Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–00–2 Spring 2000 Vol. 13, No. 2

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

Last year, the Army Special ForcesCommand sought to identify SF’s corevalues through an extensive dialoguethat involved the entire SF communi-ty — active, reserve and retired. Thedialogue continued for nearly 18months and was part of two SF Com-mand commander’s conferences andthe 1999 SF Conference.

Last summer, the SF Command for-mally stated a set of seven SF core val-ues: warrior ethos, professionalism,innovation, versatility, cohesion, charac-ter and cultural awareness. These corevalues reflect the collective experienceand the wisdom of generations of SFwarriors. They provide the foundationfor SF, and they must guide all that wedo, both individually and collectively.

Indeed, the first value, warrior ethos,may be SF’s most defining value. “Ethos”is the fundamental disposition, characteror values of a particular group. If there isone characteristic that is common andindispensable to SF soldiers, it is thatthey are warriors who are determinednot to fail in their mission.

From that determination flow theother SF core values, making the warriorethos critical for success in SF. For thatreason, our recruiting, assessment, train-ing and retention must ensure that webuild and maintain a force of warriors.

To accomplish that objective, wemust develop realistic training, andwe must instill the SF core values intothe force we have trained. The SFCommand recently implemented arealistic training program, the SpecialForces Advanced Urban CombatCourse, or SFAUCC, which preparesSF detachments to conduct operationsin the urban conditions that we willalmost certainly encounter in futureoperations. SFAUCC’s training regi-men is rigorous, but the course’s

emphasis on collective tasks, combatskills and teamwork produces gradu-ates who have confidence and a well-honed warrior spirit. The course alsobuilds cohesion and team esprit.

To instill the core values into theforce, SF leaders must serve as mentorsand as examples. I challenge SF leadersat all levels to become strong advocatesof the seven SF core values. In doing so,we will not only adhere to the warriorethos, but we will also help sustain ourwarrior community and ensure that it isready for the dangers and the opportu-nities of the 21st century.

Major General William G. Boykin

Features2 Warrior Ethos: The Key to Winning

by Colonel Salvatore F. Cambria, Lieutenant Colonel Edward M.Reeder and Major James E. Kraft

9 SF Core Values: The Final Cut

10 SOCJFCOM: Integrating SOF into Joint Task Forcesby Colonel Michael Findlay

18 ARSOF War Game IV: Assessing ARSOF’s Contribution to Regional Engagementby Charles C. Faulkner III

21 Army Values: Integrity — Ray Peers

22 The 2000 Special Forces Conference: Looking Back to Chart the Future

24 SATMO: Valuable Part of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Programby Major William Nase

28 Review Essay — MACV SOG: New Books Reveal Vietnam’s ‘Secret War’by Colonel J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.)

Departments36 Letters

38 Enlisted Career Notes

40 Officer Career Notes

42 Foreign SOF

45 Update

48 Book Reviews

PB 80–00–2 ContentsSpring 2000 Special Warfare Vol. 13, No. 2

Commander & CommandantMajor General William G. Boykin

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia W. McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkGloria H. Sawyer

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147.Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the USASOC internal web(https://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Eric K. ShinsekiGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

0011608

Headquarters, Department of the Army

“Through all this welter of change anddevelopment, your mission remains fixed,determined, inviolable. It is to win ourwars. Everything else in your professionalcareer is but corollary to this vital dedica-tion. All other public purpose, all other pub-lic projects, all other public needs, great orsmall, will find others for their accomplish-ments; but you are the ones who are trainedto fight.”

General Douglas MacArthur,Speech to West Point Cadets, 1962

The armed forces of the United Statesexist for the sole purpose of fightingand winning the nation’s wars. To

fight those wars, an effective military forcedepends on weapons, equipment and per-sonnel. But intangible factors — unit cohe-sion, integrity, physical and moral courage,dedication, commitment, and leadership —are equally vital because they make up the“warrior ethos.” Without the material fac-tors, we cannot fight. Without the warriorethos, we cannot win.

Army Field Manual 22-100, Army Lead-ership, defines the warrior ethos as theprofessional attitudes and beliefs thatcharacterize the American soldier. TheArmy has forged the warrior ethos ontraining grounds from Valley Forge to thecombat training centers. The warrior ethoshas been honed by the realities of battle atBunker Hill, San Juan Hill, the Meuse-Argonne, Omaha Beach, Pork Chop Hill,

the Ia Drang Valley, Salinas Airfield andthe Battle of 73 Easting. Developedthrough discipline, commitment to Armyvalues, and knowledge of the Army’s proudheritage, the warrior ethos echoes throughthe precepts in the Code of Conduct, show-ing us that military service is more than ajob. Winning the nation’s wars calls fortotal commitment, and the core of the war-rior ethos is the refusal to accept failure.

The SF soldierU.S. Army Special Forces is a brother-

hood of warriors who are bound by theirdedication to mission accomplishment, bytheir loyalty to one another, and by theirmoral and physical courage. Regardless ofthe theater of operations, the mission orthe resources available, our warrior ethosis embedded in everything we do.

SF must never forget that quality sol-diers are its greatest asset. People, notequipment, are critical. The most sophisti-cated equipment in the world cannot com-pensate for the lack of the right people. Onthe other hand, the right people, highlytrained and working as a team, will accom-plish the mission with whatever equip-ment is available to them. Through theprocess of selecting and retaining qualitysoldiers who have demonstrated exception-al maturity, skill and initiative, SF is ableto meet challenges across a broad spectrumof mission requirements.

2 Special Warfare

Warrior Ethos: The Key to Winning

by Colonel Salvatore F. Cambria, Lieutenant Colonel Edward M. Reederand Major James E. Kraft

Volunteers for SF units must have firstdemonstrated their maturity, intelligence,combat skills and physical toughness intheir parent units and then complete the SFAssessment and Selection process. Throughthis extensive and rigorous process, SFidentifies soldiers who are capable of work-ing under the most demanding and stressfulconditions, including situations in which thereputation of the U.S. may depend upon thesuccess of an assigned mission.

The desire to become part of a uniquemilitary organization that has demanding,uncompromising standards and challeng-ing missions speaks volumes about thecharacter of the soldiers who volunteer forSF. Character is the inner strength and thecommitment that inspire one to do what isright, regardless of the operational envi-ronment or the circumstances. Character isdemonstrated by behavior. SF soldiersmust be prepared to deploy to remoteregions of the world under the most sensi-tive political, economic and military condi-tions. And although SF soldiers often haveextraordinary responsibilities, we are fullyconfident that in all circumstances, theywill follow their best judgment regardlessof the consequences.

In “A Soldier and His Conscience,” Gen-eral Sir James Glover writes, “A man ofcharacter in peace is a man of courage inwar. Character is a habit. The daily choiceof right and wrong. It is a moral qualitywhich grows to maturity in peace and isnot suddenly developed in war.”1

The human dimension is central in war.War is a clash of human wills; it is shapedby the complexities, inconsistencies andpeculiarities of human behavior. No degreeof technology can overcome the humandimension of war. Any attempt to reducewarfare to ratios of forces, weapons andequipment neglects the impact of thehuman will on the conduct of war and isthus inherently flawed. Because of itshuman dimension, war is an extreme trialof a soldier’s warrior ethos. Individualsreact differently to the stress of war — anact that may break the will of one may infact strengthen the resolve of another.

Unit cohesionSF soldiers must be dedicated to fighting

and winning under the most arduous condi-tions, and they must always maintain theirwill to win at the highest level. Whether in

Spring 2000 3

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

Candidates in an early SFAssessment and Selec-tion work on a problemdesigned to allow evalua-tors to assess candi-dates’ ability to worktogether under stressfulconditions.

personal or professional matters, SF soldierspossess a fierce loyalty to their comradesthat is unsurpassed in any other community.Teammates work closely with one anotherevery day. Their faith and confidence in eachother is a fraternal bond that is developedthrough rigorous training, challengingdeployments, and personal hardships. Thecourage of one SF soldier, Master SergeantCharles E. Hosking Jr., clearly illustratesthe strength of SF loyalty.

Hosking was posthumously awarded theMedal of Honor for his heroic actions onMarch 21, 1967, in Phuoc Long Province,Republic of Vietnam, while he was servingas a company adviser in the Civilian Irreg-ular Defense Group Reaction Battalion.His award citation reads:

A Viet Cong suspect was apprehendedand subsequently identified as a Viet Congsniper. While Master Sergeant Hosking waspreparing the prisoner for movement backto the base camp, he suddenly grabbed agrenade from Master Sergeant Hosking’sbelt, armed the grenade and started run-ning toward the command group. Withutter disregard for his own personal safety,Master Sergeant Hosking grasped the VietCong in a bear hug, forced the grenadeagainst the enemy’s chest, and wrestled theprisoner to the ground. Covering thesniper’s body with his own until thegrenade detonated, Master Sergeant Hosk-ing was killed. By absorbing the force of theexploding grenade with his body and that

of the enemy, he saved the other members ofhis command from death or serious injury.2

IntegrityIntegrity provides the basis for the trust

and the confidence that must exist betweenSF soldiers. Integrity is sincerity, adherenceto a moral code, and the avoidance of decep-tion or expedient compromises. Integrityunderlies everything that SF soldiers do; itdemands a commitment to the other compo-nents of the warrior ethos.

SF soldiers demand integrity from theirsubordinates, peers and superiors alike.Each SF soldier must therefore internalizeand demonstrate integrity. There can be noinconsistency between personal and pro-fessional standards. If an SF soldier com-promises his personal integrity, he breaksthe bonds of trust with his fellow soldiersand with his leaders. Once these bonds arebroken, the warrior ethos is weakened, andthe SF soldier may be rendered ineffective.

A samurai warrior once wrote, “No mat-ter how lacking a man may be in humani-ty, if he would be a warrior, he should firstof all tell no lies. It is also basic that he benot the least bit suspicious, that he know asense of shame. The reason being thatwhen a man who has formerly told lies andacted suspiciously participates in somegreat event, he will be pointed at behindhis back and neither his allies nor his ene-mies will believe him, regardless of howreasonable his words may be. One shouldbe very prudent about this.”3

In our profession, we are actively engagedon a daily basis with foreign militaries andheads of state, U.S. ambassadors and U.S.country teams, the joint staff, geographiccommanders in chief and special-operationscommands, the warfighting corps, and otherU.S. agencies and service components. Wecannot afford a breach of integrity.

CourageWar is characterized by the interaction

of physical forces and moral forces. Thephysical forces are generally easily seen,understood and measured. However, themoral forces are less tangible. Moral forcesare difficult to grasp; in fact, it is virtually

4 Special Warfare

A soldier from the 3rd SFGroup schedules anAntiguan soldier formarksmanship training inBelize during Tradewinds98, a multinational train-ing exercise.

Photo by Jonathan Jensen

impossible to quantify emotion, fear,courage, morale, leadership or esprit. Yetmoral forces exert a greater influence onthe nature and the outcome of war than dothe physical forces. But we cannot slightthe importance of physical forces, for theycan have a significant impact upon moralforces. For example, the greatest effect offires on the enemy is generally not theamount of physical destruction, but theimpact of that physical destruction uponthe enemy’s moral strength.

Physical courage and moral courage, syn-onymous with the warrior ethos, require asynergistic balance in order to maximizetheir effect. Physical courage is demonstrat-ed by acts of bravery. Part of being a warrioris possessing the innate ability to set asideone’s fear of death and to concentrate on thetask at hand. Twenty-two ARSOF soldiershave received the Medal of Honor for con-spicuous gallantry in action, at the risk oflife above and beyond the call of duty. Thenumber of undocumented cases would prob-ably fill volumes.

Fear and physical courage alike are con-tagious. Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshallsaid, “The courage of any one man reflectsin some degree the courage of all those whoare within his vision. To the man who is interror and bordering on panic, no influencecan be more steadying than that of seeingsome other man near him who is retainingself-control and doing his duty.”4 The cohe-sion of the SF organizational structure,

along with the faith, respect and confi-dence that SF soldiers have in each other,promotes an environment that is conduciveto building courageous attributes.

Carl von Clausewitz said,“Courage is of twokinds: courage in the face of personal danger,and courage to accept responsibility, eitherbefore the tribunal of some outside power orbefore the court of one’s own conscience.”5

Combat situations that demand physi-cal courage are infrequent, but everydaysituations that require moral courage areplentiful. Moral courage is the willing-ness to stand firm on one’s values, prin-ciples and convictions. It is as much apart of the warrior ethos as physicalcourage. Wise SF leaders appreciate andwelcome candor from the ranks. SF lead-ers expect SF warriors to stand up forwhat they believe is right, and theyexpect them to accept responsibility fortheir actions. As strategic assetsdeployed along the operational continu-um in a global environment in support ofnational objectives, SF soldiers shouldexhibit the highest levels of personal andmoral courage.

Dedication and commitmentDedication and commitment are hall-

marks of the warrior ethos. SF soldiers arededicated and committed to upholding astandard of excellence that demands thebest of their abilities. The SF warrior is

Spring 2000 5

Photo by Carl Fountain

SF frequently deals withforeign military leadersand heads of state, andthe integrity of SF sol-diers must be beyondquestion.

dedicated to duty, honor and country and iscommitted to the mission and to his com-rades. The warrior spirit has always beenand shall always be an integral part of theSF culture.

German Major General Hasso von Man-teuffel said, “Our honour lies in doing ourduty toward our people and our fatherland aswell as in the consciousness of our mutualobligation to keep faith with one another, sowe can depend on each other. We mustremember that, even in our technologicalage, it is a man’s fighting spirit that ulti-mately decides between victory and defeat.”6

Commitment is also the act of dedicatingoneself to seeing every task to completionand serving the values of the country, theArmy and SF. SF soldiers are members of ateam that functions well only when eachmember of the team accomplishes his indi-vidual assignment.

LeadershipIt is critical that SF leaders be commit-

ted to doing their best to contribute to theArmy, to train and develop their units, andto help their soldiers develop professional-ly and personally. The warrior spirit comesfrom SF leaders who are dedicated andcommitted to developing the will to fightand win through realistic and challengingtraining. SF soldiers who can overcome thephysical factors of battle and who can

apply the skill and knowledge they learnedin training can overcome any opponent incombat. SF leaders can give their soldiersthe will to win by setting the example,demonstrating the attitudes, establishingthe expectations, and enforcing the stand-ards. They can and must develop the will towin in themselves and in their soldiers.

Urbanization challengeSince the end of the Cold War, the U.S.

armed forces and their leadership havebeen contemplating the kind of force struc-ture that will be required in an ever-chang-ing, uncertain world. Will our nation’s nextwar be waged on open deserts where thereare relatively clear battle lines and whereconventional maneuvers can be decisive?While the possibility certainly exists, it ismore likely that our forces will be fightingfuture battles amid city walls, housingareas, complex road networks and a myri-ad of other supporting infrastructure asso-ciated with urbanization.

By the year 2010, the world’s population —currently nearly six billion people — is expect-ed to exceed seven billion. Of that population,approximately half will live in cities; only one-third of today’s population does.7 To makematters worse, approximately 95 percent ofthe population growth is expected to occur indeveloping countries, which are already facingfinancial hardship.

Urbanization places an enormous demandon a country’s infrastructure, and it candiminish a country’s ability to supply water,energy, housing and transportation. When acountry is so weak that it cannot adequatelysupply basic human needs, its people willinevitably lose faith and confidence in it, andthey may express their dissatisfactionthrough violent means. Because our Nation-al Military Strategy emphasizes “engage-ment” as a means of providing global leader-ship, maintaining stability and promotingdemocratic ideals, our armed forces are like-ly to encounter conflict in urbanized areas.

SFAUCCOne of the steps the U.S. Army Special

Forces Command has taken to prepare itssoldiers for urban combat is to develop the

6 Special Warfare

Photo courtesy 7th SF Group

The 7th SF Group’s Spe-cial Forces AdvancedUrban Combat Courseteaches combat marks-manship skills in anurban environment.

Special Forces Advanced Urban CombatCourse, or SFAUCC. This course prepares SFA-detachments to conduct an urban assaulton a single-story, single-entry building con-sisting of several rooms. Soldiers gain skillsfrom the SFAUCC that are applicable in avariety of SF missions, including directaction, special reconnaissance, foreign inter-nal defense, counterproliferation and com-bating terrorism. It is important to note thatthe SFAUCC is designed to train detachmentcollective tasks, not individual tasks.

The SFAUCC’s program of instruction, orPOI, includes 34 hours of combat marksman-ship, 60 hours of advanced urban combat and26 hours of general subjects. The combat-marksmanship segment provides extensiveinstruction on target engagement in anurban environment. Students gain proficien-cy in firing the M-9 pistol, the M-4 carbineand the shotgun. During the advanced urbancombat segment, students conduct an urbanraid and clear a single-room building,employing the shotgun as an alternatebreaching device, and employing specialexplosives for urban combat. The general-subjects segment enhances the soldiers’ abil-ity to interdict designated targets. It includesplanning; collecting information and fulfill-ing priority intelligence requirements; con-ducting individual searches; managing risk;running vehicle checkpoints; and climbingvarious types of structures.

