Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: KarbalaTRADITIONS OF BLOODSHED: THE BATTLES OF KARBALA AND THE ROLE OF AIR POWER

William Head 78ABW Office of History Robins AFB

Even before there were airplanes history records a notable Battle of Karbala, in present day Iraq. This first bloodletting took place in October 680 between Islamic factions. The most recent combat occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) when advancing Coalition forces on the southern route to Baghdad had to take the city of Karbala and the Karbala gap in order to open the way to final “victory” during the invasion phase of OIF. Over those 1,323 years the ability to kill one’s fellow man had expanded to include the use of high tech aerial weapons. While the original battle occurred when flight was only a part of Arabian Knights’ tales, by 2003, military aircraft had become a key component for attaining control of the battlefield.

Opening a Wound: The First Battle of Karbala

The first famous battle near Karbala took place during Muharram or 10 October 680 CE. One side was led by al-Husayn Ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and son of Ali, the fourth caliph. The other was led by Umar ibn Sa’ad sent by Caliph Yazid I of the Umayyad (Omayyad) Dynasty. Al-Husayn’s group had fewer than 100 men, women, and children. Most were close relatives of the prophet Muhammad. The battle took place in a desert region located just opposite one of the tributaries of the Euphrates River. Completely outnumbered, al-Husayn

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbalaibn Ali’s men fought to the death to protect their families. Ultimately, the men were massacred, while the women and children were taken into captivity. The immediate result was total control of the fledgling Islamic movement by the Umayyads. However, its cruelty led to subsequent revolts and the downfall of the dynasty. Since the battle, al-Husayn ibn Ali has been honored by Shi’ites during an annual 10-day celebration held every Muharram and culminating on Ashura, the tenth day. Today, Karbala is one of the holiest Shi’ite cities in Islam.1

Modern day Karbala

The Evolution of Social, Political, and Military Conflict in the Region

The massacre at Karbala in 680 C.E. facilitated the rift in Islam that exists until this very day and that has contributed to the conflicts in the modern Persian Gulf and Mid-East regions of the world. America’s involvement was born out of its rush to fill the vacuum of power after World War II when colonial powers such as Great Britain and France withdrew from the developing nations of what was once known as the Third World. The United States’ support of Israel during the Arab-Israeli Wars drew the nation deeper and deeper into the politics of the area and eventually led them into combat. In 1980s, as U.S.-Iranian relations reached an historic low, President Ronald Reagan provided Iran’s neighbor Iraq with weapons and other support in its bloody and protracted war with Iran in order to provide a counter balance in the area. Since one nation was Sunni and the other Shia, this balancing act was not just about politics but also focused on socio-religious issues. Indeed, the battle mentioned earlier had led to the evolution of one region, later nation, into a Persian Sunni state and the other into an Arab Shi’ite state. These nations were the product of World War I and World War II political maneuvering by the states of Western Europe and after WW II grew into this later day conflict.2

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In 1979, a Ba’athist Secularist Saddam Hussein seized power and began a reign of terror among his own people, especially minority cultural and religious groups. His war with Iran designed to reunite the core of the people in the nation had a high cost in lives and resources and left Iraq nearly bankrupt. Seeking to remedy his economic problems he struck out against his oil rich neighbor Kuwait. As a result, America’s erstwhile ally soon became its battlefield enemy when in 1990 Iraq invaded their tiny neighbor of Kuwait. Led by the U.S., a coalition of states denounced the invasion as naked aggression and demanded the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein withdraw his troops or face sanctions and perhaps military action by the allied states. In truth the basic reason for America’s concerns proved to be her anxieties for her nearby ally Saudi Arabia who was important for the supply of oil and other petroleum resources to America and dozens of her allies such as Great Britain, Japan, and Germany.

Once President George H. W. Bush convinced both the U.S. Congress and the United Nations of the virtue of his cause, war broke out between the Coalition forces and Iraq on 17 January 1991. This took the form of air strikes that first destroyed Iraqi Command, Control, and Communication (C3) centers in Baghdad and then expanded to the destruction of Iraqi ground forces, industrial and arms production centers, and eventually SCUD missile launch sites. In one spectacular example of the efficacy of Allied Airpower they even helped capped hundreds of oil well fires designed by Saddam Hussein to create ecological terrorism. In fact, the 38-day air campaign proved so devastating that by the time the ground campaign began, in late February, it took less than a week for Coalition army forces to retake Kuwait City and end the war with a sweeping victory.3

For the next 12 years Hussein and the U.S. played an aggravating game where the dictator would first deny weapons inspectors access to his nation and at the last minute relent. Religious factions caused tensions to rise in the area and led to the U.S. implementing no fly zones to protect Shi’ites, Kurd’s, and other minority cultural groups. The tension grew when it was discovered that the former President Bush had been targeted for assassination by the Iraqis during his visit to the area. While President Clinton responded with Cruise Missile strikes, when the elder Bush’s son, George W. Bush became President he began to seek ways to eliminate the dictator from power.

Conflicts in and around Karbala during OIF

Only weeks after he became President and roughly eight months before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), George W. Bush, advised by his neo-Conservative (Neo-Con) adviser, had ordered an operational plan be drawn up to invade Iraq and capture Baghdad. As a result, more than 1,300 years after the battle of 680, two modern military forces would meet in a series of engagements that proved pivotal in the outcome of the invasion phase of the Second Persian Gulf War. President George W. Bush announced the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom on 19 March 2003, during a live national television address. In his speech the President declared he had authorized the mission to rid Iraq of the tyrannical dictator, Saddam Hussein, and eliminate Hussein’s ability to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). According to President Bush, this was part of his pledge to use unilateral, pre-emptive strikes, if necessary, against nations believed to be dangerous to American national security. He claimed this was a part of the retaliatory process against militant Islamic fundamentalist terrorists who

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbalahad hijacked U.S. commercial airliners on 9/11 and flown them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon killing nearly 3,000 people.4

The March toward War in 2003

According to the Bush Administration, immediately following the 9/11 attacks, U.S. intelligence agencies increased investigations into Iraq’s possible connection to the terrorist organization al-Qaeda, which was responsible for the attacks. In his second State of the Union address in late January 2002, Bush identified Iraq as one of several “rogue nations” that financed and trained terrorists. He pointed to now-disputed intelligence that seemed to indicate that Iraq was negotiating with Niger to purchase vast quantities of yellowcake uranium (a product associated with the production of uranium ore) with the intent of creating WMDs.

Between 2002 and early 2003, United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors tried to discover if Hussein had violated UN resolutions against manufacturing biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons. Throughout; Hussein stalled in complying with the inspections. At first, after unsuccessful attempts to enlist the support of key UN Security Council nations including France and Germany, Bush announced the U.S. was prepared to launch military actions against Iraq. Eventually, Britain agreed to join in the attack. On 15 March, Bush gave Hussein and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or face war, a demand they defied. The UN inspectors evacuated Iraq on 17 March with incomplete reports on Iraq’s WMD capabilities. After gathering the support of a small contingent of international supporters, including Britain, Belgium, and Spain, Bush gave the green light to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom on 19 March.

