre-deal, Iran had restricted UN inspections and remained reluctant to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which granted the

nuclear watchdog virtually unrestricted access. Under the deal, Iran agreed to reduce its

stockpile of low-enriched uranium stockpile by 98 per cent. It agreed not to enrich uranium for the first 15 years after the deal went into effect beyond the level of 3.67 per cent purity, needed to produce the low-enriched uranium (LEU) used in nuclear power stations.

Iran placed more than two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, with enrichment capacity limited to a single plant. Critically, Iran will implement the IAEA Additional Protocol agreement that will continue as long as Iran remains a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The deal did allow Iran to present reservations

From the Director’s Desk

Written by Cesar Jaramillo

A deal undone


The Ploughshares Monitor summer 20184

to IAEA requests to inspect suspicious facilities. In such cases, an arbitration committee made up of the P5+1 and Iran would decide. Some critics were concerned that the time allowed for this process would give Iran the opportunity to conceal any wrongdoing. But negotiators clearly

took into account the IAEA’s technical means and expertise to detect and assess recent nuclear activity.

Perhaps most importantly, under the deal, the P5+1 maintained the prerogative to react swiftly and sternly to any perceived undue obstructions from Iran. Sanctions could be reinstated.

Why withdraw if no violations?Both of Iran’s regional arch-rivals—Saudi Arabia and Israel—are close U.S. economic and military allies.

Israel has long railed against the deal. As early as 1992, current Prime Minister Netanyahu (then a Member of Parliament) warned that Iran was “3 to 5 years” from acquiring nuclear weapons. In 2003, the Jerusalem Post reported that “Iran will have an operative nuclear weapons program by 2005.” In 2009, Netanyahu told a U.S. Congressional Delegation that Iran was “one or two months away from a bomb.” In 2012, he presented a cartoon of a bomb with the fuse lit up before the UN General Assembly.

Trump seems especially receptive to Israel’s concerns. And he had made a campaign promise to withdraw from the JCPOA.

Widespread implicationsAs the United States engages North Korea in high-profile talks over the latter’s nuclear weapons program, U.S. behaviour vis-à-vis the Iran nuclear deal will certainly be considered by

North Korea’s leadership. This decision has put the United States at

odds with close allies on a key foreign policy issue. The re-imposition of sanctions directly affects the interests of European companies keen to do business with Iran. Some might have

to choose between doing business in the United States (if trade wars permit) and doing business in Iran.

The JCPOA has served not only to defuse the stalemate

over the Iranian nuclear program, but has also laid a foundation for increasingly normalized interactions between the Islamic Republic and the West. The negotiation process itself represented a rare example of rapprochement between serious adversaries, which could help overcome a history of mutual transgression and utter mistrust. All good will gained could be lost.

Parting thoughtsYes, the JCPOA is necessary and addresses legitimate proliferation concerns. But let us not forget the profound double standards upon which it is founded. Each of the P5+1 nations has nuclear weapons stationed in their territory. Israel is the only Middle East state actually in possession of nuclear weapons, and one of only four outliers to the nearly universal Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In the end, stiff opposition to the deal has never been tantamount to extensive opposition. The JCPOA was broadly welcomed by the international community as a highly promising path to address tensions around Iran’s nuclear program, and as an alternative to potential military escalation. But the United States, with Israel and Saudi Arabia as support, could well derail the best diplomatic attempt thus far to resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran. □


Stiff opposition to the deal has never been tantamount to extensive opposition.“

Cesar Jaramillo is Executive Director of Project Ploughshares.

He can be reached at [email protected].


Autonomous Weapons

Recently, Lockheed Martin, the U.S. aerospace and defence company, released a promotional video of its work on

autonomous systems. The main message: “The future of autonomy isn’t human-less. It’s human more.”

Doublethink lives onThis formulation brings to mind George Orwell. In his novel 1984, Newspeak, the language of the fictional society Oceania, is full of “doublethink”—slogans such as “War Is Peace; Freedom Is Slavery, Ignorance Is Strength.” In the appendix, “The Principles of Newspeak,” Orwell explores the power of the structures and vocabulary of language to alter consciousness, to make “heretical thoughts” “literally unthinkable.” In this way, he tells us that we must all be vigilant in seeking the truth behind obfuscation and euphemism. Lockheed Martin clearly does not want its autonomous systems to be seen to be diminishing human control, thus raising fears about a lesser role for human work, human brain power, and human ethical concerns. Instead, the video shows how these systems will INCREASE human abilities.