Ten detachments from the 7th SF Grouprecently completed the SFAUCC’s first andsecond iterations. The end-of-course critiquesexpress the heightened morale as well as thewarrior spirit among the graduates: “Withouta doubt, the SFAUCC was the best training Ihave received in 17 years in the Army and 10years in Special Forces.” “In over 17 years inthe Army, I have attended many courses (U.S.and foreign), some hooah, some not. Thiscourse was by far the best.” “It is what I cameinto Special Forces to do — be a warrior.”

During each course’s numerous high-risk,live-fire maneuvers, students fired 110,000rounds of 9-mm ammunition, 100,000rounds of 5.56-mm ammunition, 1,375 shot-gun shells, and more than 4,000 feet of shocktube. The experienced and highly skilledcadre, combined with an attentive and eagerstudent body, produced realistic, interactive

and challenging training that accuratelysimulates urban-combat scenarios.

Although the skills that the studentsacquired from the SFAUCC are important,the importance of the warrior spirit dis-played by the students cannot be overstat-ed. Without a doubt, the SFAUCC preparesSF detachments to meet the challenges ofurban combat, and it gives them the confi-dence to lethally and discriminatelyengage any adversary. Sun Tzu says thatthe ancient Chinese described a cleverfighter as one who not only wins, but whoexcels in winning with ease.8

ConclusionSince the end of the Cold War, regional

instability has been the greatest threat toglobal security; in the future, this threatwill grow, not diminish. As the U.S. andother countries face new challenges, SFwill play an active role in maintainingregional stability and in deterring war.

But if deterrence should fail and ourcountry calls on SF to help fight and win itswars, we will prevail because we will acceptnothing less than victory. As General of theArmy Douglas MacArthur said, “It is fatalto enter any war without the will to win it.”9

Our warrior ethos is at the heart of ourmost valuable resource — quality soldiers.Preparing these soldiers through challeng-ing and realistic training has alwaysserved SF well, and it will be our recipe forsuccess in the future. The SFAUCC is themost recent example of such training. Notonly does the SFAUCC hone soldiers’ abili-ty to engage adversaries in an urban envi-ronment — it nurtures the warrior spiritthat motivates SF to focus on the U.S. mil-itary’s core mission: to fight and win thenation’s wars.

Colonel Salvatore F. Cam-bria is commander of the 7thSF Group. His other assign-ments include rifle platoonleader, mortar platoon leaderand company executive offi-cer in the 24th Infantry Divi-sion; A-detachment commander in the 10th

Spring 2000 7

SF Group; assistant S-3, company com-mander and battalion executive officer inthe 8th Battalion, 2nd Infantry TrainingBrigade; operations officer and chief of cur-rent operations in the 1st Special Opera-tions Command; policy and strategy officerin the U.S. Special Operations Command;commander of the Support Battalion, 1stSpecial Warfare Training Group; G3 of theU.S. Army SF Command; and speech-writer/strategic analyst for the deputy chiefof staff for operations, U.S. Army. ColonelCambria is a graduate of the Infantry Offi-cer Basic and Advanced courses, the SFQualification Course, the Army Commandand General Staff College, the ArmedForces Staff College and the Air War Col-lege. He holds a bachelor’s degree in biologyfrom Northeastern University, Boston,Mass., and a master’s degree in businessfrom Webster University.

Lieutenant Colonel Ed-ward M. Reeder is the deputycommander of the 7th SFGroup. Commissioned throughROTC as an Infantry officer,he has served as an SF detach-ment commander, companycommander, battalion S3, group S3, andgroup XO in the 7th SF Group. He alsoserved as an adviser in El Salvador, as anoperations officer in the Joint Special Oper-ations Command, and as chief of J3 plansin the Joint Interagency Task Force-South.Lieutenant Colonel Reeder is a graduate ofthe Infantry Officer Basic and Advancedcourses and the Army Command and Gen-eral Staff College. He holds a bachelor’sdegree from Appalachian State Universityand a master’s degree from Central Michi-gan University.

Major James E. Kraft is theexecutive officer for the 7th SFGroup. Commissioned throughROTC as an Infantry officer,he has served as an SF detach-ment commander and hascommanded three companiesin the 7th SF Group. He has also served as aJCS intern in the Special Operations Divi-sion and as a special-operations personnel

systems and staff officer in the Army Office ofthe Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Heholds a bachelor’s degree in general studiesand law enforcement; and a master’s degreein national security and strategic studiesfrom the Naval War College.

Notes:1 General Sir James Glover, “A Soldier and His Con-

science,” Parameters, September 1983, pp. 53-58.2 USSOCOM Public Affairs Office, Special Operations

Recipients of the Medal of Honor and the Victoria Cross(MacDill AFB, Fla.: U.S. Special Operations Command),p. 64.

3 Soteki Waki, Ideals of the Samurai: Writings ofJapanese Warriors, translation and introduction byWilliam Scott Wilson, edited by Gregory N. Lee (Bur-bank, Calif.: Ohara Publications, 1982).

4 Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall, The Armed ForcesOfficer (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,1950).

5 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by MichaelHoward and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1976).

6 Major General Hasso von Manteufflel, as quoted inFriedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, German Generals ofWorld War II: As I Saw Them (Norman, Okla.: Universi-ty of Oklahoma Press, 1977).

7 Remarks by John Gannon, Chairman of the NationalIntelligence Council, to the Washington InternationalCorporate Circle, 31 October 1997, “Global EconomicIntelligence.”

8 http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html.9 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Address to

the Republican National Convention, 7 July 1952.

8 Special Warfare

Spring 2000 9

Special Forces Core Values

Warrior Ethos. Special Forces is a fraternity of warriors, theultimate professionals in conducting special operations whenthe cause of freedom is challenged. The SF warrior traditionoriginates from SF’s early roles in unconventional warfareand is exemplified by the SF motto, “De Oppresso Liber.”

Professionalism. Special Forces soldiers provide the nationwith a broad range of capabilities to address challenges to ournational security and national interests. SF soldiers interfacewith high-level military commanders, country teams, ambas-sadors and heads of state. Through their actions and theirrange of technical and tactical skills, SF soldiers serve world-wide as operational and strategic assets.

Innovation. Special Forces soldiers are creative and inven-tive in accomplishing their missions through the judiciousapplication of conventional and unconventional problem-solv-ing. They solve problems imaginatively, developing the rightsolutions outside the constraints of institutional norms.

Versatility. Special Forces soldiers adapt quickly to rapidlychanging environments, consistently operating and easilytransitioning across the entire spectrum of conflict, frompeace to war. SF is truly a capability-based organization, pro-viding the widest range of capabilities to accomplish assignedmissions.

Cohesion. The cohesion within an SF detachment enables itto withstand the most violent shocks and stresses of combatand to perform its duties under demanding circumstances,without definitive guidance, while accomplishing the com-mander’s intent.

Character. SF soldiers understand the operational environ-ment. They can be trusted to do the right thing and never toquit. SF soldiers recognize the political implications inherentin their missions. Knowing the cost of failure, they succeedagainst all odds.

Cultural Awareness. SF soldiers use interpersonal skills towork with all foreign cultures, gaining the trust, confidenceand cooperation of the people by winning their hearts andminds. SF soldiers have a situational awareness that enablesthem to deploy worldwide and accomplish their missions inambiguous and complex situations.

In the book Built to Last, James C.Collins and Jerry I. Porras define corevalues as “The organization’s essential

and enduring tenets.” That definition is thebasis for the seven core values that havebeen approved for Special Forces by thecommander of the Army Special ForcesCommand. The SF core values are the prod-uct of extensive dialogue within the SF com-munity, including the 1999 SF Conferenceand two USASFC commander’s conferences.With the approved list, SF commanders andleaders at all levels should strive to ensurethat they and their subordinates exemplifythese values in all their activities.

SF Core Values: The Final Cut

The nature of modern warfare and thetheater-engagement plans of theUnited States demand that U.S.

forces know how to operate as a joint team.No other forces require this particularknowledge more than U.S. special-opera-tions forces, or SOF.

Even before a crisis occurs, SOF may bein the crisis area, and SOF may be part ofwhatever force is called upon to resolvethe crisis, whether that force is a unilat-eral U.S. joint team or a multinational,interagency one. All of SOF, from SpecialForces A-detachments to theater special-operations commands, should understandthe issues facing decision-makers and thecommanders and staffs of joint taskforces, or JTFs. Understanding joint per-spectives and joint requirements willenable SOF to better advise commanderson SOF considerations and to better sup-port the operation.

SOF now has a joint command focusedon supporting joint training in specialoperations. The Special Operations Com-mand, U.S. Joint Forces Command, orSOCJFCOM, supports both the training ofconventional joint commanders and staffsin the employment of SOF, and the train-ing of prospective commanders and staffsof joint special-operations task forces, orJSOTFs. SOCJFCOM has recently reor-ganized to form a SOF Joint TrainingTeam, or SOF JTT, to support these train-ing activities.

Located in Norfolk, Va., near the USJF-COM Joint Warfighting Center, or JWFC,which supports the training of CINC staffsand JTF commanders and staffs, SOCJF-COM is well-situated to integrate SOF oper-ations into the training of potential joint-force commanders and staffs. The SOCJF-COM can also support the training ofJSOTFs and other joint SOF headquarters,and it can collect and share lessons learnedin tactics, techniques and procedures fromjoint SOF operations worldwide.

In July 1998, the U.S. Special OperationsCommand, or USSOCOM, requested thatUSJFCOM facilitate the USSOCOM mis-sion of providing joint training to SOFheadquarters and units. USJFCOMagreed, and now SOCJFCOM responds tothe training needs identified both by con-ventional joint-force commanders and byjoint SOF commanders.

USJFCOM responsibilities outlined inthe USJFCOM Unified Command Planand USSOCOM responsibilities outlined inTitle 10, U.S. Code, thus establish the fourmajor activities of SOCJFCOM:

• Support the training of joint-force com-manders and staffs in SOF employment(responsibility of USJFCOM).

• Support the training of the command-ers and staffs of JSOTFs, and in thefuture, of joint psychological-operationstask forces, or JPOTFs (responsibility ofUSSOCOM).

• Provide realistic joint-training envi-

10 Special Warfare

SOCJFCOM: Integrating SOF into JointTask Forces

by Colonel Michael Findlay

ronments within the continental U.S., orCONUS, for training of SOF (responsibilityshared by USJFCOM and USSOCOM).

• Support joint integration throughimproved activities that blend doctrine,organization, training, materiel, leadershipand personnel, or DOTMLP, from the dif-ferent military services in order to improveservice interoperability and joint experi-mentation (responsibility shared by USJF-COM and USSOCOM).

Training JTF commandersThe SOF JTT works hand in hand with

the JWFC, which annually supportsapproximately 15 joint exercises world-wide, within the priorities established bythe respective regional CINCs. SOCJF-COM supports CINC staff and JTF head-quarters training by providing academicseminars on SOF capabilities, limitationsand employment considerations. It also pro-vides observer-trainers who furnish addi-tional training and feedback during theexercises or operations.

The SOF JTT’s academic seminars give a

brief overview of SOF capabilities and lim-itations before focusing on JTF considera-tions for SOF employment. SOF may bethe primary means by which a regionalCINC can achieve success in his theater-engagement plan. While the seminars rec-ognize that SOF may be the CINC’s force ofchoice for quickly responding to a crisis,training focuses on scenarios in which SOFis subordinate to a conventional JTF —these are the situations for which there isa need for more training. Training empha-sizes the absolute applicability of joint doc-trine in the employment of SOF by a joint-force commander, or JFC.

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for JointOperations, identifies the four authorities ofthe JFC: the authority to assign missions;the authority to organize the force; theauthority to organize the joint-operationalarea, or JOA; and the authority to directrequired coordination. These four authori-ties constitute the legal basis for the JFC toemploy SOF and all of his other forces.These authorities, however, are notabsolute. A JFC’s higher commander, nor-mally a geographic CINC, can limit these

Spring 2000 11

USJFCOM & USSOCOM Similarities

SynchronizedCoherent

Joint Force

USJFCOMCONUS-basedConventionalForces

USSOCOMCONUS-basedSOF

Joint Warfig

hting

Joint Warfighting

ProviderProvider

ProviderProvider

IntegratorIntegrator

IntegratorIntegratorTrainerTrainer

TrainerTrainer

authorities through numerous control mea-sures. Rules of engagement (based on mis-sion, policy and legal considerations) are acommon control measure. Other controlmeasures include the specifying of certainJTF task organizations (such as a JSOTF);retaining CINC-level control of certainforces or activities (e.g., SOF and some com-partmented intelligence activities); andretaining mission-approval authority forcertain activities. While the extent of eachauthority varies with the situation, SOFJTT training addresses all four authoritiesin their absolute sense in order to provide aless complex operational construct.

Authority to assign missions. JTFs arenormally established by a geographicCINC for the conduct of major operations,such as offensive and defensive opera-tions, air interdiction, and theater missiledefense. The JFC’s concept of operationsarranges these major operations eithersequentially or simultaneously. SOF maybe a key player (or possibly the main play-er) during the early phases of an opera-tion. However, JTT training focuses moreon the ways that SOF can support theJFC’s concept of operations than it doeson unilateral SOF missions. In discussingwhat SOF can do to complement the JFC’smajor operations, the SOF JTT empha-sizes feasibility — the principle of notallowing enthusiasm to override a realis-tic appreciation of what SOF can do with-in its capabilities.

Authority to organize the force. The SOFJTT training emphasizes that when theJTF commander organizes the JTF, hemust consider two factors above all: taskorganization and command relationships.

In turning a force list into a task organi-zation, the JTF commander must make sev-eral key decisions. SOF JTT training con-centrates on the SOF-specific decisions by:• Emphasizing that SOF are normally

task-organized and that they are locatedthroughout the JTF organization.

• Noting the advantages in placing mostCivil Affairs and tactical psychologicaloperations, or PSYOP, units under theoperational control, or OPCON, of theground-force commanders — Armyforces and Marine forces — and of estab-lishing JPOTFs subordinate to the JTF.

• Highlighting the role of Naval Special War-fare task units (SEALs and special-boatassets) that habitually support carrier bat-tle groups and amphibious-ready groups.

• Pointing out that AC-130s and otherSOF aviation assets may temporarilyfall under the tactical control, orTACON, of the joint-force air-componentcommander, or JFACC, for specific mis-sions, such as close air support and jointcombat search and rescue.

• Noting that, almost without exception, theJFC forms a JSOTF in order to providecentralized control of special operations.The second factor that the JTF com-

mander must consider in the organization

12 Special Warfare

SOF JTT Primary Training Audience: JFCs and Staffs

MarineComponent

Joint Task ForceCommander

NavyComponent JSOTF JPOTFJFACC Army

Component

JTF Headquarters Examples:

• XVIII Abn Corps• 6th Fleet• CENTAF

of the JTF is command relationships. Dur-ing the past five years, the appreciation forthe value of supported and supportingcommand relationships has grown signifi-cantly, both in joint doctrine and in real-world operations. Guided by joint doctrineand lessons learned, SOF JTT trainingemphasizes that in order to achieve effec-tive, synergistic joint operations, JFCsshould consider all possible command rela-tionships, including the relationshipbetween the supported commander and thesupporting commander.

Appreciation of the relationship betweenthe supported commander and the support-ing commander has allowed U.S. forces toadvance the concept of joint warfare beyondan elementary and fractured component-warfare perspective (with continualchanges of OPCON and TACON) toward amore coherent perspective of a single forcein which all components work together toaccomplish the mission.

This coherent perspective takes fulladvantage of the services’ core competen-cies. It also reinforces a precept of jointwarfare: It is better to allow the services toemploy their own forces than it is to frag-ment those forces or to place them underthe operational control of commanders whomay not have the expertise to employ themto their full potential. The perspective also

supports a SOF principle noted in JointPublication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint SpecialOperations: Employ SOF through a SOFchain of command in order to maintainexpertise in planning and execution.

The keys to successfully maintaining therelationship between the supported com-mander and the supporting commander liein the details. From the outset, the JFCmust clearly establish:• The scope of the support and of the

authority of both the supported com-mander and the supporting commander;

• The reporting and liaison requirementsof the supported commander and theorder in which the supported command-er will prioritize his mission needs;

• The means by which the supporting com-mander will ascertain and fulfill the mis-sion needs of the supported commander.There are two key enablers to the rela-

tionship between the supported command-er and the supporting commander: the liai-son officers who help identify the support-ed commander’s needs, and elements suchas the special-operations command-and-control element that facilitate support andenable responsive reporting to a supportedcommander.

The designations “supported command-er” and “supporting commander” maychange from one phase of an operation to

Spring 2000 13

Photo by Willis Pelton

A soldier from the 10th SFGroup administers firstaid to a civilian role playerduring an exercise at theJoint Readiness TrainingCenter, Fort Polk, La.

another, or even during the phases andspecific activities. But if the JFC establish-es a clear understanding of his intent andhis priorities, he will be able to bring thefull capabilities of the joint force to bear onmission accomplishment.

