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BITRUS MICHAEL
PG/M.SC/11/59842
ELECTION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN
NIGERIA: AN EVALUATION OF POST 2011
Social Sciences
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Nwamarah Uche
Digitally Signed by: Content manager’s Name
DN : CN = Webmaster’s name
O= University of Nigeria, Nsukka
OU = Innovation Centre
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ELECTION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: AN
EVALUATION OF POST 2011 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
IN NIGERIA
BY
BITRUS MICHAEL
PG/M.SC/11/59842
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA
JULY, 2012
i
ELECTION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: AN
EVALUATION OF POST 2011 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN
NIGERIA
BY
BITRUS MICHAEL
PG/M.Sc/11/59842
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE (COMPARATIVE POLITICS)
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA
SUPERVISOR: DR. H. C. EDEH
JULY, 2012
ii
APPROVAL PAGE
This research project work has been examined and approved by the
Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, for the award of
Master of Science (M.Sc) Degree.
BY
________________________ _________________________
DR. H.C. EDEH P.C CHUKWU
SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
________________________ _________________________
EXTERNAL EXAMINER PROF. C.O.T UGWU
DEAN OF FACULTY
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am very grateful to God Almighty, creator of Heaven and Earth for giving
me the grace, protection and inspiration in the pursuit of this academic programme.
Without him, this journey to success would have been a futile effort. My deep
appreciation goes to my able and dynamic supervisor, Dr. H. C. Edeh, who is like a
father to me. He create time out of his tight schedules to go through this work and
make honest and constructive input to make the work perfect and worthwhile. May
the good Lord reward him abundantly. To my HOD Mr. P. C. Chukwu, am happy to
have come under your tutelage. To post Graduate coordinator (political science) Dr.
Ken Ifesinachi, a political guru of the 21th century. He consoled me in times of
distress. God in his infinite love will grant him all his heart desires. To these
myriads of scholars, whom I have been privileged to come under their tutelage Prof.
B.O. Ezeani, Prof. Onuaha, Prof. Obasi Igwe, Dr. Aloysius Michaels-Okolie, Dr. I.
M. Abada, Dr. Peter Mbah, Dr. Asogwa, Mrs. Uju etc.
I will never forget my political mentors Hon. Dr. Francis Zira, Medical
Director New Life Hosptial, Mubi Adamawa State, and RT Hon. Titsi Ganama
Kwaga MHR-Representing Madagali/Michika Federal Constituency who gave me
the opportunity to serve him as Principal Legislative Aide in the National Assembly
and also the architect of this laudable programme. May God raise help for him in
time of need. And I pray that his political future will be bright as we are heading
toward another election year. I owe a lot of gratitude to my colleagues in the
National Assembly, especially our Senior Legislative Aide – Mr. Amos Drambi
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Kwaji JP Legislative Assistant Mr. Luka Kwaghe, personal Assistant Alhaji
IbrahimGoni, Secretary Mallam Abdulkarim Saidu Gulak.
I thank my parents Mr. Bitrus Sule Techipla and Mama Jacqueline Nzarpaya
Damudu Wafalda for their prayers and provision for my family while I was in
school. I also thank my siblings, Paulina Bitrus, Godwin Bitrus, Thomas, Justina
and Tony, Cecilia Bitrus and other members of the family for their care and support.
My unalloyed thanks goes to my understandable wife, Mrs Juliet Japari
Modibbo and our Son Master Melchizedek Michaels – Modibbo who endured my
absence and the hardship consequent to this programme. I am grateful to my friends
and course mates, especially our able class Chairman Mr. Nwoke Ikemefuna
Sunday, Cyril Sunday Ovart, Elijah Okorie Albert, Obinna, Oji James Bitrus, Bala
Taru, Linus Ndakwa and all the class of all science M.Sc of 2011/12 session.
I remember in pains of tears, my childhood friends late Jonathan Lawrence
Wulshiri, clement T. Suleman and Vandu Joseph Soja. It is true you are dead, but
your thoughts are still much alive in me. “May your gentle souls rest in peace.
Amen.
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DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to Almighty God My caring wife Juliet and
Son, Melchizedek.
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ABSTRACT
Elections in Nigeria since political independence, has been characterised by violence activities that often resulted in socio-economic tension of unrest whoever they are shows signs of violence either overtly or governmentally in words or action. They fighting or preparing to fight; either are moody counting their loses of past struggle, or busy celebrating the dividends of their pyrrhic victory. Nigerian have often been roasted in the flame of political violence; especially in the northern part of the country. Hence, this study focuses on the main cause of the 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria. Is high rate of poverty and level of illiteracy in Northern the root cause of this violence? We used relative deprivation theory on the course of this research. We adopted the content analysis model of data analysis. The involvement of the NYSC members as ad hoc staff in the 2011 general election and consequences on the scheme as a government agency charged with the responsibility of reconstructing, reconcile and rebuild Nigeria after the Civil War. The research seeks to find a lasting peaceful coexistence among Nigerians especially in the northern part of the country where political violence has become a recurring decimal. The Almajiri school system which sometimes serves as training ground for clandestine youths was also a focus of this work. We highlighted other causes of political violence such as religious sentiments, institutional decay, religious intolerance, “crisis of expectation” and use of inciting language during campaign as remote causes of the 2011 presidential post election violence in Nigeria. The full implementation of justice Uwais committee report was recommended among others as the way to avert future occurrence of such politically motivated violence in Nigeria.