In adopting this play on “human-less” and “human more,” Lockheed Martin is coopting

the language of civil society organizations, academics, and researchers that have spearheaded the concern about the development of autonomy in weapons systems. For example, participants in the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots have been calling for a commitment to meaningful human control to ensure that decisions to end life are taken by humans, not machines. The relinquishing of human control over such key decisions to machines—making control “human-less”—could even lower the threshold for going to war.

This coopting of vocabulary is not a new tactic. There are plenty of examples in which the language of civil society has been used—and abused—by industry and government. In this case, Lockheed Martin is aiming to moderate concerns. The focus is on human safety: new technology will “keep humans out of harm’s way.”

Words matterIf Orwell was concerned about the abuse of language in the 1940s, how much more so must we be now, in a world bombarded with words. We need to be alert to the uses, abuses, and coopting of language. We need to examine how an issue is framed and whose security and

Human-less or human more? “DefenceTech speak” and autonomous weapons

Written by Branka Marijan


interests receive most attention. In Sex and Death in the Rational World of

Defense Intellectuals, Carol Cohn explores the jargon, which she terms “technostrategic language,” used by defence analysts during the Cold War. Such language was “abstract, sanitized, full of euphemisms.” Discussions about weapons that would have catastrophic consequences were stripped of their power to evoke strong human emotion. Cohn points to defence experts who referred to “counter value attacks,” which in translation meant incinerating cities.

Cohn’s insights can help us to understand the divide between defence experts who discuss nuclear weapons at international conferences and ordinary people who contemplate a bomb falling on their city. She writes, “Anyone who has seen pictures of Hiroshima burn victims or tried to imagine the pain of hundreds of glass shards blasted into the flesh may find it perverse beyond imagination to hear a class of nuclear devices matter-of-factly referred to as ‘clean bombs.’” The rhetoric clearly does not match the event.

Today, we are used to hearing about

“collateral damage” when innocent civilians are killed in armed conflict. Does it seem like “secondary” or “subordinate” damage to the families of victims?

The new autonomous weapons systems, based on advanced technological knowledge, are described in esoteric technical language that I’ll call DefenceTech speak. DefenceTech speak

blends concepts from artificial intelligence and machine learning with military terminology. For sure, such language is sometimes—maybe often—deliberately used to minimize public comprehension. So, a discussion about automating target identification, selection, and engagement is actually about choosing whom to kill. Such language is more than a barrier to understanding by all but computer scientists or combat engineers. Such specialized conversations are also being used to prevent the robust regulation of these weapons.

At the UNWhen autonomous weapons are discussed at the United Nations, questions about jargon, definition, and technology constantly surface. In mid-April, the Group of Governmental Experts met at the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in Geneva, Switzerland. During the week-long meeting it became clear that some progress has been made in defining what autonomous weapons systems are in terms of critical functions, that is, their ability

to select and engage targets (choose whom to kill).

But many countries, including France and Germany, are still seeking more clarification when weapons systems of various levels of sophistication come up for discussion. For some countries, autonomous weapons are years away from deployment and will likely include technology

that has not yet been developed. For others, the technology—including sensors, facial recognition software, and robotics—already exists. Definitions are about setting parameters for the types of weapons that would be banned; for some countries, future technological advancements would address some of the current concerns.

Autonomous Weapons

Anyone who has seen pictures of Hiroshima burn victims or tried to imagine the pain of hundreds of glass shards blasted into the flesh may find it perverse beyond imagination to hear a class of nuclear devices matter-of-factly referred to as ‘clean bombs’.“


A few countries use the complexity of technology and rapid advancements in artificial intelligence as reasons for not developing any significant regulations at the global level. The United States stated at the April meetings, “The issues presented by LAWS [lethal autonomous weapons systems] are complex and evolving, as new technologies and their applications continue to be developed. We therefore must be cautious not to make hasty judgments about the value or likely effects of emerging or future technologies.”

The United States released a working paper ahead of the CCW meeting highlighting the humanitarian benefits of more autonomous systems. The main point appears to be that more precise weapons would be more humane—less “collateral damage.” As well, these systems can assist the military in performing functions other than killing, such as search-and-rescue and information gathering.

