The Elements of Strategic ThinkingForeign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft by Terry L. DeibelReview by: Gregory A. RaymondInternational Studies Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Jun., 2008), pp. 315-317Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25481966 .

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International Studies Review (2008) 10, 315-317

The Elements of Strategic Thinking Review by Gregory A. Raymond

Department of Political Science, Boise State University

Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic far American Statecraft. By Terry L. Deibel. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2007. 435 pp., $85.00 cloth (ISBN: 978-0-521-87191-4); $29.99 paper (ISBN: 978-0-521-69277-9).

"I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the enemy's devices." So, report

edly, said the Athenian leader Pericles in 431 BCE, on the eve of war with Sparta and its allies in the Peloponnesian League (Strassler 1996: 83-84). Among the

most serious blunders that a political leader can make is to embark upon a

major policy initiative without a coherent plan for the coordinated use of the resources that a state possesses for achieving its goals. As illustrated by the ill-fated Sicilian expedition launched by the Athenians more than a decade after Pericles' death, foreign policy undertakings divorced from strategic thinking about the relationship between means and ends are unlikely to be successful.

Arguing that "strategic thinking is far too useful to be limited to military sub

jects" (p. 4), Terry Deibel has written a guide on how to think strategically about

foreign affairs. Given that the majority of texts on contemporary American for

eign policy concentrate on the sources of policy proposals and the dynamics of the policy-making process, his focus on designing foreign affairs strategy is a wel come addition to the literature. To be sure, some current texts have chapters

on

military coercion and economic sanctions, but few delve into the strategic logic that links national values and interests to instruments of statecraft for dealing

with international threats and opportunities. Indeed, the dearth of such books is

surprising given the academic community's frequent expressions of concern about being policy relevant.

Terry Deibel's Foreign Affairs Strategy is organized around a three-tiered analyt ical framework derived from the most fundamental tasks that he believes strate

gists perform. Assessment, which comprises the framework's first tier, pertains to examining prevailing assumptions about the international and domestic environments. Analysis, the second tier, entails matching

means with ends.

Planning, the third, involves formulating objectives and determining which instruments will be used in what ways to achieve them. Thus for Deibel, the elements of strategic thinking are straightforward: begin with a clear concep tion of interests based on the nation's values; prioritize threats to those inter

ests and opportunities for advancing them according to their magnitude, likelihood, imminence, and tractability; carefully consider what resources

are needed to address these threats and opportunities, remaining sensitive to the distinctions between latent versus mobilized power, absolute versus relative

power, and concrete versus perceptual power; formulate objectives that are

both desirable and feasible; frame them in a way that attracts domestic and international support; and choose political, informational, economic, and mili

tary instruments of statecraft that maximize leverage while minimizing costs and risks.

? 2008 International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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316 The Elements of Strategic Thinking

Though sketched in a sequential manner, Deibel's framework is meant to be used in an iterative fashion, with the strategist moving back and forth matching means to ends while continuously reevaluating his or her assumptions about the

strategic environment. Throughout the book, Deibel illustrates different compo nents of his framework with examples from recent American foreign policy, including

cases where assessment, analysis, and planning were done poorly

as

well as where they were done effectively. Special attention is devoted to critiqu ing the strategy of the George W. Bush administration, and proposing an alterna tive that he maintains would better serve the nation's interests at a lower cost

and risk. Incisive and accessible, clearly written and well-organized, Foreign Policy Strategy not only helps sharpen the reader's thinking about American foreign pol icy, but it provides a scheme that is suitable for dissecting the strategic logic that

underpins any country's foreign policy. Whereas, at first glance one might have the impression that Deibel has pro

duced a checklist for would-be strategists, the book is far more ambitious,

devoting considerable effort to explaining the nuances of key concepts and

exploring the internal and external impediments to forging an effective for

eign affairs strategy. To be successful, Deibel insists that strategists must main tain "a mental stance of provisional agnosticism" (p. 118) and recognize that

they will encounter "intelligent resistance" to the courses of action that they

choose (p. 21). That is to say, strategists must guard against allowing ideologi cal preferences to interfere with appraising evidence and not allow estimates of threats, opportunities, or their country's military strength determine national interests.

At the same time, they need to bear in mind that strategic thinking is

interactive. Domestically, policy proposals must be justified to Congress and

the general public, and the roles of disparate executive agencies must be

orchestrated so they can function in a complementary, reinforcing fashion

when applying the instruments of state power. Internationally, strategists must forecast the capabilities and intentions of opponents who might frus

trate their plans, and then develop countermeasures to circumvent potential

obstacles.

Rather than simply following a neatly ordered checklist, strategists must

think far and wide. Looking over a long time horizon, they need to analyze multiple factors simultaneously, weighing their relative importance and how

they may interact in nonlinear ways. As suggested by former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross (2007:xi), they must also appreciate power while respecting its

limits. Effective strategic thinking thus involves more than adhering to a

checklist; it requires good judgment. Whereas strategists strive to attain cher

ished values, they face a world of uncertainty and difficult tradeoffs where suc

cess is rarely total. "The point of doing foreign affairs strategy...is not to get between blue covers a plan that can then be slavishly followed," concludes

Deibel. "The idea is rather to bring intentionality into one's statecraft, to

infuse in decision makers' minds ways of thinking about policy and a sense of

direction that will sustain them through the inevitable vicissitudes of foreign relations" (p. 360).

In summary, Terry Deibel's Foreign Affairs Strategy makes an important, timely contribution to the field of foreign policy analysis. Of course, following a foreign

policy decision-making process anchored in strategic thinking cannot guarantee

goal attainment. It can, however, reduce the odds of making serious, avoidable

blunders. As Amarillo Slim, a former winner of the World Series of Poker, put it:

"One of my mantras has always been 'Decisions, not results.' Do the right thing

enough times and the results will take care of themselves in the long run"

(Preston and Dinkin 2003: p. 101).

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Gregory A. Raymond 317

References

Preston, Amarillo Slim, and Greg Dinkin. (2003) Amarillo Slim in a World of Fat People: The Memoirs

of the Greatest Gambler Who Ever Lived. New York: HarperCollins.

Ross, Dennis. (2007) Statecraft: And How To Restore America's Standing in the World. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Strassler, Robert P., ed. (1996) The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. New York: Free Press.

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