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TABLE CONTENTS Title Page ........................................................................................................... i
Approval Page .................................................................................................. ii
Acknowledgment .............................................................................................. iii
Dedication .......................................................................................................... iv
Abstract .............................................................................................................. v
Table of Contents .............................................................................................. vi
CHAPTER ONE
1.1 Background of the Study .................................................................. 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem .................................................................... 5
1.3 Objective of the Study ....................................................................... 6
1.4 Significance of the Study ................................................................... 6
1.5 Literature Review ............................................................................... 7
1.6 Theoretical Framework .....................................................................................................14
1.7 Hypothesis .................................................................................................................................. 16
1.8 Method of Data Collection ...................................................................................................... 16
1.9 Method of Data Analysis ........................................................................................................ 16
CHAPTER TWO
2. 1 Elections and Violence in Nigeria: an Overview
2.2 Pre-Independence Era ......................................................................... 18
2.3 The First Republic Election and Violence 1964/65 ........................... 20
2.4 The Second Republic Elections and the Uprisings (1983) ................. 22
2.5 The Third Republic ............................................................................. 24
2.6 The Fourth Republic ........................................................................... 25
2.7 The 2003 Election and Political Violence .......................................... 25
2.8 The 2007 General Elections ............................................................... 29
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CHAPTER THREE
3.1 Major causes of the 2011 Post Election Violence in Nigeria ............. 35
3.2 Poverty as Catalyst for Political Violence in Nigeria ......................... 36
3.3. An Overview of the April 2011 Presidential Election ...................... 38
3.4 Political Activities that Preceded the 2011 Presidential Election ....... 40
3.5 Change of the INEC Chairman ........................................................... 41
3.6 Pre Election Violence ......................................................................... 44
3.7 Presidential Election .......................................................................... 46
CHAPTER FOUR
4.1 Post Election Violence and National Integration ............................... 52
4.2 Presidential Post Election Violence ................................................... 55
4.3 Poverty Level in Kaduna and the 2011 Presidential Postelection
Violence .......................................................................................... 56
4.4 The Role of the Security Forces in the Post-Election Violence ........ 63
4.5 Post Election Violence and NYSC ..................................................... 66
4.6 Origin and objectives of the NYSC ....................................................
4.7Core values of NYSC and the Effect of the Post-election Violence ... 68
CHAPTER FIVE
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations ......................................... 72
5.1 Summary ............................................................................................ 72
5.2 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 74
5.3 Recommendations .............................................................................. 75
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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1
CHAPTER ONE
1.1 Background of the Study
Elections are considered as cardinal and indispensable in the practice of
modern democracy. According to Nnoli (1990) “It is closely tried to the
growth and development of democratic political order that is generally held to
be the single most important indicator of the presence or absence of
democratic government”. Elections if properly organized, devoid of rigging
and all forms electoral manipulations and malpractices do not only establish
and entrench democracy, but confers legitimacy on the leadership that
emerged from the process, the political institutions, polices and programmes
that accompany such administration.
Election has been defined as the manner of choice agreed upon by
people out of many to occupy one or a number of positions of authority
(Nnoli, 2003). Elections have always been the legitimate way of transferring
power from one regime to another through ballot box. Through election,
popular conduct and participation in public affairs is created in the society,
Ugoh (2004).
The current global emphasis on democratisation has made election an
inevitable process of leadership choice and succession. Obviously, the success
of every conditional democracy is tried to the integrity of electoral process
while the quality of a representative government is also lived to the capacity
of state to evolve viable, transparent, and trusted electoral machinery that will
inspire the interest and confidence of broad spectrum of civil society and
contending factions of political society (Okolie, 2008).
Regrettably, election in Nigeria since political independence has been
characterized by violent action that often results in socio-economic tension
and unrest. This has indeed remained a recurring decimal in Nigeria’s political
life despite efforts at curbing it.
2
Besides, political violence in the country has been sustained and
reinforced mostly by religious, ethnic and tribal diversities of Nigeria. For
instance, the political violence that greeted the Nigeria’s first and second
republics which eventually led to military intervention and long spell in the
country’s government and politics. This had its roots in ethic and tribal
considerations.
The Human Right Watch revealed that between independence in 1960
and 1990, Nigeria produced only two elected governments both later
overthrown in military coups. Nigeria’s military ruled the country for nearly
30 of 40 yrs of independence. However, in 1999, Nigeria made a transition to
civilian rule. The 1999 elections, which brought a retired general, Olusegun
Obasanjo to power, were blights by such widespread fraud that observers from
carter centre concluded that “it is not possible for us to make an accurate
judgment about the outcome of the presidential election”.
Federal and state election in 2003 were again marred by fraud as well as
serious incidents of political violence that left over 100 people dead and many
others injured. Human right watch found that members and supporter of the
ruling party were responsible for the majority of abuses, though opposition
parties also engaged in political violence. Most deaths occurred where
opposing bands of armed gangs fought each other in an effort to control an
area and displace supporters of the opposing party. Human Rights watch
documented how ruling party politicians in the oil-rich Niger Delta mobilized
and funded armed groups to help rig elections. That led to a sustained increase
in political violence and criminality in the region.
Despite the abysmal record of the 1999 and 2003 elections, the
government did not correct the problems in the next elections. Observers from
the European union described the 2007 elections, which brought Umaru
Yar’adua to power, as the worst they had witnessed anywhere in the world.
3
Human Right watch estimates that at least 300 people were killed in political
violence linked to the2007 elections.
The 2011 general election process under Attahiru Jega was commended
by international and domestic observers regarding major improvements in
areas like voter registration excise, accreditation and counting phases of the
elections. The 2011 presidential election raised strong domestic expectations,
as exemplified by the high turnout rates, especially in the core Hausa/Fulani
states of Northern Nigeria, where women living in “KULLE” (a kind of
Islamic nunnery) were mobilized on religious ground to vote for Gen.
Muhammadu Buhari of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) New social
media tools like facebook, blackberry, Ipad, twitter and Android has aided in
the collection/collation, analysis and dissemination of information (open
society foundation 2011).
However, the whole electoral process has been criticized for number of
reasons ranging from under age voting, campaigning during election,
intimidation and political violence. The presidential election was marred by
allegations of vote buying, ballot box stuffing and inflation of results most
noticeably in South Eastern Nigeria, Jonathan’s stronghold where official
results in the presidential election in some rural areas recorded close to 100
percent voter turnout and parts of Kaduna, plateau and Adamawa states with
Christian ‘enclaves’. This was greeted with widespread protest which later
turn to violence in Northern Nigeria (Human Right Watch, 2011).
The Nigerian presidential election has come and gone, but the ‘credible’
election have been stained by the blood of Nigerians who have their lives in
the post-election violence experienced mostly in northern part of Nigeria.
According Corinne Dufka, a senior West Africa researcher at Human
Rights watch, “the April elections were heralded as among the fairest in
Nigeria’s history, but they also were among the bloodiest.
4
Following the announcement of the result of the 2011 presidential
election which saw to the re-election of the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan,
candidate for the ruling people’s Democratic Party, violence began with
widespread protests by supporters of the main opposition candidate,
Muhammade Buhari, Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) challenging the
results. The protests degenerated into sectarian violence and killings by the
Almajiri (Sanghaya school students) in the Northern states of Adamawa,
Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and
Zamfara. Relief officials estimates that more than 65,000 people were
displaced while over 800 people are estimated to have lost their lives in the
political violence.