In his speech to the nation at 1445 hours, Bush told the American public that Iraq was the next target in an ongoing, worldwide battle against terrorism that had begun with America’s attack on Afghanistan’s Taliban government on 7 October 2001. The President warned that “helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable, and free country will require our sustained commitment” and appeared to acknowledge substantial domestic opposition to the war by stating he “reluctantly” authorized military force but reaffirmed his Administration’s refusal to “live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder.” 5

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Invasion Map

In later years, President Bush was roundly criticized for the invasion. Critics claimed his administration primarily sought control of Iraq’s vast oil resources, or that the war was in retaliation for Saddam Hussein’s attempt on former President George H.W. Bush’s life in 1990. In addition, disclosures that the intelligence regarding the supposed Iraq and Niger yellowcake uranium deal was faulty reinforced the arguments against the Iraq war. Bush denied accusations that he and his advisors manipulated intelligence to justify a war and insisted the paramount goal was to rid Iraq of Hussein, stabilize the Middle East, and bring democracy to Iraq. While the dictator had gone into hiding shortly after the invasion began, U.S. forces finally captured Hussein on 14 December 2003.

Although Bush announced “mission accomplished” and the end of combat operations on 1 May 2003, Iraq continued to experience ongoing violence by insurgents while U.S. and Coalition troops and civilian contractors attempted to train an Iraqi army and police force and establish a freely elected government. In the first four years of OIF, American casualties totaled more than 3,000 with more than 23,000 wounded, while Iraqi civilian casualties were estimated at more than 50,000.6

One key issue to come out of the invasion itself must be the tactical plan used to defeat the Hussein regime. In 1990-1991, Airpower had led the way to a swift and relatively easy victory. Few Coalition forces were killed or wounded and the conflict was wildly popular at home in the U.S. Instead, this invasion plan focused on ground forces and took more than 40 days to complete. In many cases when the ground units were bogged down by Iraqi resistance they called in air strikes to blow open the defenses they faced. Ultimately, first phase this war

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbalatook slightly longer than the First Gulf War. However, the first war was basically over when the treaties were signed. In spite of the President’s speech on 1 May 2003, this war was far from over. It was not until November 2011 that U.S. troops officially withdrew. The bloodiest battles of the war took place in places like Al-Fallujah, long after the President declared “mission accomplished.” Roughly 4,500 Americans died during this period and 30,000 were wounded. In addition, the Iraqi war diverted resources from the original war in Afghanistan which has still not ended. Last, but not least, many Middle Eastern experts argue that the rise and success of ISIS was born out of the U.S. destabilization of the region and the rise of anti-American/Western resentment evolving from the Second Gulf War and the creation of the prison facility at Guantanamo, Cuba.7

Recounting the Invasion

The Coalition invasion began the same Wednesday night the President made his speech to the nation. It commenced with air and missile attacks against key Iraqi leaders such as Saddam Hussein as well as important Command, Communications, and Control (C3) targets mostly in and around Baghdad. On the night of 21 March 2003, B-52Hs launched at least one hundred AGM-86C Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCMs) at significant locations inside Iraq.8 This decapitation strike was followed by attacks by units of the Army’s 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Division and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) supported by British ground and Royal Air Force (RAF) air assaults, which seized control of the Faw Peninsular. Simultaneously, other Marine units captured the port of Umm Qasar. Allied aircraft also ramped up their strikes against targets in Baghdad unleashing their “shock and awe” air campaign. They also assaulted Saddam Hussein’s ancestral home near Tikrit. Ground attacks against Mosul and Kirkuk, in the north, resulted in the surrender of 8,000 troops of the 51st Iraq Army Division. All the while, aircraft of varying kinds continued to strike ahead of the rapidly advancing Coalition ground forces flying 1,500 Air Force and Navy aerial sorties.9

Even as Allied units came within reach of Karbala on 22-23 March, Iraqi troops bloodied a Marine unit in an ambush near the southeastern city of Nasiriya. This action caused Coalition leaders to rethink the direction of their advance and, eventually, led to the combat that took place in Karbala. At this point, Allied Air Power had already had a devastating impact on Iraqi defenses and allowed ground forces to push 150 miles into Iraq and cross the Euphrates River. Air strikes had beaten back enemy units near the river’s bridges and kept them from destroying the access routes toward Baghdad. This meant the speedy push could continue to make rapid progress toward ultimate conquest.10

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Among the aircraft providing Close Air Support were the A-10 Warthogs

The Battles for Karbala Begin

Of the many engagements by Coalition forces during this invasion, some of the most important proved to be the ones in and near Karbala. These battles in Karbala and at Karbala Gap lasted from 23 March 2003 to 6 April 2003. By the 21st century, Karbala had become a city of 572,300 people in the center of Iraq near a strategic cross-roads leading to the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. During the initial phase of the 2003 Allied invasion of Iraq, advance units of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, after pushing their way through Republican Guard forces southeast of Karbala, arrived near the area on 22-23 March 2003. While some troops kept a watchful eye on the Iraqis in Karbala, the main body made plans to bypass the city and attack Baghdad through the heavily defended Karbala Gap. This meant Allied forces would eventually have to defeat the Iraqis in Karbala at some later date.11

The initial helicopter assault actually began on 24 March 2003, several hours before the main body of the 3rd Division moved around Karbala toward Baghdad. That morning, units of the 11th Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, struck members of the Republican Guard’s 2nd Iraqi Armored Brigade, Medina Division. Allied leaders decided to strike the Medina Division, which was mostly deployed along the Karbala Gap, west of the city of Karbala itself, since they were the best equipped Iraqi unit, and its destruction would devastate Iraqi military morale. Instead, the Medina Division absorbed only minor damage during the engagement. Afterward, experts determined this had been Iraq’s only “real” victory during the invasion.12

One of the worst aspects of the engagement came when the Iraqis shot down an American AH-64 Apache helicopter intact. They captured the two pilots and showed them off on television along with the helicopter. Subsequently, Pentagon officials stated the captured Apache was destroyed by a U.S. Air Force airstrike the following day. Iraqi officials claimed a farmer with a Brno rifle shot down the Apache, a claim the farmer later denied.13 In fact, the claim seemed ridiculous since the rifle mentioned was a Czech-made Turkish post World War I rifle with limited capabilities. Even so, the news of these events improved Iraqi optimism, which was already high after putting up such stiff resistance at the Battle of Nasiriya. Ultimately, this initial attack went from an expected continuation of America’s “shock and awe” tactics that had demoralized the enemy during the first Gulf War, to an embarrassment.14

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The AH-64s had been experiencing several tactical problems before the operation. While they were built to be used in open and flat terrain, the area around the Iraqi capital was not desert, rather a metropolitan environment replete with urban sprawl. This was a lesson that should have been learned during the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu. This battle had already demonstrated that helicopters, like these, were vulnerable over cities. Moreover, Karbala’s urban area still had electricity, since its infrastructure had been spared to hasten post-war recovery. Allied intelligence was also faulty, and the information on the enemy’s disposition proved to be wrong. This forced the helicopters to search the target area themselves. Prior to the attack, intelligence reports had identified 30 T-72 tanks in the area. They were not present at all!