The emphasis on the relationshipbetween the supported commander and thesupporting commander does not, however,rule out the exercise of TACON of SOF bynon-SOF commanders. When the situationwarrants, either the JFC or the JSOTFcommander may place SOF under theTACON of another commander. For exam-ple, the JFC or the JSOTF commandermay change control of SOF if the gainingcommander has a long-term need for theSOF support; if the gaining commanderhas the requisite expertise to control theSOF; or if the mission does not requireadditional SOF support or centralized SOFcontrol. The bottom line is that the JFChas the authority to organize his joint forceas he deems necessary.

Authority to organize the JOA. The SOFJTT training briefly addresses the fact thata JFC has the authority to establish jointspecial-operations areas, or JSOAs, inmuch the same way that he establishes

areas of operation, or AOs, for the land-and naval-component commanders.

Authority to direct required coordination.The JFC’s authority to direct requiredcoordination entails establishing anyboards and centers that are needed forplanning and controlling operations andfor establishing a battle rhythm. TheJSOTF commander’s involvement in theJFC’s planning process is critical to ensur-ing that SOF is responsive to the opera-tions of the JTF. SOF JTT training empha-sizes that early SOF involvement in theplanning process helps clarify prioritiesand levels of mission-approval authority,thereby enhancing the JSOTF’s support ofthe JTF.

Training JSOTFsBecause the theater SOCs have the respon-

sibility and the expertise to form and to operateJSOTFs, the SOF JTT focuses on satisfying thetraining requirements of the theater SOCs.With the support of General Peter Schoomaker,commander in chief of USSOCOM, the SOFJTT has familiarized the theater SOCs withthe JSOTF-training mission. In turn, the SOCshave identified their training needs and have

14 Special Warfare

SOF JTT Secondary Training Audience: JSOTFs and JPOTFs

MarineComponent

Joint Task ForceCommander

NSWTU ARSOTF SOLE

SOCCENSWTG

JSOACC

SOCCE

NavyComponent JSOTF JPOTFJFACC Army

Component

JSOTF and JPOTF Examples:

• Theater SOCs (JSOTFs)• 4th POG (JPOTFs)

SOCCORDSOCCORD

Operational Control

LEGEND

Coordination

contributed their ideas about how and whenSOCJFCOM might support their trainingrequirements.

SOF JTT emphasizes the concept ofnesting JSOTF training within existingCINC exercises — at both the CINC andthe JTF levels. The JWFC provides a rangeof support to CINC exercises, from minimalassistance in exercise development to a fullsupport package that provides the CINCstaff with help in designing the exercisescenario, setting up planning conferences,developing the exercise script, managingthe exercise control group, and conductingan after-action analysis. The SOF JTT pro-vides experienced SOF personnel to aug-ment the JWFC training team. During theexercise, SOF personnel help train conven-tional-force commanders and staffs aboutSOF capabilities and the best methods ofemploying them — in essence, they providea SOF user’s manual for the exercise. SOFaugmentation also provides conventionalforces with a better understanding of SOFand allows SOF personnel to work as aJSOTF with the conventional componentsof a JTF during a joint exercise. All of thisassistance requires a minimal investment

of SOF resources. The training-team con-cept not only ensures that the JSOTF isoperating in a realistic environment, it alsofacilitates the further integration of SOFinto the joint, multinational and inter-agency environments.

SOCJFCOM is not yet fully capable ofproviding an entire menu of JSOTF train-ing; it is still developing academic semi-nars and staff exercises, and gaining expe-rience in training. However, with the aid oflessons learned and with the input fromthe SOCs, SOCJFCOM has identified sev-eral areas of JSOTF training that canenhance SOF operations:

• An understanding of joint warfare fromthe JTF perspective. How better to succeedthan by understanding your boss’s concerns,priorities and perspectives? JSOTFs shouldknow how to operate within the battlerhythm of a JTF headquarters, with itsassociated joint boards (e.g., the joint target-coordination board and the intelligence-col-lection synchronization board), its groups(such as the joint planning group), its cen-ters and its cells.

• Component requirements. JSOTFs mustunderstand the needs of the other compo-

Spring 2000 15

Joint Special Operations Task Force Training Capability

OperationsSupport

DistributedLearning

Ex. Support

STAFFEX

Oct. 99 Oct. 00 Oct. 01 Oct. 02

AcademicSeminars

Not Mission Capable

LEGEND

Partly Mission Capable

Fully Mission Capable

NOTE: Chart represents training capability in terms of manning, ex-pertise, and products.

nents of a joint force. Components such asthe JFACC and the Army forces may often bedesignated as supported commanders.

• Mission planning. SOF mission plan-ning can responsively support the needs ofboth the JFC and the supported command-ers. SOCJFCOM is involved with USSO-COM’s Missions, Planning, Analysis,Rehearsal and Execution Initiative, andwith other joint-planning initiatives, in aneffort to improve the joint-planning process.

• Information management. We mustensure that knowledge is shared efficientlyand effectively throughout the JSOTF. To thatend, SOCJFCOM is pursuing initiatives ofcommand, control, communications, comput-ers and intelligence. It is also developing aJSOTF web page that will be much like theweb pages developed by the JWFC, the XVIIIAirborne Corps and the 2nd Marine Expedi-tionary Force.

Providing CONUS joint training The best joint training of SOF occurs in

JCS exercises led by geographic CINCs. Inthese exercises, SOF operates under a real-istic chain of command in a realistic envi-ronment. However, real-world operations,cost prohibitions and scheduling conflictsmay prevent some CONUS SOF units fromparticipating in JCS exercises on a regularbasis. These units maintain their proficien-cy by participating in CONUS joint SOFtraining.

In addition to the CONUS joint SOFtraining provided by the services (the Bat-tle Command Training Program, the AirForce’s Blue Flag theater exercise series,and exercises at the Joint ReadinessTraining Center), USJFCOM sponsorsseveral joint command-post exercises, orCPXs, and field-training exercises, orFTXs, each year. CPXs such as the UnifiedEndeavor, or UE, series are simulation-driven JTF and component training exer-cises. The UE series offers excellentopportunities for theater SOCs to exercisetheir JSOTF skills in a demanding andrealistic environment.

USJFCOM also sponsors three jointFTXs each year. These FTXs, whichinclude Roving Sands (a theater-missile-defense simulation exercise) and theseries of JTF exercises sponsored by theNavy’s 2nd Fleet, provide CONUS SOFwith a realistic joint environment.SOCJFCOM is resourced to form and tooperate a JSOTF in one of the exerciseseach year. However, in hopes of providingfor additional SOF-unit participation inthe other two exercises, SOCJFCOM isresearching an option that would allow itto train and to augment selected CONUSSOF units in basic JSOTF headquartersprocedures. This training, if implemented,would not be used to validate the unit’sproficiency to operate as a JSOTF.Instead, it would provide an efficient andeffective means of increasing the opportu-

16 Special Warfare

Photo by Marv Lynchard

Fake SCUD missilesawait the start of joint-service exercise RovingSands 97. The exerciseincluded a search forSCUD missile sites.

nities for SOF to receive joint training inCONUS. As a by-product of the training, apool of SOF personnel would be availableto augment an operational JSOTF head-quarters when necessary.

SOCJFCOM is already supporting theefforts of the Naval Special WarfareGroup-Two, or NSWG-2, to increase theopportunity for Naval special-warfarepersonnel to become more proficient injoint operations before they deploy to the-ater. SOCJFCOM has agreed to train theNSWG-2 headquarters personnel andaugmentees in basic JSOTF headquartersprocedures; to assist the NSWG-2 staff byproviding joint expertise; to assist in thedesigning of and the controlling of exer-cises; and to provide observer-trainersduring the exercises. Army and Air ForceSOF could benefit from the same kinds ofpre-deployment training initiatives.

Supporting joint integrationThe unified commands are responsible

for ensuring interoperability and joint-ness of their forces. SOCJFCOM’s per-spective, gained from working withprospective commanders and staffs ofboth JTFs and JSOTFs, can contribute tothis effort.

One of the most important aspects ofinteroperability is joint experimentation —the process of collecting, developing andexploring concepts in order to identify andrecommend DOTMLP solutions that mayachieve significant advances in joint oper-ational capabilities. In seeking to increasethe effectiveness of the joint force, USJF-COM and USSOCOM share a commonexperimentation objective: that of improv-ing the concepts of situational awarenessand the common relevant operational pic-ture; joint interactive planning; andattack operations against critical mobiletargets.

SOCJFCOM reviews all of USJFCOM’sconceptual documents; possesses a work-ing knowledge of the ongoing USJFCOMexperimentation program; and is heavilyinvolved with the multiservice, collabora-tive-planning-tool experiment Millenni-um Challenge. SOCJFCOM assists USJF-

COM and USSOCOM experimentationprograms by sharing a user perspectiveon a project’s effectiveness for the jointforce.

ConclusionThe SOF community and the joint com-

munity are making great strides towardachieving more efficient joint warfighting.Both communities recognize the require-ment for even more coherent warfighting,not only in the joint world, but also in multi-national and interagency operations.Thanks to the vision and the cooperation ofthe commanders of both USSOCOM andUSJFCOM, SOCJFCOM is in the rightplace at the right time to support our warfighters — the CINCs, the SOCs and theconventional JTF commanders.

Colonel Michael Findlay is commanderof the Special Operations Command JointForces Command, located in Norfolk, Va.His previous assignments include com-mander, 1st Battalion, 1st Special ForcesGroup; and senior SOF observer-controllerfor the Army Battle Command TrainingProgram. Colonel Findlay is a recent grad-uate of the Army Fellowship Program at theSchool of Advanced Military Studies, FortLeavenworth, Kan.

Spring 2000 17

In January 2000, the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School conducted Army SpecialOperations Forces War Game IV as part of

a continuing effort to understand the chal-lenges that ARSOF may face in the future.

An integral part of the Army After Next,or AAN, project, ARSOF War Game IV pro-vided a means of studying the ways thatARSOF will interact with Army conven-tional forces in future peacetime-engage-ment, crisis-response and war-fightingoperations.

The Army Training and Doctrine Com-mand, or TRADOC, initiated the AAN proj-ect at Fort Monroe, Va., in February 1996 toguide the Army’s thinking into the mid- andlong-range future. AAN was designed totake a conceptual look at the strategy, tech-nology, organizations and military art thatmight influence national defense and theArmy between 2010 and 2025.

New Army visionIn October 1999, the Chief of Staff of the

Army published a new vision for the Army.The Army Transformation vision describesan Army force that will be responsive,deployable, agile, sustainable, versatile,lethal and survivable. The future Armyforce will have the following:

• The ability to deliver a combat-capablebrigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours;a division in 120 hours; and five divisionsin 30 days.

• A common design for all divisions; andinternetted capabilities for command, control,communications, computers, intelligence, sur-veillance and reconnaissance, or C4ISR.

• A systems-of-systems approach tologistics, as well as a reduced logisticsfootprint.

• An Army service-component commandcapable of serving as commander of theArmy forces, or ARFOR, and as the joint-force land-component commander, orJFLCC; Corps headquarters capable ofserving as the headquarters for theJFLCC, ARFOR and joint task force.

• Common vehicle platforms that are 50-to 70-percent lighter and capable of survivingfighting in the fore and close battle areas.

• The ability to transition rapidlythrough the full spectrum of missionrequirements without a loss of momentum.

• “Reach-back” capabilities that will pro-vide CONUS-based support for forward-deployed forces.

The Army Transformation strategyfocuses on the concepts and design nec-essary to transform the current Armyforce into an interim force and finallyinto the objective force with the capabili-ties stated in the Army vision.

ARSOF War Game IVThe purpose of ARSOF War Game IV

was to assess the ways that ARSOF mightinteract with the far-term Army force in

18 Special Warfare

ARSOF War Game IV: Assessing ARSOF’sContribution to Regional Engagement

by Charles C. Faulkner III

regional engagement (see Special Warfare,Fall 1998). To help focus the analysis, theArmy Special Operations Battle Lab devel-oped the following research questions:• How might ARSOF support the opera-

tions of the far-term force in 2025?• How might ARSOF help the far-term

force attain information superiority?• How might ARSOF help the far-term

force enter a theater of operations?• How might ARSOF help the far-term

force better coordinate with allied andcoalition forces? ARSOF War Game IV differed from its

predecessors in two ways: First, it was con-ducted at Collins Hall, Carlisle Barracks,Pa., rather than at Fort Bragg.

Second, its scenario was the same oneused during the spring 1999 AAN WarGame — a major theater of war circa 2020-25. The scenario for ARSOF War Game III(see Special Warfare, Winter 1999) focusedon an intrastate conflict.

The 60 players who attended ARSOFWar Game IV represented various militaryand government agencies, including U.S.Special Operations Command; U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command; TRADOC;U.S. Army Civil Affairs and PsychologicalOperations Command; U.S. Army SpecialForces Command; 75th Ranger Regiment;Department of the Air Force; Departmentof State; U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency;U.S Marine Corps; Navy SOF and Air ForceSOF. Several retired ARSOF and conven-tional-force general officers also attended.

ARSOF War Game IV was a seminar wargame. For the first two days, the blue(friendly) team developed the theater SOFplans. On the first day, the blue teamfocused on the theater-engagement plan.On the second day, it focused on the theaterbattlespace-preparation plan.

On the third and fourth days, seven grayteams (representing SF; CA; PSYOP;reserve components, or RC; intelligence,regional-engagement forces, and inter-agency concerns) used the blue team’splans to identify issues and to develop pro-posals for future changes in the areas ofdoctrine, training, leader development,organization, materiel and soldiers, orDTLOMS. The gray teams’ proposals

include the following:Special Forces. Leader-development

training for SF soldiers needs to be moresophisticated. In addition, future opera-tions will require SF to work with anincreasing variety of government and non-government agencies. SF soldiers willrequire additional knowledge and skills,which they could acquire from varioussources, including an SF advanced course,nontraditional schooling, embassy assign-ments and interagency internships.

SF units must be capable of supportingthe overall information-operations, or IO,campaign and of being integrated into theintelligence-fusion, or IF, process. SF shouldexamine the training requirements for IO,

IF, computer network attack/defense andsystems engineering.

Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs elements mustpossess a flexible information architecturethat can accommodate interagency forcesand coalition composite forces. Informa-tion-sharing will be essential in developingsynergy among nontraditional civil, politi-cal and business elements.

Civil Affairs elements must be capable ofplanning, budgeting and expending fundsin support of civilian-sector relief and insupport of development projects across theoperational spectrum. CA elements canmake a significant contribution to regionalengagement if they are fully and pragmat-ically integrated into the strategies for IOand for joint targeting.

Psychological operations. The demandfor PSYOP support will increase duringregional-engagement activities. The design

Spring 2000 19

Future operations will require SF to workwith an increasing variety of government andnongovernment agencies. SF soldiers willrequire additional knowledge and skills,which they could acquire from varioussources, including an SF advanced course,nontraditional schooling, embassy assign-ments and interagency internships.

and structure of the current PSYOP forcemay be inadequate to support futureregional-engagement operations. The U.S.should consider developing strategic-levelPSYOP planners for IO integration.

Reserve components. Manning for region-al-engagement activities requires an inno-vative use of RC personnel. RC issuesinclude the accessibility of RC forces forpeacetime engagement; information man-agement and connectivity with RC forces;multi-component teams; and the use ofreach-back support to provide expertise todeployed RC forces.

The ARSOF War Game IV revalidatedthe observations made during ARSOF WarGame III: Namely, that forward-deployedengagement forces provide the theatercommander in chief with the capability tostrategically shape the operational envi-ronment. Forward-deployed forces can alsoprovide information about hostile forces,and they can provide a means of facilitat-ing the introduction of ground forces intothe area of operations.

The JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool input lessons learned from ARSOFWar Game IV into the Army Transforma-tion War Game in May 2000. SWCS willcontinue to participate in the Army’s AANproject and will continue to conduct analy-ses and to identify issues and insights forARSOF DTLOMS. Through these efforts,we are committed to providing ARSOFwith the capabilities that will ensure theirdominance in future operations of peace-time engagement, crisis-response, and warfighting.

Charles C. Faulkner III is chief of theConcepts and Capabilities Division of theJFK Special Warfare Center and School’sArmy Special Operations Battle Lab. Afterretiring from the Army as an Infantry offi-cer in 1984, he served in the Concepts andStudies Division, Directorate of CombatDevelopments, at SWCS until October1992. From October 1992 until June 1995,he was chief of the Concepts and StudiesBranch, Concepts and Plans Division,Deputy Chief of Staff for RequirementsIntegration, U.S. Army Special Operations

Command. From June 1995 until June1996, Faulkner served as chief of the Plans,Assessment and Requirements Division,Deputy Chief of Staff for RequirementsIntegration, USASOC.

