The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

Special Warfare

ReserveComponent

Special Operations Forces

PB 80–92–1 March 1992 Vol. 5, No. 1

Probably nowhere in the Army is the importanceof reserve-component forces more evident than inspecial operations.

The majority of our special-operations forces arefound in the reserve components: Nearly half of ourSpecial Forces soldiers belong to either ArmyReserve or National Guard groups; 87 percent of ourPSYOP and 97 percent of our Civil Affairs troops arein the Army Reserve.

Recent military operations have emphasized thevalue of these reserve components: During Opera-tion Just Cause, there was an urgent need for moreCivil Affairs soldiers, and thousands of reservistsvolunteered, caring for civilians in the combat area,providing shelter to dislocated civilians, and restor-ing civil government and services quickly so that the Panamanian government could resume itsresponsibilities.

During Desert Shield/Storm, a number of CivilAffairs and Psychological Operations units weremobilized, as well as the National Guard’s 20th SFGroup. Following Desert Storm, Reserve CA person-nel assisted the Kuwaitis to rebuild their govern-ment and aided Kurdish refugees during resettle-ment operations in Operation Provide Comfort. Theservices which RC SOF units performed and the effi-ciency with which they mobilized were impressive.

Last year’s functional alignment of active andreserve components of the Army Special OperationsCommand was done partly to standardize AC andRC unit training and operations, and in time it willincrease USASOC’s overall readiness. Army SOF arenow aligned along functional lines, with similar ACand RC elements grouped under one commandereither in the Army Special Forces Command or theArmy Civil Affairs and Psychological OperationsCommand. USASOC oversees training and readi-ness for National Guard SOF. The Army SpecialForces Command has already initiated an evalua-tion and standardization program to measure all itsassigned units by the same standards.

At the Special Warfare Center and School, we nolonger have separate qualification courses for activeand reserve-component soldiers. All candidates forSpecial Forces now attend Special Forces Assess-ment and Selection, and if selected, the SF Qualifi-cation Course. Prior to SFAS, reserve-component sol-diers attend a two-week SF Pretraining Course to

help them improve land-navigation and other basicskills. Since 1989, this course, developed with thehelp of the National Guard Bureau, has reduced RCattrition by approximately 50 percent.

In September 1992, new tables of organizationand equipment for Civil Affairs foreign-internal-defense and unconventional-warfare battalions willprovide reserve-component detachments more pre-cisely tailored for the various CA missions in LIC. Aswe work to integrate this new RC capability into ourdoctrinal, operational and organizational concepts,we are also producing mission training plans whichwill assist commanders of these new units in train-ing for their assigned missions. These MTPs arescheduled to be complete before the changeover tothe new TOE. We are also developing instruction,training literature, basic and advanced NCO coursesand skill-qualification tests for the new Civil AffairsMOS, designed to give reserve-component CA sol-diers better opportunities for training and careeradvancement.

As we look toward the future, we face a changingthreat and a restructuring of the Total Force.Although SOF may not experience the drawdownforecast for conventional units, we may be requiredto perform new missions and a wider variety of mis-sions than in the past. As we strive to meet the chal-lenge of this new environment, it will be importantto maintain the force of trained, capable and readysoldiers that only our reserve-component special-operations forces can provide.

Maj. Gen. David J. Baratto

Special Warfare

From the Commandant

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Gordon R. SullivanGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Milton H. HamiltonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

Headquarters, Department of the Army00340

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

Commander & CommandantMaj. Gen. David J. Baratto

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Graphic Art DirectorBruce S. Barfield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Cen-ter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission isto promote the professional development of special opera-tions forces by providing a forum for the examination ofboth established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the author, and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. This publica-tion does not supersede any information presented in otherofficial Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, andshould be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFK-SWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: AUTOVON239-5703 or commercial (919) 432-5703. Special Warfarereserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except where copy-righted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and theauthor.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve spe-cial operations units. Individuals desiring a private sub-scription should forward their requests to: Superintendentof Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-ton, D.C. 20402.

Departments60 Officer Career Notes63 Enlisted Career Notes64 Foreign SOF66 Update72 Book Reviews

Cover: Helicopter photo courtesy 1/245th Avn. Bn.; USASOC mobilization photos by Bob Jordan

Features2 Special Operations in Desert Storm: Separating Fact from

Fiction7 Treating the Animals of Kuwait

by Capt. Bob Vogelsang8 Food Distribution During Operation Provide Comfort

by Capt. David S. Elmo10 Focusing on the Future: The Role of SOF in Emerging

Defense Strategyby James R. Locher III

14 USACAPOC: One Step Closer to the ‘Total Army’by Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Hurteau and Maj. Robert D. Hayner

18 The 200K Call-up: Just Cause vs. Desert Shieldby Col. Frederick C. Oelrich, USAR

25 Ensuring Readiness for Active and Reserve-Component SF Unitsby Col. Joseph K. Dietrich

28 Federalization: 20th SF Group Becomes First RC SF Unit to Be Activatedby Sgt. Scott D. Hallford

30 Special Forces Pretrainingby Lt. Col. George Rollins

32 The Lords of Darkness: Oklahoma’s 1/245th Aviation Battalionby SSgt. Gregg Bond

36 The Reserve-Component Special Forces Soldier: An Assetwith Special Capabilitiesby Capt. Michael A. O’Brien

39 FID in the 90sby Terry Doherty

42 The Crusade of a Green Beret: Eleazar Parmly IV in Southeast Asiaby Richard L. Gruenther and David W. Parmly

56 Review Essay: Understanding Terrorism Since the 60sby Stephen Sloan

Spring 1989

Special WarfareMarch 1992 Vol. 5, No. 1

ContentsPB 80–92–1

The story of U.S. Army special-operations forces in Desert Shieldand Desert Storm is a story of quietprofessionalism ...

It is a story of hiding in the dayand surveilling a 175-mile border atnight ...

It is a story of infiltrating behindenemy lines, sabotaging lines ofcommunication and destroyingcommand-and-control targets ...

It is a story of Americans train-ing coalition forces, working withsoldiers from countries as unlikelyas Syria and Czechoslovakia ...

It is a story of escaping in a heli-copter flying so low it had to pull upto get over donkeys’ backs ...

It is a story of the first U.S. troopsto reach Kuwait City during the lib-eration of an oppressed people ...

And it is a story of psyching-outthe enemy and rebuilding a war-torn nation.

But more than anything else, thisis an American success story aboutcourage, confidence and maturity in

the best-trained U.S. soldier. It isthe latest chapter in the history ofthe uniquely American art ofunconventional warfare.

Special-operations forcesBriefly, U.S. Army special opera-

tions are composed of five compo-nents made entirely of volunteers.

First, the Special Forces are theArmy’s experts at unconventionalwarfare. Taught to speak foreignlanguages and blend in foreign cul-tures, they can survive behindenemy lines and conduct risky long-term reconnaisance missions. Theyare paratroopers, but they alsoknow how to infiltrate by land andsea without detection, anywhere inthe world.

Secondly, Psychological-Opera-tions forces use the tools of commu-nication — loudspeakers, leaflets,and broadcasts — to fire creativepropaganda campaigns at targetaudiences. Their purpose: to neu-tralize hostile enemy attitudes, and

ultimately persuade their audi-ences to support the United States,all without firing a single round ofammunition.

Thirdly, Civil Affairs units winthe hearts and minds of the civilianpopulace in war-torn nations bycoordinating humanitarian reliefefforts, like aiding homelessrefugees and establishing law andorder.

Like Special Forces, Civil Affairsand Psychological Operations sol-diers are paratroopers trained inforeign languages, two skills thatenable them to respond to chal-lenges anywhere in the world.

The 75th Ranger Regimentmakes up another component ofArmy special operations. Rangersare the world’s premier light-infantry experts, capable of spear-heading an assault with lightningspeed, as they did in Grenada andPanama. They often conduct live-fire and airborne operations atnight, and they can project their

Special Operations in Desert Storm:

SeparatingFact from

Fiction

Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

2 Special Warfare

force to any part of the world.The 160th Special Operations

Aviation Regiment is the final com-ponent of Army special operations.The members of this unit fly heli-copters on dangerous missions,most often at night, and provedduring Desert Storm that they areamong the world’s finest rotary-wing pilots.

Desert StormEach of these five components

was represented in the diverseassortment of special-operationsunits we sent to the Persian Gulf:Both active-duty soldiers andreservists, they came from locationsthroughout the United States, butlargely from Fort Bragg, N.C.; FortCampbell, Ky.; Hunter Army Air-field, Ga.; and Fort Devens, Mass.

In Saudi Arabia, these forceswere united with Navy and AirForce special-operations unitsunder Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf ’sspecial-operations command, calledSOCCENT. SOCCENT’s comman-der, Col. Jesse Johnson, was the ar-chitect of the special-operations ef-

fort during the Persian Gulf crisis.Johnson’s military career has

been built in the special-operationscommunity, but a distinction in hispast would prove to further qualifyhim for this unique role. While astudent at the Army’s Commandand General Staff College, he haddeveloped a friendship with a fellowmajor from Kuwait who eventuallywould rise to be the current chief ofstaff of the Kuwaiti military.

Special operations were amongthe first units deployed to supportGeneral Schwarzkopf. Long beforethe ground war began, SOCCENTalone was responsible for a 60,000-square-mile area on the Iraqi bor-der 300 miles wide and 200 milesdeep.

Coalition warfareOne of the Special Forces’ great

successes in the Gulf was coalitionwarfare, which Schwarzkopf saidwas a vital contribution to the over-all campaign. U.S. Special Forcessoldiers were attached to the coali-tion forces and were their trainersand advisers.

Working with nearly every bat-talion of the coalition forces, SpecialForces would prove to be the gluethat held the coalition’s groundforces together throughout the campaign.

Special Forces trained extensive-ly with the Saudi Arabian military,but also with the other Arab coun-tries in the coalition such as Syriaand Egypt, and other countries asdifferent as France, Bangladesh,Czechoslovakia and Senegal.

And one very important under-taking of the Special Forces was thereconstruction of the Kuwaiti mili-tary in exile.

The 5th Special Forces Groupsent 106 teams — usually 3-4 mento a team — to work with coalitionforces’ forward battalions. One Spe-cial Forces battalion alone had acombined 6,000 hours of trainingwith coalition forces in a 13-weekperiod.

In their training, U.S. SpecialForces conducted close-air-supportmissions and defensive trainingexercises with battalions of coali-tion forces. The coalition soldierspracticed marksmanship, communi-cations and combat lifesaving.

And while they were rehearsingmilitary tactics, U.S. Special Forcesand a Czechoslovakian chemicalteam trained coalition forces inpreparing for nuclear, biologicaland chemical warfare.

On the Saudi-Iraqi border, U.S.Special Forces patrolled with theSaudi military. Other coalitionforces were massed behind them,followed by U.S. ground forces.They conducted border surveillancefrom forts called mazekas. Theypatrolled at night because therewas no place to hide during the day — they had to return to themazekas by sunrise.

U.S. Special Forces simply weresuperb in coalition warfare becausethey had been specially selected,trained and armed for this uniquerole. The Army years ago singledthem out for their military exper-tise, then gave them the languageand cultural training to communi-

Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

Col. Jesse Johnson, SOCCENT commander (left center), shakes hands withthe Emir of Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm.

March 1992 3

cate with their Arab counterparts.And because Special Forces foryears have conducted militarytraining exercises in the MiddleEast, they alone had the uniqueexpertise to specially train thecoalition forces and to keep themglued together.

Other than the battle at Khafji,which involved U.S. Marines, U.S.Special Forces conducted the onlycombined operations in the cam-paign. Our Special Forces sufferedno medical problems, even thoughthey ate foreign food and drank for-eign water along with the coalitionforces. Their vast experience in theregion played no small factor intheir great success.

Special reconnaissanceBut coalition warfare was not the

Special Forces’ only mission. Theirspecial-reconnaissance role wouldprove to be vital: In his now-famous

briefing during the final hours ofthe ground war, Schwarzkopf said:“We put Special Forces deep intothe enemy territory ... and they letus know what was going on outthere, and they were the eyes outthere.”

Special Forces searched for Scudmissile launchers behind enemylines. They targeted enemy com-mand-and-control objectives andlines of communication. They main-tained 13 early-warning positionsalong the Iraqi border from thecoastal city of Khafji westward.

While on two special-recon mis-sions, small teams of Special Forceswere compromised and found them-selves in firefights with Iraqi forcesof superior numbers. One of thefirefights was six hours long; theother three hours. There were noU.S. casualties in either fight,although one ended in a dramaticescape.

On Jan. 17, 1991, at 2:38 a.m.,SOCCENT was permitted to beginSchwarzkopf ’s campaign, sendingoperational aviation units behindenemy lines to take out key radarsites.

During the 100 hours of combat,Special Forces reported enemyactivity and locations from withinIraqi territory. And during the lib-eration of Kuwait City, SOCCENTwas given the mission to seize,clear and reoccupy the U.S., Britishand French embassies. Johnsondirected the 3rd Special ForcesGroup, with a company from the10th Special Forces Group, toretake the U.S. embassy, whichthey did in the early afternoon ofFeb. 28.

During their occupation,Schwarzkopf gave SOCCENT theenormous task of clearing KuwaitCity of stray enemy soldiers andammunition the Iraqis had leftbehind. Johnson reported, “Theentire city was an arsenal.” In theprocess of clearing the city, SpecialForces uncovered five truckloads ofvaluable Iraqi military documents.When all was clear, SOCCENTreverted to a peacekeeping role inthe devastated city.

Special Forces, however, were notthe only special-operations unitsoperating in the Persian Gulf. Onecompany from the 75th RangerRegiment was deployed to giveSchwarzkopf a rapid-strike force, ifneeded. Other forces fought per-haps the most important battle ofall: the rebuilding of Kuwait.

Civil AffairsPlaying no small role in that bat-

tle is our Civil Affairs force. Closeto half of the Army’s total CivilAffairs force was deployed. Beforethe war started, Civil Affairs sol-diers were working with the legiti-mate government of Kuwait andthe U.S. State Department, plan-ning for the country’s reconstruc-tion. Called the Kuwaiti TaskForce, they were ideal for advisingthe Kuwaitis because they are themilitary’s experts in civil adminis-

In this photo,taken through

night-vision goggles, special-

operationstroops fast-rope

from an MH-53J

Pavelow III heli-copter

during Opera-tion Desert

Storm.

Photo by Greg Ford

4 Special Warfare

tration and in managing basic gov-ernmental skills.

One of the most significant CivilAffairs accomplishments camebefore any shots were fired. CivilAffairs soldiers were among the ini-tial deployments for Desert Shield;the Army’s major logistical pack-ages were not — they arrived muchlater, but the initial demand forlogistics was great. Relatively smallnumbers of Civil Affairs soldiersfilled the void by coordinating host-nation support that ultimatelyamounted to $5 billion in SaudiArabian contributions.

Thanks to Civil Affairs, comman-ders had buses and cars for trans-portation and could refuel at manygas stations at no charge. Our sol-diers had bulk water and nutritiousfood that beat eating MREs. Mili-tary units had buildings for head-quarters, billets and warehouses,with an adequate power supply andtelephones — with no phone bill —which met a large part of our com-munications requirement.

Army Civil Affairs soldiers wereattached to every ground maneuverunit, including the Marines. Withthese units they acquired supportfrom civilians in the theater andaided other civilians dislocated bythe war.

Civil Affairs soldiers preventedmajor cultural incidents that mighthave untied the coalition by givingclasses on cultural considerationsto our deployed forces. They toldcommanders in the field of culturalconsiderations, advising them,among other things, of historical,religious and archeological sitesimportant to the innocent civilianswe wanted to leave out of the war.They coordinated our efforts inhumanitarian aid in Kuwait.

Civil Affairs reservists excel inthis area because, in their civilianlives, they are professionals in pub-lic health, public safety and publicworks. They are doctors, attorneys,businessmen — often prominentcitizens — who are experts in a cer-tain field, and who use their exper-tise to help put back on track those

civilian lives disrupted by war.Re-establishing Kuwait’s basic

public services was an enormoustask. Iraqi forces wreaked massivedestruction in Kuwait, and much ofwhat they did not destroy, they loot-ed and removed to Iraq. Medicalfacilities in Kuwait had virtuallyceased to function, as Iraqi occupa-tion forces stripped them of sup-plies and equipment.

Psychological operationsPsychological-operations forces

proved to be a unique force multi-plier for the commanders in thefield. Leaflets prepared by ArmyPSYOP specialists were remark-ably successful. One leaflet with apicture of a B-52 bomber told Iraqisoldiers in Arabic what day andtime they would be bombed next.When the prophecy came true, theleaflets became a very crediblesource of information.

Along with the Saudis, we pro-duced and distributed leaflets out-lining for Iraqi soldiers the correctprocedures of surrender. These leaf-lets led countless Iraqis to surren-der safely, while posing a minimumamount of danger to U.S. soldiers.

Radio broadcasts helped breakthe Iraqi will to fight, and loud-speaker teams supported everyground maneuver unit, includingcoalition forces. They were creditedwith saving the lives of combatantsas well as civilians.

Special-ops aviationAnother group of soldiers that

deserves a tremendous amount ofrecognition is the 160th SpecialOperations Aviation Regiment.

As mentioned earlier, one of theSpecial Forces firefights ended in adramatic escape. During thatescape, CWO 4 Jim Crisafulli of the160th flew his Blackhawk heli-copter more than 150 miles intoIraq in broad daylight just severalfeet off the ground to exfiltrate theteam. He was flying so low that hehad to pull the chopper up just toget over donkeys’ backs. Mr. Crisa-fulli volunteered for that mission;he has since been awarded the Dis-tinguished Flying Cross.

In the Persian Gulf War, the160th flew mission after mission —infiltration, exfiltration, resupplyand medical evacuation. UnderSOCCENT, the 160th and special

Photo courtesy 160th SOAR

A Blackhawk helicopter from the 3rd Battalion, 160th Special OperationsAviation Regiment flies over burning oil fields in Kuwait during OperationDesert Storm.

March 1992 5

aviation units from the U.S. AirForce were “100 percent in chargeof combat search and rescue,”according to Schwarzkopf.

“When a pilot gets shot down outthere in the middle of nowhere, sur-rounded by the enemy, and you’rethe folks that are required to go inand go after him, that is a very

tough mission,” Schwarzkopf said.From the outset of U.S. deploy-

ments to the Persian Gulf, special-operations forces infiltrated with-out being seen, performed danger-ous missions in silence, and execut-ed clandestine operations withsuperb precision. Yet they soughtno publicity, no recognition. That’s

the way American special-opera-tions forces have operated since theAmerican Revolution.

Active and reserve-componentspecial-operations soldiers werecalled on with other U. S. forcesduring Operation Provide Comfortto aid the Kurdish refugees inTurkey and northern Iraq. Theyanswered that call by coordinatinghumanitarian-relief efforts, con-ducting search-and-rescue missionsand developing refugee campsthere. Our Civil Affairs elementsdeveloped the plan that resettledthe Kurds and supplied them with1.2 million MREs, water and morethan 1,400 short tons of bulk food.

We are proud of all the Army’sspecial-operations forces and theirsuperb performance in the PersianGulf War. They are true nationalheroes, and we should never be ableto say adequately, “Thank you foryour skill, your courage and yourdedication to the fight for freedom.”

This article was prepared by thePublic Affairs Office, U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command.

Photo by Phil Prater, courtesy Soldiers magazine

Sgt. Fern Davis of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological OperationsCommand helps Kurdish children arriving at the Zakhu resettlment campduring Operation Provide Comfort.

6 Special Warfare

The Iraqi occupation of Kuwaitcost many people their lives. It wasalso unfortunate for the animals ofKuwait, many of whom barely survived.

People always wonder what a“doggy doc” is doing in an SF group.There aren’t any combat-tracker orscout dogs anymore, and any horsesleft are for show. However, a vet canwin a lot of “hearts and minds” inmany of the agriculturally-basedThird World nations that SF groupsmay encounter.

Every animal facility I visited inKuwait had been affected by thewar. Only 32 of the original zoo-

dwellers of the Kuwait City Zoocould be accounted for. There wereno birds left. We found many car-casses, including monkeys, wildboar, leopard, mountain lion, porcu-pine, antelope and zebra. LuckilyJohn Walsh, a member of the WorldSociety for the Protection of Ani-mals, out of Boston, was on thescene early and made arrange-ments for the financial and logisti-cal support that allowed the zoo tooperate immediately following theretaking of Kuwait.

The zoo’s one elephant and one of

the monkeys had been shot by occu-pying Iraqi troops — the elephantin the right shoulder and the mon-key in the right leg. An Air Forceexplosive-ordnance-disposal teamswept the elephant’s wound with ametal detector and located the bul-let, which had not gone very deep.The wound was managed by dailyflushing and antibiotic application;it eventually healed and scarredover.

The monkey was taken to a com-bat-support hospital on the out-skirts of Kuwait City to be X-rayed.The X-ray showed a mid-shaftfemur fracture that was healingcrookedly. It also showed metalfragments, confirming our fearsthat he had been shot. He wouldneed surgery, but that was quiteout of reach of the resources we hadat the zoo.

One of the zoo’s bears could notuse his right rear leg. We thoughthe might have broken something ormight have been shot also. Heseemed in good health but wouldusually just sit in a corner of thecage, and when he did move, he justdragged the leg. Walsh made con-tact with the Riyadh Zoo and wastrying to get treatment for the bearand the monkey when we left.

The real need for medicine andhard work was out in the city.There, many families were keepingtheir animals in the small court-yards of their houses. One familyhad about 70 animals tucked away — a regular Old MacDonald’sfarm. Throughout the city, animalswere suffering from lice and infec-tions. Many were thin and weakfrom lack of food.

We found a one-ton Holstein bullin a swimming pool — it had beentrying to get a drink and fell in.Local residents said the bull hadbeen in the pool for seven weeks.They were feeding and wateringhim and had drained the pool twoweeks before, but five weeks inwater had made his feet soft andsore, and they couldn’t get him out.SSgt. Steve Rhine, an SF medicfrom Co. B, 1/3rd SF Group, and I

erected a ramp out of two metaldoors, a bench and a metal frame.We covered the ramp with cushionsand tied one rope around the bull’shead and neck and put anotherbehind his back legs. It took a lot offresh grass for bait and many gut-wrenching heaves, but we eventual-ly extricated the bull. We couldn’tlocate the owner, so we trailered

our bull back to Old MacDonald’sfarm.

Much of our time in Kuwait Citywas also spent at the horse stablesnear the racetrack. The people atthe stables said most of the horseswere either taken, let loose or killedby occupying troops. The Kuwaitigovernment had a complex housingreportedly 200 Arabian horses usedin a breeding program. However,during the occupation, the complexwas made into a huge ammunition-storage area containing large quan-tities of tank and artillery rounds,as well as antiaircraft and small-arms ammunition. We found eightof the Arabians hidden in a court-yard; in a large field near the sta-bles we found about 40 badlydecomposed horse carcasses.

When the unit redeployed to theU.S., it was hard to leave with somany animals still needing atten-tion. All in all, though, we cared foras many animals as we could withwhat was available.

Capt. Bob Vogelsang is the vet-erinary officer for the 3rd SpecialForces Group.

Treating theAnimals of Kuwaitby Capt. Bob Vogelsang

Photo by Bob Vogelsang

Photo by Bob Vogelsang

March 1992 7

The challenge of providing emer-gency food supplies to returningKurdish refugees in Northern Iraqwas perhaps the military’s mostcomplicated humanitarian-assis-tance logistical effort since theBerlin Airlift.

The massive Kurdish repatria-tion (more than 700,000 civilians)from refugee camps along the Turk-ish/Iranian border into NorthernIraq demanded emergency resupplyof foodstuffs to the Kurdish villages.

“When we conducted our initialvillage assessments, there was vir-tually nothing in terms of staplefoods in the villages,” said Lt. Col.Michael E. Hess of the 353rd CivilAffairs Command, a U.S. ArmyReserve unit from The Bronx, NewYork, responsible for civil-militaryoperations.

The American, British, Dutch,French, Italian, Spanish, Canadianand Australian coalition forcefocused its humanitarian missionon selecting food-distribution sitesand stockpiling goods within theKurdish communities. The goal wasto maintain a 4-7-day supply basedupon population estimates. Thecoalition hoped that by creating vil-lage stockpiles, it would encouragerefugees to return directly to theirvillages and bypass temporary dis-placed-civilian camps.

Major settlement populationsgrew at enormous rates during May1991: Zakho City grew from 17,000to more than 103,000; the Zakhodisplaced-civilian camp grew fromzero to more than 58,000; Dohuk

grew from 20,000 to more than100,000.

Smaller village populationsincreased at similar rates. AlAmadiyah, a mountaintop village75 km east of Zakho, swelled from50 people on May 1 to more than12,000 by the month’s end.

In spite of the enormous resettle-ment, food stockpiling and distribu-tion were able to keep pace becauseof the logistical efforts of the coali-tion military, the United Nations,CARE International and otherrelief agencies.

The menu recommended bynutritionists from the UnitedNations’ World Food Program andCARE considered Kurdish dietarytradition and included 400 grams ofwheat flour, 100 grams of rice, 65grams of pulse (lentils, beans), 33grams of oil or margarine and 15grams of sugar. Nutritionists calcu-lated that this meal would yieldmore than 2,000 calories per day,

Food Distribution During Operation Provide Comfortby Capt. David S. Elmo

Civilian laborers unloadsacks of flour at the foodwarehouse inSirsenk, Iraq,during Opera-tion ProvideComfort.

8 Special Warfare

Photo by David Elmo

with 65 grams of protein and 47grams of fat. Supplemental menuitems included high-protein bis-cuits, canned meats, canned peas,canned vegetables, tea, salt, babyfood and milk.

Initially, food was delivered bytruck convoy from Silopi, Turkey,where the coalition forces hadestablished a humanitarian-servicesupport base (a logistics hub andwarehouse). But problems encoun-tered at the Turkish/Iraqi borderslowed deliveries of food. Convoyoperations became more stream-lined once food warehouses andsupply stores were positioned inIraq at the newly secured city ofZahko and at the Sirsenk Airfield(50 km east of Zakho).

In the early days of resupply,coalition military trucks were usedto rush food deliveries and other

emergency items of equipment. U.S.Marine Lt. Col. Paul D. Wisniewski,director of relief logistics at theSilopi humanitarian-service sup-port base, explained, “As the civil-ian trucks became available, theyrelieved the need for military trans-port and made the process of transi-tioning to civilian agencies mucheasier.” In May, more than 20,000tons of relief food and supplies weredelivered to 15 locations within thesecurity zone.

Food distribution took place atcentralized points such as hospi-tals, schoolhouses, fire-departmentbuildings and police headquarters.Many of the centers were initiallyestablished by U.S. Army CivilAffairs units working with othermembers of the coalition.

Orderly control of distributionwas maintained through the use of

ration cards, and most stations usedweekly, rather than daily, food dis-tribution schedules. The coalitionencouraged members of the localpopulation to assist with registra-tion, inventory, off-loading of trucksand rationing. Local involvementreduced the need for military per-sonnel, emphasized the concept ofthe military “working itself out of ajob,” and built strong comunity ties.

The fact that the coalition mili-tary force planned all its activitieswith the goal of handing off to civil-ian agencies made the transitionprocess easier. CARE Internationalwas the leading non-governmentalorganization that proposed to man-age and maintain the food-distribu-tion process. CARE representativesarrived in the secured zone in earlyMay. After becoming familiar withthe food-distribution operation, theyfound it so well advanced thatCARE could take over all operationsat the end of the month. CARE’steam leader in Iraq, Roland Roome,commented, “What was incredibleto me was how the military set upall the detailed and complicated sys-tems at such speed with so littleprior experience ... It was greatworking with them — real profes-sionals with a great attitude.”

Capt. David S. Elmo is assignedas the Supply and Services Officer,G-4 Section of the 353rd Civil Affairs Command. He was recalledto active duty for Desert Shield/Storm, served in the J-4 of USEUCOM, and deployed to Com-bined Task Force Provide Comfortas a logistics operations officer.

CARE photo by Nancy Blum

A Turkish relief worker for CARE pauses in the midst of Isikveren, a campin Turkey where 160,000 Kurds camped after their flight from Iraq.

March 1992 9

The remarkable performance ofour special-operations forces inOperations Desert Shield, DesertStorm and Provide Comfort, andthe key role played by the UnitedStates Special Operations Com-mand in training and equippingthose forces, have been instru-mental in focusing attention — inWashington and indeed across thecountry — on one of our mostimportant military capabilities.

Five years ago, our attention wasalso focused on the special-opera-tions community — in particular,the enactment of the reform legisla-tion that reorganized and revital-ized the special-operations capabili-ties of the Department of Defense.Recently we celebrated the fifthanniversary of that important legis-lation which enabled us to turn thepainful lessons of Desert One intothe bold successes of Desert Storm.

We have come a long way in thelast five years. As a result of thatlegislation, we now have a unifiedcommand, General Carl Stiner’sU.S. Special Operations Command,that is dedicated to the preparationof special-operations forces for theirassigned missions. The Army, Navyand Air Force have establishedmajor commands for their special-operations forces. Additionally, myoffice in the Pentagon was estab-lished as a high-level focal point forall special-operations and low-intensity-conflict activities of theDepartment of Defense.

We also now have a separatefunding category for special-opera-tions forces, known as Major Force Program 11, in the defensebudget. And the Special OperationsResearch, Development and Acqui-sition Center, recently establishedat USSOCOM, will help to ensurethat special-operations forces con-tinue to get the best — and mostappropriate — technology, equip-

Focusingon the

Future:

The role of SOFin emerging

defense strategy

by James R. Locher III

This article is taken from Secre-tary Locher’s speech to the Associa-tion of Special Operations Profes-sionals during SOFEX ’91, held atFort Bragg, N.C., in November.

10 Special Warfare

ment and materiel for their uniquemissions.

There is also much to celebrate inthe strengthened stature and revi-talized capabilities of the special-operations community; their excep-tional performance in Panama, theGulf and elsewhere serves as themost vivid proof. Given the nation-al-security challenges that we aremost likely to face in the future,and considering the most likely sce-narios that would require the appli-cation of military assets, thestrengthening of these capabilitiescouldn’t have happened at a bettertime.

The world has changed dramati-cally over the last few years, andspecial-operations forces, includingCivil Affairs and PsychologicalOperations forces, will provide anincreasingly important capabilityfor promoting and protecting vitalU.S. interests around the world.

I’d like to tell you why, and todescribe why the dramatic changesin the international security envi-ronment have magnified — and willcontinue to magnify — the impor-tance of special-operations forces asan instrument of national policy.

Changing worldWithout question, the world polit-

ical picture is becoming more com-plex. Despite the already visiblebenefits of diminished East-Westtensions, the world that we confronttoday is even more complicatedthan it was only a few years ago.Increased U.S.-Soviet cooperationhas significantly reduced the risk ofnuclear war. But the end of theCold War has not resulted in theend of all conflict. There will still benumerous conflicts that eitherdirectly or indirectly threaten U.S.interests. As Iraq’s bold invasion ofKuwait confirmed, the threats ema-nating from the Third World —where special-operations forcesmost often operate — have not dis-appeared. And I would even arguethat they are likely to increase.

The demise of the Soviet Unionhas changed our strategic focus

from one of bipolar confrontationand the possibility of global war tothat of a multipolar world of region-al and trans-regional threats. Therationale for this shift is evident inrecent events in the Middle East,the challenge of controlling the pro-liferation of weapons of massdestruction in the Third World, andthe threats posed by drug traffick-ing, insurgency and terrorism — allof which contribute to a less stableworld.

Though conflicts appear to bewinding down in El Salvador, Ango-la and Afghanistan, and democrati-cally elected governments havetaken power in countries ranging

from Czechoslovakia to Nicaragua,it is evident that peace is not break-ing out all over. A glance at anynewspaper will help to illustratemy point. Every day the pages arefilled with stories about drug king-pins and reports of civil wars, ter-rorist attacks, successful andunsuccessful coups, and a range ofother low-intensity conflicts — eachof them unique — raging across theglobe.

President Bush has stated thatnow, in the absence of the Sovietthreat, our most formidable enemyis instability. There has been enor-mous change since the Berlin Wallcame down only two years ago: It is

like the day when Lord Cornwallissurrendered to George Washingtonat Yorktown, and the British bandplayed a song called “The WorldTurned Upside Down.”

The general level of instability inthe Third World is increasing, aspoverty and injustice persist anddevelopment proceeds unevenly.The quest for freedom and democ-racy will continue to spur popula-tions to action that will, at times,be violent. Centuries-old ethnicrivalries, religious animosities andterritorial disputes may remainunresolved, and, in some places,even resurface with new vigor.Overpopulation, rapid urbaniza-tion, environmental degradationand disease, rising nationalism andother phenomena will place severestrains on institutions, govern-ments and alliances. Widely avail-able and sophisticated conventionaland nuclear armaments, coupledwith new means to deliver them,will render the international arenaeven more volatile and unstable.

