Strategic thinking and the environment: Planning the future in New Zealand?

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Strategic thinking and theenvironment: Planning thefuture in New Zealand?Ton Bührs a & Robert V. Bartlett ba Department of Resource Management , LincolnUniversity , Canterbury, New Zealandb Department of Political Science , PurdueUniversity , West Lafayette, Indiana, USAPublished online: 08 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Ton Bührs & Robert V. Bartlett (1997) Strategic thinking andthe environment: Planning the future in New Zealand?, Environmental Politics,6:2, 72-100, DOI: 10.1080/09644019708414328

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Strategic Thinking and the Environment:Planning the Future in New Zealand?

TON BÜHRS and ROBERT V. BARTLETT

The environmental rationale for adopting a strategic approach to theenvironment is compelling. But other-than-environmental considerationsmust always play an important role in adoption of environmental strategies,or green plans, and must affect their substance. The political demand orsupport for strategic environmental planning is nowhere very strong. Astrategic environmental plan adopted by New Zealand in 1995, anddeveloped in the context of broader strategic policy efforts, offers insightinto the significance and potential of strategic environmental policy making.Its claims to the contrary, New Zealand's Environment 2010 Strategy waspolitically feasible because it is strategic in only a limited sense and becauseit is subsidiary to the overriding goal of economic growth. The ultimatesignificance of New Zealand's environmental strategy and similar efforts inother nations, then, may lie primarily in their potential for furtheramendment and development.

In September 1995 the New Zealand government released a 63-page documenttitled Environment 2010 Strategy-A Statement of the Government's Strategyon the Environment. An earlier version of the document had been described bythe Minister for the Environment, Simon Upton, as 'the first step of an ongoingprocess of strategic thinking' [Ministry for the Environment, 1994a: 3].' Uptonwrote that the New Zealand government and other governments in the worldare 'moving beyond the "identify and repair" philosophy of the 1970s, andeven beyond the "anticipate and prevent" strategy of the 1980s ... into a newera of "long-term strategic thinking'" [Ministry for the Environment, 1994a:3]. The Environment 2010 Strategy was described as providing a strategicoverview of the government's environmental policies and legislation, 'in thecontext of Government's overall strategy' - linking it to three other recentGovernment-National Party reports, Path to 2010, The Next 3 Years andInvesting in our Future.

Ton Bührs, Department of Resource Management, Lincoln University, Canterbury, New Zealand;Robert V. Bartlett, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana,USA.

Environmental Politics, Vol.6, No.2, Summer 1997, pp.72-100PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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STRATEGIC THINKING AND THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW ZEALAND 73

'Strategic environmental planning' is, of course, a concept that has awide currency and a history beyond New Zealand.2 In this article wecritically evaluate the Environment 2010 Strategy document and processfrom several perspectives. The general rationale for adopting a strategicapproach to environmental policy, notably the need for the development ofmore comprehensive or integrated environmental policy and the need forimproved policy coordination, is indeed compelling. But even if this need isrecognised and acted upon, other-than-environmental considerations mustalways play an important role in the adoption of environmental strategies(or 'green plans') and affect their substance, both in general as well as in theNew Zealand context. Beyond commonplace political limitations, theremay be linkages among environmental strategy initiatives and strategicpolicy developments in other policy areas, economic policy in particular.Strategic environmental planning may be more 'do-able' in New Zealandthan in most other countries, but analysis suggests that challenges inherentto strategic environmental thinking and practice are still formidable.

Our purpose here is to discuss and analyse recent New Zealandinitiatives in strategic environmental planning. First, we discuss therationale for strategic environmental planning and summarise the contentsof the Environment 2010 Strategy document. Then we analyse the politicalcontext in which the Strategy was introduced, in an effort to explain its rootsand thrust. Finally, to shed more light on the Strategy's significance andpotential, we assess it in the context of the New Zealand's government'sbroader strategic policy efforts.

The Rationale for Strategic Environmental Thinking

In an era in which the legitimacy and appropriateness of many governmentroles are questioned and rejected by the politics and theories of governmentadvanced by the New Right, the term 'strategic' remains charmed. Once,forward thinking governments and businesses would have engaged in'planning', which was thought by organisation theorists of the earlytwentieth century to be one of the basic functions and responsibilities oforganisations [Gulick, 1937; Lasswell, 1956]. But success in politics isachieved most lastingly by redefining basic terms of reference [Stone,1988]. Particularly over the past three decades, New Right politicians andacademic theorists have succeeded in indelibly associating governmentplanning with detailed, inflexible prescriptions for urban development, withstifling, inefficient, centralised direction of whole economies, and withauthoritarian restrictions by the state on individual choices, opportunities,and innovation. Whatever the merits of the case against some kinds ofgovernment planning, the general concept has become tainted. Governments

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74 ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS

on the right forswear planning; governments on the left can formallyacknowledge planning only at some political risk. This notwithstanding,'strategic' thinking and action, according to New Right ideology, is still avirtuous attribute of businesses operating in market economies andtherefore is also a good thing for government to emulate, if it can.

Consequently, the introduction of strategic planning in many countries isassociated with the emergence of the "New Public Management," with itsemphasis on formulating clear goals and objectives and on assessingperformance with regard to these objectives. As such, strategic planningresults from a distrust of government, and in bureaucrats in particular, andcomplements other planks in the New Right agenda such as privatisationand diminution of the role of governments overall [Hood, 1991; Boston etal, 1996:5).

Thus a strategy may well be just a plan by another name, but strategicplanning does connote a particular kind of planning that retains somepolitical appeal in a period of conservative and libertarian ascendancy.Significantly, strategic planning also has considerable appeal, at least intheory, as a way to begin to address some hitherto particularly intractablechallenges of environmental policy-making.

As we have argued elsewhere [Bartlett, 1990, 1993; Biihrs, 1991a; Biihrsand Bartlett, 1993], inherent in the concept of environment itself is the notionthat truly successful environmental policy must be anticipatory,comprehensive, and integrative. In a nontrivial way, all policy is environmentalpolicy, hence the obvious need for environmental policy to addressconnections among the ecological, social, and economic dimensions of theenvironmental problematique. A key cause of environmental degradation isnarrow, compartmentalised, disjointed thinking and policy-making, hence theneed for environmental policy to be encompassing (comprehensive) andintegrated. The very use of the integrative, comprehensive concept'environment' implies focusing attention on fundamental causes rather thanmerely dealing with symptoms. It also implies seeking to anticipate, avoid, andprevent problems rather than merely reacting to crises and undertaking costlyafter-the-fact remediation or mitigation of damage.

But worldwide achievements in comprehensive, integrative, anticipatoryenvironmental policy have been notable mostly by their absence. Thousandsof environmental laws, programmes, directives, studies, and initiatives havebeen adopted in the past 30 years, but only a few have attempted to promoteintegration, comprehensiveness, or anticipative capacity, and even fewerhave succeeded even partially. Conceptual development has been hamperedby lack of attention, semantic confusion, and widespread acceptance ofsimplistic, ideologically charged criticisms [Born and Sonzogni, 1995;Bartlett, 1990]. More serious theoretical arguments about rationality,

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democracy, and organisational capabilities have definitively demonstratedthe impossibility and undesirability of fixed, authoritative, detailed policyblueprints. On the level of practical politics, comprehensive, integrative, oranticipatory policy-making has little public or interest group support and iscostly. Moreover, translation of planning into policy is problematic: mattersof implementation may be given short shrift in the planning process andeven partial implementation is more often the exception rather than the ruleas precarious political support wanes and latent opposition is mobilised. Thedetails of expert master plans are often quickly rendered irrelevant bydynamic technological, political, and economic forces.

