Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–97–3 Summer 1997 Vol. 10, No. 3

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

As we prepare for a future characterized byincreasing missions and diminishingresources, the American military is seekingways of doing more with less. One way will beto rely on sophisticated technology to compen-sate for smaller forces.

One might expect that SOF, a relatively low-tech force, would receive less emphasis in sucha situation, but in fact, the missions that willprobably dominate the future — peace-enforce-ment, humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief — require human skills, which havealways been a SOF specialty.

In this issue of Special Warfare, Colonel EdPhillips examines the difficulty of providingforces for operations other than war withoutdiminishing the readiness of those units. Hecompares the U.S. attempt to confront OOTWto C.S. Forester’s analogy of savages attempt-ing unsuccessfully to pull a screw from a pieceof wood by applying more and more force. Inan effort to find the most cost-effective forcefor employment in OOTW, Phillips comparesthe advantages and disadvantages of SOFwith those of conventional forces.

Colonel William Flavin writes that one ofthe greatest problems in Europe’s future willbe the need for peace-building. Because theyalready have the skills and experience needed,SOF can provide a wide range of peace-build-ing capabilities. Flavin also suggests that theconcept of special-action forces, used duringthe 1960s, might be applicable in Europe inthe future.

Dr. Thomas Marks discusses trends andproblems in Asia and suggests that multi-national action, in various forms, may bethe preferred choice for dealing with manyof Asia’s difficulties. Whatever form themultinational actions take, Marks expectsSOF to be a key component.

Captain Paul Allswede’s article shows howa three-man Civil Affairs team contributed tothe CINCPAC’s peacetime-engagement pro-gram by assisting the Cambodian govern-ment in caring for Khmer Rouge defectors

and their families. The team’s actions assist-ed Cambodia’s efforts to end the KhmerRouge insurgency and demonstrated the wayin which a small SOF contingent can some-times help to bring about dramatic results.

Finally, Dr. Carnes Lord examines the roleof PSYOP in the RMA and finds that althoughthe RMA is largely a technical and informa-tion revolution, PSYOP has not assumed agreater importance in our warfare strategies.Looking back at recent operations, Lord citeslessons learned and suggests ways of achiev-ing the possibilities that PSYOP offers.

As the U.S. military plans for the future andprepares to operate more efficiently, we shouldremember that efficiency lies not only inachieving a greater return but also in expend-ing less effort. As in Forester’s analogy, theanswer is not to apply more force but rather toapply a different kind of force — one moresuited to the task. In many of the missions wewill face, that force will be SOF.

Major General William P. Tangney

Features2 Army SOF: Right Tool for OOTW

by Colonel Ed Phillips

14 Special Operations Forces and Peace Operations in Greater Europeby Colonel William Flavin

22 Strategic Trends in Asiaby Dr. Thomas A. Marks

28 PSYOP and the Revolution in Military Affairsby Dr. Carnes Lord

35 Civil Military Operations: CA Soldiers Assist in Cambodian Humanitarian Missionby Captain Paul S. Allswede

Departments38 Enlisted Career Notes39 Officer Career Notes40 Foreign SOF42 Update44 Book Reviews

PB 80–97–3 ContentsSummer 1997 Special Warfare Vol. 10, No. 3

Commander & CommandantMajor General William P. Tangney

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia W. McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkGloria H. Sawyer

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147.Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the Worldwide Web(www.usasoc.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Dennis J. ReimerGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

03748

Headquarters, Department of the Army

How can the United StatesArmy maintain its combatedge and carry out the shad-

owy missions that are not war butare certainly not peace? Must theArmy do more with less, or is there asolution already at hand to the chal-lenge of operations other than war?Perhaps the answer lies in using theright tool for the right job, especiallywhen the tool, Army special-opera-tions forces, is available now.

President Clinton’s national-security strategy of engagementand enlargement signals that oper-ations other than war, or OOTW(humanitarian and disaster relief,peace operations, counternarcotics,and the like), will be the “growthindustry” in U.S. foreign policy.1Engagement is inevitable and apo-litical. The incidence of combat andof OOTW has increased throughtwo successive administrations, oneRepublican and one Democratic.2

Engagement also means crusad-ing, but American crusading isnothing new. The U.S. committed toan “active internationalist agenda”with the National Security CouncilDirective (NSC 68) of 1950. Thisagenda had less to do with the riseof a Soviet peer competitor than itdid, as NSC 68 proclaimed, with“fostering a world in which the

American system can survive andflourish.”3 Stability is key to thatkind of world. Stability meansAmerican engagement in someform. (Thus, NSC 68 preceded thecore of President Clinton’s 1996National Security Strategy by 46years and, in effect, established ourpolicy from 1950 to the present.)

What has changed with the end ofthe Cold War then is not the agendaof American foreign policy, butrather the way by which Americanforeign policy must pursue thatagenda. The Cold War’s bipolarnature usually cast engagement atthe high end of the conflict spectrum

(Korea, Vietnam, and European IronCurtain containment). The post-Cold War’s multipolar nature willusually cast engagement at the lowend (Rwanda, Somalia and Bosniainvolvement). The Cold War’sdefined global threat enabled super-powers to engage by proxy. The post-Cold War’s uncertain regional threatrequires superpower leadership byexample. The messages for the U.S.military are: (1) engagement hasbeen and will remain essential toour foreign policy agenda; (2) thenature of engagement has expand-ed; and (3) the expanded engage-ment role requires a resolution ofstrategy and force planning betweenwar-fighting and OOTW.

This article examines the ways bywhich the U.S. military proposes toconfront its expanded engagementrole, and it offers an alternative toJoint Vision 2010/Army Force XXIthinking. The discussion will reviewthe advantages and disadvantages ofboth alternatives. It will then com-pare the impact of OOTW on eachalternative’s efficiency and assesseach alternative’s effectiveness in ad-dressing OOTW. By identifying themost effective tools available and byfinding the most efficient use ofresources, we may be able to resolvethe dilemma of whether to prepare

2 Special Warfare

Army SOF: Right Tool for OOTW

by Colonel Ed Phillips

The U.S. military wonthe Cold War, demon-strating its skill at thehigh end of the spec-trum in the Persian Gulf.It now must succeed inthe post-Cold War’s low-end competition with-out trading off war-fighting capability.

for what will be most in demand(OOTW) or what will be mostdemanding (war fighting).

In The General, C.S. Forester writes:“In some ways, it was like a debate of agroup of savages as to how to extract ascrew from a piece of wood. Accus-tomed only to nails, they made oneeffort to pull out the screw by mainforce, and now that it had failed theywere devising methods of applyingmore force still. … They could hardlybe blamed for not guessing that byrotating the screw it would come outafter the exertion of far less effort.”4

Is Forester’s analogy appropriateto our attempts at dealing withOOTW? What options already existin the force structure for creativityin tool selection, for innovation ineconomy-of-force application andfor a logical division of labor? Forceplanners must identify and exploitthese options if they are to confrontOOTW efficiently and effectively.

OOTW challengeThe U.S. military won the Cold

War, demonstrating its skill at the

high end of the spectrum in thePersian Gulf. It now must succeedin the post-Cold War’s low-endcompetition without trading offwar-fighting capability. And itmust do so with significantly fewerresources than it enjoyed duringthe Cold War. This phenomenon isthe fundamental problem con-fronting the U.S. military today —so much so that Chairman of theJoint Chiefs General John M. Sha-likashvili has identified the need tobalance advancing national inter-ests in peacetime with maintainingreadiness for war as the “challengeof the new strategic era.”5

The challenge is fundamentalto U.S. military strategies for thepost-Cold War environment andto attempts to plan the forcestructure for the early 21st cen-tury. Robert Hoffa suggests that“the single most contentious poli-cy related to general-purposeforce planning is the dedication offorces to peacekeeping chores atthe expense of the conventionalmission. … Resolution of thefocus debate will have consider-

able implications for the shapeand structure of U.S. forces.”6

Efficiency paradoxThe armed forces face an appar-

ent “zero-sum” game with expand-ing OOTW commitments. Defensebudgets and force structure aregoing down. At best, DoD budgetswill probably hover around 2.9-3.0percent of the gross domestic prod-uct for the foreseeable future.7 Thethreshold for U.S. commitment islow. According to National SecurityAdviser Tony Lake, military forcescan be used for almost any purpose.8The fiscal and temporal implicationis that DoD must conduct moreoperations (most of which areOOTW) without destroying readi-ness for the overarching first priori-ty — fighting the nation’s wars.9

Fighting and winning the nation’swars, as then-CJCS General ColinPowell declared, remains “job one”for the military.10 But focusing in twodirections at the same time holdsserious consequences for any organi-zation, civilian or military. Dilutionof cognitive effort normally results inerosion of the skills necessary toexcel at the main effort. James Wil-son and Carnes Lord note that high-performance organizations are inagreement on the way critical tasksare defined.11 Agreement enhancesorganizational cohesion, sense ofpurpose and member-comfort levels.Humans avoid uncertainty. Accord-ing to Lord, “Expansion into areasonly peripherally related to the‘organizational essence’ dilute orblur the central function.”12

Stephen Cimbala captures thecognitive organizational problemsuccinctly: “Forces optimized forhigh intensity combat simply can-not be reduced in size and reas-signed to OOTW. U.S. forces’ senseof military professionalism may becompromised outside the compe-tency of military training and

Summer 1997 3

Operations other than war, such as Somalia, may require U.S. conventional military forces to per-form missions outside the realm of their military training and experience.

Photo by Michael J. Halgren

experience. Assigning militaryforces to nation-building invitespossible confusion between a mili-tary mission and a broader politi-cal one, to the detriment of militaryand political objectives.”13

There is an inverse relationshipbetween executing OOTW andmaintaining fiscal, temporal andcognitive readiness for war-fight-ing. Military organizational effi-ciency is the ratio of inputs (dollarsand time) to outputs (war-fightingprowess).14 Therefore, the possibil-ity that involvement in OOTW willdegrade efficiency is real.

The combination of fiscal, tempo-ral and cognitive factors is shown inthe chart above. The chart summa-rizes OOTW’s impact on efficiency —the first criterion that will be usedlater to evaluate the alternatives.

Effectiveness challengeOOTW requirements are pro-

foundly different from those of tra-ditional war fighting. Authorities

point to a defining separationbetween the two: OOTW is, at thecore, long-term and preventive innature, while war fighting is short-term and reactive.15 Dr. LarryCable describes the difference as“patience, persistence, and pres-ence versus find, fix, and destroy.”16

OOTW requirements are interde-pendent, dynamic and repetitive.The ultimate measure of OOTWsuccess is not steel on target, butrather no target for the steel.

OOTW is also an inherently“human” enterprise. Stephen Metzof the Army War College postulatesthat “while machines may domi-nate land combat in the future,they will not be capable of the com-plex and subtle interface withhumans. Only highly trained offi-cers and soldiers can cultivate thesophistication to succeed in peaceoperations. This requires ‘scriptadaptability.’ ”17 Metz contends thatinteragency cooperation, morethan service jointness, will be anOOTW unity-of-effort prerequisite.

Across the board, the recurrentthemes in OOTW are patience,extended physical presence, culturalsensitivity, language skill, inter-agency coordination and the need foran innovative approach. Recurrentconcerns include a high potential forthe “cure being worse than the dis-ease,” and the questionable applica-bility of traditional military power.18

Some authorities advocate amodest disposition of forces inorder to maintain a low profile.19

Still others express concern overthe unintended consequences ofmilitary intervention. Evenhumanitarian operations raisequestions of sovereignty that canlink benign intervention to imperi-al colonialism. By comparison,oppressive local thugs can take onthe mantle of a Robin Hood.20 Pro-tracted employment of U.S. combatforces in OOTW may also jeopar-dize the ultimate American centerof gravity: public support.

There is a direct relationshipbetween effectiveness in OOTW

4 Special Warfare

OOTW War-Fighting Paradox IMPACT ON EFFICIENCY

INPUT DESIRED OUTPUT OOTW IMPACT

Fiscal Materiel/personnel readiness Diversion of O&M funds Training events Maintenance R&D Monetary flexibility QOL funding

Temporal Skills/morale Dissipation of time available Training opportunities Family time

Cognitive War-fighter mentality Dilution of focus Organizational purpose Skills concentration Organizational essence Diffuse doctrine

Reduced combat skills Outdated hardware

Potential Cumulative Costs Reduced unit cohesion

Lower morale Lower retention “Hollow force”

and possession of the correct reper-toire of organizational skills. A mil-itary organization’s effectiveness isthe ratio of its outputs to its objec-tives.21 Therefore, the repertoire ofskills possessed by an organizationwill largely dictate the organiza-tion’s effectiveness in accomplish-ing its objectives. The skills neededin OOTW are shown in the chartbelow. This chart reflects the skillsthat organizations must develop ifthey are to successfully contendwith OOTW. Effectiveness is thesecond criterion that will be usedlater to evaluate the alternatives.

OOTW strategiesIn the 1995 National Military

Strategy and in Joint Vision 2010,General Shalikashvili describes themilitary’s macro plan for dealingwith OOTW. The JV 2010 descriptoris “full spectrum dominance,” a con-cept that uses existing forces toaccomplish a broader variety of mis-sions — doing more with less, but

with more capable technologies. Thedefining characteristic of the con-cept is the perennial use of a war-fighter unit serving as the OOTWlead agency. Excerpts from JV 2010and the NMS illuminate the con-cept: “We recognize that peace oper-ations are different from traditionalmilitary operations in the tasks andcapabilities they require. We aredeveloping doctrine and training forthese operations. Our guidelinescontinue to be to commit sufficientforces to achieve objectives decisive-ly and to reassess the size, composi-tion, and disposition of forces toachieve our objectives.”22

Shalikashvili also states: “Otheroperations, from humanitarianassistance in peacetime throughpeace operations in a near hostileenvironment, have proved to bepossible using forces optimized forwartime effectiveness. For non-combat operations, physical pres-ence will likely be even moreimportant. Simply to retain oureffectiveness with less redundancy,

we will need to wring every ounceof capability from every source.”23

Curiously, there is no mention ofspecial-operations forces, or SOF,in JV 2010.

Shalikashvili acknowledges thata different skills repertoire is nec-essary for realizing OOTW objec-tives. Because OOTW skills arelong-term in acquisition, war-fight-er units will incorporate some ofthem, but only the modest, combat-related ones. Combat units will dodouble duty, taking on OOTW asan implied mission. OOTW mustbe as decisive and as limited inscope as practicable. The OOTW“rose” must be handed off as soonas possible. Why? The overarchingtheme is damage control. Thechairman recognizes that the costsin war-fighting efficiency are notworth the effectiveness gains fromOOTW execution. War fighting is,after all, job one.

Some observers disagree withthe chairman’s notion that stopgapmeasures will succeed. Cole

Summer 1997 5

OOTW Repertoire Requirements IMPACT ON EFFECTIVENESS

AREA SKILLS/OUTPUT OBJECTIVES

Fiscal Economy of effort Overhead costs More bang for the buck U.S. presence/threat image Home-grown solutions U.S. target signature

Environment Set conditions Create permissive setting

Temporal Stay for the long haul Systemic focus Preventive diplomacy Violence Stability

Interpersonal Cultural awareness Host acceptance Language Leverage, dialogue Multidisciplined Address holistic problem Interagency Team effort

Reduce incidence of crisis Long-term stability Potential Cumulative Impact Exploit host capabilities Passive intel collection Reduce geopolitical surprise

Kingseed specifically cautions thatmilitary planners must “attend topromoting long term stability andsustained host nation develop-ment. Planners should emphasize‘nation assistance’ as a specifiedmission and maintain forwardpresence in areas critical to U.S.interests.”24 Floyd Spence’s criti-cism is more direct: “Doing morewith less is an accurate descriptionof the U.S. military, but it is a slo-gan, not a plan, and a recipe foreventual failure.”25

Army officers LieutenantColonel Geoffrey Demarest andCaptain Robert Bateman questionthe efficacy of the stopgap trainingmentioned by the chairman:“Untrained force is not what weshould commit (to OOTW), butwhat we must do when institution-al personnel policy and trainingpriorities combine to prevent anyone unit from becoming proficientover time.”26 “The weight of Air-Land Battle promises to keep theArmy’s training and education sys-tem from mastering concepts need-ed to respond to problems at the

low end of the conflict spectrum.”27

Full-spectrum dominance mightbe described then as “warfare dom-inance with economy in OOTW.”Criticism aside, Shalikashvili,faced with diminished resourcesand a national constituency averseto casualties, takes a hedgeapproach to OOTW strategy: over-whelm with force, avoid decisiveengagement, clear out fast, get onwith what is important. The con-ventional military cannot afford tofield a force structure with a skillrepertoire focused on OOTW.