Though these phenomena maynot individually threaten the verysurvival of our nation, vital U.S.interests at home and abroad canbe adversely affected by the low-intensity conflicts they generate. Toillustrate my point, drug traffickinghas created social and economic dis-locations here at home — in ourcities, our towns and our schools.Internationally, terrorists have tar-geted American citizens and busi-nesses overseas.

While it may be counter-intuitive,I believe that these low-intensity-conflict threats to the United Statesare likely to increase in the after-math of the Gulf War. Conventionaldeterrence has been significantlyenhanced as a result of the militarysuperiority, determination and willthat the United States demonstrat-ed in Operation Desert Storm. Atleast in the near term, potentialadversaries will be less willing toconfront us directly.

Instead, those who wish to chal-lenge American resolve and thosewho are determined to pursue

“Increased U.S.-Sovi-et cooperation hassignificantly reducedthe risk of nuclear war. But the end of theCold War has notresulted in the end ofall conflict. Therewill still be numer-ous conflicts thateither directly orindirectly threatenU.S. interests.”

March 1992 11

interests that are counter to ourswill do so indirectly, by threateningAmerican lives and property andundermining institutions and val-ues that promote democracy andcivil liberties. They now clearlyunderstand that the only meansavailable to them will be variousforms of indirect aggression such asterrorism, insurgency, proxy war-fare and drug trafficking. Addingfuel to the fire is the fact that thesemeans can provide them with alow-cost, low-risk and high-visibili-ty geo-strategic payoff.

Addressing these unconventionalthreats does not mean that U.S.forces will become engaged in everyconflict. However, if American forceis brought to bear in such situa-tions, then there is the likelihoodthat special-operations forces willbe called upon.

New defense strategyLet me now turn to our defense

strategy and describe briefly therole of SOF in implementing it.Dealing with broader, and some-what more ambiguous threats —many of which will arise from thesources of instability I describedearlier — requires a defense strate-gy that deters and defeats aggres-sion at all levels of conflict in achanging global environment. Torespond to these changes in thenational-security environment, aswell as to address our need toremain engaged in shaping it, thePresident and the Secretary ofDefense have developed a newdefense strategy. The four funda-mental principles of this new strat-egy are to:• Ensure strategic deterrence• Exercise forward presence in key

areas• Respond effectively to crises• Retain the ability to reconstitute

forces if necessary.

Peacetime engagementIt was August 1990, in a major

foreign-policy address in Aspen,Colo., when President Bush firstarticulated this new four-pronged

approach. In that same speech, healso spoke of “peacetime engage-ment” as a framework for ourdefense policy in the environmentshort of war. Since then, the termpeacetime engagement has beengaining currency in the lexicon ofPentagon policy makers.

Specifically, the President statedthat: “What we now require is adefense policy that adapts to thesignificant changes we are witness-ing, without neglecting the endur-ing realities that will continue toshape our security strategy. A poli-cy of peacetime engagement everybit as constant and committed tothe defense of our interests and ide-

als in today’s world as in the time ofconflict and Cold War.”

In congressional testimony, Sec-retary of Defense Cheney amplifiedthe President’s statement, declar-ing that: “To help deter low-intensi-ty conflicts and promote stability inthe Third World, we must haveinnovative strategies that supportrepresentative government, inte-grate security assistance and pro-mote economic development. Ourapproach for doing this is peace-time engagement — a coordinatedcombination of political, economicand military actions, aimed primar-ily at counteracting local violenceand promoting nation-building.”

Peacetime engagement reflects ashift from global to regional crisismanagement and puts a premiumon regional political-military prob-lem-solving and operations short ofwar. Successful implementation ofpeacetime engagement requiresthat the United States be proficientin four security mission areas: • Diplomacy and support for

diplomacy• Pre-crisis activities• Force projection and crisis

response• Post-crisis activities.

Special-operations forces willplay a key role in implementingthis policy. The strength of theseforces lies in their versatility. Asthey demonstrated in OperationDesert Storm, they can supportconventional operations as combatmultipliers, maximizing our capa-bilities and force potential. Theyalso provided the “glue” that keptthe coalition forces together. Butspecial-operations forces are alsoparticularly well-suited to imple-ment this policy of peacetimeengagement. Looking to the future,and considering peacetime-engage-ment requirements, I see expandingopportunities for the employment ofspecial-operations forces.

Among those missions which fallunder the rubric of peacetimeengagement, SOF have alreadydecisively demonstrated their abili-ty to respond effectively to short-notice contingencies and to conductthe wide range of actions requiredto deter regional conflict and tocombat terrorism, insurgencies anddrug trafficking.

Given their expertise as teachersand trainers, their language skills,regional orientation and culturalawareness, SOF are ideally suitedto provide training and assistanceto allied and friendly nations facinginternal security threats. They pro-vide a politically acceptable, rapidlydeployable and readily sustainableoption. And they will continue to beinvolved in a variety of activitieswhich seek to foster democratic val-ues and pluralism, and to promote

“Peacetime engage-ment reflects a shiftfrom global toregional crisis man-agement and puts apremium on regionalpolitical-militaryproblem-solving andoperations short ofwar. ... Special-oper-ations forces willplay a key role inimplementing thispolicy.”

12 Special Warfare

nation-building in the developingworld.

Additionally, as a result of theirwell-publicized recent efforts aidingthe Kurds in Operation ProvideComfort and assisting the flood-rav-aged people of Bangladesh in Oper-ation Sea Angel, we are also likelyto see an increase in the use of spe-cial-operations forces in the conductof humanitarian-assistance mis-sions around the world. The bottomline is that special-operations forceswill increasingly be called upon toprovide assistance to developingcountries in response to futurecrises, and there will be additionalopportunities for their employmentas the United States remainsengaged in the process of shapingits national-security environment.

Causes for optimismEarlier I stated that we have

great cause for optimism as the spe-cial-operations community faces theformidable challenges of the future.Already in the last five years sincethe creation of my office and theU.S. Special Operations Command,the United States has greatlyimproved its special-operationscapabilities.

The visibility, organizationalstrength and resources that wereunavailable in the past are nowours. The revitalization of our eliteforces has resulted in force-struc-ture increases and enhanced readi-ness. The ability of special-opera-tions forces to infiltrate and exfil-trate teams has been improved andexpanded. We must sustain themomentum we have gained.

SOF’s performance was outstand-ing in Operations Just Cause andDesert Shield/Desert Storm, as wellas in the numerous other opera-tional missions they have conduct-ed over the last few years. Theirsuccesses have proven their valueand ability to make unique contri-butions toward promoting and pro-tecting U.S. interests around theworld.

As Secretary Cheney said recent-ly, “We are seeing what it means to

be a democratic superpower. Itdoesn’t mean instant solutions toall of our problems. It doesn’t meanplaying the role of the world’spoliceman. It does mean being in aposition to act on our principles andour interests — without beinghostage to the arsenals of a hostilepower.” Special-operations forcesare one key instrument of nationalpolicy that provide us with thatcapability.

If recent trends are any indica-tion of the future, the number andkinds of missions assigned to spe-cial-operations forces will continue

to expand. In a volatile and turbu-lent world, where rapid change isthe only reliable norm, well-trainedand equipped special-operationsforces will undoubtedly be calledupon to face the tough, delicate andunexpected challenges that othercomponents of the Department ofDefense are not equipped to meet.Their flexibility, size, ease ofdeployment and peacetime experi-ence around the globe make themideally suited for limited contingen-cies, nation-assistance missions, orservice as valuable adjuncts in larg-er conventional actions. Given thefiscal cutbacks and drawdowns

already affecting our conventionalforces, a greater burden will likelybe placed on special-operationsforces as elements of the initialresponse to regional conflict.

As I just alluded, the changes wewill see in the next few years willnot be just those in the internation-al political arena. Domestic eco-nomic pressures and other factorswill also have an impact on thenear-term and future shape of theDepartment of Defense. In thatregard, it is encouraging to knowthat both the Secretary of Defenseand the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff have stated theircommitment to preserving and pro-tecting our special-operations capa-bilities in the current defense draw-down. Though special-operationsforces represent only about one per-cent of the total DoD budget, theyprovide a substantially greaterreturn to the nation, and theirrecent successes validate the wis-dom of continuing to invest in themin the future.

As the noted 19th-century physi-cian and poet Oliver WendellHolmes said, “I find the great thingin this world is not so much wherewe stand, as in what direction weare moving.” We can all take pridein the fact that our special-opera-tions forces are clearly moving inthe direction of improved capabilityand increasing importance to U.S.national security. In this complexand rapidly changing internationalenvironment, special-operationsforces will continue to be a highlyeffective force for the promotionand protection of vital U.S. inter-ests abroad.

James R. Locher III is currentlythe Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict.

“In a volatile andturbulent world,where rapid changeis the only reliablenorm, well-trainedand equipped spe-cial-operations forceswill undoubtedly becalled upon to facethe tough, delicateand unexpected chal-lenges that othercomponents of theDepartment ofDefense are notequipped to meet.”

March 1992 13

On Nov. 26, 1990, the concept of“The Total Army” came one stepcloser to reality with the redesigna-tion of the U.S. Army Reserve Spe-cial Operations Command as theArmy Civil Affairs and Psychologi-cal Operations Command.

The redesignationwas part of afunctional alignment that orga-nized components of the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command alongfunctional rather than componentlines: All Special Forces units arenow aligned under the U.S. ArmySpecial Forces Command, and allCivil Affairs and PSYOP unitsunder USACAPOC.

The redesignation was part of along process of functional align-ment of active and reserve-compo-nent Civil Affairs and PSYOP for-ces under one command. To under-stand the value and effectiveness ofthe functional realignment, it isnecessary to look at the history ofthe command.

HistoryUSACAPOC is an indirect result

of the Defense Authorization Act of

1987, which mandated the creationof a unified command to providetheater commanders-in-chief withthe capability to conduct special-operations activities with joint SOF.SOF includes Special Forces, CivilAffairs, Psychological Operations,Rangers and Special OperationsAviation, and most are in the Army.

After the creation of the U.S. Spe-cial Operations Command in April1987, the 1st Special OperationsCommand retained command andcontrol of all active Army SOF, butArmy reserve-component SOFunits, which include two SF groups,96 percent of CA and 86 percent ofPSYOP, were left dispersed among22 Army Reserve commands, mak-ing effective command and controldifficult. The need for unified com-mand and control for Army ReserveSOF may have been obvious, but itdid not come easily.

The first step involved the consol-idation of RC SOF units into oneArmy Reserve command in eachArmy region. While this was a stepin the right direction, commandand control of RC SOF remained

split between ARCOM commandersand 1st SOCOM. After much dis-cussion and negotiation at the high-est levels, the concept of a majorsubordinate command for RC SOFwas agreed upon.

That was only the beginning.There were many issues to be re-solved, including how, when and bywhom command responsibilitieswould be assumed to ensure unitreadiness. The two principal partiesdeveloping the proposed RC com-mand were the U.S. Army ForcesCommand and 1st SOCOM, whoserepresentatives briefed 21 Armystaff agencies before briefing theChief of Staff of the Army in June1989.

Based on the CSA’s guidance, theOffice of the Chief, Army Reserve;FORSCOM; and 1st SOCOM devel-oped a time-phased plan for com-mand and control of Army SOFunder a major command with twomajor subordinate commands. EachMSC would be commanded by amajor general: 1st SOCOM wouldinclude all active-component ArmySOF, and the U.S. Army ReserveSpecial Operations Commandwould include all RC SOF.

The U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command, the senior com-mand for all Army elements ofUSSOCOM, would assume com-mand and control of all active ArmySOF from FORSCOM. TheARCOMs would continue to play akey role in the relationship betweenReserve SOF units and the USARSOC and continue to maintaindefined logistical, administrativeand personnel functions.

Under this plan, implementedwith USAR SOC’s provisional acti-vation on Dec. 1, 1989, USAR SOCbecame the home of the 11th and12th Special Forces groups, 36 ofthe 37 Army CA units and 34 of the35 Army PSYOP units. (The onlyactive-component PSYOP and CAunits are the 4th PSYOP Groupand the 96th Civil Affairs Battal-ion, both at Fort Bragg).

This arrangement still left unitsorganized along component lines.

USACAPOC:One StepCloser to the‘Total Army’

by Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Hurteau & Maj. Bob Hayner

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14 Special Warfare

With the redesignation as of USARSOC as USACAPOC, all Army CivilAffairs and Psychological Opera-tions units, active and reserve-com-ponent, are now assigned to onecommand, headed by Brig. Gen.Joseph C. Hurteau. The other ele-ments of USAR SOC, the 11th and12th SF Groups, are now part of theUSASFC.

ElementsUSACAPOC active forces are the

4th Psychological Operations Groupand the 96th Civil Affairs Battal-ion. Its Army Reserve units are the351st Civil Affairs Command,Mountain View, Calif.; 352nd CivilAffairs Command, Riverdale, Md.;353rd Civil Affairs Command,Bronx, N.Y.; 360th CA Brigade,Columbia, S.C.; 361st CA Brigade,Pensacola, Fla.; 308th CA Group,Homewood, Ill.; 321st CA Group,San Antonio, Texas; 2nd PSYOPGroup, Cleveland, Ohio; 5th PSYOPGroup, Washington, D.C.; and the7th PSYOP Group, Presidio of SanFrancisco, Calif.

Because USACAPOC is primarilya reserve-component command, it issimilar to other ARCOMs which arealso authorized a major generalcommander. As with ARCOM units,USACAPOC units have contingency

wartime missions upon mobiliza-tion. Unlike ARCOM units, howev-er, USACAPOC’s chain of commanddoes not include any continentalarmy command or FORSCOM. Theunique chain of command reflectsthe unique mission of USACAPOC:special operations which emphasizepeacetime missions in low-intensity-conflict environments and supportto the conventional commander.

The peacetime missions of RCSOF present special challenges forUSACAPOC, since RC forces havetraditionally been oriented to war-time contingency missions whichrequire mobilization before RCunits become operational. In bothGrenada and Panama, CA reser-vists volunteered individually, butUSAR units were not activatedsince there was no mobilization.Operation Desert Shield/ Stormpresented a different challenge.

Just CauseAlthough planning for Operation

Just Cause had called for participa-tion of reserve-component Civil Af-fairs units, those plans had as-sumed that reserve forces would bemobilized. The decision by the Na-tional Command Authority not tomobilize reserve forces left only theone active-duty CA unit, the 96th

CA Battalion, to accomplish a majorCA mission. The Army had to fallback on individual volunteers, andwhat was then the U.S. Army Re-serve Special Operations Commandbegan to identify CA specialists andstructure the force that the U.S.Southern Command would need.

Within 24 hours of the initialinsertion of U.S. forces into Panamaon Dec. 19, 1989, USAR SOC hadinformally notified its major subor-dinate headquarters throughout theUnited States to begin soliciting vol-unteers for a CA staff for Panama.More than 600 Reserve soldiersanswered the call, and this numbergrew to thousands before the opera-tion was completed. By Dec. 23,USAR SOC had selected 25 individ-ual reservists, from various CAunits, who had the necessary mili-tary experience and who were will-ing to spend 139 days on active duty.

Numerous civilian and militarypersonnel at Fort Bragg worked toget these soldiers, and those whowould follow, to Fort Bragg and pro-cessed for overseas deployment.They had the initial 25 CA soldiersin Panama by Dec. 26.

USAR SOC was also working toarrange for the deployment of thenext increment. In contrast to theselection process for the CA staff,USAR SOC became primarily inter-ested in reservists’ civilian skills.Information on the volunteers, aswell as the demands from Panama,were fed into a computer data baseto identify the necessary experts inhealth, public works and utilities,public safety, dislocated civilians,public communications, transporta-tion, and administrative and com-munications skills.

Once these Reservists were iden-tified, USAR SOC saw to it that thesoldiers were transported to FortBragg, processed and shipped toPanama. By early January 1990,the second increment of more than80 CA soldiers was in Panama.

Desert Shield/StormThe Persian Gulf crisis tested the

military’s ability to move more than

U.S. Army Civil Affairs andPsychological Operations Command

Command

L E G E N D N O T E S

1.The 4th Psychological Operations Groupand the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion are activecomponent; all others are U.S. Army Reserve.

U.S. Army Civil Affairs andPsychological Operations

Command

2nd PsychologicalOperations Group

5th POG

7th POG

96th Civil AffairsBattalion

4th PsychologicalOperations Group

351st Civil AffairsCommand

352nd CA Cmd

353rd CA Cmd

March 1992 15

500,000 personnel and all of theirequipment in record time to theMiddle East. Moreover, it tested theability of newly configured ArmySOF commands to work togetherunder pressure.

Joint Chiefs of Staff ChairmanGen. Colin Powell argued for rapid,wholehearted deployment of U.S.military might. As Gen. NormanSchwarzkopf, commander-in-chiefof the U.S. Central Command, tookcommand of U.S. forces, the JointCentral Command pulled its MiddleEast mobilization plan (a plan thatincluded USACAPOC) off the shelfand revised it for use against Sad-dam Hussein.

CA and PSYOP planning to sup-port CENTCOM had begun longbefore any reserve units were actu-ally mobilized and deployed — the4th PSYOP Group and 96th CABattalion had conducted extensivecoordination with CENTCOM. Anassessment team was deployed intotheater to determine mission-sup-port requirements and manpowerneeds. After careful evaluation andconsideration by the 4th POG,CENTCOM, USACAPOC and Armyleadership, a PSYOP and CA sup-port concept plan was developedwhich included mobilization anddeployment of specific PSYOP andCA units. Once mobilization orderscame, USACAPOC notified subordi-nate units identified for deploy-ment. Within less than 12 monthsof “Just Cause,” the new commandwas preparing to deploy soldiers for“Desert Shield.”

Mobilization operations put thePentagon’s Total Force Policy to itsfirst serious test, as reservists werecalled up by the thousands toundertake the essential, highlyskilled and technical missions forwhich they were trained. Twenty-four CA and PSYOP units came toFort Bragg to begin the process ofvalidation and preparation fordeployment to Saudi Arabia. The351st Civil Affairs Command pro-vided soldiers to serve as valida-tors, advisers and trainers at FortBragg. They, along with USA-

CAPOC, shouldered the responsibil-ity to validate each unit and deter-mine its readiness to deploy.

Validation included standardmedical, dental and administrativechecks common to a preparation ofreplacements for overseas move-ment, but soldiers also had to meetSOF standards on the PT test, therucksack march, orienteering andweapons qualification. Soldierswere also interviewed to ensuretheir MOS technical proficiency.Only after they met both FORS-COM and SOF requirements weresoldiers deployed. Those who didnot meet the requirements or whohad medical profiles stayed in aholding company until they were fitto deploy.

As units arrived at Fort Bragg,the 351st-USACAPOC team identi-fied their requirements and sched-uled them for training, medical

exams and record checks. Theyestablished billeting and mess sup-port and accessed units into activeduty; they confirmed security clear-ances and completed necessary per-sonnel actions such as cross-level-ing and fillers.

Mobilization came quickly, andits demands were harsh on soldiersarriving at the mobilization site.But as units completed their valida-tion and training, those same sol-diers felt the confidence andstrength achieved by hard workand training.

Future operationsUSACAPOC missions have a

unique feature which is well-suitedto its citizen-soldiers. It is therequirement that they work closelywith indigenous civilians in thearea of operations, as well as withcivilian representatives of U.S.

Civil Affairs soldiers fromUSACAPOCload onto a C-141 at PopeAFB, N.C. priorto their long tripto the MiddleEast for Opera-tion DesertStorm.

16 Special Warfare

Photo by Bob Jordan

agencies, usually under the direc-tion of the U.S. ambassador’s coun-try team. Military activities in LICfocus on public support for politico-military objectives, and CA andPSYOP personnel have vital rolesin mobilizing public support.

Civil-military relationships andpublic support for politico-militaryobjectives are essential in at leastfive of the 10 special-operationsactivities of USSOCOM: CA,PSYOP, humanitarian assistance,foreign internal defense and uncon-ventional warfare.

In the hostile and politically am-biguous environment of LIC, thesoldiers of USACAPOC should beable to interrelate with U.S. andindigenous civilians with the finesseof diplomats. As civilians withunique military skills needed inLIC, USAR personnel can bridgethe gap between diplomacy and mil-itary operations, an essential taskin peacetime military operations.

In addition to civil-military rela-tions, mission success in LICdepends upon an integrated effortof active and reserve forces of allservices. While USSOCOM is a uni-fied command and is responsible forthe readiness of all SOF, its forceswill become operational in peace-time or wartime under the com-mand and control of geographicaltheater commands. The UnitedStates Southern Command is onesuch unified command that hasrelied heavily on SOF in its theaterof operations.

Because many SOF missions arepeacetime-oriented andmobilization during peacetime isnot necessary for mission accom-plishment, individual-volunteertheater augmentation will continueto be executed unless some changein the law requires effective inte-gration of USACAPOC units intotheater-Army peacetime operations.

Operations Just Cause andDesert Shield/Storm have demon-strated that USACAPOC is anoperational command that comple-ments USASFC and the Navy andAir Force special-operations com-

mands within USSOCOM. Whilethe Marine Corps has organic CAelements, and other services havelimited PSYOP capabilities, the CAand PSYOP units of USACAPOCwill be tasked to support all ser-vices during peace or war. Becausepeacetime LIC missions placeheavy reliance upon CA, PSYOPand SF activities and there is limit-ed CA and PSYOP capability in theactive component, the citizen-sol-diers of USACAPOC must be pre-pared to become operational muchquicker than their conventional RCcounterparts. In this regard,USACAPOC represents the “ReadyReserve.”

With the Soviet threat diminish-ing, LIC is emerging as the mostlikely threat to U.S. security inter-ests in the years ahead. Missionsuccess in LIC will depend uponeffective CA and PSYOP activitiesin coordination with other militaryand civilian activities, and the sol-diers of USACAPOC stand ready tolend their unique contributions.

Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Hurteau isthe commander of the U.S. ArmyCivil Affairs and Psychological

Operations Command. His previ-ous assignments include service asthe 1st Special Operations Com-mand’s deputy commanding gener-al for reserve affairs, chief of staffof the 120th Army Reserve Com-mand, Fort Jackson, S.C., andcommander of the 1st SpecialOperations Command Augmenta-tion Detachment at Fort Bragg. A1959 graduate of The Citadel, hehas completed the Infantry OfficerBasic and Advanced Courses, theArmy Command and General StaffCollege and the Army War College.

Maj. Robert D. Hayner, USAR, isthe public affairs officer for theU.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psy-chological Operations Command.Major Hayner has served in a vari-ety of assignments with the 82ndAirborne Division, the North Car-olina National Guard and theArmy Reserve. He holds a bache-lor’s degree from Illinois Benedic-tion College in Lisle, Ill., and amaster’s degree from Webster Uni-versity in St. Louis, Mo. He is agraduate of the Armor OfficerBasic Course, the Combined ArmsOfficer Advanced Course and theArmy Command and General StaffCollege.

Photo by Bob Jordan

Newly mobilized Civil Affairs soldiers conduct a rucksack march as part oftheir validation at Fort Bragg during Operation Desert Storm.

March 1992 17

Our nation’s military mobiliza-tion plans provide for a mix ofunits, some already mobilized (theactive component), some units to bemobilized (the reserve component),and additional units to be generat-ed or created, then mobilized.

Congress has provided the presi-dent with a flexible managementtool to use in an impending emer-gency whereby he can call up to200,000 Selected Reservists (those

in units and certain IndividualMobilization Augmentees) to aug-ment the active force. This authori-ty is intended for use to augmentthe active component in contingen-cies short of partial mobilization orto activate units required inadvance to support a broad-rangemobilization.

There are important differencesbetween partial mobilization andthe selected reserve call-up authori-ty, both written into the law and inthe intent of Congress. Under par-tial mobilization [10 USC 673(a)]the Secretary of Defense (or Secre-tary of Transportation for the CoastGuard) can call up to one millionmembers of the Ready Reserve for aperiod of up to 24 months. Thebiggest difference is that under par-tial mobilization, DoD can not onlycall the members of the SelectedReserve, but can also call membersof the Ready Reserve.

Partial mobilization is neededwhen the duration or size of the

conflict outgrows the authorities ofthe 200K call-up. Looking at possi-ble threats that might remain afterDesert Storm, partial mobilizationmay not be needed again, that is,for up to the entire one million, butmay need to be used only sparinglywhen the requirement for reservistsslips over 200K. Our main concernmust be with the kinds of contin-gencies we will be most likely toface in the future. Of course, largermobilizations must always be ofconcern, to ensure preparationagainst a war that could greatlyendanger our nation and our way oflife.

Mobilization is a process, a con-tinuum. All too often the servicesand our national decision makershave viewed mobilization as anevent, M-Day. The call-up of200,000 Selected Reservists hasbeen thought of as a provocativeescalatory step on the road to war.In most circumstances, a call-up ofthis many reservists would send anextremely strong political signal toour friends, enemies and our popu-lation. The active components haveasserted that early notification ofreservists could lead to a securitybreach. And, a 200K call-up alsocould invoke the “War Powers Act.”

Yet these assumptions are notnecessarily true, and we must real-ize that this “event” mentality isthe antithesis of our national policy of Graduated MobilizationResponse.

GMRDesert Shield served as a crucial

test of GMR, a concept that origi-nated late in the Carter adminis-tration. Most operations plans thenin being were aimed at a large con-ventional war in Europe and wereinappropriate for smaller contin-gencies. Certain individual andbite-sized mobilization actionscould be used as responses andbecome a deterrent, whereas thelarge mobilization actions/events(e.g., declaration of a nationalemergency) envisioned for Europewould be too much and too escalato-

Views expressed in this articleare those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect those of anybranch of the military services.Portions of this article appearedpreviously in the Reserve OfficersAssociation National SecurityReport under the titles “The 200KCall-up: Myth or Reality?” (August1990) and “Graduated Mobiliza-tion Response: Show of Force onthe Arabian Peninsula” (October1990). They are reprinted with permission.

The 200KCall-up:

Just Cause vs. Desert Shield

by Col. Frederick C. Oelrich, USAR

18 Special Warfare

ry. The GMR concept has becomeDoD policy and is now being insti-tutionalized in the services.

GMR covers the waterfront ofpolitical and economic actions aswell as military actions, and duringDesert Shield, President Bush useda coordinated arsenal of political,economic and military actions toshow our national resolve and callIraq’s hand at each turn. GMRdemonstrated the potential formobilization to be used to deteraggression through each step of thecrisis.

Prior to Desert Storm there hadbeen a certain reluctance among theleadership of the active componentin calling the reserve components.That paranoia was probably associ-ated with the national policy againstthe use of the reserves in Vietnam.That past reluctance to usereservists was compounded by con-fusion concerning the 200K call-up.

At an early 1990 (prior to DesertShield) conference of the Armyleadership attended by officialsfrom the Office of the Secretary ofDefense, many of the general offi-cers believed the 200K call-up wasan escalatory event that, if imple-mented, would require all 200,000reservists to be called at once.

A 1989 Joint Chiefs of Staff mobi-lization exercise, “Proud Eagle,”showed similar confusion. Mostthought the 200K call-up was a sce-nario-independent plan with pre-planned, predesignated units, i.e., one list of required units andindividuals reflective of the ColdWar.

As mentioned above, mobilizationmust not be seen as a series of spe-cific manpower events that lead towar. Mobilization must be consid-ered a process, flexible and adap-tive enough to accommodate anylevel or type of threat. The reservecomponents are in being and paidby the taxpayers. It should beexpected by the taxpayers and thereservists that the reserves will beavailable for use in any crisis.

As you read this article, thenation is under a “silent call”: mobi-

lized Air Force reserves are flyingairlift and tanker missions, provid-ing the C-130 airlift and A-7 fightersupport to U.S. Southern Commandand providing half the crews to flyMilitary Airlift Command aircraft.Navy Reservists are flying passen-gers and cargo in C-9s, and CivilAffairs Reservists are on duty inHaitian refugee camps.

An examination of recent mili-tary history shows a contrastbetween operations which followedplans to mobilize reserve compo-nents and those which did not.

Just CauseDuring the “Just Cause” opera-

tion in Panama, Air Reserve compo-nents were used routinely from theonset, by the Defense IntelligenceAgency and the North AmericanAir Defense Command as well asthe Air Force, while the ArmyReserve and Marine Corps Reservecomponents were not. (The Armyalso quietly provided SouthernCommand with about half of theReserve individual mobilizationaugmentees that would augmentSOUTHCOM in wartime.)

Only some Army National Guardmilitary police units which hap-pened to be in Panama for annualtraining and Army Reserve CivilAffairs volunteers who came laterwere allowed to participate. Armyreserve-component full-time-man-ning personnel were not permittedto volunteer.

In planning for the operation, thestaff of the U.S. Army SouthernCommand recognized early theneed for Army Reserve CA units toassist with the re-establishment ofthe civilian government and nationrebuilding. But when the “JustCause” troop list was received atSOUTHCOM just before the opera-tion, it showed no CA units. OnDec. 19, the day before militaryoperations began, SOUTHCOMsent an immediate message to theJCS with an urgent request for asmall call-up of five USAR CAunits. Initial staffing action wasbegun and the Army went so far as

to prepare the orders.The request to call the Reserve

Civil Affairs units was never elevat-ed to the Secretary of Defense. It isnot clear that the political leader-ship knew that they could call onlythe five small non-escalatory units,and the action was not staffed withthe Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Reserve Affairs.

The Army and Joint Staff contin-ued working the action until earlyChristmas Day, when the decisionto use volunteers was made. Final-ly, on Dec. 26, a message was sentto SOUTHCOM approving the useof up to 300 CA volunteers. We allsaw in the news the civil unrestand lack of basic governmental ser-vices caused by the Civil Affairsvoid during the first few days of theoperation.

The Army Reserve was ready torespond, either with units or volun-teers. Before the decision wasreached to use volunteers, a smallmanagement team was establishedto identify and/or process volun-teers. The Army Reserve PersonnelCenter had developed a manage-ment system to rapidly identifyskills needed and order Reserviststo active duty, cutting through theusual red tape. This system — peo-ple and software — worked very,very well.

The SOUTHCOM commanderpraised the performance of theReservists, and the persons doingthe actual processing also per-formed well. Once a problem wasidentified, it was addressed in aprofessional manner; but therewere problems. For example, theNational Guard MPs that stayed onbeyond the annual training periodhad civilian employment problemswhen they got back home: theiremployers were unaccustomed toanything other than a two-weektraining period scheduled far inadvance.

The Army had not previouslyaccomplished a hand-off fromForces Command to the 1st SpecialOperations Command, and thiscaused turf battles. The equipment

March 1992 19

stayed with the FORSCOM unitwhile the individual volunteerswere marshalled at Fort Bragg.

Several Reserve volunteersarrived at Fort Bragg only to besent back home — two after beingordered to active duty, and severalothers with the promise of up to139 days active duty. They mayhave had the wrong skills or wereinsufficiently fluent in Spanish ordetermined to be unqualified foroverseas deployment. (Yet manywho spoke no Spanish at all wereused.)

As many were from the South-east or Southwest, they could havemost efficiently travelled directly toPanama, then returned home. Butthey needed to be processed by andreceive equipment from the 1stSpecial Operations Command.(Those from units individual andunit equipment stayed behind withthe FORSCOM unit. Neither would1st SOCOM accept FORSCOMoverseas-preparedness qualifica-tions.) After processing, they wererequired to wait for transportationto Panama, and the Reservists hada low transportation priority.

Many arrived at Fort Bragg with-

out necessary records. Since theGander, Newfoundland, crash sev-eral years ago, there is confusionabout hand-carrying records, andas shot records were unavailable,they were given all the shotsrequired for the theater; they werealso all given dental panograms.

As they arrived as volunteers,they were issued individual cloth-ing and equipment from FortBragg, and unit equipment itemssuch as vehicles had to be borrowedto accompany the Reservists toPanama.

When they arrived in Panama,there were additional problems.They were billeted all over thePacific side and had to find theirown way to Quarry Heights thefirst several days. The equipmentitems they brought were insuffi-cient, and items like field deskswere improvised or acquired on theeconomy, some at personal expense.

The improvised structure had nounit identification code, so they hadno way to enter into the Army sup-port system. Those that workedwith Panamanian Civil Agencieswere told to bring minimum bag-gage, then found they were re-

quired to wear civilian clothes.They worked in areas where tacti-cal vehicles were inappropriate,and some rented cars.

Another problem was commandand control. The reservists camefrom strategic nation-buildingkinds of Civil Affairs units. Theyworked with an active tactical CivilAffairs battalion, a unit whose mis-sion was only to re-establish gov-ernment, then move on with thecombat troops.

The Army Reserve Civil AffairsTask Force worked for and withinfive different command-and-controlrelationships in the first severalweeks. Then, those that arrivedafter Jan. 31 were informed, afterthe fact, that they would not receivea campaign ribbon. Some of thereturning volunteers expressed areluctance to volunteer again; notbecause of the mission, but becauseof the way they were treated.

They believed that, because theywere volunteers, the active Armyfelt less obligation to support themthan if they had been part of a unitthat had been mobilized. Somemembers of the 358th CA Group,the one used for Grenada, hadexpressed the same reservationsafter their return.