Well done strategic planning, however, may be able to transcend someof these obstacles by its emphasis on establishing priorities over stipulatingspecifics; by its explicit attention to means; by its embrace of the politicalcharacter of choice; and by being dynamically flexible. Strategicenvironmental planning, then, would involve the formation and adoption ofsubstantive environmental policy, namely, general environmental goals,fundamental objectives, or basic principles. The identification of goals andprinciples would establish common direction, priorities, and evaluativecriteria by which policy action would be allocated, coordinated, and guidedfor greatest achievement over a period of time longer than the usual decisionframe. Simultaneous with this establishment of goals, strategicenvironmental planning implies that appropriate means for achieving thegoals also be identified, arranged in a logical and feasible sequence, andadopted. All methods may not be fully known in advance, and noteverything can be done at once, hence the need again for direction,priorities, and coordination of efforts, at least with respect to the best placeto start and the first few steps. There is no pretense of apolitical objectivity;only, ideally, an informed and well reasoned intertwining of values andanalysis in the choice of ends and means through what is recognised as apolitical process. Development of complete and definitive blueprints - animpossible task - is foresworn in favor of planned learning, adjustment tochanged circumstances, and re-strategising. Strategic environmentalplanning entails developing, and continuously reconsidering, a longer-termpolicy within which medium and short term policy is then fitted.

As such, in spite of the ambiguity of the idea, strategic environmentalplanning offers some hope of escaping from the nasty dilemma of 'whatmust be done cannot be done' [Bartlett, 1990]. If, indeed, the concept ofenvironment implies something fundamental about both the ends and themeans of policy making, such that truly environmental policy must beanticipatory, integrative, and comprehensive - within the realm of thepossible - then engaging in strategic environmental planning is one way ofbuilding a greater capability for more comprehensive, integrated, and

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anticipatory environmental policy. There are a variety of ways thatenvironmental policy-making can be made more comprehensive,integrative, and anticipatory [Biihrs, 1991a; Biihrs, 1991b; Bartlett, 1990),but strategic environmental planning is more promising than other tried andprospective approaches with respect to its potential to lead, at least intheory, to greater integration of the environmental policy acrossgovernments, across resources and media, and across the ecological, social,and economic dimensions of environmental policy. Moreover, strategicenvironmental planning does not compete with other more proceduralapproaches which by themselves are responsive and reactive, at best makingenvironmental policy more comprehensive, more integrative, and moreanticipatory but nevertheless toward uncertain and often unconsidered ends.Meaningful strategic environmental planning offers a way of linking means,even institutionally and politically complex means, to positive, longer-termgoals and principles.

The need for strategic environmental planning has been recognised inmany countries, with initiatives being undertaken in numerous countries inEurope and North America [Danish Environmental Protection Agency,1993: 2; Johnson, 1995]? Even among poorer nations, those wishing toborrow from international financial institutions in the 1990s have beenrequired first to complete national environmental action plans (NEAPs) toidentify priorities and develop consensus on acceptable solutions throughparticipatory processes [Lampietti and Subramanian, 1995; Margulis andBernstein, 1995]. The extensive environmental reforms of the last decadenotwithstanding, a need for strategic environmental planning has becomeincreasingly obvious in New Zealand over the last 20 years [Biihrs, 1991a;Biihrs, 1991b).

Indeed, it is not overstatement to say that the ultimate success of NewZealand's previous environmental policy reforms since 1984 fully dependson the central government's willingness to engage in serious strategicenvironmental planning. In part this is because the reforms themselves donot impart any obligation on the central government to integrateenvironmental values into its policies. The much touted ResourceManagement Act 1991 is largely an enabling, not a policy, piece oflegislation. The Act exempts most of central government from its provisionsand provides little guidance for the integration of policy across economic,ecological, and social dimensions. One of the things it enables centralgovernment to do is develop national policy statements and standards,although the National Party Government of 1990-96 has chosen to issueonly a mandatory national coastal policy statement which offers little firmdirection. Although mandatory regional policy statements are a startingpoint for environmental policy development on a regional level, realisation

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of the potential of the Act for local and regional governments to becomprehensive, integrative, and anticipatory is dependent upon issuance ofnational policy statements and standards.

Moreover, the reorganisation of national environmental agencies in themid-1980s still left serious gaps in organisational capacity that are as yetunremedied, including a Ministry for the Environment with severely limitedregulatory, planning, or advocacy authority and no national pollutioncontrol agency. In sum, the reforms offer or require virtually no substantiveenvironmental policy development on the part of central government. In itsrestricted focus on environmental effects, the Resource Management Acteven directs attention away from the sources of those effects [Biihrs andBartlett, 1993: 149]. Transportation, energy, agriculture, economic andother policies (all with potentially crucial implications for the environment)may still be developed without serious thought and weight being given toenvironmental considerations [Biihrs, 1994a].

The development of comprehensive, integrative, and anticipatoryenvironmental policies that reflect the environmental aspirations of NewZealanders requires the formulation and adoption of goals and principles aswell as of measures to achieve them across all policy sectors withpotentially significant environmental implications, public and private. Forthat to happen, an activist role by the central government, providing strongsymbolic, moral, and practical guidance, is imperative. Inevitably, thismeans the resurrection of planning, despite its current ideologicalunpopularity [Biihrs, 1994a], as strategic environmental planning.

The Environment 2010 Strategy Document

The 56-page 'public consultation document' released by the New ZealandGovernment on 6 October 1994 was touted as 'the first comprehensivestatement on the environment ever developed by a New Zealandgovernment' [Ministry for the Environment, 1994c; 1]. Printed onsemi-glossy paper in three colors, with boxed examples, graphs, and asides,frequent pictures, and bulleted lists, the Strategy was a political documentthat reflected a considerable concern with marketing. It was visuallyappealing and easily readable; the slick organisation conveyed animpression of competence and substance. But neither the concept ofstrategic planning nor the process by which this document was producedwas discussed at all. Eleven chapters briefly presented an overarchingvision statement, identification of key values, a listing of principles forintegrating environment and economy, a brief survey of current 'strengths,weaknesses, threats and opportunities' with regard to New Zealand'senvironment, a listing of nine environmental goals, a discussion of nine

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priority environmental issues corresponding with those goals, a proposal toestablish priorities among those nine goals and issues by conducting acomparative risk assessment, a declaration of responsibility for actions toimplement the strategy, a listing of conditions necessary to meet the visionstatement, a broad management agenda for achieving the vision, and a briefdescription of planning and review processes through which the strategywould be put into operation.

Ironically, the September 1995 'final' Strategy document is notmulticoloured and is less attractive. Other major changes include additionalattention to air quality, the urban environment, transportation, andenvironmental education. The market context of environmental policy isdeemphasised, as are the use of property rights approaches. The importanceof environmental values is recognised for other-than-instrumental reasons.