Also, for the first time, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC)
members were used in the electoral process, particularly in the presidential
elections. The crops members were used during the voter registration exercise
and the election proper as ad hoc staff to complement officials of the electoral
agency. They played prominent role as the main agents for the organization of
the elections. However, the scheme which was designed by the then military
government of General Yakubu Gowon to foster national integration through
the posting of young graduates to places outside their home states came under
thereat as a result of the attack and murder of ten corps members in Giade
Bauchi state, this led to calls from different quarters for the scrapping of the
scheme.
In a bid to forestall future occurrence, two commissions were
established in May, 2011 following the elections, to examine the factors that
led to the violence. Governor Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa established a 12-person
commission in Kaduna, and nationally, President Jonathan established a 22-
person commission headed by Sheikh Ahmed Lemu. The commission’s work
is ongoing, and findings from either or both have the potential to identify the
5
root causes of violence in Nigeria, and even identify the perpetrators for
possible punishment. But the tracks of past commission suggest that neither
effort will make any headway.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
What appeared to be a free, credible and peaceful presidential election,
took on a different coloration overnight. The human Rights Watch reported
that the presidential election divided the country along ethnic and religious
lines. As election results trickled in on April 17, and it became clear that
Buhari had lost, his supporters who are mostly Almajiri and Islamic clerics
took to the streets of northern towns and cities to protest what they alleged to
be the rigging of the results. The protests soon turned to skirmish which
quickly degenerated into sectarian and ethnic bloodletting across the northern
states. Muslim rioters targeted and killed Christians and members of ethnic
groups from southern Nigeria, who were perceived to have supported the
ruling party, burning their churches, shops, and homes. The rioters also
attacked police stations and ruling party and electoral commission offices.
In predominantly Christian communities in Kaduna and other northern
state, mobs of Christian youths retaliated by killing Muslims and burning their
mosques and properties. Jega (2011) blamed the post-election violence on
what he termed as “Crisis of Expectation”. In his reasoning.
I regret to say in my view that a lot of post-election violence that we have seen, to a large extent, can be attributed to what i call crisis of expectation. I think so many people expected the election to be so credible, so perfect that in the perfection and credibility it is their candidate who will win, and once their candidate did not win, it was no longer credible and perfect and that I think would have explained, to a large extent, some of the postelection violence.
6
Furthermore, he attributed the causes of the election violence to related
systemic issues such as poverty and unemployment, illiteracy and lack of
proper education, poor political enlightenment and voter education, rather
than the actual conduct of election, and even less of ethno-religious factors as
opined by some analysts. The study is thus guided by the following research
question:
1. Did the high rate of poverty and level of illiteracy contribute to the post
election violence in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria?
1.3 Objective of the Study
The general objective of this study is to investigate the nature of
political violence in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria; while the
specific objective of the study is:
1. To determine whether the high rate of poverty and level of illiteracy
contributes to the 2011 Post Presidential Election violence in Nigeria.
1.4 Significance of the Study
The study has both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically,
the study has the potential of contributing greatly to existing body of literature
on elections and political violence. This work will provide the student of
political science and political history, the needed framework for tackling the
issues of political violence in future elections.
Practically, this research work will be of interest to Nigerian
government, especially House committee on electoral matters, Ministries,
Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) like the Independent Electoral
Commission, National Policy think-tank, States independent Electoral
Commissions (SIEC) etc. The findings of this study will also provide valuable
information in articulating potential policies that will help address the
problems of political and electoral violence.
7
Finally, to the readers and researchers, this would make useful
contributions to any study on same topic or any related topic on elections and
political violence.
1.5 Literature Review
Researches on electoral violence are scarce and often times focuses
broadly with a mixture of political and electoral violence. Most of the works
reviewed includes articles, commentaries, reports and interviews from
newspapers and magazines on the 2011 presidential post-election violence.
Some scholars have made attempt to conceptualise electoral violence.
Fischer defined electoral violence (conflict) as any random or organized
act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process
through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical
assault, forced “protection”, blackmail, destruction of property, or
assassination (Fischer, 2002). Election violence generally involves political
parties, their supporter4s, journalists, agents of the government, election
administrators and the general population, and includes threats, assaults,
murder, destruction of property, and physical or psychological harm
(International Foundation for Election Systems, 2011; Fischer, 2002).
This work of Fischer culminated into a comprehensive research by the
international foundation for Election Systems (IFES) on electoral violence,
which later set the stage for Electoral Violence Education and Resolution
(EVER) project that has been implemented in countries across continents
including Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Guyana, Iraq, East-Timo and Nigeria. The
EVER project is currently been implemented in Nigeria and it presents a
comprehensive and robust understanding of the context and concept of
electoral violence, within the EVER framework therefore, election-related
violence refers.
8
Any violence (harm) or threat of violence (harm) that is aimed at any person or property involved in the election process, or at disrupting any part of the electoral or political process during the election period (International Foundation for Election Systems, 2011).
Nweke (2005) define electoral violence as any form of physical force
applied to the end of disorganizing the electoral process, ranging from the
destruction of electoral materials to the intimidating of the electorate to vote
against their wish. It includes physical force aimed at influencing electoral
officials to work in favour of particular groups or parties or persons as against
an established procedure. Also it is a harmful act targeted at causing
disharmony during elections.
Olagbegi (2004) viewed electoral violence as a faceted process not
open to a singular explanation but, unfortunately tending to reproduce itself in
a series of socially disruptive behaviours. Basically, electoral violence can be
said to be any behaviour involving or tending to involve the use of physical
force to cause damage to property of maim or kill an individual(s) in order to
ensure of prevent electoral gains.
According to IIufoye et al (2005), electoral violence is a limited aspect
of political violence that is associated with the process of elections. They
reason that forms of political violence occur before, during or after elections.
According to Jegede (2003), there are different manifestations of
electoral violence e.g. murder, arson, abduction, assault, and violent seizure
and destruction of electoral materials. These acts are perpetuated by
individuals and groups with the intention of positions after elections.
Electoral violent mostly occurs in the conduct of an electoral contest
before, during, and after elections. Most often they are directed at altering,
influencing, or changing, by force, the voting pattern or manipulating the
9
electoral results in favour of a particular candidate or particular candidate or
political party (Ugoh, 2004).