Some in the Army cited theseproblems as reasons not to usereservists in the future. Fortunate-ly, their recommendations were notheeded.

Desert ShieldDesert Shield marked the first

use of the graduated mobilizationresponse and the first-ever use ofthe Presidential 200K call-upauthority. The political reluctanceto call the reserves that had beenpreviously widely espoused simplydid not exist with this Presidentand Secretary of Defense (and prob-ably would not have existed duringJust Cause, either, if the militarycommunity had asked for reserviststo be called.)

Before the operation began, theU.S. Central Command had devel-oped a series of plans for contingen-

Photo by Brian Kappmeyer

Sgt. Maj. Ramon Gonzalez of the 353rd CA Command talks with a residentof a displaced civilian camp during Operation Just Cause.

20 Special Warfare

cies in the Middle East, but itbelieved the war would, most likely,occur in Iran. Although there was aplan in development for the defenseof Saudi Arabia, the Joint Staff wasin the process of developing a seriesof geographic contingency plansincluding requirements for a re-serve call-up unique to that area ofthe globe. However, at the onset ofthe crisis there was no one completelist of reserve units unique to therequirement.

The Joint Staff recognized theneed for reserve units very early onand called in the service plannersto alert them of the impending needfor a call-up and to task them todevelop detailed troop lists. BothFORSCOM and CENTCOMrequested use of the call-up author-ity early in the second week of thecrisis.

At the onset, the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff discussed acall-up with the Secretary of De-fense and the President andreceived concept approval. Actionofficers on the Joint Staff workedon the call-up to determine whenand how many, not if it were to happen.

The plans required modification,and the types of units, then the indi-vidual readiness of units, had to beconsidered. Many of the senior lead-ership, military and civilian, wereunfamiliar with the mobilizationprocess, and others were still orient-ed toward a general mobilization fora large war, not graduated mobiliza-tion response for a contingency.

Some wanted an immediate call-up of a few units that were mostneeded, others thought they wereobligated to work toward the totalof 200,000, and yet others wanted acomplete and completely staffedpackage to announce as an event —all in one shot.

The dimensions that were exam-ined were: how soon were reserveunits needed; how soon they couldbe mobilized; if they were to bedeployed, when would there be apriority to provide them transporta-tion; how many and what types of

units would be needed; and whatunits, by type, would be needed inthe event the crisis broadened.

Flags (unit identification) weredetermined by using first the unitsthat had been identified in CENT-COM’s plans and were of sufficientreadiness. Then other units wereselected on the basis of previouslyplanned missions, active/reservecommand structure, linkages andunit readiness.

Although the following remarksare biased toward the reserves, thatis not to infer the deployments didnot go well, or that deployed unitsdid not do well. Quite the oppositeis true; the mobilization processwent well and GMR worked.

The services adopted the “TotalForce” policy (e.g., integration ofthe reserve components as an inte-gral part of the services’ war plans)at the end of the Vietnam era, butthe Air Force seems to be the onlycomponent to have really integrat-ed regular use of reservists. Use ofAir Force Reserve airlift aircraftand crews has become so routine asto be transparent to the userwhether the mission is active orreserve.

During Desert Shield, beginning

on Aug. 7, 1990, Air Force Reserveand Air National Guard crews hadflown about 35 percent of the Mili-tary Airlift Command strategic mis-sions, with 9,000 volunteers, beforea call-up was enacted. The reserve-component units estimated thatthey could operate for 30 to 45 dayswith volunteers before a call-upwould be necessitated.

The Army has placed many of itssupport units needed for any otherthan the most minor contingency inthe reserve components. This didnot happen as a single event, buthappened over time in congression-ally mandated tooth-to-tail andother restructuring efforts, mostlyfor budget purposes.

With the preoccupation with awar in Europe, mobilization of sup-port troops along with combattroops fit nicely into the reinforce-ment plans. Examples of supportunits required for the contingencyin the Persian Gulf include well-drilling detachments, water-purifi-cation and pipeline units, and unitsneeded for desert survival. Theseunits are found mostly in the ArmyReserve.

The Army troop list for CENT-COM’s plans included the 82nd Air-

Photo by Kit Thompson

An EC-130 from the 193rd Air National Guard, Harrisburg, Pa., practiceselectronic-warfare operations during Operation Desert Storm.

March 1992 21

borne, 101st Airmobile, and 24thMechanized Divisions. The 24thMech. has a “round-out” brigade,the 48th, from the Georgia NationalGuard. (A round-out unit is anArmy National Guard or ArmyReserve unit that is an integralpart of the active parent unit,trains with the active unit and isplanned to fight with its parentunit.)

The Army chose to deploy the197th Infantry Brigade in lieu ofthe 48th. The 197th is the InfantrySchool Brigade and needed manyfillers from elsewhere in the Armyto bring it up to strength with qual-ified individuals to achieve a “readi-ness” level high enough to meetdeployment standards.

There may have been good andcogent reasons not to call the 48thright along with the rest of the24th, but the decision was madeunilaterally without consultationwith or an explanation to theReserve Component leadership.This decision immediately causedsome real problems in the activeand reserve planning communitiesbecause of the seemingly abruptdeparture from the “Total Force”concept. How are we to plan for use of round-out units in futurecontingencies?

There is now discussion in theArmy about calling only company-and battalion-level support units,without their reserve commandstructure. The Army has a programaligning peacetime and wartimecommand structures, the Capstoneprogram, that previously most hadconsidered to be sacrosanct. Thesedecisions not to fully utilize theTotal Force in the Army have par-tially destroyed the relationshipbetween the components as it previ-ously existed. There is also somequestion as to what role Armyreserve components would play incontingencies short of general warin the future.

Overriding the parochialism ofthe Desert Shield crisis should bethe experience and lessons learnedfrom this real mobilization exercise.

We should come away from thiscontingency much better equippedto implement a deterrent strategy,to use deterrent-force packages anddeployment modules and to conductcontingency operations if the deter-rence fails.

Use of ReservesThere are many arguments pro

and con regarding use of thereserves. Many of the political lead-ership have an outmoded stereo-type of the reserve components. Thereserves of today are all volunteers.None are serving to evade the draft.Those opposing the use of reservescite as their reasons: poor readi-ness, lack of political courage toenact a call-up, possible strategicsecurity breaches, and escalatorysignals from mobilization.

Some also strongly believe warshould be left only to professionals.Others on the same side of this coinbelieve that because career militaryfolks are paid fighters, their lives

are somehow less valuable, andthat active forces should always beused up first.

Those favoring reserves say thatreservists are less expensive,remarkably ready in considerationof training time and resourcing,and that they permit citizens tocontribute in a dual status — con-structive community member inpeacetime and trained militarymember in a military emergency. Alarge reserve structure also placesmore of the burden for nationalsecurity on the populace.

Most agree that reserves are oflimited value if they are not to beused. Reserves do have deterrentvalue, but if that is the only pur-pose, they may not be worth theexpense of being maintained at thecurrent high state of readiness.Reserves should be used in contin-gency; to justify the expense to the taxpayer and to assure the via-bility and vitality of the reservesthemselves.

Photo by Bob Jordan

Civil Affairs soldiers from the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Opera-tions Command load onto a C-141 for deployment during Desert Storm.

22 Special Warfare

Gradual use of reserves, begin-ning with volunteers, is the mostsensible approach — and theapproach used in Desert Shield.Although the reserve communitycan argue with the services aboutthe details, the Joint Staff did avery good job of managing the call-up and implementing GMR.

Service differencesDuring “Just Cause” the use of

the Air Force reserve componentswent well because to them it wasroutine. The use of the Armyreserve components did not go aswell.

The reason is twofold: first thereis confusion concerning the use ofreserves, and second, the makeupof the units in the Air Force andNavy reserve components is basi-cally different from that of theArmy and Marine Corps reservecomponents. Because of this differ-ence, the services plan and reactdifferently.

Air Force Reserve and NavalReserve personnel are significantlyolder, and the units have more offi-cers and a higher enlisted rankstructure. They are more equip-ment-intensive, are manned byprior-service persons and can fieldteams or crews to operate theirequipment. They typically areemployed from their home base orport.

For example, an aviation unit cangenerate a crew or crews to operatea portion of their equipment on aregular basis. Many, including thetechnicians, have military leavefrom their employment as well asvacations that permit double payfor up to six weeks a year while onactive duty. This permits many ofthese units and individuals to beemployed.

In contrast, Army Reserve andMarine Corps Reserve units arelabor-intensive, requiring numer-ous low-ranking individuals whomust accomplish interdependent orinterrelated tasks in a coordinatedway to do the mission. These unitstypically deploy to the place of

employment. To say it another way,the privates do the fighting awayfrom home. The Army and MarineCorps reserves must recruit andtrain their personnel at the entrylevel and employ them as a unit.

The Army has not been doingroutine deployments of reservesupport units for operational mis-sions. It does often deploy reserveunits for annual training and dur-ing annual training in support ofexercises. However, it does not usethe same teams or crews and sup-port structure habitually.

Why can the Air Force Reservecomponents be used routinely for operational missions and theArmy reserves cannot? It is becausethe entire personnel mobilizationprocedure is based in the law (10USC, Sections 672 and 673) uponthe phrase, “without the consent of the persons affected (membersconcerned).”

When an entire unit is required,and the Army thinks in units, it iscalled, “without their consent,”because in all likelihood not allwould volunteer. Yet often theneeds for the unit function can bemet with individuals and teams,rather than calling up the unit as awhole. The Air Force approachoperating under the “silent call”facilitates this.

Use of volunteersIn today’s environment some

reservists can volunteer twice, firstto be in a unit, then to accomplishroutine military missions. Thereserve aircrews that fly opera-tional missions in peacetime arevolunteers, and this works verywell, because only the part of theunit that is used gets paid.

The support structure for the per-sonnel comes from the local commu-nity, supported by the local econo-my, rather than an active basefunded from the defense budget.This also works well because theydo it routinely.

When there are enough reservevolunteers with the right skillsavailable for a long-enough time,

we do not need the 200K call-up.The Army and Marine Corps dohave some units that can be used ascrews, teams or individuals. Plansshould be made for, and personsvolunteer for, contingencies beforethey happen.

A linguist unit might be an exam-ple. A nation-building Civil Affairsunit is another example. This typeof call-up is not an escalatory eventand can provide the additional orspecialized personnel needed forsmaller and very flexible responses.

The military, at times, seems toforget that war is an extension ofpolitics. By being so enamored withwar fighting, we have slighted thepolitical dimension. And, mostassuredly, the political dimension inlow-intensity conflict is moreimportant strategically than themilitary dimension. The officialafter-action report for Grenadaended at 72 hours. Now, more than10 years later, we are still sendingCivil Affairs teams to Grenada toassist with nation-building. It maybe that in some contingencies, war-fighting units may not be appropri-ate, where nation-building unitsare.

When entire units are needed, orit appears the requirement will beof a long duration, the 200K call-upcan and should be used incremen-tally, to obtain the units or individ-uals needed, to match the require-ment. There exists a base-case planand the various contingency planswith reserve 200K troop require-ments laid against them.

As the Joint Staff studied andexercised crisis management, itbecame apparent that most proba-bly the events leading up to a crisiswould:• Not happen all at once.• Be different from the assump-

tions in the plan or be at a placewith no written plan.

• Be such as to require modifica-tion of existent plans prior toexecution.Because events cannot be exactly

predicted, mobilization plans mustallow for the maximum flexibility

March 1992 23

and latitude. Current planning isfor generic 200K call-up plans tosupport contingencies in variousparts of the world. There is eventalk of a strategic lift augmentationcall-up plan. For example, any con-tingency in the Pacific will requirelogistics units at air and sea portsalong the west coast and in theobjective area. The same is true forAtlantic contingencies and the eastcoast.

The larger the contingency, themore RC support units; then, as thecrisis moves up the scale and manyAC units are committed, RC combatunits will be called. The concept isto use the deliberate planning pro-cedure and then modify the appro-priate plan at time of execution.This is a common-sense approach.

There is an ongoing action withinthe Department of Defense to rein-stitute the policy of “The first tofight, the first to receive equip-ment.” In the Army the “first tofight” is reflected in the Depart-ment of the Army Master PriorityList. The DAMPL is based on a warin Europe (although it is subject tochange in the near future), as arethe priority systems of the otherservices. It would make far moresense to determine which units arethe most likely to be needed in alow-intensity conflict and equipthem first.

Under the new philosophy of“adaptive planning,” force packagesare being prepared for exerting ameasured military response inanticipation of a crisis, under theumbrella of graduated mobilizationresponse. This response could movesome active forces and, at the sametime, give a political signal that isnot totally escalatory.

The “rapid reaction” force pack-

ages at the lower end of the spec-trum have few or no reservistsother than strategic airlift. And, asthe contingencies become moreintense, more reservists will berequired. There is still reluctanceon the part of the active-componentdecision makers to plan for usingreservists in any crisis short of gen-eral war.

The previous Chief of Staff of theAir Force had asked for plans tosupport contingencies without theuse of the reserve programs thatare routinely working so well now.The Marine Corps observed theArmy problem with calling ReserveCA units to active duty and hasorganized active Marine Corps CivilAffairs units out of the Reserve.The Navy is planning to take mis-sions from the Navy Reserve.

This is a result of the “all or noth-ing” syndrome and contrary to theintent and philosophy of GMR. Inrecent years we have routinelyemployed reserve units and individ-uals, not only to accomplish activesupport missions, but also to pro-vide assistance after HurricaneHugo and the San Francisco andArmenian earthquakes. TheNational Guard is assisting daily inthe war on drugs, hauling waterand providing emergency power tocommunities with utility problems,and standing by, just in case a bigwar occurs.

As the mobilization continuum isexamined, moving from peacetimeto large-scale wars, there are manyopportunities for reservists to beused as volunteers. This provides afar wider range of responses andcapabilities than using only theactive component, and it is free ofany previous paranoia associatedwith the 200K call-up.

We must get on in the aftermathof Desert Storm with an eye to thefuture. A flexible, modular, expand-able, resourced force structure mustbe designed to make the best andmost efficient use of each of thecomponents. Some reserve unitsshould be included in contingencyplanning, taking advantage of thestrengths of some types of reserveunits, and other units must formthe basis of our mobilization poten-tial. Some fixes can be done in-house, others will require legisla-tion, but all will require forward-thinking leadership.

To be used effectively, units orelements required must be identi-fied, trained and, if possible, usedroutinely; so that when it’s time foremergency use, they are ready, andthe parent service is ready to, andaccustomed to, supporting them.

Col. Frederick C. Oelrich, USAR,is currently on active duty, recalledfrom retirement by the Secretary ofthe Army to serve as national coor-dinator for the NATO Reserve Offi-cers Congress, to be held in Wash-inton, D.C. in August 1993. Prior tohis current assignment, he servedon the staff of the National DefenseUniversity. He is on a leave ofabsence from his job as a nationalreadiness officer for the FederalEmergency Management Agency.Colonel Oelrich has served in theArmy reserve components since1956. He has completed numerousmilitary schools and is a 1986graduate of the National War Col-lege. He has earned a Ph.D. fromthe University of Texas and hastaught economics and statistics.

24 Special Warfare

The functional realignmentwhich created the U.S. Army Spe-cial Forces Command on Nov. 27,1990 had significant impact onreserve-component Special Forcesgroups.

With the creation of the U.S.Army Special Forces Command,these reserve-component SpecialForces groups are aligned withtheir active counterparts and areorganized, trained, and have theirreadiness certified and validatedaccording to the same standards.

RC Special Forces groups tracetheir history back to the early yearsof Special Forces. In the early1960s, seven SF groups were acti-vated in the Army Reserve — the2nd, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 17th and24th — and four in the ArmyNational Guard — the 16th, 19th,20th and 21st. Following deactiva-tions in 1966, the Army Reservewas left with the 11th and the 12thand the Army National Guard withthe 19th and the 20th.

These reserve-component unitsmake up about half of the SF man-power and are widespread geo-graphically. The 11th SF Group,headquartered at Fort Meade, Md.,has units in New York, Virginia,

Massachusetts, Georgia, Ohio,North Carolina, New Jersey andFlorida. The 12th SF Group, head-quartered in Arlington Heights, Ill.,has units in Washington, Missouri,Oregon, Texas, Oklahoma and Cali-fornia. The 19th SF Group, head-quartered in Salt Lake City, Utah,has units in Colorado, West Vir-ginia, Rhode Island and Arizona.

The 20th SF Group, headquarteredin Birmingham, Ala., has units inMississippi, Maryland and Florida.

QualificationIn the past, training courses were

different for active and reserve-component SF: The RC SF Qualifi-cation Course was a six-phase pro-gram (at that time, the active pro-gram was three-phases) which com-bined resident training duringannual training periods with train-ing by correspondence course. Qual-ification of RC soldiers took anaverage of six years.

The RC Special Forces Qualifica-tion Course has been phased out.All new Special Forces soldiers gothrough the same Special ForcesQualification Course (now twophases). An individual recruited offthe street for an RC SF group goesto basic training, advanced individ-ual training, airborne school andthe Primary Leadership Develop-ment Course before he comes toFort Bragg for pretraining and Spe-cial Forces Assessment and Selec-tion. (See “SF Pretraining,” pp. 30-31. — Ed.) If he is selected in SFAS,he then attends the SFQC. Sincethe Q-Course now contains the SFBasic NCO Course as well, when

EnsuringReadiness forActive and Reserve-ComponentSF Unitsby Col. Joseph K. Dietrich

U.S. ArmySpecial Forces

Command

1st SpecialForces Group

3rd SFG

5th SFG

7th SFG

10th SFG

11th SpecialForces Group

12th SFG

19th SpecialForces Group

20th SFG

112th SignalBattalion

528th SupportBattalion

(C)

Command

L E G E N D N O T E S

1.The 11th and 12th Special Forces Groupsare U.S. Army Reserve.

U.S. Army Special Forces Command

2.The 19th and 20th Special Forces Groupsare U.S. Army National Guard.

Coordination(C)

March 1992 25

the soldier graduates from theSFQC and reports to his unit, hewill also be a BNCOC graduate.This allows the unit commander toconcentrate on sustainment andunit training instead of having toworry about continued MOS train-ing for RC SFQC graduates.

Command and controlBefore the creation of USASFC,

the 11th and 12th SF Groupsreported directly to the 97th and86th Army Reserve Commands,respectively. The ARCOMS, in turn,reported through First Army andFourth Army, respectively, to ArmyForces Command. The 19th and20th SF Groups, since they areNational Guard, reported to theirstate adjutants general and theNational Guard Bureau.

With the new organization, the11th and 12 Groups are under thecommand and control of the SFCommand. The 19th and 20thGroups still report to the stateadjutants general and the NationalGuard Bureau; USASFC has train-ing oversight.

Certification and ValidationThe USASFC certification and

validation program, instituted bythe command’s first commander,Maj. Gen. James A. Guest, isdesigned to ensure that SF soldiersin reserve-component units main-tain the same standards of trainingand readiness as the active-dutyunits. Despite having full-timecivilian occupations, RC soldiersmust make the time to stay physi-cally fit and perform additionaltraining in excess of the days forwhich they are reimbursed. Thesesoldiers are ready to leave theircivilian jobs and their families toperform the same challengingassignments as their counterpartson active duty. Therefore, they mustmeet the same standards.

The strength of Special Forceshas always been the A-detachment.It is the same in the RC SpecialForces. By being trained well andtrained to standards, RC SF sol-

Certification and Validation ProgramStandardizes SF Unit Training

One of the first missions for the new Army Special Forces Commandwas to see that all SF units are trained to the same standards.

The command initiated the Certification and Validation Program tostandardize unit readiness, but certification and validation are onlypart of the program, according to Maj. Bob Chadwick of the USASFCTraining and Evaluation Branch. The unit commander, whether activeor reserve-component, certifies that his troops are ready. Evaluatorsfrom the SF Command verify, by evaluating the unit’s performance,that the unit meets SF Command’s standards. The real purpose of theprogram, Chadwick said, is training. Evaluators report deficiencies inunit performance so that the unit can retrain to correct them.

Certification and Validation is organized into phases, and the heartof the program is what SF Command calls the “Intensive TrainingCycle,” ITC, or the green phase. ITC is composed of six segments, orgates, Chadwick said. Each of these gates emphasizes a different kindof training, and by the time a unit’s soldiers have passed all six gates,they should be fully prepared to perform their missions:

• Gate 1: Battle-focused analysis — soldiers learn to assess themission and their ability to accomplish it.

• Gate 2: Individual skills — weapons training, land navigation,32K rucksack march, swim test, SF common and MOS-specifictraining.

• Gate 3: Collective combat skills (infantry-related) — day andnight live-fire, raid, defense, move-to-contact and attack.

• Gate 4: Mission preparation and rehearsal, including infiltrationand exfiltration.

• Gate 5: Field training exercise: soldiers apply training in a fieldenvironment.

• Gate 6: After-action review.

ITC can be performed at a number of locations: Fort Bragg, a unit’shome station, or on a deployment for training, Chadwick said.

The second, or amber phase, is a deployment phase in which unitsput their skills to use in joint exercises or exercises at combat trainingcenters such as the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee,Ark., or the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif. The thirdphase, red, is a support phase and is for active units only, Chadwicksaid.

The training and deployment phases are the same for all units,whether active or reserve-component, Chadwick said. The difference isin the length of time units have to complete them. Active units have90 days for ITC; reserve units, since they train during monthly drillperiods and annual training, have two years. For the same reason,active units have 90 days for the deployment phase, and reserve unitshave one year. Active units also have 90 days for the support phase —they will therefore begin a new training cycle every nine months;reserve units begin the cycle every three years.

26 Special Warfare

diers and operational detachmentsgive USASFC the capability totask-organize for special missionsby drawing on the wealth of civilian job expertise in the reservecomponents.

Desert StormOn Jan. 23, 1991, the 20th SFGA

was activated in support of Opera-tion Desert Storm — the first timethat an RC SF group had beencalled to active duty. A number ofother RC Special Forces soldierseagerly volunteered to serve duringthe operation. Twenty-six SFmedics from the USAR were calledto active duty and served with dis-tinction in the Kuwaiti theater ofoperations as members of the 5thSF Group. Following Desert Storm,about 40 members of the 20thGroup, mostly engineers, linguistsand medics, went to Turkey forOperation Provide Comfort, theKurdish relief effort. Fourteen ofthe USAR SF medics also served inOperation Provide Comfort withthe 10th SF Group, following their

redeployment from Saudi Arabia.The future will likely see an

increased participation of RC SF inworldwide missions. USASFC,through streamlined command andcontrol, verified combat readinessand standardized training, will helpto maximize the effectiveness ofthis valuable asset which can play avital part in achieving U.S. objec-tives worldwide.

Col. Joseph K. Dietrich is cur-rently assigned to the U.S. SpecialOperations Command as theSenior USAR Adviser. His previousassignments include SeniorReserve Component Coordinatorfor the U.S. Army Special ForcesCommand, Senior USAR Adviserfor the U.S. Army Special ForcesCommand, Chief of Staff of theReserve Special Operations Groupand Senior USAR Adviser to theJFK Special Warfare Center andSchool. A 1966 graduate of theSpecial Forces Officer Qualifica-tion Course, he served with the 1st

SF Group as commander of an A -detachment and a B-detachment,and with the 5th SF Group in Viet-nam as an A-detachment comman-der and as commander of a mobile-strike-force battalion.

March 1992 27

On the evening of Jan. 31, 1991,around 11:30, Col. Stewart Micheli-ni was asleep when the phone rang.It was a phone call that wouldmake history and entail an awe-some burden for the officer who wasresponsible for more than 1,400National Guardsmen activated tosupport Operation Desert Storm.

Michelini is the commander ofthe 20th Special Forces Group, aNational Guard unit headquarteredin Birmingham, Ala. The 20th’s SFsoldiers were called to Fort Braggfor a train-up period and possibledirect involvement in the PersianGulf war. It was the first time inhistory that any reserve-componentSpecial Forces group had beencalled to active duty by the Presi-dent of the United States for a wareffort. The activation would proveto be a learning experience for boththe 20th Group and its regular-Army counterparts.

After the mobilization ordercame, the 20th Group staff setabout the task of alerting all groupmembers through the unit pre-planned call-up system. The citi-zen-soldiers received their march-ing orders, and the 1,400-man unit,spread out over the states of Alaba-

ma, Mississippi, Florida and Mary-land, began packing for mobiliza-tion and movement to Fort Braggon Feb. 23.

Despite the massive nature of themove, “We moved all of our peopleand 250 pallets of equipment with-out incident and got here on time,”Michelini said. The move left noth-ing in the 20th’s armories. “Theywere stripped of everything becausewe expected to be on active duty fora year. One of the things thathelped us was that we’ve done awhole lot of overseas deployments,so packing everything up and mov-ing is not a strange thing to us.”

“After being here (Fort Bragg) foronly three days we were set up andoperational,” said Michelini. “But itlooked like we’d been here formonths. One of the reasons the mo-bilization was so successful is be-cause of the help we received fromSpecial Forces Command. When wecame on line we were treated likeany other SF Group.”

Another thing for the 20th to beproud of is its performance duringmobilization process, Michelinisaid. Generally, an activatedreserve-component unit loses 8-10percent of its personnel during in-

processing because of physical dis-qualification. At that rate, the 20th,with 1,400 soldiers, stood to lose asmany as 140 soldiers. It lost onlyseven.

Although the war in the PersianGulf ended only days after 20thGroup’s arrival at Fort Bragg, theconflict’s end was not the signal tosend the newly federalized troopshome. There would still be anintense train-up period of certifica-tion and validation that was al-ready scheduled had the war con-tinued or not. Certification and val-idation is a program to ensure thatSF soldiers can still perform indi-vidual common skills learned during the Special Forces Qualifica-tion Course and that whole ele-ments of a group — A-detachments,B-detachments, forward operationalbases, and Special Forces opera-tional bases — function integrallytoward their overall mission.

“When we look at the trainingprocess, we’ve certified every ele-ment in 20th Group — three FOBs,nine B-teams, and 42 A-teams,”said the group’s deputy command-ing officer, Lt. Col. Travis Guthrie.“We did this in an intensified train-ing cycle, validating three battal-ions in about a 45-day cycle, where-as the active (SF) components certi-fy one battalion in 90 days. I thinkthat speaks for itself.”

Because of the opportunity to cer-tify and validate the entire groupduring the deployment, Michelinisaid, the 20th is three years aheadof the “power curve” in its trainingschedule.

“I think prior to our coming herethere were some doubts as towhether we could take our groupand transform it into a viableforce,” Guthrie said.

“There is certainly better rapportwith Special Forces Command,”said Guthrie. “I think that everyoneat SF Command was surprised byour professionalism and the spiritwith which we performed. It’s a realtribute to the dedication of ourmen. They have to do a lot of train-ing on their own time.

Federalization:20th SF Groupbecomes first RC SFunit to be activated

by Sgt. Scott D. Hallford

28 Special Warfare

“It’s also important to understandthat the standards in SF, reserve-component or active, are greaterthan the rest of the Army,” Guthriesaid. “All of our people have to fire expert with both the rifle andpistol.”

During individual certifyingtasks, 100 percent of the group’ssoldiers completed the 20-mile, 55-pound rucksack march in the eight-hour time limit. This included one56-year-old A-team member andanother, a police officer in his civil-ian profession, who was recoveringfrom a gunshot wound which hereceived to the leg six months earli-er. In other individual testing, the20th’s success rate was between 96and 100 percent.

Not only did 20th Group learn agreat deal, but so did the 7th SFGroup’s 2nd Battalion, which wasprimarily responsible for overseeingthe training of the Guardsmen.

Guard and Reserve units oftencontain a large number of combatveterans, In the 20th many of themare also former active SF. Furtherbroadening the scope of knowledgein Guard and Reserve units thatcan be used in military planningand operations are the professions

of these citizen-soldiers.“There was tremendous cross-

fertilization of ideas,” according toMaj. Steve Causey, 2/7th operationsofficer. “Being the Army’s newestbranch (SF) and not having specificdoctrine, there are challenges.There’s no manual that says ‘do itthis way.’ A lot of these guys in 20thhave a lot of good experience. Sud-denly, you see lots of good ways todo things. Training with 20thGroup has been a very enlighteningexperience.”

Most of 20th Group left FortBragg May 17 and demobilizedfrom federal duty May 23. But be-fore leaving Fort Bragg, the groupheld a demobilization ceremony atPike Field, including a pass-in-review by an entire Special Forcesgroup, a rarity because of the verynature of their mission: they maybe broken up in deployments allover the world at any given time.

But while most members of theunit looked forward to demobiliza-tion, some of the Guardsmen decid-ed to become full-time soldiers.Guthrie said he fully expected tolose some people to the active sideof the house. “We have some verysharp men in our unit and I’m sure

the active Army would like to havethem, but I’m also sure we’ll seethem again. Eventually, we’ll getthem back and they’ll be better SFsoldiers.”

The Special Forces community,active and reserve, will be able touse what has been learned fromthis mobilization as a buildingblock on which to base the next pos-sible activation of the 20th Groupor another RC Special Forces unit.

Michelini said that he is veryproud and pleased with the stan-dards which the 20th Group hasmet, and although the group wasdeactivated, he is sure that it willbe called again when needed.

Capt. Paul Roberts, A Co., 2/7thSF Group, said that relative toother RC units their same size,“20th Group shone like a star.” And7th Group’s Causey said, “Theyhave met the training standardsand could be employed in any oper-ational area of the world.”

Sgt. Scott D. Hallford is a mem-ber of B Company, 1st Battalion,20th SF Group, based in Mobile,Ala. A veteran of 12 years’ servicein the reserve components, he hasspent all his time in either the 11thor 20th SF Groups. In his civilianoccupation, Sergeant Hallford is astaff writer for the base newspaperat the Pensacola Naval Air Station.

Courtesy Soldiers magazine

An SF NCO performs a jumpmaster’s pre-inspection prior to an airborneoperation during the 20th Group’s certification and validation.

March 1992 29

In 1989, the Special Warfare Cen-ter and School and the ArmyNational Guard began a new train-ing program that has doubled thesuccess rate of reserve-componentsoldiers in Special Forces Assess-ment and Selection.

The two-week Special Forces pre-training program allows students toreview basic land-navigation skills,learn rucksack marching and swim-ming techniques, teach classes,practice rope climbing and developa proper attitude for Special Forcesthrough extensive contact with Spe-cial Forces cadre role models.

Pretraining also briefly definesthe role of Special Forces andreviews basic soldier skills such asoperations orders and first aid.Since physical conditioning is keyto successful Special Forces train-ing, pretraining attempts toimprove the soldier’s fitness levelby demonstrating proper tech-niques. It is not designed to get asoldier into physical condition: thishas to be done by the soldier sever-al weeks prior to pretraining.

From a cursory observation, theconcept of pretraining is very sim-ple. In actuality, the establishmentof a viable program required

detailed planning, coordination andexecution. The concept of the pre-sent Special Forces pretraining pro-gram originated with the NationalGuard Bureau in July 1986.Reserve components were confront-ed with a high attrition rate in Spe-cial Forces training: During fiscalyears 1986, 1987 and 1988, reservesoldiers averaged a 65-percentattrition rate. Depending on MOSand rank, the attrition rate rangedfrom about 50 percent for officers to80 percent for initial-entry enlistedsoldiers. In some cases, such as 18D(medical sergeant) initial-entry sol-diers, the attrition rate ran about85 percent. Overall, less than 35percent of reserve-component Spe-cial Forces candidates were success-fully completing Special Forcestraining.

The immediate question to beanswered was: Could this highattrition rate be overcome orreduced? The problem had to bedefined before any remedies couldbe suggested, and to detail specificreasons for student course losses,the entire Special Forces trainingprogram had to be analyzed todetermine where the losses wereoccurring.

The four major sections of SpecialForces training at that time were:Special Forces Assessment andSelection; Qualification CoursePhase 1 (basic skills), Phase 2(MOS-specialty training), andPhase 3 (field-training exercise).(As of Oct. 1, 1990, the SpecialForces Qualification Course wasrealigned as follows: Phase 1 [CMF-18 MOS] — 16 weeks, and Phase 2[SF Branch] — eight weeks.) Eacharea had training losses. In SFAS,losses were due to weaknesses inswimming, attitude, rucksackmarching, rope climbing and gener-al physical conditioning. InPhase 1, the principle causes ofattrition were weak land-naviga-tion and tactical skills. In Phase 2,especially in medical training, themajority of losses were due to lackof self-confidence and academic pro-ficiency. In Phase 3, the primarycause of attrition was lack of team-work, cooperation and leadership.

The best way to overcome attri-tion seemed to be to offer a programwhich would teach, coach andimprove the skills necessary forstudents to complete Special Forcestraining. Courses already beingconducted provided most of theseskills: the Primary LeadershipDevelopment Course, Infantry one-station unit training and the Spe-cial Forces Qualification Course,Phase 1. Using these courses as abasis, the Special Warfare Centerand School and the National GuardBureau developed a program ofinstruction. Other approaches, suchas having students teach classes,showing military movies, coun-selling students in-depth, and usingSpecial Forces instructors as rolemodels, were also included. Train-ing subjects and scheduling werecrucial because pretraining wouldimmediately precede SFAS andcould not wear students down phys-ically. Pretraining’s emphasis,therefore, had to be on attitude, notphysical fitness.