A brief (and certainly broad and vague) vision statement is presented inChapter 1, followed by identification of four key conditions for achievingthe vision: a competitive enterprise economy, effective laws and policies,information, and social participation. Pride of place belongs to a discussionof 'Environmental Values in a Market Economy' in Chapter 2, althoughadded to the final document is a section on 'Environmental Values for aCohesive Society.' Potential tensions between market and environmentalvalues are acknowledged. The task of government, and thus presumably ofthe strategic planning exercise itself, is identified as 'to design rules andinstitutions that promote good environmental outcomes within theframework of a pluralistic society and a market economy' (p.12). Anongoing need is asserted for analyses of cost and benefits, for maximisingeconomic wealth generation, and for minimising conflicts betweeneconomic growth and environmental quality. This is linked to what follows:First, principles are described in Chapter 3 ('Principles for IntegratingEnvironment, Society and Economy') that the Government will refer to inseeking to improve environmental outcomes within the market framework.Second, the document in Chapter 5 describes the environmental outcomes itaspires to and by which the adequacy of New Zealand's regulatory andinstitutional framework should be measured (p. 10).

Eleven principles are presented in Chapter 3, each with someexplanation and justification:

(1) The use of natural resources should be carried out in a manner whichsustains the resources and services that society values.

(2) The Precautionary Principle should be applied to resource managementpractice, where there is limited knowledge or understanding about thepotential for adverse environmental effects or the risk of serious orirreversible environmental damage.

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(3) Resource management should proceed by defining'environmentalbottom lines' in situations of special sensitivity and high risk, andwhere adequate information exists on which to base such a definition.

(4) Resource management should ensure that the unpriced environmentaleffects (or external costs) associated with the production, distribution,and consumption of goods and services are 'internalised', that is, theyare assessed and consistently charged to users and consumers whobenefit from them.

(5) Specifying property rights in terms that ensure private and collectivedecisions achieve sustainable outcomes should be encouraged as aresource management tool.

(6) Central and local government interventions should be evaluated toensure that they are necessary, and, if so, that the 'least cost' policytools are adopted to achieve the desired environmental result.

(7) Policies should be formulated and implemented to ensure thatenvironmental and social goals are mutually supportive. The likelysocial impacts of environmental policies should be appraised andalternatives that maintain or enhance environmental quality in amanner that promotes social cohesion should be advanced.

(8) Public utility infrastructure pricing should follow full cost pricingprinciples.

(9) In determining publicly funded research priorities, considerationshould be given to local, national and international dimensions ofsustainable resource management.

(10) To achieve sustainable management, we need to recogniseopportunities for substitution of resources such as coal or gas, whileaccepting our limited ability to substitute for the myriad servicesprovided by natural and physical resources.

(11) New Zealand will assist in protecting the international competitivenessof its businesses by improving its clean green image, working with itstrading partners to advance common interests, and playing a positiveand active role internationally without getting out of step with othercountries where this would significantly affect competitiveness.

In its Chapter 4 the Strategy lists some of the natural environmentaladvantages of New Zealand, the nation's social, political, and economicstrengths relevant to environmental policy, current problems, opportunitiesfor 'win-win' outcomes in the relationship between economics andenvironment, and threats to the biophysical environment of New Zealand.

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Eleven priority issues are identified as eleven major goals proposed inChapter 5:

( l ) to maintain and enhance the quality, productivity and life-supportingcapacity of our soils, so that they can support a variety of viable landuse options;

(2) to manage the quality and quantity of surface water, groundwater,coastal and geothermal water so that it can meet the current and futureneeds of ecological systems, communities (including Maori), primaryproduction and industry ... ;

(3) to maintain air quality in parts of New Zealand that enjoy clean air, andimprove air quality in places where it has deteriorated;

(4) to protect indigenous habitats and biological diversity ... ;

(5) to manage pests, weeds and diseases by reducing the risks they pose,to levels consistent with New Zealand's established objectives ... ;

(6) to conserve and manage New Zealand's fisheries for the benefit of allNew Zealanders by providing for sustainable utilisation of fisheriesresources, including commercial, recreational and Maori customarytake;

(7) to manage sustainably the environmental effects of producing andusing energy services;

(8) to manage the provision of transport services in a manner thatminimises adverse effects on the natural and physical environment andhuman health;

(9) to manage waste, contaminated sites and hazardous substances ... ;

(10) to take precautionary actions to help stabilise atmosphericconcentrations of greenhouse gases, in order to reduce risk from globalclimate change and to meet New Zealand's commitments under the UNFramework Convention on Climate Change ... ;

(11) to help achieve the full recovery of the ozone layer and constrain peaklevels of ozone destruction by phasing out imports of ozone-depletingsubstances as quickly as possible and at rates no less than those agreedinternationally, and by limiting, where practical, emissions of thosesubstances that are imported.

An agenda for action in Chapter 6 attempts to set out what needs to bedone by the year 2010 to achieve the above 11 goals, without specifying bywhom or by when - questions which are reserved for the next stages of the

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strategic process. For each of the eleven goals, issues are briefly discussed,key risks identified, and actions recommended, including a shorter list ofpriority actions. A boxed case study is presented to illuminate some issue orevent pertaining to each goal (for example, rabbit and land management;cleaner production; the Waitaki Power Project).

The Strategy places responsibility for translating the strategicframework set out in the Strategy document into specific policies and actionplans with six groups of actors: central government, local government, iwi(Maori tribal organisations), industry, nongovernmental organizations, andcommunities and individuals. The roles of each are presented very brieflyand generally in Chapter 7.

To help achieve the vision declared earlier, Chapter 8 offers a six-part"Environmental Management Agenda':

(1) integrate environmental, economic and social policy;

(2) establish a coherent framework of law;

(3) sharpen the policy tools;

(4) build up the information base;

(5) promote education for the environment;

(6) involve people in decision-making.

Several proposals for action are offered under each of these agendacategories.

Finally, Chapter 9 identifies the planning and review processes that areexpected to ensure that the Strategy is implemented and evaluated. Firstamong these is a proposed comparative environmental risk assessmentinitiative to set priorities across and within the eleven goals and actionagendas described earlier. Comparative risk assessment would influence butnot determine priorities, as priorities would also be contingent on 'politicalconstraints and preferences as expressed through documents such as Path to2010, and the fiscal costs of policy action' [Ministry for the Environment,1995b: 59]. The comparative risk assessment process would inform otherpolicy development and review processes, including annual budget cycles,departmental planning, local government and private sector annualplanning, a State of the Environment reporting system of central and localgovernment, OECD and Commission on Sustainable Development reviewsof New Zealand policy development, international agreements, and publicparticipation. The Strategy itself is slated to be formally reviewed andupdated in four years, following production of the State of the EnvironmentReport. The Strategy document concludes by acknowledging a linkage

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between this effort and the Government's other recent strategic planningreports, Path to 2010 [1993] and Investing in Our Future [7995a].4

The Politics of Strategic Environmental Policy

Although the reasons for strategic environmental planning may be strong,or even imperative, from an environmental point of view, they may not beso politically. Simplified, the political obstacles to introducing strategicenvironmental fall into two categories: institutional obstacles and weaksocietal demand and support. Institutional obstacles to strategicenvironmental policy relate to the rules of prevailing political rationalityand to bureaucratic factors.

In democratically governed countries, long-term planning, on whichstrategic environmental policy development is based, does not fit well withdominant political rationality, which is based on relatively shortelection-cycles. Political survival (re-election) depends primarily on the ruleof 'delivering the (mostly economic) goods' today rather than tomorrow. Aspolitical rewards and penalties depend foremost on a government's abilityto meet expectations and demands within the short term, there is littleincentive for governments to extend their political horizon and basedecisions and policies on uncertain future needs or scenarios. Governingoften comes down to 'facing up to the difficulties created by where you arenow' instead of 'planning where you want to go' [Painter, 1981: 277].