20 Special Warfare

Spring 2000 21

Army Values

IntegrityRay Peers

William R. “Ray” Peers demonstrated unwaver-ing integrity and superb leadership as the com-mander of Detachment 101 of the Office of Stra-tegic Services in China and Burma during WorldWar II. He was responsible for thousands of U.S.and Burmese soldiers and guerrillas during themost successful guerrilla war ever conducted byAmericans.

Trusted with huge sums of cash and equipmentby the OSS, Peers made the most of every assetgiven him in order to pursue his mission: to drivethe Japanese out of Burma. His men trusted himimplicitly.

Near the end of his distinguished militarycareer, Lieutenant General Peers faced the great-est challenge to his integrity while serving aschairman of the commission investigating thealleged massacre of South Vietnamese villagers byU.S. soldiers at My Lai. Under considerable pres-sure from both the media and the military hierar-chy, Peers was unwavering. He was determined todiscover the truth, no matter who was implicated,and to present his recommendations to the Army.Peers let the chips fall where they might, namingdozens of Army officers and soldiers whom hebelieved should be held accountable for theiractions. After the investigation, even those who dis-agreed with his recommendations never ques-tioned his integrity.

Peers retired shortly after the commissionadjourned, confident that he had lived up to hisown sense of integrity and that he had told thetruth, regardless of the cost to the Army or to hisown career. — Dr. Richard Stewart

Ray PeersCourtesy USASOC Archives

In March, the Special Warfare Centerand School hosted the 2000 SpecialForces Conference and Exposition in

Fayetteville, N.C., bringing together mem-bers of the SF community to chart SF’svision of the future.

The SWCS commander, Major GeneralWilliam G. Boykin, intended for the con-ference’s symposiums and workshops toyield recommendations that will con-tribute to the continuing process ofchange and evolution in Special Forces.This year’s conference was a joint effort bySWCS; the National Defense IndustrialAssociation, or NDIA; the Army SpecialForces Command, or USASFC; and theSpecial Forces Association.

The four organizations synchronizedtheir efforts to appeal to SF personnel inall grades, to SF-qualified personnel innon-SF units, and to SF retirees. As in1999, the conference was held at a largehotel/convention center in Fayetteville,which provided an ideal facility for the con-ference’s diverse activities.

A number of Army and SOF senior lead-ers, both active-duty and retired, attendedthe 2000 conference. Among the key speak-ers were Assistant Secretary of Defense forSpecial Operations and Low Intensity Con-flict Brian Sheridan, who spoke on “SpecialForces: A Viable Relevant Force in Supportof National Policy”; John Rendon, chiefexecutive officer of the Rendon Group, whospoke on “Information in the Information

Age”; Major General Robert H. Scales Jr.,commandant of the Army War College, whodiscussed “Revolution in Military Affairsand Future Warfare Trends”; Major Gener-al Geoffrey Lambert, director of the U.S.Special Operations Command’s Center forOperations, Plans and Policy, who spoke on“The Future of Special Forces”; and RetiredBrigadier General Wayne Hall, who spokeon “Future Warfare Information Operationsand Technology.”

Also in attendance were LieutenantGeneral William Tangney, commander ofthe Army Special Operations Command,who spoke on “The Future of Army SpecialOperations”; and Brigadier General JohnScales, acting commander of the Army SFCommand, who spoke on “Keeping SpecialForces Relevant in a Changing Army.”

Activities began on March 13 with theSpecial Forces Open Classic golf tourna-ment. During the next three days (March14-16), the conference conducted a numberof concurrent activities: three symposiums,two workshops and the NDIA exposition.

The symposiums supported the confer-ence theme, “Looking Back to Chart theFuture.” The first symposium, “HistoricalValidation of Special Forces Combat Skills,Values, Attributes and Organization,”sought to identify, through historical exam-ples, the skills, attributes and organizationthat have made Special Forces the uniqueentity that it is today. The second sympo-sium, “Defining the Future of Special

22 Special Warfare

The 2000 Special Forces Conference: Looking Back to Chart the Future

Forces in a Changing Global Environ-ment,” sought to develop the intellectualfoundation for SF during peacetimeengagement, during crisis-response situa-tions and in war-fighting operations; and todefine the operational capabilities that SFmay require during the period 2005-20.The third symposium, “Augmenting Spe-cial Forces Capabilities Through Technolo-gy Integration,” sought to examine theimpact of technology on SF and to defineSF’s future technological requirements.

All three symposiums followed the sameagenda: A briefing presented by the moder-ator or a speech delivered by one of theguest speakers served as a catalyst for dis-cussion. Following each symposium, themoderator fielded comments from the audi-ence and directed questions to a panel ofactive-duty and retired members of the SFcommunity.

The workshops, conducted March 14 and15, were designed to gain input from SFpersonnel in the grades of staff sergeantthrough master sergeant, WO1 throughCW3, and captains and majors. The firstworkshop, “Impacts on Special ForcesReadiness by the Emergence of KnowledgeManagement,” sought to develop a vision ofthe way SF will employ information-tech-nology systems and how SF will operate inthe knowledge-management era. The sec-ond workshop, “Retention and Recruiting:Keeping Soldiers in Past 20,” broughttogether current SF command sergeantsmajor and SF-qualified former sergeantsmajor of the Army to discuss the Branch’sdifficulty in retaining senior NCOs pasttheir 20-year point. Workshop participantssought to develop recommendations andincentives that SF might adopt to encour-age senior enlisted personnel to remain onactive duty more than 20 years.

The NDIA exposition, which required nosoldier support from SWCS, featured thedisplays of 85 vendors. Conference atten-dees were also invited to participate in avendor-sponsored live-fire of selectedweapons, held on Fort Bragg’s Range 44.

Each day of the conference ended with asocial event: On the first evening, theNDIA hosted a social for all conferenceparticipants. The SF Association hosted a

barbecue on the second evening. And onthe third evening, the conference concludedwith the SF Ball.

The 2000 SF Conference continued thestandard set by the 1999 conference. Likeits predecessor, the 2000 SF Conferencefocused on complex issues and developedrecommendations that may benefit theentire SF community in the future. Withits relevant agenda, the inclusion of theexperiences and opinions of current andformer SF operators, and the professionaladvice offered by senior leaders in militaryand government circles, the 2000 SF Con-ference made a valuable contribution tothe ongoing and critical evolution of Spe-cial Forces.

This article was prepared by the staff ofSpecial Warfare.

Spring 2000 23

On any given day, the United Stateshas approximately 200 personneldeployed worldwide on security-

assistance missions. Security assistance,designed to achieve global security by pro-viding advice and equipment to developingnations, is a valuable part of the overallU.S. foreign-assistance program. Since theearly 1970s, the U.S. Army Security Assist-ance Training Management Organization,or SATMO, has assembled, prepared,deployed and supported security-assist-ance teams, or SATs, operating outside thecontinental U.S., or OCONUS.

SATMO is the single source for providingSATs and training-related support to U.S.security-assistance organizations, such asmilitary groups and offices of military coop-eration. These organizations carry out U.S.foreign and national-security policies byproviding military assistance, equipmentand training to developing nations to helpthem become self-sufficient.

SATMO is an element of the U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command, orTRADOC, which is headquartered at FortMonroe, Va. SATMO and the SecurityAssistance Training Field Activity, orSATFA, make up TRADOC’s SecurityAssistance Training Directorate. SATFAis responsible for all security-assistancetraining in the continental U.S., orCONUS, and has overall financial man-agement responsibility for all Army secu-rity-assistance training. SATMO is

attached to the U.S. Army John F.Kennedy Special Warfare Center andSchool, which provides SATMO with oper-ational oversight as well as administra-tive and logistics support.

SATs are composed of soldiers and civil-ians drawn from Army organizations locat-ed within CONUS. In assembling theteams, SATMO is authorized direct coordi-nation with CONUS and overseas com-mands and has broad tasking authorityover all CONUS-based Army assets.

From Jan. 1, 1999, through November1999, SATMO deployed 297 SATs (involv-ing 634 personnel) to 47 countries. Of the297 SATs, 34 were Special Forces-specificand required 103 SF soldiers.

FundingFunding for SATs is provided in part

through U.S. government programs such asthe Foreign Military Financing Program,International Narcotics and Law Enforce-ment, the International Military Educa-tion Training Program, and the 506A2Presidential Drawdown. These programsprovide funding to eligible countries toassist them in self-defense, in counterdrugoperations, and in promoting democracyand human rights. With the exception of506A2, the funding is provided by congres-sional allocation. Under the authority of506A2, the U.S. president can direct anorganization to provide equipment, sup-

24 Special Warfare

SATMO: Valuable Part of the U.S. ForeignAssistance Program

by Major William Nase

plies and personnel to a foreign govern-ment. The losing organization is responsi-ble for the associated costs.

Another source of funding, Foreign Mili-tary Sales, is a nonappropriated programthrough which eligible foreign govern-ments can purchase defense equipmentand request training assistance from theU.S. government. The purchasing govern-ment pays all costs associated with a sale,including the cost of the training-assist-ance teams.

RestrictionsIn accordance with U.S. public law, all U.S.

government personnel performing security-assistance tasks and functions in a foreigncountry are under the direction and supervi-sion of the U.S. ambassador in that country.SAT personnel are not issued combat gear orweapons. Federal laws and agreements withforeign governments prohibit SAT personnelfrom participating in combat operations or incross-border deployments.

OrganizationSATMO is divided into a command sec-

tion and two divisions: the Security Assist-ance Support Division, or SASD, and theSecurity Assistance Training Division, orSATD.

The SASD develops, coordinates and

executes support operations in order toprovide each deploying team with funding,supplies, equipment and an information-management capability.

The SASD consists of a personnel-man-agement section, the Resource ManagementBranch, the Logistics Branch and the Infor-mation Management Branch. The ResourceManagement Branch manages SATMO’sannual budget, which includes $25 millionallocated for SATs and approximately$700,000 allocated for administrative costs.

The Logistics Branch manages SATMO’sproperty at Fort Bragg and ensures thatdeploying soldiers have all required equip-ment, uniforms, training aids, etc.

The Information Management Branch main-tains dozens of telephone lines,several messageservers, a large amount of automation equip-ment, and a database that can be accessed at amoment’s notice by multiple users.

The SATD is responsible for the overallmanagement of the training missions. Itassists SATMO’s “customers” with theirmission analysis; it also forms, prepares,deploys and redeploys SATs. SATD’s SATmanagers are involved in every aspect of amission. They fulfill the roles of planners,trainers, logisticians and politicians. Theirgoal is to make sure that the training mis-sions run smoothly. The role of a SAT man-ager begins when he receives a projectedSAT request from the security-assistance

Spring 2000 25

The Security Assistance Training Management Organization

Office of theCommander

SATD

SOUTHCOMJFCOM CENTCOM PACOM

EUCOM Personnel ResourceManagement Logistics

SASD

InformationManagement

officer, or SAO, in a foreign country. (TheSAO is the senior U.S. military personassigned to a foreign country.)

NotificationAs the duties of SAT missions vary, so does

the time required for their completion. Somemissions, such as extended training servicespecialists and technical-assistance fieldteams, require more than 180 days to com-plete and involve permanent-change-of-sta-tion, or PCS, assignments. Other missions,including mobile training teams, require-ments-survey teams, technical-assistance

teams, and predeployment site surveys, canbe performed in 180 days or less and involvetemporary-duty, or TDY, assignments.

The SAO submits a request for a projectedPCS mission 18 months prior to deployment;for a projected TDY mission, the SAO sub-mits the projected SAT requirement 12months prior to deployment. After receivingthe request, the SAT manager begins todevelop the mission-cost estimate that hewill provide to SATFA. SATFA uses the esti-mate as a guide in preparing the letter ofoffer and acceptance, or LOA. The LOA is thecontractual agreement between the U.S. gov-ernment and the country requesting the SAT.

At a later date, the SAO transmits a call-upmessage, either to SATFA or to SATMO, for-mally requesting a SAT.A thoroughly prepared

call-up message includes a detailed missionstatement and a list of the training goals. Themessage states the duration of the SAT missionand the date on which the SAT is to be in coun-try. It outlines what the team’s compositionshould be; any special qualifications the teamshould have; and whether the team membersshould be of a specific rank. It also addressesthe training locations; transportation; who is tobe trained; the support that the host nation willprovide; uniform and equipment requirements;the availability of quarters; provisions for med-ical and dental support; and any restrictionsthat will be placed on the team.

If the SAT mission involves a PCSassignment, the call-up message is trans-mitted nine months prior to deployment. Ifthe mission involves a TDY assignment,the call-up message is generally submittedsix months prior to deployment.

After the SAT manager receives thecall-up message, he coordinates with theSAO to ensure that all requirements —training aids, publications, equipment,materials, billeting, transportation, train-ing locations and necessary translators —have been identified and will be providedprior to the deployment date.

SAT requests can sometimes be complex,and the SAT manager must ensure thatevery aspect of the mission has been resolvedbefore the team deploys. For example, theSAO in a foreign country may request a tech-nical-assistance team to conduct technicalinspections of all the country’s wheeled andtracked vehicles.The country may have 1,000vehicles in its inventory and may be askingfor four personnel for 10 days. The SAT man-ager must contact the SAO to ascertain vehi-cle densities, vehicle locations, travel timesbetween sites, and the focus of the inspection.

Next, the SAT manager contacts subject-matter experts at various locations through-out CONUS to determine whether theteam’s composition is appropriate, based onthe length of time that has been allotted forthe mission. Once the team’s compositionand the duration of the mission have beenestablished, the SAT manager, with assist-ance from SATFA, performs a cost analysis.The SAT manager determines the costs ofall elements of the mission, includingexpenses that may not have been consid-

26 Special Warfare

Since the 1970s, SATMOhas been deploying securi-ty-assistance teams world-wide to provide training insupport of U.S. national-security policies.

File photo

ered in the cost estimate, such as itinerarychanges, requirements for extra manuals orequipment, or additional host-nation sup-port. Once completed, the cost analysis issent to SATFA for inclusion in the LOA.

SATMO cannot authorize any expendi-ture of funds until the LOA has beensigned and SATMO has received thefunding-obligation authority. Once themission has been funded, the obligatingauthority is passed from the DefenseFinance Accounting System throughSATFA to SATMO. This process normallytakes 3-6 weeks after the funds havebeen deposited and the program datahave been received at TRADOC.

Personnel selectionTo meet a TDY SAT requirement, SATMO

is authorized to task all CONUS major com-mands (e.g., TRADOC centers and activities,the Army Special Operations Command, theArmy Forces Command). If a command isunable to support the tasking, a general officerat the major-command level must approve thenotification of nonsupport. If none of the com-mands can support the tasking, the tasking issubmitted to the Department of the Army fora decision. PERSCOM nominates personnelfor PCS SAT assignments and provides theinformation to SATMO.

After SATMO receives the nominations,the SAT manager contacts and interviewseach soldier, selects the most qualifiedones, and notifies all of those selected.

Once SATMO receives the funding-obliga-tion authority from SATFA, the SAT managerprovides deployment instructions to the teammembers’ units and installations for the prepa-ration of TDY orders. For the preparation ofPCS orders, the SAT manager provides deploy-ment instructions to PERSCOM. Deploymentinstructions include passport and visa require-ments; special authorizations; financial, trans-portation and medical instructions; and anytraining requirements that the SAT membersmust meet prior to their deployment.

TrainingThe Department of the Army has directed

that all SAT members must attend the Secu-rity Assistance Team Training and Orienta-

tion Course, or SATTOC, at Fort Bragg. Dur-ing this three-day course, SAT membersattend a country orientation, intelligence-and-threat classes and briefings on various mis-sion considerations — public affairs; legalmatters; fraud, waste, and abuse; and medicalconcerns. They also receive Code of Conducttraining and instruction in survival, evasion,resistance and escape. SAT members who aredeploying to high-risk areas may be required toattend a weapons orientation and range firings.

SAT managers must have a definitiveunderstanding of the specific rules andguidelines that apply to passports and visas.Some of the soldiers who are deploying on aPCS assignment may be required to travelwith a diplomatic passport, while others maybe required to travel with an official pass-port. Soldiers may need to apply for thesedocuments weeks or even months prior todeployment. In many cases, these documentsare delivered directly to SATMO and are dis-tributed to the soldiers upon their arrival atFort Bragg.

After returning from a mission, SAT mem-bers usually prepare an after-action report,in which they discuss the conduct of the mis-sion, the degree of mission success, the num-ber of personnel trained, any problemsencountered during the mission, andwhether the team received its required sup-port. After completing the after-action reportand submitting it to the SAO, the SAT mem-bers either return to their home stations ordeploy to their next assignment.

In support of foreign-policy objectives, theU.S. may deploy military teams to assistdeveloping nations by providing equipmentand training. These teams may be of varioussizes; the length and the intent of their mis-sions may vary greatly;and they may be foundin parts of the world as disparate as SaudiArabia, Honduras, Estonia, Egypt, Colombiaor Kuwait. Yet despite their differences, theseteams have one thing in common: They havebeen assembled, trained and deployed bySATMO, which for nearly 30 years has been avaluable, if little-known, part of the U.S. for-eign-assistance program.