Having a course-of-instructionproposal, pretraining neededinstructors, students, facilities and

SPECIALFORCESPRETRAINING

by Lt. Col. George Rollins

30 Special Warfare

oversight. The latter two were pro-vided by the proponent of SpecialForces, the SWCS. Pretraining atthe SWCS would benefit from directinput by Special Forces subject-matter experts and development ofa good Special Forces’ attitude inthe students. The first two areas,instructors and students, were tocome from reserve-component SFgroups. The National Guard offeredits one, full-time, 12-man SpecialForces detachment as instructors.This detachment, assigned to the19th Special Forces Group in Utah,had to come to Fort Bragg on a reg-ular basis, both for initial coordina-tion of resources and to conduct theclasses. During the January-August1989 period, SWCS and the 19thGroup coordinated training areas,classrooms, billets, messing andequipment; rehearsed and certifiedinstructors; and forecast studentprojections.

In September 1989, pretrainingwas ready for execution. The firstformal course was held in Novem-ber 1989 for 53 students. Of thesesoldiers, 35 were ineligible for Spe-cial Forces training: Six were weakswimmers, 23 had no SpecialForces physicals, and six neededwaivers. After pretraining, all 53soldiers entered SFAS. When SFASconcluded three weeks later, 39 of

these 53 were selected — 75 per-cent. This high success rate contin-ued through fiscal year 1990. Forthe first year, pretraining soldiershad a 72-percent selection rate inSFAS.

For its first two years, most of SFPretraining’s students came fromthe reserve components. DesertShield/Storm changed that. Duringthat period, most active-duty candi-dates for Special Forces trainingwere deployed to the Middle East.To fill the resulting void in SpecialForces training, the Army beganrecruiting personnel who hadrecently left the military — throughthe 18X prior-service program.Since most of them needed refresh-er training, all 18X personnel beganattending SF Pretraining.

Near the end of Desert Storm,the 20th SF Group activated, andabout 250 of its soldiers went topretraining as well. In all, duringDesert Shield/Storm, pretrainingprepared more than 600 active andNational Guard personnel to attendSpecial Forces Assessment andSelection.

Pretraining, in combination withthe Primary Leadership Develop-ment Course, has greatly improvedreserve-component success in Spe-cial Forces training. To allow suc-cessive attendance, the schedules of

airborne, PLDC, pretraining, SFASand SFQC are aligned. This pro-vides reserve-component soldiersthe opportunity to complete alltheir Special Forces training in oneextended period.

In summary, the purpose of pre-training is to teach and coach theskills necessary to complete SpecialForces training. The fundamentalpremise is that Special Forcesinstructors will be role modelswhom candidates will want to emu-late. Pretraining that is properlyconceived, planned and executedcan produce the required results: ahigher selection rate, without sacri-ficing the overall quality of trainingor lowering standards.

Lt. Col. George A. Rollins is theArmy National Guard Adviser tothe Special Warfare Center andSchool. He is a Special Forces-qualified aviator with severalyears’ experience in both active andNational Guard forces. ColonelRollins holds a bachelor’s degreefrom the U.S. Military Academy atWest Point, master’s degrees fromthe Naval War College and CentralMichigan University, and is a can-didate for a master’s degree in gov-ernment from Harvard University.

March 1992 31

Oklahoma’s Thunderbird patch ofWWII fame has found new distinc-tion in the realm of special opera-tions. Now the mark of the Ok-lahoma Army National Guard’s 1-245th Aviation Battalion, it is thesymbol of one of the most special-ized helicopter units possible fortoday’s modern warfare.

Officially known as the 1st Bat-talion, 245th Aviation (SpecialOperations) (Airborne), the unithad its beginning in 1978 as afledgling unit of 50 people, threeUH-1M attack and two OH-58 lightobservation helicopters. With thefailure of “Desert One” to freehostages in Iran in 1980, the Armyrapidly accelerated its efforts todevelop a skilled, well-equippedreserve-component special-opera-tions aviation unit. The new unitwould augment the active compo-nent’s ability to conduct indepen-dent SOF operations. The Armyand the National Guard Bureauselected Oklahoma to become the

home base, and the 1-245th wasselected as the basis of the newunit.

Year-round trainingBy 1981, year-round annual-

training periods for the 1-245th hadbecome commonplace. Teams of air-craft, crews and support personnelflew to various locations across theU.S. to support SOF training andoperations. Often several teamsdeployed to different locations atthe same time, testing thebattalion’s ability to maintain con-trol and effective logistical andadministrative support of its assets.Night-vision-goggle training wastop priority. Long-range deploy-ments during darkness were madeon a continuing basis to remoteairstrips and confined landingzones. For more distant operations,battalion aircraft were ferried,along with other Army and AirForce special-operations units, inAir Force C-130 transports. Train-

ing and development continued,and by 1985, the battalion’s missionhad been refined to air support ofSOF missions.

In February 1985, under the Cap-stone program, which aligns peace-time and wartime command struc-tures, the battalion was Capstonealigned with the 1st Special Opera-tions Command (now Army SpecialOperations Command) at FortBragg, N.C. Since then, this special-operations aviation battalion hasgrown to more than 380 skilled per-sonnel. Their specialties range fromaircrewmen, aircraft and ground-vehicle mechanics, flight opera-tions, intelligence, administrativeand supply specialists to airborne-qualified forward-area-refueling-point operators.

In September 1991 the battalionreorganized and now consists ofHeadquarters and Headquarters

Original owl artwork by RebeccaBond, used with permission.

32 Special Warfare

TheLORDSDARKNESSof

TheLORDSDARKNESSof

TheLORDSDARKNESSof

TheLORDSDARKNESSof

Oklahoma’s 1/245th Aviation BattalionOklahoma’s 1/245th Aviation Battalion

by SSgt. Gregg Bond

Company; Company A, with allUH-60 Blackhawks; Companies Band C, with UH-1H Hueys; andCompany D for aviation intermedi-ate maintenance. The ArmyNational Guard Bureau is also con-sidering adding an Oklahoma spe-cial-operations aviation companyattached to the 1-245th, whichwould add C-23B fixed-wing capa-bilities for support of SOF.

The unit takes pride in its abilityto sustain short or long-range oper-ations worldwide. Pilots are pre-pared to fly over land or at sea,night or day, in support of special-operations forces, whether SpecialForces, Rangers, or other special-ized units.

Night-vision flightsThe battalion’s pilots frequently

fly after dark, wearing night-visiongoggles, in order to deliver orretrieve special-operations cargo.Their missions and training requireflying in all conditions, enduringtemperature extremes, high windsand reduced visibility. Their spe-cialty is flying nap-of-the-earth mis-sions in virtually all types of ter-

rain, including plains, desert ormountainous regions. Such exact-ing conditions require the utmost inskill from every battalion member,from the pilot to the maintenanceand support soldiers at home base.

As of this writing, the 1-245th’spilots, some of whom have formerlyflown for the Army, Navy, Air Forceand Marine Corps, have flownapproximately 296,000 hours, anaverage of 2,200 hours apiece. In1989, they flew more than 7,550hours in support of SOF, in varioustraining exercises, and for NVGand mission qualification. In 1990,

the battalion pilots flew more than8,750 hours to support specializedmissions in the U.S. and OCONUS.

Altogether, the 1-245th has flownthousands of hours under night-vision-goggle conditions, and unitmembers refer to themselves as“the Lords of Darkness.” Pilots havean average of approximately 170hours of NVG time — those withthree or more years’ experienceaverage more than 350 hours ofNVG time, and most instructor-pilots have flown from 600 to 700NVG hours. The battalion’s high-time NVG pilot has logged morethan 1,000 hours.

Two facilitiesAs the 1-245th has grown in size,

its bases of operations and itsequipment have grown as well.Currently, the unit has 37 aircraftlocated at Oklahoma’s two U.S.Army aviation-support facilities,AASF-Tulsa and AASF-Lexington,about 100 miles apart.

The newer AASF is at Tulsa,where a $7-million complex wasdedicated Aug. 26, 1989. The 50-acre site is located east of the TulsaInternational Airport and housesthe battalion’s Headquarters andHeadquarters Company, CompanyA, Company C and Company D. Itfeatures a two-story NationalGuard armory, a combined aviation-intermediate-maintenance-levelaircraft hangar and flight-opera-tions center, and a new organiza-tional-maintenance-shop building.A 2,000-foot autorotation runway

Photo by Dennis Lee Barlow

Two crews from the 1/245th sharpen their night-flying skills under thelight of a full moon.

The Army Aviation Support Facility nearTulsa features a two-storyarmory, an aircraft hangarand a flight-operations center.

Photo courtesy 1/245th Aviation

March 1992 33

and helicopter parking rampsaccommodate the battalion’s Tulsa-based special-ops aircraft.

The other complex is located nearLexington, Okla. It was establishedin 1975 and is the home of Compa-ny B. In addition to its armory,flight ops, aircraft-maintenancefacility and special fire-fighting andcrash-rescue complex, this base alsohouses the battalion’s aviation med-ical center.

Between these two AASF com-plexes, the Oklahoma pilots andcrews maintain and man the battal-ion’s UH-1H lift helicopters andUH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. Fiftypilots are based at AASF-Tulsa and50 at AASF-Lexington. Company Ain Tulsa has recently undergoneaircraft redistribution and now hasits full complement of 15 special-ops-equipped Blackhawks. Compa-ny B in Lexington is planning andcurrently training for its scheduledreplacement fleet of 16 MH-47EChinook helicopters, scheduled to

arrive during fiscal year 1993. In an article in the Oklahoma

National Guard’s January 1991 OnGuard, Col. Leroy Wall, commander

of Oklahoma’s Troop Command(Aviation), described the MH-47Eas specially designed for medium-range special-operations missions.“This helicopter is capable of higherspeeds, longer range, air-to-air refu-eling, and is better armed and has alarger troop capacity then the UH-1s we are presently using,” Wallsaid. He added that the Chinookswill have state-of-the-art avionicsand night-vision capabilities.

Drug interdictionIn tune with the times, the

1-245th is trained, equipped andexperienced to meet the growingdemands of the nation’s war ondrugs.

Several pilots and crews havealready flown special missions insupport of drug-interdiction opera-tions in Oklahoma and the desertSouthwest. In these missions, thebattalion’s ability to work closelywith civilian law-enforcement, fed-eral agencies and joint militaryforces has been successfully triedand tested.

Personnel profileThe average “Lord of Darkness”

is 28 years old. A large percentageof the veteran NCOs and officers

An MH-60Blackhawk

from the1/245th

slingloads a steel tower

during trainingat Fort Chaffee,

Ark., in 1988.

Photo courtesy 1/245th Aviation

Soldiers of the 1/245th prepare for M-16 weapons qualification.

Photo courtesy 1/245th Aviation

34 Special Warfare

have served either one or two toursin Vietnam, Korea or Germany,either in aviation or ground combatunits.

At both the Tulsa and Lexingtonfacilities, a combined force of nearly150 full-time Army guardsmenserves in command or staff posi-tions, maintenance support orinstructor-pilot roles. On the aver-age, members of the battalion servethe equivalent of 75 or more dayson active military duty each year.Aviators, selected crewmen, staffofficers, NCOs and airborne person-nel, however, spend an average of122 days each year on active duty.Simply stated, these citizen-soldiersspend more than one-third of theirtime wearing the uniform, ready tosupport active, National Guard orArmy Reserve special-operationsforces.

Their duty normally includesannual-training periods, key-per-sonnel upgrade programs, basicmission qualification and special-ized programs such as the ArmySurvival, Evasion, Resistance andEscape Course. The latter is con-ducted at the Special Warfare Cen-ter and School and in Oklahoma bySWCS mobile training teams. Pilotsand crews also receive U.S. Navytraining in carrier-landing qualifi-cation and underwater egress —using the Navy’s 9D-5 helo/dunkerdevice, crew members learn to sur-vive water crashes and to escapefrom their craft underwater.

Despite being in excess of 100-percent strength every year since1984, the battalion keeps makingroom for more. Noted for its lowturnover rate, the 1-245th is currently at 100 percent of itsauthorized strength and could easi-ly increase its manpower ifrequired.

In 1987, the Army Aviation Asso-ciation of America named the 1-245th the outstanding ArmyNational Guard aviation unit of theyear for FY 86. The unit’s superbsafety record in light of the typeand nature of its specialized forcescontinues to honor the high level of

competency and know-how of itsmembers.

Exercise supportThe long list of SOF units with

which the 1-245th has trained is anindication of its stature and experi-ence level. The battalion hasdeployed, trained or served withactive- and reserve-componentArmy special-operations forces onsuch exercises and operations asCasino Gambit 86 in Puerto Rico;Cabanas 86 in Honduras; LabelVista II and III at Fort Huachuca,Ariz.; Erawan 87 in Thailand; Lem-pira 87-4 and 88 in Honduras;Operation Balikatan in the Philip-pines; maintenance trainingthroughout the U.S. and atSchofield Barracks, Hawaii; Opera-tion Jaguar Bite at Fort Campbell,Ky., and Operation Larkspur Boun-ty 89 at Camp Williams, Utah.

Nearly 100 members of the1/245th supported the 19th SFGroup in June 1990 during “GoldenStar,” a 17-day exercise in Alaskainvolving close to 1,100 NationalGuard members from severalstates. Flying Alaska’s UH-1 Hueysduring the exercise, the Oklahomaaviators inserted Special Forcesteams into various areas whenthose teams couldn’t parachute in.Helicopters were equipped withspecial landing skids to keep themfrom sinking into marshy areaswhen they landed troops.

The true measure of the 1/245th

still rests with the future. If Okla-homa’s proud past and its heritageare typical of what to expect downthe road, then the men of the 1stBattalion, 245th Aviation, “TheLords of Darkness,” will continue tobe rated highly among those unitsand special-operations forces whosepurpose in life is stated on the 1-245th’s regimental crest: “Not forourselves alone.”

SSgt. Gregg Bond is the formersenior intelligence NCO for the 1-245th Aviation. A veteran of 12years active military service, heserved two tours in Vietnam as acombat helicopter pilot andinfantry officer. A native Okla-homan, he joined the OklahomaNational Guard in March 1987,after 17 years of service separation.

Pilots and crewsof the 1/245thprepare for a“dunk” in thehelo/dunkerdevice duringtheir Navy training phase.

Photo courtesy 1/245th Aviation

March 1992 35

With the future of warfare direct-ed more and more toward low-intensity conflict, the need for Spe-cial Forces personnel will continueto grow, and with half the SF forcein the reserve components, it is notinconceivable that future SF opera-tions might contain a mixture of ACand RC soldiers.

The active-component SpecialForces commander who finds him-self in charge of RC SF soldiersmay be uncertain what their capa-bilities are and how best to employthem. He may have had little or noexposure to Army Reserve andNational Guard SF personnel. Hemay wonder whether he has beensaddled with a mob of overweight,overage and under-trained “week-end warriors” or instead beenblessed with an operational detach-ment possessing abilities and skillsnot found in his own unit.

The RC SF soldier must meet thesame standards and complete thesame training as an active-compo-nent SF soldier; however, the RCsoldier is somewhat different innature.1 An SF leader, when com-manding RC personnel, must learn

to recognize and understand thesedifferences in order to use this typeof soldier to the best advantage.

Positive aspectsMany RC SF soldiers, as a result

of their civilian occupations, pos-sess skills not found in active-com-ponent SF detachments. All detach-ment operations sergeants havecompleted the Operations andIntelligence Course, but how manyare also master electricians? Howmany detachment commandershold multi-engine and instrumentratings as pilots? How often will thedetachment medic be a registerednurse who works at the hospitalemergency room and is also a pro-fessional artist?

By surveying the RC SF soldiersunder his control, the SF comman-der may find that he has doctors,lawyers, firemen, police officers,computer engineers, railroad work-ers, telephone-company techniciansand their combined knowledgeavailable for his use.

The skills of the soldiers citedabove are all applicable to the dif-ferent SF missions. During a recent

Army Training and Evaluation Pro-gram exercise, the engineer ser-geant for a National Guard opera-tional detachment cited in his por-tion of the briefback highly techni-cal target data and displayed a fa-miliarity with civilian communica-tions equipment to which SF engi-neers are not normally exposed.

The senior AC evaluator ques-tioned the sergeant’s description ofthe interior of a building in whichthe sergeant had never been andhis ability to identify pieces ofequipment that would have to bedamaged or destroyed in order todisable a communications relaysite.

The evaluator learned that twodetachment members were em-ployed by a telephone company astechnicians and that a third soldier,normally employed as a computer-systems engineer, knew how to disrupt the relay site’s controlequipment.

An NCO who works with complexequipment on a daily basis doesn’trequire additional training in orderto render it inoperable. A soldierwho is a general contractor in hiscivilian occupation can plan andbuild a complex structure, while anactive-component engineer wouldlikely require some form of assis-tance. These “extra” skills enablethe SF commander to accept, planand complete missions withoutrequests for additional training orextra personnel.

A particular strength of RC SFlies in the extended periods of timethat individual soldiers serve to-gether on a detachment or at leastwithin the same company. It is notunusual to find detachments inwhich soldiers have been togetherfor 4-5 years. Although all militaryunits experience some turnovereach year, the number of soldierslost to extended schools, post com-mitments, promotions and dis-charges is much lower in RC SFunits. This durability results in RCdetachments with long-term work-ing relationships and greater mis-sion proficiency.

TheReserveComponentSpecial ForcesSoldierAn Asset withSpecial Capabilities

by Capt. Michael A. O’Brien

36 Special Warfare

SF commanders will also find awealth of military experience at thesoldier level in the RC detachment.Enlisted SF personnel often spendseveral years in the same positionon a detachment. The stabilitywithin the detachment produces asoldier who has worked in his MOSfor many years instead of the 2-3years sometimes encountered onAC SF detachments.

This stability is due to severalfactors: The RC SF soldier is usual-ly well-settled in the civilian com-munity. A soldier who remains atthe same job for several years islikely to maintain his Reserve orNational Guard association for thesame period of time. The paycheckthat the RC SF soldier receives forhis military duty also becomes astabilizing influence as the yearspass.

RC SF officers, many of whomhave served as SF-qualified enlist-ed men, often remain in place asdetachment commanders for a simi-lar 4-5-year period. In a survey ofone SF company in the 20th SFGroup, the commanding officer, theexecutive officer and three of thesix detachment commanders hadall served as enlisted men, with allbut one having been SF-qualifiedprior to commissioning. Junior offi-cers still serve as detachment exec-utive officers in RC units when spe-cial-operations technicians are notassigned.

Finally, many RC SF officers andNCOs stay with their units becauseit is an SF unit. Promotion andopportunity may be available else-where, but as the RC unit is nottheir primary source of income,many soldiers can do somethingthey enjoy in lieu of searching forincreased income.

This depth of experience gainedover years can be compared to theshorter but more intense opera-tional and training experiencefound in the active components.Typically RC SF soldiers havetrained or operated with the civil-ian or military personnel of five orsix countries. During the period

1987 through 1989, personnel fromthe same 20th Group SF companydescribed earlier operated in fivecountries and instructed militarypersonnel of three nations at loca-tions in the United States.

Two of the most important quali-ties an SF soldier can have arematurity and the ability to interactfavorably with persons of other cul-tures. These qualities are nottaught; they are the result of age,life experience and education. TheRC SF soldier is typically a littleolder than his AC counterpart. Hiscivilian employment often involvessupervision of others and results inthe ability to get others to do whathe wishes them to do. The RC sol-dier’s education level is often higherthan his counterpart on an ACdetachment as the result of havinghad more time to pursue education-al goals. Typically NCOs in RC SFunits have more than two years ofcollege.

Negative aspectsAlthough the characteristics of

RC units as described above pre-sent many advantages to the com-mander, that commander must alsobe aware of the negative aspectsinherent in RC SF units. Thesemust be recognized and plannedfor; however, they do not presentlong-term problems.

The SF commander will find thatRC SF soldiers are in good physicalcondition. Most personnel in a typi-cal RC SF company engage in aphysical-fitness program on theirown, as they recognize that condi-tioning cannot be maintained bytraining only during drill periods.Instead, physical training during aunit assembly (drill weekend)serves as a tool for monitoring thefitness of company personnel. A sol-dier who cannot handle weekendactivities is counseled and retestedthe following month.

Although the RC SF soldier isserious about his physical condi-tion, any off-duty physical-condi-tioning program must be juggledwith civilian employment. While

there may be a good number ofexceptions to the rule, a full-timejob does not usually allow for ruck-sack marches every week. The workschedule which allows for physicalconditioning each day is not oftenfound in the civilian work place.

The RC SF soldier may also belimited in his exposure to certaintypes of training. The trainingavailable to a RC SF unit is, for themost part, dependent on the loca-tion of the unit. A unit situated inone of the western mountainousstates will have a great deal oftraining in mountain operations.Ocean-type water operations andtropical weather training will likelybe limited to one or two times peryear.

As a function of the unit’s loca-tion, the RC SF unit may haveaccess to a military reservation thatcan provide specific types of train-ing facilities. Units close to anArmy post with a MOUT trainingfacility will have more of an oppor-tunity to train in that aspect ofwarfare than units which musttravel long distances to reach thefacility or who are forced to makedo with what is available locally.

On an individual level, it is verydifficult for most RC SF soldiers toattend schools that are severalweeks in length. Although thedesire to go to the school is present,the ability to attend without affect-ing civilian job responsibilities orthe family finances is not. Mostemployers are not enthusiasticabout losing what may be a keyemployee for several weeks at atime. Many RC personnel take apay cut when they are on activeduty, and the loss to the familybank account must be taken intoconsideration.

The SF commander, however,should not assume that the trainingexperienced by the RC SF soldier islimited to two days a month andthe traditional two weeks in thesummer. In most RC SF units, the39 training days per year is a thingof the past; the RC SF soldierserves extra training days, attends

March 1992 37

additional short-term schools andfulfills operational commitmentssuch as drug-interdiction missions.

Finally, the RC SF soldier maynot have the same equipment thathis AC counterparts possess. Many,if not all, RC SF groups still main-tain the M16A1 and the M1911A1as the issue weapons, while the ACSF groups are using the M16A2and the 9mm Beretta. This does notmean, however, that RC SF areequipped with obsolete items. Gore-Tex clothing has been issued inmany groups, communicationsequipment is the same as found inthe AC units, and equipment suchas the new outboard motors andZodiac inflatable water craft are on-hand and being used in training.

The SF commander, when con-trolling RC SF detachments, doesnot have to anticipate re-equippingthe RC detachment. He does, how-ever, need to be aware of the differ-ences that exist in the equipmentassigned to these units and plan forlogistical problems.

Although there has been a vigor-ous debate over the years as to

whether or not RC SF units couldsurvive in the special-operationsenvironment, or whether RC unitsshould exist at all, those issues arenow becoming moot.

Reserve-component SF personnel,both as members of detachmentsand as individuals, have repeatedlyparticipated in both CONUS andOCONUS special-operations exer-cises, mobile training teams, civic-action missions, humanitarian pro-jects, the certification and valida-tion process and drug-interdictionmissions.

Currently only 50 percent of allSF are on active-duty status. Withthe complete manning of the 3rd SFGroup, that percentage will growonly to approximately 55 percent.The RC SF soldier is and will be apart of the special-operations com-munity for the foreseeable future.As demands on SF personnelincrease in the future, the AC SFcommander, whether he prefers toor not, will likely be involved withRC SF soldiers. It is imperativethat both active-duty commandersand individual SF soldiers under-

stand and appreciate this assetwith special capabilities.

Capt. Michael A. O’Brien is cur-rently an SF detachment comman-der in B Co., 3rd Battalion, 20thSF Group. He has also served as adetachment executive officer and asa weapons NCO in the 3/20thGroup and spent six years on activeduty with the U.S. Marine Corps.In his civilian occupation, CaptainO’Brien is chief of the economiccrimes unit in the Office of theFlorida State Attorney in Orlando,Fla. He is a graduate of theInfantry Officer Advanced Courseand holds BA and JD degrees fromFlorida State University.

Notes:1 Although an understanding of the RC

SF soldier would appear to be important inthese days of the Total Force policy, theauthor is aware of only one commentary onthis area. See Hans Halberstadt, GreenBerets: Unconventional Warriors (Novato,Cal.: Presidio Press, 1988), pp. 27-30.

38 Special Warfare

In the Army’s 1967 Field Manual31-23, Stability Operations - U.S.Army Doctrine, internal defensewas defined as “the full range ofmeasures taken by a governmentand its allies to free and protect itssociety from subversion, lawless-ness, and insurgency.”

Today, foreign internal defense isdefined in Joint Pub 1-02 as “partic-ipation by civilian and militaryagencies of a government in any ofthe action programs taken byanother government to free andprotect its society from subversion,lawlessness, and insurgency.”

Conceptually, little has changedin more than two decades. Today’sdoctrine remains essentially thesame as that prevailing at theheight of the Vietnam war. Howev-er, FID today is not the same as itwas 20 years ago. The definitionhasn’t changed, but the world has,and the mission has. The Cold Waris over. Zealous, knee-jerk anti-com-munism is no longer in vogue.Obsessive anti-communism hassuddenly become anachronistic.

As we enter the last decade of the20th century, FID will no longeremphasize efforts to establish gov-ernments ideologically opposed to

communism, but instead willencourage constructive programsemphasizing the building of viable,progressive and responsible govern-ments capable of providing for theirpeople’s needs in today’s interde-pendent global community.

Changing roleThe U.S. role in FID will range

from the less-likely unilateral sup-port for a friendly government to amuch more likely multinationalcoalition to assist a nation in takingits place in an emerging worldorder considerably more diverseand actually more challenging thanthe bipolar world we have known.While superpower confrontationappears unlikely, subversion, insur-rection, rebellion, insurgency andrevolution are sure to occur inmany areas of the world. For a widevariety of reasons, established gov-ernments will continue to be threat-ened by forces striving to overthrowand replace them.

Some reasons for rebellion arejust; others are not. Human-rightsabuses, lack of social mobility,unjust economic conditions, ethnicor religious discrimination, andgovernmental unresponsiveness or

basic incompetence are amongarguably justifiable reasons forrebellion when no other avenue forchange is available. Our own Decla-ration of Independence eloquentlyaffirms “the right of the people toalter or to abolish” an unjust gov-ernment. Moreover, that revereddeclaration of 1776 asserts that “itis their Right, it is their Duty, tothrow off such Government, and toprovide new Guards for their futureSecurity.”

However, it is obvious that not allrebellions against constituted gov-ernments are just. Some are under-taken by ethnic, political or socialgroups seeking dominance for theirown parochial interests. Frequently,legitimate governments are threat-ened and challenged by violentgroups characterized by an unwill-ingness to recognize fundamentalhuman rights and democratic prin-ciples. Legitimate governments ded-icated to the interests of their citi-zenry must provide the secure envi-ronment necessary for economic,social and political progress. It willbe to assist these deserving govern-ments under challenge that the U.S.military will be called on to executeits FID mission.

Foreign internal defense is a leg-islated and primary mission for theU.S. Special Operations Command.It is most timely for USSOCOM toexamine thoroughly and identifyspecifically its proper role in theaccomplishment of FID missions inachieving U.S. national objectives.FID requires a multi-agency coordi-nated effort in the pursuit of eco-nomic, social, political and militaryobjectives. FID is not a purely mili-tary mission, for it is undertakenfor broader economic, social andpolitical goals. Accordingly, the mil-itary will not be the lead agency inthe national effort, but it will besubordinate to and in support of thelarger political purpose.

RequirementsThe FID mission requires a high-

ly skilled military force — one withsignificantly more skills than those

FIDin the

by Terry Doherty

90s

March 1992 39

traditionally associated with themilitary. Political skills are critical.Fundamental is regional knowl-edge, including a firm appreciationof historical, political, cultural andsocio-economic realities. SuccessfulFID operations require stronginterpersonal skills demonstratedby an ability to work effectivelywith people from diverse back-grounds, both U.S. and foreign. FIDskills include not only understand-ing the operational region but alsohaving the ability to work withallies in a multicultural arena, fre-quently without U.S. hegemony.

An important consideration forfuture FID is the likelihood that theU.S. military may not be the lead-ing foreign element supporting acountry needing assistance. Just asthe military is in a subordinate roleto the political in FID, the U.S.itself may serve in a subordinaterole as part of a multinational enti-ty, quite possibly under a non-U.S.commander. Such a role will bemuch more challenging for U.S. mil-itary leaders, requiring them togain respect, authority and influ-ence through competence, diploma-cy and professionalism rather than

by simply assuming command.The FID mission will continue to

stress developing indigenous capa-bilities so that threatened countriesbecome able to solve their ownproblems and promote legitimate,responsible, good governments. FIDefforts will be geared to resistthreats from both the left and theright.

As in the past, FID missions willbe undertaken in many ThirdWorld areas which have faced tur-moil during most of the 20th centu-ry. However, FID will now be possi-ble in areas heretofore never envi-sioned, such as Eastern Europe andeven sections of the Soviet Union.Such an effort with our erstwhileadversaries will indeed attest to atruly new world order. Moreover,the example and experience ofUnited Nations action against Iraqmay be a harbinger of a new inter-national order where the most com-mon and probable application ofmilitary force will be to thwartoppression in its many and variedforms. This may sound somewhatutopian and quite foolishly opti-mistic, but FID may well make avaluable contribution to the ulti-

mate well-being of mankind and toa benevolent and peaceful worldorder.

SOF responsibilityBecause of the unique character-

istics of special-operations forceswhich make them especially appro-priate for FID, USSOCOM mustplay a prominent role in FID plan-ning and operations. Not only doSOF have a specifically assignedFID responsibility, but their lan-guage skills, area orientation andcapability for independent actionmake them ideally suited for theFID mission. USSOCOM thereforecan be expected to provide theregional commanders-in-chief withthe expertise they need to accom-plish their varied FID missions.Moreover, as there will be consider-ably fewer U.S. personnel deployedoverseas than before, the CINCswill be required to look to USSO-COM for the specialized skills andtalent essential for successful FIDoperations.

The FID mission will not call fora large number of people, but onlythose people with the appropriateskills are likely to be successful.Although FID will involve forcesother than SOF, the uniquecharacteristics of USSOCOM makeit most capable of assuming theoverall responsibility for preparingand providing the force to accom-plish the FID mission. USSOCOMtherefore must ensure that militarypersonnel assigned FID responsibil-ities are prepared to operate onboth a unilateral and a multina-tional basis. Moreover, USSOCOM,in coordination with the theaterCINCs, must develop an effectiveanalytical capability both to identi-fy potential FID environments andto assess existing FID operations.

Training for FIDIn preparing the force for FID,

the key factor is the establishmentand conduct of appropriate special-ized training for FID. FID educa-tion must aim at promoting a mind-set which sees opportunity for the

Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

A Special Forces NCO instructs Salvadoran soldiers in basic techniques ofmarksmanship. In addition to strong military skills, soldiers must haveregional knowledge and interpersonal skills to be successful in FID.

40 Special Warfare

military to contribute to the devel-opment of a peaceful world orderand to influence the world for thebetterment of mankind. This maybe somewhat grandiose, but FIDindeed emphasizes the non-combataspects of military operations insupport of economic and socialdevelopment. Perhaps the most ide-alistic vision of the FID soldier isthe image of the traditional westernmovie cowboy — a do-gooder readyto confront and overcome evil inorder to make life safe and prosper-ous for the innocent farmer, rancheror city dweller. Essentially, the goalof FID is to establish an honest andresourceful local sheriff who canform a posse to safeguard the inter-ests of the citizenry.

USSOCOM must establish prima-cy in training for FID. It can buildupon the current FID/IDAD Courseat the JFK Special Warfare Centerand School and stress the psycho-logical, economic, political, intercul-tural and military aspects of FID.Specialized training for FID mustaddress intelligence, psychologicaloperations, civil-military operations,economic development, counterin-surgency, interagency cooperation,U.S. foreign policy, regional studies,international relations and security

assistance. A joint center for FIDstudies may be appropriate to edu-cate military, both U.S. and foreign,and civilian students from U.S. gov-ernmental agencies and depart-ments involved in FID. Certainly, ifFID is a major U.S. military missionand an important foreign-policyactivity, it follows that thorough,effective and suitable training forFID is essential.

As USSOCOM develops compe-tent, qualified personnel for FID, itshould establish a personnel pro-gram to retain and refine such ex-pertise by providing alternate as-signments in the region and at US-SOCOM. This would be most advan-tageous in providing both CINCs —the regional and USSOCOM — withqualified, trained, well-educatedand experienced personnel.

