T8 B3 Boston Center John Hartling Fdr- 9-23-03 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 746

8/14/2019 T8 B3 Boston Center John Hartling Fdr- 9-23-03 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 746

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Commission SensitiveMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Adm inistration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview withJohn Hartling, Kingston Sector 20 Radar C ontroller on 9/11Type of event: Recorded InterviewDate: Monday, September 22, 2003Special Access Issues: No nePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Num ber: 8Location: FAA Boston Air Route C enter, Nashua, New HampshireParticipants - Non-Com mission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 2387045]Participants - Com mission: John A zzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey BrownNOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

BackgroundHartling has been an Air Traffic Controller (AT C) with the FAA since 1981. Prior

to that, he was an ATC with the Air Force fo r eight years. On 9-11 he was on duty as theRadar Controller, Kingston Sector, R20. His RA was "Bo" Dean.Morning of 9-11 and Associated Anom alies

Hartling first became aware of AA11 when Athens Sector 38 forced an AA11data block onto his radar. It had last reported an altitude of FL 290, an d hadn't yetreached Kingston Sector. The data block fo r AA11, primary only, had no altitudeconfirmed since FL 290, and A A11 was m oving in excess of 500 knots. Hartling statedthat, at the time, he did not take AA11 too seriously, since his main concern w as keepingaircraft out of any possible path of the primary target. He was handling departures out ofBradley International [Hartford CT], and vectored a US A ir flight aboveAA11 in anattempt to get an altitude estimate. The US A ir flight was unable to get a visual. Hartlingthen asked UA L175, who w as able to get a visual and an altitude estimate of FL 270 toFL 290. It was at this point that H artling heard his supervisor in the background mentionthreatening communications from the cockpit of AA11.

Hartling does not remember a single time in his years with the FAA , nor in histime with the military, in which he controlled an aircraft with no radio com munications,no transponder and was seriously of f course. Harlting remembers the sequence as AA11


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"losing" radio at 0814EDT, while in the control of Bosox Sector, 47R, then being passedto Boston Sector, 46R. AA11 remained in Athens Sector, 38R) for a "good amount oftime", then passed into Kingston, Harding's Sector. He acknowledged that wheneverthere was a problem with a flight, the first step a controller takes is to notify the areasupervisor.

He turned UAL 175 35 degrees right and then put the flight back on course afterdeviating it because of AA11. He noted with strong personal regret that it wasunnecessary to do this since UAL175 could have been changed to a northern route to LosAngelese, but he felt it best to put the flight back on its scheduled route. He kept UAL 175at FL 310, and thought that this com bination of a turn and FL 310 would keep UAL 175safe, considering AAll's unpredictable altitude. [Staff Note: Hartling feels strongly thathe personally could have done something about the fate of UA175 by keeping it on acourse to the west. He regrets turning it back to its scheduled course and the words"strong personal regret" don't do justice to the remorse he demonstrated to us]

Th e floor for his sector is 16,800 feet, so if AA11 passed below that it would slideinto "Coast" mode. AA11 was apparently below that level, so Hartling could estimate asafe zone for his planes. Hartling kept his supervisor, Ron McQwin (?), Area F, andWilliam (Bo) Dean, Hartling's RA, notified. Hartling does not remember w hen AA 11was officially termed a "hijack", but he knows th e supervisors had constant informationas to the factors contributing to AA11 s situation.Predictability of the Routes of AA11 and UA175

Staff asked Hartling how predictable the routes taken by AA11 and UA175 w ereon 9-11, given that those were regular flights, well known to controllers? hi other words,did AA11 always fly a northern route and UAL175 a southern route to Los Angeles, andcould that have been predictable on 9-11? Hartling informed Staff that the routes takenby AA11 and UA175 on 9/11 were in no w ay predictable. One was scheduled that day totake a northern route, and the other, that day, a southern route. Even these routes can bemodified on any given day to allow for developing weather conditions. It is usually a"company" (airline company) decision as to which route one of their flights may take onany particular day, and Hartling believes much of that decision is based on the amount offuel a particular route necessitates.Other Information

Hartling does believe Boston had good situational awareness and that it wasAA11 that hit the WTC. When Steve Smalls came in from the break room to inform thecenter of the first hit, he said "THAT airplane" hit the WTC.He does no t believe the response to the hijack on 9-11 could have been anyquicker to make a difference. He noted that the air space caps around nuclear facilitiesshould be monitored and addressed with more thought. He also does not believe aresponse to a nuclea r site could be quick enough to make a difference.Past ATC training scenarios for hijack situations did not take into account thepossibility of simultaneous multi-plane hijackings. Nor are has he been involved in atraining scenario that would include no "hint" from the pilot of the cockpit compromise.Hartling further noted that the AA1 1 characteristic of descent and slowing from its rapid


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[Classification]M E M O R A N D U M F O R TH E RECORD

Event : Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview withJohn Hartling, Kingston Sector 20 Radar Associate on 9/11Type of event: InterviewDate: Monday, Septem ber 22, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Geoffrey BrownTeam Num ber: 8Location: FAA Boston Air Route Center, Nashua, New HampshireParticipants - Non-Commission: John R. Donnelly, FAA Senior Attorney [(781) 2387045]Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion ofthe interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