Igwe (2007) provides more insight on the meaning of election violence.
According to him, election violence connotes any forceful act intended to
compel a re-direction nor affect the stable course of development of the
political system, usually in response to natural or other emergencies,
longstanding demands for changes or part of a evolutionary alternation of the
system. He maintains that election or political violence may or may not
involve actual bloodshed, what is essential to amount to the condition is the
effort to coercively carry out changes or the process of governance by means
that are outside the normal, stable routine of the conventional legal machinery
of the political society.
Election or political violence according to him may also be perfectly
legal and provided for within the constitutional order when taken in response
to extreme situations demanding the temporary declaration of a marshal law
or state of emergency, and the application of extra-judicial measures to return
the political pendulum to normalcy.
Noli (2003:104) “violence is necessary because the new ruling class
must not only seize the various instruments of state power, it must also
suppress the often determined resistance of the deposed ruling class, smash
the old state machinery build its own state apparatus under circumstances in
which it new and revolutionary values have not widely taken hold in the
society and began to build a new society, based on the new values”
“In this regard, it is based on the process of destroying completely one
in their place. In the final analysis, a new must replace the old, so this cannot
be done without violence”.
Eckstion (1999) asserts that electoral or political violence aimed to
change political order, its constitution, common authority and of such
10
dimension that its incidence will affect the exercise of authority in the society.
Anifowose (1982) for instance provides an all embracing definition of
political.
As the use of threat or physical act carried out by an individual or individuals and/or property with the indentation to cause injury or death to persons and damage or destruction to property and whose objective, choice of the target or victims surrounding circumstances, implementation and effect have political significance, implementation and effect have political significance, that is tend to modify the behaviour of others in the existing arrangement of power structure that has some consequences to political system.
Therefore, political violence is carried out in the struggled for
acquisition of political power, whole in some case; political violence is aimed
at modifying the political behaviour of individuals and groups within political
system for some desire results.
Election violence on the other hand, is a limited aspect of political
violence that is associate with the process of elections. This form of political
violence occurs before, during or after elections.
Election violence is a form violence that is associated mainly with the
process of elections in a given society, precisely in a democratic setup or in
the process of democratic translation (Afolabi 2003:79).
Election violence particularly in Nigeria is quintessential elite affairs
arising from the inordinate struggle for places in the structure of power that
have often degenerate into open violence among ethno-communal groups or
individuals who are deceived into believed into believing that their interest is
about to be imperilled.
11
Okoro (2011) attributed the 2011 post-election violence to the type of
campaign embarked upon by politician and party leaders which incited the
people to violence. He is of the view that the immediate cause of the
immediate cause of the post-election violence can be traced to the campaign
of Congress for Progressive Chang (CPC) in which party leaders, during the
presidential campaign urged their members to “protect their votes by all
means” and ensure that the elections are not rigged. Therefore, he attributed
the cause of the cause of the post election violence to the poor education and
religious sentiments which in his view, is inextricably intertwined with
political action.
Northern leaders in a conference held in Kaduna agreed that
institutional decay, poverty and religious intolerance were the key factor that
led to the post-election crisis.
Makarfi (2011) admitted that the failure of the National Assembly to
implement Justice Uwais report which recommended a bill to establish
electoral offences tribunal which would have served as a deterrent, and the delay in
announcing election results by the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC) as two factors which led to the post election
violence.
Tofa (2011), a former presidential candidate of National Republic
Convention (NRC) observed that the violence stemmed from ethnic and
religious as well as political thuggery which needs immediate and permanent solution.
In his opinion, the government should address the issue of Almajiris in the North and
review the national policy that would address influx of children and criminals
from neighboring countries.
12
Salisu (2011) one time speaker of house of representatives, condemned the
violence and singled out the media as one of the core motivators of the riots.
According to him, opinion writers and political commentators on the national daily
inflamed divisionary opinions that led to the crisis.
Jega (2011), blamed the post-election violence on what he called: "Crisis
of Expectation" from people who expected a particular outcome from the elections.
The huge expectation between who wins and who loses and the management of this
expectation in his view resulte in the post election violence. He further
attributed the election violence to the large systemic Issues of poverty,
unemployment, illiteracy, lack of proper education, poor enlightenment and voter education
as the primary causes, while playing down on the ethno-religious factors as opined by some
analysts.
The Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU) in a press release assessing
the post election violence that swept Kaduna and some northern states in Nigeria
looked at the immediate and remote causes of the violence. The remote cause of the
post election violence was attribute to the peoples Democratic Party (PDF) zoning
policy which became a burning issue following the death of President Musa Yar'
Adua. The zoning arrangement is a situation in which power is shared between the
North and the South as stipulated in the party's constitution. Therefore the indication
of interest by vice-president Goodluck Jonathan, the immediate successor and
southerner denied the North the chance for a second term. This party issues later resulted
into a national debate, ingniting strong reactions from some Northern elements
who threw full support for Gen. Buhari, the CPC candidate while insisting that it was
their slot and anything short of that they will make Nigeria ungovernable to president
Jonathan . The immediate cause of the post-election violence is said to be the conduct of
the presidential elections of April 16, 2011. The official position of the CPC is that the
violence was the product of the incumbent to win elections by all means (The Nation
13
May 10.2011). In a response to this allegation, the PDF said that the violence was
engineered and masterminded by no other party but CPC (Daily Trust Newspaper,
May 16 2011).
Conscience reports (2011), also threw light on the root causes of the
violence in the North. They attributed the recent election violence in the North to
poverty and ignorance. The report points out the fact that Northern leaders are either
alienated from the longings and aspirations of their people or simply ignore them by
being nonchalant. In their assessment, political power had been in the domain of
the northern region for close to 38 years of Nigeria's 51 years of independence. The
report also pointed out how the northerners dominate every sphere of Nigerian
politics; citing the superior control in term of population in the legislature and at the
committee level to the control in the local government chairmen association and
governor's forum with the northern states totalling 19 to their credit. Despite all
the powers wielded by the Northern leaders, the bulk of the North live in abject
penury because the bulk of the resources accruing to the people is wasted by the
leaders while their people wallow in poverty and crass ignorance.