But few of us object to the use of artificial intelligence and emerging technology in life-saving operations. The working paper avoids the chief objection, that machines could be making the decision to kill. How can THIS capability be considered humanitarian? Not only what is said, but what is left unsaid, must be carefully examined.

Beyond wordsDiscourse on language is ultimately about giving certain voices privileges not given to others. It’s not surprising that discussions about future weapons technology amplify military voices, which shape the general perception of these systems. Speaking at the GGE in April, Duke University professor Missy Cummings, a former U.S. Navy fighter pilot, provided a thoughtful critique of the state of technology and expressed concern about how autonomous technology would navigate in conflict.

Still, when asked about the potential of future technology she was very supportive. She even

suggested that fighter pilots would no longer suffer from post-traumatic stress disorders if fully autonomous weapons were in operation. This focus on the pilots was interesting. Or perhaps it was the absence of any focus on the civilian victims. The lack of any concern for those who face the consequences of military decisions was a stark example of the silencing of humanitarian voices.

Military-centric discourse has an impact on how autonomous weapons systems are valued and viewed by the world at large. And indeed, to date, military strategy and technological concerns have received most of the attention at international discussions on these systems. This focus must change. It is not only the military, engineers, and computer scientists that have something valuable to say about how emerging technologies should be used in warfare. Or, indeed, IF they should be used.

Ultimately, the debate on autonomous weapons is an ethical, moral, and political one. At the heart of the debate is this question: “Should machines be given the right to kill people?” If we put people—especially potential victims—first, the answer should be a resounding “NO”! □

Branka Marijan is a Program Officer with Project Ploughshares. She can be reached at [email protected].

Autonomous Weapons

In George Orwell’s novel 1984, Newspeak, the language of the fictional society Oceania, is full of “doublethink” slogans.


Nuclear Weapons

Thank you, Chair.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been instrumental to address matters related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But it has failed to deliver on the goal of nuclear abolition, itself a foundational objective of the United Nations.

Today the question is not just whether the world is better with the NPT than without it, but whether this treaty will actually lead to complete nuclear disarmament. And the record is hardly promising.

Nuclear-weapon states extol the value of nuclear weapons in safeguarding their national interests, but expect no one else to embrace the same rationale. They demand immediate, consistent compliance with non-proliferation obligations, but disregard their own responsibility to disarm. They consider the pursuit and possession of nuclear weapons by some states unacceptable, but are content

to accept the nuclear-weapons programs of military or economic allies, even outside the NPT framework.

The irony that the sole possessors of nuclear weapons within the NPT are the five permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council, which are tasked specifically with the maintenance of international peace and security, has not been lost.

But the P5 are not the only ones obstructing progress in abolishing nuclear weapons. States that participate in nuclear alliances, such as NATO, are wantonly complicit. They agree with nuclear-weapon states when they claim that they maintain their arsenals not only for their own security, but also for the security of their allies. Put simply: they give nuclear-weapons states cover.

For much too long, states under so-called nuclear umbrellas have been allowed to reside in two camps. When it suits, they present themselves as responsible international actors

Delivered by Cesar Jaramillo on behalf of Project Ploughshares April 25, 2018Geneva, Switzerland

Statement to the 2018 Preparatory Committee of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty


that are nonnuclear-weapon states under the NPT. At the same time, they are party to, and explicitly endorse, a security arrangement that runs contrary to the letter of the NPT and the broader goal of nuclear abolition.

The nuclear disarmament landscape was dramatically altered last year in New York, as newly emboldened voices from all corners of the planet established a legal ban of the most dangerous weapons on Earth. Those voices will not be quelled, and cannot be wished away—whatever the position of outliers.

They will be heard at meetings of states parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty—such as this one, at sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, at the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security.

Most NATO members, as well as other nuclear-weapons endorsing states, boycotted the process that resulted in the adoption of the nuclear ban treaty, just as the United States had asked. In doing so, they undermined the very rules-based multilateral order they claim to support.

They continue to embrace nuclear deterrence as a valid security policy, effectively legitimizing the weapons held by its nuclear-armed allies.

Now those allies are engaged in a multibillion dollar modernization of their nuclear arsenals, which will inevitably extend the shelf-life of nuclear weapons and push the abolition goalpost even further.

How can this not be seen as contrary to the goal of nuclear abolition? How can the placement of U.S. nuclear weapons on the territories of NATO

members be compatible with the objective, the spirit and the specific provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty? Does anyone really believe that proliferation concerns will ever be fully allayed while nuclear-weapons states obstinately cling to their arsenals?