Major William Nase is a security-assist-ance team manager in SATMO.

Spring 2000 27

The Studies and ObservationGroup, or SOG, of theUnited States Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam,or MACV, operated in secrecy foreight years during the VietnamWar. At its height, SOG had astrength of some 2,000 Ameri-cans. Despite the considerablenumber of soldiers who cycledthrough SOG, the existence of theunit and its specific activitiesremained, if not secret, at leastlargely unknown.1

Recent declassification ofSOG’s surviving records hasallowed researchers to delve intoSOG’s history, and four recentbooks help to dispel some of thefog surrounding SOG’s activities.

Although SOG was a jointorganization, its leaders and itslargest component were Army.Overwhelmingly, the Army compo-nent was composed of SpecialForces soldiers, who were for mostof SOG’s existence assigned to the5th SF Group for purposes ofadministration and cover.

A high percentage of the SF sol-diers who were awarded Medals ofHonor during Vietnam were oper-ators in SOG. The organizationalso included a disproportionatenumber of the SF operators who

were killed or wounded in action,and of those who still remain inthe missing-in-action/body-not-recovered category.2

SOG’s principal mission, cross-border reconnaissance, was at thetime unique, and it was new toSF. Largely as a result of SOG’sachievements in Vietnam, deepreconnaissance has become partof the SF mission lexicon.3

Because of the size and the longduration of the SF commitment,and because of the later migra-tion of the reconnaissance mis-sion, the histories of SOG and SFare forever intertwined. The his-tory of SOG would not be com-plete without recognizing themajor SF contribution, and thehistory of SF in Southeast Asiawould not be complete withoutincluding the SOG experience.

During its existence, SOGdrew SF personnel from allgrades and from all the SFgroups. The collective combatexperience of SOG was exten-sive: A few of the senior officersand NCOs had World War IIexperience; a sizable numberhad Korean War service; a largemajority had served in Laos or inVietnam during earlier tours.Not all of its members, however,

were salty veterans. As early as1966, the reconnaissance teamscould boast of a couple of veryjunior soldiers, Specialists FourGoth and Keller. Later, SOG’sranks would include CaptainWilliam P. Tangney and 1st Lieu-tenant Kenneth R. Bowra.

Most SOG soldiers had signedaffidavits to be silent about theorganization and its operations,and long after SOG had ceased tooperate, they remained silentsave amongst themselves. Evenafter the end of the war, accountsof their operations rarely ap-peared in print, except for one notwidely popular novel. Surprising-ly, SOG remained obscure despitethe efforts of hostile congressmenintent on exposing it to the mediain order to embarrass the admin-istration. The intensity of thecongressmen’s hostility wasmatched only by their lack of con-cern for the lives of the soldiersthey sought to expose.

For many years, SOG veterans,particularly those who had servedin the few sensitive positions thatpermitted them to peer into theorganization’s numerous isolatedcompartments, wanted to see thehistory of SOG written. The moti-vations for their desire varied.

28 Special Warfare

Review Essay

MACV SOG: New Books Reveal Vietnam’s ‘Secret War’

by Colonel J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.)

Some wanted to see their dedicatedand often heroic service recog-nized. Others wanted to see thehistorical records culled for opera-tional lessons that would be applic-able in current or future conflicts.Still others undoubtedly just want-ed to show their families what theywere part of during their war serv-ice. The desires of the veteranswere frustrated by the classifica-tion of SOG’s surviving records andby the scarcity of authors who weresufficiently interested in the sub-ject to fight for declassification ofthe hoary records.4

John Plaster’s widely acclaimedbook of three years ago, SOG: TheSecret Wars of America’s Com-mandos in Vietnam,5 created adegree of public awareness ofand interest in SOG that hadnot existed earlier.

This year, three other bookshave followed Plaster’s semi-nal work. Between them,they largely dissipate the fogthat has surrounded SOG.One, The Secret WarAgainst Hanoi, by RichardShultz,6 is an overallanalysis of SOG and itsactivities. The other twopresent narrower viewsof SOG. Spies and Com-mandos: How AmericaLost the Secret War inNorth Vietnam, byKenneth Conboy and DaleAndradé,7 concentrates, as its titleindicates, strictly on operationsinto North Vietnam. Plaster’sSOG: A Photo History of the SecretWars8 largely follows the patternof his earlier book. It presents ageneral view of SOG and its oper-ations, giving its most generousand detailed treatment to thereconnaissance operations in Laosand Cambodia. Incidentally, thereader should not be misled by thetitle. Although the book containshundreds of pictures and can be

quite properly described as aphoto history, it also containsextensive, informative text.

Shultz seems to have left nocranny unprobed, nor should hissense of timing be faulted. Hewrote his book while many of theprincipals, including most ofthose who carried the title “Chief,SOG” were still available to pro-vide the depth and details needed

to flesh out the frag-mentary and

often cryp-tic written records.During the same period, the U.S.Army Special Operations Com-mand, or USASOC, enjoyed a suc-cession of commanders, beginningwith Lieutenant General JerryScott, who encouraged and sup-ported Shultz’s efforts. USASOC’ssupport was particularly helpfulin the effort to declassify the sur-viving SOG records.

Despite the fact that the four

books have the same general sub-ject, there is little redundancy inthem. They are largely comple-mentary, addressing the manyfacets of SOG from differentaspects and with different levelsof detail and emphasis. WhileShultz includes the efforts inNorth Vietnam and the recon-naissance programs, his bookdoes not cover those operations inas much detail of the other worksdo. It does, however, present awider, more extensive picture,

describing SOG’s birth, organ-ization, programs andstruggles at the theater,regional, and nationallevels.

As described byShultz, SOG’s problemswere manifold, massiveand generally insolubleby most of those who hadto address them. SOG’sinitial problem (one thatthe organization could nev-er overcome) could bedescribed as a bastard birth,followed by a poor upbring-ing by a distracted, singleparent of limited capability —an unprepared Department ofDefense, or DoD, which wasincreasingly focused on fightinga conventional war. The otherparent was an impatient andfickle administration. Concep-tion was the result of PresidentKennedy’s demand that the U.S.generate an insurgency in NorthVietnam similar to the one thatthe North Vietnamese govern-ment was creating and support-ing in South Vietnam.

The presidential directivereflected the administration’scomplete lack of recognition ofthe amount of time, effort,resources, skills, and above all,patience required to develop aninsurgency under even the best ofconditions.9 The administration,

Spring 2000 29

annoyed by what it perceived asthe dilatoriness of the CIA,placed the insurgency effortunder the direction of DoD, adecision that was rife with mis-chief. The CIA, fenced out of whatit considered not only a part of itsfounding charter but also a partof its patrimony fromthe Office of StrategicServices, or OSS,became, at best, a luke-warm supporter. Be-cause the CIA was con-currently conducting a“private war” in neigh-boring Laos, it was by nomeans a disinterestedparty.10 For the most part,the CIA was a powerfulopponent who had theadvantages of agency status,more responsive communica-tions and command struc-tures, and the ability toobstruct at the national level.

DoD neither wanted the insur-gency program nor did it haveany particular competence toapply to it.11 Fomenting insur-gency was not an assigned DoDmission. Further, the great guerril-la operations of World War II hadtaken place before DoD was creat-ed, so the organization had noinstitutional memory to guide it.

The Army, the service with themost cogent interest in insurgentoperations, had little applicabledirect experience in fomenting,organizing, supporting and di-recting insurgencies. Its largestand most unilateral insurgencyexperience, the World War IIPhilippine guerrilla movement,had been almost entirely self-gen-erating, self-organizing, and self-supporting until late in the con-flict. Guerrilla-warfare experiencein Europe largely belonged to theOSS and the British Special Oper-ations Executive, which sustainedguerrilla operations essentially as

a service in support of the Allies’senior military commands.12 Dur-ing the Korean War, changes inthe political environment hadquickly forced incipient guer-rilla warfare toe v o l v e

i n t ocoastal raiding.13

Both DoD and the serviceslacked what would now be calleda special-operations structureabove the Army SF groups andthe seminal Navy SEAL units.Despite understandable misgiv-ings, resentment of the misguid-ed presidential direction, and thelack of precedent and experience,DoD made a more than commend-able effort. It formed a jointorganization under the hopefullyobscure title “Studies and Obser-vation Group.” Although theorganization’s structure was ade-quate, it was an ad hoc reflectionof assigned functions rather thana reflection of the doctrinal joint

unconventional warfare taskforce, or JUWTF.

The Army assigned its mostexperienced special operators toSOG. Two of the five colonels whoheld the position “Chief, SOG” hadprevious guerrilla-warfare experi-ence: Colonel Donald Blackburnhad served as a guerrilla leader inthe Philippines,14 and ColonelJohn Singlaub had served as anOSS operative in France and inChina.15 While the value and theapplicability of their experiencesas company-grade officers 20years earlier might be debated,Blackburn and Singlaub werethe best officers available.Blackburn and two other chiefs,Colonel Clyde Russell andColonel Steve Cavanaugh,were former SF group commanders.

Finally, DoD estab-lished an organization inthe Pentagon — the Spe-cial Assistant for Coun-terinsurgency and Spe-cial Activities, orSACSA — to provideSOG with connectivi-

ty, national-level en-trée, and oversight. Shultzimplies that SACSA was alsoexpected to restrain SOG. If so, itwas singularly inefficient at thetask: In addition to the manyother duties SACSA acquired inthe course of coordinating SOG’sauthorities with Washington-areaagencies and offices, it became astrong SOG advocate. AlthoughShultz perceives a basic DoD hos-tility toward SOG, that hostilityappears to be overstated. Therewere undoubtedly some whoresented a secret organization towhose mysteries they were notprivy, but the number of suchmalcontents was not large.16

Following some rough start-upexperiences, DoD supported SOGwith personnel, equipment, fund-

30 Special Warfare

ing and, most important, the req-uisite priorities to assure that in-country headquarters providedthe cooperation and the assetsnecessary to support specificoperations. The support to SOGcontinued essentially unabatedwhile DoD and the services wereheavily engaged in building upthe armed forces and conductinga constantly expanding war.

As the war expanded and as thenumber of American units in-country increased, the president’sand the Secretary of Defense’sinterests in SOG declined. Aspresidential interest waned, theDepartment of State becamemore active in its opposition tothe operations of and (as wasoften suspected) the existence ofSOG. Thereafter, regardless ofhow egregious the actions of theNorth Vietnamese government,DoS could be counted on tointroduce evidence of some con-ciliatory motion or pendingNorth Vietnamese peace ini-tiative as a basis for opposingoperations proposed bySOG.17 The North Vietnam-ese, of course, could pullDoS’s chain by having aspokesman state thatpeace negotiations couldbegin as soon as theAmericans ceased what-ever was annoying theNorth Vietnamese atthe moment.

In the not necessari-ly unprejudiced mindsof senior SOG mem-bers, the basis of DoS’s opposi-tion was often suspect. There wasa frequent suspicion that DoS’sobstructionism was in support ofthe American Embassy, Vien-tiane’s protection of the CIA’smonopoly of operations in Laos.Suspicion and hostility were inno way reduced by what was seenas a variable standard espoused

by Ambassador William Sullivanin Vientiane, Laos. While Sulli-van interposed numerous ob-structing objections to smallground operations as violatingLaotian neutrality and the 1954Geneva Accords, he demandedAmerican in-country air supportfor indigenous operations andeven demanded that he have apart in allocating B-52 strikes.

Apparently DoS, the AmericanEmbassy in Vientiane and, later,the Johnson administration,wanted to avoid any action thatmight annoy the North Viet-

namese. Although theirattitude would

have been aprudent prelude to surren-der, it was an exceedingly poorbasis for fighting a war. Fewamong the three groups seemedto recognize the absolute critical-ity of the Ho Chi Minh Trail sys-tem to the North Vietnamese con-

duct of the war.SOG operated under the disad-

vantage of having to seek approvalfrom three agencies in Washingtonfor its operational authorities andfor its specific operations. Unfortu-nately, two of those agencies werebasically opposed to SOG’s exist-ence. At times the White Housealso joined the opposition. Even thepresidential administration thathad demanded that the U.S. fomentguerrilla warfare in North Vietnambackpedaled when it came toaction. Although the demand forSOG to achieve near-term resultscontinued, the authority to conductoperations against North Vietnamwas slow in coming and, when

granted, was greatly restrainedand caveated, to thepoint of making themission impossible tofulfill.

Despite all of therestrictions placed onSOG and the growing listof naysayers, the SOGchiefs struggled to accom-plish as much as their hotlynegotiated and heavilyrestrained authorities per-mitted. Their efforts evolvedinto three programs: attemptsto create an insurgency inNorth Vietnam; small-scaleseaborne raids on North Viet-nam’s coasts; and reconnais-sance, backed by air strikes,against North Vietnamese forcescrossing first Laos and later Cam-bodia. Each program had its ownset of frustrations, almost all ofwhich were American-made.

InsurgencyBecause American participa-

tion in ground operations inNorth Vietnam was forbidden,SOG was limited to inserting sin-gletons and small teams of indige-nous agent volunteers. The

Spring 2000 31

restrained operational authorities,coupled with the lack of time, poorarea preparation, lack of a quali-fied support structure, and limitedborder access to North Vietnam,precluded developing an insur-gency there. It is arguable whetheran insurgency could have beendeveloped even without thoserestraints.

Conditions then extant inNorth Vietnam would have madesuccess in fomenting andsupporting ani n s u r g e n c ythere highlyunlikely. Largenumbers of theonly Vietnameseminority thatmight have formeda basis for resist-ance, the Catholics,had been evacuatedto South Vietnam in1954, at the end of theFirst Indochina War.Although the commu-nist government wasundeniably dictatorial,few Vietnamese hadever known anythingbetter. Above all, it wasa Vietnamese govern-ment, and it had defeatedthe French only a decadeearlier, ending nearly acentury of colonial rule anda grueling eight-year warfor independence. In fact,the memory of French rulewas still vivid, and it isunlikely that without longand extensive political andpsychological preparation, theNorth Vietnamese populacewould have accepted the rhetoricand the agendas of a new set ofCaucasian strangers. Given theconditions, the prohibition againstAmerican operations in North Viet-nam may have been an unappreci-ated mercy.

Unable to create and sustain aninsurgency, SOG, recognizing theparanoia of totalitarian — partic-ularly communist — governments,instituted a grand deception pro-gram to create the perception ofdisaffection, subversion and incip-ient insurgency. The expectationwas that even if the programachieved only minorsuccesses,

a signifi-cant number of enemy

forces would be tied down per-forming security roles, such asguarding facilities, searching fornebulous insurgents, and institut-ing repressive controls. SOG’sdeception program had the poten-tial of becoming even more valuablethan anything achievable by theoriginally intended insurgency.

In an effort to cajole the NorthVietnamese into peace negotia-tions, the Johnson administrationcut off all air operations overNorth Vietnam. Consequently,the aircraft that had been sus-taining the “insurgency” withsimulated agent insertion and

resupply drops were alsogrounded. As a result, thecredibility of the SOG’s decep-tion program was under-mined. Thereafter, opera-tions in North Vietnam werelimited to radio play(intended primarily toextend the lives of cap-tured agent radio opera-tors), occasional brief for-ays for limited goals(such as the recovery ofair crews), and the pris-oner-rescue effort atSon Tay.

Conboy and Andradé’sSpies and Commandosis particularly valu-able in under-standing these SOGo p e r a t i o n s .Although rathercritical in tone, thebook is well-re-searched andwell-written, andit addresses pro-grams (such asthe VietnameseShort Term

Roadwatch andTarget Acquisition Teams,

often known as STRATA) that arenot covered well elsewhere.

Seaborne raidsWith its long coast, North Viet-

nam was a natural target for acoastal raiding program thatcould attenuate and harass theNorth Vietnamese forces. Again,the Johnson administration, rep-resented by the Secretary of

32 Special Warfare

Defense Robert S. McNamara,expressed great interest in such aprogram and demanded earlyresults. However, the administra-tion not only limited the opera-tions geographically, it also limit-ed mission authorizations, and itrestricted American participation.The political restrictions, alongwith the poorly motivated Viet-namese operators, the range limi-tations of the raiding craft (eventhe outstanding Nasty-class pat-rol boats), and the small numberof productive targets in thecoastal areas, resulted in a pro-gram of limited effect. A burgeon-ing naval-air-attack program ren-dered the results of the coastalraiding program insignificant.

ReconnaissanceEven the reconnaissance pro-

gram conducted against the back-bone of the North Vietnamese wareffort, the Ho Chi Minh Trail sys-tem in Laos, suffered cripplingrestraints. The American Embassyin Vientiane, citing the widely dis-credited 1962 Geneva Accords(that the enemy had blatantly vio-lated since their signing), constant-ly raised objections to SOG opera-tions. For the reconnaissance pro-gram, this meant an effective limi-tation of 20 kilometers into Laos.The pattern of contacts soon madethe 20-kilometer limitation evidentto the enemy, making it easier forhim to protect critical targets anddrastically increasing the hazardsto the reconnaissance teams.