The Army’s Force XXI visionprovides a micro view of thechairman’s concept.28 The focus ofForce XXI is “information domi-nance”; that is, the ability to seethe battlefield in near-real timeand to make operational-leveldecisions in minutes rather thanin days. Technology is the center-piece of this concept. Force XXI (asystem) marks its forwardmomentum by tracking theprogress of subsystems (theComanche helicopter, automatedC4I systems, the Crusader 155

mm howitzer, and logisticsautomation, to name a few).

According to General DennisReimer, Army chief of staff, full-spectrum dominance means domi-nant maneuver, precision strike,force protection and focused logis-tics29 through exploitation ofenhanced technology. OOTW is asecondary concern, but “real” unitswill always be in charge of OOTW.

Many agree with such an orien-tation, and with good historicalprecedence. In testimony beforeCongress, columnist Harry Sum-mers claimed that the proper mil-itary “value system” is firmlyrooted in war fighting. He made acompelling point about the impor-tance of war-fighting focus byreviewing the capstone doctrinein FM 100-5 from each of threeeras: World War II, Vietnam andthe Gulf War. In 1941, FM 100-5said the Army should “destroy theenemy’s armed forces in battle.”In 1968, FM 100-5 said the Armyshould “provide a presence to cre-ate, preserve, and maintain anenvironment of order and stabili-ty.” In 1986, FM 100-5 said theArmy should “destroy the enemythroughout the depth of the bat-tlefield.” Summers then allowedcongressmen to draw their ownconclusions.30

Other sources cite temporaltrade-off pitfalls associated withOOTW. The General AccountingOffice concludes that “while partici-pation in peace operations enhancesthe capabilities of some formations(aviation, signal, and special opera-tions), combat skills are at thegreatest risk of atrophy. … Thegreatest impact is in removing aunit from its normal training cycleand equipment. … Army command-ers estimate a required range ofthree to six months to restoreOOTW participant units to fullcombat capability.”31 (A dismount-ed infantry battalion is responsible

6 Special Warfare

Major General William Nash, commander of the 1st Armored Division, talks with a Russian sol-dier. Nash’s division’s superb performance in Bosnia may have high costs in terms of readiness.

Photo by Ken Bergmann

for maintaining proficiency in 60collective tasks.)32

Cimbala references testimonybefore Congress by General CarlVouno, former CSA, as evidence ofthe fiscal impact on Army efficien-cy of conducting OOTW. Vouno tes-tified that “commitment of combatforces (hence O&M dollars) topeacekeeping missions de factodilutes readiness to meet twoMajor Regional Crises (MRCs).” In1993 alone, Congress allocated$1.1 billion to supplement expendi-tures from unforeseen OOTW.33

The figure for FY 1995 was $2.5billion, according to Defense Secre-tary Perry.34

The Army’s approach to OOTW —attempting to minimize OOTWimpact on core competency —makes sense if one assumes thatthe only rational base line forOOTW is the combat division, aug-mented with other combat serviceand SOF. Events in Somalia, Haiti(involving the 10th and 25thInfantry Divisions), and Bosnia

(involving the 1st Armored Divi-sion) make it clear that this is theArmy’s frame of reference. As thechairman stated, this pattern willwork, and under many conditionsit will work well. (Major GeneralWilliam Nash’s 1st Armored Divi-sion has set the standard with itssuperb performance in Bosnia.)

But the cost of success in war-fighting readiness (and thus effi-ciency) is astronomical. Considerthe Bosnia example. The 1stArmored Division stripped theremaining U.S. division in Europe(1st Infantry) as well as unitsfrom U.S. V Corps to fill its ranks.The same occurred with logisticsresources. Then the divisiontrained exclusively, seven days aweek, from September 1995through its deployment in Decem-ber. Priority for key training facil-ities in eastern Germany went tothe 1st Armored, affecting thetraining readiness of other forma-tions. Because mission exigenciescurtailed normal personnel rota-

tions, every Army unit in Europewill experience a disproportion-ate, immediate turnover when the1st Armored returns.

Had the Soviet Union still beena viable threat, the Army inEurope could not have conductedthe mission.35 As it stands, thecost in readiness is staggering —dollar figures excluded. Theeffects on war-fighting efficiencycascade and reverberate through-out the Army, affecting national-security interests. The stakes inBosnia (NATO’s perceived viabili-ty and the legitimacy of U.S. lead-ership) justify the cost, but mostOOTW will not. The chart aboveshows the advantage/disadvan-tage trade-offs associated withthe U.S. military’s present andfuture OOTW strategy and forcestructuring. Not depicted, butperhaps more insidious, is therisk that the conventional-forceoption places on U.S. grand strat-egy. Casualties or some type of“debacle” (so-called or real) can

Summer 1997 7

JV 2010/Force XXI OOTW Advantages–Disadvantages

ADVANTAGES TRADE-OFFS DISADVANTAGES

Provides security/overwhelming force High fiscal and temporal expense Cascading effect on other units Makes large target Sends aggressive signals High media visibility Difficult to disengage

Uses/justifies existing force structure (Defense appropriations) Inappropriate skills False expectations May set up for failure

Avoids fund diversions to “non-war-fighter” force structure Limits outcome of effectiveness Dilutes war-fighter training focus “Ad hoc vs. systemic” approach

Does more with less Jeopardizes core competency Jeopardizes organizational ethos

Critical tension point Core competency

derail national policy, as Somaliademonstrated.

The SOF alternativeSOF (primarily Army Special

Forces, Psychological Operations,and Civil Affairs) can provide anexisting economy-of-force solutionto take the “OOTW monkey” off theback of combat formations.36 Whenthe presence of combat forces isunnecessary, SOF can, in concertwith civilian international organi-zations, nongovernment organiza-tions, private volunteer organiza-tions, Department of State, and thelocal population, conduct OOTWalmost indefinitely. When the pres-ence of combat forces is essential forcombat-related forced entry, SOFcan relieve the combat forces earlyand allow them to retain their war-fighter focus. When military objec-tives are subordinate to psychologi-cal, economic or political ones, SOFcan be the tool of choice by virtue oftheir core competencies in languageand intercultural relations.

SOF efficiencies are the mirrorimage of combat-unit efficiencies.The attributes that make combatformations less OOTW-effective arethe attributes that make SOF moreOOTW-effective. SOF has morelimited application in full-blowncombat, but they are tailor-madefor OOTW.

This alternative envisions “man-on-man” coverage of U.S. areas ofinterest, 365 days per year, as thefirst line of stability. The desiredoutcome is crisis avoidance. Thisconcept is already a reality (in FY1995, SOF conducted 2,765 deploy-ments to 137 countries, using only3,650 personnel).37 And the price isright. FY 1995 SOF expenses (ad-justing for personnel costs, whichthe services paid) represented about1 percent of all DoD outlays, andslightly more than 5 percent ofArmy expenditures.38

In most of these cases, SOF per-sonnel worked for the interagencycountry team and the theater com-mander in chief. (Military Observ-er Mission Ecuador-Peru is a goodexample. U.S. observer-communi-cators are from the Army’s 7thSpecial Forces Group and work forthe CINC through the MOMEPchain of command. About 30 SFtroops control what could haveevolved into a major force deploy-ment.)39 Ensuring consistency and“right country selection” is prob-lematic in OOTW because of diffi-culties in developing stability-campaign plans between DoD andDoS authority lines. SOF canserve as the interagency “go-between” that is essential toOOTW.

When crises occur, SOF can gen-erate creative, non-standard taskorganizations and command rela-tionships. SOF might fall under aconventional-force JTF for initialentry, then assume command of allresidual forces as soon as extensivecombat power is no longer neces-sary. The joint SOF task force, orJSOTF, could work for U.S. political

authorities and incorporate civil-ian organizations as components.The JSOTF could assume responsi-bility for operations at the outsetby taking operational control of tai-lored combat units. This arrange-ment would free war-fighting head-quarters to concentrate on otherissues and would put the elementwith the appropriate skill reper-toire in charge.

This idea, ignored so far by themilitary hierarchy, found an indi-rect supporter in the late GeneralMaxwell Thurman. Commenting inan interview after Operation JustCause, then-CINCSOUTH Thur-man conceded that he had “under-estimated SOF potential for get-ting results in the twilight betweenall-out war and all-out peace.” Hemarveled at how SOF had accom-plished so much in Panama with sofew men.40

The use of the SOF alternativeputs U.S. policy at less risk, throughreduced target signature and localacceptance. It is more difficult totarget SOF elements because they“hug” the local population.

The fundamental weakness of

8 Special Warfare

General Maxwell Thurman (second from right), the CINCSOUTH during Operation Just Cause,later marveled that SOF had accomplished so much in Panama with so few soldiers.

Photo by T.K. Ritchie

the SOF option is that withoutcombat-force augmentation, SOFcannot generate the security neces-sary to set conditions for initialconflict resolution. SOF cannot“stand in the line of battle” like thecombat division. The amount ofday-to-day coverage that SOF cangenerate in a theater is about 21Army teams (the addition ofSEALs increases the coverage).Beyond this number, SOF suffersthe same temporal efficiency costsas the war-fighting forces.

The advantages and disadvan-tages of OOTW trade-offs for theSOF alternative are shown in thechart below. The charts on pages 7and 9 are veritable mirror images.The split in alternatives is at thecritical tension point for each —infrastructure efficiency for SOFand OOTW effectiveness (definedby core competency) for war-fight-ers. The question is, Which of thealternatives appears to maximizeits strengths and minimize itsweaknesses under all conceivable

approaches to strategy and force-planning? Three criteria — effi-ciency, effectiveness and planningmethodology — form the axes ofevaluation.

Evaluating alternativesThe chart on page 10 compares

the JV 2010 and SOF OOTWalternatives against the backdropof the standard force-planningalternatives described by NavalWar College professors Bartlett,Holman and Somes.41 The force-planning alternatives representall rationale for development of aforce structure. The chart buildson the efficiencies-effectivenessmodels already discussed by com-paring them against all conceiv-able force-planning approaches.

The top-down planning ap-proach emphasizes national objec-tives, ends and systemics. TheSOF option supports this conceptby offering efficiency — low diver-sion of O&M or R&D funds (fis-

cal), low or no cost in combat-unitreadiness or morale (temporal), nocost in war-fighter focus (psycho-logical) — and effectiveness —cheapest option (fiscal), systemicsolution over the long haul (tem-poral), best-available core compe-tency (interpersonal). As in allcases, setting the conditions orenvironment is an effectivenessmeasure that SOF cannot performalone.

The bottom-up approach focus-es on the use of existing militarycapabilities at the expense of cre-ativity. This approach is the basisof the JV 2010 OOTW plan: Effi-ciency equates to justifying theexisting force structure (fiscal);and effectiveness equates to usingoverwhelming force to set theenvironment for conflict resolu-tion. Although JV 2010’s OOTWplan comes from a bottom-upstart point, the matrix makes itclear that the SOF alternative isthe better option under bottom-upplanning.

Summer 1997 9

SOF OOTW Advantages–Disadvantages

ADVANTAGES TRADE-OFFS DISADVANTAGES

Low fiscal and temporal expense Insufficient combat power Limited effect on other units Lack of sustainment/logistics Makes small target Limited forces available for Sends benign signals 365-day operations Low media visibility Easy to disengage

Appropriate skills repertoire Does not justify service force Less risk of failure structure or big-ticket R&D Small terrorist/scrutiny target appropriations

Increases chance of positive outcome Protects war-fighter training focus Promotes systemic approach

Does more with less Capitalizes on core competency

Critical tension point Infrastructure efficiency

The scenario and threat ap-proaches focus on potentialadversaries, and when they arecombined with bottom-up plan-ning, explain the logic behind JV2010 — worst-case planning. Thehedging approach is closelyrelated and follows from the war-fighter focus on being able tohandle worst-case threats in anera of limited resources. The war-fighter alternative competes mostfavorably under these planningapproaches.

The mission-planning ap-proach zeroes in on functional-area-friendly capabilities. Underthis and every other planningapproach, interpersonal effective-ness is a SOF strength. Despitethe logic of the SOF alternativeunder the mission-planningapproach, senior planners havechosen predictable OOTW solu-tions based on combat-divisionbuilding blocks.

The technology approach is cen-tral to the way JV 2010 will domore with less: efficiency isdefined as doing more with the

same or reduced force structure(fiscal), at higher speed to limitreadiness and morale costs (tem-poral). Effectiveness is defined asusing overwhelming force (actu-ally overwhelming fires) in theshortest time. As in the bottom-up approach, the SOF alternativeappears to be more attractive.Providing more high technologyto SOF might skew the alterna-tive comparison matrix evenmore. The fiscal approach favorsthe SOF alternative hands down:The logic behind a force accom-plishing the OOTW requirementat 1 percent of the DoD budgetrequires no amplification.

Comparison of the alternativesfavors the SOF OOTW optionover the JV 2010 option by ascore of 35 to 18. Assigning com-bat forces to a JSOTF (and there-by obviating the environment-setting factor) would raise thescore in the SOF alternative’sfavor to 40-13. However, thealternative comparison matrix israther simplistic and broad-based. Is there a way to measure

the validity of its findings basedon empirical evidence?

Uphold DemocracyThe record of SOF operations in

Haiti bears out the validity of thealternative comparison matrix in aconvincing way. A comparison ofcosts (efficiency-fiscal) versusreadiness impact (efficiency-tem-poral) versus the amount of territo-ry controlled (effectiveness-inter-personal) is insightful.

ARSOF total expenditures forthe period August 1994 throughFebruary 1996 were $16.83 mil-lion.42 According to the Congres-sional Research Service, total U.S.troop costs in Haiti for the periodSeptember 1994 through January1995 were $200.9 million.43 Thatmeans non-SOF costs were approx-imately $182.158 million. This rep-resents a SOF cost share of about9.2 percent.

Extrapolating for time presentsa more realistic picture. SOF par-ticipated three times as long asthe period covered in the CRS

10 Special Warfare

Alternative Comparison Matrix EFFICIENCIES EFFECTIVENESS Fiscal Temporal Psychological Fiscal Environmental Temporal Interpersonal

Top-down S S S S W S S

Bottom-up W S S S W S S

Scenario W W S W W W S

Threat W W S W N S S

Mission S S S S S S S

Hedging S W S W W W S

Technology W W N S W S S

Fiscal S S S S N S S

Legend: S = favors SOF W = favors war-fighter units N = neutral

report. Carrying forward thegeneric mathematics logic, thewar fighters’ comparable costswould conservatively fall in the$546-million range, bringing thecomparison down to 3 percent.SOF occupied 27 of the 30 sitespermanently garrisoned by allUphold Democracy forces, andthey were responsible for morethan 700 smaller villages. Rough-ly, SOF performed 90 percent ofthe work at 3 percent of thecost.44

According to the GeneralAccounting Office, the 10thInfantry Division paid an effi-ciency cost in combat-skills readi-ness.45 Brigade commanders didnot report full combat readinessuntil May 1995, five months afterredeployment. Still, these com-manders expressed concern abouttheir ability to synchronize com-bat systems for a major trainingevent at the Joint ReadinessTraining Center in October-November 1995, some 10 monthsafter redeployment. The GAOrated Haiti’s impact on SOF unitsas less problematic.

The 10th Division also paid aprice in morale. Army psycholo-gists who interviewed 10th Divi-sion soldiers found that morethan 60 percent of infantry,artillery and air-defense troopsreported “they were performingmissions for which they were nottrained.” Junior infantry soldiersreported a higher level of psycho-logical stress than any otherrespondents. Psychologists con-cluded that combat-arms soldiershad difficulty understandingtheir role in Uphold Democracyand that unit cohesion sufferedas a consequence.46 Only 23 per-cent of SOF soldiers reported con-cern over mission focus, but all ofthose respondents were supporttroops who were not SOF-quali-fied. Psychologists claimed that

operations in Haiti “stood aloneas the poorest example of sup-porting the soldier.”

ConclusionsOperations other than war in the

era of engagement are inevitable.The case for using SOF as the leadagent in these operations is strong,from the perspectives of efficiencyand effectiveness. Recalling C.S.Forester’s analogy, SOF are the toolthat will allow us to confront OOTWwith less effort, and they are a toolthat is already purchased.

OOTW is the most likely, but notthe most dangerous, event the U.S.military will face. Stephen Metzsummarized the state of play thisway: “The Army’s war fighting com-ponent, built on armored andmechanized divisions, will evolvein a different direction from itspeace operations conflict resolutionbased on SF and light units. Thisseparation already exists, butreflects the clear priority of the warfighting function.”47 Organization-al inertia and infatuation with

warfare specialty traditions, asBartlett, Holman and Somesrelate, may partially explain whySOF is not the “first thought” whenOOTW surface. Protection of flags,image baggage from Vietnam, anda sincere desire to retain heavyforce structure for the next “bigone” may cover the rest of the story.