These are not matters of opinion or interpretation. No reasonable observer—in or out of government—would characterize this behaviour as favourable to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

This much is certain: the value of the process

Nuclear Weapons

The determined opposition of those who fail to recognize the gravity of the nuclear weapons threat and the urgency of the nuclear abolition enterprise will not diminish the push for abolition, but rather energize it. “

Cesar Jaramillo addresses states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the United Nations in Geneva.


that resulted in the adoption of the nuclear ban treaty at the United Nations last year goes far beyond the legal prohibition itself. It is ultimately an ongoing political struggle of the highest order.

States with nuclear weapons will only disarm—if they ever do—when they so choose. That odious reality is well understood. But no longer will they, or their nuclear-weapons endorsing allies, control the prevailing narrative around nuclear weapons. For a vast majority of nations, these already-illegitimate instruments of mass destruction are now and forever unambiguously illegal.

The determined opposition of those who fail to recognize the gravity of the nuclear weapons threat and the urgency of the nuclear abolition enterprise will not diminish the push for abolition, but rather energize it.

Here’s the thing: there is no path to nuclear abolition that avoids stiff, multifaceted opposition. Any and all efforts in this regard will need to overcome deeply entrenched political, economic and security interests.

We know that nuclear-weapon states, and those who endorse their policies, will dig in their

heels—in fact, they already have. They will continue to refer to any effort that challenges the nuclear disarmament status quo as a “distraction.” They will point to progress where there is none. Perhaps most problematic, they will continue to refer to any serious plan to initiate and conclude a process to eliminate nuclear weapons as “premature.”

But, as the great Bob Marley once said, “you can fool some people sometimes, but you can’t fool all the people all the time.”

Chair, distinguished delegates,

We are fooled no more.

States in nuclear weapons alliances, even if officially considered non-nuclear-weapons states under this treaty, are not only in a clear minority, but also on the wrong side of history and humanity.

Their purported support of nuclear abolition can only hold true in the most ethereal and noncommittal way possible. Because today, in 2018, these states actually—and openly—support the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons by their allies. □

Nuclear Weapons

The United Nations Office at Geneva is located in the Palais des Nations building. UN Photo


Arms Trade Treaty

Thank you, Chair.

Control Arms recognizes the value of full and robust compliance with the Treaty in its entirety as the key measure of its effectiveness. At this time, however, we want to draw special attention to the paramount importance of the effective implementation of Articles 6 and 7, which deal, respectively, with Prohibitions and Risk Assessment.

We welcome the facilitators’ initiative to introduce presentations at the beginning of each sub-working group on these articles, so far from Sweden and Japan.

In our view, such exchanges of information and views are an important step toward the robust and credible implementation of Articles 6 and 7. This fosters transparency and accountability around arms transfer decision processes. Control

Arms urges all States Parties to contribute substantially to these discussions.

While we welcome the draft guidance document on a possible list of resources to consider in a risk assessment, we believe the sources of information could be expanded to include others such as the ICRC Practical Guide on Arms Transfer Decisions, the User’s Guide to the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, the ATT Monitor or Saferworld’s ATT Expert Group Reports. Further, we consider that a human rights based approach to risk assessment is an important element towards aligning the ATT with the Sustainable Development Goals.

Distinguished delegates,

Today there is perhaps no more egregious violation of the purpose and objectives of the Arms Trade Treaty than arms transfers to Saudi

Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation

Statement delivered by Cesar Jaramillo on behalf of Control Arms May 29, 2018Geneva, Switzerland

Arms Trade Treaty


Arabia and its coalition partners that are at risk of being used in the war in Yemen, thereby contributing to the ever-worsening humanitarian crisis in that country. Such arms transfers not only constitute flagrant contraventions of Articles 6 and 7, but also risk undermining the very integrity of the Treaty.

When the last Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty was held here in Geneva, there were approximately 250,000 cases of cholera in Yemen. Within the next six months the number quadrupled to more than 1,000,000, with UNICEF currently expecting another outbreak with the return of the rainy season.

Despite overwhelming evidence of ongoing human rights and international humanitarian

law violations by Saudi Arabia over the past 3 years, arms sales from some States to Riyadh continue unabated. Control Arms would like to hear from exporters, including France and the UK, how their risk assessment and risk mitigation measures were found to be compatible with arms transfers to the Saudi-led coalition.