Although the depth limitationwas sometimes relaxed to permitthe recovery of American aircrews, the requirement to coordi-nate the recovery with the Amer-ican Embassy in Vientiane oftendelayed SOG until it was too latefor the recovery efforts to beeffective.18 Plaster’s SOG: APhoto History of the Secret Wars

exhaustively covers this aspect ofSOG’s activities in both word andpicture. It is not, like most photocollections, a coffee-table decora-tion, but the single best descrip-tion of SOG’s reconnaissance pro-gram extant, surpassing evenPlaster’s earlier work.

Following a recent presentationby Shultz on The Secret WarAgainst Hanoi at the NationalDefense University, a noted mili-tary historian asked, “Did SOGhave a strategy? What was it?”These questions beggar reality.The U.S. military practice, bothdoctrinal and historical, is that amilitary special-operations or-ganization supports the strategyof the command fighting the war.Although the SO command mighthave its own organization, equip-ment, tactics, techniques and pro-cedures, it would not have its ownstrategy, any more than theArtillery Branch or the EngineerBranch would have separatestrategies.19 Shultz contends thatSOG operations were not an inte-grated facet of MACV’s strategybut that they occurred in parallelisolation. The validity of thisargument would seem to dependon whether MACV itself had astrategy. The late Colonel HarrySummers argued strongly that itdid not.20

LessonsWhat are the lessons of the

SOG experience? For the combatsoldier, they are few. Warfare hasso changed in the interveningyears that only exceptional cir-cumstances would create an oper-ational environment in which thecombat lessons of SOG wouldapply.

Even though the chiefs of SOGhad theater-wide responsibilities,they were mere colonels among awealth of senior generals whose

interests and agendas were oftenin conflict with SOG’s. To performtheir missions, SOG leadersstruggled against impedimentscreated by the diplomatic, intelli-gence and political elements ofgovernment. They also had tostruggle against multiple, oftenuncomprehending, military lev-els. Given what SOG leadersachieved under trying conditions,it would be hard to fault them.

SOG’s legacy is not so much oneof lessons-learned as it is one ofexample. For eight years, despitedifficult conditions and impedi-ments at all levels, the SOG Spe-cial Forces soldiers, the smallernumber of sailors and airmen,and the greater number of indige-nous warriors, did their jobs withunfailing dedication, tenacity and,all too often, fatal courage.

The real lessons of SOG arethose of the greater Vietnamexperience. They are applicablenot in special-operations organi-zations, but at the higher politi-cal and military levels. The chieflesson is that national leaderswould do well to recognize(Clausewitz not withstanding)that although war pursues politi-cal ends, it is not a precisemachine that can be turned onand off, run by exact rules, orfine-tuned to pursue politicalgoals. Any attempt to treat it sowill surrender political and mili-tary initiatives to a determinedenemy and waste the militaryinstrument of power.

From that primary lesson, wecan derive others:

• Limiting major combat opera-tions to a single country while theopponent operates essentiallyunfettered in every adjoining coun-try surrenders critical advantageto the enemy.

• Sending troops deep enoughinto enemy territory that theycannot be readily supported, but

Spring 2000 33

not deep enough to seriously hurtthe enemy, challenges commandresponsibility.

• Continuing the above practiceafter the enemy has determinedthe limits of penetration andwhen almost every missionrequires early extraction underfire defies logic.

Given the limitations on opera-tions, the increasing difficulty ofpenetration, and the repeatedloss of brave men, one might won-der why the MACV commandersdid not terminate the operations,or if that decision was beyondtheir authority, why they did notrequest that the operations beterminated. It is hardly conceiv-able that such a request wouldhave been refused.

Although MACV commanderswere well-informed of the prob-lems in SOG operations,21 theyapparently valued the intelli-gence on enemy movements inLaos and in Cambodia that,because of the political limita-tions and the jungle cover, wouldnot otherwise have been avail-able to them. The fact that theintelligence was largely employedfor defensive uses did not meanthat it was not important. TheMACV commanders probably alsovalued the opportunity that thereconnaissance teams gave themto strike at the enemy in Laos, anarea generally outside their oper-ational authorities.

Shultz, Plaster, Conboy andAndradé have all done an excel-lent job of dispelling the mists ofclassification and time that havelong hidden SOG. Each of theirworks tells its tale well, with ade-quate indexes, end notes and ref-erences for those who wish todelve farther. Spies and Com-mandos will appeal most to theintelligence operators. The SFsoldier will most enjoy SOG: APhoto History.

Shultz’s The Secret War AgainstHanoi is particularly recom-mended to those who are inter-ested in the nation’s political-mil-itary decision processes and inthe histories of the SecondIndochina War, of Southeast Asia,and of the era. On a professionallevel, the book is recommended todiplomats, politicians, intelli-gence officers, foreign-area offi-cers, and joint special-operationspersonnel of all grades. It is notrecommended to the survivors ofSOG reconnaissance teams. Theymight have too many awkwardquestions as to why their mostdamaging enemies were not onthe Ho Chi Minh Trail, but inWashington and in an Americanembassy.

Colonel J.H. Crerarserved 23 years inSpecial Forces unitsand in service, jointand combined spe-cial-operations staffpositions. As a mem-ber of the 3rd, 5th and 10th SFgroups and MACV SOG, heenjoyed wide experience in Spe-cial Forces mission areas, primar-ily in Southeast Asia. ColonelCrerar is a graduate of the SFQualification Course, the PSYOPOfficer Course and the CivilAffairs Officer Course. He holds abachelor’s degree from the U.S.Military Academy and has gradu-ate degrees in engineering andmanagement. He is employed as amilitary analyst with a primaryfocus on future equipment andtrends.

Notes:1 Steve Sherman, Special Forces’ respect-

ed accumulator of Southeast Asia person-nel records, estimates that approximately4,000 SF personnel passed through SOGduring its eight-year existence. This num-ber included many who were on their sec-

ond and third volunteer tours.2 Approximately 250 personnel were KIA

and 57 MIA/BNR. Because the only twoSOG prisoners of war who survived andreturned were captured within SouthVietnam, there is a suspicion that theNorth Vietnamese had initiated a localprogram equivalent to Hitler’s infamousKommando Befehl, which directed theexecution of any Allied special operators,whether uniformed or not, captured inGerman rear areas.

3 Although the modern Special Forcesmission is an outgrowth of the SOG expe-rience, the changes in technology in thelast quarter century virtually guaranteethat modern special-reconnaissance oper-ations will have little similarity to thoseof the Vietnam era.

4 The continued classification was not amatter of excessive government secretive-ness but of indifference. SOG and itsWashington oversight organization, theSpecial Assistant for Counterinsurgencyand Special Activities, or SACSA, hadceased to exist. There were few who wereinterested in or who had knowledge ofwhat records existed, where they were,and what, if anything, was still sensitive.The lack of interest, the reduced manningof peacetime, and the lack of a require-ment to declassify the material all sup-ported the status quo. In one Pentagonoffice, a fortunate series of staff officerswho had a sense of history saved the SOGpapers in their files from the periodicefforts of DoD to reduce its store of inac-tive documents.

5 John Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars ofAmerica’s Commandos in Vietnam (NewYork: Simon and Schuster, 1997).

6 Richard H. Shultz Jr., The Secret WarAgainst Hanoi (New York: HarperCollins,1999).

7 Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andradé,Spies and Commandos: How America Lostthe Secret War (Lawrence, Kan.: Universi-ty Press of Kansas, 2000).

8 John L. Plaster, SOG: A Photo Historyof the Secret Wars (Boulder, Colo.: PaladinPress, 2000).

9 Even with the impetus of hardships,national embarrassment, and the pres-ence of the thoroughly hated Germaninvaders, it took the parallel efforts ofSOE and the Free French four years todevelop the French underground and toprepare it for the D-Day uprising. In com-parison, the North Vietnamese had anunderground in South Vietnam goingback at least to the 1930s.10 The CIA’s war in Laos is well-describedin Roger Warner, Shooting At the Moon

34 Special Warfare

(Steerforth Press, 1996); and in KennethConboy, Shadow War: The CIA’s SecretWar in Laos (Boulder, Colo.: PaladinPress, 1995).11 The CIA did have applicable experi-ence. Many OSS veterans joined the newCIA, which had supported dissidence inpost-War Eastern Europe as well as inTibet, Iran, China and elsewhere. The Bayof Pigs fiasco could be seen as an aberra-tion wherein the CIA conducted hastyconventional operations, in which it hadlittle experience, in lieu of slower, long-term insurgency, in which it had solid ifnot always successful experience.12 World War II OSS guerrilla efforts arebroadly described in Kermit Roosevelt,War Report of the OSS (Walker, 1975).More personal accounts are to be found inWilliam B. Dreux, No Bridges Blown(Notre Dame Press, 1971); Franklin Lind-say, Beacons In the Night (Stanford Uni-versity Press, 1993); Aaron Bank, FromOSS to Green Berets (Novato, Calif.: Pre-sidio Press, 1986); and Max Corvo, OSS inItaly (Praeger, 1990).13 An excellent description of the KoreanWar’s special-operations experience canbe found in Ben Malcom, White Tigers(Brassey’s, 1996).14 See Philip Harkins, Blackburn’s Head-hunters (Norton, 1954).15 John Singlaub and MalcolmMcConnell, Hazardous Duty (New York:Simon and Schuster, 1991).16 One, however, rose to be a four-starcommander in chief, continuing to snipeat an organization to which he had beendeprived access. See Parameters, Summer1992, pp. 109-12; and Winter 1992-93, pp.106-07.17 This delusional pattern was to berepeated during the Teheran hostage cri-sis of 1980. At that time, each Iranianmullah newly on the scene was describedas a budding moderate to whom the U.S.should be obsequious.18 For those who are interested in SOG’spersonnel recovery efforts, see George Veith,Code Name Bright Light (Free Press, 1998);and Daryl Whitcomb, The Rescue of Bat 21(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,1998). The first contains extensive detail onthe difficulties imposed by the AmericanEmbassy, Vientiane.19 As the Department of Defense discov-ered during the Korean War and con-firmed in Southeast Asia, this orientationdoes not necessarily hold true for anotheragency’s unconventional warfare efforts,regardless of pre-war agreements.20 Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Criti-cal Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato,

Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982).21 COMUSMACV was formally briefedweekly on SOG operations. Reconnaissance-team leaders (“one-zeros”) were debriefed atMACV J2 after each SOG mission. GeneralAbrams, not widely known as an advocate ofspecial operations, at least twice comment-ed favorably on the accomplishments andexceptional courage of the SOG reconnais-sance personnel.

Spring 2000 35

Author comments on reviewof his book

I would like to comment on thereview of my book, U.S. SpecialOperations Forces in Action (Spe-cial Warfare, Winter 2000). Nor-mally, I do not reply to reviews,especially favorable ones. However,because this one was the closestthing to a negative review the bookhas received, and because thereview was published within thespecial-operations community, Ihope the reviewer will not beoffended by my taking issue with afew of the points he raised.

First of all, the reviewer con-tends that the book is actually twoseparate books. Rather, the firstchapter is the introduction, and thelast one is the conclusion. The firstchapter sets forth the basics for theuninitiated, and it specifies thethemes to be discussed throughoutthe remainder of the book; forexample, the tendency of various“special” units to drift back towardconventional functions. Havingbeen thus alerted, the readerunderstands why that theme keepsemerging throughout the followingnine chapters.

Secondly, there are a number ofspecific minor criticisms, some ofwhich are well-taken (such as themisspelling of Roger Pezzelle’sname), and they will be correctedin future editions, if there are any.There are some criticisms, howev-er, with which I do want to takeissue.

The reviewer contends, “TheU.S. Cavalry’s last horse-mountedcampaign was not the 1916 Puni-

tive Expedition but the 1941-42Defense of the Philippines, endingwith Lieutenant Edwin Ramsey’sgallant last charge at Morong,Bataan.” The Ramsey to which thereviewer refers is presumablyEdwin Price Ramsey, formerly a1st lieutenant and platoon leaderwith the 26th Cavalry Regiment,Philippine Scouts. The reviewer’sbelief that the Scouts were a U.S.unit is probably based on Presi-dent Roosevelt’s 1941 order incor-porating Philippine Army Unitsinto the U.S. armed forces. Butlater, under Public Laws 79-301and 79-391, Congress determined“military service of the organizedforces of the Commonwealth of thePhilippines … shall be deemed notactive service in the armed forcesof the U.S.” In recent years, Ram-sey has been active in seeking torestore the position of the Scouts.It is also arguable that the mount-ed Philippine Scouts were mount-ed infantry rather than cavalryper se. On the other hand, the sta-tus of the 10th U.S. Cavalry as ahorse-mounted unit of the Ameri-can Army that did engage in com-bat and that did fight from horse-back during the period 1916-17 isunchallenged.

The reviewer further statesthat my account of some actionsdiffers from that of the partici-pants. It is difficult to know whatto make of this, for I was person-ally present for some of the inci-dents. And whenever possible, Iused official records, first-handaccounts and interviews withparticipants for the others. Forexample, former members ofMACV SOG reviewed the account

of that organization.The reviewer also states, “Jed-

burgh teams were neither civiliannor intended to appear as such.” Infact, I identify the teams on page37 as “ ‘civilian’ (paramilitary)” innature, meaning, as stated in thetext, that they were part of theOSS (a civilian agency) and not apart of the War Department. TheWar Department and the theatercommanders (especially MacArthur)were opposed to the idea of havingforces who were not explicitly mili-tary assigned to a military theaterof operations.

The reviewer contends thatRoger’s Rangers were not in the SFlineage. According to DA DirectiveAGAO-322, dated 13 October 1960,they were.

The reviewer further names asa “substantive fault” the book’salleged “overidentification” ofSpecial Forces with the PhoenixProgram. In fact, the programwas clearly identified as a pro-gram sponsored by the govern-ment of Vietnam under GVNDecree 280 (1 July 1968) and sup-ported by the CIA and MACVintelligence assets. “SpecialForces” are identified only as hav-ing been one source of advisers,along with Navy SEALs, theUSMC, Army MI and others. Atno point is it stated or impliedthat Phoenix was wholly or par-tially an SF program.

On the other hand, the revieweris correct in stating that navalfighters did not destroy the aban-doned helicopters in OperationEagle Claw. My mistake: PresidentCarter personally countermandedthe order to do so, and the strike

36 Special Warfare

LettersSpecial Warfare

never went in. I don’t know what Iwas thinking of.

Thomas K. AdamsFayetteville, N.C.

‘Ranger Personnel Recov-ery’ ignores SF capabilities

The USAJFKSWCS Publica-tion 525-5-14, UnconventionalAssisted Recovery, featured inthe Spring 1999 Special Warfare,is an interesting product thatclarifies some issues of terminol-ogy and roles associated withunconventional assisted recov-ery, or UAR. However, I have afundamental disagreement withthe inclusion of Appendix K ofthat document.

Appendix K outlines a specificsubset of UAR that is referred toas “Ranger Personnel RecoveryOperations.” In my opinion, thisparticular appendix inappropri-ately correlates a specific ele-ment of the Army’s special-oper-ations forces, or ARSOF, to theconduct of one particular aspectof UAR. To attribute the plan-ning, organization, executionand extraction capabilities out-lined in Appendix K of the docu-ment solely to the Ranger Regi-ment is flawed and inaccurate.This doctrinal misrepresentationcould lead to uninformed deci-sion-making by senior leader-ship when they consider theavailable personnel-recoveryoptions.

In fact, in some instances, theRanger option may carry with it alarge operational footprint, opera-tional-security constraints, andtime/distance limitations. Addi-tionally, the employment of aRanger element would most certainlydictate the use of at least companystrength, because of associated command-and-control requirements.Finally, in some cases, the exclu-sive employment of a Ranger force

for conducting personnel recovery,while certainly one course ofaction, may not necessarily sub-scribe to the SOF imperative of“engage the threat discriminately.”

There are clearly other forceswithin the ARSOF arena, includ-ing Special Forces, who have theprerequisite training, equip-ment, organization and capabili-ties to perform personnel recov-ery of a unilateral, direct-actionnature. Additionally, while sucha mission profile could emergewithin the parameters of a com-bat-search-and-rescue missionor a noncombatant-evacuationoperation, the mission profile iscertainly not limited to thoseoperations.

My intent is not to slight myRanger brethren, but to point outthat Appendix K of USAJFKSWCSPublication 525-5-14 incorrectlyexcludes other capable and doctri-nally mandated ARSOF forceswith regard to the conduct of cer-tain planned UAR options. It isimportant to ensure that thelabel of unconventional assistedrecovery is not misconstrued andsteered too far toward unconven-tional warfare, to the detrimentof other available options andcapabilities within SpecialForces.