To make matters worse, officials’ decision to speed up their timetable caused coordination issues. The 3rd Infantry Division moved ahead of schedule causing the mission to be pushed up 24 hours. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) sorties were launched faster than anticipated, and the Apaches were not ready to join the mission. As a result, they arrived after a three hour delay, and the SEAD fighter-bombers had departed leaving the helicopters without support. The three hour delay provided Iraqi air defenses time to recover.15

AH-64D Apache Longbow Specifics of the Engagement

This engagement in Karbala began when the 31 AH-64 Apaches of the U.S. 11th Regiment launched from RAMS Base, which was an objective captured early in the advance. The base had become a supply and refueling center for Coalition forces. On 23-24 March 2003, American troops had taken Objective RAMS, which was located only a few miles southwest of An Najaf. From here, they had made plans to move against An Najaf and Karbala.16

Things immediately went wrong. One helicopter crashed soon after takeoff when its pilot became disoriented. As the remaining choppers turned north toward Karbala, intelligence

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbalalistening stations picked up over 50 Iraqi cell phone calls alerting their forward units of the AH-64s’ approach. The Iraqis signal forces immediately alerted their troops to open fire by turning off, and then a few second later, on the area’s lights. Iraqi ground troops, having recovered from the mistimed SEAD assault, opened up with small arms and heavy weapons. Lieutenant Jason King, pilot of Apache “Palerider 16,” was hit in the neck by a 7.62 mm round from an Avtomat Kalashnikova Modernizirovanniy (AKM)-47 assault rifle. This was a modern variant of the AK-47 designed and developed by Mikhail Kalashnikov in the 1940s. While grievously wounded, King never lost consciousness while making an emergency landing. He was later evacuated to Germany for surgery and survived the ordeal.17

Since most of the enemy fire came from houses and there was a high risk of collateral damage, the AH-64 crews were reluctant to return fire. Instead, they scattered in search of the Medina Division but were, again, hampered by poor intelligence. AH-64 “Vampire 12,” flown by Warrant Officers David S. Williams and Ronald D. Young Jr., was forced down after gunfire severed the hydraulics. The air commander’s radio was also hit, preventing communication with the other helicopters. The Apaches turned for home after a half-hour of combat. Most were without functioning navigation or sighting equipment. At least two narrowly avoided a mid-air collision. It had been a most unsatisfactory mission. After-action analysis indicated the U.S. gunships were targeted in a planned ambush with cannon fire, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and small-arms all coming from multiple camouflaged fire teams.18

Planned Invasion Objectives during OIF

Army Secretary Thomas E. White was deeply disappointed by the outcome of the battle declaring, “We were very fortunate we didn’t lose more aircraft.”19 Of the 29 AH-64s that

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbalareturned, all but one endured severe damage. Each one had 15 to 20 bullet holes. One had suffered 29 hits. In addition, there was significant damage to sixteen main rotor blades, six tail blades, six engines, and five drive shafts. Most were damaged beyond repair. In the after-action report, one squadron stated they had only a single airworthy helicopter left. The 11th Regiment required a month to recover enough to be ready to fight again. These were terrible lessons to learn, but learn them they did. As a result of the damage sustained by the Apaches, leadership initiated a change of tactics by placing significant restrictions on the use of helicopter gunships. They directed that attack helicopters only be employed to discover the location of enemy troops, so they could be destroyed by artillery and air strikes by fixed-wing aircraft.20

With this initial assault declared a failure, American leaders determined an all-out attack

was necessary. This task fell to the 101st Airborne Division, supported by the 2nd Battalion, 70th Armored Regiment 1st Armored Division. On 24-25 March 2003, things got worse when the Pentagon confirmed that two AH-64 crew members had been captured. They were David S. Williams of Florida and Ronald D. Young of Georgia. In spite of this terrible news, the offensive pressed on. With ground troops only 60 miles from Baghdad, Coalition Air Power continued to clear a path toward the Iraqi capital. Now began the next phase of the ground combat around Karbala.21

The Attack on the Republican Guard

On 25 March, American-led Allied forces devastated a large unit of Iraqi troops in a major land engagement near An Najaf in the Euphrates River Valley, killing more than 200.22 As this engagement was underway, other U.S. Army troops confronted thousands of Republican Guard soldiers at the entrance of the strategic Karbala Gap, about 50 miles south of Baghdad, in what U.S. and British officials called “one of the most crucial -- and perilous -- encounters so

B-52H Carpet Bombing Area Targets

far in the war.”23 As the ground engagement erupted at the southern end of the pass, B-52 “Stratofortress” bombers carpet-bombed Republican Guard positions to the north of the gap to facilitate the ground advance and weaken the enemy before the battle for Baghdad began. Even as units of the 2nd Brigade of the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division sped across the high desert to the south and west of the gap, facing three brigades of the Guard’s elite Medina Division on the other side, air assets continued to obliterate key targets throughout the area of operation.24

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On 26 March, in an action designed to open a northern front, 1,000 U.S. paratroopers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade jumped into Kurdish-held territory to secure an airfield for Allied use. This airfield afforded the Coalition airlift units the capability to bring in armor and humanitarian supplies for the advancing ground units and Iraqi citizenry.25

With Coalition ground forces grinding toward the mountain pass near Karbala, questions arose over whether or not Saddam Hussein, who had supposedly appeared live on television, was actually still in power. In the audacious presentation, he had vowed that “victory will soon be ours.” In a last ditch effort to halt the massive Allied advance, Iraqi leadership sent an armored column, south, toward the mountain gap near Karbala. This Shi’ite Muslim holy city and strangle point for troops advancing on Baghdad had already been the site of one engagement and, now, the pass to the north would be the location for another. It began when Allied aircraft destroyed ten tanks in the advancing Iraqi column and several other armored vehicles. The impact of the airstrike halted the Iraqis in their tracks. Unfortunately, yet another U.S. helicopter was forced down during heavy fighting near Karbala, and its crew members became the sixth and seventh Americans to be captured by the Iraqis.26

The Battle of Karbala

With combat operations swirling all around the bypassed Shi’ite holy city, it soon became clear that a second engagement was in the offing and this time in Karbala itself. What became known as the Battle of Karbala actually was brought on when, on 29 March, a suicide bomber, later identified as Ali Jaafar al-Noamani, an Iraqi noncommissioned officer, killed four American servicemen, specifically, Sargent Eugene Williams, Corporal Michael Curtin, and Privates 1st Class Michael Weldon and Diego Rincon, on Highway 9 on the outskirts of Karbala.27

As noted earlier, two days later, major lead elements of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division were on the outskirts of Karbala where they joined the fight against the Republican Guard forces southeast of the city. Once they pushed through the combat area, they bypassed the city and drove through the Karbala Gap towards Baghdad. To avoid having a potential enemy stronghold at its back, Coalition leaders gave the task of clearing the city to the 101st Airborne Division supported by the 2nd Battalion, 70th Armored Regiment, and Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Division. The Americans were already anxious to seize the city, which had been the source of so many losses. By early April, things had become personal. This feeling only became more intense when, on 2 April 2003, a U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter was shot down by small arms fire near Karbala killing 7 soldiers. Four other soldiers onboard were wounded.28

Planners in the 101st determined to use helicopter-borne forces to seize three landing zones (LZs) on the outskirts of the city. They designated those codenames Sparrow, Finch, and Robin. In turn, they decided to coordinate this landing with an assault by an armored force of M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles linking up with troops fanning out from the LZs. The tactical plan worked exactly as planned. At 1100 hours, on 5 April, the 101st Airborne’s Division’s troops swept into Karbala following several successful airstrikes hitting targets all around the city. With this action underway, 23 UH-60 Blackhawk and 5 CH-47 Chinook helicopters transported three battalions of infantry from the 502nd Infantry Regiment to

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbalatheir designated landing zones. Forces at LZ Sparrow ran headlong into heavy but disorganized resistance as they moved into the city. To the south, members from the Second Battalion landed at LZ Robin and quickly moved, street by street, where they discovered several arms caches hidden in hospitals and schools. They also uncovered a suspected insurgent training camp.