It would also be useful to hear from those states that have changed their arms export policies to Saudi Arabia and its allies, including Norway, Finland, Germany, the Flemish and Waloon regions of Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Sharing information on examples of exports they have denied will help build understanding, good practice and norms

around the implementation and compliance with Articles 6 and 7.

Irresponsible arms transfers to persistent human-rights and humanitarian law violators such as Saudi Arabia exacerbate armed conflict, enable the violation of human rights and sustain repressive regimes. They create conditions in which innocent civilians die, every single day. They help validate the skepticism of those who feel that the ATT will not prevent the most questionable arms transfers.

At the same time, some of the states that are engaged in irresponsible arms transfers tend to be among those speaking most loudly — and eloquently — about the importance of full treaty compliance. For a growing number of

observers such rhetoric rings increasingly hollow and detached from reality.

If substantive matters are not discussed in a Working Group specifically focused on treaty implementation, it is very hard for us to see where such discussions might otherwise take place.

We feel strongly that it is the responsibility of all States Parties and signatories to the ATT, not just civil society, to speak out against violations of Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT.

Chair,

Full compliance with Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty constitutes a compelling testament to its credibility and effectiveness.

Unless there is a fundamental change in the business-as-usual approach to the global arms trade that prompted the international community to adopt the ATT in the first place, there is a real risk that the value and promise of this historic treaty will be gradually eroded. □

Arms Trade Treaty

Irresponsible arms transfers to persistent human-rights and humanitarian law violators such as Saudi Arabia exacerbate armed conflict, enable the violation of human rights and sustain repressive regimes. “


ARMS TRADE TREATY

ARMS TRADE TREATY

Arms Trade Treaty

Article 6: Prohibitions

1. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.

2. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a Party, in particular those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.

3. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party.

Article 7: Export and Export Assessment

1. If the export is not prohibited under Article 6, each exporting State Party, prior to authorization of the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, under its jurisdiction and pursuant to its national control system, shall, in an objective and non-discriminatory manner, taking into account relevant factors, including information provided by the importing State in accordance with Article 8 (1), assess the potential that the conventional arms or items: (a) would contribute to or undermine peace and security; (b) could be used to: (i) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law; (ii) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law; (iii) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which the exporting State is a Party; or (iv) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which the exporting State is a Party.

2. The exporting State Party shall also consider whether there are measures that could be undertaken to mitigate risks identified in (a) or (b) in paragraph 1, such as confidence-building measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and importing States.

3. If, after conducting this assessment and considering available mitigating measures, the exporting State Party determines that there is an overriding risk of any of the negative consequences in paragraph 1, the exporting State Party shall not authorize the export.

4. The exporting State Party, in making this assessment, shall take into account the risk of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of the items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

5. Each exporting State Party shall take measures to ensure that all authorizations for the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 are detailed and issued prior to the export.

6. Each exporting State Party shall make available appropriate information about the authorization in question, upon request, to the importing State Party and to the transit or trans-shipment States Parties, subject to its national laws, practices or policies.

7. If, after an authorization has been granted, an exporting State Party becomes aware of new relevant information, it is encouraged to reassess the authorization after consultations, if appropriate, with the importing State.


Technology and Human Rights

RightsCon, one of the world’s largest annual meetings of digital rights activists, was held in Toronto from

May 16-18. Access Now, which organized the conference, decided to hold this year’s event in Toronto instead of San Francisco, partly because of visa restrictions in the United States, but also because of Toronto’s growing reputation as a tech hub. Three days with 450 sessions offered a host of important insights on the human-rights implications of emerging technologies.

Here are seven key insights I gained from panels on phone surveillance, cybersecurity governance, robot wars, and Canada’s position on human rights and artificial intelligence (AI).

Computers don’t make logical, unbiased decisions.

As the experts showed, bias becomes embedded in computer models. Bias can be intentional: the writer of code deliberately includes skewed

perspectives. Or unintentional: the machine-learning system reproduces bias in the data. As these systems are trained on historical data, the continued presence of bias is no surprise.

One machine-learning system was provided with information from newspapers to make associations. Thus, it learned that “man” is to

key insights from RightsCon 2018

And the inevitable questions

Written by Branka Marijan

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“doctor” as “woman” is to “nurse.” And, computer systems make errors. These

errors impact the decisions made by the system. Bottom line: computer systems are not infallible.