As the international arenachanges from a bipolar superpowerenvironment into a more balancedinterdependent global entity, it isappropriate that the role of the U.S.in FID be examined. The benefits ofFID for the U.S. are numerous.Intangible benefits such as in-creased U.S. prestige, good will, andinternational understanding andtrust are worth pursuing. Moreimportant, however, are the

strengthening of U.S. security andeconomic alliances and the encour-agement of a global political stabili-ty which makes conflict or war lessprobable. In this post-Cold War era,such lofty goals for FID are notmerely fanciful, for the opportunityto foster a just, humanitarian andprogressive new world order is real.

Terry Doherty is currentlyassigned to the SWCS Directorateof Evaluation and Standardizationas a social scientist; he is the for-mer chief of the SWCS Low-intensi-ty Conflict Branch. A retired Armyofficer, he served in a variety ofactive-duty assignments whichincluded duty as a militaryattaché, serving as director of threeseparate departments at the JFKCenter, advisory and commandtours in South Vietnam and serviceas assistant professor of militaryscience at Fordham University. Hehas earned a BA from ProvidenceCollege, an MA in political sciencefrom Villanova University and amaster of technology for interna-tional development from NorthCarolina State University.

March 1992 41

uesday, July 26,1977, was asultry summer day at West Point.The Most Holy Trinity Chapel wasfilled with family and friends whohad come to pay their last respectsto Col. Eleazar “Lee” Parmly.

Lee and Marie Parmly had beenmarried at Holy Trinity after hisgraduation from the Military Acad-emy in 1946, but Marie was con-spicuously absent from the funeralmass — she lay hospitalized inGeorgia with broken legs and ribsand facial lacerations incurred inthe automobile accident that hadtaken Lee’s life. They had beentraveling from St. Augustine toKansas City for a religious confer-ence when their van struck a trac-tor-trailer near Tifton, Ga.

Still, the mass was celebrated by10 priests, the five Parmly children,four grandchildren, family andArmy friends and a contingent ofSpecial Forces soldiers. At the fami-ly’s request, it was a joyful occasion,with no cause for grief. Friends and

family gathered to discuss theirmemories of Lee Parmly — of thetimes when he returned to theAcademy, and of other memories ofthe man over the many years.

Eleazar Parmly is a name out ofhistory. Lee’s great-grandfather, thefirst Eleazar, had been president ofDartmouth College. Eleazar IIIgraduated from West Point in 1924and served 23 years in the fieldartillery. Lee’s brother Tut Parmlyalso chose field artillery after hegraduated from the Military Acade-my in 1950. Lee’s choice in 1946was infantry and airborne — nosurprise, for he had been an out-standing cross-country runner andmiler on the track team.

After graduation, Lee hadreturned to West Point for twoassignments: from 1961 to 1964 asa member of the Tactical Depart-ment and from 1972 to 1975 asTreasurer of the Academy. As amember of the Tactical Depart-ment, Lee Parmly was one of the

institution’s more colorful charac-ters, affectionately known through-out the Corps of Cadets as “RangerMajor Parmly.” Although sworn tosecrecy concerning a year’s missionwith the CIA in Laos, he was a visi-ble and outspoken proponent of theSpecial Forces.

At that time, the status of SpecialForces had been enhanced by Presi-dent John F. Kennedy, who came toWest Point to address the graduat-ing class of 1962. In that speechKennedy described a new kind ofwar differing from the nuclearstrategy so prominent in the late1950s. He talked of “war by am-bush instead of by combat, by infil-tration instead of aggression.” Hemade a plea for the Special Forces,and sitting in the field house,Parmly was elated. He was in hiselement, where young leaders forwar would be schooled. He was, ashe thought, in the right place at theright time. Little did he suspectthat of that 600-man graduating

TheCrusade of

A Green Beret

Eleazar Parmly IV in Southeast Asia

by Richard L. Gruenther and David W. Parmly

42 Special Warfare

T

class, 439 would serve in Vietnamand 19 would die there.

Twin loyaltiesThe account of Lee Parmly’s own

service in Southeast Asia is both acharacter study and a lesson in his-tory and tactics. Lee Parmly was aSpecial Forces soldier whose back-ground and combat experience haddeveloped warrior tendencies; hewas also a deeply religious manwith respect for human dignity andmisgivings about the Americanpresence in Southeast Asia. Thesetwin loyalties haunted him duringhis time in Southeast Asia andafterward.

It is rare for a soldier in combatto find time, or to possess the talentand energy, to record what goes onaround him. It is fortunate that LeeParmly’s exploits have come tolight, supported by three accountsthat he prepared without the slight-est thought that people might comeupon them after his death. One is atape prepared in 1977 at therequest of a sixth-grade class inAmerican history in Morehead, Ky.,of which his niece, Carolyn West,was a member. The students senttheir request for the tape alongwith eight questions for the colonelto answer.

A second source is a letter to hiswife dated Nov. 12, 1966, writtenjust after his return from the PleiTrap Valley operation during theVietnam War. Finally, we can resortto notations from his diaries toshow the sources of Lee’s faith andthe reasons for his being an officer.In Lee Parmly’s case, his diariessaid what he meant — he wrote theentries in ink, with scarcely astrike-over. In them one can see theagony and the judgment of a manwho loved life and adored theChurch and knew the meaning ofdeath.

In the tape he prepared for thehistory class, Parmly summarizedhis service in Southeast Asia:1

I served three tours in the Armyin Southeast Asia and I’m able tocomment as a witness on three of

the stages of our nation’s involve-ment in the efforts of the interven-tion by communists to spread con-trol over Southeast Asia. My firsttour was from 1955 to 1958. I wasin Thailand with the Joint UnitedStates Advisory Group. There Iobserved and participated in thecombined efforts ... to confront thecommunist-directed nationalistictakeovers of the three protocolnations of the former French colonyof Indochina — Laos, Cambodiaand Vietnam. I traveled to Cambo-dia and Vietnam and also to HongKong, to the Philippines andBurma, and to India, those threeyears that I was in Thailand. ...

My second tour in SoutheastAsia began two years later in 1960and went for a little over a year, to1961. I was on a secret mission toLaos. I was used as an adviser onanti-guerrilla warfare on the Unit-ed States Military Advisory Teamin Laos.

Eventually I became the mainadviser for the commander of theLaotian Army units which formeda counter-revolutionary force ...against the Neutralists of Kong Lewho overthrew the government inAugust of 1960. The Pathet-LaoCommunists assisted CaptainKong Le and his coup d’état infighting against the Royalists ofGeneral Phoumi Nosavan, andthen eventually the CommunistPathet-Lao absorbed Captain KongLe’s Neutralist party into the Com-munist party. ...

LaosLee Parmly’s combat experience

in Laos deserves further explana-tion. When he arrived in Laos inthe summer of 1960 (for what hecalls a “secret mission to Laos”), allLaotian operations were done withadvice and support of U.S. SpecialForces advisers who were incognito.They were all “civilians” — placedon the retired list, paid by CIA andnot the U.S. Army, because the Gen-eva Agreement prohibited Ameri-can military personnel in Laos. Thequasi-military organization set up

to accommodate the phantom U.S.presence in Laos was known as thePrograms Evaluation Office.

As a Special Forces volunteer inthis early experiment, Parmly wasan important field operator. He wasadvising and seeking to organizethe lethargic forces of the RoyalLaotian Army just as North Viet-namese and Russians were advis-ing the opposing Pathet-Lao. Ac-cording to a 1961 article in Timemagazine, “unmarked U.S. trans-port planes loosed red and whiteparachutes that floated down thesupplies of war: ammunition, cloth-ing and food. Only a few milesaway, across the canyon or a hill,Russian Ilyushins bounced ontorough turf runways bearing how-itzers, mortars, assault guns andcommunist technicians to manthem. Among all the crises aroundthe world, only in remote andrugged northern Laos were commu-nists and anti-communists armieslined up for war.”2

The countercoup to recaptureVientiane from Kong Lee was anevent to which Parmly was a wit-ness — more than that, a partici-pant. As Shelby Stanton describesthe battle:

“On 9 August 1960 Captain KongLee, the commander of the crack774-man Battaillon de Parachut-iste posted to the mud flats outsideVientiane after hard fighting on theSam Neua front, staged a coupd’état while most Laotian govern-mental officials and military lead-ers were in Luang Prabang. ... Thecountercoup advance toward Vien-tiane started on 25 November 1960,spearheaded by Special Forces offi-cers and sergeants with the forwardunits. General Phoumi Nosavan’sGroupement Mobile I (roughly equi-valent to a brigade) fought throughheavy resistance, stormed acrossthe Ca Dinh river, and recapturedthe town of Pak Sane. On 13 De-cember 1960 Special Forces soldiersjumped into the critical crossroadsof Ban Tha Deua (just south ofVientiane) with the 1st and 3rdBattaillons de Parachutiste and

March 1992 43

pushed aside light opposition. Twodays later Vientiane was surround-ed. The battle for the capital began,during which the U.S. embassy washit by artillery fire and burned out.The capital fell after sharp rear-guard fighting on 17 December1960, and a new Laotian govern-ment was declared by the victors.”3

Parmly’s diary contains a dailyaccounting of these early stages ofAmerican involvement in Laos. Thefirst half of his tour (April-October,1960) was devoted to training theRoyal Laotian Army. Stanton ex-plains the situation as follows: “Be-fore Gen. Phoumi Nosavan couldget moving, some of his line troopswere trounced by tough Kong Leparatroopers led by Pathet-Laocommanders. Col. Albert Brown-field (Deputy Chief of ProgramEvaluation Office) located in Sa-vannakhet, and Parmly’s superior,decided to invigorate the counter-coup command with the rebelMAAG (Military Assistance Adviso-ry Group) Special Forces team.Finally released from all tripartitetraining restrictions, the SpecialForces enjoyed a new freedom ofaction as operational advisorsinstead of as technical trainers.”4

Parmly showed this change in hisdiary for Oct. 20: “Told I’m to takeIspen Team (James Ispen was incommand of an eight-man SpecialForces field training team) fromPakse to Thakhet to run Boun LeutOperation. Terrific-fabulous.” Brig-adier General Boun Leut was theLaotian field commander. His im-mediate subordinate was a ColonelSunthorn. Parmly at last was aboutto realize his ambition to engage incombat. Three days later his diaryreports: “Inspected training anddefensive positions in Thakhet. Notvery aggressive attitudes — hope Ican go in to change all.”

The importance of the operationis indicated in the Oct. 24 diaryentry: “arrive ball park at 1125 - toCP (Thakhet) Phoumi (GeneralPhoumi Nosavan, commander ofthe Laotian Army) came in heliocourier — long discussion and

aggressive pep talk.” Parmly need-ed no such encouragement, forsince commissioning at West Pointhe had waited for the moment athand.

The next large operation forPhoumi’s Groupement Mobile I wasto cross the Ca Dinh River andrecapture Pak Sane. For this opera-tion Parmly was not only an opera-tional adviser but also the principalplanner. His diary of Nov. 1 reports,“To church 0515 - closed still - saton steps - began rosary - finishedinside. No 0600 Mass - said prayerstil 0630 - Mass and communionthen. Breakfast. Then to Hq to dis-cuss atk plans with BL (GeneralBoun Leut) - vague - wait on Phou-mi. Back - wrote Plan X, Phase I &II for Pak Sane.” Reference to theearly-morning service is typical.His diary reports church atten-dance each day when he was not inthe field.

Once heavy fighting began inNovember 1960, there are frequentdiary references to casualties.Parmly liked the Laotian people.Since he had an aircraft availablemuch of the time and was an opera-tional adviser rather than a com-mander, he would frequently shut-tle the wounded to the rear.

The Dec. 2 diary reports: “Wound-ed from 5th Co & Recon Plat at B.Phouey - six - Lt. Suntanu, reconldr concussion, one shot in foot(self-inflicted wound), one in head,one in left shoulder, one in face.Helped Ronald who extractedshrapnel from shoulder fixed Ltand foot cases and sewed rt cheekof other. Candles and lots of blood.Very good sew-up by Doc.”

Parmly to be sure, was an aggres-sive soldier. Baptism of fire hadreinforced his confidence — some-thing that training alone can neveraccomplish. Even his Special Forcesfriends considered him at times “toogung-ho.” But his supervisor, Col.Brownfield in Savannakhet, had adifferent viewpoint. Parmly’s diaryof Feb. 18 reports: “Brownfield sayswe were close to cashiering inDecember—Saved by Parmly and

Sunthorn (Laotian commander).”The final stage of Parmly’s com-

bat in Laos was an attack towardLuang Prabang. Friendly Laotianforces came under intense fire onJan. 10, when the diary reports:“Enemy 120 mortar fire in on ourposition - fire 1/2 hour - all aroundbut not on us or artillery - w/in 300yards - stuff going in and out rightoverhead. Parmly real cool.” Againon Jan. 29 the diary contains a par-ticularly descriptive action: “Upearly - forward with LT In Pangslow cautious going around tortu-ous curves and w/bulldozer remov-ing obstacles. Excellent work. Camearound one bend, enemy openedwith machine guns - all hit bankand returned fire for 15 minutesrecoilless rifles and mortars. Goodreaction - envelop - drove enemy off - continue on - one really roughmess of trees only 15 minutes tomove. During lunch heard blasting -found terrific landslide in face ofsteep cliff. Infantry 1 km. beyond.Slept between jeep and cliff.Artillery in and some out all day.”

From November 1960 until mid-February 1961, Parmly’s diary con-tains an endless array of such com-bat vignettes. After Kong Le forceshad escaped into the Plaine desJarres, Parmly returned to head-quarters at Savannakhet to reporthis experiences before departure forhome.

VietnamAbout this time President Ken-

nedy approved use of Special Forcesas trainers and advisers to SouthVietnam. With three years in Thai-land and service in Laos, Parmlywas prepared for important work —training and organizing the SouthVietnamese special forces — whicheventually brought him back toSoutheast Asia. The tape describeshis next experience:

My third tour in Southeast Asiawas from August 1966 to August1967, when I was in Vietnam ascommander of several UnitedStates-forces units fighting againstthe Vietnamese guerrillas as well

44 Special Warfare

as the regulars of the North Viet-namese Army. My tour in Vietnamwas limited to the northern two-thirds, but I was all over thatmajor portion of the country.

My U.S. soldiers — there wereabout 400 of them — advised and led over 40 battalions of irreg-ular soldiers, who were more capa-ble than guerrillas but certainlyless capable than professional sol-diers. ... We organized andequipped them ourselves and weused them to wage war on theenemy from three dozen separateand very, very isolated and fortifiedcamps. They were strategicallylocated in the country of SouthVietnam, either in the mountainsor the jungles that were controlledby the enemy... We also placed thecamps along the border, provoca-tively located astride the mainroutes of infiltration for the NorthVietnamese coming across the bor-ders from Cambodia, from Laosand from the DMZ in the north. Wealso located some of our camps invalleys and in places that weremain avenues of attack by the com-munists if they were to try to hitany of the major cities in the north-

ern part of Vietnam.My area covered 17 provinces.

Our Special Forces and CivilianIrregular Defense Group battalionsand their camps — there were threedozen of them — were workingclosely all the time with the SouthVietnamese Army, the local units ofthe South Vietnamese DefenseForces, and with the United StatesArmy and Marine Corps when theyconducted campaigns or establishedbases that were within the opera-tional areas of my responsibility.

At this point, having set out thelocales of his service in SoutheastAsia, Parmly reflected on what hewas up against.

Those are my three tours. Threeyears in the last half of the 1950sin Thailand, one year in the firstpart of the 1960s in Laos, and oneyear toward the middle part of the60s in Vietnam. And I saw variousaspects of the developing war inThailand, the early efforts of thecommunists to stir up discontentamong the Chinese and otherminority populations in Thailand,or among the people who live in themountains away from the controlof the main government in the

cities, and trying to incite them toside with the communists and over-throw the legitimate governmentsin Thailand.

In Laos the communists weremuch more aggressive, they weremuch more organized and were ledby a former Laotian prince (PrinceSouphanouvong) who had becomea communist. His Laotian soldiers,called the Pathet-Lao, had beentrained in southern China andwere being advised by Vietnameseand Russians as they foughtagainst the Royalists whom I wasadvising. This was a much moreelaborate war, much more elabo-rate than the insurgency going onin Thailand.

When I got into Vietnam themain-force units of the North Viet-namese Army, assisted by the irreg-ular Viet Cong soldiers, were carry-ing on a major war against thestanding army of South Vietnam ...greatly assisted by, almost domi-nated by, the U.S. forces and sever-al other allies’ — the Koreans, theThais, the Australians primarily —units in Vietnam.

On the tape, Parmly explainedwhy he became involved in the war.

I was actively in the war in 1960and 1961 in Laos, and in 1966-1967 in Vietnam because I volun-teered for that duty. Since I was aprofessional soldier in the UnitedStates Army it was my belief thatmy sole reason for being employedwas to train American citizens intobecoming good, competent soldiersduring peacetime periods and thento lead those soldiers and officersin battle whenever we were at war.Many Americans were drafted andsent to the war zone in Vietnamwhen our presidents agreed tomove Army, Marine, Navy and AirForce units from the United Statesto Southeast Asia.

And here came a surprisinglyfrank admission.

I was not in favor of those deci-sions. Of course, they didn’t askme. I didn’t agree with thembecause I agreed with the advice ofGeneral of the Army Douglas Mac-

Photo courtesy Eugene Deatrick

West Point classmates Lt. Col. Bill Simpson, Lt. Col. Eugene Deatrick andLt. Col. Lee Parmly pose together following the Plei Trap battle.

March 1992 45

Arthur when he said that the U.S.should never again allow itself tobecome involved directly in a regu-lar land war in either Eastern orSoutheast Asia. He knew firsthand,from years of experience, the abso-lutely impossible terrain that wewould have to contend with on thestrange battlefields where our menwould have to fight at a tremen-dous disadvantage against peoplewho were at home on that terrain.He knew firsthand the climatic andhealth conditions of Southeast Asiathat would debilitate and psycho-logically depress U.S. soldiers, andhe knew firsthand the cultural,philosophical, religious and politi-cal beliefs of the Asiatics, so differ-ent from ours. ...

I volunteered to serve as a profes-sional soldier in Southeast Asia ina United States unit that was com-posed only of volunteer professionalsoldiers. That was the Special

Forces, as some people call it, theGreen Berets. I was offered somevery juicy desk jobs in Saigon andsome very attractive command jobsin United States brigades in Viet-nam, but I turned them downbecause I sensed the conflict that Iwould experience within myself if Ihad to order or lead United Statesmen who had been drafted andordered by blind politicians andgenerals to fight in a war thatthose draftees didn’t believe in(and) that I could not, in con-science, convince them they shouldbelieve in.

I went into the war because Iwanted to. That was a very selfishdecision on my part, because mywife and our children did not wantme to volunteer. But I felt obligedto make good on the commitmentthat I made on the first of July in1943 when I joined the Army andraised my hand in an oath “to serve

the Constitution of the UnitedStates against all enemies, foreignand domestic.” And I felt obliged toutilize the skills that I had beentaught as a professional soldierand was being paid by the taxpay-ers to use, when they called me. It’sjust like a fireman who doesn’t liketo see someone’s house burn down.He doesn’t want to get burned him-self or exposed to death fightingthat fire, but, nevertheless, he is awilling and even an anxious volun-teer to join in putting out the fire.

Plei TrapLee Parmly may have had second

thoughts about volunteering forthat tour in Vietnam when he andhis small task force of Montagnardstrikers became heavily engagedwith superior North Vietnameseregular forces during the Plei TrapValley operation in November 1966.

Parmly arrived in the highlandsin August, 1966 as commander ofCo. B, 5th Special Forces Group atPleiku, about the time that leadelements of the 4th Infantry Divi-sion, commanded by Maj. Gen.Arthur S. Collins, were arrivingfrom Fort Lewis, Wash.

The 4th Division was stillunblooded when Operation PaulRevere IV was being planned as thefirst operation controlled by thedivision in Vietnam.5 Radio inter-cepts indicated that several NorthVietnamese regiments had crossedthe border from Cambodia andwere in the mountains north of PleiDjerang, north of Duc Co, but near-er Pleiku and farther from the bor-der.6 Parmly’s Montagnards wouldsupport the Division’s 2nd Brigade.

As Shelby Stanton describes it,“Parmly was horrified at their (the4th Division’s) first battle plan toinsert Task Force Prong (named forColonel Prong, the Vietnamesecommander of Kontum Special Mil-itary District) between two divi-sional battalions ‘on an axis ofadvance by phase lines.’ He imme-diately requested that the CIDG besimply employed moving along theCambodian border, so he could con-

Lee Parmlytalks with Brig.

Gen. GlennWalker on the

morning of Nov.10, 1966, the

day of the PleiTrap operation.Parmly’s black

pajama shirtcame from thepack of a dead

NVA soldier.

46 Special Warfare

Photo courtesy Parmly family

trol them with reference to a fixedarea boundary. The division relent-ed, and Task Force Prong was air-mobiled to (landing zone) Lane onthe morning of Nov. 8, 1966,already secured by a company ofthe 2nd battalion, 8th Infantry.”7

Parmly discusses the situation inhis tape to the sixth-grade class.

We had been operating for aboutthree days on the Ho Chi MinhTrail, which was located just onthe Vietnam side of the Cambodianborder about 45 miles west of thecity of Pleiku. The place I was inwas called the Plei Trap. I was on amission to protect the left flank ofthe 4th United States InfantryDivision that was making a mas-sive attack that we called Opera-tion Paul Revere IV.

I had been in three battles alongthat stretch of the Ho Chi MinhTrail, the day before ... and whenGeneral Walker asked me to goback down that trail and attack aline of bunkers I discovered withmy Montagnard irregulars so thathis U.S. soldiers could attack theflank of the enemy defenses andsurprise them, I knew what he wasasking me was pretty risky. I hadalready stirred up a hornet’s nestthe day before in my three battlesand I knew that the enemy werewatching for me. When I turnedaround and went down that trail toattack their main trenches and pill-boxes, I knew that they would beaware of it immediately and theywould have time to lay an ambushfor me. The reason I felt that wasbecause if I had been in the enemy’sposition, that is exactly what Iwould have done. But, anyway, Iagreed to do what General Walkerhad asked me to do because Ithought my soldiers could handleit, and I knew that the UnitedStates forces, with their artilleryand air (support) would be there tohelp me. ...

In his book, West to Cambodia,S.L.A. Marshall has devoted anentire chapter, titled “A Small Prob-lem of Command,” to Parmly’s rolein this operation. Marshall further

explains Parmly’s reservations:Here was a lightly armed force ofMontagnards, trained mainly forscreening and reconnaissance,being asked to go after a fortifiedline protecting the Ho Chi MinhTrail. According to Marshall, it wasMaj. Gen. Arthur Collins, the 4thDivision commander, not Brig. Gen.Glenn Walker, the assistant divi-sion commander, who asked Parm-ly, “Can your people then movesouth along the trail and pin themfrom the front so Charley Company(Co. C, 1/14th Infantry Bn.) can rollthem up?”8

“I am sure that by now they willbe waiting for us on the trail,”Parmly replied, “but I think thatwith 185 men I ought to be able totake them.”9

Marshall follows with his ownperspective. “One may idly wonderif a realist’s view of tactical circum-stances conditioned these judge-ments. Parmly, the only one whohad seen the ground, might haveurged more caution. Or having areal go at it with all possible heavyweapons might have been weighedas a more promising option. Mostlikely, in these circumstances, allcommand levels react too strongly,like beagles scenting game.”10

In the tape, Parmly describesbriefly the events in the Plei Trapambush:

At the exact place that I wouldhave set up an ambush, the NorthVietnamese battalion commanderhad set up an ambush, what wecall an L-shaped ambush. If youcan visualize an “L” on the trail,the bottom part of the L crosses thetrail so that it acts like a gate tostop me. (See drawing, p.48)Theenemy soldiers on that part of theambush would stop my advanceand the long part of the L is alongthe side of the trail parallel to thetrail and the long axis of my col-umn and when they fired theywould be able to shoot right intothe sides of my soldiers and prettyneatly wipe us out. Because I antic-ipated an ambush, I had putguards out about fifty yards on

each side of the flanks of my col-umn going along the trail.

I walked with the point, with thescouts, at the very front of the col-umn, so as to keep them alert andnot be surprised. We were goingthrough some fairly dense jungle.All of a sudden it came to a ratheropen, clear area where I expectedthe ambush would be because theenemy would be able to see us andhave good fields of fire and yetthere was a lot of underbrush andshrubbery that they could hide in,and that’s where they were. As wewere going through the thick jun-gle, before we got to the clearing,the flank guards had had a hardtime of it and had fallen behind. Infact, they were so far behind theyweren’t going to do me any good asa warning. So I stopped the columnon the trail just at the edge of theopen area and I went back andwalked over into the jungle andfound the left flank guard. DivineProvidence, if you will, it was agood thing that I walked over to theleft guard first because if I hadwalked to the right flank guard, Iwould have walked right into thelong part of the L ambush, as theywere on the right-hand side of thetrail ...

In his letter to Marie dated Nov.12, 1966, Parmly gives an extraor-dinary account of excitement andfury during four days of continuousclose combat in the Plei Trap Val-ley. None of the other referencescontains the detail or the insight ofthis account.11 His letter contains aplethora of lessons about small-unitleadership in combat and some hintof his religious convictions.

Sat - 12 NovMarie Darling

Your hubby is one happy,relieved, and strong believing indi-vidual right now. I’m back at theBattalion Cp (Command Post) ofthe 1st Bn., 14th Infantry from the3rd Bde/25th Div. During the lastfour days — 8-11 Nov — I’ve beenin close continuous combat andreally earned my CIB (Combat

March 1992 47

48 Special Warfare

Infantryman’s Badge). As I toldyou (or was it Mike) in my 7 Novtape, I was taking a 3 CompanyForce of strikers into the Plei Traparea to work with Col. Miller’s Bdeof the 4th Division (2nd Bde) andwe really found Charlie. Weengaged three separate North Viet-namese Regular Companies in fivemajor engagements. With me wereMaj. Buttermore, Capt. Berry,Capt. Casto, Sgts. Caro, Quigley,Lewis, Wyatt, Mitchell and Sim-mons and Bill Simpson.*

With the 3rd Mike Company on aseparate operation were Capt. Sin-cere, Lt. Jacobelly and Sgt. Huff.Only Buttermore, Sincere andBerry were not wounded. Sgt.Mitchell was killed after beingtwice-before wounded in the samebattle. Jacobelly got a bad gut shotand Simmons got a round in hisleg that tore out his thigh bones.All the rest of us were only slightlywounded and weren’t evacuated,except I sent Quigley back becausea wound was infecting, and Huffcouldn’t walk well with an oldwound so he went back.

Out of our 330 strikers, we’vehad 25 killed and 11 missing pre-sumed dead, and 63 wounded. Ihad one Sgt. of an Artillery LiaisonTeam attached to me have an eyeshot out. So far we’ve only counted79** dead NVA and are sure of 4 wounded. We’ve captured 2 NVAand a whole mess of enemyweapons to include two anti-air-craft machine guns. I gunned downone NVA at about 40 yards rangeyesterday. I had just gone to the leftflanking element as we approachedwhat I thought might be a likely

ambush site. The left flank securitywas lagging behind and I grabbedthe lead man by the shirt and legpulling him showed him where Iwanted him to go and how fast.Suddenly an NVA soldier in khakistood up about 3040 meters in frontof me and in a crouching positionwas watching the head of the col-umn on the trail and didn’t see me.(See drawing) I levelled on himwith my M-16 Armalite andsprayed him with a 20-roundburst. It got him — but moreimportant it warned our entireforce Our people hit the groundand began firing before the NVAwere ready. They would havesprung the ambush when our col-umn reached the dotted arrow andwould have probably slaughteredthose on the trail. (Parmly’s lettercontains a rough sketch of theambush with his column’s progressmarked by arrows; a dotted arrowmarks the point in the column’sadvance, the bottom of the “L,” atwhich the NVA troops intended tospring the ambush.) I rushed overto the command post group andSgt. Lewis said branches werebreaking all around me as theenemy tried to cut me down. But-termore, Casto, his two radio oper-ators Simmons and Mitchell, Lt.Mike LaPolla and his radio opera-tor attached to me and the attachedartillery team of Capt. Komornik,Lt. Fosdick and 4 Sgts. They werelaying on the edge of the trail and Ihunkered down at the head (southend) of the column and said toorganize a perimeter with theradios in the center. I said (or myguardian angel said) I’ll get behindthe tree on the east side of the trailand cover the perimeter to thesouth. The second I hopped behindthe tree and before the others hadtime to move, an AK-47 automaticrifle fired a burst right down thetrail. I could almost see the bulletspass my right shoulder as theyclipped twigs and grass 4 inchesabove the ground. They would haveall hit me if I hadn’t moved.Instead they plowed into Sgt. Sim-

mons’ leg, shattering his left femurand into Chuck Buttermore’s pack.I tried to fire back at the gunnerbut my gun jammed. By the time Ichanged magazines I’m afraid hewas down. He kept firing bursts fortwo or three minutes, then musthave moved. I brought Sgt. Lewiswith three fine strikers from theDuc Co Reconnaissance Platoonand put them opposite me on theother side of the trail. Simmonswas crying out in pain and Butter-more began giving first aid andmorphine. LaPolla and his radiooperator crawled up behind me butno one else could (or would) crossthe trail with Charlie firing downit. I told Mitchell to tell everyone(over the radio) to get on the eastside of the trail while Dave Castocalled in an air strike on Simmons’radio and Fosdick got someartillery in. Then an NVA just westof the group on the trail startedthrowing hand grenades. The firstone landed on top of an anthillwhich our radio operators wereusing for protection. When itexploded fragments hit Mitchell(his second wound in ten minutes)and Capt. Casto. Someone hollered“There’s a grenade in the trail” andsince I was sitting up behind thetree with my pack acting as ashield on the trail side of me, Idropped into a prone position los-ing my cap in the process. Whenthe grenade went off, I felt a pain of“bee-sting” sensation on my backand neck and then went on firing.Later, in our final perimeter Ifound a swelling on the small ofmy back (no broken skin) a smallblood clot on the base of my skullat the back of my neck and thismorning discovered a scabby soreon the left side of the top of myhead. Just about as cheap a PurpleHeart as anyone could get. DaveCasto was mad and stood upbehind the anthill — when theNVA stood up with his arm cockedto throw the third grenade, Davecut him in half with his M-16 andthe grenade dropped beside thethrower and blew up harming only

* Bill only stayed 2 days andmissed the L Shaped Ambush.

** The number keeps going up asmore are found.

Left: Parmly’s drawing of the PleiTrap ambush. This version, donesome time later, shows consider-ably more detail than the onewhich he included in the letter tohis wife.

March 1992 49

the NVA if he were not alreadydead. Just then the aircraft (GeneDeatrick’s A-1Es) arrived. I hadtalked with a Capt. Partridge whowas flying over us in a FAC OIE(L-19) Piper Cub. I said tell the COof the 1st Air Command Squadronat Pleiku that his classmate was indeep s—t and to come to the rescue.Gene did.12 I told him to fire onanything more than 5 meters westof the trail and they swooped downat tree top level machine gunning,firing rockets and droppingnapalm. They just kept circlingand shaking the ground beside usso violently that we couldn’t talkclearly. But that saved us, althoughwe didn’t realize it then.

Chuck Buttermore had hoppedacross the trail to my rear and waswith LaPolla. We couldn’t chancedragging Simmons across. Every-one was tossing smoke grenades tome so that when the pilots asked usto mark our flank — I’d throw one.Talking with Chuck we agreed we’dhad it — there didn’t seem to beany chance of getting out alive.There was one machine gun thatfired at our airplanes on each pass.Chuck kept standing up to try tosilence it but he (machine gunner)was in a position formed by felledtrees and beyond our shots. He wastoo far away for hand grenadesplus the foliage was too thick.

I didn’t describe the battlefield.It was a hilltop in the dense junglethat had been somewhat cleared.There were a lot of large trees thathad been felled but enough of themwere still there to make it impossi-ble to fire mortars at us because therounds would hit a tree over themortar before ever reaching us.They had mortars because I pickedup an 82mm mortar round besidea dead NVA soldier. Mortars wouldhave done us in for sure. I foundout from Capt. Berry, who hadtried to bring the Plei DjerengCompany around our east flank toenvelop the enemy, that they werepinned down at their front plusanother NVA platoon had followedthem and was encircling them. I

told Chuck to arrange to extract thewounded to the east and I wasgoing to organize a perimeterwhere the Plei Djereng Companywas. I decided to do this becausethe enemy would have to move outof their prepared positions to attackus there and I wanted to get awayfrom the trail which was not onlytoo hot but also pretty close to theair strikers. We had three PRC-25radios, 1 PRC-72 and one PRC-64.Simmons had been carrying thePRC-72 and I didn’t want it or anyof my belongings to be abandonedto the enemy. They’d have to getsouvenirs off of me over my deadbody (which at the time was nojoke). I dashed across the trail,grabbed the 45-pound radio andSimmons’ pack (total about 70pounds) and dragged it back acrossthe trail into a thicket. It was tooheavy to put on and Sgt. Lewis(who I didn’t know was on my sideof the trail) came to help me. I putit on atop my pack — told Lewis togo back to cover the CP Group’swithdrawal and I took off throughthe dense tangle of jungle to theeast. Sgt. Caro called to me and Iswung south into his perimeterhardly able to keep my balancewith my 95-100-pound load. I toldBerry to guide the CP Group inand cover them. I grabbed Caroand began organizing a group totry to break out east to the stream.I told Mitchell to go with him andgave Sgt. Wyatt the PRC-72 tocarry. Two of the PRC-25s had beenshot up on the trail and Dave Castodropped his pack without thinking,to carry Simmons out, and left thePRC-64 behind. Both the 72 andthe 64 would be rich prizes for theenemy. They all finally made it intothe perimeter and we told theplanes to plaster the area on top ofthe hill and 100 meters east of thehill.