By nightfall, they had cleared 23 of their 30 assigned sectors. The 1st Battalion pushed forward from LZ Finch in the southeast and also captured several weapons caches. Air support from helicopter gunships as well as artillery support was used in the operation. The artillerists used roughly 100 smoke shells to act as a screen for infantry moving through the streets and alleyways of Karbala. Concurrently, the 2nd Battalion of the 70 Armored Regiment and Charlie Company, First Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment (Mechanized) had reached Karbala and were engaged in combat, losing one man killed from small arms fire and a Bradley to an RPG.29

Pulling Down the Regime of Saddam Hussein

The next day, the units continued to clear their sectors until resistance evaporated around 1700 hours. Thirty minutes later, soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 70th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division, tore down a large statue of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. This symbolic gesture marked the end of this phase of the struggles in and around Karbala. In the end, the enemy lost 254 men killed, while the Americans lost 21 killed, one M-1 tank disabled, one M2A2 Bradley destroyed, one Navy FA-18 Hornet shot down, and one UH-60 shot down.30

Collateral Combat

Even as the 101st was planning the seizure of the city itself, the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division launched heavy attacks on Iraqi positions north of Karbala, where 2,000 paramilitary members of the Saddam Fedayeen and the Baath Party were dug in. The attacks began around midnight on 2 April 2003. At least 20 Iraqi were killed and an unknown number of fighters were taken prisoner. Lt. Col. Scott Rutter, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, later reported that Iraqi troops concentrated their attacks on his battalion allowing the rest of the brigade to pass into the Karbala Gap unscathed. This proved to be very important since the mountain gap was a chokepoint between a lake to the west and the city of Karbala to

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbalathe east and it opened onto a sweeping plain where Coalition forces were able break out and rush forward toward Baghdad.31

Further to the east, U.S. Marines seized an important bridge over the Tigris River near the city of al-Kut amid fighting with the Baghdad Division of the Republican Guard. The bridgehead allowed thousands of Marines from the 1 MEF to cross the river in their push toward Baghdad from the southeast.32 That night, around Karbala, even as Iraqi defenders fired anti-aircraft guns skyward, B-52 bombers circled Karbala carpet-bombing some areas while U.S. Air Force and Navy fighters went after more specific targets. The next day, the Allies fired Tomahawk cruise missiles and launched more airstrikes pounding positions held by the Republican Guard’s Medina Division near Karbala. As the assaults waned, Army units smashed into the remnants of the Medina Division in an effort to eliminate the Guard before ground troops moved on toward Baghdad. For more than a week, coalition airstrikes and artillery barrages had devastated Guard units to the south, west, and north of the capital. General Richard Myers, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported, “The Medina Division’s fighting strength had been reduced by more than half.” He added, “The Republican Guard’s Baghdad Division, centered near the city of al-Kut to the southeast, also has been similarly worn down.”33

The Advance Moves Forward: Seizing the Bridges

The Battle of the Karbala Gap

Even as the Coalition was taking Karbala itself, a battle to take the vital mountain pass leading out of Karbala and onto Baghdad was underway. The Karbala Gap is a 20–25-mile wide strip of land with the Euphrates River on the east and Lake Razazah (also known as Lake Milh) on the west. The moment for the great battle on the road to Baghdad had arrived. To quote an article on the battle, “Near Karbala, the Army’s Third Infantry Division hoped to find the battle it has been looking for: a climactic showdown with the elite troops of Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard. The U.S. goal was twofold: to blow through the Karbala Gap and open the road to Baghdad, as well as to pin and crush the Medina Division and any other Republican Guard force blocking the way.”34

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As OIF unfolded, Iraqi military leaders realized this strip of land was a key approach to the capital city of Baghdad. As a result, they moved their elite Medina and Nebuchadnezzar Divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard into position to defend the area against the Allied advance toward Baghdad. From the outset, Lt. Gen. Ra’ad al-Hamdani, commander of these forces, recognized he would need even more troops in order to hold back the powerful and highly mobile Coalition forces on the way. He argued vehemently for the additional troops to no avail. Iraqi military leaders in the capital rejected his appeals mainly due to the fact that President Saddam Hussein wanted to keep as many troops as possible around the capital to defend against an attack from Turkey in the north. Besides, they were afraid of disobeying the dictator’s orders and having these troops cut off and unable to retire to help in the defense of Baghdad.35

Lt. Gen. Ra’ad al-Hamdani

As the engagement became inevitable, U.S. military leaders at the Central Command (CENTCOM) forward headquarters told members of the Reuters News Agency that, “This is the big battle for the Karbala Gap!”36 Allied forces, led by the 3rd Division and commanded by Maj. Gen. Buford Blount II, determined to attack Iraqi forces in the area first with massive airstrikes followed by concentrated armored thrusts which would result in the Iraqi units being surrounded and annihilated.37 Not only did U.S. planners pour in Coalition Air Power, they used a wide variation of weapons platforms that included B-52 heavy bombers, which dropped 500-pound iron bombs in carpeted patterns all over the enemy’s defensive positions. The success of these aerial raids, limited as they were, raises the question as to why, in this second war with Iraq, Coalition leaders had not followed the pattern of the first war in which massive and prolonged airstrikes preceded the ground campaign leaving the Iraqi forces so devastated that the ground forces cut through the remaining Iraqi defenses like a hot knife through butter.