Context matters when using data.

Tech companies collect an incredible amount of information about users on their platforms or in their applications. Some, such as Facebook, also track the user’s activity on other websites to offer more targeted advertising. Now, fear is growing that data collected in one sector of activity will be used in another.

Google’s original motto, “Don’t be evil,” inspired trust, but do we trust Google to follow its newer motto to “do the right thing”? Like Amazon and Microsoft, Google collected personal data to give the user a more efficient experience, while also selling information to advertisers in what was claimed to be a win-win scenario. Recently, Google has been subjected to serious backlash from its own engineers for participating in a U.S. military drone-imaging project. Other tech companies are involved in military projects; Amazon and Microsoft are providing their AI systems to law enforcement.

Is data collected for one purpose now seeping into security and crime-fighting sectors? Who knows for certain?

Own your data.

Without individual ownership of personal data, it is hard to control what happens to the data and how it is used. Citizens should feel empowered to ask why certain data is needed and to say no to unreasonable requests for information. We all need to know what information is used by our government and other institutions in making decisions that affect us.

New rules of protection over data are now

emerging. For example, telecommunication companies, such as Rogers, have privacy responsibilities to their customers and cannot provide law enforcement with data without proper authorization.

The Canadian government is developing an AI strategy that highlights human-rights concerns, with a particular focus on privacy, freedom of expression, and equity and bias.

Algorithmic accountability and transparency are essential.

Algorithms are increasingly being used to make decisions on everything from lending rates to social security benefits. Often, however, organizations that employ these algorithms claim proprietary rights and will not disclose them. This situation is not sustainable, particularly as governments start using algorithms to determine the levels and types of services available to citizens. We all need to know how the algorithm makes a decision and how it can be changed if errors are found.


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Going dark is a right.

To the police, “going dark” means moving communication to a private or encrypted channel. Often, “going dark” is seen as evidence of illegal activity. But to civil society, “going dark” represents an individual’s right to privacy, safe from constant surveillance by government or anyone else.

Now, with many of us purchasing smart home systems and virtual assistants, such as Alexa, we are willingly, if unwittingly, installing potential surveillance systems that could be used by law and other enforcement agencies.

But giving law enforcement such access is problematic. Certain populations could be targeted. Where do we draw the line on the creeping advancement of surveillance?

We must preserve evidence while removing harmful content.

Digital information can easily be broadcast and deleted. It can promote justice or incite hate-based activities. How do we preserve evidence of war crimes, for example, while trying to decrease the amount of dangerous material online?

Witnesses have taken videos of atrocities in

Syria and Myanmar, which have appeared on social media platforms, only to be removed soon after. While some organizations work to preserve content that might be useful in international criminal investigations, much of it is lost before anyone sees it, because algorithms have flagged it as sensitive. In 75 per cent of such cases, a human analyst never sees the material before it is removed.

Customers are demanding the removal of harmful content. Security experts want extremist content deleted. The European Union wants harmful content down within two hours. Such demands will only increase the use of algorithms.

But there are no simple solutions. Hate speech can alert peacekeepers to flash points before a crisis spreads. Or it can incite violence. Regulatory controls can be used by governments that are themselves perpetrators of human-rights violations. Where do we draw the line? And who gets to draw it?

Hacking is a major security concern.

Many systems, including those that are becoming commonplace in our homes, are easy targets for hackers. A Roomba vacuum that is


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wirelessly connected to an application can allow the owner to remotely turn on the vacuum and to monitor activity in the house. It can also be used by hackers to get to know the layout of that home. Off-the-shelf drones can be hacked.

Hacking is most dangerous when aimed at critical infrastructure or when it is state-sponsored. Weapons systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks.

Currently, there is no mechanism to hold countries accountable for cyberattacks that they carry out or support. One idea is to create an

international organization that would monitor cyber activity and hold countries accountable for their actions. Great work is being done by university-based organizations, such as Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, which has been able to trace different cyberattacks. More university centres are clearly needed.

Civil society and digital rights activists have much to say about these concerns. But the questions raised are important to all citizens of our connected world. So, join the conversation! □


RightsCon Photo


The Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement: What’s at stake?