Bureaucratic obstacles to the introduction of comprehensive andstrategic environmental policy lie in bureaucratic fragmentation andspecialisation, problems associated with coordination, and issues of relativepower, hierarchy, and 'turf'. By its very nature, strategic environmentalpolicy crosses departmental boundaries, may affect agency decision makingand priorities, and raises questions regarding responsibility and capacity forthe coordination, implementation and monitoring of such a policy. In orderto work, lines of departmental responsibility may have to be redrawn andresources reallocated. In general, it is likely to involve a strengthening ofrelatively young and not so powerful environmental agencies vis-a-vislonger established and more powerful government departments. Obviously,this is unlikely to be received enthusiastically by the latter.

Even among those who are less or not affected by the rules of political andbureaucratic rationality, the demand or support for strategic environmentalplanning is not very strong.. Environmental interest groups, although they maybe concerned about long-term problems, are to some extent also subject to theneed to focus on concrete and short-term issues for mobilising effective publicsupport. Within academia, a comprehensive approach to environmentalmatters, the basis for strategic environmental policy, does not fit well with the

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prevailing rationality of specialisation [Bartlett, 1990). In economic circles,the whole notion of traditional comprehensive policy and planning bygovernments is overwhelmingly disliked, if not met with hostility, because ofits perceived incompatibility with the needs and virtues of a 'free market', andis often discredited by associating it with the collapsed centrally plannedeconomies in Eastern Europe. Although an exception may be admitted for'strategic planning', which is endorsed as a means to make government moretransparent, accountable, small, and confined to specific purposes, that doesnot necessarily translate into demand or support for strategic environmentalplanning.

But if the obstacles to comprehensive and strategic environmental policydevelopment are so overwhelming, why does it happen at all? As mentionedearlier, an increasing number of countries are taking steps in this direction.The obstacles can be, and have been partially, if not fully, overcome.

The conditions for and experiences in overcoming these obstacles mayvary from country to country [Toner and Doern, 1994], In the New Zealandcontext, we suggest that the following three factors have been crucial: thepresence and effectiveness of a 'policy entrepreneur'; the potential ofstrategic environmental policy as a symbolic policy device; and (althoughthis may seem contradictory to what was stated above) economic reasons.

Individuals (labelled 'policy entrepreneurs' or otherwise) in theformation and adoption of policies can be crucial [Kingdon, 1995],Individuals who combine expertise, commitment, vision, and energy withcommunication, argumentation and political skills can play an importantrole in getting issues onto the political agenda. Moreover, if such peopleoccupy strategic or influential positions, they have an even better chance ofovercoming political apathy or inertia. Toner and Doern refer to the crucialrole of political and bureaucratic leadership provided by individuals(notably the prime minister) in the adoption of the Canadian Green Plan[Toner and Doern, 1994: 399-406].

The importance of policy entrepreneurs is confirmed in the case of theintroduction of the Environment 2010 Strategy in New Zealand. There wasno broad public demand for such a strategy, on the one hand, and no cabinetor ministerial initiative on the other. Although there was a demand fromlocal and regional authorities, as well as from environmentalists, for thegovernment to provide more guidance (for instance, in the form offormulating 'national policy statements' under the Resource ManagementAct) in specific policy areas, such as hazardous substances management andenergy policy, this had not taken the form of a demand for an overarchingenvironmental policy or strategy. The initiative for developing such astrategy stemmed from within the Ministry for the Environment, and wasvery much the 'brain-child' of the chief executive of the Ministry for the

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Environment, the Secretary of the Environment, who was also responsiblefor shaping the idea in the New Zealand context.5 And given his strategicposition and effectiveness, he was able to convince the Minister for theEnvironment to adopt this 'brain-child' as his 'baby'.

In contrast to the Canadian experience, prime ministerial leadership wasnot vital for the introduction of the New Zealand Environment 2010Strategy [Toner and Doern, 1994: 399-402]. On a government level,political leadership in this was matter was provided by the Minister for theEnvironment, a relatively senior and well regarded Cabinet minister. In thisrespect, the New Zealand experience confirms the importance of ministerialand bureaucratic leadership for the adoption of green plans [Toner andDoern, 1994: 402-6].

A second potential explanation for the introduction of an environmentalstrategy in New Zealand is that it meets a political need for the governmentto be seen as 'doing something' and to be 'in control' when de facto it lacksthe will or means, or both, to act. In other words, strategic environmentalpolicy may take the form of symbolic policy [Edelman, 1971]. Given thehuge task and potentially quite radical implications of green planning, andconsequently the significant costs and strong opposition that may beencountered, this is not an implausible scenario.

By definition, symbolic policies are policies not meant to beimplemented substantively. This implies two things: first, thatnon-implementation is intentional on the part of policy-makers; second, thatthe policy is formulated in general terms and no means for implementationare specified. The first is hard to prove, as it requires digging underneathstated intentions. The second is less difficult to establish.

The Environment 2010 Strategy contains a number of environmentalgoals that 'indicate a broad sense of direction' and that 'will need to berefined' [Ministry for the Environment, 1994a: 21]. Also, the documentdoes not attempt to establish priorities amongst these goals: 'work remainsto be done' [Ministry for the Environment, 1995b: 3] and is postponed untila comparative risk assessment has been completed. As yet, and in contrastto for instance the Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan, it does notspecify concrete goals or targets and dates for their achievement. Nor doesthe Strategy say much about the means that will be assigned to achievingthese goals. 'Responsibility for action' is laid with everyone in society[Ministry for the Environment, 1995b: 51]. Although an 'EnvironmentalManagement Agenda' identifies general means (again called 'goals')[Ministry for the Environment, 1995b: 52-8] such as the integration ofenvironmental, economic and social policies, the establishment of acoherent framework of law, the sharpening of policy tools, the building upof an information base, the promotion of education for the environment, and

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involving people in decision-making, they are hardly at all linked with thegoals specified earlier. Nor are they rooted in an analysis of what is requiredfor their achievement. As for financial facilitation, no amounts arementioned at all; it is only stated that 'The annual Government Budget cycleprovides an opportunity to consider environment strategy in the broadercontext of the Government's overall strategy and priorities' [Ministry forthe Environment, 1995b: 60].

The general vagueness of the Strategy, and the apparent lack ofenthusiasm with which it was launched, has led some environmentalists tolabel the document as a 'damp squib' [ECO, 1995:2]. And although the paperexplicitly states that this is only a first step of an ongoing process of strategicthinking [Ministry for the Environment, 1994a: 3], and it is indeed possiblethat goals and means will be further specified in due course, there are alsodistinct grounds for taking the view that this strategic exercise serves largelysymbolic purposes. This may not be the aim of the initiating agency or eventhe Minister for the Environment, whose intentions may be genuine. But thepossibility should not be ruled out that, for the government as a whole, theEnvironment 2010 Strategy was never adopted with the intention, let aloneserious commitment, towards specification and implementation.

This scenario also helps to explain why the Strategy was introduced inthe absence of a strong public demand for it. The prime purpose of theStrategy may not lie in a need to meet specific environmental demands, butin a need for the government to be seen as responding to mountingenvironmental problems and concerns in general and to be perceived asbeing in control. The widespread adoption of strategic environmental plansor policies in countries could be interpreted as a means to create theimpression that governments are serious about dealing with these problemsand concerns, and more effectively so than in the past, by putting them in abroader context and by using the term 'strategy' which suggests that oneknows where to go and how to get there. Strategic environmental planning,in other words, is politically attractive as a means to counter the (growing)perception of governments' inability to deal effectively with theenvironmental problematique.