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President Bush honors Maj. Gen. Buford Blount II

Details of the Struggle

Originally, the Iraqi high command positioned the aforementioned two Guard divisions to block the Karbala Gap. Throughout the combat in this area, U.S. and British Air Power inflicted heavy casualties on these units degrading them by 30-40 percent by the time the ground battle began. However, while, in retrospect, it is easy to criticize the losers in any war, their reasoning was not altogether flawed. Since early March, Coalition covert operations personnel had been artfully conducting a strategic deception campaign to deceive the Iraqis into believing the American 4th Infantry Division would make the major assault into northern Iraq from Turkey. Much as the Allies had tricked the Germans into believing the cross channel invasion on 6 June 1944 would be made at the Pas d ’Calais and be led by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, the success of this operation in Iraq had a direct effect on the outcome of the war.38

This deception plan worked so well that on 2 April 2003, Saddam Hussein’s son Qusay Hussein, asserted that the American invasion from the south was a feint and ordered troops to be re-deployed from the Karbala front to the north of Baghdad. As noted above, Lt. Gen. Raad al-Hamdani, commander of the Karbala region, protested this radical strategic departure and argued that unless reinforcements were rushed to the Karbala Gap immediately to prevent a breach, the fate of Baghdad would be determined within 48 hours. His recommendations fell on deaf ears, and the fate of the Hussein regime was all but sealed!39

Even as this misstep occurred, Allied troops rushed through the gap and reached the Euphrates River at the town of Musayib. They paused, for a moment, expecting an Iraqi chemical attack which did not materialize. At Musayib, U.S. troops crossed the Euphrates in small boats and seized the vital al-Kaed bridge, better known as Objective Peach. Once across the Euphrates, they were able to prevent Iraqi demolition teams from blowing up the bridge. Soon, the Allies’ heavy units began to cross into the city to take it over. Hearing of this disaster, Iraqi leadership ordered Lt. Gen. Hamdani to launch an immediate counterattack. After the war, Hamdani said his units were in no condition to launch an immediate counterattack and that he had wanted to setup a defensive line along the Usfiyah River in order to contain the Allied breakthrough. Ultimately, he relented and his exhausted troops launched a counterattack on the night of 2, and the early morning of 3 April 2003.40

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The Counter Attack

The counter stroke was spearheaded by the 10th Armored Brigade of the Medina Division and the 22nd Armored Brigade of the Nebuchadnezzar Division supported by massed artillery. The strike was launched at night against the Allied bridgehead at Musayib. Even though the Iraqis made the assault in earnest, the attack was violently repulsed by tank fire and massed artillery rockets, which destroyed or disabled every Iraqi tank in the assault. The next morning, Coalition strike aircraft and helicopters savaged the remainder of the Republican Guard units destroying many more vehicles and wiping out their communications infrastructure. The Republican Guard units disintegrated under the massed firepower and lost any sense of

Key Objectives between Karbala and Baghdad

command and cohesion. By the end of the day, the tanks of the 3rd Infantry Division had overrun Lt. Gen. Hamdani’s headquarters and Hamdani and his staff fled. At the end of this engagement, American forces had suffered none killed by Iraqi fire, while Iraqi losses were counted at 233 killed. Even so, the Iraqi counterattacks had caused much confusion, which had led to the friendly fire death of Captain Edward Korn on 3 April in the Karbala Gap.41

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An Iraqi Casualty—the Human Face of War and its Tragedies

The End of the Medina Division

On 3 April, as the combat around Musayib raged on, other elements of the 3rd Infantry Division engaged Iraqi forces surrounding the Baghdad International Airport and soon took control of this vital position. As this unit secured the captured airport and moved against the capital city itself, American military commanders decided to finish off the vestiges of the Medina Division which were still present south of Baghdad. Their plan was to take these Iraqis from behind, while they were engaging other units to their front. The 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division, commanded by Col. David Perkins, was sent to the southwest towards Objective Saints, the codename for the intersection between highways 1 and 8. Iraqi dismounted infantry defended this interchange. During the engagement, the U.S. had one M-1 Abrams tank disabled by an RPG and one American soldier wounded. Both were quickly patched up and returned to their units.42

Following the seizure of Objective Saints, the 2nd Brigade moved south and engaged the remnants of the 10th and 2nd Brigades of the Medina Division. Despite Allied reports that 80 percent of the Medina Division’s vehicles had been destroyed, the truth proved to be much different. The Iraqis had redeployed their vehicles away from their prepared defenses and hidden them near buildings and in palm groves, saving the majority of them from the devastating Coalition air attacks. As a result, hundreds of Iraqi tanks, Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), and artillery were capable of fighting back. On the other hand, the Iraqi troops, with little hope of reinforcements or victory, were becoming increasingly reluctant to continue the fight and/or make useless gestures of defiance. Thus, when the U.S. tank units attacked, they quickly tore through the Iraqi vehicles and defenses destroying many of them at point blank range. Even with all their vehicles in place, the Iraqi defense was un-coordinated, and many troops surrendered

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbalawithout a fight or discarded their uniforms, put on civilian clothes, and deserted as the fighting continued. It soon became evident to the Americans that the expected resistance had evaporated. By mid-day on 4 April, the Medina Division ceased to exist as an effective fighting force.43

The Results

As night fell on 4 April 2003, the Battle of the Karbala Gap was over. It had been a one-sided engagement during which elements of the 3rd Infantry Division annihilated the best units in the Republican Guard while absorbing minimal losses. In fact, during the Battle of Karbala Gap, only one American died and that was the aforementioned Captain Edward Korn who was killed by friendly fire. The U.S. had one tank damaged. The Iraqis suffered nearly a thousand casualties and had hundreds of armored vehicles destroyed. The destruction of these elite units left the door to Baghdad wide open for the Allies. The next day, Col. Perkins led the first armored strike through southern Baghdad known as a “Thunder Run.” This marked the beginning of the end of the invasion and the regime of Saddam Hussein. By 10 April 2003, Baghdad had fallen. In one last act of defiance, four days later, the Republican Guard scored a direct hit on the 3rd Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade’s Tactical Operations Center, with an Al-Samoud variant rocket which killed 3 soldiers, 2 foreign news reporters, wounded 14 more soldiers, and destroyed 22 vehicles, mostly unarmored Humvees.44

President Bush on the USS Abraham Lincoln

On 1 May 2003, 43 days after the invasion of Iraq began, President George W. Bush landed on the deck of the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and declared “mission accomplished.” In his speech, he announced that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended.” Now the occupation phase began with the search for the leaders of the Hussein regime. On 22 July 2003, Uday and Qusay Hussien were killed in a fire fight and on 14 December, their father, Saddam Hussein, was captured while hiding in a small hole in the ground.45

The Role of Air Power

Throughout the invasion of Iraq, Air Power became one of the primary combat assets employed. On 19 March 2003, even before ground operations began, Air Force F-117 stealth

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbalafighters, based on intelligence reports that Saddam was in the area, struck the Dora Farms complex southwest of Baghdad. While the mission went off without a hitch, and the ensuing

The Capture of the Dictator

pyrotechnical display proved to be spectacular, the goal of the attack was not successful. The next day, as ground operations began, a variety of Air Force aircraft began aerial attacks in front of the advancing ground armies striking key targets in and around Baghdad. In total, during the first day of the invasion, Coalition air forces launched more than 1,700 air sorties and missiles against Iraq. During this 43-day invasion phase of OIF, roughly 68 percent of the ordnance employed was precision-guided munitions (PGMs).  Since Turkey refused to allow Allied air assets to use their air bases to deliver troops and supplies into Northern Iraq, Coalition Forces needed an airfield in Iraq.  On 26 March 2003, C-130 Hercules and C-17 Globemaster III cargo transport aircraft airlifted nearly 1,000 paratroopers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade as well as members of the Air Force’s 86th Contingency Response Group into Bashur airfield near Erbil in Northern Iraq to help secure the airfield.  That marked the first time the C-17 had been used in a combat airdrop.  By 6 April 2003, Central Air Forces (CENTAF) leadership declared air supremacy over all of Iraq and, ten days later, the first humanitarian relief flights landed at Bashur airfield.46