Ploughshares Presents

Written by Sonal Marwah

On April 10, to commemorate the 33rd anniversary of Refugee Rights Day in Canada, which is celebrated on April 4,

Project Ploughshares and the Commission on Justice and Peace of the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC) co-hosted a public engagement on “The Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement: What’s at stake?” in Waterloo. The objective was to learn about, and reflect on, Canada’s responsibility and obligations to refugees and refugee claimants.

On April 4, 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects the fundamental rights of refugees. The Court examined section 7 of the Canadian Charter, which states, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person,” and decided that “everyone” includes those seeking refuge at our borders. They recognized that refugees, even if they are non-citizens and have not been legally admitted to Canada, cannot be deprived of “fundamental justice”—just like everyone else in Canada.

The Court determined that the interests at

stake for a refugee—the risk of returning to a place where persecution or torture threatened—are of such a fundamental nature as to require an oral hearing. This ruling became known as the “Singh decision,” in recognition of six citizens of India and a Guyanese citizen of Indian heritage, who had made separate refugee claims in Canada.

Now, each April 4 is an opportunity to examine the state of refugee rights in Canada.

Four experts and practitioners from the United States and Canada explored facets of the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA), a 2004 bilateral agreement that seeks to prevent (with exceptions for those with family members in their destination country, unaccompanied minors, and stateless persons) refugee claimants who land first in the United States from making a claim in Canada, and those that land first in Canada from making a claim in the United States. At the heart of the agreement is the understanding that each country is “safe” for refugees.

A brief summary of each presentation follows:

Forced Migration

Photographs by Karl Griffiths-Fulton


Forced Migration

Refugees and claimants in the United States have come under acute threat from the new anti-immigrant laws and policies initiated by the Trump administration. But among the greater numbers of people approaching the Canadian border because of the current U.S. political climate are some who always intended to come to Canada. They might have had temporary status or were undocumented in the United States. But the STCA effectively deprives a large class of refugee claimants to Canada from accessing the rights recognized in the Singh case and in the international Refugee Convention.

In July 2017, the Canadian Council for Refugees, Amnesty International, and The Canadian Council of Churches launched a still ongoing legal challenge of the designation of the United States as a safe third country for refugees under the STCA. The litigants are asking the federal court to strike down the STCA on the grounds that the United States does not fully comply with obligations to refugees under the Refugee Convention. In particular, they argue that the Agreement violates refugees’ rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, specifically the right to life, liberty, and security of the person (section 7) and to non-discrimination (section 15).

Erin Simpson is a lawyer specializing in refugee and immigration law and counsel for the STCA federal challenge.

“


Forced Migration

Refugee claimants face “harrowing journeys to

Canada.” Among the most afflicted are those who escape their home countries to avoid gender-based persecution. To get to Canada, these resilient women and men, boys and girls must deal with threats and trauma, often gender-based. And when they reach Canada, their legal status is often uncertain.

Canadian churches are deeply engaged with refugees. Many congregations sponsor refugees, supporting them before and after they arrive. Many advocate for the just treatment of refugees. Canadian churches do this because such acts are an integral part of their faith story. Early in its life, The Canadian Council of Churches assisted refugee migrants through a travel loan repayment fund and by making community connections for refugees when they reached Canada. Thus began a key element of Canada’s private refugee sponsorship program, in which sponsors assume responsibility for the care of refugees in their first year of arrival.

From the 1970s to the 2000s, the churches, through the Inter-Church Coalition for Refugees, focused on refugee rights, including the 2005 charter challenge to the Safe Third Country Agreement. In 2017, The Canadian Council of Churches determined that it is the duty of the Government of Canada to uphold the fundamental principles of justice laid out in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. On this basis, the CCC joined the second legal challenge of the STCA.

“

“

Eunice Valenzuela is a member of the executive of the Canadian Council of Refugees and a Refugee Specialist at the K-W Multicultural Centre.

Peter Noteboom is General Secretary of The Canadian Council of Churches.


Under the conditions of the STCA, asylum seekers from the United States who approach the Canadian border are interviewed, held, and

then returned by the Canada Border Services Agency to the United States. But the system currently operating in the United States denies claimants basic rights.

Most claimants turned back at the Canadian border are held in U.S. immigration detention centres, which are often crowded and unpleasant. Those who want to claim asylum are confronted by obstacles in accessing counsel and risk being sent back to their country of origin, no matter the level of danger.

Women who bring gender-based persecution claims can face even more challenges. Evidence suggests that the one-year window, during which asylum seekers must file claims, has created a disproportionate hardship for female asylum seekers, who file late claims at a rate more than 50 per cent higher than men. Many are not initially aware that spousal abuse can even be grounds for a refugee claim.