A third, possibly even more skeptical explanation for the adoption ofstrategic environmental plans, despite the obstacles described earlier, lies inits potential usefulness, or even importance, not for environmental, but foreconomic purposes. With environmental problems and demands presentingincreasing threats and uncertainties to future investments, there is a need forthe development of a long-term framework that provides (quasi-) certaintyas to what can be expected or will be required. The possibility ofgovernments introducing significantly more stringent and costlyenvironmental regulations in the not too distant future can be a serious

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impediment to new investment, and particularly to attracting overseasinvestment. Long term environmental policy helps to reduce uncertaintyand to create a more favourable investment climate.

The potential economic benefits of strategic environmental policy gofurther, however. Strategic environmental policies and plans are often basedon the notion that economic and environmental needs are fundamentallycompatible, and that in the long term sound economic and environmentalmanagement are the same. Policies and plans often identify the existence ofmany 'win-win' situations in which improving environmental performance(for instance, introducing energy efficient technologies) is also economicallylucrative and enhances competitiveness. In general, such plans are based ona notion of 'sustainable management' which implies a recognition of thepossibility of 'integrating' economic and environmental needs, and movingaway from the 'environment versus development' paradigm. In short, takingon board environmental considerations strengthens a company's (and acountry's) competitiveness and long term economic viability.

The Environment 2010 Strategy, particularly in its draft version,contains much evidence in support of this view. In the draft, theachievement of environmental values is explicitly placed in the frameworkof a 'market economy' and the need to 'evaluate the costs and benefits ofany proposed intervention' [Ministry for the Environment, 1994a: 10]. Inthis document, the formulation of 'environmental bottom lines' is identifiedas 'highly desirable, from the point of view of defining sustainable propertyrights and ensuring certainty for investors and the community' [1994a: 11].The protection of international competitiveness is explicitly mentioned as aprinciple for the integration of environment and economy [1994a: 17]. It isalso argued that there are many examples of 'win-win' opportunities[1994a: 7], and that the Strategy 'seeks to minimise or resolve conflictsbetween objectives of economic growth and environmental quality' [1994a:10]. Apart from formulating 'environmental bottom lines as rapidly andclearly as possible', certainty (and the minimisation of 'arbitrary'government intervention) is promoted by the requirement (also contained inthe Resource Management Act 1991) that 'any government interventionshould be necessary, and should be the most efficient and effective methodto achieve the desired end' - not necessarily morally or socially the mostpreferred [1994: 14]. Although this orientation towards economicconsiderations and instruments is said to be motivated by a concern to usethe 'best' and most innovative policy tools, it has also been interpreted asreflecting a 'New Right libertarian stance' {Environmental Policy andManagement Research Centre, 1995].

In the 1995 version of the Strategy, the emphasis on the importance theeconomic ('market') context is somewhat toned down. Chapter 2 of the new

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document is now titled 'Environmental Values' instead of 'EnvironmentalValues in a Market Economy' [Ministry for the Environment, 1995b: 11] andhas been substantially rewritten and expanded to give greater consideration tothe importance of environmental values in themselves ('Economic growthmust not occur at the expense of environmental quality') and for 'socialcohesion' [Ministry for the Environment, 1995b: 11-13]. Most references toinvestor certainty have been deleted. Throughout, the wording of thedocument has been changed to lessen the impresssion that economic criteriaand tools (costs-benefit analysis; efficiency; economic instruments; 'leastcost') are of foremost importance in the formation and implementation ofenvironmental policy. Greater recognition is given to the difficulties involvedin defining 'environmental bottom lines', the limitations of economicinstruments (including internalisation and compensation), and to the need foran 'appropriate mix' of policy tools.

But in the revised version, the Strategy still expresses a preference for areliance on economics ('the market') above politics (government) in theallocation and management of resources. Market mechanisms and economicapproaches, self-regulation by industry (voluntary codes of practice), and'partnerships' between the government and the private sector areemphasised as policy tools, and listed before guidelines and standards, ornegotiation and mediation [Ministry for the Environment, 1995b: 55]. Inparticular property rights approaches to the management of resources'previously regarded as common property resources' are strongly advocatedand 'should be developed as far as possible' as they, amongst others,encourage economic efficiency and increase investor certainty [Ministry forthe Environment, 1995b: 16-17].

Trust in the market is also reflected in the argument that the 'communitymay allow gas, coal or other mineral resources to be depleted because of theavailability of substitutes' whose development will be assisted by the pricemechanism, although the 1995 document is more cautious about 'severelydepleting resources' than was the draft Strategy [Ministry for theEnvironment, 1995b: 20]. With regard to energy policy, where the goal forthe government is to manage the environmental impacts of energyproduction and use, and to 'ensure the continuing availability of energyservices, at the lowest cost to the economy as a whole consistent withsustainable development', the role of the government is seen primarily asone of ensuring that environmental costs are internalised in the price ofenergy services [Ministry for the Environment, 1995b: 40-41].

In general, a competitive economy, market forces, and economicmeasures are seen as important for the generation of revenue 'to fund thegovernment' and to achieve environmental goals [Ministry for theEnvironment, 1995b: 10]. Overall, the Strategy goes a long way to try to

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alleviate potential fears about unpredictable or 'arbitrary' governmentintervention to achieve environmental goals, and in emphasising the needfor such goals to be met by means which are 'rational', cost-effective, andacceptable or attractive to business.

Nowhere in the Strategy is mention made of a potential strengthening ofthe power or responsibilities of environmental agencies, including theMinistry for the Environment, or of a need for any other significantinstitutional reforms to implement strategic environmental policy. On thecontrary, the suggestion is given that the framework for achievingenvironmental goals, including those of the Strategy, are essentially in placeor almost completed. The immediate challenge is one of using 'theinnovative opportunities offered by the new law', and of monitoring andreview, rather than of creating new agencies or legislation [Ministry for theEnvironment, 1995b: 54].

In summary, the obstacles to introducing strategic environmental policyas discussed earlier in this section have been overcome in the New Zealandcontext by the commitment of a strategically placed policy entrepreneurpromoting the idea, by (for the time being) avoiding the formulation ofspecific goals, priorities, and a timeframe for their achievement, and byformulating a document that does not contain any threats to economic andinstitutional interests. To the contrary, the selected format of the Strategyemphasises its compatibility with and potential advantages to business andthe economy as a whole, and it seems politically attractive to thegovernment because of its symbolic value. In other words, something whichmight have been potentially upsetting and threatening, even though'environmentally rational', has been made politically feasible by turning itinto a 'toothless tiger'.

Linkages Between the Environment 2010 Strategy and Other StrategicGovernment Efforts

The significance of New Zealand's environmental strategy should not beassessed only on its substance or the reasons for its adoption. Its properplace and meaning can only be understood by looking into the broadercontext in which the strategy has been developed and will be functioning.The Strategy is only one element of the New Zealand government'sstrategic efforts. In order to assess its role as well as its potential, a closerlook at the connections between the Environment 2010 Strategy and theseother strategic initiatives is essential.

The Strategy document itself refers to the importance of these linkages,and states that the Environment 2010 Strategy is linked to the government'sPath to 2010 and Investing in Our Future. It is argued that 'This

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Environment 2010 Strategy will influence, and be influenced by, ourjourney down the Path to 2010' [Ministry for the Environment, 1995b: 61].

