The MIL-STD-882 Process

Presentation to the 14-15 January 2014 Safety Case Workshop

Don SwallomU.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama

CaveatOpinions expressed are those of the speaker and not the coordinated position of AMCOM, Army Materiel Command, the US Army or the Department of Defense.

But maybe they should be.

• MIL-STD-882• Content• Process• What is "Acceptable Risk"• How 882 "makes the safety case"

Task Section 100 – ManagementTask 101 Hazard Identification and Mitigation Effort Using The

System Safety MethodologyTask 102 System Safety Program PlanTask 103 Hazard Management PlanTask 104 Support of Government Reviews/AuditsTask 105 Integrated Product Team/Working Group SupportTask 106 Hazard Tracking SystemTask 107 Hazard Management Progress ReportTask 108 Hazardous Materials Management Plan

Task Section 200 – AnalysisTask 201 Preliminary Hazard ListTask 202 Preliminary Hazard AnalysisTask 203 System Requirements Hazard AnalysisTask 204 Subsystem Hazard AnalysisTask 205 System Hazard AnalysisTask 206 Operating and Support Hazard AnalysisTask 207 Health Hazard AnalysisTask 208 Functional Hazard AnalysisTask 209 System-of-Systems Hazard AnalysisTask 210 Environmental Hazard Analysis

Task Section 300 - EvaluationTask 301 Safety Assessment ReportTask 302 Hazard Management Assessment ReportTask 303 Test and Evaluation ParticipationTask 304 Review of Engineering Change Proposals, Change

Notices, Deficiency Reports, Mishaps, and Requests for Deviation/WaiverTask Section 400 - Verification

Task 401 Safety VerificationTask 402 Explosives Hazard Classification DataTask 403 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Data

Appendix A Guidance for the System Safety Effort (2 pages)

Appendix B Software System Safety Engineering and Analysis (6 pages)

Element 1 Document the system safety approach

Minimum requirements:• Describe the risk management effort and how the program is

integrating risk management into:– Systems engineering process, – Integrated Product and Process Development process– Overall program management structure

• Identify and document the prescribed and derived requirements applicable to the system – Ensure inclusion in the system specifications – Requirements flow-down to subcontractors, vendors, and

suppliers.• Define how hazards and risks are formally accepted (DoDI 5000.02)• Document hazards with a closed-loop Hazard Tracking System

(HTS)

Element 2Identify and document hazards

• Identify hazards through a systematic analysis process. Include:• System hardware and software• System interfaces (includes human interfaces)• Intended use or application • Operational environment• Mishap data• Relevant environmental and occupational health data• User physical characteristics• User knowledge, skills, and abilities• Lessons learned from legacy and similar systems• Entire system life-cycle • Potential impacts to personnel, infrastructure, defense systems,

public, environment• Document hazards in the HTS

Element 3Assess and document risk

• Assess severity and probability of the potential mishap(s) for each hazard across all system modes using Tables I and II

• Assessed risks are expressed as a Risk Assessment Code (RAC)• Table III assigns a risk level of High, Serious, Medium, or Low for

each RAC.• Tables I, II and III used unless alternative approved

– Document numerical definitions of probability• Assessed risks documented in HTS

Element 4Identify and document risk mitigation measures

• Identify potential risk mitigations• Estimate expected risk for alternatives • Document in the HTS• Eliminate the hazard else reduce to lowest acceptable level within

constraints of cost, schedule, and performance by applying system safety design order of precedence:– Eliminate hazards through design selection– Reduce risk through design alteration– Incorporate engineered features or devices– Provide warning devices– Incorporate signs, procedures, training, and personal protective

equipment (PPE)

Element 5 Reduce risk

• Select and implement mitigation measures to achieve an acceptable risk level

• Consider and evaluate the cost, feasibility, and effectiveness of candidate mitigation methods as part of the systems engineering and Integrated Product Team (IPT) processes

• Present current hazards, their associated severity and probability assessments, and status of risk reduction efforts at technical reviews

Element 6Verify, validate, and document risk reduction

• Verify implementation• Validate effectiveness of all selected risk

mitigation measures through appropriate:– Analysis– Testing– Demonstration or – Inspection

• Document verification and validation in the HTS

Element 7Accept risk and document

• Risks accepted by appropriate authority per DoDI 5000.02 before exposing people, equipment, or environment to known system-related hazards

• System configuration and associated documentation supporting formal risk acceptance decision shall be provided to the Government for retention through the life of the system.