Late in 2017, President Trump decided to end the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for immigrants from a number of countries, including Nicaragua, El Salvador, Sudan, and Haiti, with a variety of upcoming dates. This means that these groups will lose their U.S. status and face deportation. And if they try to go to Canada at border checkpoints, they face the possibility of being automatically sent back to the United States. □

“

Forced Migration

Sonal Marwah is a Program Officer with Project Ploughshares. She can be reached at [email protected].

Alex Vernon is a professor of Law and Director of the Immigration Law Clinic at the University of Detroit Mercy.


For most of us, outer space is not a topic of regular conversation. It seems to be physically removed from our everyday

experiences, a distant place that we imagine to be cold and barren or the stuff of fantastic fiction.

This distance is an illusion. We on Earth are now intimately connected with what goes on in outer space in ways we could only dimly imagine a few decades ago.

Critical to most of our daily activities are satellite services—invisible but essential streams of data and connectivity. And outer space is neither barren nor fanciful, but rhe focus of

emerging technology, economic activity, social development, environmental monitoring, and, of course, national security. Outer space is one of the fastest changing domains of human activity.

Project Ploughshares and our partner organizations on the Space Security Index have been tracking these changes for 15 years. The results can be seen in the annual Space Security

Index volumes, available in electronic and hard-copy formats.

In May, the SSI governance group gathered in Montreal with a group of experts from a variety of fields and countries to analyze the importance of events of 2017 for the safety, security, and sustainability of activities in outer space. The changes taking place are both exciting and concerning.

We all have a stakeSpace is becoming a domain in which all the countries of Earth have a stake. Private

sector services provide an unparalleled ability to monitor Earth, collect and send data, and enable global communication. The potential for an economy based in outer space is also emerging, with a focus on tourism, exploration, and

even mineral extraction. Much of this activity is outpacing existing

national and international regulation. International organizations, such as various United Nations entities, are struggling to provide the rules and oversight that ensure that new activities—such as the launching of mega-constellations of satellites—do not negatively

Uncharted territory in outer space

Written by Jessica West

Space Security

We on Earth are now intimately connected with what goes on in outer space in ways we could only dimly imagine decades ago. “


affect the long-term sustainability of popular orbits.

Space debris—fragments from rockets and satellites—is perhaps the most critical challenge. Securing future access for new uses and new users is becoming another prominent concern as well.

We need new answers to old questionsWith so many technical problems to solve, ethical questions go unanswered. But we need to consider them. For example: What is the best way to use and distribute space resources so that all humans benefit? How do we venture into deep space with a minimal impact on the surrounding environment? Are there valid, ethical reasons for space exploration? What are they?

Humans must also confront the use of outer space in terrestrial security. Space-based capabilities are foundational in modern warfare. Many states are preparing for the consequences of direct confrontation in space. But we really don’t know what they will be. Yes, the space environment will be harmed. Yes, civilian and commercial services will be disrupted. But how far out into space would such damage extend? How can damage be contained? The looming spectre of a space war casts a long, dark shadow.

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times

Looking back to the First Space Age, it is clear that the coexistence of immense opportunity and profound challenge is not new. Then, we developed mutual understandings through dialogue and, eventually, international law to guide brand-new space activities. Now something more is needed.

The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space did recently complete a compendium of guidelines for the long-term

sustainability of outer space activities. But SSI participants at the May meeting believe that the world must work more quickly and delve into the more contentious challenges, including the use of space in warfare.

There are deep divides over how this should be done, and by whom. But civil society must be part of the conversation.

The future of outer space concerns all of us. □

As Project Manager for the Space Security Index, Jessica oversees the assembly and publication of the annual SSI volume on space-related activities for the preceding year. She can be reached at [email protected].

Space Security

Some members of the Space Security Index research team gathered in Montreal for the 15th annual Space Security Working Group meeting (May 19-20, 2018). In the photo, from left, Dr. Ram Jakhu, Dr. Peter Hays, Valérie Bastien-Dupuis, Jessica West, Kiran Nair, Jamil Castillo, Julia Selman, Lukas Price, Cody Knipfer.

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PLOUGHSHARES MONITORploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Monitor... · the language of civil society has been used—and abused—by industry and government. In this case, Lockheed