We heard a lot of shooting to oureast and pretty soon Sgt. Caro’sgroup staggered into the perimeter.The road to the east was closed andwe were completely surrounded. Aquick count showed about forty-five

missing, over a dozen wounded andCaro said Mitchell was badly hitand four strikers were still withhim. I said get him and he went byhimself back, picked Mitch up withthe help of the strikers and rushedthe fifty yards back. I was withFosdick working the radio to get inartillery because the planes wererunning out of gas and ammo.

I could see Caro and Buttermoreworking over Mitch giving oral res-piration and other techniques buthe died. We figured we’d join himpretty soon.

The artillery started coming in atthis time and “Fearless” Fosdickcoolly and calmly “walked” it allaround us. I talked to Col. Millerand others on the radio begging fora relief column and he said he’d dohis best. He did. Just at sunset acompany about 800 meters to ourSE and another rifle company (CCo. on the SE and A Co. on theNE)13 landed at the landing zone,LZ Lane, and was coming from theNE. Everyone said “hold on” and Isaid “thanks for the advice.”

I am proud to say I was com-pletely calm and resigned — so waseveryone else. Even the strikers whowere aware of the gravity of the sit-uation seemed to say they’d selltheir lives dearly. One squadrushed out to knock off an AK-47and did it with grenades and anM-79 grenade launcher. Theartillery was within 50-100 yardsof us but we were not getting hurtand the firing was dying down. Bythis time four hours (an eternity)had passed since I’d killed the firstman at _p.m. (Parmly’s letterleaves this blank.)The enemy firinghad died down, only our artillerywas shattering the silence, the air-planes were gone, our perimeterwas tight (only 50 meters in diame-ter), there was dense undergrowththat the enemy would have to noisi-ly come through to reach us, a

Right: The first of two pages inParmly’s diary recording the eventsof Nov. 10, 1966, the day of the PleiTrap ambush.

50 Special Warfare

March 1992 51

dense canopy was overhead. Twocompanies were on the way (onewith a surgeon brand-new in coun-try) and night was falling rapidly.We wouldn’t carry our wounded outand have enough men to fight. Wewere tired — spent — and I saidlet’s stay put. Col. Miller advisedbreaking out in small groups, but Isaid we won’t leave a singlewounded man and will only traveland fight as a unit. We heard that30 men had retreated to LZ Lane,which pretty much accounted foreveryone. We fired flares over ourperimeter for 5 hours and the twocompanies arrived simultaneouslyat 12:15 (midnight). You could feelthe drama in the air and thosetroops performed a Herculeaneffort coming through dense track-less jungle, full of enemy for allthey knew, with only flares to guideon and our urging to keep themgoing. Those U.S. GIs were realpretty. They formed a circle aroundus 100 meters in diameter andfound four dead NVA — that’s howclose they were. All of us exceptFosdick went to sleep. He keptartillery coming all night. I went tosleep at 0200 after the Doc assuredme each man (including one of Fos-dick’s radio operators who lost his

right eye) was in the best shapepossible and the two U.S. compa-nies were dug in.

At sunrise I took a platoon up tothe scene of the afternoon’s fightand we found a total of ten NVAbodies, our PRC-64, lots of packsand gear our troops had aban-doned and one more dead striker.Our total count was 1 USSF KIA, 4USSF MIA, 1 U.S. MIA, 4 CIDGKIA, 23 CIDG MIA, none missing.

I’m proud of my men — U.S. andCIDG, and they are proud of me.Guess we’re kinda proud of eachother. My guardian angel and yourprayers were all working overtime —I even found time to rush through afervent Rosary — and it all paidoff. Thank you all. We spent anoth-er night, last night, on the hill tomake a helicopter landing zone toextract the wounded. They all cameout in dust offs yesterday eveningand one rifle company stayed withme to increase our security. One ofour ambushes last night got 3 NVAon the trail to the south and ourambush on the trail to the north (at0430) reported enemy were slippingup on them. We pulled the ambush-es in, plastered the area with artil-lery, and if they were planning anattack at dawn we discouraged

’em. We found another dead NVAthis morning and now we are allout.

You can thank your friend Col.Kelly (Col. Francis Kelly, command-ing officer, 5th Special ForcesGroup). He sent me copious wordsof praise and congratulationsthrough Bill Simpson and orderedme to never put myself in that kindof a dangerous situation again. Ireally think he didn’t want to loseme — not that way. So I’m rotatingmy three tired but valiant compa-nies with another Mike Companyand A Company from Plei Me. Iwill work back at Col. Miller’sBrigade Headquarters, Chuck But-termore will stay with one U.S. bat-talion HQ. and Capt. Sincere theother. We’re not finished with thefight but that is it for that one hair-raising phase.

Glad I can tell you about this inperson. Happy to be back and aliveyou may be sure. I’m anxious toshave and bathe and find out ifthere’s any mail. Bye for now –

All My Love –Lee

Brig. Gen. David A. Bramlett,currently commandant of cadets atWest Point, has helped to explainthe midnight relief operation of theencircled CIDG force in the PleiTrap. In November 1966, 1st Lt.Bramlett was the executive officerfor Company C, 1st Battalion, 14thInfantry in the Plei Trap Valley.When the L-shaped ambush wassprung prematurely by Parmly’s fir-ing at the NVA captain, Company Cwas near enough to receive somespent rounds from the firefight.Capt. Audley M. Federline, the CCompany commander, requestedpermission to move northwestacross the stream to relieve thepressure on Task Force Prong. The2nd Brigade denied the request atthe time (about 1430 hours) andtold the company to move to ablocking position about 1,500meters away. Then during theevening (Parmly’s diary says at

Photo courtesy Parmly family

Aerial view of LZ Lane, taken Nov. 10, 1966.

52 Special Warfare

1815 hours) Companies C and Awere ordered to attack (C Companyfrom the southeast and A Companyfrom the northeast) to link up withParmly’s force. They knew that theCIDG force had taken heavy casu-alties and needed help badly. Gen-eral Bramlett explains, “We were asafraid of T.F. Prong firing us up asthe NVA.”14

Col. Charles M. Simpson wasdeputy commander of the 5th Spe-cial Forces Group, headquartered inNha Trang. He called the Plei Trapoperation “perhaps the finest exam-ple of cooperation between a U.S.unit and the CIDG. ... Lee had morethan bent over backwards to put hisforces at the disposal of the Ameri-cans, in the hope of gaining mutualbenefit for his camps, whichdepended heavily on Americanrelief or reinforcement in the eventof heavy attacks by the NVA divi-sions in II Corps.”15

“The 4th Division sweep wouldundoubtedly have had a far differ-ent outcome if Lee Parmly’s offer toguard their left flank had beenignored or refused. ... Lee Parmlyended up in the hospital with asevere case of blackwater fever. Leealso was awarded the Silver Starand the Purple Heart for his role inthe battle of Plei Trap.”16

Killing the enemyParmly makes reference to the

Plei Trap Valley operation inanswering one of the other ques-tions posed by the sixth-grade class:“How do you feel about killing peo-ple?” The most sensitive question, itwas exactly the sort that sixthgraders might ask, and within itsinnocence, perhaps, was a wide-eyed wonder over what it mightmean to take a life — to kill a man,although that man might be anenemy. Parmly gave his own honestanswer, and rarely has a soldierwith a strong Christian compassionfor all people answered this ques-tion so directly.

First, I would have to explain thephilosophy of most professional sol-diers. War is a game that is played

for keeps, like players on both sideswho know and accept the fact thatsome are going to be killed. This isa fatalistic but a very practicalviewpoint, and most professionalsoldiers don’t worry about beingwounded or killed. For attitude,you might say their head is in thesand, but it’s kind of summed up inthe belief that when your time isup, a bullet will come in that hasyour name on it and you’ll get it.Also, our training tells us that it isan honor to die fighting for yourunit and for your country. ... Youcould say that all professional sol-diers share this philosophy just likeall professional football playersaccept the odds that they will sus-tain serious injury to their knees,shoulders, etc., as a price for play-ing pro ball.

I found it hard to order my meninto situations where I knew thatsome would be killed. Whereverpossible I went with them to sharethe dangers, and this way it easedmy conscience a little bit about giv-ing these orders. Being in the Spe-cial Forces, which was an all-vol-unteer unit of highly trained pro-fessionals, I had trouble keepingmy men out of danger. In the PleiTrap operation where I waswounded, every one of my menbegged me to take them with mewhen I went out (on the operation),and I had to turn down a lot of mysoldiers who wanted to go. I couldonly take 12 of them. They knew itwas going to be a good scrap andthey wanted to be with me in it.Sergeant Mitchell ... begged me forthe chance to go. He was returningto the States in a few weeks, after ayear of duty as my radio chief, andhad never been in a battle. As luckwould have it, he was the one whowas killed. During my year in Viet-nam, I had five of my officers and15 of my soldiers killed, that is,Americans. I knew each one ofthem by name and I personallygrieve over their loss to the fami-lies, as though it was my fault.

My feelings about the enemybeing killed, as a result of my

orders to shoot artillery, to dropbombs, or to actually attack theirforces, are negative feelings. How-ever, I was extremely meticulousabout allowing any firing wherecivilian habitations or villageswere, or any other locations wherenoncombatants might be involved,because I just was against it. Itwas, of course, against our policyalso. ...

I feel no remorse about enemy sol-diers who were killed in combat. ...When I shot deliberately with myown M-16 rifle that North Viet-namese Army captain, I admit Ihesitated a minute before I pulledthe trigger, because I really didn’twant to do it. After the battle, whenI was recovering in the hospitalfrom my wounds, it worried me abit and I talked with a priest. Heconsoled me. He said that that manwas intent on wiping out me andmy whole force. In fact, he was sointent on doing that that he didn’ttake his eyes off where I had been,and therefore he didn’t see mewhen I moved, and he was deliv-ered into my hands. I’m not proudthat I shot him. I wish I could haveavoided doing it. But I did what Iwas trained to do. Now that I haveconfessed my feelings and gotten itoff my conscience, I feel God hasforgiven me, even though the NorthVietnamese officer maybe hasn’t. Ihope I never kill anyone again. AndI hope none of you, in your class,Carolyn, will ever be expected tokill in a war or that any of you willtake the life of another either byaccident or on purpose.

Contemporary questions of spiri-tual conflicts with a soldier’s codewere nothing new for Lee Parmly.For years he had studied Biblicalreferences concerning warfare andsoldiers. He gathered these findingsin a “Christian Soldier” file. Beloware some extracts from that materi-al, used during one of his “Chris-tian in the Military” seminars forcadets at West Point in March1973.17

“Does God intend that the Chris-tian is to follow blindly, no matter

March 1992 53

what the human institution’s ordersare? Absolutely not! And with suchexcellent credentials as ...

“Peter & John who refused tostop speaking in the name of Jesusbecause God had commanded themto do this thing (Acts of the Apos-tles 4:11-20).

“Peter and the other apostles,who again refused to stop speakingin the name of Jesus because theyfelt they were obligated to obey Godrather than man (Acts 5:29).

“Note that in the first examplecited above, Peter and John did notclaim exemption from man’s law,but only that they felt obligated toobey the ‘higher authority,’ andtherefore it was up to the humaninstitution to determine whetherthey were doing right or not. Verse21 gives the outcome.

“Can we claim a higher authorityas cause to disobey man’s laws? Yes,but we’d better be certain of ourauthority before doing so, and eventhen we must be prepared to sufferwhatever consequences are forth-coming.”

This was followed in the Chris-tian-soldier file by a discourse onkilling an enemy in combat.

“The scriptures exhort us inmany places not ‘to kill.’ Thoseplaces in the New Testament thatdo, and there are many, use theGreek word ‘phoneuo,’ which means‘to murder,’ i.e., intentional premed-itated killing (see Matthew 5:21;23: 31 & 35; Romans 13:9; James2:11, 4:2, 5:6 for some examples). Acouple of other Greek words trans-lated ‘to kill’ in the New Testamentare ‘apokteino’ (put to death) and‘thuo’ (to sacrifice).”

The crux of this, in Parmly’s mind,is that one can have concern for anenemy as a person, yet still put himto death as representing an instru-ment of an enemy government.

The authors do not intend toexpose the readers to all thethought that Lee Parmly devoted toreconciling the fundamental dilem-ma between religious belief and vio-lence. Suffice it to say that he de-voted great energy to such reconcil-

iation. In the final analysis, he wasat peace with his profession, whichexposed him to situations requiringdifficult choices. His son, Davidsays, “I’m certain that Dad wrestledwith his conscience often after Viet-nam but his solid spiritual founda-tion served him very well indeed. Itis interesting to note that Dad’sdiary makes special mention ondays when he did not get to Mass,even at times of frantic activity.”

‘Dumb war’Parmly’s frankness caused S.L.A.

Marshall to describe him as one ofthe Army’s most outspoken of-ficers.18 Consider the way in whichhe handled rebellious students ofJohns Hopkins University while onROTC duty in the early 1970s.With the war in Vietnam, draft-agecollege students were rioting. Inuniform, Parmly would confront theStudents for a Democratic Societyas if they were West Point cadets atthe opposite end of the politicalspectrum. He disarmed these angrystudents by his enthusiasm andsincerity. He describes oneencounter for the history class:

I once told a rioting bunch of col-lege students that my personal andprivate thoughts of the VietnamWar were that it was a dumb war.Those were the words I used: dumbwar. That remark was printed inthe Baltimore and Washingtonnewspapers and I got a call fromthe Pentagon asking me to explainwhy I made that derogatoryremark on the way I thought of thewar. I answered the Pentagonspokesman, that if he picked anywar in history and picked eitherside of that war, that I could provethat as a means of solving theproblems of that country that itwas a dumb war to that side. Hesaid nothing, and I never heardany more about the incident. War ishell. War is also stupid and unnec-essary. If we would only love our-selves and each other as God lovesus, there would be no more wars.There wouldn’t even be rumors ofwar.

Lee Parmly was born, bred andtrained to be a professional soldier,to give his life for his country, ifnecessary. When the chips weredown that terrible night in the PleiTrap, when his small band of Mon-tagnards and Special Forces sol-diers were defending in a tightperimeter, he refused to break outas Colonel Miller advised. Better tobe overrun and die as a unit thanabandon the wounded who couldnot be carried on a breakout.

But there was one element ofLee’s character that was not taughtin his West Point curriculum nor inservice schools — his strong reli-gious beliefs. He credited his guard-ian angel and the Holy Spirit forwarning him to jump from the trailjust before the AK-47 automatic rifleblasts filled the area where he wasstanding. In the thick of the PleiTrap battle, he even found time to“rush through a fervent rosary.”While in Southeast Asia he seemedto know the priest in every village orhamlet near his area of operation.

Record of serviceHis service to the church did not

go unrecognized. On Nov. 7,1966, ina ceremony at II Corps Headquar-ters in Pleiku, Father Sampson(later chief of chaplains), represent-ing the Vatican, presented Parmlywith the highly respected Benemer-enti Award that, for the RomanCatholic faith, is comparable to theDistinguished Service Cross.

Parmly was driven by Christiancompassion, yet he was every inch asoldier, as his record of servicebears out. Love for his fellow manwas Lee’s guiding principle. Henever joined an organization orsupported a cause just to be num-bered as a member. He anxiouslyassumed leadership and tookresponsibility.

Active in scouting as a youth,Parmly contributed more than 30years of leadership in the BoyScouts of America, serving as aleader in 15 Scout, Explorer andOrder of the Arrow units. He heldthe Vigil Honor of the Order of the

54 Special Warfare

Arrow, one of scouting’s highestawards.

These characteristics of leader-ship and responsibility were incul-cated from childhood by a motherwho set the standards for spiritualformation and a father who,although an alcoholic, demandedfirm disciplinary standards whileremaining Lee’s boyhood idol. Lee’sfather often said, “Do as I say, notas I do.” Lee’s enthusiasm was con-tagious. No one could be offendedby his aggressiveness, even whenthey disagreed with his cause.

After tours in Panama, Vietnam,the Pentagon, and as Professor ofMilitary Science at Johns HopkinsUniversity, Parmly had returned toWest Point from 1972 to 1975. Thistime he was Treasurer of theAcademy. Normally a man in thisposition would attract little atten-tion among cadets and junior offi-cers. Not so with him.

Those were trying times for theclergy at service academies. The Su-preme Court would soon rule thatcompulsory chapel was unconstitu-tional. Parmly’s answer was to “turnon” the Corps and young officers bymaking religion interesting — evenexciting, and the Parmlys had a sub-stantial influence on the religiouslife of cadets and young officers andwives. Supporters flocked to Lee’sseminars on “The Christian in theMilitary.”

On one occasion he met with theParish Council to attempt to changethe conservative services at MostHoly Trinity, but to no avail. Ser-vices remained as rigid as the WestPoint toy that, according to cadetlore, “you wind up and it standsstill for 150 years.”

After retiring from the Army, Leeand Marie volunteered as teachersof a religious course on marriage tohigh school seniors at St. Joseph’sAcademy in St. Augustine, Fla. Atthe time of his death in 1977, LeeParmly had applied for a graduateprogram at the University of Flori-da that would have led to a Ph.D. incounseling psychology. The Parmlyshad decided on the field of gerontol-

ogy, in which Marie later received aB.S. degree, to allow them to workwith the large number of elderlypersons in the environs of theirretirement home in St. Augustine.

Lee Parmly’s final resting place isthe West Point Cemetery, alongwith other comrades of the LongGray Line. It is not surprising thatLee’s widow continues the spiritualwork they had undertaken together.Marie has since spent years in Mex-ico assisting the poor as a Mary-knoll lay missioner, not unlike Lee’swork with the Montagnards in theirstruggle for justice and peace.

In writing about Lee Parmly, theauthors have chosen to emphasizehis military service in SoutheastAsia and his religious convictions toshow how he was able to reconcilethe two. His courage and dedicationto the cause, even one he consid-ered questionable, should serve asfertile ground for study by futuremilitary leaders.

Retired Army Col. Richard L.Gruenther was a West Point class-mate of Lee Parmly’s. Colonel Gru-enther served as a rifle companycommander during the Korean Warand as a brigade commander dur-ing Vietnam. In Vietnam he operat-ed throughout much of the II Corpsarea, which was served by Parmly’sCIDG units.

David W. Parmly received a Reg-ular Army ROTC commission fromthe University of Florida in 1982.He served as a cavalry platoonleader in Europe and as a tankcompany commander in the U.S.before resigning as a captain ofArmor in 1990 to pursue a man-agement career in the civilianworld.

Notes:1 “Eleazar Parmly IV to Carolyn West and

6th grade history class — 1977,” tape fromthe Parmly family collection.

2 Time, 17 March 1961.3 Shelby Stanton, Green Berets at War

(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), pp. 19-21.

4 Ibid., p. 22.

5 History of the 4th Infantry Division, pre-pared by the 29th Military History Detach-ment, p. 3.

6 Charles M. Simpson III, Inside theGreen Berets The First Thirty Years: A His-tory of the U.S. Army Special Forces (Novato,Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983), p. 219.

7 Stanton, p. 126.8 S.L.A. Marshall, West to Cambodia

(Nashville, Tenn.: The Battery Press, Inc.,1984), p. 115.

9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Eleazar Parmly IV to wife Marie, 12

November 1966, from the Parmly family col-lection.

12 Col. Eugene P. Deatrick to Richard L.Gruenther, 14 January 1990. A West Pointclassmate of Parmly’s, Deatrick took overcommand of the 1st Air Commando Squad-ron (A-1Es) in February of 1966. The squad-ron’s mission was to provide close air sup-port primarily in II Corps, but it frequentlyflew north of the DMZ and south into IIICorps. Deatrick and Parmly had initiated aprogram whereby squadron officers were as-signed for a week to each of Parmly’s SpecialForces camps to prepare target folders andto synchronize working relationships. Thisobviously paid dividends in the Plei Trap.

13 The “C Co.” mentioned here is C Com-pany, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry. “A Co.” isA Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.

14 Brig. Gen. David A. Bramlett, interviewwith Col. Richard L. Gruenther, 21 August1990.

15 Simpson, p. 219.16 Ibid., pp. 228-229.17 Plebe Spring Mini-Conference at Round

Pond, USMA, 24 March 1973.18 Marshall, p. 102.

March 1992 55

The shock waves generated bythe skyjackings of the 1960s andthe indelible images of the horrorsof the Munich Massacre confrontedboth academics and policy makerswith major challenges.

For the academic, there were thehalting efforts to define and under-stand the underlying causes anddynamics of a form of violence thatone pioneering authority aptly called“a new mode of conflict.” For the pol-icy maker, there was the more press-ing challenge of fashioning respons-es to the incidents of carnage thatseized the world headlines andintimidated a global audience.

Since those early days, the stateof the art in countering terrorismhas been marked by the massiveproliferation of books and periodi-cals that have made terror a field ofacademic specialization. In additionthere is now a body of doctrine,policies and techniques which aredirected at meeting terrorists’threats and incidents. Yet, for allthe activities in the halls of aca-demia and the councils of state, itstill remains to be seen if the inter-national order now understands orcan effectively deal with what hasbecome an enduring challenge to afragile and now profoundly chang-ing international order.

The current state of open-sourcecounterterrorism knowledge andcapabilities is to a considerabledegree represented in the fourbooks reviewed in this article. Don-ald J. Hanle’s Terrorism: TheNewest Face of Warfare (Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989) addresses recur-rent and fundamental questions ofwhere terrorism fits in the natureand dynamics of human conflict,while Maxwell Taylor’s The Terror-ist (Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988)

examines terrorism from a psycho-logical perspective.

In contrast to the primarily aca-demic approach of the first twobooks, the remaining works arewritten by individuals who havecombined their academic back-grounds with extensive operationalexperience in combatting terrorism.Neil C. Livingstone’s The Cult ofCounterterrorism (Lexington Books,1990) provides an insider’s view ofcounterterrorism from an individu-al who has been a security consul-tant, while Robert Kupperman andJeff Kamen’s Final Warning:Averting Disaster in the New Ageof Terrorism (Doubleday, 1989)enables the reader to share insightson the future of terrorism from ascientist who has been involved inthe formulation of counterterrorismpolicy and a journalist who has cov-ered terrorist acts for the massmedia.

Terrorism: The Newest Faceof Warfare

Hanle’s book is the outgrowth ofa thesis he wrote at the Naval Post-graduate School. The author initi-ates his analysis by surveyingmajor doctrines, principles and ele-ments associated with the study ofwar. The first half of the book is an

Understanding Terrorism Sincethe 60s – An Evaluation of Academic

and Operational Perspectives:

What have we learned andwhere are we going?

by Stephen Sloan

56 Special Warfare

R E V I E W E S S A Y

excellent overview of war’s ele-ments and principles. By drawingon the classic writings of Clause-witz and Sun Tzu, and contempo-rary scholars, the author provides agood description of the nature andapproaches to the study of warfare.The chapters may be slow going tothe reader not versed in militaryaffairs, but they could almost standalone as a primer for the study ofwar in a basic class in national-security studies.

Chapter 3, “The Principles ofWar: Factors Governing the Use ofForce in War,” provides the founda-tion for Hanle’s perspective on ter-rorism. He establishes three crite-ria for warfare: the use of lethalforce for political objectives, theemployment of force on a moralplane (the psychological and socio-logical objectives of conflict) and theemployment of force against force(reciprocity).

Hanle then notes how technologi-cal change, particularly in referenceto the coming of the nuclear age,has enhanced the importance of“social warfare” — with its empha-sis on controlling a populationthrough intimidation and othernon-military measures. He there-fore lays the foundation for anunderstanding of why and howunconventional warfare, and morespecifically, terrorism, are employedas an alternative to the dangers ofdirect military confrontation by thesuperpowers.

In the ensuing chapters theauthor identifies three major typesof terrorism: apolitical, whichincludes psychotic, criminal andcriminal acts; revolutionary (alsocalled repression terrorism), whichinvolves the mobilization of thepopulation, particularly in the con-text of revolutionary war; and stateterrorism, where lethal force isused by the state to weaken thepopulation’s will to resist. Underthe latter heading, the author alsodiscusses military terrorism, whereterroristic force is used by militaryforces within “a targeted entity”and state-sponsored terrorism,

where surrogate forces are usedoutside of the supported state.

In his conclusion, Hanle contendsthat revolutionary, military andstate-sponsored terrorism qualifyas forms of war which can be coun-tered by the use of military forcesapplying the principles of war. Hisview that apolitical terrorism doesnot meet the criteria of warfareshould be considered by policy mak-ers who are now calling for theincreased employment of militaryforces in the law-enforcementarena, particularly in regard to the“war” on drugs.

Terrorism: The Newest Face ofWar explores familiar materialrelated to the continuing debate

over the nature of terrorism andwhere it fits, particularly in refer-ence to armed conflict. While hesurveys well-traveled ground, Hanleprovides a refreshing approach tothe way in which military doctrineand principles can be used as onemeans of developing alternatives tocombatting terrorism.

The Terrorist Maxwell Taylor in The Terrorist

takes a “psychological perspective”in the study of terrorism. Morespecifically, the author employs an

“essentially behavioral and descrip-tive approach to psychology ...(which stresses) the importance ofthe consequences of our behavior inits development and expression”instead of using “more commonapproaches ... which tend to assumethat psychological manifestations ofterrorism are ‘attributes’ of theindividual.” (p. 12.)

In developing his approach, theauthor effectively indicates the dif-ficulties of identifying common psy-chological attributes of terrorism.He takes the position that whileterrorism “may perhaps be specialin the mixes of attributes it dis-plays, those attributes are not nec-essarily unique to terrorism — theyare shared by other kinds of situa-tions and events.” (p. 38.) Such aview should be of concern for thosewho wish to explain the behavior ofterrorists based on psychologicalprofiles and the concept of a terror-ist “mindset.”

Taylor addresses the “social ambi-guity” surrounding the identificationof the major aspects of terrorism andindeed takes on the challenging andfrustrating tasks of offering a defini-tion of what he refers to as “terroristaction.” It is a lengthy definitionwhich essentially restates character-istics that have commonly beenassociated with terrorism, namely“the use of violence, or the threat ofviolence by the terrorists to achievepolitical ends.” (p. 71.)

The author very effectivelyunderscores the dangers of tryingto categorize and therefore out-wardly understand terrorism bysimply viewing it as a form ofabnormal behavior. While thosewho resort to terrorism may bedefined as acting abnormally in thecontext of what he calls “a socialdefinition,” behaviorally, the terror-ists may be engaging in what canbe regarded as rational acts basedon their past experiences.

I would particularly recommendChapter 5, “Fanaticism,” in whichthe author engages in a fruitful dis-cussion of the importance of cross-cultural considerations. It helps to

March 1992 57

underscore the fact that while thefanatic may be viewed as engagingin extreme behavior, such behaviormay not be extreme if understoodin the context of the culture inwhich he or she was brought up.

Dr. Taylor, by drawing on existingliterature and his own analysis, hasindeed advanced our understandingof the psychological dimensions ofterrorism.

The Cult of CounterterrorismThe Cult of Counterterrorism

offers the reader quite a differentapproach in assessing contemporaryresponses to terrorism, with anemphasis on the experience of theUnited States. The book will be ofinterest to the general reader, forwhile it deals with an inherentlyserious topic, the author providesvery readable insights into some ofthe unique characters and organiza-tions that exist in the counterterror-ist world.

The book will also interest thosewho specialize in the policy andoperational aspects of counterterror-ism, for they will be familiar with anumber of the personalities andfirms that are discussed. Living-stone, from his vantage point ofbeing directly involved in the often-fragmented counterterrorism “com-munity,” provides a colorful accountof the cult of counterterrorism.

He initially shows how countert-errorism has become a very bigbusiness, inhabited by individualsand organizations who often have avested interest in playing on thefears of terrorism as a means ofgenerating income. More specifical-ly, through his portrayal of what hecalls “The Fear Industry,” Living-stone illustrates how highly diversefirms dealing with different aspectsof counterterrorism are of unevenquality, ranging from the highlyrespected security services to themercenary schools that play on thefantasies of would-be Rambos. Thegreat variations in professional andethical behavior within the fearindustry serve to underscore thefact that there is a pressing need

for more rigorous regulation of suchfirms on the state, local and nation-al level.

Livingstone provides a real-lifeadventure story of one of the securi-ty services, Corporate TrainingUnlimited, and its rescue of a 7-year-old girl from Jordan. Doubt-less there will be a made-for-televi-sion version of the story in thefuture.

For those who have an academicspecialization in terrorism, Chapter5, “Writing Terrorism to Death,”will be of particular interest. Theauthor is a man of strong opinions

and is not afraid to express them.He offers his view on the best writ-ers in the field and then proceeds tonote what he regards to be the 10worst books on terrorism.

The reader will have to make hisor her own judgment concerningLivingstone’s assessments. His dis-cussion of the colorful career of BobBrown, the publisher of Soldier ofFortune, illustrates how the coun-terterrorist/survivalist industry hasbecome a very big business. TheOmega Group, for example, whichpublishes Soldier Of Fortune andrelated publications, is “estimatedto have a gross annual sale of $5million.” (p. 207.)

In Chapter 7, “Oliver North’s Pas-

sionate War Against Terrorism,” theauthor shows what a “can-do”Marine lieutenant-colonel can do inthe absence of a clearly defined poli-cy, systematic implementation andthe failure of the oversight process.While the legal ramifications of theIran/Contra Affair are still to beresolved, one can agree with the fol-lowing observations on North by theauthor. “He became a modern-daywarlord, deftly manipulating thelevers of power ... Whether oneregards him as a dedicated patriotor a one-man wrecking crew, Northclearly was a man of action, not ofreflection, who had little patiencefor endless political debates con-cerning policy and nuance.” (p. 290.)

The Cult of Counterterrorismdoes not offer particularly innova-tive material to the field of terror-ism studies, but it is a lively, enter-taining and, at times, soberingchronicle of man’s foibles in this ageof terrorism.

Final WarningThe last book, Final Warning:

Averting Disaster in the New Ageof Terrorism, offers a discussion ofnew and often highly innovativeand technical terrorist threats thatauthorities will face in this newdecade. The authors note thatfuture terrorists will seek novelways to attract a jaded media andpublic who have grown used to theconventional acts of skyjacking,bombings and hostage-taking. Per-haps even more ominous is thepotential that these incidents willinvolve mass casualties as a resultof the resort to chemical, biologicaland nuclear weapons against thesocial and political order.

Kupperman and Kamen make aparticularly telling case for theemergence of what they refer to as“infrastructure terror attacks”which will assault the soft underbel-ly of technologically dependent soci-eties through their grid systems,computers and other facilities.

In their wide-ranging assessmentof future trends, they also contendthat the Soviet Union, which has

58 Special Warfare

been charged with supporting ter-ror networks, will increasingly befaced with outbreaks of domesticterrorism fueled by ethnic conflictand other forms of violence nowcoming to the fore. The authors con-clude that this will lead Moscow toseek further cooperation on antiter-rorism measures with the UnitedStates.

After providing an assessment ofthe current threat, which includesthe activities of various Islamic fun-damentalist groups and continuedSyrian involvement in state spon-sorship, the authors make a tellingcase for the view that “under-trained, overstressed, and poorlymanaged antiterrorism programs inthe United States and WesternEurope ... has made it easy for ...terrorists to succeed.” (p. 69.) Cer-tainly the tragedy of Pan Am 103 isa testament to that reality.

The authors then discuss “tech-no-terror” and portray a chillingMiddle Eastern scenario of the useof nerve gas. They then assess themeans of dealing with terror and,in contrast to Taylor’s military per-spective, suggest that “effective lawenforcement is an indispensable —perhaps the indispensable — tool inthe counterterrorism arsenal of freesociety.” (p. 123.)

Kupperman and Kamen discussthe very familiar issues associatedwith what the media’s role andresponsibilities should be in cover-ing terrorism. Their interviewswith such commentators as Tom

Brokaw and Bernard Shaw illumi-nate the constant problems associ-ated with attempting to reconcilethe need for ethical behavior withthe pressures involved in gettingthe story.

In the final section, after provid-ing readers with parts of the tran-script of a command-post exercisefor dealing with a terrorist incident,the authors make a solid case forthe use of simulations to train crisismanagers and policy makers indealing with present and futurethreats.

Final Warning can help to sensi-tize both the public and policy mak-ers to a danger to the civil orderthat will not only continue but be

subject to invidious innovation inthe immediate future.