The Christian association of Nigeria (CAN) and the Nigerian Supreme Council
for Islamic Affairs, NSCIA also gave differing opinions on the cause of the post
election violence that erupted after the April presidential elections while appearing
before the federal government committee on post-election violence. The Christian
association blamed the violence on premeditate aggression targeted at Christians
and their places of worship. Christians were said to have had to grapple with thugs,
who demanded that they should be ruled exclusively by Muslims. The NSCIA
blamed the violence on the spontaneous reaction by people against perceived
rigging of elections in favour of a particular party during the presidential
election; use of undue exploitation of incumbency factor and wilful disregard of the
14
zoning principle after the death of the former president Umaru Yar'Adua were given as
reasons for the post election crisis.
Dakas (2011) while delivering a public lecture on the post election
violence organized by the institute of Peace and conflict resolution blamed the post
election violence on zoning. He also stated that the dimension of violence showed that
top political figures in the county took advantage of the illiterate population in the
North to perpetuate the act.
Gap in Literature
Undoubtedly, the study has unravel some salient literatures on dominant
issues on elections and political violence in Nigeria. However, these literature have
concentrated only on causes of violence that occurred pre and during the 2011
elections in Nigeria; neglecting the nexus between the poor and illiterate Almajiri, as
the perpetrators of the 2011 post election violence in Nigeria.
This tends to pose some difficulties in using such work by policy
makers. In recognition of this fact, the study intends to fill this gap through holistic
review of the activities of the Mallams, Alrnajiri's and political elites in connection
to the 2011 post presidential election violence that occurred mostly in Northern
Nigeria.
1.6 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework adopted for this research is the relative
deprivation theory, the theory of relative deprivation is one of the most popular
behavioural explanatory frameworks utilized in the study of violence. This theory was
propounded by the following scholars: Ted Gurr-1970, John Dullard-1939, Leonard
Berkowitz-1962, James Davies-1972 etc. The central thesis of the theory is that
15
aggression and violence is always a result of frustration and anger due to
discontent of the individual or group concerning what he/they perceive as his/their
due, and what he/they actually get(s).
In other words, it is the degree to which the group/individual feels
deprived and its related anger and frustrations as mentioned above. People
normally result to irrational behaviour and violence if they feel an intense of relative
deprivation. Emphasis is on intensity and scope. In other words, if social want
formation exceeds social want satisfaction, then the consequences is social frustration
which may lead to violence.
However, by way of definition, Gurr (1970) conceptualized deprivation as a
perceived discrepancy between, value expectation and their value capability.
Value expectations are the goods and condition of life which people believe they
are rightfully entitled to. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions of life they
are capable of attaining and maintaining, given the social means available to them.
This relative deprivation framework can be used to explain the recent 2011
post presidential election violence which is said to have broken out in Northern
Nigeria as a result of poverty and illiteracy. We can thus posit that the Almajiri and
Mallams protested under the pretext that the PDF led government did not live to
expectation of alleviating poverty and illiteracy in the North. The discrepancy
between value expectation (of different candidate of any political party to win election)
and value satisfaction led frustration and aggression which culminated in the post
election violence.
16
1.7 Hypothesis
In line with our research questions and to vigorously pursue the
achievement of broad objectives of the study, we have formulated the
following hypothesis;
1. The high rate of poverty and level of illiteracy contributed to the 2011
postelection violence in Nigeria.
1.8 Method of Data Collection
Method of data collection specifies how the test of hypothesis is carried out
(Ifesinachi, 2010). Method of data collection of this study is based mainly on
secondary sources. This is a method use in gathering already existing data on the
subject matter such as government publication, textbooks, articles and magazines,
annual reports etc.
1.9 Method of Data Analysis
We will adopt the content analysis model of data analysis. The
effectiveness of this method or model lies in its ability to allow the researcher to
extract and interpret relevant research materials, make judgment input into the work.
Content analysis hence, are scholarly methodology in research writing, by
which texts are studied as to authorship, authenticity or meaning
(www.wikipedia.com). Harold Lasswell formulated the core questions of content
analysis, "who says what, to whom, why, to what extent and with what effect?"
(Krippendor/t:2004:l 1).
17
Ole Host (1969) offers a broad definition of content analysis as "any
technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying
specified characteristics of messages".
Finally, Kimberly A. and Nevendor F. (2006:16) offers a six-part definition of content
analysis.
Content analysis is a summarizing quantitative analysis of messages that relies
on the scientific method (including attention to objectivity, inter-subjectivity, a priori
design, reliability, validly, generalization, replicability and hypothesis testing) and is
not limited as to the types of variable that may be measured or the context in which the
messages are created or presented.
18
CHAPTER TWO
2. 1 Elections and Violence in Nigeria: an Overview
The first elections in Nigeria were conducted by the colonial
government in response to the nationalists clamour for greater participation in
the colonial government. Nigerians were offered the first opportunity to
occupy political offices in 1922 with limited representation and restricted
franchise. Nevertheless, the 1959 general elections paved way for the
emergence of Nigeria as a sovereign state. Since then, various elections have
been held either in transition from one civilian government to another or in
transition from one military regime to a civilian regime.
In this chapter, we will give an overview of elections and electoral
violence since independence down to the recently concluded 2011 elections,
with emphasis on the post presidential election violence that occurred
primarily in Northern Nigeria.
Elections conducted in Nigeria can be broadly categorized by the
colonial, Military and civilian governments. The elections organized by the
colonial governments (1954 and 1959) and the military government (1979 and
1999) were adjudged to be the less violent, which the ones organized by the
civilian regimes in 1964/65, 1983, 2003, 2007 and the recent 2011 general
elections appeared to be more violent and crisis prone at the pre, during and
post election stages, compared to the former.
Egwu (2003:88) argues that, like the colonial supervised elections, the
1979 general elections conducted under the supervision of the then military
government was not beset by problems of political violence. Thus, it can be
19
said that military regimes in Nigeria have organized relatively violent-free
elections, though these elections have been found wanting in terms of
credibility. It is important to note that, violence associated with election and
electoral processes started in Nigeria with the 1959 elections designed by the
British to facilitate transition from colonial rule to independence. The failure
to nip the problem in the bud at the inception, led to protracted incidences of
election violence after 51 years as an independent state.
2.2 Pre-Independence Era
The introduction of the elective principle in 1922 motivated political
activities among the educated elites, leading to the formation of political
parties and participation in the political process. The first election in 1923,
into the legislative council precipitated the formation of the political parties in
the country. The Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) was formed by
a foremost nationalist Herbert Macaulay and other leading nationalists.