In addition, to combat and supply missions, the Coalition air forces flew nearly 1,000 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) sorties during the initial weeks of OIF gathering 42,000 battlefield images and more than 3,000 hours of video film. According to Capt. Greg Ball, Ph.D.’s official report, by 30 April 2003, Allied air assets numbered 1,801 aircraft, 863 of which were U.S. Air Force fighters, bombers, tankers, special operations/rescue aircraft, transport aircraft, and ISR/C3 aircraft. In the first six weeks, Coalition air forces flew more than 41,000 sorties with the U.S. Air Force accounting for more than 24,000 of this total. Likewise, Air Force C-130 aircraft transported over 12,000 short tons of materiel during the initial stages of the operation. Air Force aerial tankers flew more than 6,000 sorties and distributed more than

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbala376 million pounds of fuel. By the end of April 2003, the Air Force had 54,955 active duty personnel in Iraq along with 2,084 Air Force Reserve personnel and 7,207 members of the Air National Guard (ANG). In addition, Air Force officials had requested support from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) for only the second time in its history. The first time had come only 12 years earlier during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Although only active for four months, CRAF units transported nearly 100,000 troops to the Area of Operations.47

Among the new components used during OIF was the Air Force’s Global Mobility Task Forces (GMTF), which accompanied advanced forces and made determinations on whether or not captured airfields could be quickly converted for Coalition use as logistics hubs or Close Air Support (CAS) bases. The efficacy of these teams, in identifying suitable bases, led Allied leaders to position the first Coalition aircraft inside Iraq on 4 April 2003. These were Air Force A-10s which were stationed at Tallil Airfield.48

The War Was Over—Right!?

When President Bush declared an end to combat operations on 1 May 2003, the socio-political circumstances in Iraq had been thoroughly destabilized with little security and considerable plundering by Iraqi civilians. As this situation deteriorated, Allied forces quickly found themselves facing an insurgency brought on by a plethora of factors, including a lack of infrastructure and basic human services, as well as ethnic and religious tensions. For these and other reasons, in the years after the invasion of 2003, the Air Force maintained a continuous presence in Iraq until President Barrack Obama withdrew all combat troops in November 2011.49

Following Hussein’s capture, the U.S. turned the dictator over to the new interim Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). They, in turn, created the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), made up of five Iraqi judges, to try Hussein and his aides for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. After two lengthy and, by many accounts (such as Amnesty International/Human Rights Watch), “show trials,” he was convicted of all charges and sentenced to death. While many believed Hussein likely got what he deserved, they also agreed that the process was clearly flawed.50

On 30 December 2006, he was hanged in Kadhimiya, Iraq and buried next to his sons in Tikrit, his home town.51 Surely, at this point, the war in Iraq was finally over, and U.S. troops could come home. However, this was not the case. The shaky Iraqi government was still too fragile to survive alone, and their security forces required more training. Ironically, the bloodiest combat of the entire OIF venture came after “victory” had been declared by the President. For example, U.S. air and ground forces attacked the city of Al-Fallujah three times in 2004-2005. They eventually captured it, only to have it retaken by enemy fighters after the Americans departed. In fact, as noted, it was not until November 2011, that President Obama finally declared the campaign in Iraq over and withdrew all U.S. combat forces.52

Analysis

After more than a decade, President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq on 19 March 2003 remains controversial. As mentioned earlier, the Bush Administration attempted to justify the

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Virginia Review of Asian Studies Volume 18 (2016): 133-159 Head: Karbalainvasion by linking it to the events that occurred on 11 September 2001. They claimed that Saddam Hussein’s regime was part of the worldwide terrorist network and was developing nuclear, biological, and chemical WMDs that could be a major threat to, not only the United States, but all humanity. Policymakers convinced Secretary of State Colin Powell to make this case, on 5 February 2003 to the United Nations and, then, before Congress in an effort to obtain their approval to invade Iraq. Being a highly respected former general, Powell’s presentation convinced many in Congress, who had had doubts, to eventually vote for the invasion.53 Among the evidence presented was a claim that Iraq had obtained yellowcake uranium from Niger and had tubing for centrifuges, so they could make nuclear bombs. Years later Powell, by then disillusioned by those he had once worked for, publicly admitted he had been deceived because the evidence he presented was not accurate, since there were no WMDs in Iraq. He described the invasion as “Badly Flawed.”54

In retrospect, given the fact the combat in Iraq and the entire region has continued even after President Obama officially withdrew American troops in late 2011, one must re-inspect the real reasons for America’s invasion. While President Bush and his advisers, no doubt, believed they were doing what was best for the nation, their stated justifications for OIF have left rational gaps regarding all the reasons for the invasion. Even before the attacks against U.S. targets on 9/11, planning had begun to create an operational plan for the invasion of Iraq. Once the terrorists carried out their evil deeds on that late summer morning, the President realized he had to act in response to the assaults against the nation. However, once the initial response was underway in Afghanistan and the justifiable public outrage began to subside, he used the new found national unity to take revenge on Saddam Hussein for the assassination attempt on his father’s life in 1990, when the former was president.55

George W. Bush’s first Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O’Neil, characterized the Bush White House as a world out of kilter. He described it as a place where “policy decisions were decided, not by the meticulous examination of facts and the complexities of key issues but, by a faction of ideologues and political advisors operating outside the view of top cabinet officials.” According to O’Neil, “President Bush was not fully engaged in the supervision of the executive but, was rather a paradoxical leader who was, at best, a person who was guarded and poker-faced or, worse, disinterested, weak-willed, and an instrument of larger forces.” The most extraordinary portion of the Secretary’s book was his assertion that Saddam Hussein was targeted for elimination, not in the wake of 9/11 but, “soon after Bush took office.” In fact, O’Neil’s assertions have only gained additional traction in the period since his book was first published in 2004.56

It is worth recalling that, during his inaugural address of 29 January 2001, the President described Iran, North Korea, and Iraq as the primary members of the “axis of evil.” This was the first time he employed the term, but he repeated the phrase many times thereafter, to describe governments he accused of helping terror groups and those developing WMDs. He portrayed Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as rogue states which were building nuclear weapons. While these charges were justified regarding Iran and North Korea, Iraq, in retrospect, seems to have been a stretch. He declared that all were enemies of the United States and repeated these charges regularly in an effort to rally the country in support of his War on Terror.57

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Those who supported and/or still support the implementation of OIF would argue that President Bush led a courageous struggle against an evil dictator, whose goals were to destroy the United States and terrorize the world. Those who opposed this policy would assert that the reason for the Iraq invasion stemmed more from personal reasons to avenge the plot to kill his father and to control oil production in that part of the world. This is not the forum to develop an argument or delve into the veracity of either of these claims. Whichever reality may be proved one day, what can be said is that the war that resulted from the OIF invasion did not end with Bush’s landing on the USS Abraham Lincoln. Would that it had!