The four books reviewed hereserve to underscore that we havecome a long way in combatting ter-rorism since the days of the 60s andthe nadir of the Munich Massacre.But we must also recognize thatterrorists have also “refined” theircapabilities to engage in individualand mass destruction.

Hanle effectively addresses thecontinuing discussion on the natureof terrorism, Taylor providesinsights on our growing knowledgeof the psychology of terrorism, Liv-ingstone gives us a very readableaccount of the current world ofcounterterrorism, and Kuppermanand Kamen sound the warning offuture threats and the need todevelop effective responses. Wehave learned a great deal, but sohave our adversaries.

Stephen Sloan is a professor ofpolitical science at the University ofOklahoma. While on leave from theUniversity, he headed a counterter-rorist practice for a Washington,D.C., firm and was a senior re-search fellow at the Center for Aero-space Doctrine, Research and Edu-cation at the Air University, Max-well Air Force Base, Ala. ProfessorSloan specializes in the areas of ter-rorism, low-intensity conflict andsecurity administration.

March 1992 59

Dual-tracked FA 39 officers with two or more consecutive tours in theirfunctional area may be considered “de facto” single-track officers by PER-SCOM and picked up involuntarily for nominative assignments, accordingto the Special Operations Proponency Office. This would prevent themfrom returning to a branch assignment and could make them non-compet-itive in their basic branch. Officers who fit this category should contacttheir basic branch or the PERSCOM FA 39 assignments officer.

New areas of concentration for Functional Area 53, Systems AutomationOfficer, are: 53A, Systems Automation Management; 53B, SystemsAutomation Engineering; 53C, Systems Automation Acquisition (ArmyAcquisition Corps); and 53X, Designated Systems Automation trainee.53B will be a hard skill, encompassing software and hardware engineer-ing. Officers in 53A will attend a 10-week course at the Computer ScienceSchool at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., and will serve as consultants,staff officers, managers or commanders (in non-Officer Professional Man-agement System commands).

The special-operations proponent, Maj. Gen. David J. Baratto, has decidedthat Special Forces officers will participate in the Army Acquisition Corps.This decision was based on the fact that the special-operations communityhas its own funds and budget, and Special Forces needs to become a keyplayer in the Acquisition Corps, according to Maj. Jean-Luc Nash of theSpecial Operations Proponency Office. The Special Forces force structurewill include developmental, product-manager, program-manager and otherleadership positions. These will range in rank from major to colonel andwill exist at all major special-operations headquarters, especially USSO-COM. Public Law 98-525, Public Law 99-145, and the Defense AcquisitionWorkforce Improvement Act establish strict guidelines for education, train-ing, experience and service requirements, and advanced civil schooling isan integral part of the training process. Although AAC officers are con-trolled by Army Acquisition Branch rather than Special Forces Branch,SF officers in the AAC will have a tremendous impact on the future of spe-cial operations by bringing their SF experience into the acquisition pro-cess, Nash said. The SWCS Directorate of Combat Developments is hold-ing a board to recommend which positions to develop and identify withinthe special-operations force structure as AAC positions. The board willalso recommend within which of the three AAC functional areas — FA 51(Research, Development and Acquisition), FA 53 (Systems AutomationOfficer), and FA 97 (Contracting and Industrial Management) SF shouldparticipate. Volunteers in FA 51 and FA 53, if selected, will be accessedinto the AAC in their eighth year of service. FA 51 and FA 53 officers whodo not volunteer will remain FA 51 and FA 53 without the 4M (trainee)and 4Z AAC additional skill identifiers. A recent Army personnel changereduces FA 97 to one-third its present size and accesses those remainingofficers into the AAC. Department of the Army is sending letters to FA 97officers explaining the changes and reclama procedures.

Some FA 39 officers may notbe competitive

FA 53 has new areas of concentration

SF officers to participate in Army Acquisition Corps

Spring 1989

Special Warfare

Officer Career Notes

60 Special Warfare

Listed below are statistics which show how Special Forces warrant officersfared on the FY 91 CWO 3 promotion board compared to the Army as awhole:

Above zone Primary zone Below zonecons sel % cons sel % cons sel %

SF 12 5 41.6 55 38 69.0 9 1 11.1Army 21.3 66.1 5.3

Promotion opportunities to CWO 3 remain excellent, and to CWO 4 evenbetter, according to CWO 3 Bobby Shireman of the SWCS Special Oper-ations Proponency Office. Shireman reminds warrant officers who will beeligible in FY 92 of the importance of updating their officer record briefs.

Special-operations soldiers with language abilities may now qualify forforeign-language proficiency pay regardless of whether their duty positionrequires language. The new policy is contained in MILPER Message 91-225, 261100Z July 1991, according to Maj. Jean-Luc Nash of the SWCSSpecial Operations Proponency Office. It applies to officers in the SpecialForces and Civil Affairs branches or in FA 39, enlisted soldiers in SpecialForces and Psychological Operations and Special Forces warrant officers.To qualify, soldiers must take the Defense Language Proficiency Test IIIand submit the results through their personnel service center, along witha DA Form 4187 requesting the pay, Nash said. The amount of pay willdepend on soldiers’ proficiency level and the difficulty of the language.

The SF Branch reminds officers that the two principal factors influencingofficer assignments are Army requirements and the Officer DistributionPlan. ODP is the way that the Army matches assignments of the officerpopulation against TOE and TDA authorizations. It determines how manyofficers by grade and specialty can be assigned to a given major commandor installation. When an assignments officer says he can’t assign a soldierto a particular post because it is over ODP, it means the post is projectedto be balanced or over in that officer’s grade and specialty. Other generalassignment considerations include:• Grade, career field, education and experience• Professional-development needs of the officer• Availability• Policy considerations — PCS costs, stabilization and tour equity• Officer’s potential for advancement• Officer’s personal preferences or family considerations• Date of projected command designated position list; location of command

These factors result in the following officer-assignment priorities:Captains — New SF captains go immediately to detachment command forbasic branch qualification; following ODA command, captains can expect 18-away-from-troops or functional-area assignments; some officers may attendadvanced civil schooling to support functional-area development.Majors (and promotable captains) — Resident command-and-staff collegeselectees go to those schools as soon as possible; maximum resident CSCgraduates go to troops for branch qualification; many go to joint- dutyassignments for early designation as joint-specialty officers or to function-al-area assignments; some senior majors are positioned with troops beforeconsideration for lieutenant-colonel battalion command.Lieutenant colonels — Some command SF battalions; many will serve injoint-duty assignments or functional-area assignments.

Army releases statistics on FY 91 CWO 3 promotions

SOF soldiers eligible for language pay

Army requirements, officerdistribution plan influence

officer assignments

March 1992 61

The following list may help officers who need to contact PERSCOM aboutpromotions, assignments or professional development:

SF Officer BranchCol. Kavin L. Coughenour DSN 221-3173Branch Chief comm. (703) 325-3173Maj. Charles T. Cleveland DSN 221-3169Field Grade Assignments comm. (703) 325-3169Maj. Hector E. Pagan DSN 221-3175Company Grade Assignments comm. (703) 325-3175Capt. Christopher Perkins DSN 221-3178Prof. Development, Accessions comm. (703) 325-3178

Officer Functional Area 39Capt. (P) Russ Medina DSN 221-3115FA 39 Assignments Manager comm. (703) 325-3115

Warrant OfficersCWO 4 John McGuire DSN 221-7841WO Assignments Manager comm. (703) 325-7841

Mailing address: U.S. PERSCOM; Attn: TAPC-OPE-SF (for SF officers),TAPC-OPB-A (for FA39), TAPC-OPW-II (for WO); 200 Stovall St.; Alexan-dria, VA 22332-0414 (SF), -0411 (FA 39), -0400 (WO).

The FY 1992 Lieutenant Colonel Command Selection Board selected 14officers to command Special Forces, Psychological Operations and CivilAffairs battalions. Selected to command SF battalions were Lt. Col. RobertM. Bailey, Lt. Col. William C. Council Jr., Maj. (P) Ronald V. Davis, Lt. Col.John P. Everett, Maj. (P) William L. Faistenhammer, Lt. Col. Leslie L.Fuller, Maj. (P) Joseph B. McMillan and Lt. Col. William L. McMullen.Selected to command PSYOP and CA battalions were Lt. Col. Alvin D.Aaron, Maj. (P) Paul B. Kappelman, Lt. Col. James F. Powers Jr., Lt. Col.Richard R. Seim, and Maj. (P) Robert W. Trost III. Lt. Col. Hy S. Rothsteinwas selected for an FA 39 assignment with Task Force Bravo in Honduras.

The fiscal-year 1991 Special Forces Accession Board for year-group 1988officers met Sept. 23-25 to select officer volunteers to begin Special Forcestraining. Acceptance of further applicants will be limited to those neededto round out the year-group’s goal. No further applications for rebranchingfrom YG 84 have been accepted since March 1991, and YG 85 closed Sept.1, 1991, according to Maj. Jean-Luc Nash of the SWCS Special OperationsProponency Office. Nash encourages applicants for rebranching to submittheir applications in their third or fourth year of service. The accessionboard occurs in their fourth year of service. Officers will be considered formajor in their ninth year, and there is a limited time for Special ForcesAssessment and Selection, the Special Forces Qualification Course, lan-guage training, officer advanced course, 12-18 months’ service as an SFdetachment commander, CAS3, and functional-area training, Nash said.

PERSCOM points of contact

1992 Board selects SOFbattalion commanders

Officers should apply early for SF

62 Special Warfare

The Special Forces Advanced NCO Course is scheduled to run three class-es in 1992: Class 01-92 — Jan. 6-April 2; Class 02-92 — May 4-July 28;and Class 03-92 — Sept. 8-Dec. 4. Soldiers should plan to report one dayprior to the class start date. The 12-week course is divided into threephases: common leadership training, SF MOS-specific skills and SF com-mon skills. Soldiers may attend either TDY or TDY in conjunction with aPCS move. To be eligible, soldiers must have a secret security clearanceand have graduated from the Basic NCO Course. For more information,contact the SF Enlisted Management Directorate at PERSCOM, DSN221-5497, commercial (202) 325-5497, or the Enlisted Training Branch,Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS, DSN 239-5000,commercial (919) 432-5000.

The SWCS NCO Academy is scheduled to run the Psychological Opera-tions Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course March 23-April 29, 1992.Students should report one day prior to the starting date for inprocessing.PSYOP BNCOC is five weeks, three days long and is conducted once peryear. It emphasizes PSYOP-related subjects, intelligence functions andcommon-core leadership tasks. The Army Personnel Command nominatesthe best-qualified soldiers to attend training, and unit commanders havethe option to approve, substitute for, or defer a candidate. For furtherinformation contact MSgt. Phil Snyder, SWCS Special Operations Propo-nency Office, at DSN 239-6406, commercial (919) 432-6406.

SF soldiers in grades E-6 through E-8 who have questions or commentsabout professional development or assignments should contact Capt. (P)Jeffrey Waddell or MSgt. Thomas Rupert at PERSCOM’s Enlisted Man-agement Directorate. Address correspondence to Commander; PERSCOM;Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452.Phone AV 221-8340, commercial (202) 325-8340. Army Reserve SF enlist-ed soldiers should contact SFC Ron Williamson at the Army Reserve Per-sonnel Center. Address correspondence to: Commander, ARPERCEN;Attn: DEAR-EPA-SF; 9700 Page Blvd.; St. Louis, MO 63132. Phone DSN892-2223, commercial (314) 538-2223, toll-free 1-800-325-4743.

Soldiers in Career Management Field 18 will now receive up to 60 promo-tion points for completion of the Special Forces Qualification Course/SFBasic NCO Course. (SF BNCOC is taught as part of the SFQC.) The addi-tional points can be used to compete for promotion beginning April 1,1992; there will be no retroactive promotions based on the new policy,according to Sgt. Maj. Bill Frisbie of the SWCS Special Operations Propo-nency Office. Local personnel service centers will add points according to aformula in PERSCOM message 121500Z Dec 91 and notify soldiers oftheir new scores. For further information contact Sgt. Maj. Bill Frisbie atDSN 239-9002/2415, commercial (919) 432-9002/2415.

SF ANCOC to run threeclasses in 1992

PSYOP BNCOC scheduledfor March 1992

PERSCOM, ARPERCENoffices can answer soldiers’ questions

CMF 18 soldiers to receiveadditional promotion points

March 1992 63

Spring 1989

Special Warfare

Enlisted Career Notes

For three decades, spokesmen for the now-former Soviet Union reservedsome of their harshest condemnations of Western military establishmentsfor U.S. Army special-operations forces. Recently, however, some Soviet com-mentary on U.S. SOF has been clearly complimentary. One authorexpressed admiration for the “professional efficiency” of U.S. SOF in JustCause, and suggested that the Soviets might “borrow” from the U.S. experi-ence of fielding and employing a spectrum of light and special-operationsforces — but for use in internal-security and stability actions. In discussingSoviet military spetsnaz training and activities in late 1990, the article saidthat spetsnaz groups studied the U.S. effort to rescue American hostages inTehran, concluding: “the operation of the U.S. reconnaissance service ... wasprepared for in a quite well-thought-out and thorough manner – it was bro-ken off purely because of events.” The author said that Soviet spetsnaz treatU.S. SOF with neither arrogance nor uncritical approval, noting, “Profes-sionals respect professionals.” These assessments, stripped of ideologicalcondemnations that characterized much of earlier reporting, highlight anintention to assess, and possibly draw on, U.S. special-operations experienceas members of the commonwealth restructure their own military and secu-rity forces.

A December 1990 interview with the commander of the Polish CapitalPolice Command Counterterrorist Division highlighted that unit’s missionsand training. According to the commander, the unit is charged with counter-ing both criminal and political violence. The unit has been involved in pro-tecting Polish and visiting foreign leaders; countering hijackings andhostage situations; and giving unspecified kinds of assistance in natural dis-asters. Unit training includes parachute, alpine, diving and skiing pro-grams; as well as armed and unarmed combat, including sniper skills. Somemembers of the unit are said to be military reservists assigned to the 6thAssault Landing Brigade, an elite Polish airborne/air-assault unit.

The acquisition of illegal arms by “terrorist” groups within the former USSRhas become a major problem for military and security forces charged withcontrolling interethnic and national conflicts and responding to violence ofall types. For several years, weapons have been stolen from military andsecurity-force warehouses, illegally purchased from soldiers and police, andseized by nationalist or criminal groups in armed attacks on isolated gar-risons. As a result, thousands of assault rifles and machine guns, as well asmortars, grenade launchers and other weapons, have found their way intoillegal groups of various types. In March 1991, a military spokesman fromthe Soviet Main Missile and Artillery Directorate pointed to an alarmingnew development — the production of assault rifles and pistols in clandes-tine shops. According to the Soviet officer, recovered weapons produced inthese shops are of high quality and clearly turned out by skilled specialists.Some models even included inscribed serial numbers, underscoring theincreasingly organized nature of weapons production.

Commander profiles Polishcounterterrorist unit

Recent Soviet commentary favorable to U.S. Army

special-operations forces

New aspects of illegal armstrafficking in former USSR

Spring 1989

Special Warfare

Foreign SOF

64 Special Warfare

Military establishments of former Warsaw Pact member-states have be-gun to examine war-fighting approaches that depart from the Soviet-War-saw Pact coalition model. A 1990 article in a Polish military journal notedthat future battlefields would see units operating in isolation, and it dis-cussed the prospect that such units could become encircled. Under thosecircumstances, the author noted, if “there is no communication from thesuperior, the subunit has not received another mission, and there is not achance of breaking through to its own troops, then the subunit shouldtransition to battle in the form of partisan or special actions.” This state-ment suggests that at least some Polish military theorists may be consid-ering unconventional war-fighting approaches under some circumstances.Polish armed forces are being reduced sharply in size, with some unitsredeployed eastward. The emergence of some kind of “people’s war” con-cept to deter a larger and more powerful neighbor would be an intriguingdimension to evolving military posture.

With a drug-cultivation problem in the Central Asian republics of the for-mer Soviet Union that evokes comparisons with Colombia, 1991 reports in-dicate that Ministry of Internal Affairs Militia Detachments of Special Des-ignation, or OMON, are being employed in drug-eradication efforts. OMONunits gained notoriety for their repressive and lethal activities in the Balticrepublics and are based in many other republic areas. Created to deal withterrorist incidents, serious criminal activities and the “maintenance of pub-lic order,” they are organized like SWAT teams or light infantry, dependingon their roles. With rapidly increasing poppy and marijuana cultivation,the continuing problem of wild and cultivated hemp, and the growing phe-nomenon of armed traffickers, at least some Central Asian republics arenow using OMON forces. In Tajikistan, for example, OMON elements aredelivered by helicopter to “plantations.” OMON forces destroy the cropsmanually, break down fences around the plots and destroy homemadewatering systems. The loosening control of central authorities, the desper-ate need for hard currency and the move to a market economy are expectedto result in an explosion of narcotics problems. As a consequence, “Soviet”or republic counternarcotics efforts may acquire an increasingly militarizedcharacter.

The Public Security and National Defense Council, or CONASEPUDEN,headed by former Noriega minister Menalco Solis, plans to train and add300 new members to the 600-man Presidential Protection Services. Thenew personnel will be equipped from an arms inventory that includesRPG-18 and Light Anti-Tank Weapon rocket launchers, Galil and M-16rifles, Uzi and Ingram submachine guns, M-60 machine guns, many cratesof fragmentation grenades and other small arms. CONASEPUDEN is arelatively new organization which was created and organized in responseto Cabinet decrees issued in 1990 and 1991. According to Panamanianreporting, many community members are apprehensive aboutCONASEPUDEN and its militarized and investigative components, fear-ing that they could become partisan paramilitary groups such as thosethat existed in the past.

Panamanian security forceto increase weapons

and personnel

Polish military journal raises possibility

of partisan warfare

‘Special designation units’used in Central Asian

counterdrug operations

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Arnaldo Claudio of the Foreign Mili-tary Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

March 1992 65

SOF units under new commanders

Two special-operations organiza-tions at Fort Bragg have recentlyreceived new commanders.

Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing tookcommand of the U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command Aug. 5, succeeding Lt. Gen. Michael F.Spigelmire.

General Downing was formerlycommander of the Joint SpecialOperations Command, also basedat Fort Bragg. He has served ascommander of the 75th RangerRegiment, deputy commanding gen-eral of the 1st Special OperationsCommand and director of the U.S.Special Operations Command’sWashington, D.C., office.

General Spigelmire replaced Lt.Gen. Frederick M. Franks Jr. ascommander of VII Corps, based inStuttgart, Germany.

USASOC, with a strength of27,000, is made up of soldiers fromboth active and reserve forces andis the Army component of the U.S.Special Operations Command,based at MacDill AFB, Fla. It pro-vides Special Forces, Rangers, Spe-cial Operations Aviation, CivilAffairs and Psychological Opera-tions soldiers to support U.S. the-ater commanders worldwide.

On Aug. 30, Maj. Gen. SidneyShachnow took command of the U.S.Army Special Forces Command, suc-ceeding Maj. Gen. James A. Guest.

General Shachnow was formerlythe commander of the Army’sBerlin Brigade. He has held a vari-ety of Special Forces assignmentsand had last served at Fort Braggas chief of staff and deputy com-manding general of the 1st SpecialOperations Command.

General Guest’s new assignmentis as director of operations for theU.S. Special Operations Command.

The Army Special Forces Com-mand, 9,500 strong, is made up ofactive and reserve Special Forcesgroups and support units. The com-mand was established in November1990 as part of a functional realign-

ment of forces assigned to the ArmySpecial Operations Command.

3rd SF Group activates 2nd Battalion

The 2nd Battalion, 3rd SpecialForces Group was activated duringceremonies at Fort Bragg Nov. 1.

The new battalion is commandedby Lt. Col. Robert M. Bailey; itscommand sergeant major is CSMClinton R. Davis.

Originally activated at FortBragg in 1963, the 3rd SF Groupwas deactivated in December 1969.Reactivated in June 1990, it nowconsists of a headquarters and twobattalions, with a third battalion

scheduled for activation in 1992.The group will number approxi-mately 1,400 soldiers when fullymanned, according to Maj. CraigBarta, public affairs officer for theArmy Special Forces Command.

USASOC names soldier,NCO of the year

The U.S. Army Special Opera-tions Command recently announcedits selections for soldier and NCO ofthe year following competition heldat Fort Bragg.

Sgt. Michael E. Nesbitt, 3rd Ran-ger Battalion, Fort Benning, Ga.,and Spec. Michael J. Russell, 1stRanger Battalion, Hunter ArmyAirfield, Ga., took top honors asNCO and soldier, respectively.

Runners-up were Sgt. Anthony D.Hardie and Spec. Sean M. Sum-mers, both of the Army Civil Affairsand Psychological Operations Com-mand’s 4th PSYOP Group.

Also competing for NCO and sol-dier honors were SSgt. John Gardand Cpl. Allen Davis of the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School,Cpl. Dennis Keller and Spec. KarlCampbell of the Army SpecialForces Command, and SSgt. ShawnJones and Spec. Ronald Kitchens ofthe 160th Special Operations Avia-tion Regiment, Fort Campbell, Ky.Each of the contestants in the USA-SOC competition had previouslybeen chosen soldier or NCO of theyear within their own commands.

SF Command opens Centerfor Special Ops Law

The Army Special Forces Com-mand has announced the opening ofa new facility designed to serve as alegal and doctrinal database for Spe-cial Forces soldiers.

The Center for Special Opera-

3rd Special Forces Group flash

Spring 1989

Special Warfare

Update

66 Special Warfare

tions Law is a 1,200-square-footfacility located near the SF Com-mand headquarters on Fort Bragg’sButner Road. It houses a library,copies of pertinent laws and regula-tions (classified and unclassified)and other materials covering arange of special-operations topics.The CSOL is designed to assist sol-diers, commanders and theirlawyers in all aspects of operations,international and intelligence law,according to Capt. Michael Newton,chief of the SF Command’s Opera-tions Law Branch.

Collected references includeinformation on counter-drug opera-tions, low-intensity conflict, intelli-gence law, counterterrorism,human-rights law, foreign internaldefense, fiscal law, the law of warand international law. The CSOLcan also provide units with country-specific information packets con-taining area studies, human-rightsdata and points of contact at theState Department.

For more information, soldiersmay call the CSOL at DSN 236-7176/8647, commercial (919) 396-7176/8647. During non-duty hours,callers may leave a message on theanswering machine or contactCSOL personnel through the SFCommand staff-duty officer (DSN239-7884/7001, commercial 919-432-7884).

New command establishedfor USAR units

The Army has established a newcommand for Army Reserve units,scheduled to become fully opera-tional in 1992.

The U.S. Army Reserve Com-mand was formed to increase therole of the Chief of Army Reserve inthe command and control of USARunits and management of USAR-specific resources.

USARC will not exercise com-mand of USAR elements whichreport to the U.S. Army SpecialOperations Command nor of non-CONUS-based USAR units.

Established as a provisional com-mand in October 1990, USARC

shed its provisional status Oct. 18and became a major subordinatecommand of Army Forces Com-mand. Its commander, Maj. Gen.Roger W. Sandler, also serves asChief of Army Reserve and asFORSCOM’s deputy commandinggeneral for reserve affairs.

Before USARC, Continental U.S.Armies, or CONUSAs, had com-mand-and-control authority ofUSAR units in their geographicareas of responsibility. USARC willgradually assume that authority,with CONUSAs retaining opera-tional control over USAR units fortraining, operations, mobilizationand deployment functions.

USARC assumed command andcontrol of USAR units assigned toFourth Army on Oct. 1. Currenttransition plans call for USARC topick up command and control ofUSAR units from First, Second,Fifth and Sixth Armies betweenJanuary and September of 1992,according to Lt. Col. Wetzel Brum-field, USARC public affairs officer.The command will become fullyoperational Oct. 1, 1992.

USARC is temporarily located atFort McPherson, Ga., on the south-ern edge of Atlanta, and will likelymove into leased facilities in theAtlanta area as it grows toward itsfull strength of some 700 military

and civilians, Brumfield said.

Army closes post at Bad Tölz

Flint Kaserne in Bad Tölz, Ger-many, long the home of the 1st Bat-talion, 10th Special Forces Group,closed July 15, 1991, in a ceremonyattended by hundreds of local resi-dents, soldiers and former membersof its military community.

During the ceremony, eight Spe-cial Forces soldiers parachuted inwith the official orders closing thepost. Speaking to those in atten-dance, Maj. Gen. Eugene L. Daniel,deputy commander of the U.S. Ar-my VII Corps, said the closure wasnot an occasion for sadness but areason to rejoice, since it resultedfrom the end of the Cold War.

Also addressing the crowd wasretired Col. Aaron Bank, 88, whoactivated the 10th SF Group, thefirst Special Forces unit, at FortBragg in 1952 and was commanderof the 10th when it moved to BadTölz in 1953.

“Special Forces men (are) nowand always will be a special breedof men — daring soldiers who willaccept calculated risks, risks thatgo beyond the normal call of duty,”Bank said.

The 10th Group was headquar-tered at Bad Tölz until 1968, whenit moved to Fort Devens, Mass.,leaving a battalion-sized elementdeployed at Bad Tölz.

The 1/10th remains in Germany,stationed at Panzer Kaserne inBoblingen, a suburb of Stuttgart.

(As reported by Joseph Owen,European Stars and Stripes – Ed.)

CA units, SWCS to developmission training plans

The Special Warfare Center andSchool and Civil Affairs field unitsare working to develop nine newmission-training plans to reflectupcoming changes in CA unit orga-nization and force structure.

In 1992, new tables of organiza-tion and equipment for Civil Affairswill modify unit structure to sup-port a wider range of missions. For-

Crest of the U.S. Army Reserve Command

���������������������

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March 1992 67

eign-internal-defense/unconven-tional-warfare battalions will pro-vide support to special-operationsforces in low-intensity conflict; gen-eral-purpose battalions will providesupport to general-purpose forces inconventional operations.

Mission training plans providethe unit commander with a mis-sion-oriented training program,according to Capt. Mark Stevenson,Civil Affairs ARTEP DevelopmentOfficer in the SWCS Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine. The newMTPs are being developed at theSWCS from material written by theindicated CA units:• Civil Affairs battalion (FID/UW)

[41-715-MTP] – 351st CA Command.

• FID/UW battalion general-sup-port detachment [41-717-30-MTP] – 353rd CA Command.

• FID/UW battalion direct-supportdetachment [41-718-30-MTP] –361st CA Brigade.

• General-purpose battalion [41-705-MTP] – 352nd CA Command.

• General-purpose battalion gener-al-support detachment [41-707-30-MTP] – 360th CA Brigade.

• General-purpose battalion direct-support detachment [41-708-30-MTP] – 358th CA Brigade.

• HHC, Civil Affairs command [41-701-30-MTP] – 352nd CA Command.

• Headquarters and headquarterscompany, Civil Affairs brigade[41-702-30-MTP] – 351st CACommand.

• Direct-support battalion [41-725-MTP] – 353rd CA Command.MTPs for the general-purpose and

FID/UW battalions were approvedby the SWCS commander in Octo-ber 1991, Stevenson said. Coordi-nating drafts of MTPs for the gener-al-purpose CA battalion’s general-support and direct-support detach-ments were mailed to field units forcomment in January. Coordinatingdrafts of MTPs for the FID/UW bat-talion’s general-support detachmentand direct-support detachment arescheduled to be mailed to field unitsfor comment in March. Other MTPs

are still being developed, but cur-rent plans call for all nine to becompleted prior to the conversion tothe new Civil Affairs TOE, sched-uled for Sept. 16, 1992. For furtherinformation contact Capt. Mark S.Stevenson, phone (919) 432-5333/3416, DSN 239-5333/3416.

Delta seeks recruitsThe 1st Special Forces Opera-

tional Detachment-Delta is current-ly recruiting worldwide for soldiersto plan and conduct a broad rangeof special operations.

Delta is the U.S. Army’s special-operations unit organized for theconduct of missions requiring arapid response with surgical appli-cation of a variety of skills. Becauseof this, Delta’s soldiers are carefullyselected and specially trained.

Delta affords officers and NCOsunique opportunities for profession-al development. Both undergo thesame assessment, selection andtraining and, after training, are as-signed to operational positions with-in the unit. Training and experiencegained while in Delta are much indemand, and soldiers will enjoyexpanded assignment opportunities.

Officers may command at thecaptain, major and lieutenant-colonel levels and serve as execu-tive and operations officers. Thereare also staff positions at DoD, JCS,DA, USASOC, USSOCOM andother joint headquarters, as well asinteragency postings, which will beavailable to officers because of theirtraining and experience.

NCOs have leadership opportuni-ties in the unit through sergeantmajor. There are also opportunitiesto serve on senior staffs as the resi-dent expert and adviser on uniquespecial operations. In addition toexceptional training, NCOs haveincreased levels of responsibilityand sufficient authority to completetheir assigned missions. They rou-tinely operate throughout the worldalone or in small, NCO-led teams.

Delta conducts worldwide recruit-ing twice a year prior to its fall andspring assessment-and-selection

courses. Recruiting for the fallcourse begins in Europe in March.All other locations are recruitedfrom April-July. Recruiting for thespring course begins in Europe inSeptember and other locations fromOctober-January. Call Delta’srecruiters at the numbers listedbelow for specific information onthe next recruiting drive.

General prerequisites (officer andNCO) are:• Volunteer• Army active-duty, Reserve or

National Guard (Reserve andNational Guard must meet eligi-bility requirements for entryonto active duty).

• Male• U.S. citizen• Pass a HALO/SCUBA physical

and eye examination• No limiting physical profile• Airborne-qualified or volunteer

for airborne training• Pass a background security

investigation and have at least asecret clearance

• Minimum age of 22• No history of recurring disci-

plinary action• Pass the five-event physical-fit-

ness qualification test (invertedcrawl; run, dodge and jump; push-up; sit-up; and two-mile run) and100-meter swim, all while wear-ing fatigues (or BDUs) and boots.NCO prerequisites are:

• Rank of sergeant (E-5) thrusergeant first class (E-7)

• Four years’ minimum time inservice

• Passing SQT score in primaryMOS (MOS immaterial)

• Minimum GT score of 110• Two years’ active service remain-

ing upon selection.Officer prerequisites are:

• Captain or major (branch immaterial)

• Advanced-course graduate• College graduate (BA or BS)• Minimum of 12 months’ success-

ful command (company, battery,troop, Special Forces A-detach-ment, or aviation platoon).For information on the unit, its

68 Special Warfare

prerequisites and training, callDelta recruiters at DSN 236-0689/0649 or call collect on the com-mercial line, (919) 396-0689/0649.

Delta is also interested in the fol-lowing MOSs in a support role:18D3P/4P, 33T3P/4P, 43E3P,55R3P, 63B3P, 71L3P, 75D3P and96B4P/5P. For information on sup-port prerequisites and assignmentopportunities, call Delta’s supportrecruiter, MSgt. Fred Johnson, atDSN 236-0960/0610, or call collecton the commercial line, (919) 396-0960/0610.

USAR linguist unit lookingfor new members

The First U.S. Army Reserve Lin-guist Unit is looking for memberswho want to practice their languageskills and improve their proficiency.

The unit is a non-pay reinforce-ment training unit whose membersdrill for retirement points. It is opento language-qualified Army Reser-vists of all ranks and specialties.Reservists who are members of troopprogram units are not eligible unlessthey transfer into the IndividualReady Reserve or become IndividualMobilization Augmentees.

Headquartered in Washington,D.C., the unit has detachments inColumbia, S.C.; Houston, Texas;San Diego, Calif.; Fort Meade, Md.;Norfolk, Va.; Pittsburgh, Pa. andNew York City.

For information write: First U.S.Army Reserve Linguist Unit (RTU);c/o Defense Language Institute;1111 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite507; Arlington, VA 22202-4306.

SF MQS manuals delayedSF Branch manuals for the Mili-

tary Qualification Standards Sys-tem Level II were delayed in print-ing but have now been distributed.

The original SF manuals were re-turned for reprint, according to Car-ol Bushong of the SWCS Directorateof Training and Doctrine’s Individu-al Training Division. Once reprint-ed, they were mailed, along with theInfantry Branch manual, to eachcompany-grade officer in Special

Forces. The manuals were mailed inJanuary; officers who have not re-ceived them should contact CarolBushong at DSN 239-9802, commer-cial (919) 432-9802.

OSS records open at National Archives

The National Archives has nowopened the bulk of its records deal-ing with the Office of Strategic Ser-vices to public examination andresearch.

The OSS, forerunner to both theCentral Intelligence Agency andArmy Special Forces, was a WorldWar II organization which conduct-ed intelligence analysis and special

operations. Its records include cor-respondence, reports, maps, pho-tographs, film footage and capturedpropaganda.