• Tables I, II and III used unless alternative approved• User representative part of the process throughout the life-cycle

– Provides formal concurrence before Serious & High risk acceptance

• After fielding, mishaps, user feedback, and experience with similar systems or other sources may reveal new hazards or demonstrate that the risk for a known hazard is higher or lower than previously recognized– Revised risk accepted IAW DoDI 5000.02

Element 8Manage life-cycle risk

• Identify hazards and maintain HTS through system life-cycle• Monitor and assess changes (interfaces, users, hardware, software,

mishap data, missions, profiles, system health data, etc.)• Program office and user community maintain effective

communications to identify and manage new hazards and risks• If new hazard discovered or known hazard has higher risk, formally

accept IAW DoDI 5000.02• DoD requires program offices to support system-related Class A and

B mishap investigations by providing analyses of hazards that contributed to the mishap and recommendations for materiel risk mitigation measures, especially those that minimize human errors

System safety

• The application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to achieve acceptable risk within the constraints of operational effectiveness and suitability, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life-cycle

Acceptable Risk

• Risk that the appropriate acceptance authority (as defined in DoDI 5000.02) is willing to accept without additional mitigation.

Acceptable Risk

Risk

RiskReduction

Effort

Cost ↑Schedule ↑

Performance ↓

Unacceptable

Unacceptable

Acceptable

Lowest Acceptable Risk Level

• When a hazard cannot be eliminated, the associated risk should be reduced to the lowest acceptable level within the constraints of cost, schedule, and performance by applying the system safety design order of precedence.

- Paragraph 4.3.4, Identify and document risk mitigation measures. (Element 4)

Lowest Acceptable Risk Level

Risk

RiskReduction

Effort

Cost ↑Schedule ↑

Performance ↓

Unacceptable

Unacceptable

AcceptableLowest Acceptable

High

Serious

Medium

Low

Lowest Acceptable Risk Level

Risk

RiskReduction

EffortUnacceptable

Unacceptable

Acceptable

Cost ↑Schedule ↑

Performance ↓

OptimumCost

Cost

of m

itiga

tion

mea

sure

sCost of M

ishaps

Total Cost

Cost

Degree of Safety

The Safety Bathtub Curve

A

B Defund B to increase A and optimize both

Claim = assertion to be proven

Argument = how evidence supports claim

Evidence = required documentation

Evidence Evidence

Argument Argument

Claim Claim

Claim

Claims – Arguments - Evidence

These terms are not used in MIL-STD-882E

Verify – Validate - Document

• MIL-STD-882 does use the terms verify and validate in the context of systems engineering

• Element 6 is "Verify, validate, and document risk reduction"

• Task 401 is "Safety Verification"• If hazard mitigations are rigorously integrated

into system requirements they will be verified and validated assuming a rigorous systems engineering process

April 200925 pages

Safety Assessment Report versus Safety Case Report

• Safety Case - A structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment.

• Safety Case Report - A report that summarises the arguments and evidence of the Safety Case, and documents progress against the safety programme.

- Defence Standard 00-56

Safety Assessment Report versus Safety Case Report

Safety Assessment Report - A comprehensive evaluation of the safety risks being assumed prior to test or operation of the system or at contract completion. It identifies all safety features of the system, design, and procedural hazards that may be present in the system being acquired, and specific procedural controls and precautions that should be followed.

- DI-SAFT-80102B, Safety Assessment Report

Safety Assessment Report versus Safety Case Report

• 301.1 Purpose. Task 301 is to perform and document a Safety Assessment Report (SAR) to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the status of safety hazards and their associated risks prior to test or operation of a system, before the next contract phase, or at contract completion.

- MIL-STD-882 Task 301, Safety Assessment Report

Safety Assessment Report versus Safety Case Report

The contractor shall prepare a report that contains the following information:

a. Specific risk matrix used to classify hazards

b. Results of analyses and tests performed to identify hazards, assess risks, and verify/validate effectiveness of mitigation measures

c. Hazard Tracking System (HTS) data

d. Summary of risks for each identified hazard

e. Hazardous Material (HAZMAT)

f. Test or other event-unique mitigation measures necessary to reduce risks.

g. Recommendations applicable to hazards located at the interface of the system with other systems.

h. Based on the scope of the report, a summary statement addressing the system's readiness to test, operate, or proceed to the next acquisition phase.

i. List all pertinent references, including (but not limited to) test and analysis reports, standards and regulations, specifications and requirements documents, operating manuals, and maintenance manuals.

Deep Impact

Don SwallomSafety EngineerAMCOM Safety OfficeAviation System Safety Division(256) 842-8641donald.w.swallom.civ@mail.mil

Questions?