In fact, the biggest battles of OIF took place between 2004 and 2011. American casualties during the invasion had been minimal by any count. Iraqi military members killed in action totaled 4,000-7,000. Since 1 May 2003, the U.S. has suffered roughly 4,500 KIA and 28,500 WIA. Depending on the source, the Iraqis endured 200,000-1,000,000 casualties, with two-thirds being civilians. Worst of all, the combat in the region is far from over. With the advent of the savage new threat known as ISIS or ISIL in the Iraqi/Syrian area, the possibilities of peace seem bleak! Clearly, the invasion opened this Pandora’s Box, and those who took over national leadership have been unable to close it.58

Like Karbala, the battles that made up the invasion story will be argued about for some time to come. However, one issue that can and should be briefly examined is the role of Air Power and why it was not employed as it had been in the First Persian Gulf War. During the implementation of Operation Desert Storm prior to the initiation of ground action, Coalition air assets executed an extensive air campaign that so totally softened the enemy defenses that most of their front line forces surrendered in droves--often to reporters. Those who did not were slaughtered by aircraft such as those along the “Highway of Death.”59

The Highway of Death, 1991

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The success of these operations cannot be underestimated. With this precedent in hand and with the massive number of sophisticated aircraft present for the Allies to use, why did the U.S. military and/or the Bush Administration opt to launch a classic land invasion? Ironically, as the initial phase of OIF unfolded, more and more air strikes were used not only to clear the way for the ground troops but to carry out decapitation raids to destroy Iraqi C3 resources. At Karbala alone, the Coalition used fighter bombers, helicopter gunships and, even massive B-52 bombers, which kept the number of Allied casualties to a minimum. Had they implemented the same plan as they had in 1990-1991, one wonders if the results might not have been more advantageous to both sides. With less urban ground fighting, there might have been less collateral damage, and the war might have ended sooner. That would have been better for all the people involved.

Some Final Thoughts

We will never know what might have happened. History does not allow for do-overs. What is clear is that the U.S.-led Coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003 and overthrew the brutal and cruel regime of Saddam Hussein. In doing so, American and Iraqi forces fought many battles before and after President Bush declared “mission accomplished.” The bloodshed in and around Karbala was only one a part of this combat. In Iraq and Syria the dying has not ended. New demons, like the masked members of ISIS/ISIL have become the new threat. While most Americans and Iraqis long ago wearied of this war and the suffering that goes with it, the future seems destined to spawn more battles like Karbala or worse.

Notes:

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1For more on this period in Islamic History, see Hugh Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State, (London: Routledge, 2001).2 Paul W. Westermeyer, “U.S. Marines in Battle: Al-Khafji, 28 January-1February 1991,” Washington D.C., United States of America: History Division, U.S. Marine Corps. http://www.usmc.mil/news/publications/Documents/U.S.%20Marines%20in% 20Battle%20Al-Khafji%20%20PCN%20106000400_1.pdf p. 32; Martin N. Stanton, “The Saudi Arabian National Guard Motorized Brigade,” ARMOR Magazine, (1 March 1996), Fort Knox, Kentucky: US Army Armor Center, pp. 6–11, https://www.knox.army.mil/enter/ArmorMag/backissues/ 1990s/1996/ma96/2saudi96.pdf; Fred Halliday, “The Gulf War and its Aftermath: First Reflections.” International Affairs (Blackwell Publishing) (April 1991), Vol. 67, No. 2, p. 12.3 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, “How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War,” International Security (Autumn 1991) (The MIT Press), Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 5–41, doi:10.2307/ 2539059. JSTOR 2539059, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf War, 1990-1991: Diplomacy in the New World Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 342; General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 439; Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells us About the Future of Conflict,” International Security (The MIT Press) (Autumn 1996), Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 139–179, doi:10.2307/2539073. JSTOR 2539073; James Titus, “The Battle of Khafji: An Overview and Preliminary Analysis. College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Air University, (September 1996), https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay1996/ari/ titusj.pdf, p. 4. 4This Day in History, “Bush announces the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 19 March 2003, History Channel, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/bush-announces-the-launch-of-operation-iraqi-freedom. 5For varying views on preparations and justifications for OIF, see Nicholas E. Reynolds, Basra, Baghdad, and Beyond: U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2005); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Adventure in Iraq, (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); Keven M. Woods, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership, (Norfolk, Virginia: United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis (USJFCOM), 2006); Steven Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security: The Foundations of the War on Terror, Ithaca, New York: Ithaca Press: 2007). 6See Note 3. 7For more on the air war see, Lt. Col. (later Lt. Gen.) David A. Deptula, “Parallel Warfare: What Is It? Where Did It Come From? Why Is It Important,” found in William P. Head and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back on the U.S. Involvement in the Persian Gulf War, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 127-156, [hereafter “Parallel Warfare”]. 8Ron Dick and Dan Patterson, Aviation Century: War & Peace in the Air, (Eden Prairie, Ontario: Boston Mills Press, 2006), p. 242.

9Tim Ripley, Air War Iraq, (United Kingdom: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2004), pp. 49-72, [hereafter Air War Iraq]; Article, “Iraq War Timeline,” CNN.com, no date, http://www. warchronicle.com/iraq/news/timeline_iraq_war.htm, [hereafter Timeline].10Air War Iraq, 55-59; Timeline. For details on the Marine strike forces during the Iraq Invasion, see Lt. Col. Michael S. Groen and Contributors, Occasional Paper, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy, (Quantico, Virginia: History Division, Marine Corps University, 2006), pp. 138-173, 190-203, [hereafter With the 1st Marine Division]11See, Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), [hereafter In the Company of Soldiers]; NBC Enterprises, Tom Brokaw, forward, Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Insider Story, (Kansas City, Missouri: Andrews McMeel Publishing, 2003). The Third Infantry Division is also known as the Marne Division or the “Rock of the Marne.” It was formed in 1917, at the outset of the U.S. entry into World War I, and its garrison headquarters are located at Fort Stewart, Georgia. During OIF it was a major component of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