Between 1922 and 1933, the party's candidates were able to sweep all the
elections into the Lagos legislative council. Its political activities were limited
to Lagos, thus, were unable to attract a national outlook.
The Lagos Youth Movement (LYM) which was formed in 1933 and
later renamed the Nigerian Youth Movement in 1936, dominated the political
landscape in Lagos with wider national representation. Between 1938 and
1941, they won all the elections for Lagos legislative Council, thereby
breaking the hegemony by NNDP for over a decade. The movement was short
lived due to the crisis between Ikoli and Akinsaya (J.S Coleman, 1958:227-8).
The National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon, later changed to National
Council of Nigerian citizens succeeded the Nigerian Youth Movement
(NYM).
20
Political parties like Northern People's Congress (NPC) and Action
Group (AG) were also among the political parties of the pre-independence
period. It was just before independence era as noted by Nnoli, that regionalism
and ethnicity became part of politics and elections in Nigeria (Nnoli,
1980:140-158). This was also facilitated with the introduction of the Sir
Arthur Richard's constitution of 1946 which Balkanized the country into three
regions: North, East and west. As a consequence, the first and second general
elections in 1954 and 1959 respectively were conducted along ethnic and
regional lines. The first recorded pre-independence outbreak of political
violence was the Kano riots of 1953, where the motion moved by Chief
Anthony Enahoro for self government as soon as practicable created a rift
between the south and the North.
2.3 The First Republic Election and Violence 1964/65
The third general elections and the first since political independence
were the 1964/65 federal elections, conducted by the Electoral Commission of
Nigeria (ECN). Two major alliances were formed to contest the 1964/65
elections-the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) made up of the NPC, NNDP,
the Midwest Democratic front and Dr. Chike Obi Dynamic Party on one hand
and the United Peoples Grand Alliance (UPGA) made up of NCNC, AG,
NEPU and United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) on the other hand. The
elections were held and UPGA rejected the result for alleged regularity. After
much consultations and compromise, elections were once again organized in
March 1965 and Tafawa Balewa reappointed as the prime Minister.
Nevertheless, the so called national broad based government was not
achieved, as ethnic differences and primordial sentiments were not only
exploited but served as the major platform for politicking. As a result, charges
21
and counter charges, intimidation and harassment still persisted. The election
which had been described as "the most perilous display of brinkmanship"
(Kirk Greene, 1971:21) and during which the country "fettered perilously on
the brink of disintegration and bloodshed" (Anglin, 1965:173) saw a foil
display of all the centrifugal forces which had reared their heads up in the
forties and fifties.
Dudley (1982:268) described the conduct of the 1964 elections in the
following words,
The electoral officers were terrorized into absconding from their offices once they received the nomination papers of governing party candidates, leaving opposition party with no opportunity of registering their nomination papers. So flagrantly was electoral procedure, an abuse that at close of nomination, some 88 out of total of 174 NPC candidates in the north had their candidature unopposed. In the west, about 30 percent of the NNDP were supposed to have been opposed. The situation in the East was not much different. Therefore, as envisaged by many people including the proclaimed winners of the 1964 general elections, the result was not only rejected, but the opposition especially in the western region resorted to violence to contest what they perceived as reverse of their mandate by the ruling NPC. The situation gave birth to arson, looting, killings, massive destruction of properties and total breakdown of law and order beyond the control of the central government. Consequent upon this, a state of emergency was imposed and the then prime minister declared the western region as 'wild wild west'. The intensity of the electoral violence recorded after the 1964 general elections affected the legitimacy of the newly constituted civilian authority and subsequent military interventions in Nigeria politics on January 15, 1966.
Just after independence, the political experience in Nigeria became
chaotic. Several factors such as regionalism and disparity in population of the
22
three regions contributed to the political instability in the federal units. Also,
the three major regionally based and tribally sustained political parties, the
NCNC, the NPC and the AG, with aggressive competition among the
politicians most of whom had no idea about the art of politics, and not the
least, a weak constitution contributed greatly to the electoral violence
experienced in the first republic (Ojibo, 1980:18).
Anifowose noted that turbulent crisis characterized this period such as
the action group crisis of 1962//1963, the population census crisis 1962/63,
the TIV riots of 1964/65 and the western region crisis of 1965 among others.
The major political parties in the country were engaged in the struggle not
only to win and retain power but also to control the centre which was
recognized as having all the dominant resources in spite of its weakness
politically. Hence, all available means were employed to grab power
including the blatant rigging of elections, manipulation of census figures,
violence, arson, corruption and acts of brigandage. This continued till the
army ceased power in January 1966
when it was already clear that the political class had lost control of
government affairs (Anifowose et al 1999:235).
2.4 The Second Republic Elections and the Uprisings (1983)
After thirteen (13) years of military rule, 1966-79 and the ensuing coups
and counter coups, a general election was conducted under the administration
of General Olusegun Obasanjo, which ushered in the second republic on
October 1, 1979. There were few recon incidences of violence before, during
and after the elections. As stated earlier on, the 1979 election that was
organized and supervised by the military was relatively peaceful. The major
23
contention was the question of 2/3 of 19 states, was ruled in favour of Alhaji
Shehu Usman Shagari, the NPN presidential candidate by the supreme court.
Only five of the nineteen political associations that applied for registration
were approved by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO). These were
the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Great
Nigeria peoples party (GNPP), the Nigeria's peoples party (NPP) and the
peoples redemption party (PRP). The NPN dominated the politics of the
second republic, controlling the federal as well as most state governments,
until the regime was toppled in a military coup in 1983 (Anifowose et al 1999:
247).
In comparative terms, contrary to the violence and electoral malpractice
which characterized 1964/65 elections, the 1979 elections were held with
minimum electoral violence. As Kirk Greene and Rimmer (1981:31-45)
stated:
Unlike the elections held throughout the 1950s and 60s those in the 1979 could be said to have been marked by a lack of excitement at a time bordering on apathy. National leaders found it necessary, after the unexpected low turnout at the first of the five consecutive elections, to remind voters that it was their duty to vote. Even for the presidential elections, the one which understandably polled the largest number of votes, only 16.8 million out of the 47.7 million on the electoral register cast their votes.