One thing is clear — SOF is theright lead-agency tool for theOOTW job. The only significantweakness in the SOF OOTWalternative can be obviated byassigning combat forces to aJSOTF when necessary. (In manycases, use of combat forces will notbe necessary or even well-advised.) War-fighter units shouldwork for the JSOTF, not the otherway around. The solution may lie,as Metz hints, in the creation of aseparate service, or perhaps in afull restructuring of the armedforces as we have known them.

Development of long-range,nation-building campaign plans bycombatant commanders workingwith embassy country teams is astep that should be taken now. DoS

Summer 1997 11

SOF soldiers, such as this PSYOP specialist, performed 90 percent of the work in OperationUphold Democracy at only 3 percent of the cost.

U.S. Army photo

should position a CINC regionalcounterpart with the theater CINCto facilitate such planning. Truejointness is interagency.

But the broader art of the possi-ble beyond 2010 lies in the eventu-al restructuring of national-defense forces consisting of manyagencies along cross-functionallines. The illustration above offersan example. Organization alongcross-functional lines is theessence of effective OOTW. Ifengagement is inevitable, then therise of cross-functional national-defense forces may be the “real”Force XXI.

Colonel Ed Phil-lips is commander ofthe 7th SpecialForces Group. In pre-vious assignments heserved as a platoonleader, a battalion

S1, a battalion S3 and a companycommander in the 82nd AirborneDivision; and as a detachment com-mander, a battalion S4, a group S3,a company commander and a bat-talion commander in the 7th SFGroup. Phillips served as an advis-er in El Salvador from 1984through 1985. He has also servedas an intelligence analyst in theExecutive Office of the President.He is a graduate of the Commandand Staff College at the U.S. ArmySchool of the Americas and of theNaval War College.

Notes:1 Rick Maze, “Weapons vs. People: The Out-

look Is Bleak,” The Army Times, Vol. 57, No.7, 9 September 1996, p. 6; Michael O’Han-lon, “How to be a Cheap Hawk,” The Brook-ings Review, Summer 1995, Brookings Insti-tution, p. 34. See note nine for the scope ofthe U.S. Army’s optempo since the end of theCold War.

2 The U.S.Army is in the process of changingterminologies for these types of operations.The emergent term for OOTW will probably

be “stability and support” operations.3 Christopher Layne and Benjamin

Schwarz, “American Hegemony — Withoutan Enemy,” Foreign Policy, No. 92, Fall 1993,pp. 5-7.

4 C.S. Forester, The General (Boston: Little,Brown and Co., 1936).

5 John M. Shalikashvili, National MilitaryStrategy, February 1995, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C., preface.

6 Robert P. Hoffa, “A New Look at the Bot-tom-Up Review, Planning U.S. General Pur-pose Forces for a New Century,” StrategicReview, Winter 1996, United States Strate-gic Institute, p. 25.

7 Peter T. Tarpgaard, “The Defense Budget:Context and Constraints,” January 1996, TheNaval War College, Newport, R.I., pp. 5, 8.

8 John Carrell, “The Lake Doctrine,” AirForce Magazine, Vol. 79, No. 5, May 1996, p. 3.

9 William J. Clinton, A National SecurityStrategy of Engagement and Enlargement(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-ing Office, February 1996), p. 23; Dennis J.Reimer, “Chief Says Army Is Trained andReady,” Soldiers’ Magazine, Vol. 51, No. 8,August 1996, p. 8. In this interview, the CSApoints out that while Army personnel havedeclined by 33 percent and resources havedeclined by 40 percent, the Army has exe-cuted 25 major deployments since 1989.

12 Special Warfare

Information Dominance, Situational Awareness, Rugged Cyber Connectivity, Nonlethal Munitions, Nonexplosives

Global Cooperation Force

(Crisis Preclusion) DoS, SOF, Peace Corps,

IGOs, NGOs, PVOs

Expeditionary Force

(Crisis, Forced Entry, Sustained Combat) Seaborne, Airborne,

Heavy Combat Forces

Strategic Strike Force

(Full-Spectrum Fires) Air, Nuke Triad, Info. War, Counterterror, Sea, Land

Space Force

(Air Supremacy) TMD, WMDD,

Space Platform

Component Contributors, National Defense Force

DoT, DoC, DoJ, DoD, DoS, NASA,

AID, CIA

U.S. National Defense Force

Habitually assigns reaction forces to Global Cooperation Force if/as required

Permanent liaison teams

This is in contrast to only 10 major deploy-ments during 40 years of the Cold War.(Author’s note: Some of these were not com-parable except to the Gulf War [Korea, Viet-nam].) The Army’s (and DoD’s) focus on warfighting as priority number one is clearlyand repeatedly articulated in the presi-dent’s 1996 National Security Strategy, thePentagon’s 1995 National Military Strategy,in current Army doctrine (FM 100-5, 1993),and in SECDEF 1996 Annual Report to thePresident and the Congress. CJCS’ JointVision 2010 echoes the same priority;Stephen J. Cimbala, “Military Persuasionand the American Way of War,” StrategicReview, Fall 1994, United States StrategicInstitute, pp. 33-43.10 Cimbala, op. cit., pp. 33-43. At a pressconference held in September 1993, GeneralColin Powell expressed his concern aboutthe potential erosion of U.S. military war-fighting skills as a consequence of shiftingto OOTW.11 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: WhatGovernment Agencies Do and Why They DoIt (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 26.12 Carnes Lord, The Presidency and theManagement of National Security (NewYork: The Free Press, 1988), pp. 18-19.13 Cimbala, op. cit., pp. 33-43.14 William E. Turcotte, “The Use (andAbuse) of Output Measures,” 1996, TheNaval War College, Newport, R.I., p. 1.15 Garth Evans, “Cooperative Security andIntrastate Conflict,” Foreign Policy, No. 96,Fall 1994, pp. 11, 15-16.16 Larry Cable, Lecture at Naval Postgrad-uate School, 2 February 1995.17 Steven Metz, W.T. Johnson, D.V. Johnson,J.O Krevitt, and D.C. Lovelace, The Futureof American Landpower: Strategic Chal-lenges for the 21st Century (Carlisle Bar-racks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.Army War College,March 1996), pp. 10-23.18 Robert H. Dorff, “Democratization andFailed States: The Challenge of Ungovern-ability,” Parameters, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Sum-mer 1996, pp. 17-29; Evans, op. cit., pp. 15-16.19 Edward N. Luttwak, “Toward Post-HeroicWarfare,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3,May/June 1995.20 Kimberly Stanton, “Pitfalls of Interven-tion: Sovereignty as a Foundation forHuman Rights,” Harvard InternationalReview, Fall 1993, pp. 14-16.21 Turcotte, op. cit., p. 2.22 Shalikashvili, National Military Strate-gy, pp. 9, 15.23 Idem, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington,D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), pp. 2-4, 8-9,17, 27-33.24 Cole C. Kingseed, “Peacetime Engage-ment: Devising the Army’s Role,” Parame-

ters, Autumn 1993, pp. 96-102.25 Floyd D. Spence, “What to Fight For?American Interests and the Use of Force inthe Post Cold War World,” The Brown Jour-nal of World Affairs, Vol. III, Issue 1, Win-ter/Spring 1996, pp. 280-83.26 Robert L. Bateman, “The Peace Brigade —A Hybrid Unit for Real World Missions,”Army, Vol. LXXIII, No. 12, December 1995,pp. 8-12.27 Geoffrey Demarest, “Beefing Up at the LowEnd,” Military Review, June 1993, pp. 50-56.28 Author’s note: All services contribute toexecution of OOTW, but the Army’s role(and often that of the USMC) is direct.Skills required to execute OOTW are signif-icantly different from those required in con-ventional war-fighting. Skills required tosupport vs. execute OOTW are virtuallyunchanged from those required in conven-tional war-fighting, although the ROE maybe more restrictive. For this reason, thispaper focuses on Army Force XXI conceptsto draw comparative analyses. The authoralso reviewed Forward from the Sea (USN),and select Sea Dragon (USMC) readings.The USMC appears more interested thaneither the Army or the Navy in the OOTWimplications. In all cases, however, the prin-cipal focus of service visions is on morelethal war-fighting through enhanced appli-cation of technology.29 John G. Roos, “Forging a Full-SpectrumForce,” Armed Forces Journal International,October 1996, pp. 30-35.30 Kingseed, pp. 96-102.31 General Accounting Office, Peace Opera-tions. Effects of Training, Equipment, andOther Factors on Unit Capabilities (Wash-ington, D.C.: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, October 1995); General AccountingOffice, Military Readiness Data and Trendsfor January 1990 to March 1995 (Washing-ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,August 1995).32 Army Mission Training Plan ARTEP 7-20, Army Mission Training Plan for theInfantry Battalion (Fort Benning, Ga.:USAIS, December 1988), pp. 2-1, 2-2.33 Cimbala, op. cit., pp. 33-43.34 William J. Perry, Annual Report to thePresident and the Congress (Washington,D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office,March 1996), p. 149.35 The author deployed to Germany in Octo-ber 1995 to assist the 1st Armored Divisionin its preparation for Bosnia and witnessedthe cascading impact firsthand.36 The author’s reference to Army SOF vs.SOF across all services is not intended to beexclusionary; however, the focus of USNSEALs and USAF SOS is primarily ondirect-action, war-fighting skills. The princi-

pal requirements in OOTW center on for-eign internal defense, or FID, and nation-building skills.37 Perry, op. cit., pp. 199-202.38 Budget of the United States Government,1997 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1997). See military autho-rizations section; A.H. Holmes and W.A.Downing, United States Special OperationsForces Posture Statement 1994 (MacDillAFB, Fla.: USSOCOM).39 Glenn R. Weidner, “Operation Safe Bor-der: The Ecuador-Peru Crisis,” Joint ForceQuarterly, Spring 1996, No. 11, pp. 52-58.40 George Wilson, “Jumping the Fence inBosnia,” Army Times, Vol. 56, No. 51, July15, 1996, p. 62. A former national-defensecorrespondent for the Washington Post, Wil-son has traveled with Special Forces unitsin Bosnia and Latin America. In this article,he advocates for the Bosnian mission a “pullout quick and turn over to SOF” option.41 H.C. Bartlett, G.P. Holman, and T.E.Somes, “The Art of Strategy and Force Plan-ning,” Naval War College Review, Spring1995, pp. 114-26.42 Information on ARSOF funding camefrom the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand Comptroller Office. (Phone inter-views, September-October 1996.)43 Steven R. Bowman, CongressionalResearch Service Report 94-735-Fa, 1 Janu-ary 1995.44 The author concedes that the reliability ofdollars-spent figures for non-SOF units issubject to debate. Regardless, the disparitybetween war-fighter units (10th and 25thInfantry divisions) and SOF is obvious.45 General Accounting Office, op. cit., pp. 30-36.46 R.R. Halverson, P.D. Bliese, R.E. Moore,and C.A. Castro, Psychological Well-Beingand Physical Health Symptoms of SoldiersDeployed for Operation Uphold Democracy:A Summary of Human DimensionsResearch in Haiti (Washington, D.C.: WalterReed Institute of Research, Division of Neu-ropsychiatry, Department of Military Psy-chology, 17 May 1995), pp. ii, iii, 8, 22, 23.Author’s note: The results of the psychologi-cal survey referenced here are sensitive,according to Walter Reed authorities. Theauthor obtained a copy of the basic report,but Walter Reed refused to release theresults by unit. Some unit statistics (ascited) appear in the basic report referenced.47 Metz, op. cit., pp. 10-23.

Summer 1997 13

The annual message from the President of the USA to the Congress:

For us peace reigns everywhere. We desireto perpetuate it always by granting full jus-tice to others and requiring of others full jus-tice to ourselves ... We attend to our ownaffairs, conserve our own strength, and pro-tect the interests of our own citizens; but werecognize thoroughly our obligation to helpothers, reserving to the decision of our ownjudgment the time, the place, and the method.We realize the common bond of humanity. Weknow the inescapable law of service ... Russiapresents notable difficulties. We have everydesire to see that great people, who are ourtraditional friends, restored to their positionamong the nations of the earth. We haverelieved their pitiable destitution with anenormous charity. Our government offers noobjection to the carrying on of commerce byour citizens with the people of Russia ... [O]urcountry ought to be the first to go to the eco-nomic and moral rescue of Russia. We haveevery desire to help and no desire to injure ...

[However] our main problems are domesticproblems. Financial stability is the first req-uisite of sound government. We cannot escapethe effect of world conditions. We cannotavoid the inevitable results of the economicdisorders which have reached all nations.But we shall diminish their harm to us inproportion as we continue to restore our gov-ernmental finances to a secure andendurable position.1

This was President Calvin Coolidge’saddress to Congress in December 1923,five years after the end of World War I. Itwas a world not unlike the one we facetoday. In 1923, no one could have foreseenwhat the world would look like 15 years inthe future (1938). Germany and Austria-Hungary had been soundly defeated andthe Soviet Union had just been torn apartby an internal civil war caused by the 1917Bolshevik Revolution. We are in the eighthyear after the fall of the “Wall,” and no onecan foresee what the world will look like in2012. Maybe with the judicious use of spe-cial-operations forces, or SOF, we can influ-ence its shape or distinguish its features.

SOF’s greatest contribution toward influ-encing the future of Europe lies in support-ing preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, andpeace-building as part of a coordinated,peace-building organization that can focusthe various agencies’ resources toward sta-bility and progress. U.S. Army doctrinedescribes peace operations as:

conducted to create and sustain the con-

14 Special Warfare

Special Operations Forces and Peace Operations in Greater Europe

by Colonel William Flavin

Reprinted by permission from SmallWars and Insurgencies, published byFrank Cass & Company, 900 EasternAvenue, Ilford, Essex, England. CopyrightFrank Cass & Co. Ltd. The views expressedin this article are those of the author and donot reflect the official policy or position ofthe U.S. Army, the Department of Defense,or the U.S. government. — Editor

ditions necessary for peace to flourish, [it] isa new and comprehensive term that coversa wide range of activities. The doctrinedivides these activities into three principalareas: support to diplomacy (peacemaking,peace-building and preventive diplomacy),peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peaceoperations include traditional peacekeep-ing operations as well as more forcefulactivities, such as the protection of human-itarian assistance, the establishment oforder and stability, the enforcement of sanc-tions, the guarantee and denial of move-ment, the establishment of protected zones,and the forcible separation of belligerents.2

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Sec-retary-General of the U.N., defined peace-building as “actions to identify and supportstructures which will tend to strengthenand solidify peace in order to avoid arelapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacyseeks to resolve disputes before violencebreaks out. … Peacemaking is action tobring hostile parties to agreement, essen-tially through such peaceful means asthose foreseen in Chapter IV of the Char-ter of the U.N.”3

Peace operations in general and supportto democracy in particular address the cen-tral problem facing the world today, thesearch for legitimacy. The source of most ofthe current instability is the struggle

among various groups and factions forlegitimacy. Legitimacy means that onegroup will be “perceived to have the abilityto provide an acceptable balance betweenequity, freedom, development, and securityfor a given populace.”4 In other words, whowill have the power to provide and coerce?Will it be a certain ethnic group such as theSerbs; previous members of the Communistparty as in Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuaniaand Poland; or criminal protection organi-zations that have sprung up in Russia?

This struggle for legitimacy manifestsitself not so much as a struggle amongcompetitive political ideologies, althoughideology is not dead, as among competitiveeconomic and cultural imperatives. RobertKaplan in his article in Atlantic, “The Com-ing Anarchy,” and Samuel Huntington inhis article in Foreign Affairs, “The Clash ofCivilizations,” have attempted to describethis crisis for the public.5

This struggle for legitimacy is nowheremore apparent than in the realignment ofpower among the states and substate ele-ments of Central and Eastern Europe asthey emerge from the wake of a fallen“Soviet Empire.” Many countries in Cen-tral and Eastern Europe have ethnocentricand nationalistic disputes that go backcenturies. Zbigniew Brzezinski writes thatnationalism is the “central reality of the

Summer 1997 15

A U.S. soldier from the9th PSYOP Battalion dis-tributes documents toBosnian citizens explain-ing U.S. involvement inOperation Joint Endeavor.

Photo by Michael J. Nelson

once seemingly homogeneous Sovietworld.”6 Stephen Blank of the U.S. ArmyWar College’s Strategic Studies Institutecharacterizes it in the following way:

Events in 1993, such as Yugoslavia’sunrelenting war, ethnic conflicts all alongRussia’s southern periphery, coups andcounter-coups in Russia, the Ukraine’s polit-ical and economic paralysis, the lack of apolitical resolution of the Baltic issue, Rus-sia’s effort to reintegrate its former empireeven though it is beset with serious political,constitutional and economic problems athome all point to one conclusion: the statesystem from Germany’s western border tothe Pacific Ocean is unstable and profound-ly insecure. No viable security architectureof functioning institution has arisen thatcan provide legitimacy and securitythroughout this expanse of territory.7

SOF, throughout their existence, havebeen helping people deal with this legitima-cy crisis. SOF were established to supportinsurgencies and wrest power from oppres-sive, illegitimate governments, notablythose of Central and Eastern Europe. Later,SOF became counterinsurgency fighters,shoring up failing governments. Thus, theconcern about legitimacy is central to mostof the SOF doctrinal imperatives as well astheir primary and collateral mission areas:unconventional warfare, foreign internaldefense, counterterrorism, humanitarianassistance, security assistance, counternar-cotics and anti-terrorism.

