Striking the balance: US Navy weighs quality and quantity ... · PDF filelarger than the next 13 navies combined; ... power around the world. (US Navy) 1364990 Moreover, today's wider

  • Upload
    docong

  • View
    219

  • Download
    1

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • ihs.com

    Article 1 Page 1 of 17 Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All

    trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.

    Jane's Navy International

    [Content preview Subscribe to Janes Navy International for full article]

    Striking the balance: US Navy weighs quality and quantity to stay ahead

    Looking at a range of issues from strategic re-balancing to sequestration, Grace Jean and Dr Lee Willett

    examine the choices and challenges the US Navy must consider

    The US Navy (USN) remains the most powerful navy in the world. With presence in each of the world's

    oceans, involvement in almost all of the international community's core maritime activities, taking the lead

    role in implementing the rules by which the international maritime system operates today, and managing

    an equipment programme and budget that (despite perennial challenges) remains vastly superior in size to

    that of any other navy, the USN will retain this dominant global position for some time to come.

    Some assessments, including data published by the USN itself, suggest that the service's total tonnage is

    larger than the next 13 navies combined; many also note that 11 of such navies are close US allies.

    An F/A-18 Hornet aircraft lands on the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS John C Stennis. In recent years Nimitz-class carriers have come to be seen as an archetypal symbol of USN and wider national power around the world. (US Navy)

    1364990

    Moreover, today's wider global geostrategic focus on maritime matters - with traditional and emerging

    navies noting the growing importance of the use of the sea - will only highlight to US political leaders the

    central role that US global presence, as represented by the USN, will play in the maintenance of the

    country's security interests.

  • ihs.com

    Article 1 Page 2 of 17 Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All

    trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.

    However, retaining a position of such pre-eminence is not without its challenges. Most significantly, the

    USN finds itself towards the sharper end of the budgetary pinch currently squeezing US defence spending.

    With major equipment programmes - perhaps, most notably, the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),

    the Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, and the Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile

    submarine replacement programme - to be delivered across many of the core elements of the USN's force

    structure, the navy may find itself facing a number of difficult programme choices in the near term.

    Moreover, while the navy's technological pre-eminence remains in many areas (due to its relative strength

    in funding new technological research), the smaller numerical size of the USN set against enduring global

    commitments have led some to suggest that, at least in presence terms, the USN advantage is no longer

    what it was.

    In addition, the spending constraints the navy has faced in recent years have already had an operational

    impact, with some deployments delayed and gapped. As reported by IHS Jane's , in 2013 the deployment

    of the Harry S Truman Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the USN Fifth Fleet area of operations in the Middle

    East was delayed for five months in order to help the service meet spending cuts totalling USD4 billion that

    came into effect on 1 March 2013 because of sequestration. At a time of growing concerns about the crisis

    in Syria, but with the USN wishing to maintain a carrier at sea in the Gulf region, concern was expressed in

    some quarters that the absence of a second carrier would put the US at a strategic disadvantage.

    [Continued in full version]

    US Marines assigned to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) board MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft onboard the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) in March 2015. The Bonhomme Richard Amphibious Ready Group, with the 31st MEU embarked, was deployed in the East China Sea. (US Navy)

  • ihs.com

    Article 1 Page 3 of 17 Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All

    trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.

    1630593

    Peer competition

    Despite the broad concerns, the enduring strength of US naval presence and the navy's role in the fabric of

    the current world order mean that it is unlikely that the USN's overall global pre-eminence will be placed at

    strategic risk any time soon. This does not mean, however, that there will be no geographic and strategic

    peaks in any threats to this presence. In terms of state-on-state peer competition, the USN is likely to have

    four areas of focus: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

    China sits at the centre of much US strategic thinking currently. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)

    is making some significant capability developments, and is pragmatic enough to learn from others in order

    to speed up its chase. However, as Professor Andrew Erickson noted in IHS Jane's Navy International in July

    2014, even in a key area such as aircraft carriers where China is pursuing a force structure including at least

    four carriers by the 2020s, at just that point the USN carrier force structure (which is still underpinned by a

    commitment in law to 11 ships) will be taking another step forward with the entry into service of the Ford-

    class carriers and the F-35.

    Many analysts perceive the US strategic re-balance towards the Asia-Pacific region - as set out in the much-

    discussed Department of Defense January 2012 strategic guidance, Sustaining US Global Leadership -

    Priorities for 21st Century Defense - as being focused on and driven by China's growing military strength.

    How the strategic balance between the United States and China, as well as the myriad other power

    balances in the region, are maintained will be central to regional and wider international stability. Yet

    perhaps this US focus on the Asia-Pacific region comes at a time when China is already stepping well

    outside of its traditional sphere of focus - and may even be stepping into what some might see as

    geostrategic voids created elsewhere by the US Asia-Pacific shift. Now well-established in the Indian Ocean

    as a result of a six-year contribution to the international counter-piracy campaign, the PLAN has been a

    regular visitor to the Mediterranean Sea since 2011 and, maybe as it looks north towards the Arctic and its

    resources, recently visited ports in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

    In the wake of the Asia-Pacific re-balance announcement, geopolitical discussions often focused on

    whether the United States would be able to maintain commitments in regions such as Latin America,

    Africa, and Europe. The USN's new maritime strategy appears to reinforce a focus on Europe - perhaps in

    no small part because of re-emerging concerns over Russia's strategic direction and disposition. However,

    China arguably now is a factor to be considered in the European security equation.

    Where one sits often depends on where one stands, and the European view on the rise of China is

    interesting in the context of US relations with China. With there now being a regular PLAN presence in

    European waters but with China's aims and intent arguably still unknown, it is not yet clear how this

    growing Chinese presence might affect European security affairs. Certainly, it is arguable that a number of

    European states may see more economic benefit than security risk in this Chinese presence.

  • ihs.com

    Article 1 Page 4 of 17 Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All

    trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved.

    The lead US Joint High Speed Vessel USNS Spearhead (JHSV 1) is seen here visiting Souda Bay, Greece in February 2014. The ship supported US operations in the Mediterranean and Black Sea in 2014, and conducted activities off West Africa. In the future, the USN hopes to deploy JHSVs to other regions such as Latin America. (US Navy)

    1530355

    Closer to home, China may be moving to increase its presence in the Latin American region. The USN's

    engagement there has been curtailed since 2012, with budget cuts and reduced force levels limiting ship

    deployments. The US Coast Guard (USCG) is attempting to maintain broader US presence via its counter-

    trafficking missions and, in the future, the USN hopes to deploy Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) and

    Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) to the region once enough units have been delivered to the fleet.

    China's growing interest in the region has been underscored by its recent pursuit of economic and military

    initiatives. In January 2015 reports surfaced of Beijing hosting a China-Latin America forum that drew

    leaders from 30 Caribbean and Central and South American countries. China's use of the Panama Canal has

    also increased to the point where it is second only to the United States, accounting for more than 22% of

    the canal's trans-oceanic trade (according to a USMC Security Initiative Group report in January 2015).

    Nicaragua is also working with Chinese shipping and construction firms on buildi