However, the situation was different in the 1983 elections. The 1983
elections, both at the national and state levels were said to be a replica of the
1964 general elections. All forms of electoral malpractices was said to have
been employed to influence the outcome of elections in favour of the ruling
24
party. This degenerated to chaos, and mayhem in some parts of the country
(Egwu 2003).
The conduct of the 1983 federal and state elections was marked by
allegations of widespread violence and electoral fraud. The situation was such
that at the dawn of the elections, the presidential and other elections were said
to have been 'won' and "lost".
2.5 The Third Republic
The third republic which lasted from 1992-1993 was short lived. It ushered in
a two party system imposed by the military junta under General Ibrahim
Babangida; the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican
Convention (NRC). The initiated civil rule under General Babangida was
truncated and aborted with the annulment of the June 12 presidential
elections, assumed to have been won by the SDP flag bearer Chief M.K.O
Abiola, a Yoruba man.
The elections were acclaimed by both domestic and international
observers as the most genuine, freest and fairest in the history of elections
organized in post independent Nigeria. Unfortunately, after the conclusion and
inauguration of governments at the local and state levels, the subsequent
presidential election result was later annulled. This generated controversy
which heated the polity and general Babangida stepped aside among
widespread tensions.
Following the dissolution of the Interim National Government (ING)
and the collapse of the third republic, the military regime under general Sani
Abacha instituted another transition programme which brought back multi-
partyism. The transitional programmme never materialize, and the untimely
death of General Abacha brought general Abdulsalam Abubakar to power.
25
The new military leadership sequently handed over power to a democratically
elected government on May 29, 1999. Since then, the political climate of
Nigeria has been ridden by political and election motivated crises.
2.6 The Fourth Republic
After sixteen years of military rule and three months of Interim
National Government, general Abdulsalam Abubakar ushered in Nigeria's
fourth republic. The general elections organized by Abubakars regime was
described as been free and fair. There was little or no pre and post election
violence. The presidential elections held with little controversy, power was
therefore, successfully handed over to the president-elect general Olusegun
Obasanjo, marking the disengagement of military from Nigerian politics.
As rightly noted earlier, violence in Nigeria's political system, in most
cases, has been recorded during civilian transition as was the case in 1964 and
1983 elections. This understanding has therefore marked the trajectory of the
electoral violence witnessed in the 2003,2007 and 2011 elections in Nigeria.
27 The 2003 Election and Political Violence
The 2003 Elections in Nigeria were held in the months of April 12, 19,
and May 3, for the National Assembly, presidential, gubernatorial and state
assembly respectively. These elections were significant because they served
as a test of Nigeria's ability to transit successfully from one civilian regime to
another.
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) registered
about twenty political parties that participated in the presidential,
gubernatorial, National assembly and state house of assembly elections. The
26
2003 general elections had a total registered voter of over sixty (60) million
and about forty two million valid votes were recorded during the presidential
election in particular. The result of the 2003 presidential election showed that
Peoples Democratic Party had a landslide victory. They won twenty eight (28)
states out of 36 in the gubernatorial election, which All Nigeria Peoples Party
(ANPP) and Alliance for Democracy (AD) won seven (7) and one (1) state(s)
respectively. The 2003 elections were marred by serious allegations of
electoral malpractice and election violence. The Conference of Nigerian
Political Parties (CNPP), an umbrella for some of the registered political
parties that participated in the 2003 presidential elections in their report titled
"stolen mandate" claimed that:
The 2003 elections were characterized by illegality, irregularity and malpractices. Some of the most starring irregularity are premeditated vote allocation, result swapping, forceful hijacking and diversion of election materials, the use of security agents the Army, Air force, Navy, police and paramilitary agencies to harass, intimidate, arrest, detain and even kill opposition members, all in an effort to continue in office (Stolen Mandate 2003:3).
There was also a rise in the kidnapping of opponents, assassination of
aspiring and other political figures and violent disruption of political meetings
and campaigns of rivals. These acts occurred between and within parties,
especially in the pre election period. In the African Election journal, Bodunrin
et al (2003:36-38) opined that the political violence experienced in the 2003
elections was mostly inter party violence, which occurred at the state level and
related to the party primaries. The ruling party had more intra-party violence
than other parties and contributed mostly to the violence occasioned with the
2003 elections. The African election journal also noted that the summit
27
convened by the president with all political parties in attendance aimed at
encouraging peaceful elections, bore little or no fruit to the peace building
process.
The 2003 elections witnessed an unprecedented level of electoral
violence. Electoral fraud ranges from ballot stuffing, intimidation, killing,
assassination etc; in short, it was a triumph of violence. There were no
elections but merely the intimidation of voters and the selection of already
decided winners by elites and Caucus. Human right watch reported that in
April and May 2003, at least one hundred people were killed and many more
injured during federal and state elections in Nigeria and most of the violence
was perpetrated by ruling PDF and its supporters (Human Right Watch,
2004:1). The subsequent local government elections the following year, was
also a repeat of the 2003 general elections ballot manipulations with
widespread electoral violence across the country. In some places, election did
not hold but results was announced. In other cases, thugs and hired
machineries snatched ballot boxes and thumb printed the ballot papers in
favour of their candidates. SUIP noted that violence during the 2003 election
cycle was more blatant and marked the unchecked proliferation of another
worrisome development of hiring and arming of youths to serve narrow
political ends (Onwudiwe and Berwind -Dart, 2010).
The Human Right watch reports (2003) revealed that hundreds of
political figures, including prominent opposition were killed prior to and
during the 2003 elections. This posed a serious threat to the legitimacy of the
state and national elections. Barnabas Igwe, a prominent reformer of the
Nigerian bar associations was killed in Anambra State after calling for the
former governor's resignation for felling to pay civil servants. In the same
month, Isiaku Mohammed, the deputy chairman of the opposition party, the
28
United Nigeria Peoples Party was killed in Kano State. Harry Marshall, the
Vice-Chairman of PDP South-South before defecting to ANPP was killed in
his Abuja Home.
It was also noted that a good number of the violence were clearly inter-
party. The journal of African Elections explains that one PDP/ANPP dispute,
using hired mercenaries, in Benue State, left seven people dead. Another
incident, in Gombe State, involved an attack by ANPP Supporters on the PDP
gubernatorial candidate and the minister of state for mine and power, who
were travelling in a convoy (lor, February 2003; Ibrahim, February 2003).