MAJ Scott A. MorrisonColumbia, S.C.

SF enlisted soldiers eligiblefor Thuma scholarship

I am pleased to announce theestablishment of the MasterSergeant David K. Thuma Memor-ial Scholarship at Regents College.

The scholarship is designed toreduce or eliminate the out-of-pocketexpenses incurred by soldiers in CMF18 who enroll in Regents College. Thescholarship honors one of our finestsoldiers, Master Sergeant David K.Thuma, a former team sergeant in

the 3rd Special Forces Group, whodied in 1998 while serving his coun-try. Information about the scholarshipis available by logging on to our website at http://go.to/thumascholarship.

Anyone wishing to contribute tothe fund can either download thecontribution form from the web siteor send an e-mail message tobigsargeusa@netscape.net.

I am currently working withRegents College to establish adegree program that will capitalizeon the experience of Special Forcessoldiers. The goal is to tie the pro-gram into the timeline of the NCOEducation System, so that soldierswill be able to earn their associ-ate’s degree upon graduation fromANCOC and to earn a bachelor’sdegree before retirement.

CSM Michael W. JeffersonU.S. Army (ret.)

Spring 2000 37

38 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The 1999 sergeant-major promotion-selection board selected seven mastersergeants from career-management field 37, Psychological Operations. TheCMF 37’s selection rate was 46.7 percent, vs. the Army’s average of 15.2percent. Six of the selectees were from the primary zone, and one was fromthe secondary zone. The statistics are as follows:

TIS TIG Education Age

CMF 37 (PZ) 16.2 3.6 13.8 37.3Army (PZ) 20.5 3.8 14.1 40.7

CMF 37 (SZ) 17.0 2.3 15.0 40.0Army (SZ) 18.3 2.4 14.1 39.0

The CMF 37 soldiers who were selected had successfully completed a vari-ety of assignments in the field and had served in leadership positions.Because of the high number of CMF 37 soldiers selected by the 1999 board,promotions over the next few years should be at the Army’s average orbelow.

The Army has recently implemented a C-zone selective re-enlistmentbonus for SF medical sergeants (18D) who have 10-14 years of service.Current SRBs for CMF 18 soldiers are 18B — 1A/1B; 18C — 1A/1B;18D — 2A/3B/1C; and 18E — 2A/3B.

The 1999 sergeant-major promotion-selection board selected 13 mastersergeants from CMF 18, Special Forces. The CMF 18’s selection rate is 4.9percent, vs. the Army’s average of 15.2 percent. Nine of the selectees werefrom the primary zone, and four were from the secondary zone. The statis-tics are as follows:

TIS TIG Education Age

CMF 18 (PZ) 18.2 4.2 14.4 38.1Army (PZ) 20.5 3.8 14.1 40.7

CMF 18 (SZ) 16.8 2.3 15.0 41.3Army (SZ) 18.3 2.4 14.1 39.0

The following comments are excerpts from the board’s review and analysisof the CMF 18 records:• Senior SFCs and junior MSGs are making sure that they are on the

right career path by accepting leadership positions, such as teamsergeant and first sergeant.

• Commanders and command sergeants major should ensure thatjunior master sergeants are assigned to team-sergeant positions atthe earliest possible time and that they remain in those positions for

Army selects 13 SF soldiersfor promotion to SGM

Medical sergeants eligiblefor re-enlistment bonus

CMF 37 SGM selection rateexceeds Army average

Spring 2000 39

at least two years.• If commanders and command sergeants major must reassign mas-

ter sergeants into nonleadership positions, they should not do soprematurely.

• Staff positions, instructor positions, AC/RC positions, and JRTC posi-tions should be filled only by senior master sergeants who have com-pleted leadership assignments.

• Confusing terminology was used in the NCOERs to describe principalduty titles, daily duties, and scope. For example, an SF team sergeantwas variously referred to as an “operations NCO,” as a “detachmentNCO,” as a “detachment operations NCO,” and as a “senior sergeant.”The multiple duty titles and the vaguely written duty descriptionsmade it difficult to determine the scope and the level of a soldier’sresponsibility. Duty titles should be annotated on a soldier’s NCOER inaccordance with DA Pam 623-205.

• The numerical ratings given by some of the senior raters did not corre-spond with the bullet comments. Senior raters should clearly identifytheir top-quality performers with precise comments, such as “Best of sixteam sergeants,” “Number 2 in the battalion,” or “Promote ahead ofpeers.”

40 Special Warfare

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

SF officers in three year groups recently received their career-field desig-nations. The results are as follows:• Year group 1981. Twenty-four officers will single-track in SF, and two

will single-track in FA 39.• Year group 1987. Sixty-one will single-track in SF; one will single-track in

FA 45; seven will single-track in FA 48; and one will single-track in FA 59.• Year group 1989. Fifty-five officers will single-track in SF; one will sin-

gle-track in FA 24; one will single-track in FA 30; four will single-trackin FA 39; one will single-track in FA 46; 11 will single-track in FA 48;one will single-track in FA 52; and one will single-track in FA 53. Foradditional information, telephone Paula Stewart at DSN 239 6406/8102or commercial (910) 432-6406/8102.

The FY 1999 major promotion-selection board considered 292 FA 39 offi-cers and selected 108. The statistics are as follows:

Considered Selected Percentage

FA 39 (AZ) 31 8 25.8Army (AZ) 19.0

FA 39 (PZ) 127 94 74.0Army (PZ) 78.1

FA 39 (BZ) 134 6 4.4Army (BZ) 3.7

The FY 2000 reserve-component colonel promotion-selection board considered161 officers in the Civil Affairs Branch and selected 16 (a 10 percent selectionrate). Twelve of the officers selected were being considered for the first time.

The 180A SF warrant-officer recruiting program has met its goal of 25 for FY2000. The program’s recruiting goal for FY 2001 is 37. Reaching that goal willrequire a concerted effort on the part of every SF group. In order to producethe highly trained, technically and tactically sound warrant officers who willbe needed in 2010, we must access the most talented and the most dedicatedNCOs. While the demands upon qualified candidates are great, the fruits oftheir endeavor can be boundless. The Special Operations Proponency Officeurges experienced SF NCOs, E-6’s and above who have at least three years’team time and who have less than 12 years’ active federal service, to becomethe continuity factor for the SF A-detachment. The 180A can serve either asthe assistant detachment commander, or as the ODA commander in theabsence of the commander. He can provide the commander with technical andtactical expertise in the areas of administration, intelligence, operations, logis-tics, CA and PSYOP. The 180A can develop, direct, supervise, and conduct

SF officers in three yeargroups receive CFD

16 CA officers selected forpromotion to colonel

SF warrant officers canhave lasting impact

108 FA 39 officers selectedfor promotion to major

Spring 2000 41

training for U.S forces, for foreign military forces, and for paramilitary forces.He can provide the commander with advice on the conduct of DA, SR, UW, FIDand CT missions. He can advise the commander on ASOT and civil-militaryactivities. And he can advise the commander on collateral missions in supportof joint, combined or unilateral operations. A WO1 or a CW2 can expect toserve on an ODA 6-8 years. Senior warrant officers can expect to serve at var-ious levels: ODB, battalion, group, theater SOC headquarters, or special-oper-ations-command.The duties and the responsibilities of the SF warrant officersare demanding. With their extensive MOS proficiency, operational experi-ences, and intensive 180A training, SF warrant officers can have a lastingimpact upon SF. Commanders should be proactive in their efforts to identifyNCOs who have demonstrated the potential of becoming exceptional SF war-rant officers. For details on applying for WO candidacy, NCOs should consultwith the senior warrant officer either in their battalion or in their group.NCOs can also telephone the SWCS SOPO at DSN 239-1879 or commercial(910) 432-1879; or they can access the Army Recruiting Command’s warrant-officer home page at http://www.army.mil/adsxxi.

The FY 2000 reserve-component lieutenant colonel promotion-selection board con-sidered 157 officers in the Civil Affairs Branch and selected 100 (a 64-percent selec-tion rate).Eighty-one of the officers selected were being considered for the first time.

During the FY 1999 major promotion-selection board, the Special ForcesBranch achieved an overall select rate of 92 percent, vs. the Army’s aver-age of 87 percent. The branch’s favorable select rate indicates that SF offi-cers continue to be competitive for promotion to major.

Under the provisions of the Army’s Officer Professional Management SystemXXI model, officers in two year groups were recently designated as FA 39:

• Year group 1981. Fourteen officers were designated as FA 39 — 10 ofwhom possess FA 39 training and utilization experience.

• Year group 1987. Twenty-five officers were designated as FA 39 — 22 ofwhom possess FA 39 training and utilization experience. For additionalinformation, telephone Jeanne Goldmann, FA 39 manager, at DSN 239-6406/8102 or commercial (910) 432-6406/8102.

Officers in FA 39 fared well on FY 1999 selection boards, exceeding theArmy’s average in the following cases:

• During the FY 1999 colonel promotion-selection board, FA 39 achieveda selection rate of 66.6 percent. The Army’s average was 49.6 percent.

• During the FY 1999 senior-service college-selection board, FA 39’s selec-tion rate was 8.4 percent. The Army’s average selection rate was 7.4 per-cent. The majority of the FA 39 officers who were selected were beingconsidered for the third time.

• During the FY 1999 Command and Staff College selection board, FA 39’sselection rate was 21 percent. The Army’s selection rate was 20 percent.

FA 39 exceeds Army’s average on FY 1999 boards

Officers designated as FA 39

SF major-selection ratefavorable indicator

100 CA officers make LTC

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

42 Special Warfare

A former director-general of India’s Indo-Tibetan Border Police hasproposed the creation of a special-operations force to deter cross-borderterrorism in hostile, remote and culturally sensitive areas. The formerdirector-general reviewed the advantages he had seen in special forcesaround the world, especially “in low-intensity conflicts because [theyare] a relatively low-cost and more effective option, compared withfielding large conventional forces.” He indicated that despite the field-ing of various specialized military and police units, India has “neverseriously considered creating an elite counterinsurgency (force).” Hebelieves that a special-operations force (along with combined, strongborder-fencing programs) could help India deal with its terrorism, traf-ficking in drugs and arms, smuggling and other transnational issues.In addition, India would be better able to meet its security needs, espe-cially in Kashmir. During the first four months of 2000, 65 foreign mil-itants were among 227 militants killed in antimilitancy operations inthe Kashmir valley. From India’s perspective, these statistics indicatethat the problem is not only a local one.

Western reporting indicates that a Montenegrin “secret program” istraining an “elite team” of police snipers to target senior Yugoslav mil-itary officers in the event of a war between Montenegro and Serbia.These police snipers, along with other members of the 20,000-strongpolice force, could form part of an eventual Montenegrin army.Increased tension between Serbia and Montenegro established the set-ting for the local Montenegrin elections held in June, during whichbackers of Montenegro President Djukanovic’s party and pro-Milosevicopposition supporters confronted each other.

A special forces unit that is being formed in the Democratic Republic ofCongo may be receiving training from North Korean officers. The newunit, the 10th Special Infantry Brigade, consists of several thousandtroops and supposedly has a combined-arms composition — includingreconnaissance, infantry, and artillery elements. The unit’s primarypurpose will be to fight rebel forces that have been active for the lasttwo years in a conflict that now involves several neighboring states. Atelevision program featuring the graduation of 10th-brigade soldiersshowed a number of North Korean officers in attendance.

The prospect of establishing a unified military and police force inPapua New Guinea, or PNG, has been advanced by a PNG cabinet com-mittee. Under the proposal that was being considered in early May2000, a paramilitary force would be established by combining the trou-bled PNG Defense Force (which is widely viewed as corrupt and ineffi-cient) and the Royal PNG Constabulary. Tensions between the two

Papua New Guinea proposes to merge defense

force, constabulary

Montenegro reportedlytrains police snipers

North Korean officers trainCongolese special forces

Indian special-ops forceproposed for Kashmir duty

Spring 2000 43

organizations have been evident for some time, and a merger could pro-voke a strong reaction or revolt from the Defense Force. In the view ofsome Western observers, this move could also have serious implicationsfor the situation along the PNG-Indonesian border, where IndonesianArmy Special Forces, or Kopassus, have reportedly organized militiasinside PNG and have attempted to create internal problems centeredon independence aspirations in West Papua. An even more weakenedDefense Force would further reduce PNG’s capabilities to respond totrouble in West Papua and elsewhere. Kopassus is facing its own chal-lenges. Earlier this year, Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahidvisited the headquarters of both Kopassus and the Air Force SpecialForces, or Paskhas. In late April, he inspected elements of the Strate-gic Reserves Command, or Kostrad, and visited Army special-opera-tions components in West Java. At the same time, some foreigners weredemanding that Kopassus be disbanded. Although the Kopassus com-mander asserted that no such plan had been decided, Indonesia is con-ducting a study to determine whether some military roles should bereduced.

In May 2000, Romania announced force-restructuring plans thatwould transfer parachute units and associated special-operationsunits from the air force to the ground forces by September 2000.Romanian military officials noted that the units designated for trans-fer are primarily land forces and that once the transfer occurs, the airforce will be responsible only for transporting the units to their areasof employment.

Faced with continuing violence by paramilitary groups in some Mexi-can states, Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office has formed a new unitdesignated the “Special Unit for Dealing With Crimes Committed bySuspected Armed Civil Groups.” The new unit focuses on paramilitarygroups, not on insurgent groups like the Zapatista National LiberationArmy, the People’s Revolutionary Army and the People’s RevolutionaryInsurgent Army. Many of the paramilitary groups are suspected of hav-ing affiliations with political, police and military components, and theyhave been responsible for murders and intimidation in Mexican states,including Chiapas and Guerrero. The new unit has investigatory pow-ers and consists of 40 judicial agents, six agents from the Public Pros-ecutor’s Office, and other key personnel needed to support the unit’sagenda.

By some estimates, the number of Colombian paramilitary combatantsengaged against guerrilla forces has doubled to 7,000 in recent years.The paramilitary combatants operate as part of declared umbrellaorganizations, such as the Peasant Self-Defense Units of Cordoba yUraba and the Self-Defense Units of Colombia. In the spring of 2000,the Colombian military reported an increase in the kidnaping andextortion activities of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia, or FARC. In the view of some specialists, FARC is nowchanging its tactics, reportedly moving its kidnaping activities awayfrom its traditional rural areas into urban areas like Bogota. Thechange in tactics could be driven by a need for greater financialresources, since kidnaping and extortion are the FARC’s chief sources

Colombian paramilitariesmay be gaining strength

Mexican police unit focuseson paramilitary forces

Romanian airborne, special-ops units resubordinated

44 Special Warfare

of income. It could also mean that the FARC would rather take on theColombian police authorities than the paramilitary forces, with theirstrong ties to the military. In recent months, the paramilitary forceshave boldly carried their military objective beyond the Colombianinternational borders into neighboring countries. In September 1999, aprominent paramilitary chief warned that his organization wouldattack any Panamanian or Venezuelan military unit found to be assist-ing Colombian guerrillas.

Two Belgian army special-operations units, the Pathfinder Detachmentand the Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment, have been combinedinto an 80-man special forces company. The newly created company isa subdivision of the 3rd Lansiers Paratrooper Battalion, which is thereconnaissance battalion of the army’s paratrooper brigade. Accordingto press reports, elements of the Pathfinder Detachment typically oper-ate in teams of six to prepare drop zones and landing areas for follow-on forces. Elements of the Long Range Reconnaissance Detachmenttypically operate in teams of four to gather intelligence in enemy rearareas. Although the new special forces company is subordinate to the3rd Lansiers, it will continue to perform special duties and will not besubsumed by the paratrooper brigade.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel Ernerst Guerra Jr.,USAR, of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Belgium combines pathfinder, recon units

SWCS NCO Academy dedicated to fallen NCO

The John F. Kennedy SpecialWarfare Center and School dedi-cated its NCO Academy to thememory of a Special Forces NCOApril 14.

Master Sergeant David K.Thuma, a 14-year veteran of Spe-cial Forces, died June 18, 1998,while deployed to Kenya as a mem-ber of the 3rd SF Group. “There arenot enough words in his biographyto say what a great soldier he was,”said Command Sergeant MajorCharles Blake, commandant of theNCO Academy. “We in the academyhere today and in the future willsee this memorial and rememberall that he stood for.”

Thuma, a native of Troy, Ohio,entered the Army in 1980. In1983, he earned a Bronze Starduring Operation Urgent Fury. In1984, he attended the SF Qualifi-cation Course. Thuma served invarious SF units and at theSWCS NCO Academy, where hewas an instructor in the SFAdvanced NCO Course until hisassignment to the 3rd SF Group. —Specialist Jon Creese, USASOCPAO

Toney new leader of ArmySF Command

Brigadier General Frank J.Toney took command of the U.S.Army Special Forces CommandJuly 6 in a ceremony at FortBragg’s Meadows Memorial Plaza.

Toney pledged to uphold theSF Command’s warrior spiritand to ensure that his soldiersare equipped, resourced, trained

and prepared to fight, win andsurvive in combat.