12Todd A. Davis, The Global War on Terror: 9/11, Iraq, and America’s Crisis in the Middle East, (Bloomington, Indiana: Xlibris Corp., 2005), pp. 52-65, [hereafter Global War on Terror].13News Story, “Iraq shows off Apache crew,” BBC News, 25 March 2003, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/2883043.stm; News Story, “Downed Apache Blown Up To Keep Secrets From Iraq,” (London) Evening Times, 25 March 2003; News Story, “Downed Apache Blown Up With Missile,” New Straits Times, 26 March 2003, http://news.google.co.uk/ newspapers?; News Story, “The ‘Apache’ farmer’s tale,” BBC News, 23 April 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/296971.stm. 14Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 147-153. 15Ibid. 16For more on the supply efforts during OIF, see Eric Peltz, John M. Halliday, Marc L. Robbins, Kenneth J. Girardini, Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Battle Logistics and Effects on Operations, U.S. Army Contract No. DASW01-01-C-0003, (Santa Monica, California: Rand Arroyo Center, 2005), pp. xviii, 6, 18. 17Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 150-153; Jonathan Bernstein, AH-64 Apache Units of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, (United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2005), p. 49, [hereafter AH-64 Units]. 18Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 151-154; Bernstein, AH-64 Units, pp. 49-50; Col. David Eshel, “Deadly Scourge of the US Helicopter Pilots in Iraq,” no date, http://defense-update.com/newcast/0207/analysis/analysis-100207.htm. 19PBS, Interview with Thomas E. White, 31 January 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/white.html. 20Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 150-152; John Gordon, et. al., “Assessment of Navy Heavy-Lift Aircraft Options,” RAND Corporation, 2005, p. 87, http://www.rand.org/pubs/ documented briefings/2005/RAND_DB472.pdf. 21Timeline; Article, “U.S. Apache Pilots Taken Prisoner,” CNN, 24 March 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/24/sprj.irq.apache.attack/index.html. 22Timeline.23Geoffrey Mohan and Tracy Wilkinson, “Key Battle Begins Near Baghdad, U.S. Forces Confront Hussein's Ultra-Loyal Republican Guard,” Los Angeles Times, 25 March 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/25/news/war-iraq25, [hereafter “Key Battle Begins”]. Also see, Ripley, Air War Iraq, pp. 87-98.24Mohan and Wilkinson, “Key Battle Begins.”25Timeline; Ripley, Air War Iraq, pp. 98, 115-124. 26Mohan and Wilkinson, “Key Battle Begins.” 27News Story, “U.S. Forces Battle Republican Guard Near Karbala,” Fox News, 2 April 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/04/02/us-forces-battle-republican-guard-near-karbala.html, [hereafter “U.S. Force Battle Republican Guard”]; Article, “Jersey family watched a quiet boy grow Cpl. Michael E. Curtin,” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/901719/posts; Article, “With grief and resolve, Ft. Stewart salutes 4 dead,” Los Angeles Times, 6 April 2003, http://www.latimes.com/chi-030410316apr01-story.html. 28“U.S. Forces Battle Republican Guard;” Commonwealth Institute of Cambridge, Wages of War, Appendix 1, “Survey of reported Iraqi combatant fatalities in 2003 war,” 3 October 2003, http://www.comw.org/pda0310rm8ap1.html#10Karbala,%20Karbala%20gap,%20and%20north%20to%Baghdad, [hereafter Wages of War]. 29Ripley, Air War Iraq, p. 98; Article, Jim Dwyer, “A Nation at War: In the Field, 101st Airborne Division; In Karbala, G.I.s Find Forsaken Iraqi Armor and Pockets of Resistance,” New York Times, 6 April 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/06/world/nation-war-field-101st-airborne-division-karbala-gi-s-find-forsaken-iraqi-armor.html, [hereafter “In the Field, 101st Airborne Division,”]. 30Timeline; Dwyer, “In the Field, 101st Airborne Division.” 31“U.S. Forces Battle Republican Guard.” 32Groen, With the 1st Marine Division, pp 180-254.

33“U.S. Forces Battle Republican Guard. 34Article, Tom Infield, Inquirer Staff Writer, “At Karbala Gap, U.S. moves for decisive stroke The plan is to open the way to Baghdad and destroy Hussein's best troops. But it’s a battlefield chosen by Iraq,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly.com, 2 April 2003, http://Articles.Philly.Com/ 2003-04-02/News/25476079_1_Medina-Division-Razzaza-Lake-Iraqi-Capital. 35Spencer C. Tucker, General Editor, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts, (Santa Barbara, California: ABC Clio, 2010), p. 673. 36Ellen Dunkel, S. Thorne Harper, Juan O. Tamayo, and Jonathan S. Landay, “Battle begins in Karbala Gap,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, 1 April 2003, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/882384/posts. 37Timeline; Davis, Global War on Terror, p. 61. 38Timeline; Article, “Battle through, around Karbala Gap likely to be ‘hell of a fight’” Stars and Stripes, 1 April 2003, http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=13572 &archive=true; Article, “The Euphrates – Michael Kelly,” Jewish World Review, 3 April 2003, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/michael/kelly1.asp#3%20Across. 39PBS Frontline Interview, “Interview with Lt. Gen. Ra’ad al-Hamdani,” PBS.org News, 26 Feb 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/raad.html, [hereafter Hamdani Interview]. 40Ibid.; Timeline. 41“Karbala Gap, and north to Baghdad,” Wages of War; Article, “Edward Korn was the 3rd I.D. captain killed on April 3 in Karbala Gap while searching an Iraqi T-72 tank for possible intelligence documents,” 4 April 2003, National Journal, Vol. 35, pp. 1025-1336, (New York: National Journal Group, Inc., 2003).42PBS Frontline Interview, “Interview with Col. David Perkins,” PBS.org News, no date, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/perkins.html#medina. 43Ibid. 44“Karbala Gap and north to Baghdad,” Wages of War; Groen, With the 1st Marine Division, pp. 255-375. Also see, Jason Conroy, Heavy Metal: A Tank Company’s Battle to Baghdad, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006); James Lacey, Takedown: The 3rd Infantry Division’s Twenty-one Day Assault on Baghdad, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2007).45Timeline. 46Capt Gregory Ball, USAFR, Ph.D., Air Force Historical Studies Office, Joint Base Anacostia Bolling, Washington, D. C., “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Air Force Fact Sheet, 16 October 2014, http://www.afhso.af.mil/topics/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=18635, [hereafter “Operation Iraqi Freedom” Fact Sheet]; Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, Commander, USCENTAF, Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Numbers: Assessment and Analysis Division, 30 April 2003, [OIF by the Numbers].47Ball, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” Fact Sheet; Moseley, OIF by the Numbers. 48Ball, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” Fact Sheet; Moseley, OIF by the Numbers. 49Ball, “Operation Iraqi Freedom” Fact Sheet. 50Susan Sachs, “Iraqi Governing Council Sets Up Its Own Court for War Crimes,” New York Times, 10 December 2003, p. 1A; Article, “Iraqi P.M. Seeks Saddam ‘show trail,’” BBC News, 23 September 2004.51Article, “Saddam’s final words,” The Daily Telegraph (UK). 30 December 2006; Article, Qassum Abdul-Zahra, “New Video of Saddam’s Corpse on Internet,” The Washington Post/Associated Press, 9 January 2007. 52William P. Head, “The Battles for Al-Fallujah: Urban Warfare and the Growth of Air Power,” Air Power History, Winter 2013, Vol. 60, No. 4, p. 49. 53Article, “Full Text of Colin Powell’s Speech,” The Guardian, 5 February 2003, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa.

54Gen. Colin Powell, “Meet the Press: Invasion of Iraq ‘Badly Flawed’,” NBC News, 6 September 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/colin-powell-invasion-iraq-badly-flawed-n422566. 55For more on the Bush White House and the decision to invade Iraq, see Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Education of Paul O’Neil, (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 2004). O’Neil’s revelations are considered particularly damning with regard to the decision to carry out OIF.56Ibid. 57“George W. Bush’s Second State of the Union Address,” Congressional Record, Vol. 149, p. H123, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002). 58Seiji Yamada, Mary C. Smith Fawzi, Gregory G. Maskarince, and Paul E. Farmer, Report on the Iraq War: Casualties, Narrative and Images of the War on Iraq, (Amityville, New York: Baywood Publishers, Inc., 2006), pp. 401-415. Other sources include, Opinion Research Business Poll, PLOS Medical Study, and the Iraqi Body Count Project.59Deptula, “Parallel Warfare,” pp. 127-156.