The SOF doctrinal imperatives stressthat SOF is a political tool supporting alarger interagency and multinationaleffort. SOF elements are comfortable deal-ing in the ambiguity that lies on the borderbetween the civil and military worlds. Theycan provide a bridge between the twoworlds with the experience they havegained from their insurgency and coun-terinsurgency backgrounds as well as therecent counterdrug and humanitarian-assistance efforts. Operations ProvideComfort in Iraq, Restore Hope in Somalia,and Uphold Democracy in Haiti haveshown SOF’s ability to work not only withprivate volunteer organizations, or PVO,but also with nongovernmental organiza-tions, or NGO. In fact, SOF have alsoworked closely with contractors and entre-preneurs who are now a part of the scenein Eastern Europe and the states of the for-mer USSR. Thus they can deal with therealities of national power that is relative,situational, dynamic and subjective.8

The SOF imperatives stress the protractednature of these conflicts and their psychologi-cal dimensions. Indeed, as we have discoveredin both Somalia and the former Yugoslavia,the informational aspect of national powercan be decisive in peace operations. Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, former Canadiancommander of U.N. peace operations in Sara-jevo, stated before Congress,“I would add thatmy comments will be somewhat guarded. …They watch C-SPAN every night in Bosnia-

16 Special Warfare

Photo by Blaze E. Lipowski

Bosnian children fromthe village of Hadzicireceive toys donated bySamaritan’s Purse, acivilian relief group thatworked with militaryforces to distribute thetoys.

Herzegovina, they watch CNN and all othermajor networks. … I think what’s happenedis that there have been atrocities, and thoseatrocities have been sophisticatedly exagger-ated — don’t forget that the internationalmedia is there in big numbers in Sarajevo —and the propaganda that has been perpetuat-ed has now entered into the minds of the peo-ple and they do not trust and will never trust,in my estimation, the other side.”9 In Rwan-da, the RTLM radio station, owned by theHutus, conducted an Anti-Tutsi campaignbefore the 6 April 1994 plane crash to preparetheir people for the planned uprisings.10

In addition to these imperatives, SOFpossess a wide range of capabilities thatcan be used to support peace-building.Some of these forces are linguistically andculturally oriented to certain geographicareas and consist of individuals proficientin cross-cultural communications and nego-tiations. Trained to operate in small groupsor independently, skilled in unconventionalwarfare, counterinsurgency, counterterror-ism, psychological operations, nation-assistance techniques, and equally conver-sant with both the most sophisticated tech-nology and the most primitive methods offield operations, they are a useful “tool” toadvance U.S. national objectives.11

Because of these capabilities, SOF havedeveloped special relationships with spe-cial-operations forces of other nations andthus can gain access and be employedwhere the use of conventional forces wouldbe expensive, premature, inappropriate ornot feasible. Additionally, SOF provide theU.S. with a military option that “does notentail the degree of political liability orrisk of escalation associated with employ-ment of necessarily larger, more visible,conventional forces.”12

SOF are most useful when employedbefore hostilities commence. Then they canuse their capabilities to prevent the situa-tion from escalating to such a level thatmilitary force must be used in a peacekeep-ing or peace-enforcement mission. There-fore, SOF must be engaged today in concertwith other elements of national power togain the initiative. SOF must be working inor near those countries identified by thenational command authority that have the

potential, in four years, to become destabi-lized. There they should study and under-stand the local situation and how it relatesto U.S. national objectives while providingintelligence and advice through appropri-ate channels to policy-makers.

SOF provide a “grassroots” assessmentthat is not always available to the policy-maker and cannot readily be otherwiseobtained. Like T. E. Lawrence and OrdeWingate before the two world wars, SOFcan walk the ground, live with the people,and develop a deep understanding of allaspects of the “environment, the political,

economic, sociological [cultural, religious],psychological, geographic, and military [sit-uation]. … They (can) identify the friendlyand hostile decision makers and … theirobjectives and strategies.”13 This assess-ment should form the basis for further pol-icy decisions that could range from disen-gagement from a failing country to increas-ing foreign assistance or employing conven-tional military in a preventive deploymentor a peace-enforcement operation.

Besides assessing the situation, SOF can“influence human behavior in a way favor-able to our objectives” by:

• aid[ing] and [assisting] a friendlynation to develop and mature along thelines such that those conditions normallyassociated with the causes of insurgencycan be prevented or diminished.

• aid[ing] and [assisting] a friendlynation which has thrown the yoke of com-munism off its shoulders and is nowattempting to grow along the road of democ-racy and self-determination.

• aid[ing] and [assisting] a friendly nationto recover from those conditions which existas a result of an armed conflict or natur-

Summer 1997 17

The SOF doctrinal imperatives stress thatSOF is a political tool supporting a largerinteragency and multinational effort. SOF ele-ments are comfortable dealing in the ambigu-ity that lies on the border between the civiland military worlds.

al/manmade/technological disaster.14

If the peace-building mission deterio-rates, SOF are in an excellent position to bea policy tool to control or contain the crisis.Because of their low visibility, SOF can stayor be withdrawn quietly at any time. SOFcan support the escalation of the involve-ment of conventional military forces bypreparing the operational area and sup-porting their introduction and employment.Upon the termination of the peace-enforce-ment mission, SOF can support peace-building as they did in Operation PromoteLiberty in Panama. Major General JosephLutz, when commander of Special Forces in1982, summed it up this way:

In the special operations forces we havethe capability of being introduced into agiven country, being established on theground with contacts, maybe even with ourown intelligence networks. If war ultimatelybreaks out within that region, there are peo-ple on hand who understand the region andare available to go there. That is the secret ofthe peacetime to wartime transition.15

In 1962 SOF conducted what could becalled peace-building operations as part ofan integrated organization established bythe Department of the Army called a Spe-cial Action Force, or SAF. It was formedaround the core of a Special Forces groupand consisted of the following units: Spe-cial Forces, Civil Affairs, PsychologicalOperations, medical, military police, sig-nal, electronic warfare, intelligence, coun-terintelligence, and engineers, and otheraugmented units as needed, such as avia-tion maintenance, to complement the U.S.government’s developmental programs.16

... to cure the substantial ills of ad hocorganization of mobile training teams. It

provided by unity of command a method toensure standardization and interoperabili-ty of our training efforts throughout theparticular region; quick access to skilled,multi-disciplinary personnel in an environ-ment that demands the ability to operatequickly; enhanced continuity of effort; per-sonal and unit identification with the suc-cess of the mission at hand; and increasedopportunities to develop rapport and per-sonal relationships with host nation coun-terparts through recurrent contact withSAF personnel.17

SAFs, in some form or other, operatedsuccessfully in South America, Africa, thePacific region and the Middle East untilthe 1970s, when the Nixon and the Carteradministrations dissolved them.

SOF were selected to form the core of theSAF, because of their area orientation,organizational flexibility, instructionalskills, extensive experience with andknowledge of instability (i.e., terrorism,insurgency and drug trafficking), prior con-nections with the host nation, and provencapability to work with host nations, con-ventional and elite militaries.

In Europe, the SAF concept should be con-sidered as a method for conducting peace-building operations. SOF can best accom-plish their peace-building mission as part ofan international and interagency “SAF”whose purpose is peace-building. The U.N.should empower the Organization for Secu-rity and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, toestablish such a multinational peace-build-ing organization to employ preventativemeasures in selected countries to shape thenew face of Europe. This organizationshould not replace any individual nation’sforeign-assistance programs; rather itshould focus on coordinating a developmentprogram for specific countries who have notfallen into chaotic instability.

This organization should be built arounda coordinating committee similar to theStanding Liaison Committee of the CivilMilitary Operations Command used byUNOSOM II in Somalia. The committeewas chaired by Phil Johnston of CARE andcoordinated the activities of governmentalorganizations, NGOs and PVOs. It wouldlink into the Supreme Allied Commander-

18 Special Warfare

SOF have established long-standing relation-ships with conventional and special forces ofWestern Europe. Even during the Cold War,SOF maintained relations with special forcesof the East by participating in parachute, rifleand ski competitions.

Europe through a humanitarian-assist-ance coordination center like Central Com-mand used for Somalia.18 The military por-tion of this organization should be organ-ized similar to the old security-assistanceforce, also called a SAF.

This multinational peace-building or-ganization should be oriented on providinga coherent approach toward integratingmilitary and non-military developmentand coordinating that effort with PVOs,NGOs, and the contractors and entrepre-neurs that currently are working in Cen-tral and East Europe. The integration of allaspects of the peace-building program isessential. For example, a sound programcould fail if psychological dimensions areneglected. In Latin America there are anynumber of stories about engineer projectsto build bridges or schools that failedbecause the lack of an integrated PSYOPprogram allowed the drug organizations todiscredit the project.19

The military portion of this organizationshould assist the military, paramilitaryand security forces in selected counties todevelop into organizations that can sup-port legitimate popular governments andmultipolar political systems, while teach-ing them ways to deal with the instabilityof drug trafficking, criminal organizations,terrorism and insurgency. SOF would playa key part of this task force by providingthe Civil Affairs and PSYOP expertise aswell as Special Forces, SEALs, and special-

operations aviation of both the Army andthe Air Force to work with the foreign mil-itary and their special forces.

Militaries and paramilitary forces willplay a decisive role in Central and EastEurope to help nurture the institutionalbasis on which the new democratic govern-ments will exist.20 These militaries mustuse their “energy, discipline, training andtechnical capability … for purposes otherthan illegal intervention in politics.”21

SOF have established long-standingrelationships with conventional and spe-cial forces of Western Europe. Even duringthe Cold War, SOF maintained relationswith special forces of the East by partici-pating in parachute, rifle and ski competi-tions. Today, Central and East Europeancountries have invited SOF to assist themin combating drugs, terrorism and insur-gency. SOF, therefore, have access.

This peace-building organization cansolve the complaints of the NGO and PVOcommunities that the time to begin work-ing together is not on a departure airfieldin the middle of a crisis but through pre-crisis planning and exercises. It will alsoengage the West in a positive project thatcan lead to the development of a newinternational order. It will expose theEast to the ideas and examples of democ-racy and free government. And finally itwill allow the West to understand close-upthe plight of the East. The knowledgegained by such a venture can forge politi-

Summer 1997 19

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

U.S. PSYOP soldiers dis-tribute copies of the Rajonewspaper to children inSomalia.

cal, social, cultural and economic bonds.However, there are three major issues

which can limit the use of SOF in supportof a peace-building organization. These arelack of political direction, inadequate inter-agency and multinational synchronization,and incorrect appreciation of the magni-tude of the problem.

SOF, as a political instrument, has to becalibrated by clear political guidance to beeffective. Without such clear and consistentguidance SOF may be ineffective or, worse,counterproductive. The employment ofSOF is not a neutral act. Local ethnicgroups will interpret all of the words andactions of Special Forces teams as U.S. orU.N. policy.22 This is especially critical in

the information war. A peace-building mis-sion can be easily discredited by the type ofsophisticated psychological war that hasbeen witnessed in the former Yugoslavia.Without a policy to synchronize efforts, anypeace operation can dissolve.

All of the elements of national powermust be balanced to employ SOF success-fully as part of the peace-building organi-zation. When one element, like the mili-tary, takes primacy, then the operationbecomes unbalanced. This will lead toimposing military solutions on what is apolitical problem. Somalia was an exampleof trying to force a solution through mili-tary means without an accompanying com-prehensive and robust political program.23

Other nations and international organiza-tions exacerbate the problem. PSYOP inSomalia can provide an example. In Soma-lia, the U.S. PSYOP elements published apopular and credible newspaper calledRajo. This paper printed the facts andencouraged settlement rather than vio-

lence. When UNOSOM II was established,the PSYOP elements departed with thejoint task force, UNITAF, leaving the pub-lication of the newspaper to the U.N. Afterthe October 1993 killing of the U.S.Rangers, the PSYOP elements returned todiscover that the editor was runningadvertisements for weapons, such as mor-tars, in the paper. The U.N. officially statedthat they were just trying to be neutral andsupport individual enterprise.24

The third issue is the propensity for theU.S. and the U.N. to underestimate themagnitude of the problem. Some states inCentral and Eastern Europe may needyears of assistance and dramatic mea-sures such as military occupation to beginto solve their problems. However, the U.S.and other Western nations, driven bydomestic and international agenda influ-enced by the popular media, can underes-timate the complexity and the amount oftime it would take to solve some of theseproblems. Peace operations may belaunched to “do something humane.” Ifpeace operations are based on best-casescenarios and assumptions, then thepotential for failure is great. This was thecase in Somalia. The assumption was thatUNOSOM II was an organization capableof returning governance to Somalia, andtherefore most of the U.S. military sup-port could withdraw. When the assump-tions proved false, the resources too many,the risks too many, then the support forthe venture collapsed.25

The European Union cannot wait andsee if “Greater Europe” moves on its owntoward peace and stability. The Balkansare an example of the EU not engagingearly on with positive measures. Europehas an opportunity to provide insuranceagainst the unknown and shape thefuture the way it would like to see it byestablishing a peace-building organiza-tion which can engage early on with pos-itive measures. SOF, employed in sup-port of this peace-building effort, canpromote and support democratic idealswithin other armed forces, stabilize situ-ations so that support for pluralisticpolitical institutions and free-marketeconomies can grow, provide early indica-

20 Special Warfare

There are three major issues which can limitthe use of SOF in support of a peace-buildingorganization. These are lack of political direc-tion, inadequate interagency and multination-al synchronization, and incorrect appreciationof the magnitude of the problem.

tions of instability, and influence othergovernments in ways which would bemutually advantageous.

Colonel William Flavin is deputy director of specialoperations, Supreme Head-quarters Allied PowersEurope. He has served as afellow at the Center for Stra-tegic and International Stud-ies in Washington, D.C., and as deputydirector for low-intensity conflict in theOffice of the U.S. Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict.

Notes:1 Calvin Coolidge, “Message of the President of the

United States to Congress, December 6, 1923,” inPapers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates 1923 Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 1938), pp. vii-xxiii.

2 Department of the Army, Peace Operations: Version#7; FM 100-23 (Draft) (Washington, D.C.: Headquar-ters, Department of the Army, April 1994), p. ii.

3 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (NewYork: The United Nations, 1992), p. 11.

4 Max Manwaring and Court Prisk, “A StrategicView of Insurgencies: Insights From El Salvador,”Small Wars and Insurgencies 4/1 (Spring/Summer1993), p. 53.

5 Robert D. Kaplan. “The Coming Anarchy,” TheAtlantic Monthly (Feb. 1994); Samuel Huntington,“The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72/3(Summer 1993).

6 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Post-Communist National-ism,” Foreign Affairs 68/5 (Winter 1989/90), p. 1.

7 Stephen J. Blank, “Russia and Eurasia,” in Steven K.Metz and Earl H. Illford Jr. (eds.) World View: The 1994Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Insti-tute (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1994), p. 15.

8 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor and LawrenceKorb, American National Security (Baltimore, Md.:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 9.