Toney was previously command-ing general of the Special Opera-tions Command, U.S. CentralCommand, at MacDill Air ForceBase, Fla. His other assignmentsinclude commander, 10th SpecialForces Group; and commander, 1stBattalion, 3rd Special ForcesGroup during Operation DesertStorm. He has also served in the7th PSYOP Group, the 75thRanger Regiment, and the 1st and5th SF groups.

Toney replaces Brigadier Gen-eral John R. Scales, who willremain with the SF Command asits deputy commander. Scales hadbeen acting commander of the SFCommand since the departure ofMajor General William G. Boykinin March. Boykin is now com-mander of the John F. Kennedy

Special Warfare Center andSchool.

‘SF pipeline’ research needs soldiers’ input

Over the next few months, SpecialForces detachment commanders andteam sergeants will have an oppor-tunity to contribute information thatwill be critical to improving theselection and training of future SFsoldiers.

As part of a project being spon-sored by the Army Special Opera-tions Command, the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School, and theArmy Special Forces Command,detachment commanders and teamsergeants are being asked to providefield-performance ratings on themembers of their detachments.

The ratings will be used to studyways that Special Forces Assessmentand Selection, or SFAS, and the Spe-cial Forces Qualification Course, orSFQC, are related to the perform-ance of SF soldiers in the field. Theratings will be linked to existingdata on SFAS and SFQC, and alldata will be analyzed to find ways ofimproving SF selection and training.

The field-performance ratings col-lected during the project will be usedsolely for “SF pipeline” research andwill be confidential, according to Dr.Mike Sanders of the USASOC Psy-chological Applications Directorate,or PAD. No individual ratings will bedisclosed.

To ensure the confidentiality,integrity and validity of the data,Sanders said, all data will be ware-housed in a secure, independentdatabase at PAD. Psychologists fromthe Army Research Institute, N.C.

Spring 2000 45

UpdateSpecial Warfare

Photo by Pamela SmithBG Frank Toney (left) accepts the colors of theArmy SF Command from LTG William P.Tangney.

State University and the PAD willconduct the research and analysis.

For more information, telephoneDr. Mike Sanders at DSN 239-7411or commercial (910) 432-7411.

SOF units to receivemachine gun telescope

This summer the 75th RangerRegiment, the Army SpecialForces Command, and the JFKSpecial Warfare Center andSchool will begin receiving a newtelescope.

The M-145 Machine Gun PowerTelescope will offer machine gun-ners an improved capability ofidentifying and acquiring targetsat extended ranges, by day or bynight. It features 3X and 4X mag-nification and a wide field of view.The M-145 also contains a reticle,or grid, that allows the gunner toscale and adjust the sight pictureso that point of aim equals point ofimpact. The telescope also hasazimuth and elevation adjust-ments for zeroing the weapon.

The telescope is designed foruse on the M-60, M-249, and M-240B machine guns. It is alsodesigned to function in the samemission and climate scenarios asthe machine guns do.

Fielding the M-145 Power Tele-scope is the responsibility of theForce Modernization Branch,Combat Development Division,U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand Deputy Chief of Stafffor Force Development and Inte-gration. For more information,telephone Jonathan James, chiefof the Force ModernizationBranch, at DSN 239-6144 or com-mercial (910) 432-6144.

Eye surgery may bar soldiers from SF schools

Soldiers who receive an eye-surgery procedure that has notbeen approved by the Army Sur-geon General could be disqualify-ing themselves from attending

Special Forces schools.Since the late 1980s, laser

surgery has been used to correctdefective vision. Two common pro-cedures are photorefractive kerate-ctomy, or PRK; and laser in-situkeratomileusis, or LASIK. PRK hasbeen approved by the Army Sur-geon General, but LASIK has not.

“PRK involves reshaping thecornea using laser surgery,” saidMajor William Corr of the ArmySpecial Operations CommandSurgeon’s Office. “It takes a coupleof layers of cells off the outside ofthe cornea.”

“In the LASIK procedure,” Corr

said, “a surgeon cuts a flap on thecornea, flips the flap up, recon-tours the inner layer of the cornea,then puts the flap back down. Theflap heals around the edges, butnot in the center.”

“We’re not sure that the LASIKprocedure will stand up to the rig-ors of military service and train-ing, such as the wind encounteredduring military free fall or thepressure of underwater diving,”Corr said.

Because PRK has beenapproved, soldiers who have hadPRK may be accepted for SF ini-

tial or advanced-skills training ifthey have been granted a waiverby the USASOC Surgeon’s Office.No waivers are being granted forsoldiers who have had LASIK.

For more information, telephonethe USASOC Surgeon’s Office atDSN 239-5408 or commercial(910) 432-5408.

SWCS producing ARSOF CS, CSS, TTP manuals

The Special Warfare Center andSchool is developing or revisingseven publications orientedtoward ARSOF combat support, orCS; combat service support, orCSS; and tactics, techniques andprocedures.

These publications are beingproduced by the Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine’s Joint andArmy Doctrine Division. They willsupplement the 1999 ARSOF cap-stone manual, FM 100-25, Doc-trine for Army Special OperationsForces.

FM 1-108, ARSOF AviationOperations, is a revision of FM 1-108, Army Special Operations Avi-ation Forces, dated 1993. Therevised FM will describe com-mand and control, employment,CS, and CSS for ARSOF aviationoperations and will include theorganization of the 160th SpecialOperations Aviation Regiment.FM 1-108 is complete and isscheduled for fielding in August2000. The project officer is FredFunk; DSN 239-4427; e-mail:funkf@soc.mil.

FM 31-18, MTTP for SOFNuclear, Biological and Chemical(NBC) Defense Operations, is arevision and an expansion of FM3-18, Special NBC Reconnaissance(LB Team), dated 1993. The U.S.Special Operations Command,MacDill AFB, Fla., is responsiblefor developing this multiservicepublication. The project officer atSWCS is Captain Byron S. Hayes;DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail:

46 Special Warfare

File photo

The M-145 Machine Gun Power Telescope.

hayesb@soc.mil.FM 24-31, ARSOF C4, is a new

publication that will cover com-mand, control, communications andcomputers for all ARSOF units. Itwill include the organization of the112th Signal Battalion. The manualwill describe the architecture ofcommand-and-control, or C2, inoperational commands and theinformation flow from ARSOF oper-ational units to C2 systems at thespecial-operations-command, the-ater and national levels. FM 24-31was published in July 2000. Theproject officer is Major AlexanderFletcher; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail:fletchea@soc.mil.

FM 34-31, ARSOF Intelligence,is a revision of FM 34-36, SOFIntelligence and Electronic War-fare Operations, dated 1991. FM34-31 will describe the organiza-tion and the capabilities of intelli-gence elements within ARSOFunits. It will also describe theintelligence structures of theaterSOCs, joint intelligence centers,and higher-level agencies, as wellas their connectivity with ARSOFoperational units. The initial draftof FM 34-31 is being staffed bySOF units. The project officer isCaptain Martin Glynn; DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: glynnm@soc.mil.

FM 63-31, ARSOF CombatService Support, is a revision andan expansion of FM 63-24, SpecialOperations Support Battalion,dated 1995. FM 63-31 will provideusers with a base document fordetermining future CSS doctrineand procedures. It will addressARSOF CSS structure, capabili-ties and support requirements.FM 63-31 will offer guidance onoperational planning and on edu-cating personnel; and it willinclude the structure of both theSpecial Operations Support Com-mand and the Special OperationsSupport Battalion. The project offi-cer is Major Alexander Fletcher;DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail:fletchea@soc.mil.

TC 31-25, Special Forces Water-borne Operations, dated October1988, is being converted into afield manual. The new publica-tion, FM 31-25, is titled SpecialForces Waterborne Operations.Areas of expanded informationwill address the duties of divingsupervisors and of dive medicaltechnicians; small-boat navigationtechniques; infiltration tech-niques; principles of open- andclosed-circuit diving; and planningfor waterborne operations. FM 31-25 is intended for use with FM 20-11-1, Military Diving. The projectofficer is Master Sergeant SeanFleenor; DSN 239-5952; e-mail:fleenors@soc.mil.

ST 31-184, U.S. Army SpecialForces Forward Operational BaseField Standing Operating Proce-dures, dated 1976, is beingrevised. The special text will serveas a basis for the establishmentand operation of an SF battalionforward operational base. ST 31-184 is intended for use with FM31-20, Doctrine for Army SpecialForces Operations. The projectofficer is Ed Sayre; DSN 239-8689/5255, email: sayree@soc.mil.

Drafts of the publications will beposted on the DOTD web site(http://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd),and they will be available throughTRADOC’s Automated SystemsApproach to Training.

3rd SF Group gets new commander

Colonel Mark V. Phelan tookcommand of the 3rd Special ForcesGroup from Colonel Gary M. Jonesduring a ceremony held at FortBragg’s Meadows Field July 7.

Phelan was formerly the deputychief of staff for personnel for theU.S. Army Special Operations Com-mand, or USASOC. His previous SFassignments include detachmentexecutive officer, detachment com-mander, company commander, bat-talion executive officer and battal-

ion commander with the 5th SFGroup. He also served at the U.S.Special Operations Command,MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa,Fla., where he established the Spe-cial Operations Forces PersonnelMonitorship Division.

Jones is now the USASOCdeputy commander.

Videotape to serve as PSYOP doctrine

A new videotape is being pro-duced by the Directorate of Train-ing and Doctrine, JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School, forstudents and soldiers in psycho-logical-operations units.

The videotape will provide userswith an introduction to thePSYOP development process. Itwill outline the process from tar-get analysis through test andevaluation, and it will include anoverview of the functions of boththe joint PSYOP task force andthe PSYOP task force.

The videotape’s primary targetaudience will be PSYOP soldierswho are attending advanced indi-vidual training at SWCS; however,the videotape will be distributedto all active and reserve PSYOPunits and will serve as doctrineuntil FM 33-1-1, PsychologicalOperations Techniques and Proce-dures, is published.

The videotape is being producedthrough the collaborative effortsof two offices within the SWCS:the PSYOP Training and DoctrineDivision and the AudiovisualBranch.

It is scheduled for distribution inthe fall of 2000. It will also be avail-able (production number 711195) atno charge through the Defense Visu-al Information web site (dodim-agery.afis.osd.mil).

Spring 2000 47

Fighting for the Future: WillAmerica Triumph? By RalphPeters. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stack-pole Books, 1999. ISBN: 0-8117-0651-6 (hardback). 210 pages.$19.95.

Ralph Peters is quite frankly themost gifted military theorist of hisgeneration. He is a genuine for-ward thinker who is brutally hon-est, thoroughly believable, andvery often profound. Peters ferretsout truths that many others wouldfind difficult to articulate. A best-selling novelist and a retired U.S.Army intelligence officer and for-eign-area specialist, Peters writeswith conviction, integrity andunusual artistry.

Fighting for the Future is a com-pilation of 12 superb essays on thefuture of warfare. In these essays,Peters critically examines warfareand culture, combat in cities of thefuture, nationalism and fundamen-talism, military ethics, futurearmored warfare, and ways offighting and winning the battlesthat America is likely to face in thenext millennium. His analyses aresolidly grounded in the facts of thepresent, even when he is projectingsome alternative and very nastyfutures.

By combining political, cultur-al, economic and military analy-ses, Peters is able to paint extra-ordinarily credible pictures oflikely future American combat.Joltingly realistic, the scenariosare frightening because today’sArmy is largely ill-equipped andill-trained to handle them.

The author rightly points outthat the next millennium is likely

to be characterized by urbanizationon a massive scale. America’s like-ly future adversaries may usethese cities and their civilian popu-lations as shields for their activi-ties. No current world army wouldwish to face the American Army ona traditional battlefield: Our mili-tary technological superiority is toooverwhelming. Peters predicts thatpotential adversaries will desertthe traditional battlefield for theurban jungle, where America’smassed firepower will be of extra-ordinarily limited utility. Thepower of cruise missiles, stealthbombers, multiple-launch rocketsystems, conventional artillery, andthe combined might of America’sair forces will all be horribly trun-cated in cities.

Collateral damage (civiliandeaths) is much more likely tooccur on a battlefield that can bedescribed in terms of concrete,brick, and steel. The urban sce-

nario creates terribly complexmoral and ethical dilemmas forcombatant commanders and forindividual soldiers. Potentially,millions of noncombatants could becrowded into an area the size of sixor seven city blocks. Among thesenoncombatants could hide anurban Army that will not fight byany recognized rules.

The U.S. Army is neither trainednor equipped for urban combat.Moreover, our nation is not psycho-logically prepared for this often-brutal warfare — warfare in whichwomen and children could easilybecome casualties by merelyrounding a street corner at thewrong time.

Peters also speaks of what wecall asymmetrical warfare. Inthis kind of warfare, our potentialenemies will not be wearing uni-forms. Villains such as drug lords,petty warlords, international crim-inal organizations, terrorist cells,corrupt governments and theirleaders will not present the Ameri-can military establishment withclear-cut “legal” targets.

The ambiguity created as aresult of our legal system servesto hamstring our efforts againstsuch antagonists. The author asksthe long-overdue question, “Whyis it acceptable to slaughter —and I use the word advisedly —the commanded masses but not tomortally punish the guiltiest indi-vidual, the commander, a manstained with the blood of his ownpeople as well as that of hisneighbors?” Peters asks goodquestions. Many of his questionsgo to the heart of our morality,which the author suggests that

48 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

we adapt to emerging realities.Peters is a loyal fan of special-

operations forces. For the betterpart of a decade, he has champi-oned the cause of multiservice Spe-cial Forces, Psychological Opera-tions and Civil Affairs.

In his view, only SOF and theU.S. Marines are adequatelytrained and sufficiently adaptableto succeed against the new reali-ties of future warfare. Every SOFsoldier will benefit from a close andcareful reading of Peters’ essays.

LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr.U.S. Army (ret.)Sana’a, Yemen

Our War Was Different: MarineCombined Action Platoons inVietnam. By Al Hemingway.Annapolis, Md.: Naval InstitutePress, 1994. ISBN: 1-55750-355-9.189 pages. $25.

Our War Was Different chroni-cles the mission and the accom-plishments of the U.S. MarineCorps’ Combined Action Programin Vietnam from 1965 through1971. The story is told by Marineswho describe what they did andwhat they saw. It is not an officialhistory; rather it is an intimatelook at life in the villages, as expe-rienced by members of the differ-ent Combined Action Platoons, orCAPs, in the I Corps area of oper-ations. The Marines, who were allvolunteers, were enthusiasticabout the program, and theyempathized with the popularforces and the villagers whoseconfidence they sought to win.

The basic goal of the CombinedAction Program was to bring peaceto the Vietnamese villages by inte-grating the local knowledge of thepopular forces with the profession-al skill and superior equipment ofthe Marines. The Vietnamese knewwho the guerrillas were and wherethey hid; the Americans knew howto defeat them.

Although the U.S. Armyemployed soldiers as advisers, ithad no organization quite like theMarine CAPs. Led by MarineNCOs, CAPs consisted of a Marinerifle squad and 35 Vietnamese sol-diers. Army mobile advisory teamsconsisted of two U.S. officers, threeU.S. enlisted men and a Viet-namese-army interpreter. SpecialForces A-detachments were com-posed of 12 men.

The SF detachments had severaladvantages over the CAPs: longstateside training, the presence ofofficers and senior enlisted men,reinforcements of Montagnards orChinese Nungs, and languageskills. In fact, language was one ofthe CAPs’ two major problems. AsCAP Marine Michael Petersonstates, “There was no real attemptto systematically utilize enlistedgraduates from the Defense Lan-guage Institute.” The other majorproblem was the selection process:All CAP Marines were supposed tohave six months of in-countryexperience; such was not alwaysthe case.

The Combined Action Programwas also not fully supported by theMarine Corps. There were approxi-mately 80,000 Marines in Vietnam

at the height of the war, but theCAPs never had more than 2,500assigned Marines — less than fourpercent of the total USMC force.

In spite of the disadvantages,the CAPs were highly successful.No village captured from the Viet-cong was ever retaken, and 60 per-cent of the CAP Marines volun-teered to extend their time withthe program.

Today, as U.S. war fighters areincreasingly being tasked to per-form peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions for whichthey are ill-trained, the lessons ofthe Combined Action Program maybe relevant. The transition fromwar fighter to peacekeeper hasnever been easy, but in Vietnam,the Combined Action Programhelped ease that transition. OurWar Was Different will cause read-ers to consider whether similarprograms might work in othercountries and in other conflicts.

In the words of Lieutenant Gen-eral Victor H. Krulak, USMC (ret.),“This book serves as a series ofguideposts, with its credible exam-ples of right and wrong in the crit-ical task of winning the support ofthe people. Without their support,as Vietnam taught us, victory is outof reach.”

LTC Tom BalthazarNaval War CollegeNewport, R.I.

Spring 2000 49

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

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