The most recent addition to therecords consists of more than 3,000cubic feet of declassified materialacquired from the CIA since 1980.For more than a decade, the Na-tional Archives has worked to de-classify, arrange, describe and indexthe materials, said Lawrence Mc-Donald, a projects archivist at theNational Archives. Earlier ArchivesOSS holdings consisted of approx-imately 1,000 cubic feet of recordsreceived from the State Department

after World War II and opened tothe public in 1976.

Materials from the CIA recordshave been gradually made availableas work on them was completed.Only a few hundred cubic feet ofrecords remain to be added, and theopened records now amount tonearly 5,000 cubic feet, enough tofill a large house, McDonald said.

While the Archives expects thatthe records will be used mainly byhistorians and researchers, the col-lection is open to anyone who re-quests access. The OSS records arecurrently receiving some of theheaviest reference of all the holdingsin the National Archives, McDonaldsaid.

The value of the records lies intheir comprehensive nature, saidMcDonald, who has worked withthe records since 1985. “BecauseOSS intelligence collection andanalysis covered every theater, therecords are a précis of the war. Ifyou somehow lost all the otherrecords of the Second World War,you could still write a pretty goodhistory from these records.”

President Franklin Rooseveltestablished the OSS in June 1942from the Office of Coordinator ofInformation, formed a year earlierto collect intelligence related tonational security. OSS retainedCOI’s leader, William Donovan, andexpanded to perform a number ofactivities, including espionage andcounterespionage, propaganda de-velopment, and covert-action opera-tions behind enemy lines. Thesecovert operations included the Jed-burgh mission, which sent three-man teams into France, Belgiumand Holland to organize guerrillaoperations against the Germans,and Detachments 101 and 202,which organized native guerrillaforces against the Japanese in Asia.

From OSS intelligence operationscame the experienced personnelneeded to form the CIA in 1947,and from its guerrilla-warfare oper-ations came the Army’s SpecialForces, formed in 1952.

Immediately following the war,

William Donovan, director of the OSSSpecial Warfare Museum

March 1992 69

President Truman disbanded theOSS, and its records went either tothe Department of State or to theWar Department’s Strategic Stud-ies Unit, a small cell of OSS veter-ans which later formed the nucleusfor the CIA.

Records acquired by the StateDepartment were primarily thosefrom the OSS Research and Analy-sis Branch, which collected infor-mation and produced analysis on awide variety of subjects, McDonaldsaid. The bulk of the records,including those dealing with intelli-gence, covert operations and propa-ganda development, became part ofthe CIA’s OSS archive and were notavailable for public examinationuntil after they were transferred tothe National Archives in 1980.

Special Forces Ballto be held in April

The Special Forces Ball is sched-uled to be held April 10 in Fayet-teville, N.C., to celebrate the fifthanniversary of the Special ForcesBranch.

The ball, open to all past and pre-sent SF officers, warrant officersand enlisted soldiers, will be held atthe Howard Johnson ConventionCenter. Time and cost are to beannounced. For further informa-tion, contact SFC Ette Zimmer atDSN 239-1717, commercial (919)432-1717, or Maj. Jean-Luc Nash atDSN 239-9002, commercial (919)432-9009.

PSYOP course offers optionfor FA 39 training

The JFK Special Warfare Centerand School has recently endorsedthe U.S. Army School of the Americ-as’ Psychological OperationsCourse, providing an additionaltraining opportunity for soldiers inspecial operations.

Officers in Functional Area 39B(PSYOP) with a regional orienta-tion toward Latin America maynow take the SOA PSYOP Courseas a full-credit alternative to thesix-week SWCS PSYOP Course inattaining 39B qualification.

Even though its content is thesame, the SOA course is longer —11 weeks compared to six —because of additional practical exer-cises, according to Maj. Jose Mar-tinez, FA 39 manager in the SWCSSpecial Operations ProponencyOffice. But the SOA course offerssoldiers the opportunity to improvelanguage skills, heighten culturalawareness and establish personalrelationships with the future mili-tary leaders of Latin America.

The SOA conducts two PSYOPclasses annually at Fort Benning,Ga. Classes scheduled for fiscal year1992 begin Feb. 26 and Aug. 31,1992. SOA teaches all courses in

Spanish, and attending officers mustbe competent Spanish linguists.

The SWCS has also requestedthat SOA develop a Civil AffairsCourse based on the SWCS CivilAffairs Course. This course couldprovide a similar training opportu-nity for officers in FA 39C (CA).SOA is currently analyzing LatinAmerican demand for the course,Martinez said.

For more information on FA 39training, contact the SWCS SpecialOperations Proponency Office atDSN 239-6406, commercial (919)432-6406. For specific informationon the SOA PSYOP Course, contact

SOA Directorate of Training andDoctrine, DSN 835-1914, commer-cial (404) 689-1914.

New equipment will improveSOF infil/exfil capabilities

Three equipment projects cur-rently under development at theSpecial Warfare Center and Schoolwill greatly improve infiltration,exfiltration and resupply of special-operations forces.

The Fast Rope Insertion/Extrac-tion System will allow soldiers toinfiltrate and to be extracted fromlanding zones which are not suitedfor helicopter-landing operations.

The FRIES consists of a 1 3/4-inch polyester-fiber rope with a loopat one end for attachment to amounting bracket inside the heli-copter. During fast-rope, soldiersslide down the rope — a methodwhich is faster than rappelling. Thelower end of the rope has six bridleloops to which soldiers can attachvests which they wear for extrac-tion by stabilized-body operations.STABO vests are included with thesystem, but they are the same asvests currently in use for STABO,according to Capt. Samuel Young,chief of the Infil/Exfil Branch of theSWCS Directorate of CombatDevelopments.

The rope comes in lengths from60-120 feet. It must be strongenough to support the weight of sixmen and their equipment and isdesigned to have a tensile strengthof 35,000 pounds, Young said.

The extraction capability of FRIESis currently restricted to speciallymodified MH-60s and MH-47s whichhave an I-shaped mounting bracket.The H-shaped mounting bracketsstill found on some helicopters couldfail during extraction operationswith FRIES, Young said, and unitswill not be able to use FRIES forextraction on those helicopters untilmodifications have been made.

FRIES is planned to be issued toSF and Ranger units at the rate of80 per group and 45 per Rangerregiment. Fielding of FRIES will bedelayed until after the revision of

Prototype of the ARABSFile photo

70 Special Warfare

Army Special Operations CommandRegulation 350-6, Rotary WingOperations, Young said. The revisedregulation and subsequently updat-ed technical manuals will containinformation telling units how totrain with the system.

The Aerial Resupply Accompany-ing Bundle System will make possi-ble pinpoint deliveries of suppliesattached to a radio-controlled,steerable parachute.

The system comes with a square-canopy parachute, a transmitter/controller and a guidance unit tosteer the parachute, Young said.The ARABS is capable of deliveringup to 500 pounds of equipmentfrom as high as 25,000 feet and canbe delivered from a variety of air-craft. “It’s basically a high-tech doorbundle,” Young said, “it will workon any aircraft you can throw adoor bundle out of.”

Once the bundle has been de-ployed, it is guided by radio controleither from an accompanying para-chutist or from the ground. “A greatdeal of the success of the systemwill depend on the training andcompetence of the operator,” Youngsaid. From high altitudes, the steer-able parachute can be used to deliv-er the supply bundle a considerablelateral distance from its exit point.This offset distance for the ARABScan be up to 20 kilometers (morethan 12 miles), and will help toensure the security of the aircraftand of the SOF team.

Possible future additions includethe global positioning system, a nav-igational system that takes positionreadings from satellites. With GPS,destination coordinates could be setbefore the drop and the bundlescould guide themselves to the target,Young said. Other possibilities areautomatic flaring of the canopy justbefore landing to lower its rate ofdescent, and modification of the re-ceiver to allow the ARABS to homeon the PRC 112V survival radio.

The system has been operational-ly tested by troops of the 7th SFGroup at Yuma Proving Grounds,Ariz., and is tentatively scheduled

for fielding beginning in fiscal year1993, Young said.

The MC-4 Ram Air ParachuteSystem, featuring tandem-mountedidentical square-canopy main andreserve parachutes, is the firsttype-classified ram-air parachutefor the Army.

The system consists of two 370-square-foot parachutes and an ad-justable harness. Both parachutesare ripcord-activated, and the re-serve may also be deployed by a jet-tisoned main parachute. The har-ness will also accommodate anautomatic opening device and anoxygen system.

Both canopies are capable of sup-porting a 360-pound rigged weight(jumper plus equipment). The MC-4was designed and tested for use ataltitudes between 2,000 and 25,000feet. Its higher opening altitudesgive it a greater lateral-transversecapability than the current MT1-XX free-fall parachute system,Young said.

The system has been underdevelopment since 1983 and hasundergone changes in require-ments, testing and numerous modi-fications, Young said. It has nowbeen type-classified in the Armysupply system. Fielding of the MC-4 will begin as soon as finalapproval of its technical manualhas been granted, probably duringMarch 1992.

Once the system has been fielded,soldiers who have suggestions formodifications to the MC-4, or forany infiltration, exfiltration orresupply items, should forward sug-gestions through their chain of com-mand to Commander; USAJFK-SWCS; Attn: AOJK-CD-ML. Forfurther information contact Capt.Samuel Young at DSN 239-9901/1816, commercial (919) 432-9901/1816.

SWCS publishing new SFSoldier’s Manuals

The Special Warfare Center andSchool is publishing a new series ofsoldier’s manuals to assist SpecialForces NCOs and officers.

Several new soldier’s manualshave already been publishedrecently by the SWCS:• STP 31-18B3/4-SM-TG, SF

Weapons Sergeant, October 90• STP 31-18C3/4-SM-TG, SF

Engineer Sergeant, October 90• STP 31-18E3/4-SM-TG, SF

Communications Sergeant, Octo-ber 90

• STP 31-18F4-SM-TG, SF Assis-tant O&I Sergeant, June 91

• STP 31-18II-MQS, SF CompanyGrade Officer’s Manual, July 91A new edition of the SF basic

tasks manual was published inSeptember, and a new soldier’smanual for SF medical sergeants isscheduled to be published in late1992, according to MSgt. John K.Thomas of the Individual TrainingDivision of the SWCS Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine.

Even though ITD develops thesoldier’s manuals and maintainssome copies for review and refer-ence, it does not stock copies for dis-tribution, Thomas said. Army AGpublications centers automaticallysend copies to all units which havepublications accounts with anestablished requirement for thosemanuals.

Unit publications officers shouldestablish requirements for soldier’smanuals for each MOS in the unit,Thomas said, to ensure that theyreceive new and revised editions asthey are published. In the back ofevery soldier’s manual is a refer-ence section listing manuals rele-vant to the MOS. ITD recommendsunits make lists of required manu-als from this reference section(including number of copiesrequired) and add them to theirunit’s publications requirements.Supplies of manuals can be orderedfrom the Baltimore PublicationsCenter using DA Form 4569. Formore information on publicationsaccounts, refer to DA Pam 310-10,The Standard Publication System:Users Guide.

March 1992 71

Armies in Low Intensity Con-flict: A Comparative Analysis.Edited by David A. Charters andMaurice Tugwell. London: Brassey’sDefense Publishers, 1989. ISBN: 0-08-036253-2. 272 pages. $45.

Low-intensity conflict is general-ly considered to be the major topicfor study by today’s Army. Eventhose formerly obsessed with the“Fulda Gap” mentality now concedethe necessity of studying and react-ing appropriately to LIC situations.The near-universal acceptance ofLIC makes this book important forour study.

The book’s organization is appro-priate. The editors introduce thesubject and define terms, providinga common foundation from whichthe reader can later make morevalid comparisons. Next, differentauthors analyze in turn the Ameri-can, Israeli, French, Canadian and

British experiences in LIC. Whilethe writing styles of the authors aresomewhat diverse, they share aheavy academic flavor and a strongemphasis on history. Potential read-ers should not be put off by thestyle — for the most part, it main-tains its readability.

Scholarship is one of the book’sstrongest points: it is of a very highquality throughout. The data ismostly historical, but some modernstatistics have been gathered withcare and determination.

The Canadian chapter looksdeeply at “peacekeeping” opera-tions. The Canadians are experts atthis, and the chapter is quiteinstructional.

The final major chapter looks atBritish operations in Northern Ire-land, which are of a particularinterest. The British policy of pre-emptive strikes against terroristsidentifies a key issue, “When do westrike pre-emptively?” Americanswill not like pre-emptive opera-tions, no matter how deeplyCongress directs that the militaryinvolve itself in the drug war. Forthis reason, the British experiencecould be a big help.

This book is neither great norsimple; it is truly intellectuallychallenging. It comes recommendedwith the qualification that the read-er must have some appreciation ofhistory and policy to attempt tofully understand the importantanalysis within. Serious students ofLIC should read it, as should “lay-man” soldiers. LIC is here to stay,and it behooves us to learn from themistakes of our predecessors.

Maj. Steven P. Bucci7th SF GroupFort Bragg, N.C.

Mates and Muchachos: UnitCohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War. By Nora KinzerStewart. New York: Brassey’s(U.S.), Inc., 1991. ISBN: 0-08-037439-5. 192 pages. $20.

Mates and Muchachos is animportant analysis of the conceptof military cohesion. The bookshould be read as a modern accom-paniment to S.L.A. Marshall’sMen Against Fire. Stewartresearched the issue well, usingboth Argentine and Britishsources. The book is written in astraightforward style and is well-organized, with each chapter rein-forcing the next.

Stewart’s research shows that theexperience of both the British andArgentine armed forces in the Falk-lands War reinforces lessons on mil-itary cohesion from previous con-flicts. Additionally, Stewart de-scribes military cohesion as multi-

Spring 1989

Special Warfare

Book Reviews

72 Special Warfare

dimensional bonding; made up ofhorizontal (peer) bonding, vertical(leadership) bonding, organization-al (institutional) bonding and soci-etal (civic) bonding. Stewart stress-es that soldiers need to form bondsat each level. Interviews with veter-ans of both sides strengthen herarguments supporting the impor-tance of all the dimensions of mili-tary cohesion.

Of particular importance is thedimension of organizational bond-ing. The author credits much of theBritish success in the FalklandsWar to the British regimental sys-tem, which is built upon tradition,pride and honor. British Marinesand members of the Para andGuards Regiments fought hard,because they felt the honor of theregiment was at stake. The authorquotes one British colonel as say-ing, “In the Second World War wemarched from Normandy to Berlin.We can bloody well march 80 milesto Stanley.” Stewart contrasts thissystem to the organization of theArgentine Army, largely made up ofone-year conscripts.

Unfortunately, Stewart’s argu-ment supporting societal bonding isunsound. She correctly shows howculture, societal values and thedefense budget all contribute tocombat effectiveness. However, sheweakens her argument by launch-ing into training, doctrine and tac-tics. These topics, while relevant,do not belong in an argument sup-porting societal bonding.

Additionally, the book could use agood proofreading by someone morefamiliar with military organizationand terminology. Passages such as“two battalions per artillery battal-ion,” and “The 3rd Artillery Infan-try Brigade,” detract from theauthor’s arguments and overallcredibility. Furthermore, the authormakes use of erroneous data frommilitary history on several occa-sions. For example, in one passagediscussing the burden of command,she uses the case of “Lee at Vicks-burg” to support her argument. Infact, Lee was 1,500 miles away

from Vicksburg at a place calledGettysburg. But, despite the error,she makes her point.

Despite its flaws, Mates andMuchachos is an excellent study onwhy soldiers fight. Understandingsoldiers is crucial to all leaders, andthis book is recommended.

Capt. Robert J. GaddisUSAJFKSWCSFort Bragg, N.C.

LIC 2010: Special Operations &Unconventional Warfare in theNext Century. By Rod Paschall.Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s (U.S.),Inc., 1990. ISBN: 0-08-035982-5.166 pages. $23.

Whenever retired Army Col. RodPaschall has something to say,members of the special-operationscommunity ought to listen. Paschallis an intelligent, articulate, well-read and experienced soldier withan impressive grasp of military his-tory. His latest book, LIC 2010:Special Operations and Unconven-tional Warfare in the Next Century,is an attempt to chart “the likelycourse of low-intensity conflict overthe next two decades.”

The book is interesting, though

relatively lightweight, reading.Some parts of the book are far toosuperficial, e.g., the author’s discus-sion of Soviet special-purposeforces. The text is well-organized,the writing style is fairly clear, andthe author offers several uniqueinsights on his subject. The cover-age of the topic is basically com-plete, but is not comprehensive.The weakest points in the book areits definitions and objectivity.

Paschall gets into deep trouble inhis first chapter by presenting vari-ous cursory definitions that applyto the subject of the book. “Low-intensity conflict” is a subset of“war,” as opposed to relative pointson the operational continuumstretching from peacetime competi-tion through conflict to war. Politi-cal and social struggle associatedwith insurgence are “warfare.”“Peace” is merely “an absence offighting.” “War” is “armed conflictsin which there were at least 1,000deaths per year.” “Foreign internaldefense” is “a euphemism for coun-terinsurgency” (the military’s rolewhich the author later says shouldbe “thrown into the rubbish heap ofhistory” and replaced by privatecontractors).

None of the definitions offered byPaschall square with the officialdefinitions used within governmentand academic circles today, nor arethey competent substitutes. Pas-chall’s claim that “they accuratelyrepresent the intent of the U.S.Army definitions” is simply not so.Paschall’s attempt to define hissubject is thus quite confused andconfusing.

The book displays strong biasesand a degree of short-sightedness.The author is “battle-focused,” em-phasizing “bang and boom” militaryaction over other, nonviolent appli-cations of the elements of power. Heis infatuated with the laser rifle,cruise missile, resupply operationsand direct-action “commandos.” Hemakes a good point on the irrele-vancy of arbitrary academic re-quirements for most officers, but hedoes not address the fact that polit-

March 1992 73

ical, social and cultural awarenessin depth are important traits of mil-itary leaders in LIC environments,outside of the relatively short peri-ods of activity devoted to killingguerrillas. Similarly, a range ofother important aspects of LIC getno or scant mention.

Despite (or perhaps because of)the uneven qualities of this book, itis useful for starting argumentsamong special-ops personnel of var-ied backgrounds and experiences. Itis not useful for settling any ofthese. Regrettably, the book is fartoo short, lean and expensive to beworth purchasing by members ofthe special-operations community.

Maj. William H. Burgess III3rd SF GroupFort Bragg, N.C.

American Guerrilla: My WarBehind Japanese Lines. ByRoger Hilsman. New York:Brassey’s, 1990. ISBN 0-08-037436-0. 312 pages. $21.95.

Roger Hilsman skillfully weavestogether his experiences as a WestPoint cadet, soldier, scholar andstatesman in a candid and occasion-ally humorous recollection of hisexperience as a guerrilla leader

with OSS Detachment 101 inBurma.

If the reader is expecting detailedaccounts of Detachment 101 orother guerrilla operations, he maybe disappointed. Hilsman providesbackground information, but thefocus is on his experience. He doesnot present himself as Lawrence ofArabia or an early version ofRambo, but as a thoughtful, inexpe-rienced young infantry officer withcommon human fears and foibles.

After lengthy reminiscing abouthis youth and abbreviated years atWest Point, Hilsman recounts hisfirst action as an infantry platoonleader in Burma. His ill-equippedand disorganized regiment wascommitted piecemeal to reinforceMerrill’s Marauders at Myitkyina.Casualties in Hilsman’s companyexceeded 90 percent and attested tothe difficulty of their task and lackof adequate preparation. Hilsmanhimself was seriously woundedwhile on a reconnaissance patrol.

Following his stay in the hospital,Hilsman, not overjoyed with theprospect of leading men in frontalattacks on pillboxes, sought someother line of employment. Seeking ameans by which he could betterexercise control over his own fate,Hilsman volunteered for Detach-ment 101. Initially, he was assignedas the OSS liaison officer with theBritish 14th Army. Subsequently,he requested and was given com-mand of a guerrilla battalion com-posed of Chinese, Karens, andShan.

Lacking any formal training inthe theory of guerrilla warfare,Hilsman formulated his own ideasaround the general rule of Det. 101 — keep moving and neverspend two nights in the same place.Hilsman maintained that “Guerril-las should never try to take andhold ground,” “Safety lies in move-ment,” and “Stay on the good side ofthe natives.” Lastly, he concluded,“When pursued, safety is notacquired by retreating towardfriendly lines, but by moving deeperinto enemy territory.” Basic ideas?

Absolutely, but ones that frequentlyspell the difference between successand disaster. Valuable practicaladvice on guerrilla stratagems,based upon first-hand experience,are liberally sprinkled throughoutthis easily read text.

Hilsman’s epilogue, “Burma’sLessons for Vietnam,” is of specialinterest. The discussion of theapplication of strategy, airpowerand large conventional forces inwhat some would argue was essen-tially a guerrilla war is a debateworth revisiting. Although occa-sionally distracted by his frequent,unnecessary defense of PresidentKennedy’s intentions and policies inSoutheast Asia, Hilsman includessufficient points on guerrilla war-fare to warrant close study.

Retired Col. Jerry King, USATampa, Fla.

About Face: The Odyssey of anAmerican Warrior. By DavidHackworth and Julie Sherman.New York: Touchstone Books, 1989.ISBN 0-671-69534-7 (paper). 875pages. $14.95.

Retired Col. David Hackworthhas written the story of his time inthe U.S. Army from 1946 to 1971. Itchronicles his initial assignment inItaly, combat duty and battlefieldcommission in Korea, life in thepeacetime Army, and his severaltours in Vietnam. Although ColonelHackworth doesn’t list his ownawards and qualifications, he was a“comer” and would have gone fur-ther if not for the disillusionmentwith the Army and Vietnam whichcaused him to speak out publiclyand leave the service.

The book is interesting if for noother reason than to follow thecareer of a great soldier and to hearhis war stories. The intent, though,is to describe what happened to theArmy leading up to Vietnam and toshow those things which eventuallycaused Hackworth to leave in dis-gust. He shows vividly the “twoarmies” of peacetime managerial

74 Special Warfare

bureaucrats and the warriors. Hiscontention is that in Vietnam, con-trary to other U.S. conflicts, thepeacetime leadership was notsuperseded by the warriors. Theresult was that the Army madenumerous mistakes in policy mat-ters and in tactics.

This book is believable readingand is well-presented. The prob-lems it describes are, to a largedegree, still with us, and Hack-worth’s final section discusses someof our current faults. It is construc-tive criticism which professionalsoldiers should take as such. It isalso good professional reading forthe topic of the “next Vietnam” andhow we should do things differentlyif we fight again in another uncon-ventional war.

Maj. Gregory T. BannerU.S. MilgroupEl Salvador

Armed Forces and ModernCounterinsurgency. Edited byIan F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott.New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985.ISBN 0-312-00449-4. 232 pages.$12.95.

Armed Forces & Modern Coun-terinsurgency examines major coun-

terinsurgency campaigns conductedby seven countries since World WarII. Rather than merely presentinghistorical descriptions or tacticalanalyses of those counterinsurgen-cy campaigns, the book examinesthe civil-military philosophies,strategies and tactics used.

In the introduction, the editorsdiscuss elements necessary to con-duct a successful counterinsurgen-cy: integration of military, political,and economic efforts; a unifiedpolitical and military chain-of-com-mand responsible for conduct of thecampaign; a chain-of-command thatis both “clean,” and clearly under-stood by all prosecutors of the cam-paign; effective intelligence collec-tion and dissemination; use of localassets (e.g., people) whenever possi-ble; and, the need to be flexible.The book then examines the cam-paigns in light of the presence andeffectiveness, or lack thereof, ofthese essential elements.

The first two chapters, the book’sbest, examine the British Army’scampaign in Dhofar, Oman, and theFrench Army’s campaigns inIndochina, Algeria and Chad. Thesechapters present both armies’philosophies, strategies and tactics,as they evolved through the campaigns.

The third chapter examinesAmerican involvement in the Viet-nam War. The author focuses onthe war’s counterinsurgencyaspects and blames America’sfailed effort on three problems: analmost total lack of integration ofmilitary, political and economicefforts; a divided political and mili-tary chain-of-command responsiblefor conduct of the war; and a chain-of-command so convoluted andcomplex that no one could under-stand its intricacies. Additionally,problems in the dissemination ofintelligence contributed to thefailed effort. While the topic willgenerate at least some controversyamong American military readers,the chapter presents a perspectiveon the war that should interest allSOF personnel.

The analysis of Uruguay’s fightagainst the Tupamaros is interest-ing for two reasons: it is the onlyurban insurgency examined in thebook; and, in the process of crush-ing the insurgency, the UruguayanArmy also crushed the country’sdemocracy. Analyses of Rhodesia(Zimbabwe) and South Africa areinteresting not only in themselves,but also because of the influencethe British Army and its experiencein Malaysia had on both theseAfrican armies and their campaignsagainst black nationalist guerrillas.

An interesting lesson of this bookis that all of the campaigns exam-ined, with the exception of Uruguay(the only urban insurgency), usedresettlement as a counterinsurgen-cy technique — with varying,though often negative, results.However, those negative resultswere due to the ineffectual andshort-lived commitments to makingresettlement work. Armed Forces& Modern Counterinsurgency is notmerely an interesting historicalaccount of various counterinsurgen-cy campaigns, it is also a valuable“lessons learned” text.

Capt. Tim M. MatherCo. A, 2/11th SF GroupFort A.P. Hill, Va.

March 1992 75

On War. By Carl von Clausewitz.Edited and translated by MichaelHoward and Peter Paret. Prince-ton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1984. ISBN 0-691-05657-9(cloth), 0-691-01854 (paper). 732pages. $47.50 (cloth), $18.95(paper).

Carl von Clausewitz’s magnumopus, On War, is one of the most-quoted but least-read classics ofmilitary literature. This is indeedunfortunate because it is the singlemost comprehensive military-politi-cal work on the nature of war everwritten, and this translation byscholars Peter Paret and MichaelHoward is the best available.

Written in the early 1800sagainst the backdrop of more thantwo decades of European warfare,On War is in a class by itself.Clausewitz is able to bring the forceof his personal experience as wellas in-depth historical knowledgeinto his analysis. Unlike otherworks on the same topic, his doesnot consider conflict in isolation,but analyzes warfare as an exten-sion of politics.

The son of a soldier, Clausewitzfirst experienced war first-hand asa 12-year-old lance corporal in

1793. He rose in rank rapidly be-cause of personal competence, asopposed to noble birth. He attendedthe most prestigious military schoolof his day, the Berlin War College,under the brilliant military scholar,General Scharnhorst. Clausewitzgraduated first in his class in 1803and began a highly successfulcareer as an officer in the PrussianArmy. He fought in numerous cam-paigns across Europe against theFrench under Napoleon, and helater fought against a short-livedalliance of France and Prussia inthe service of the Czar of Russia.His most distinguished positionswere those of chief of staff of twodifferent corps and superintendentof the War Academy in Berlin.

Although Clausewitz discussesall manner of war-fighting in hiseight chapters, it is his discourse onunderstanding the true nature ofwar that is most valuable to con-temporary military scholars. ArmyField Manual 100-5, Operations,reflects a great deal of his wisdom.

Clausewitz takes the positionthat war is always subordinate topolitical goals. He differs from SunTzu, who believed that once warbegan, it was the general who con-ducted the war until the enemy wasdefeated. In other words, military,not political concerns dominatedthe strategic war-planning process.Clausewitz supports a concept oflimited war, defined by a limitedpolitical goal: one where the com-plete destruction of an enemy armymight not be necessary.

This is not to imply that Clause-witz was in favor of conducting warby half-measures. He firmly be-lieved that all possible force shouldbe brought to bear on the enemy’s“center of gravity.” To be successfulin war, one must find and destroythe single most critical element ofnational power which allows hisadversary to fight — whether it benational will, logistics or economics.It was a radical thought for itstime: the clash of armies had decid-ed political questions in Europe forhundreds of years.

Clausewitz’s work was published,unfinished, after his death. The edi-tors make it clear in their introduc-tion that Clausewitz recognizedthat On War required a great dealof revision, but his death preventedhim from completing the work.

Even with the understandingthat On War was unfinished, andthat it was written in the context ofhis times, Clausewitz’s bookremains the single most valuabletext for understanding war, and itshould be required reading for allprofessional soldiers.

Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.4th PSYOP GroupFort Bragg, N.C.

The OSS. in Italy 1942-1945: APersonal Memoir. By Max Corvo.New York: Praeger Publishing Co.,1990. ISBN: 0-275-93333-4. 334pages. $29.95.

This book is all that it says it isand more. It is indeed a personalmemoir by the chief of operations ofthe Office of Strategic Services’Special Intelligence Section in Italy.It is also a carefully prepared, well-written and documented study ofall aspects of the fight to establishan intelligence network in Italy inWorld War II.

Corvo is obviously interested instraightening out what he perceivesas misconceptions or half-truthscontained in other accounts of theOSS in Italy. He does so in anauthoritative and complete fashion.His work should stand as aninvaluable primary source for any-one attempting to tell the story ofthe OSS in World War II. It is theinsider’s story, providing accountsof numerous nasty bureaucraticstruggles about methods, control,lines of authority and intelligencepractices.

Corvo certainly has a fascinatingstory to tell: one with continuingapplication to the special-opera-tions and intelligence communitiestoday. One is continually struck bythe resemblance in the goals, meth-

76 Special Warfare

ods and personnel of the OSS andtoday’s Special Forces. Even thoughCorvo was operations head of theSpecial Intelligence Section of OSSItaly (SI involving covert activities,civilian clothes and false identities)rather than the Special OperationsSection (raids, sabotage, guerrillawar and partisan support), his com-ments and lessons on deep-penetra-tion missions are invaluable.

Corvo has given us a “worms-eye”view of his section of the OSS frommid-1942 to the disbanding of theOSS in 1945. His first involvementwith OSS was indicative of the na-ture of this new office, formed byWilliam Donovan only after thestart of the war. Bored with hisduties at the Quartermaster Schoolat Camp Lee, Va., then-PrivateCorvo sent through channels, unso-licited, a complete plan for subver-sive warfare and intelligence collec-tion against Sicily in July 1942,four months before the allied land-ings began in North Africa — theessential first step to such an oper-ation. The plan eventually made itto the OSS and, with Corvo’s per-sonal brand of enthusiasm andnaiveté in arranging for meetingswith his state senator and otherofficials, earned him an introduc-tion and a transfer into the OSS.

Once in the OSS, Private Corvoproceeded to contact all of hisfriends and Italian organizations toput together the nucleus of an Ital-ian SI team. The ad-hoc nature ofthis practice led him into numerousblind alleys and, in one instance, tohis arrest in New York City byagents of the Counter-IntelligenceCorps who were suspicious of thissecond-generation Italian recruit-ing espionage agents.

Corvo, by now a lieutenant, sincethe presence of a private at high-level planning meetings led to someawkwardness, soon found himselfin Algiers, where the OSS was des-perate “to justify its presence in thefield.” Allied planners were by nomeans enthusiastic about the OSS.Its involvement in the North Af-rican landings was minimal, and it

simply did not have the assets tolaunch deep penetrations of Sicily.Nor did it have the organizationalclout. The British Special Opera-tions Executive and MI-6 (ForeignIntelligence) were also less-than-cooperative at times. Apparentlythey felt that their expertise andcontacts in Italy and the Balkansput them in the driver’s seat for allintelligence missions, and theywere not pleased to see a rival orga-nization developing.

Learning from its failures, theItalian SI section coordinated mule-train infiltrations through U. S.lines after the invasion of Sicily. Itwas also involved in negotiationswhich led to the surrender of Italy.However, it was run on a shoestringwith borrowed expertise (from theBritish), borrowed boats (from theNavy), no airplanes (only in August1944 did 30 C-47s arrive for regularOSS use), shortages of equipment(at one time only 11 radios wereoperational) and inherent couragedespite the failures. With the fail-ures came attempts by other partsof the OSS to take over personneland missions from the SI section.The result was lost time, conflictingmissions and, occasionally, foolishand sacrificial missions in order to“score points” in the bureaucratic

struggle for survival or expansion.Corvo’s sections on this petty warare the most illuminating and themost infuriating in the book. Thejealousy and maneuvers of the OSSofficials at all levels show few ofthem in a good light and make it allthe more remarkable that SI wasable to perform as well as it did.Corvo is to be commended for hiscandor in setting the recordstraight, even if it is uncomfortable.

This is a book well worth reading.It drives home again some SOF“truths” which cannot be repeatedtoo often: “Quality is more impor-tant than quantity,” “People aremore important than hardware,”“Quality people cannot be mass-produced,” and “You cannot createan organization of quality peoplequickly after the need arises.”Corvo proves these truths by show-ing us the unvarnished reality ofbuilding an organization in haste,even with quality people, and allthe costs that haste entailed. Thismemoir adds to the heritage of theOSS which, despite CIA claims tothe contrary, belongs at least inpart to special-operations forces,especially in terms of personnel,methods and techniques. We canlearn about our past from this book.

Dr. Richard W. StewartCommand HistorianU.S. Army Special Operations

CommandFort Bragg, N.C.

March 1992 77

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Special Warfare

Department of the ArmyJFK Special Warfare Center and SchoolATTN: ATSU–PAOFort Bragg, NC 28307–5000

PIN: 069206–000