Path to 2010 was published in June 1993 as the government's firststrategic policy initiative. In this 35-page document, the governmentformulates 'the next phase of New Zealand's development' and the goals'set for New Zealand to achieve by the year 2010'. The document alsodiscusses 'what we must do to reach these goals.' It is presented as an'ambitious programme' but 'no apology' is made for taking such a longer-term view: 'We firmly believe that if our nation is to achieve its truepotential we must look beyond the three year election cycles' [New ZealandGovernment, 1993: 3].

Economic and social goals lie at the core of Path to 2010. Theachievement of an economic growth rate of 3.5 to 5 per cent per annum isput up front as a necessary condition to secure a high standard of living andsocial welfare, including that of an ageing population. 'Building a solideconomic base' is presented as the first priority. Five stages are identifiedfor achieving this, three of which have already been completed: 'opening upto the world' (financial and import/export deregulation), 'getting thefundamentals right' (inflation, interest and the real exchange rate), and'improving the performance of existing industries' (reform of the labourmarket, the public sector, research and development activities, and theenergy sector). The remaining fourth and fifth stages are identified asinvolving the creation of new industries, markets and jobs, and a continuingprocess of education, innovation and growth [1993: 10-14].

Innovation, research and development, investment in infrastructure, andthe development of skills and education are all seen as key factorsunderpinning economic growth. Striking in this context is the emphasis oneducation as a means for achieving economic objectives, with a review ofthe school curriculum focusing 'on the skills needed for the workplace ofthe future' [1993: 21]. The social welfare system, on the other hand, isdescribed primarily as a burden to the economy, and as 'overly generous' inthe past. In general, people are seen as a ('most precious') resource: 'Toachieve economic success in the international community we must harnessall our strengths and this means all our people' [1993: 32]. Overall, theimpression given is that economic growth is the most important goal, an endin itself.

Environmental matters do receive attention in Path to 2010, but aredescribed in a similar instrumental vein. New Zealand's environment, 'thecleanest greenest place on earth' is seen as a key resource [1993: 6], notablyfor the tourism industry: 'In the main, we have treated our environment withrespect and care. Now it will repay us' [1993: 24]. Maintaining resourcesand environmental quality is seen as important for 'sustained economic

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growth.' Although it is acknowledged that there 'is always some tensionbetween the goals of economic growth and job creation and protection ofthe environment', this is seen as resolvable by defining some 'clearboundaries' ('environmental bottom lines') 'that will never be crossed inseeking one or other of the goals' [1993: 24]. Earlier in the document, it isrecognised that this will 'place some constraints on the strategy we choose'[1993: 6].

Path to 2010 identifies seven 'key areas which will require focus'(energy efficiency, pollution, ozone layer protection, CO2 reduction, soilerosion, biodiversity, and environmental monitoring) but very little ifanything is said about how these issues are to be addressed [1993: 28-9].Overall in the Path, the environment is seen as a resource at best and aconstraint at worst. But in both cases, its significance lies in its connectionto the principal goal of economic growth.

Although the Path to 2010 has been criticised as not much of a strategyat all, it is at least remarkably consistent in its identification of the pursuitof economic growth (of 3.5 to 5.0 per cent per annum) as an overridingpriority. Moreover, it contains a strategic element in its identification of keyfactors that are expected to lead to the achievement of that goal, and in itssequencing of those factors in stages. In that context, it appears thatinnovation, the development of skills, and education receive a higherpriority than environmental protection.

This seems to be confirmed in The Next Three Years, a documentpublished in June 1994 that portends to provide 'specific objectives and awork programme for achieving the vision set out in Path to 2010' [NewZealand Government, 1994: Preface]. The Next Three Years reiterates the'two overriding goals' of Path to 2010 as: 'Maintaining our current strongeconomic growth' and 'Building strong communities and a cohesivesociety' [1994: 2]. Education is seen as the 'bridge' between these twogoals [1994: 3]. Four priority areas are identified for the next three years: toencourage an even more dynamic business sector, build trade and otherlinks with the global economy, ensure economic growth remainssustainable, and 'build the best education and training system in the world'[1994: 5].

After blowing the trumpet of recent economic achievements andattributing these to its programme of reforms, and announcing furtherchanges in government policy to promote competition and innovation in theeconomy, The Next Three Years focuses on education and training. As inPath to 2010, the emphasis is on the requirement for training and educationto meet the needs of 'tomorrow's workforce', the strengthening of linksbetween educators and industry, and the development of programmes thatbring students into greater contact with the business world. Overall, the role

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of education as a key factor for achieving the (predominantly) economicgoals of Path to 2010 is confirmed [1994:15-21}.

'Building stronger communities', the second main ingredient of TheNext Three Years, is described as important as they 'add to quality of lifeand provide a strong foundation from which economic development cantake place' [1994: 22]. Again, the view conveyed is a concern for peopleunder stress for economic reasons (people as a resource, disruptive effectsof social problems on economic performance). Similarly, Maoridevelopment seems inspired by the desire to let Maori 'participate fully inthe economy'. Although not stated explicitly, it seems plausible that theexpressed aim of settling all major claims by 2000 is led by a concern thatthe 'dragging on' of Maori claims on land and other resources creates anuncertain investment climate with regard to those resources.

In a similar vein to the Path to 2010, The Next Three Years gives someattention to environmental matters. The compatibility of pursuing strongeconomic growth with environmental goals is possibly emphasised evenmore, but the seven areas mentioned for 'focus of government effort' arepartly different from those in Path to 2010 (with energy efficiency, ozonelayer protection, and environmental monitoring being replaced byhazardous substances, pests and weeds, and monitoring of the ResourceManagement Act). But again, these items are mentioned without addingmuch detail, although it is announced that the Minister for the Environmentis developing a strategic plan for the environment that will guide theGovernment's management of the environment in the coming years [NewZealand Government, 1994: 30-31].

Consistency in the government's strategic planning efforts is furtherreflected in the publication of Investing in our Future in February 1995, adocument foreshadowing the annual government budget. Anotherinnovation, a document of this nature will be produced by the governmentevery year 'to put flesh on the financial bones of the Budget PolicyStatements' which are required under the Fiscal Responsibility Act [NewZealand Government, 1995a: 3]. Investing in Our Future, then, sets the nextstep in the strategic exercise, by 'translating' the priorities contained in thePath to 2010 and The Next Three Years into annual policy initiatives with afinancial backing. In other words, it allows the government to 'put itsmoney where its mouth is'.

Consistent with the identification of training and education as a keyfactor in the promotion of economic growth, Investing in Our Futureforeshadows an increase in government expenditure for education, tofinance new schools, more teachers, and in many areas smaller classes.'Good' teachers will be paid more, and a new subject, Technology, will bedeveloped for incorporation in the curriculum [1995a: 6-7]. Industrial skill

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development is promoted by a 'Skill New Zealand' strategy [New ZealandGovernment, 1995a: 9]. More support will also be given to early childhoodeducation, special education, and assisting the unemployed [1995a: 10}.Other priorities are identified in the areas of social welfare, health, andhousing [1995a: 12-14], The desire to resolve major Treaty of Waitangiclaims by the year 2000 is reconfirmed, and here it is openly admitted that'the existence of unresolved Treaty claims creates uncertainty that detersinvestment' [1995a: 15).

Priorities in the area of environmental management identified inInvesting in Our Future are: threatened species, pests, hazardoussubstances, land management, and water. In line with the Environment 2010Strategy, it is announced that the government will conduct a systematicevaluation of the environmental risks facing New Zealand. But in advanceof that, the development of strategies in the five areas mentioned is alreadylabelled as urgent, and water pollution is even identified as 'perhaps thegravest environmental problem in New Zealand', requiring the developmentof standards and ('bottom line') policies for water quality and quantity, theprotection of public health, recreational and cultural needs [1995a: 16-18].