Hartling has been an A TC with the FAA since 1981. Prior to that he was an ATC withthe Air Force.On 9/11 Hartling first became aware of AA11 when A thens Sector 38 forced A A 1 1 ontohis radar. It had last reported an altitude of FL 290, and hadn't reached Kingston Sectoryet. Stwart, Palling an d Danbury Sectors are all below Kingston. The data block fo rAA 11 had no altitude c onfirmed since FL 290, and A A 1 1 was m oving in excess of 500knots. Ha rtling admits that he did not take A A 1 1 too seriously, since his main concernwas keeping aircraft out of the possible paths of AAll's primary. He was handlingdepartures out of Bradley, and put a US Air flight above AA 11 in an attempt to get analtitude estimate on A A 1 1 . This particular US Air flight was una ble to get a visual, butHa rtling then asked UA L 175, who w as able to get a visual and estima te of FL 270 to FL290.It was at this point that Ha rtling heard his supervisor in the backgrou nd me ntionthreatening com munications from the cockpit of AA11.Hartling had does not remem ber a single time in his years with the FAA , nor in his timewith th military, in which he controlled an aircraft with no radio communications, no


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transponder and was seriously off course. Harlting remembers the sequence of AA1 1 asA A 1 1 "losing" radio at 0814EDT, while in the control of 47R, then being passed to 46R.AA1 1 remained in Athens sector for a "good amount of time", then passed into Kingston.He acknowledged that whenever there w as a problem w ith a flight, the first step acontroller takes is to notify th e supervisor for the area.He turned UA L 175 35 degrees right to put the flight back on course after deviating it tocheck on A A 1 1 . He notes that it was un necessa ry to do this since U A L 175 could havebeen changed to a northern route to L AX, but he felt it best to put the flight back on itsscheduled route. He kept U A L 175 at FL 310, and was aware that this combination of aturn and FL 310 would keep UA L175 safe considering AAll's unpredictable altitude.The floor for his sector is 16,800 feet, so if AA11 passed below this it would slide into"Coast" mode. Since AA11 was not below this level, Hartling could estimate a safe zoneto keep his planes in. Hartling kept his supervisor, Ron M cQwin (?) for Area F, andWilliam (Bo) Dean, Hartl ing's RA , notified. Hartling does not remem ber when AA 11was officially termed a "hijack", but he knows the supervisors had constant informationas to the factors con tributing to AA1 1 s situation from the ATC perspective.Hartling did not p ersonally become involved in the military notification of the hijack, andbelieves it was the watch desk supervisors who were involved. He noted that calling OtisAir Force Base was a logical step.Regarding cross-country flight course, Hartling inform ed C om mission staff that theroutes taken by A A 1 1 and UA175 on 9/11 were in no way predictable. One wasscheduled to take a northern route, and the other a southern route. Even these routes canbe modified on any given day to allow fo r developing weather conditions. It is usually a"company" (airline company) decision as to which route on of their flights may take, andHartling believes much of this decision is based on the amount of fuel a particular routenecessitates.Hartling does believe ZBW had good situational awareness that it was AA1 1 that hit theW TC, since when Steve Smalls came in from the break room to inform the center of thehit, he said "THAT airplane" hit the WTC .Hartling does not believe the response to the hijack could have been quick enough tomake a difference. He noted that the air space caps around nuclear facilities should bemonitored and addressed with more thought. Hartling does not believe a response to a"cap break" around a nuclear site could be quick enough to ma ke a difference. Hartlingnoted that past ATC training scenarios for hijack situations did n ot take into account thepossibility of simultaneous m ulti-plane hijackings. Nor are has he been involved in atraining scenario that would include no "hint" from the pilot of the cockpit compromise.Hartling further noted that the AA11 characteristic of descent and slowing from its rapidpace are not real signals of a hijack.Hartling's main point regarding the 9/11 attacks is that the attacks were out of the FAA


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"box". His worry is that even thought the example of 9/11 is being used today to preparefor future events, the next terrorist attack on US soil may again be "out the box" createdby the 9/11 attacks. He does note that the FAA is more aware of the threat now, and hasimplemented ne w procedures. Unfortunately, for the ATC, Hartling notes that there isvery little that can be done except to track an d attempt to communicate with the aircraft.Regarding the military, Hartling has had contact with military flights on a regular basis atthe pilot to controller level, but has no knowledge of the relationship at the manageriallevel. Before 9/11 Hartling did not have m uch know ledge though on the w arning areasan d hot areas monitored by the military, and learned much later from 9/11 that Otis coulddeploy defensive strike fighters. Prior to 9/11 Hartling has no "intercept" training withthe military, and was aware that NO RA D controls muc h of the highest altitude airspace.He has had even more contact with military aircraft post-9/11 since military fighters areoften running escort for VIP flights. Hartling does not think extensive FAAcontroller/military training is necessary since he is confident an FAA controller is able tovector an aircraft to a target, an d can "break up" flights of between four to six aircraft.Hartling does note that part of his com fortable mindset regarding w orking with militaryflights does stem from his training as a controller in the Air Force.Regarding what worked well on 9/11, Hartling notes that the grounding of airborneflights was a com plex endeavor for the A TC system, and that the fact that there were noaccidents should not be overlooked. He also notes that it was a positive sign in the A TCcommunity that all ATC centers were able to take definitive control over the airborneflights an d over the flights waiting to depart. Hartling noted that without thisacknowledgement of FAA authority over the skyways, their may have been seriousincidents beyond those of the actual terrorist attacks on 9/11.Hartling noted that the 9/11 hijackers must have calculated the GPS coordinates of theWTC, an d this led them to know when to descend and how to guide the planes to theirtargets.


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T8 B3 Boston Center John Hartling Fdr- 9-23-03 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 746