9 Transcript of Senate Armed Services CommitteeHearing on the Situation in Bosnia and AppropriateU.S. and U.N. Response (Washington, D.C.: Senate ofthe U.S., 11 Aug. 1992), p. 2.10 International Press Service 6-28-94 (Filex062B41.9ps).11 “Interview with LTG William Yarborough (ret.)”(unpublished) (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army Military His-tory Institute, 1975), pp. 7, 53, talks about tailoring asa key strength of Special Forces along with the train-ing and selection of the proper soldiers who should bediplomats rather than just fighting machines.12 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrines for Joint Spe-cial Operations, JCS Publication 345 (Washington,

D.C.: JCS, 28 Oct. 1992), pp. 1-3.13 U.S. Army, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army SpecialOperations Forces (Final Draft) (Washington, D.C.:Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1990),pp. 2-25.14 U.S. Army, Operation and Organizational Conceptfor Active Component Civil Affairs Assets (Draft) (FortBragg, N.C.: JFK Special Warfare Center and School,Sept. 1990), pp. 1, 2.15 Frank Barnett, Hugh Tovar and Richard Shultz(eds.), Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washing-ton, D.C.: National Defense University, 1984), p. 49.16 Charles M. Simpson, III, Inside the Green Berets:The First Thirty Years: A History of the US Army Spe-cial Forces (Novato, Ca.: Presidio Press, 1983), p. 82,and Yarborough (note 12), p. 57, state that the SAF forAfrica and Latin America were very successful. Head-quarters, Department of the Army, DCSOPS, “Imple-mentation of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Program”(unpublished memo) (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army MilitaryHistory Institute, 1962), pp. 3, 4, 6. A full SAF, in addi-tion to an SF group, consisted of the following: PSYOP -72; Civil Affairs - 86; Engineers - 60; Military Intelli-gence - 47; ASA - 44; Medical - 66; Military Police - 57;Signal - 40.17 LTC Thomas Kuster, “Regional Military AssistanceCommands” (unpublished study) (Washington, D.C.:Acting Secretary of Defense for Special Operationsand Low Intensity Conflict, 1988), p. 9.18 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Memo-randum: CENTCOM Humanitarian Assistance Struc-ture” (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 1992).19 LTC Arthur B. Gravatt, Army Engineers in Supportof Nation Assistance (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War Col-lege 1993), provides an excellent example of the needfor the integration of informational war with nationassistance.20 Gabriel Marcella, “The Latin American Military,Low Intensity Conflict, and Democracy,” in John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, eds., Winning the Peace: TheStrategic Implications of Military Civic Action (NewYork: Praeger Publishing, 1992), p. 61.21 Edward Bernard Glick, Peaceful Conflict: The Non-Military Use of the Military (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stack-pole Books, 1967), p. 20.22 Daniel Williams, “Moscow’s Troubling Interven-tion: U.S. Fears Troops in Former Republics May Leadto Expansion,” Washington Post, 21 June 1994.23 Walter S. Clark, “Testing the World Resolve inSomalia,” Parameters (Winter, 1993/94), pp. 42-59.24 Related to the author by the commander of the 6thPSYOP Battalion.25 Clark (note 25), p. 51.

Summer 1997 21

In examining possible areas of Asiawhere future multinational peace oper-ations might take place, a special-oper-

ations component thus following, there aretwo possible approaches. The first, which Ishall decidedly not use, is to comb theregion systematically for likely candidates,an inventory of instability if you will. Thisleads only to argument between self-appointed experts. It is, in any case, ratheran exercise in futility, since there is littlechance we can raise our intelligence gath-ering and analytical capabilities to the nec-essary level of viability. What we can do,though, a second approach, is to sketch outthe strategic trends and, in the process,cite some exemplars.

It is the end of the Cold War, of course,which sets the stage for what follows. It isa stage which has seen 50 years of arrange-ment. World War II’s conclusion found thedemocratic powers, having defeated Fas-cism, locked in immediate confrontationwith their erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union,an opponent more powerful in every sense

than either the Nazis or Japanese mili-tarists (Italy need not detain our discus-sion). How subsequent Cold War victorywas actually achieved by the Washington-led coalition remains a subject of muchdebate, the most salient aspect of which isa concerted effort by the academic veteransof the anti-Vietnam War movement topaint the struggle as neither victory norcrusade, but only America forcing conflictupon an unwilling, frightened Moscow(with sundry Third World victims sufferingalongside, targets of our institutional andsystemic terrorism). Less debatable hasbeen the result: To use World War IIimagery, we have not seen peace in ourtime.

In retrospect, this seems hardly surpris-ing. That we expected victory to bring withit a moment’s rest can only call forth ana-lytically a jaded recitation of the truismthat hope springs eternal in the breasts ofmen. What has followed, the veritableexplosion of violence, appears with the ben-efit of hindsight to be all too predictable.That it was not anticipated is a telling com-mentary upon our complete preoccupationwith the trees at the expense of the forest.Likewise, the intense discussion which hasgreeted efforts at explication often doesmore to reveal respective ideological posi-tions than it does to provide accurate com-mentary about either the posited frame-works or the realities the explication seeksto elucidate. Nevertheless, certain impor-

22 Special Warfare

Strategic Trends in Asia

by Dr. Thomas A. Marks

Reprinted by permission from SmallWars and Insurgencies, published byFrank Cass & Company, 900 EasternAvenue, Ilford, Essex, England. CopyrightFrank Cass & Co. Ltd. The views expressedin this article are those of the author and donot reflect the official policy or position ofthe U.S. Army, the Department of Defense,or the U.S. government. — Editor

tant works have served as a foundation forthe intellectual and strategic debate whichhas emerged in the so-called “new worldorder” (which, as any number of wags havehad it, has turned out to be neither newnor very ordered). The notes cite them.

What the references attempt to do is tograpple with the underlying strategicdynamic(s) at hand now that the over-whelming dynamic of the Cold War has col-lapsed. Samuel P. Huntington argues thatfuture conflict is likely to be driven by a“clash of civilizations,” as dissimilar world-views play themselves out in local arenas.1Ted Robert Gurr lowers his sights a notchbelow this and speaks of ethnonationalismerupting in a bewildering array of circum-stances and groups.2

Fred W. Riggs provides a macro-historicalcontext in analyzing what he calls the“three tsunamis” (tidal waves) of recentworld history: consolidation (of the globe’speoples into geopolitical units), liberation(as distinct peoples have sought autonomy),and self-determination (as the previousstage moves forward in logical sequence).3Thomas E. Homer-Dixon et al. examine theseemingly inevitable violent consequencesof resource depletion and population

growth.4 Michael Tobias does the same butgoes beyond the descriptive to present ajournalistic immediacy that includes inter-views with key players worldwide.5

Robert D. Kaplan takes the lot anddescribes a world already reduced to near-anarchy in spots and rapidly heading forthe same in others.6 Rudolph J. Rummel, intabulating the sheer awesome scope ofman’s inhumanity to man, highlights thepolitical consequences of non-democraticpolitical solutions and the quest for power.7Finally, Benedict Anderson has servednotice that the communities we take forgranted are, in a very real sense, artificial.They have been created and sustained.8

These works are neither mutually exclu-sive nor necessarily designed to explain theuniverse of problems which have surfaced inthe post-Cold War political arena. Rather,they offer means to deal analytically withthe problem. Using their strategic explana-tions, we can say that the operational issueswhich confront us are as follows:

• Systemic Disintegration — the rippingapart of nation-states as nations clash withstates, the latter necessarily artificiallycreated, but the former, too, in some cases,artificially created; the point being, howev-

Summer 1997 23

Photo by Mark Martello

Despite the end of theCold War, the people ofAsia, such as this Cam-bodian woman and herchild, face a number ofproblems, including vio-lence, overpopulationand resource depletion.

er, that the “fit” between the two has neverbeen perfect, any more so in Asia than inother areas of the globe. In some cases theresults are simply annoying (e.g., Is it ofmore than passing concern that even tinyBhutan now has active ethnic unrest asNepali migrants in its south work againstthe Bhoot majority?), but in numerousother cases the implications are profound.The situations in India and Pakistan comereadily to mind, where, amidst the numer-ous uprisings only just contained througha degree of militarization which is quite

astonishing (e.g.,India’s paramilitaryforces), there aresome (e.g., Kashmir)which have threat-ened to embroil rivalpowers (i.e., alreadyIndia and Pakistanhave narrowly avoid-ed military engage-ment over Pakistan’salleged assistance tothe Muslim insur-gents in Kashmir).

• Ideological Clash –the march of commu-nist utopianism mayhave been halted, butin its place we havethe “subversion” ofother ideologies (e.g.,democracy or funda-

mentalism). This has already led to seriousviolence in the largest Asian state of all,China, but one should not disregard thelower but equally serious level of disorienta-tion which has emerged in the likes ofJapan or Thailand as demands for increaseddemocratic access have shaken the bureau-cratic polities so-favored by Asian govern-ments, whether civil or military.

• Ecological Concerns/Population Growth —throughout the region, the growth of popu-lation and the depletion of resources arecreating scenarios far closer to that out-lined years ago by Morris West in his novel,Shoes of the Fisherman, than is generallynoticed (i.e., populations forced on themove in search of sustenance). India haslong been the premier illustration, but in

truth there is no Asian country which canbe said not to have either present or poten-tial for serious violence in this area. Evengiant China, the subject of West’s treatiseand long thought in the popular mind tohave established a base level of subsistencefor all, in reality has problems of ecologicaldevastation which rival those which haverecently come to light in eastern Europeand the former Soviet Union. Consequent-ly, there are enormous areas (i.e., enor-mous both actually and comparatively)which are already all but uninhabitable.The chain reaction that will necessarily beset in motion as large population move-ments begin to occur will become increas-ingly more evident as the years pass and aspopulation growth, even if checked some-what, ensures that the carrying capacity ofthe land will be exceeded.

• Resource Scarcity — it follows from thediscussion above that resources not onlyare strained now but increasingly willbecome a source of conflict, both internallyand in international relations. We see theformer in any number of contexts (e.g.,Homer-Dixon et al. discuss the tragic caseof the ongoing clash in the BangladeshiChittagong Hills between resisting uplandtribesmen and migrating lowlanders). Thelatter has recently emerged as a seriousconcern in the South China Sea (Chineseirredentism may be at work, but it seemsmore likely that Peking’s infatuation withthe region stems from the possibility thatit will contain resources). In either case,the results are likely to be explosive.

• Economic Dislocation/Clash — again,what has just been discussed leads natu-rally to another concern, one which hasboth an internal and an external dimen-sion. As presently we understand the real-ities of life on earth, there is no mecha-nism, save industrialization, capable ofproviding work and sustenance for bur-geoning populations. Industrialization,though, brings with it a host of conflict-laden problems which are reaching crisisproportions in many areas of Asia. Further,the consequences of alienation, as therecent growth of cults exemplifies (with orwithout a desire to use poison gas in sub-ways), contains an element of concern

24 Special Warfare

File photo

Demonstrators give evi-dence of the ideologicalclash in China, thelargest of the Asianstates.

which has been all but ignored by govern-ments. Some decades ago, the conse-quences of “development” were examined,particularly as they related to the ColdWar clash (i.e., the exploitation by one sideor the other of “grievances”), but of late ourattention has turned elsewhere. Occupyingus instead have been the external manifes-tations of economic growth, the growingclash between systems, of which the U.S.-Japan tiff is only the most obvious andserious.

• Culture Clash — one does not have toagree wholeheartedly with Huntington toaccept that he is on to something. The bit-terness evident in recent exchangesbetween the U.S. and Singapore (or evenbetween two Asian states, such as thePhilippines and Singapore) highlights thepotential here for conflict. How the statesof the region deal with the various prob-lems identified above can lead to seriousdisagreements of style and substance.When the fallout is but bad blood, as in theMichael Faye caning case, it is one thing;when bilateral relations are actuallyendangered, as is presently the case fol-lowing the disputed execution of a Filipinamaid, it is another matter altogether.

There are, as well, at least four concernswhich might be called more traditional:

• Cold War Holdovers — victory mayhave been achieved, but the war is not over.The West still has enemies who do not wishit well. North Korea is only the most obvi-ous, but China should not be judged a part-ner and may yet precipitate conflict in theregion. Of most concern are Peking’s cur-rent aggressive moves in the South ChinaSea and its continuing efforts to isolateTaiwan.

• Weapons Proliferation — Not only doat least three Asian states possessweapons of mass destruction (i.e., China,India and Pakistan), there also continue tobe efforts by others (e.g., North Korea, cer-tainly; Taiwan, by accusation of some) toobtain these. Further, proliferation ofweapons of more traditional concern goeson unabated. China, for instance, hasemerged as a leading supplier.

• Natural Disasters — disease, movementof refugees, earthquakes and such all remain

significant regional phenomena. Of particu-lar concern should be the inevitable conse-quences of HIV moving into AIDS in certainstates, devastating the populations (e.g., inSoutheast Asia, especially Thailand).

• Drugs — far from vanishing, this prob-lem has become more serious and wide-spread than ever, with the added elementthat the products no longer simply transitthe states concerned but have instead con-tributed to serious domestic problems.

What is difficult, and fortunately the con-cern, in a sense, of others, is to discern pre-cisely where these trends will achieve sub-stantive form such that we might anticipatemultinational action. One thing is clear:

Any such action, in fact, will involve a spe-cial-operations component, for it becomesincreasingly obvious that it is special-opera-tions forces that are capable of carrying outthose functions peculiar to what we at onetime termed, almost prophetically, “stabilityoperations.” It is also clear that we discardat our peril the possibility of multinationalaction, since it is obvious that will and fund-ing, both facets which rise and fall with dis-tressing frequency, are the keys, not proba-bility per se.

Ergo, there is just as likely to be multina-tional effort in support of flood relief in, say,Bangladesh, as there is to be a more tradi-tional deployment, such as that whichremains along the demarcation linebetween Indian and Pakistani forces inKashmir. And it is their off-the-mark capa-bilities, as well as the simple fact that theywill go where they are told, do what isordered, and work long hours at bargainwages, that guarantee special-operations

Summer 1997 25

It becomes increasingly obvious that it isspecial-operations forces that are capableof carrying out those functions peculiar towhat we at one time termed, almostprophetically, ‘stability operations.’ It is alsoclear that we discard at our peril the possi-bility of multinational action.

forces’ uses in roles as disparate as civicaction, coordination and control, or readyreaction. Gunships or water systems, all areof a special-operations piece — and Asia isas likely to see their employment as areaswe think of as perhaps more unstable.

A ready illustration might be the ongo-ing conflict in Sri Lanka, where Indianintervention was ultimately carried out insummer 1987 under the guise of providinga peacekeeping force. There were any num-ber of observers who at the time were urg-ing Colombo to invite in a Commonwealthor United Nations presence. This did nothappen, and we may consider it unlikelythat it would have, but how likely is thepresent situation, where India has depart-ed, but the U.S. now sends in SpecialForces training teams to work with SriLankan forces? As has been demonstrated,it has become a logical step that such pres-ence should become part and parcel of amultinational peacekeeping effort shouldthe international community decide thatsuch would facilitate “peace” (whateverthat is, the cynic would add).

More to the point of what has been dis-cussed above, the conflict in Sri Lanka,though “ethnic” in its externals, involved

deeper considerations of ideology, popula-tion pressure impinging upon scarceresources, geopolitics, and a host of otherconcerns — none of which in isolationcould have been judged beforehand likelyto turn an island paradise into a protract-ed battle zone.

Likewise, might we not expect some sortof U.N. involvement in calming the growingtensions in the South China Sea? It is cer-tainly not beyond the realm of possibilitythat a solution, requiring verification andobservation, would require specializedwork which would consequently beassigned to the only bodies able to carry itthrough instantly: special-operationsforces. Yet what drives Chinese actions?Population pressure combined withresource scarcity? Irredentism?

My point is not that either of these illus-trations is imminent, only that, given thetrends above, we ignore possibilities at ourperil. The use of a massive matrix (drivenperhaps by factor analysis?) might be use-ful; but so, too, would be simple area exper-tise. To continue the point, it may be hardto envisage another immediate multina-tional deployment on the scale of the Cam-bodian mission (1992-93), but can we seri-

26 Special Warfare

United Nations photo

Many of the problems inAsia may require multi-national action, andmultinational operationswould almost invariablyinclude special-opera-tions forces.

ously rule out the possibility that a similaraction might not surface in Timor or Jaffnaor any of several other trouble (and trou-bled) spots? True, Asia contains economicpowerhouses such as Japan, Korea andTaiwan. It is also, however, a host of otherworlds, with possible multinational effortas diverse in form as the region. No matter:in any effort, special-operations forces willplay a key role.

Dr. Thomas A. Marksteaches social sciences at theAcademy of the Pacific inHonolulu, Hawaii, and is anadjunct professor at the U.S.Air Force Special OperationsSchool. He is a graduate ofthe United States Military Academy at WestPoint, and he holds a Ph.D. from the Uni-versity of Hawaii. His graduate workfocused on the relationship between insur-gency and revolution. His close associationwith South Asia began in the early 1970s.Eventually, Dr. Marks served three years asthe South Asia desk officer at the Intelli-gence Center-Pacific, the analytical arm ofthe U.S. Pacific Command. In that capacityhe traveled extensively in the subcontinentand authored a number of benchmark clas-sified reports. As a scholar, he has contin-ued this work, and he is widely known asan authority on the conflict in Sri Lanka.

Notes:1 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civiliza-

tions?” Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.“Comments: Responses of Samuel P. Huntington’s‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ ” Ibid., 72/4 (Sept/Oct.1993), pp. 1-26; Samuel P. Huntington, “Response: IfNot Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-ColdWar World,” Ibid., 72/5 (Nov/Dec. 1993), pp. 186-94.

2 Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk - A Global Viewof Ethnopolitical Conflict (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Institute of Peace Press, 1993); Idem., “On the Politi-cal Consequences of Scarcity and Economic Decline,”International Studies Quarterly 29/1 (March 1995),pp. 51-75. “Peoples Against States: EthnopoliticalConflict and the Changing World System.” Presiden-tial Address to the International Studies AssociationAnnual Meeting, 1 April 1994, Washington, D.C.

3 Fred W. Riggs, “Ethnonationalism, Industrialism,and the Modern State.” Paper presented to PoliticalEconomy Sect., International Studies AssociationAnnual Meeting, 6 April 1994, Washington, D.C.