Two other elements in the government's framework for strategic policydevelopment need mentioning: Strategic Result Areas, formulated for theperiod 1994-97, set the strategic priorities for the public sector. Theyprovide the link between the government's long term objectives and theoperational activities of government departments, identifying the activitiesthat the public sector needs to undertake in order to achieve the longer-termstrategy. The Strategic Result Areas, in their turn, provide the frameworkfor Key Result Areas for incorporation in all performance agreements ofdepartmental chief executives [New Zealand Government, 1995b].

As would be expected, the Strategic Result Areas for 1994-97 fall inline with the objectives specified in previously published documents.Maintaining and accelerating economic growth, the promotion of enterpriseand innovation, and education and training receive foremost attention,whereas protecting and enhancing the environment 'in a manner consistentwith maintaining environmental values in a growing market economy',through means 'that impose least cost on the economy and theenvironment', is mentioned last. The development of standards and policymechanisms for achieving environmental quality 'at least equal to domesticand international benchmarks', the development and monitoring of policyand legislative frameworks for the management of the environmental effectsof production and use of energy and hazardous substances, and thepreparation of a national strategy to implement the International Conventionon Biological Diversity are singled out for 'particular emphasis' [1995b:12}.

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From this overview of the New Zealand government's strategic effortsin recent years, it will be apparent that strategic environmental planningdoes not stand on its own, but exists within, and partly alongside, otherstrategic initiatives. Foremost in all these strategic documents, thecontinued promotion of economic growth figures, with innovation, theenhancement of skills, and educational reform as key factors for achievingthat. The environment is seen as both a resource and a constraint. To ensurethat economic growth can be sustained, it is recognised that there is a needfor identifying clear 'bottom lines' (mainly through the formulation ofstandards).

The auxiliary nature of the Environment 2010 Strategy to othergovernment priorities is explicitly acknowledged:

The Environment 2010 Strategy supports [emphasis added] the twomajor strategic priorities of the Government, economic opportunityand enhancing social cohesion. Environmental values can beadvanced in a way that contributes to economic opportunity andprosperity. Environmental values are also an important part of thevalues that hold our society together, and promoting them contributesto social cohesion [Ministry for the Environment, 1995b: 11].

The environmental goals specified in the Environment 2010 Strategyreflect a preliminary assessment of the relative seriousness (in terms of'risk') of the environmental problems (contraints) facing New Zealand, butit is argued that priority setting in this respect can only be more definitivewhen a more systematic assessment has been completed. This, then, willoccur after other priorities have been set in the overarching strategy (asformulated in Path to 2010, The Next Three Years and Investing in OurFuture).

Earlier in this paper we argue that the basis for strategic policydevelopment lies in both a recognition of the existence of linkages betweenpolicy areas (that is, the need for the development of more comprehensiveand integrated environmental policy) and an acknowledgement of the needto define priorities on the basis of the identification of 'pressure points'among these linkages. From our analysis of the strategic efforts of the NewZealand government it is apparent that the linkages between policy areas aredefined unidirectionally, in the sense that those linkages which areimportant for economic growth are highlighted. Mainly 'pressure points'that are perceived as most likely to contribute to achieving those goals areidentified and given priority for action. Some aspects of environmentalpolicy (notably the lack of clear 'bottom lines') are identified as pressurepoints, but largely from a negative perspective (potential damage to theprime goal of not 'getting this right'). Environmental goals, in this

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framework, are primarily instrumental ('strategically aligned with'), and notput on the same level as economic goals [Ministry for the Environment,1994b: 8]. Also, the environment strategy was produced after theoverarching strategy had been determined, not concurrently with it andstrategies for other policy areas. In other words, the 'integration' ofeconomic and environmental values, goals, and policies in these strategicefforts is heavily biased towards the overriding goal of economic growth.

The foremost reasons for that are likely to be political, related to thedistribution of power, resources, and values in the New Zealand society. Butthe relative strength and importance of economic and environmental goals inthese strategic efforts is also mediated through the institutional frameworkand processes. The development of the overarching strategy has beencoordinated by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, with astrong input from Treasury, both top agencies in the departmental hierarchy.The role of the Ministry for the Environment in this exercise has beenconfined largely to contributing to the writing of the environmental sectionsin these documents, and to the production of the Environment 2010 Strategy,and did not extend to the formulation of the overarching framework.

Almost ironically, the relative importance of these strategic documentsis inversely reflected in their differential treatment with respect to allowingpublic input. All the overarching strategy documents have come aboutthrough a restricted process of deliberation among government politiciansand departmental officials. Once produced, they are presented as thegovernment's strategic policy and not subjected to a process of publicdebate and submissions. By contrast, the Environment 2010 Strategy,although largely an 'in house' job of the Ministry for the Environment, hasbeen produced in some consultation with representatives of environmentalgroups, and was subjected to an extensive round of public debate and inputafter its initial publication.6 Whereas the environment strategy is presentedas 'negotiable' to take on board views and priorities put forward by thepublic, this is not the case with the overarching strategy (although also thelatter will be regularly reviewed and amended, this will be based mainly onthe government's own perception of the need for change).

Another indication of the relatively low importance of the Environment2010 Strategy is that it was not subject to much interdepartmental debate.And there is no evidence that it was part of any ongoing turf struggle. Thissuggests that the exercise was seen primarily as involving the making of aninventory of environmental problems (rather narrowly defined), with as yetfew if any implications for existing 'non-environmental' policies andpriorities.

The predominance of economic over environmental goals in theoverarching strategy is also underpinned by the rigour of and vigour of the

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theoretical basis for identifying strategic key factors or variables ineconomic policy as compared to environmental policy. Although theprevailing neo-classical economic doctrine in New Zealand is certainly notinfallible or uncontestable, it is well developed, coherently and consistentlyapplied, and firmly entrenched both in academia and the bureaucracy.Although there may be disagreement within the economic policycommunity about the desirable level of economic variables and indicators(such as inflation, interest rates, the exchange rate, and the level of publicdebt), there is apparently little disagreement that these are the key factorsthat impinge crucially on the health of the economy. By contrast, thereseems still little in the way of agreement about a theoretical basis or keyfactors in the environmental policy area. The selection of core elements forstrategic environmental policy as in the Environment 2010 Strategy islargely based on a perception of the relative seriousness of the problemsidentified, not on what is causing these problems. The Strategy points outthat priorities for environmental policy development in the absence of astrategy such as this tend to be arbitrary and reactive. But the developmentof a strategy itself may be just as arbitrary and reactive, unless there istheoretical, procedural, or methodological justification for the selection ofgoals and principles and assigning priorities. Little or no such justificationis offered in this Strategy.

Any effort to do so, of course, is complicated by the very broad andmulti-disciplinary nature of environmental (policy) studies, the difficulty ofdeveloping a theoretical framework for integrated environmentalmanagement (even on a conceptual level), and the pronounced role ofvalues and ideology in the environmental policy realm. As a result, there areas yet no widely agreed upon key variables or 'pressure points' that can orneed to be manipulated through a strategic approach to advance'environmental health' in a broad sense.