4 Thomas E. Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey H. Boutwell andGeorge W. Rathjens, “Environmental Change and Vio-lent Conflict: Growing Scarcities of RenewableResources Can Contribute to Social Instability andCivil Strife,” Scientific American (Feb. 1993), pp. 38-45. Thomas E. Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Envi-ronmental Change as Causes of Acute Conflict,” Inter-national Security 16/2 (Fall 1991) pp. 76-116.

5 Michael Tobias, World War III: Population and theBiosphere at the End of the Millennium (Santa Fe:Bear & Co., 1994).

6 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” AtlanticMonthly (Feb. 1994), pp. 44-75.

7 Rudolph J. Rummel, Death by Government: Geno-cide and Mass Murder Since 1900 (New Brunswick,N.J.: Transaction Press, 1994); Idem., “Focus on:Power, Genocide and Mass Murder,” Journal of PeaceResearch 31/1 (1994), pp. 1-10.

8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflec-tions on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Lon-don: Vetso Editions, 1983).

Summer 1997 27

Psychological operations, or PSYOP,deal largely with information; andinformation is at the core of the con-

temporary Revolution in Military Affairs,or RMA. One might reasonably concludethat PSYOP has assumed greater impor-tance in current debates regarding thefuture of warfare; and one might also con-clude that PSYOP as a discipline has prof-ited from these debates, in that PSYOP hasinitiated its own process of doctrinal andoperational renewal. Unfortunately, bothconclusions would be very wide of the mark.

Why should this be so? The standardanswer might be that the RMA is, aboveall, a technological phenomenon, reflectingthe radical improvements of the last sever-al decades in electronic gathering, manipu-lation and communication of informationfor the purposes of enhancing traditionalwar fighting.

PSYOP, by contrast, remains, to a largeextent, a low-tech enterprise, the standardanswer would continue. Indeed, its majortools — leaflets, balloons, loudspeakers,

radio broadcasting — are almost laughablyold-fashioned. Moreover, the impact of mili-tary PSYOP is either diffuse and hard todemonstrate or else essentially tactical,while the RMA affects the entire conflictspectrum, with decisive results for strategyand for the overall conduct of war.

The standard answer would concludethat finally, and most fundamentally, theRMA reduces, if not actually eliminates,the need for PSYOP. To the extent that theRMA enables the United States to applycrushing and decisive force against anyplausible adversary, thereby avoiding pro-tracted conflict, there would seem littlepoint in worrying about employing tech-niques of persuasion. To paraphrase theVietnam-era adage: “If you have themwhere you want them, their hearts andminds will follow.”

While the standard answer is not alto-gether wrong, it seriously understates thecase for PSYOP, or rather a broader func-tion we will refer to as “strategic informa-tion.” Before examining the recent andfuture roles of PSYOP and any relatedactivities, some general observations are inorder concerning the emerging strategicenvironment and the nature of the RMA.

RMA’s originIt can be argued that in some respects

the RMA belongs to the past rather thanthe future.1 It was born in a strategic con-

28 Special Warfare

PSYOP and the Revolution in Military Affairs

by Dr. Carnes Lord

This article was originally presented at a1995 conference, “War in the InformationAge,” hosted by Tufts University’s FletcherSchool of Law and Diplomacy. Papers fromthat conference have been collected and willbe published by Brassey’s Publishing Co. asWar in the Information Age, edited byRobert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. and Richard H.Shultz Jr. — Editor

text of rigid alliance systems, peer militaryrivalry, and the prospect of high-intensitygeneral war. From our country’s point ofview, the RMA was the core of a more orless consciously pursued “competitivestrategy” aimed at offsetting Soviet advan-tages in men and materiel with Americanstrengths in high technology — especiallymicroelectronics technology. As the GulfWar convincingly demonstrated, advancedAmerican military capabilities providehigh leverage against conventional armedforces of the Soviet type. Yet the Gulf Waralso occurred in a strategic context quitedifferent from a U.S.-Soviet test of arms,and it can be argued that during the GulfWar, America’s capabilities were onlyimperfectly harnessed to the strategic pur-poses and requirements of the conflict.

There is, of course, an important sense inwhich the RMA remains to be achieved.2Analyses of military-technical revolutionsthat have occurred in the past suggest thattechnology was only one of the principalcomponents. In addition, these revolutionsalmost always involved significant changesin military systems, in operational con-cepts, and in organizational forms.

In all of these areas, the implications of

the ongoing revolution in information tech-nologies have yet to make themselves fullyfelt. Some foresee a battlefield of the futureas one that will dispense with large sys-tems and platforms as well as with cen-tralized command-and-control hierarchies.Others argue that the information-domi-nated battlefield will essentially collapsethe traditional distinction between tacti-cal, operational and strategic levels of war.3

It is, as yet, far from clear when, how or towhat extent such developments will trans-form current American military practice.What does seem clear is that these develop-ments will unfold in a strategic context thatwill impose imperatives of its own — onesthat may not always be compatible with thetechnologically driven imperatives of theRMA as generally understood.

Key featuresWhat are the key features of this strate-

gic context? The following are the mostobvious and fundamental: absence of apeer competitor, more fluid and weakeralliance relationships, less stability andpredictability in domestic and internation-al politics, heightened prospects for both

Summer 1997 29

U.S. Navy jets preparefor takeoff during theGulf War. Despite ourdemonstrated ability toapply decisive force, westill require forces capa-ble of applying tech-niques of persuasion.

Photo by Thomas E. Witham

regional conflict and mid-intensity conven-tional warfare (with the possibility ofunconventional excursions), and the per-sistence of low-intensity internal warfareand international lawlessness.

Perhaps less obvious, but no less impor-tant, are the commercially driven develop-ments in the international communica-tions environment, especially the growingavailability of global television with real-time reporting capabilities. There can belittle doubt that what is sometimes called“the CNN factor” not only has greatly mag-nified the political impact of violence, butin complex ways has also affected decision-making processes and diplomacy in timesof crisis and war.4 Coupled with a decliningexternal threat and the uncertainty of the

stakes involved in any potentialmilitary involvement by the

U.S., the CNN factor is a kindof strategic wild card whose

potency is still inadequatelyappreciated. While it clearlycreates a source of strategicvulnerability for this coun-try, the CNN factor is a two-edged weapon that also

opens up certain strategicopportunities.

To understand the rise ofglobal television, we need tolook at the decades-longAmerican commitment to an

overseas information effortspecifically targeted against theSoviet bloc. The mainstay of thiseffort, the shortwave radio broad-casts of Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty and the Voice of America,

though widely discountedat the time as an ele-ment of Western secu-rity policy, unquestion-ably made a major con-tribution to the politi-cal and ideologicaldecay of the foundations

of communism — particu-larly in Eastern Europe — and therewithcontributed to the eventual collapse of theSoviet rule.

In retrospect, given the high credibility

and the wide listenership of Americanradio broadcasts, it seems certain that theycould have played a primary role in anywar-threatening crisis in Europe, very pos-sibly causing political turmoil that wouldhave complicated any Soviet decision to goto war.5 The broadcasts were a major factorin the Soviet decision not to intervene mil-itarily to crush the Solidarity movement inPoland in 1980. A careful analysis of mediacoverage (especially CNN) of the continu-ing civil war in the former Yugoslaviawould almost certainly show a persistentstory of television’s strategic impact on thecourse of the conflict.

If anything, the importance of what maybe called the psychological-political dimen-sion of conflict is greater today than it wasin the strategic environment of the ColdWar. However critical the “war of ideas”was between East and West, no one doubt-ed that the key security challenge then wasto thwart Soviet military power in a high-intensity struggle, thereby approximatingClausewitz’ model of pure war. Today, thekey security challenge is to be able to wagelimited and politically constrained warfarein a glare of publicity in which unaccus-tomed factors — ethnic and cultural sensi-tivities, human-rights outrages and envi-ronmental concerns — can unexpectedlyassume political importance, and in aninternational environment in which weakleadership and domestic political instabili-ty are increasingly the rule rather than theexception.6

In the psychological-political dimen-sion of conflict, the U.S. has potential vul-nerabilities but also significant advan-tages. The key vulnerability is our sus-ceptibility to what has been called “polit-ical attrition” — that is, a decline in pop-ular support for a military involvementas a result of factors such as unexpectedlosses (the bombing of the Marine bar-racks in Beirut), atrocities (the My Laimassacre), or prolonged military stale-mate. The role of the popular press is, ofcourse, important here, though it is some-times overstated. As we learned from theGulf War, the military-media relation-ship, while inevitably a tense one, cannevertheless be managed effectively,

30 Special Warfare

although perhaps not to the satisfactionof all concerned. Perhaps more importantand worrisome is the still-unresolved ten-sion between the president and Congressover war powers, as the Gulf War alsodemonstrated (and as we are now seeingbecause of Bosnia).

U.S. advantagesBut consider the advantages the U.S.

enjoys here. Our military forces are disci-plined, professional, highly educated,technically competent, and morally andculturally sensitive. Moreover, they enjoyan unparalleled reputation for overallmilitary excellence. This was especiallyevident following the Gulf War. Thus,while the vulnerability to psychologicaloperations is very low for our militaryforces, the potential for their conductingeffective PSYOP is very high, particular-ly against our likeliest adversaries —Third World military establishments thatlack most of the qualities that are inher-ent among our forces.

It is also important to bear in mind thevulnerabilities of Third World politicalleaders. While not generally subject tothe kind of political attrition Americanofficials worry about, these leaders —who may be lacking the support of goodstaff work and good intelligence — areapt to have highly distorted views of theworld and to think in conspiratorial

terms. Furthermore, these political lead-ers are frequently suspicious — oftenwith reason — of their own military highcommand. These are vulnerabilities theU.S. should be prepared to exploit.7

How should American PSYOP capabili-ties be reconfigured in light of the contem-porary RMA?

It is impossible to think intelligentlyabout PSYOP without considering it inthe context of a much broader category ofpsychological-political capabilities andactivities, a category that cuts across theresponsibilities of all the major agenciesin the national-security establishment.

Related activitiesThe first task of any effort to improve

the effectiveness of military PSYOPmust be to rethink its relationship tofour related activities: public diplomacy;public affairs; covert psychological-politi-cal warfare; and what has been called“military persuasion” — that is, thedeliberate use of military combat capa-bilities to create psychological-politicaleffects.8 One can assume that the lastcategory includes the new discipline ofcommand-and-control warfare, or C2W,which proposes to integrate PSYOP withother capabilities in a comprehensiveattack on an adversary’s decision-mak-ing and military communications.9

Thinking about PSYOP in this larger

Summer 1997 31

Photo by William E. Lee

U.S. PSYOP soldiers talkwith a Bosnian woman.The U.S. has a high poten-tial for effective PSYOPbecause its PSYOP forcesare disciplined and cultur-ally sensitive.

context is necessary because of theimpact of the RMA, with its accelerationof the tempo of military operations, itspotential for radical psychological shock,and its tendency to collapse the levels ofwarfare. No less important is the increas-ing transparency of the modern battle-field and the near-real-time reporting ofmilitary operations by the global media.Both of these developments haveincreased the strategic salience of psy-chological operations. But by so doing,these developments have also increasedthe urgency and the importance of a morecareful delineation of the area(s) ofresponsibility of military PSYOP, and ofachieving better coordination with relat-ed disciplines.

Anyone familiar with the postwar his-tory of military PSYOP knows that theissues of definition and coordination havelong been contentious, reflecting thebureaucratic weakness of PSYOP withinthe national-security establishment as awhole.10 Public-affairs personnel withinDoD have generally succeeded in theirrelentless efforts to keep PSYOP out oftheir business. Relations with the for-eign-affairs agencies have been episodicat best. During Operation Desert Shield,PSYOP was essentially derailed by theconfusion over the handling of (arguably)covert portions of the PSYOP plan devel-oped within DoD. PSYOP planning andcommand and control within the uni-

formed military have often been problem-atic. During the Gulf War, most of theseproblems were eventually overcome, andPSYOP proved highly effective when fullyengaged. But significant systemic changehas yet to occur.

Critical lessonsAlthough an adequate discussion of

these complex organizational issues is notpossible here, a few key points should bemade. One of the critical lessons of bothOperation Just Cause and OperationDesert Shield is that PSYOP planning can-not be effectively conducted in purely mili-tary channels. Furthermore, requirementsin pre- and post-combat environmentsmust also be considered. In order to posi-tion PSYOP to play an effective role in apre-combat crisis situation, a well-under-stood and accepted system, established onan interagency basis, is needed for theplanning, coordination and management ofPSYOP activities in peacetime.

A second key lesson is that PSYOP mustbe securely coupled with policy at a rela-tively high level — and not only within theU.S. government. The Gulf War demon-strated beyond question the importance ofthe coalition dimension of PSYOP andrelated activities. The strategic salience ofPSYOP was much more evident in Riyadhand Cairo than it was in Washington.

The fluidity of alliance relationships

32 Special Warfare

Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

U.S. PSYOP soldiers dis-cuss an upcoming oper-ation during OperationJust Cause in Panama.

during the Gulf War is, in fact, a strongargument for an enhanced role forPSYOP-related activities in post-ColdWar conflict. Saddam Hussein’s efforts tosplit the allied coalition through propa-ganda and political warfare enjoyed con-siderable initial success, and the U.S.and its partners were slow to counterHussein’s efforts. Part of the reason forthis was that the task was thought toexceed the scope of PSYOP as a militaryfunction, yet other elements of the U.S.government were not prepared to take onthe responsibility. The result was thereconstitution of a “public diplomacy”staff within DoD, with the mandate ofconducting (in coordination with the U.S.Information Agency) counterpropagandaand counterdisinformation operationsthroughout the Muslim world. This is oneof the unsung success stories of the GulfWar.

What is to be done? If the U.S. is toengage effectively in political-psychologi-cal warfare in a post-Cold War context,PSYOP within DoD will have to becomebetter integrated with public diplomacy,public affairs and overall national policythrough a “strategic information staff,”which would be housed at a high levelwithin the office of the Undersecretary ofDefense for Policy. The staff would becomposed of civilian and military person-nel representing all of the agenciesinvolved as well as the intelligence com-munity.11 Staff members would developand validate plans and programs for mil-itary PSYOP and defense-related publicdiplomacy across the conflict spectrum,and they would coordinate related activ-ities through appropriate public affairsand other operational loops both withinDoD and at the national level.

At the same time, a focal point for“strategic information” should be createdwithin the National Security Council tohelp ensure policy and operational coordi-nation across all relevant agencies. A keypriority for such a national-level effortmust be to develop agreed policy, doctrineand procedures governing the relation-ship between overt and non-overt psycho-logical-political warfare and the respec-

tive responsibilities associated with psy-chological-political warfare within DoDand in the Central Intelligence Agency.

PSYOP possibilitiesThere should also be a stronger focus on

the relationship between traditionalPSYOP and the use of other combat capa-bilities in conducting sophisticated com-mand-and-control warfare, as well as for“military persuasion” generally. In a battle-field environment where the U.S. maintainselectronic dominance, many possibilitiesexist for the direct exploitation of electronicsystems for psychological purposes. There-fore, possibilities also exist for close cooper-ation between the disciplines of PSYOP andelectronic warfare, or EW. With adequateintelligence, there is no reason why PSYOPcould not be more surgically targeted at anenemy’s command structure; there are alsointeresting possibilities for interactive com-munication with enemy troops and leaders.Also, more systematic efforts could be madeto interrupt or degrade an enemy’s nonmili-tary communications traffic and nationalbroadcast media.

These are some examples of new opera-tional concepts for PSYOP that could prof-itably be pursued. Other innovative possi-bilities exist in the more traditional areasof responsibility of military PSYOPers. Anargument could be made that given theincreasingly compressed time frame ofoperations and the opportunities affordedby the shock and disorientation of front-line enemy troops (as in the Gulf War),PSYOP personnel should be more fullyintegrated with combat units and should,at an earlier stage, assume a larger role incertain kinds of ground actions. There isalso considerable work to be done in devis-ing PSYOP approaches to the use, or thethreatened use, of weapons of massdestruction on the future battlefield.

Finally, there is room for improvementand innovation in PSYOP systems, whichhave generally received very low priority indefense procurement. During the Gulf War,the greatest technical failure of PSYOPwas their inability to transmit an adequateradio signal into Baghdad. That difficulty

Summer 1997 33

reflected, in particular, the limitations (andthe vulnerability) of Commando Solo (for-merly Volant Solo), an EC-130 aircraft con-figured for both television and radio broad-casting, principally for PSYOP purposes.Though it has been repeatedly modernized,the Commando Solo will soon have to besupplemented or replaced by a new type ofaircraft equipped with a significant self-defense capability and perhaps a powerfulshipborne mobile radio.

The use of unmanned aircraft for leafletdissemination and possibly for broadcast-ing is beginning to receive attention andshould be seriously explored. Considera-tion should perhaps also be given to thedevelopment of a highly agile aircraft forinformation-gathering and for broadcast-ing in support of defense public affairs,public diplomacy and PSYOP require-ments in low-threat environments and inoperations other than war.

The key to future improvement in Americanperformance in psychological warfare remainsat the conceptual and organizational levels.Only when we have gained greater clarity asto what PSYOP actually is, determined whichobjectives PSYOP can reasonably be expectedto achieve, and ascertained how PSYOP cam-paigns are to be planned, organized andimplemented, will PSYOP come fully into itsown as an integral component of Americanmilitary power and as an accepted tool of ournational-security policy.

Dr. Carnes Lord is a polit-ical scientist with interests ininternational relations, stra-tegic studies and the historyof political philosophy. Hehas served in the U.S. govern-ment in a variety of positions,including senior staff member of theNational Security Council, assistant to thevice president for national security affairs,and distinguished fellow of the Institute forNational Strategic Studies at the NationalDefense University in Washington, D.C. Heis currently the John M. Olin visiting pro-fessor of statecraft and civilization at theFletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ofTufts University. His most recent book is

The Presidency and the Management ofNational Security, 1988.

Notes:1 For a vigorous statement of this case, see Ralph

Peters, “After the Revolution,” Parameters 25 (Sum-mer 1995):7-14.

2 For what follows, see Jeffrey Cooper, “Another Viewof the Revolution in Military Affairs” (U.S. Army WarCollege, Strategic Studies Institute, 15 July 1994).

3 See Douglas A. MacGregor, “Future Battle: TheMerging Levels of War,” Parameters 22 (Winter1992/93):33-47.

4 For an excellent and well-documented account, seeFrank J. Stech, “Winning CNN Wars,” Parameters 24(Autumn 1994):37-56.

5 See Henry S. Rowen, “Political Strategies for Gen-eral War: The Case of Eastern Europe,” in CarnesLord and Frank R. Barnett, eds., Political Warfareand Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S.Approach (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Uni-versity Press, 1989), pp. 169-97.

6 Some of these themes are developed in CarnesLord, “The Role of the United States in Small Wars,”Annals of the American Academy of Political andSocial Science 541 (September 1995):89-100.

7 See Alvin H. Bernstein, “Political Strategies inCoercive Diplomacy and Limited War,” in Lord andBarnett, pp. 145-59.

8 See Stephen J. Cimbala, “Military Persuasion andthe American Way of War,” Strategic Review 22 (Fall1994):33-43, and Military Persuasion (State College,Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).

9 “PSYOP is critical in command-and-control war-fare, which is the integrated use of operations securi-ty, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare, andphysical destruction, supported by intelligence, toinfluence, degrade, destroy, or deny information toadversary command-and-control capabilities and toprotect friendly command and control against suchactions.” Jeffrey B. Jones and Michael P. Mathews,“PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC,” Joint ForceQuarterly 8 (Summer 1995):31. This article provides asnapshot of the current state of the discipline.10 Fundamental for what follows is PSYOP at War:Psychological Operations in Recent Conflicts (Washing-ton, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies,National Defense University, 1993), SECRET (withunclassified summary). This study (of which the pres-ent writer was director and principal author) wasbased on interviews with military and civilian partici-pants at all levels from a variety of agencies, and cov-ers Operation Just Cause as well as Operations DesertShield and Desert Storm. See also Carnes Lord, “ThePsychological Dimension in National Strategy,” as wellas Alfred H. Paddock Jr., “Military Psychological Oper-ations,” in Lord and Barnett, pp. 13-37 and 45-65.11 Worth particular emphasis here is the intelligencedimension. The timely and effective use of declassifiedintelligence information in support of policy is cur-rently no one’s primary responsibility; yet this is afunction that can assume great importance in crisesand in wartime.

34 Special Warfare

Deep in the jungles of southwesternCambodia, a Cambodian MI-17helicopter landed. As the rotor

blades slowed to a stop, Cambodian andAmerican soldiers stepped off the heli-copter and were surrounded by formerKhmer Rouge soldiers. But for the firsttime in 17 years, the Cambodian forces hadnot come to fight the Khmer Rouge: Theyhad come to feed them.

In February 1997, a three-man CivilAffairs liaison team, or CALT, from Compa-ny B, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, based atFort Bragg, N.C., assisted United States-trained civil-affairs soldiers of the RoyalCambodian Armed Forces, or RCAF, indelivering and distributing 20 tons ofhumanitarian daily rations, or HDRs. Therations were intended to feed formerKhmer Rouge soldiers, their families, andassociated internally displaced persons, orIDPs. The CALT consisted of the author;SFC William Dupré, the team sergeant;and SFC Norm Mastalski, the team medic.HDRs are nutritionally balanced meals,high in protein, low in sodium, and specifi-cally designed for an undernourished andunderfed population.

This humanitarian mission was per-formed in support of the peacetime-engagement program of the commander inchief of the U.S. Pacific Command, in coor-dination with the Cambodian govern-ment’s Khmer Rouge defector program.The Khmer Rouge defector program has

Summer 1997 35

Civil Military Operations: CA Soldiers Assist in Cambodian Humanitarian Mission

by Captain Paul S. Allswede

(Top) All ages of the Khmer Rouge commune help to unload rations at Phum Kon Trom,Cambodia. (Bottom) SFC Norm Mastalski of Company B, 96th CA Battalion, assistsCambodian CA soldiers in loading rations aboard a helicopter in Phnom Penh.

Photo by Paul Allswede

Photo by Paul Allswede

become the single most effective method ofending the Khmer Rouge insurgency inCambodia.

The mission was initiated by the CALTfor the purpose of conducting joint civil-military operations with the RCAF, fromthe planning stage through the executionstage. Mission planning had begun inNovember 1996, when two divisions of theKhmer Rouge force defected and were offi-cially integrated into the RCAF. The ele-ments consisted of the 405th Division, locat-ed in the vicinity of Koah Sla, in the Chhoukdistrict of the Kampot province; and the305th Division, located near Phum Pring, inthe Phnom Sruoch district of the KampongSpeu province.

The divisions were approximately 30kilometers apart, separated by a largemountain range. The 405th Division wascomposed of 340 soldiers and 1,448 familymembers and other IDPs, for a communitypopulation of 1,788. The 305th Divisionwas composed of 306 soldiers and 1,400family members and other IDPs, for a com-munity population of 1,706. With the defec-tion of these two divisions, the Cambodiangovernment considered the entire south-west region of Cambodia to be free of

Khmer Rouge insurgents.Leading the effort for the Khmer Rouge

defector program is the RCAF Office of theG5, under the direction of CambodianBrigadier General Preap Tan. The RCAF,although poorly resourced, is responsiblefor feeding and caring for all Khmer Rougedefectors once they have been integratedinto the Cambodian armed forces.

The U.S. Embassy provided the HDRs forthe mission in response to an urgentrequest from the RCAF general staff.Although the Cambodian government hadagreed to provide food for all Khmer Rougedefectors, no arrangements had been madeto provide food for their family membersand associated IDPs. To further magnifythe problem, the Khmer Rouge encamp-ments had been unable to plant sufficientcrops of rice and vegetables during theplanting season. And because of theintense fighting during the 1996 rainy sea-son, the crops that had been planted couldnot be harvested and had been left in thefields.

The situation presented the opportunityfor the CALT to capitalize not only on pastU.S. Civil Affairs mobile-training-teamtraining, but also on “partnership” planning

36 Special Warfare

Photo by Paul Allswede

Former Khmer Rougesoldiers and their fami-lies gather around theCambodian MI-17 heli-copter to begin unload-ing the humanitariandaily rations.

with the RCAF G5, the RCAF Civil AffairsCompany, the RCAF G3, the RCAF AirForce, and the U.S. Defense Attaché Office.

The HDR donation evolved into a highlycomplex operational and logistics effort thatrequired more than four months of planningand coordination by the CALT for projecteddeliveries into Koah Sla and Phum Pring,two extremely isolated and remote loca-tions. The areas are surrounded by moun-tains, streams and triple-canopy jungles.Roads to the areas were impassable, andhelicopters had to be used for the deliveries.When the CALT and the Cambodian MineAction Committee identified several mine-fields near Phum Pring, nearby Phum KonTrom was chosen as an alternate landingsite. Deliveries were made to Koah Sla Feb.10 and to Phum Kon Trom Feb. 11.

Ambassador Kenneth M. Quinn servedas the official U.S. representative for theHDR delivery at Phum Kon Trom.

Presenting the HDRs to the formerKhmer Rouge soldiers and their families,Quinn stated that the U.S. was pleased tosupport the Cambodian government’sefforts to achieve reconciliation and peace,and that through the cooperation of theU.S. and Cambodian governments, theRCAF, and former Khmer Rouge peoples,all Cambodians will be able to settle down,raise their children in peace and worktoward a better future. Brigadier General

Preap Tan, who accompanied AmbassadorQuinn, commented on how difficult it hadbeen to provide the support and assistanceto the villages. He said that the Cambodi-an government’s goal is to provide homes,land, wells, good roads and schools. He alsothanked the U.S. government for its assist-ance. The former Khmer Rouge 305th Divi-sion commander, Van Sorn, thanked theambassador for the donation to his people.He said that during 17 years of fighting,his people had moved from place to placethroughout the jungle, and that all of themwould now have a better future throughcooperation and trust.

The CALT is continuing its efforts tosecure additional HDRs, clothing, sheltermaterial, construction equipment and anyother items that will improve the lives ofCambodia’s newly integrated soldiers andtheir families.

Captain Paul S. Allswedeis a Civil Affairs TacticalSupport team leader as-signed to Company B, 96thCivil Affairs Battalion, FortBragg, N.C. He previouslyserved as company com-mander for HHC, 279th Base Support Bat-talion, and for HHC, 82nd Engineer Bat-talion, both in Germany. Allswede graduat-ed from Northern Michigan Universitywith a BS in industrial engineering.

Summer 1997 37

Ambassador Kenneth M. Quinn (in baseball cap) talkswith the former commander of the Khmer Rouge 305thDivision, Van Sorn (in fatigues), following the deliveryceremony at Phum Kon Trom.

Photo by Paul Allswede

38 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

In response to a Department of the Army initiative to conduct a department-wide review of all CMF NCO grade structures, the JFK Special Warfare Cen-ter and School has reviewed all CMF 18 and CMF 37 positions and recom-mended changes to the TDA structure only. The SWCS recommendationaffected 68 positions in CMF 18 and 11 in CMF 37. In June, DA completed areview of the proposal and submitted recommendations to the Chief of Staff ofthe Army for his decision. The recommendations have been accepted.

The Chief of Staff of the Army has approved for consideration, on a case-by-casebasis, all decorations for valor for actions performed in El Salvador betweenJan. 1, 1981, and Feb. 1, 1992. MILPER Message No. 97-123, CDR, PERSCOM,TAPC-PDA, Subject: Consideration of Decorations of Valor — El Salvador,dated June 24, 1997, outlines the criteria and the submission procedures. Con-tact your unit PAC or PSNCO for additional information and details.

Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted PersonnelDirectorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows:

LTC Michael W. Grant SF Enlisted Branch chiefMSG R.B. Gardner Senior career adviserSFC Timothy Prescott USACAPOC; 4th POG; 96th CA;

NCOES and schools manager; drillsergeants; recruiters

SFC Tod Young CMF 18 PDNCOMrs. Faye Matheny Career branch integrator; analystMrs. Rhonda Ruano 1st, 5th and 10th SF groups; JRTC;

SFOD-K; ROTC; SOCs; SOTSEsMs. Pam Wilson 3rd and 7th SF groups; USASOC;

USASFC; JFKSWCS; JOTB; AC/RCadvisers

Ms. Dyna Amey SFAS/SFQC

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager.Career-development questions should be directed to the PDNCO or seniorcareer adviser. SFQC students who have questions about assignments shouldcontact their student PAC, company first sergeant or sergeant major. NCOESquestions should be directed to the unit’s schools NCO. To make telephoneinquiries, call DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395. Address corre-spondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.;Alexandria,VA 22331-0452.The e-mail addressis epsf@hoffman-emh1.army.mil.

Proponent recommendschanges to TDA structure

of CMFs 18, 37

Army to consider awardsfor valor in El Salvador

PERSCOM points of contact

Summer 1997 39

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The FY 98 lieutenant-colonel command-selection board adjourned Nov. 22,1996, after considering 2,704 officers for 357 commands. FA 39 had fourcommands requiring fill, and 33 FA 39 officers were eligible for considera-tion, resulting in a selection rate of 12.1 percent. The Army selection ratewas 13.2 percent. A profile of the FA 39 lieutenant-colonel selectees shows:

• Two were single-track Psychological Operations officers.• One was a single-track Civil Affairs officer.• One was a dual-track Civil Affairs officer.• Three were fully trained, and one was partially trained.• Two had master’s degrees.• Three had served as battalion S3s.• Two had served as group S3s.• One had served as a deputy division G5.• One had served as an assistant corps G5.• The selectees’ average FA 39 utilization time was 73 months.

The FY 98 lieutenant-colonel command-selection board considered 115Special Forces officers and selected 14 for battalion command. The boardstatistics were as follows:

Eligible Selected Selection %

DA 2704 357 13.2SF 115 14 12.2Other combat arms 1354 160 11.8

The board selected 11 SF officers for SF branch commands and three SFofficers for garrison command. In all but one case, the selectees had servedin two or more branch-qualifying positions as majors. A profile of theselected officers shows the following key duty assignments:• Nine had served as SF company commanders.• Seven had served as battalion S3s.• Seven had served as battalion XOs.• Five had served as group S3s.• Five had served as group XOs.

FA 39 LTC commandselectees profiled

LTC command boardselects 14 SF officers

40 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

The newly formed Guatemalan National Civilian Police, or PNC, beganoperations July 15, 1997. The force — formed in the wake of peaceaccords between the Guatemalan government and the GuatemalanNational Revolutionary Unity guerrillas — is projected to have 20,000members by the year 2000. The initial contingent will be expanded everythree months as new recruits graduate from training. Eventually, thepolice will replace the security forces and Army units assigned tem-porarily to law-enforcement duties in the Guatemalan capital. Now thatthe new force is formally operational, Guatemalan President Arzu hasdeclared war on “lawbreakers, white-collar criminals, drug traffickers,rapists, agitators, members of youth gangs, and other social outcasts.” Inrecent years, organized crime, street crime and associated violence havesoared in Guatemala as a consequence of war and weakened institutions.A major mission of the PNC will be to develop strong ties with the pop-ulation and to win the trust and respect of society at large.

A July 1997 military-scientific conference in Moscow addressed theevolving role and structure of Russian “special operations forces” infuture conflict. Participants examined special-operations concepts notonly from the perspective of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (espe-cially the Airborne Troops) but also from the perspective of the FederalSecurity Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Border Service,Civil Defense/Emergency Situations, and other agencies. All of theseorganizations have their own “special operations” requirements,approaches and definitions. Specialists at the conference noted trends inthe development of a “new concept of war involving the use of noncombatsystems or limited use of combat equipment and arms”; they character-ized SOF as a “modern high-precision weapon, Russian-style”; and theyobserved that little of the extraordinarily rich base of practical RussianSOF experience had been incorporated into theory. Participants alsowere warned that the Russian Airborne Troops — so well-suited as can-didates for newly formed SOF units — were only one source, and that allministries and agencies involved need to collaborate on SOF structureand roles.

The 1997 U.S. National Security Strategy includes “protecting the globalenvironment — managing our forests, stopping the spread of toxic chemi-cals” as one of a number of strategic priorities requiring interagencyapproaches. Environmental security is also emerging as an importantsecurity consideration in other areas of the world. As some militariesaround the world examine their future roles in supporting civil authori-ties, environmental protection and law enforcement are being added tosuch nontraditional tasks as immigration control and counternarcotics. Inthis regard, some African militaries have been given the additional role ofproviding environmental security. Under the DoD Biodiversity Program,

New Guatemalan NationalCivilian Police operational

Russians examine future of special-operations forces

African militaries to provideenvironmental security

Summer 1997 41

the U.S. has provided materials and training to the military forces of anumber of African countries for the protection of wildlife and other natur-al resources. The Botswana Defense Forces, or BDF, for example, are activein biodiversity missions, especially anti-poaching. At any time, up to 20percent of the BDF may be involved in these missions, and the BDF havebeen successful in countering commercial poaching. The Uganda People’sDefense Force, or UPDF, has also received an environmental security role.The UPDF is training an anti-poaching squad to fight poaching in Murchi-son Falls National Park. Some West African navies have also receivedpatrol craft and fisheries-protection training. The overall success rate ofsuch programs in Africa is arguable, in light of reports of the less-than-effective use of U.S.-provided material. Also, there have been reports ofsome military poaching by less disciplined armies.