These points are to a large extent acknowledged by the former Secretaryfor the Environment, the 'brain' behind the Environment 2010 Strategy. Hedescribes one of the key issues regarding strategic policy development (ingeneral) as located in the problematic linkage between (departmental)'outputs' (policy advice, measures) and 'outcomes' (goals), and the 'lack ofrobustness of causal theory' in this context [Blakeley, 1995: 9-10]. Theremedy for this is seen in a 'rigorous and well-informed environmentalpolicy priority setting process', to be developed in six stages: (1)comparative risk assessment; (2) the development of 'state of theenvironment' indicators; (3) an assessment of public perceptions of risksand priorities; (4) the gathering of 'comparative heuristic information onhow effective various policy interventions seem to be in advancing desiredoutcomes'; (5) 'a broad assessment of the economic and social costs and

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benefits of possible interventions'; and (6) 'assessment of links andsynergies between possible policy priorities and other aspects of theGovernment's strategy' [7995: 14].

Presently, according to Blakeley, the government is focusing on stages 1and 2, in particular on developing a 'robust comparative risk assessmentframework' and 'indicator development in a limited number of areas.'Without such indicators (presently 'the biggest gap'), it is not possible tomove forward 'robustly' to stages 4, 5, and 6 [Blakeley, 1995: 14-15].

Whether these proposed steps will lead to the allocation of a higherstatus of environmental goals in the government's overarching strategy, orwhether they will lead to the amendment of the theoretical frameworkunderpinning the strategy (including the incorporation of environmental keyfactors), remains to be seen. The (legitimate) role of values and ideologybehind the Environment 2010 Strategy is also acknowledged by Blakeley,who states that 'in the event of a change of government, the newgovernment would be likely to review the Strategy' [1995: 12].

To summarise, the role of the Environment 2010 Strategy, and ofenvironmental goals in general in the New Zealand's government's strategicefforts, is largely subsidiary to the overriding goal of economic growth. Inthe overarching strategy, concern for the environment is almost exclusivelyexpressed in terms of the safeguarding of resources for their exploitation atever increasing levels. Much of the strategic policy development in theenvironmental area is directed at identifying clear 'bottom lines' thatprovide certainty about how far resource use can be taken. Other prioritiesfor future environmental policy development are based on the perceivedrelative seriousness of the environmental problems facing New Zealandsuch as the loss of biodiversity and the depletion of the ozone layer, areformulated alongside the principal goals of the overarching strategy (partlyin the Environment 2010 Strategy), and are not based on an analysis of thefactors behind these problems. In that respect, the environmentalcomponent of the government's strategic efforts is less strategic than theoverall strategy, significantly weaker in its theoretical foundation, andpoorly (if at all) 'integrated'.

Conclusion

This analysis of the New Zealand's Environment 2010 Strategy in thecontext of the government's broader strategic initiatives in the last two yearsprovides support for the view that strategic environmental planning mayhave been adopted for economic (not environmental) reasons, although theinitiative for it may have been inspired by environmental concerns and arecognition of the need to deal with these more effectively than in the past.

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The environmental component of the New Zealand government'sstrategic efforts, including the Environment 2010 Strategy, is only strategicin a limited sense: important problems are identified and goals areformulated, but these are as yet hardly prioritised and, more significantly,are not based on an analysis of where these problems are coming from (notheoretical framework and identification of key factors or variables that canbe manipulated to address these problems most effectively).

The move towards systematic risk assessment may not alter much withregard to the two previous conclusions. Apart from the limitations andquestionable assumptions associated with this [US EnvironmentalProtection Agency, 1984; US Environmental Protection Agency, 1987;Andrews, 1994; Finkel and Golding, 1995], which raise the questionwhether this approach ('technique') can indeed lead to a sensible ranking ofenvironmental problems in order of significance (risk thus equalssignificance), it fits in well with the view that environmental prioritiesshould be set within certain economic constraints, a view which providesthe prime rationale for it. In fact, the 1995 version of the Environment 2010Strategy acknowledges this by mentioning 'an important caveat' ofcomparative environmental risk assessment that was not mentioned in thedraft document, namely that 'it would not be sufficient in itself to determinepriorities' and that 'political constraints and preferences as expressedthrough documents such as Path to 2010, and the fiscal costs of policyaction' are other factors [Ministry for the Environment, 1995b: 59]. Also, itmeans little, if anything, for the development or strengthening of atheoretical framework (and identification of key factors) based on insightsinto and analysis of where these problems are coming from.

The New Zealand developments in strategic policy development alsounderline the 'untouchability' of economic growth and economic policiesfor promoting it. As long as economic policy development and prioritysetting is not opened up by democratisation (public input, provision ofalternative courses or policies), it may prove to be impossible forenvironmental goals and strategies to break into overarching governmentstrategies, and to gain a more strategic place within these.7 The importanceof economic democracy becomes manifest in this context [Btihrs, 1994b].

But the significance of strategic environmental plans or policies, apartfrom their substance and the reasons for their adoption, lies also in theirpotential for further amendment and development, and in a potentialstrengthening of the strategic environmental capability as such. Weak oreven symbolic policies may evolve into more significant policies as theystart leading a life of their own, independent of initial government intentionsor commitment. Such policies may create their own constituencies amongthose who identify with them (for instance, government officials) and who

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develop a commitment towards their implementation or improvement. Theymay also become a platform for new demands and raising issues that werenot originally addressed by the plans or policies.

NOTES

1. Although this earlier version of the Strategy was not labelled as a draft, it was treated as suchby the Ministry for the Environment, which, calling it a "public consultation document"scheduled public meetings and invited submissions from the public.

2. We use the terms 'strategic environmental planning' and 'green plans' interchangeably. Eachterm is used in different countries and contexts to refer to the same phenomenon: thedevelopment of a comprehensive, goal-based approach to environmental policy.

3. Related initiatives have also been taken in Strategic Environmental Assessment. The two arenot mutually exclusive. Strategic environmental assessment is a form of policy appraisal andinvolves the assessment of proposed policies, programmes, and plans in specific areas suchas transport. It is an extension of environmental impact assessment beyond the traditionalfocus on individual projects [Therivet et al., 1992; Therivel and Rosario, 1996]. Strategicenvironmental planning is distinct from strategic environmental assessment inasmuch as itinvolves comprehensive assessment across a whole range of policies and programs andentails the identification of priority goals and problems. Strategic environmental assessmentmay complement strategic environmental planning by informing plans or planning efforts. Itmight also be undertaken for more detailed investigation of options during theimplementation of strategic environmental plans.

4. The 1994 draft Strategy had explicitly linked itself also to The Next Three Years [NewZealand Government, 1994:54].

5. This does not imply that the idea of developing strategic environmental policy originatedwithin the Ministry. As for all ideas, it is impossible and not very useful to try and trace theirorigins. It suffices to say that the chief executive of the Ministry for the Environment thoughtthat the development of an environmental strategy would be a useful means towards thecoordination and integration of hitherto fragmented environmental policies.

6. A total of 36 meetings were held around the country late 1994, 29 of which were publicmeetings open to everyone, and the rest were special meetings set up at the request ofparticular sector or interest groups. The Ministry received more than 200 submissions on theStrategy [Ministry for the Environment, 1995a].

7. Whether the introduction of proportional representation in the New Zealand electoral system in1996 will have an influence on the development of strategic environmental planning is not yetclear. Although it may be more difficult for a coalition government to develop, and stick by,long-term strategic objectives than it is for a single party government, there are many otherfactors that impinge on strategic planning. In the Netherlands, proportional representation hasnot impeded a strong effort in green planning, but the significance or political weight of astrategic environmental plan fluctuates, related to the changing perceptions of the seriousnessof environmental problems relative to other problems [Bührs, 1996].

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Documents

Strategic thinking and the environment: Planning the future in New Zealand?