Bolivia’s Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army, or EGTK, which most specialistsbelieved had disbanded, is evidently still in existence in rural areas ofBolivia and is thought to be in contact with the rebels of the ChileanManuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, or FPMR. The EGTK — best known forits bombings of power pylons and oil pipelines in the Bolivian Altiplano inthe early 1990s — was badly damaged when its top leaders were arrestedin 1992. With the recent arrest of another EGTK member, there have beenindications that the EGTK is still active and that its members possessarms and explosives. In addition, EGTK members are apparently develop-ing plans to surface as the Malkus Rojos rebel group. Meanwhile, concernsover possible guerrilla infiltration from Peru and Chile, coupled withrumors that FPMR escapees have entered Bolivia, have resulted in aheightened awareness of Bolivia’s potential guerrilla and terrorist prob-lems and in more intensive army patrolling along the Peruvian andChilean border areas to prevent guerrillas from crossing into Bolivia.

According to Colonel General Georgiy Shpak, commander of the RussianAirborne Troops, the Russian airborne numerical strength was alreadydown by some 27 percent in 1996. The reduction, which is continuing, wasaccomplished by reorganizing the combat-support units and by makingmost of the airborne brigades subordinate to military district commanders.By the end of 1997, the Airborne Troops are to comprise three airbornedivisions, one airborne brigade, support units and training facilities(including the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School). The unit’s mis-sion focus will be on tactical-level support of ground forces. At the begin-ning of 1997, the Airborne Troops constituted about 2.5 percent of the totalRussian Federation armed forces. In March 1997, in a further effort to cuttheir staff and administrative overhead, the Airborne Troops became apart of the Main Command of Ground Forces. With the loss of the AirborneTroops’ autonomous status, concern has mounted over the potential loss ofairborne traditions and esprit.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and LTC Karl E. Prinslow of the U.S. Army’sForeign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Bolivian guerrilla elementsstill active

Russian airborne troopsdownsizing

USASOC unveils statueof Dick Meadows

Members of the special-operationscommunity gathered at the U.S.Army Special Operations Commandheadquarters June 6 to pay tributeto a special-operations soldier.

On what is now the MeadowsMemorial Parade Field, a statue of thelate Major Richard J. “Dick” Meadowswas unveiled. The eight-foot-tallbronze statue, the work of sculptorLawrence Ludtke, honors “one ofAmerica’s finest examples of courage,integrity and patriotism,” said Lieu-tenant General Peter Schoomaker,USASOC commanding general.

“Dick Meadows’ exploits spannedmore than three decades and includedthe best known and most well-definedmissions of U.S. special operations,”said General Henry H. Shelton, com-manding general, U.S. Special Opera-tions Command. “His biography readslike a movie script, except I woulddescribe it as a documentary, becausethe words and deeds are true.”

Meadows joined the Army in 1947at the age of 16, served in the Kore-an War and was promoted to mastersergeant when he was 20 years old.He volunteered for Special Forces in1953, served several tours in South-east Asia and received a direct com-mission to the rank of captain in1967. He was chosen to help planthe 1970 Son Tay raid, and heserved as an assault-team leader onthat mission.

Meadows retired from the Armyin 1977, but he remained active inU.S. operations. As a civilian, hesecretly entered Tehran, Iran, in1980 to assist the Desert One res-cue mission of U.S. embassy per-

sonnel held hostage by the Irani-ans. He died from leukemia in 1995at the age of 64.

Meadows’ statue is due to theefforts of H. Ross Perot, a long-timesupporter of special operations, whopaid for the $160,000 monument.

“This memorial will serve toremind us that it’s not equipmentor technology that wins battles —it’s people, it’s great soldiers,sailors and airmen of courage andcharacter like Dick Meadows,”Shelton said. — SSG BrianThomas, USASOC PAO

7th SF Group receives new commander

The 7th Special Forces Grouppassed the reins of command toColonel Edward F. Phillips during achange-of-command ceremony July 3.

Phillips replaced Colonel James

W. Parker, who became the deputycommanding officer of the ArmySpecial Operations Command.

Phillips’ previous SF assignmentsinclude detachment commander andbattalion logistics officer in the 3rdBattalion, 7th SFG; logistics officerand operations officer, 7th SFG; com-mander, Company A, 1st Battalion,7th SFG; and commander, 2nd Bat-talion, 7th SFG. He also served asthe U.S. adviser for the 4th Salvado-ran Infantry Brigade, Chalatenango,El Salvador, and as an analyst on theNational Security Council.

Phillips is a graduate of both theArmy Command and General StaffCollege and the Naval War College.He holds master’s degrees in man-agement and in national securityand strategic studies.

112th Signal Battalion recognized for excellence

The 112th Signal Battalionreceived the Army Superior UnitAward in a ceremony at the U.S.Army Special Operations Com-mand June 13.

The 112th was credited for its serv-ice and support from March 1995 toApril 1996. During that time, the bat-talion supported peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, humanitarian-assist-ance and noncombatant-evacuationmissions in Turkey, Iraq, Rwanda,Italy, Bosnia, Croatia, Sierra Leone,Liberia and Ecuador. It also support-ed joint readiness exercises in Israel,Zimbabwe, Germany, South Korea,Panama, Thailand and the U.S.

“The ability of the 112th’s soldiersto stand side by side and operatewith Special Forces, Rangers, night-stalkers and other special-operations

42 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

Meadows’ statue is unveiled at USASOC headquarters.Photo by Brian Thomas

forces places you in a class all yourown,” said Lieutenant General PeterJ. Schoomaker, USASOC command-ing general.

“The majority of our work is doneby small teams over very long dis-tances.” said Lieutenant ColonelHoward I. Cohen, commander ofthe 112th. “Because we’re soinvolved in joint readiness exercis-es and real-world operations, thesesoldiers have a sense of purposeand a real sense of mission.”

Conference to considerfuture PSYOP environment

The 1997 Worldwide Psychologi-cal Operations Conference will beheld Nov. 13-14, 1997. This year’sconference theme will be “Psycho-logical Operations in Future Oper-ational and Strategic Environ-ments.” The conference is spon-sored by OASD-SO/LIC and hostedby the Air Force Special OperationsSchool at Hurlburt Field, Fla. Toschedule attendance, call MajorDean Messelheiser at DSN 579-1845 or commercial (904) 884-1845not later than Oct. 1.

Course teaches role of information warfare

The Armed Forces Staff Collegein Norfolk, Va., conducts the JointInformation Warfare Staff andOperations Course to acquaint stu-dents with the emerging role ofinformation operations, or IO, andinformation warfare, or IW, in jointwar-fighting doctrine. Offered eighttimes a year, the course trains serv-ice personnel in grades E7-O6, andcivilian equivalents, in the concepts,procedures and applications of IOand IW in a joint, combined or serv-ice environment.

The training is available as a two-week resident course or as an on-siteorientation course (for unified com-mands, services or components). Theresident course is taught at theTS/SI/TK security level; the orienta-tion course is normally taught at the

secret level. For more information, callYN1 (SW) Gerry Banks at DSN 565-6680 or commercial (757) 445-6680.

The AFSC also offers the five-week Joint Command, Control, Com-munications, Computers, and Intelli-gence Staff Operations Course. Thiscourse teaches the application ofcommand-and-control concepts inthe joint environment; the organiza-tion of DoD and the way it supportsthe C2 process; and the managementof joint C4I systems and related jointprocedures of strategic, theater andtactical systems. The course isintended for non-technically orientedmilitary officers and DoD civilians.For more information, call LTC FelixPenn at DSN 564-5142 or commer-cial (757) 444-5142.

Borchini takes command of 4th PSYOP Group

Colonel Charles P. Borchiniassumed command of the 4th Psy-chological Operations Group fromColonel William C. Hunter June 25.

Borchini comes to the unit fromthe Pentagon, where he served asthe chief of the Civil Affairs andPsychological Operations Branch inthe Special Operations Division ofThe Joint Staff.

A native of Baltimore, Md., Bor-chini has served the PSYOP com-munity since 1991 and hasdeployed in Operations SouthernWatch in Southwest Asia andRestore Hope in Somalia. He holdsa bachelor’s degree in political sci-ence from Towson State University,Towson, Md., and a master’s inpolitical science from JacksonvilleState University, Jacksonville, Ala.

Exercise points out need for CMO manual

A command-post exercise at FortLeavenworth, Kan., has pointed outthe need for an additional doctrinalpublication on civil-military operations.

During Prairie Warrior 1997, repre-sentatives of humanitarian-relieforganizations, or HROs, participated

in order to make the exercise morerealistic. Prairie Warrior, conductedannually as part of the Command andGeneral Staff Operations Course,teaches students how to plan and exe-cute corps and division operations.

The HRO representatives werefrom CARE, the International Res-cue Committee, and Joint ReliefInternational. Following the exercise,the HRO participants and represen-tatives from the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School formulated anumber of lessons learned to beapplied to future operations.

One lesson learned was the needfor a publication on the tactics, tech-niques and procedures used to inte-grate SOF and HRO operations. TheCivil Military Operations Division ofthe SWCS Directorate of Trainingand Doctrine is developing the publi-cation’s concept.

The CMO Division is also work-ing on other publications:

• FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Opera-tions. The CMO Division is review-ing comments from field units forinclusion into the manual.

• FM 41-10-1, Civil Affairs Tac-tics, Techniques and Procedures.This how-to CA manual willinclude checklists and formats forperforming assessments, CMOestimates and annexes.

• Civil Affairs Mission TrainingPlans. The CMO Division is develop-ing Army Training and EvaluationProgram mission training plans for thetactical-support-team generalist (41-701-10 MTP); HHCs of CA battalions,brigades and commands (41-701-30MTP); and functional-specialty teams(41-701-60 MTP). These new MTPswill consolidate the current eightMTPs. They will provide clear descrip-tions of unit training methods forachieving wartime-mission proficiency.

For more information, call theCMO Division at DSN 239-1654/8253or commercial (910) 432-1654/8253.

Summer 1997 43

SOG: The Secret Wars of Amer-ica’s Commandos in Vietnam.By John L. Plaster. New York:Simon & Schuster, 1997. ISBN: 0-684-81105-7. 367 pages. $25.

The history of Special Forces inthe Second Indochina War, alsoknown as the Vietnam War, seemsdestined to be told in much thesame as it was experienced andusually viewed: in discrete parts,never as an integrated whole.

Until now, a large part of the SFVietnam story has not beenrevealed. The SF soldiers assignedto the 5th Special Forces Groupand detailed to the Military Assist-ance Command’s Studies andObservations Group, usually called“MACV SOG” or simply, “SOG,” attimes were a third of the 5thGroup’s strength.

But SF’s role in SOG is morethan just a matter of numbersassigned. Half of the 5th Group’sMedal of Honor recipients wereserving in SOG, as were two-thirdsof those reported missing in action.Additionally, the statistics for SOGSF killed-in-action or wounded-in-action are comparable to those ofsome unfortunate Civil War units.

SOG members conducted classi-fied operations for a covert organi-zation. Participants were swornnot to tell where they had been orwhat they had done. When casual-ties or heroic actions forced publicadmissions, the reported locationswere often “displaced” to put thesoldiers within politically correctareas. Despite the many postwarbooks, the large number of peoplewho passed through SOG assign-ments, and the wartime efforts of

politicians and news media toembarrass the country by exposingit, the SOG story has remainedlargely untold.

The title notwithstanding, this isnot an account of SOG per se. Thebook concentrates on SOG’s largestoperation: cross-border reconnais-sance. Enough is told about otheraspects of SOG — a highly com-partmented organization — to putthese programs in context and tokeep the title honest, but the bookis overwhelmingly about SOGreconnaissance and the demandingcombat missions that came to beassociated with it: personnel recov-ery, trail interdiction, wiretapping,bomb-damage assessment and pris-oner snatching.

It is primarily the story of thebrave men of the small SOG recon-naissance teams, or RTs (American,Nung and Montagnard), who wentdeep into heavily occupied hostileterritory knowing that there was no

possibility of support by friendlyground forces or fires. The teamswere equipped with small arms andradios of inadequate range to reachfriendly forces. They were depend-ent on the sporadic overhead pres-ence of U.S. Air Force forward aircontrollers, or FACs, for communi-cations. Weather and other condi-tions permitting, these FACs couldmuster friendly fighters to attacklucrative targets or to support RTsthat were in trouble.

Given the prevailing conditionsof multilayered jungle, groundmist, and mountainous terrainwith monsoonal cloud cover, eventhis assistance was sometimesunavailable, despite the courage ofthe FACs and the fighter pilotswho repeatedly risked the hazardsof flying into massive ground fireand cloud-concealed mountains.

It is hard to read this book with-out wondering at the courage andtenacity of the RT members. Theywere no “ignorant army” facinghazards unknowingly. At least asearly as 1966, the word was outamong Special Forces personnelthat the missions of the mysteriousSOG were tough and dangerous. Asimilar knowledge must haveexisted among the indigenousmembers.

Although an American’s firstassignment to SOG was largely aproduct of selection by reputation(comrades’ often fatal compliment),SOG was a volunteer outfit to theextent that a member could bereassigned upon request. Theindigenous, because they weremercenaries, could quit when noton missions. Yet very few of theAmerican or indigenous members

44 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

of SOG availed themselves of theseoptions. Overwhelmingly, theypulled mission after mission until,for the Americans, their tour wasfinished or, for both, their luck ranout. Many SF soldiers volunteeredfor successive tours in SOG, fur-ther depleting that precious finitestore of luck. (Plaster himselfserved three tours in SOG RTs).

Because recognition was sparseexcept among comrades, decora-tions were limited, and the RTmembers could talk of their activi-ties only with other SOG RT per-sonnel, it is hard to understandtheir dedicated endurance save interms of unit cohesion, loyalty tocomrades and personal pride. Plas-ter has told this story extremelywell, and these characteristicsshine through without specificstatement.

Although this is not a book togive Aunt Minny for Christmas (ina very few places the language isaccurately salty), it is a book thatany combat soldier would under-stand and appreciate. Clearly, itshould be read by the SOG sur-vivors and particularly by thosewho patiently waited for them,unable to learn just what they did.It should also be read by anyonewith an interest in SF history andby any SF operator with a profes-sional interest in SF’s special-reconnaissance mission.

COL Scot CrerarU.S. Army (ret.)Vienna, Va.

Peacekeeper: The Road toSarajevo. By Major General LewisMacKenzie. Vancouver, B.C.: Dou-glas & McIntyre Publishers, 1993.ISBN: 1-55054-098-X. 345 pages.$28.95.

Retired Canadian Major GeneralLewis MacKenzie is one of theworld’s few genuine experts in theart of peacekeeping.

MacKenzie served eight tours as

a peacekeeper in places like Gaza,Cyprus and Central America —finally serving as chief of staff ofUNPROFOR and as commandinggeneral of United Nations Forcesin Sarajevo during a period ofheavy fighting between BosnianSerbs and Muslims. He definitelyknows his stuff.

Perhaps just as important,MacKenzie is a good storyteller.He begins his book with a chronol-ogy of events that covers all of hispeacekeeping tours — beginningwith his experiences as a younglieutenant serving in Gaza. Hetells his stories with humility andhumor, and some of his tales aregenuinely funny.

Also — and this is no smallpoint — MacKenzie does not pullany punches: He freely speaks ofthe mistakes he made. Many booksof this type are self-congratulatory,but Mackenzie avoids that autobio-graphical trap by assiduouslytelling the truth — no matter howmuch it hurts or who it offends.

In fact, MacKenzie details theoften wasteful, overly bureaucraticand ineffective ways of the variousU.N. directorates, and there arethose in the U.N. who will takeoffense. The inefficiencies and

ineptitudes include the refusal onthe part of U.N. politicos to acceptmilitary advice not to use Sarajevoas their headquarters; the continu-ing refusal of the U.N. to givepeacekeeping generals the respon-sibility for their own budgets; theinability of the U.N. to supply eventhe simplest administrative mate-rials for UNPROFOR; and the ini-tial unwillingness of the U.N. togive soldiers heavily armedarmored vehicles for their own pro-tection. Many U.N. soldiers died asa direct result of that lack of fore-sight. We could use more ofMacKenzie’s kind of honesty.

MacKenzie’s book will also givethe reader a more complete under-standing of events in Bosnia andthe issues surrounding that coun-try’s longstanding conflict. Theopportunity to see Sarajevothrough MacKenzie’s eyes isenlightening.

If you are interested in peace-keeping or in Bosnia, this is a greatbook to read. Even if you are inter-ested in neither topic, the book isstill recommended, and it willappeal to soldiers of all grades.MacKenzie is a good soldier, and heserved well and faithfully underthe most difficult of circumstances.His story is one that can be appre-ciated by anyone who has everworn a uniform.

LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr.U.S. Army (ret.)Fayetteville, N.C.

Summer 1997 45

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the ArmyJFK Special Warfare Center and SchoolATTN: AOJK – DT – MDMFort Bragg, NC 28307 – 5000

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