And just days after he lost the race in Kwara State, the ANPP candidate for a
House of Assembly seat was headed to death with a Machete (florin, April
2003).
Two weeks leading to the 2003 elections alone, the Institute for
Democracy in Southern Africa (ID ASA), in its weekly report, titled ID ASA
weekly Updates on Election Related Violence and Conflict reported the
following incidents of political violence in Nigeria.
• In Niger State, Progressive Redemption Party (PRP) Supporters
attempted an attack on the governor's convoy.
• Mohammadu Buhari, the ANPP presidential candidate, was attacked in
Adamawa state, which is a PDP stronghold.
• In Ondo State, the campaign convoy of chief Gani Fawehimi,
Presidential candidate for the National Conscience Party (NCP), was
• Seven people were injured in a gunshot and machete attack on the Oyo
State governor, Alhaji Lam Adesina.
• In Abuja, Six gunmen raided the house of the spokesperson for the PDF
presidential campaign, Osuntokun, but he was not at home.
29
• In plateau State suspected raiders from Chad, motivated by the ongoing
ethnic tensions between the Fulani and the natives, attacked the
indigenes of Dei Village between Langtang and Wase Local
Government councils violence and intimidation between ANPP and
PDF gubernatorial candidates became so serious that president
Obasanjo considered withdrawing the security officials attached to both
candidates and threatened other punitive action.
• In Zamfara State, police warned religious leaders to steer clear of
politics in their sermons. In an effort to avert violence, political parties,
after an interparty consultative forum, decided to suspend political
rallies throughout the state (Adebo et al 2003: 37-38).
After the 2003 elections exercise, domestic and international observes
reported that the presidential and gubernatorial elections suffered as a result of
numerous administrative and procedural errors combined with many observed
instances of obvious premeditated electoral manipulation. The comments from
the monitoring bodies of the elections conduct in most of the states were
indeed, far from positive.
2.8 The 2007 General Elections
The 2007 general elections were the third of such elections held since
the transition from military to civilian rule in 1999. Electorate went to the
polls with high expectations that Nigerian leaders will cease the opportunity
to strengthen its democratic institution and restore its glory as the giant of
Africa, by conducting a credible and violent free election. However, it was a
different thing all together; Nigeria once again, became a thriving market for
political violence as the 2007 elections towed the path of the two previous
30
polls of 1999 and 2003. They were marked by widespread violence,
intimidation, bribery and corruption.
A total of 52 political parties were registered by the electoral body,
Independent National Electoral Commission (INCE) for the 2007 Elections.
The general elections were held on 14 and 21 April 2007. Governorship and
state assembly elections were held on 14 April, while the presidential and
national assembly elections were held a week later on 21 April.
After the voting and counting phases was over, the electoral body
declared that the ruling party won the majority of the states and federal
elections, topping the score chart with 28 of the 36 states. Opposition
gubernatorial candidates won in eight (8) states including Lagos and Kano,
two most populous states in Nigeria.
Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, a northern governor from Katsina State, largely
unknown to many Nigerians, was declared winner of the presidential elections
by Prof. Maurice Iwu, the INEC Chairman. It was alleged that Obasanjo
'hand-picked' Yar'Adua in order to retain his political influence after having
lost the bid for a third term in office. The result showed that Yar'Adua won
70% of the valid votes cast (24, 638,063 votes). Buhari was said to be second
with 18% of the valid votes, (6,605,299 votes). Both Buhari of ANPP and
Atiku of AC rejected the results. The opposition candidates believed that the
election was rigged in favour of Yar'Adua.
According to the final reports on the elections by the European union
observer mission, the results announced by INCE before the departure of
EOM on 7 May 2007, PDF won 70 percent of the valid votes cast during the
presidential election, twenty eight (28) governorship seats, eighty six (86)
senatorial seats out of 109 and one hundred and sixty nine (169) house of
31
representatives seats out of the two hundred and forty seven (247) seats
announced so far. ANPP won nineteen (19) percent of the presidential
election votes, five (5) Governorship seats, fifteen (15) senatorial seats, forty
nine (49) House of Representatives seats. Action Congress (AC) got seven (7)
percent of the presidential election valid votes, one (1) Governorship seat, six
(6) senatorial seats and twenty six (26) House of Representatives seats. PPA
won two (2) Governorship seats, one (1) senatorial seat and three (3) House of
Representatives seats. According to these figures, Peoples Democratic Party
(PDP) secured a two third majority in both chambers of the National
assembly, 79 percent in the senate and 68 percent in the House of
Representatives out of the 247 announced results. Further, PDP won the
governorship seats of Sokoto, Jigawa and Kebbi States from ANPP and
Anambara State from APGA but lost the Governorship seat in Bauchi state to
ANPP, and the Governorship seats in Imo and Abia States to PPA's favour
(EOM, 2007: 41).
Below is the summary of the 2007 presidential elections,
Summary of the 21 April 2007 Nigeria Presidential Election Results
Candidates
Parties
Votes
%
Ambrose Owuru
Hope Democratic Party
28,519
0.08
Atiku Abubakar
Action Congress (AC)
2,637,848
7.47
Attahiru Bafarawa
Democratic Peoples Party (DPP)
289,324
0.82
Bartholomew Nnaji
Better Nigeria Party
11,705
0.03
Chris Okotie
Fresh Democratic Party
74,049
0.21
32
Chukwuemeka Ojukwu Odimegwu
All Progressives Grand Alliance
155,947
0.44
Emmanuel Obayuwana
National Conscience Party
8,229
0.02
Emmanuel Okereke
African liberation Party (ALP)
22,677
0.06
Habu Fari
National Democratic ?arty
1,934
\ 0.06
Lawrence Adedoyin
African Political System (APS)
22,409
0.06
Maxi Okwu
Citizens Popular Party (CPP)
14,027
0.04
Mojisola Obasanjo
Nigerian Masses Movement
4,309
0.01
Muhammadu Buhari
All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
6,605,299
18.72
Olapade Agoro
National Action Council
5,752
0.02
Orji Uzor Kalu
Progressive Peoples Alliance
608,848
1.73
Patrick tomi
African Democratic Congress (ADC)
50,849
0.14
Pere Ajuwa
Alliance for Democracy (AD)
89,241
0.25
Umaru Yar'Adua
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)
24,638,063
69.82
Source: INEC
The results of the 2007 elections were strongly criticized by domestic
and international observers who challenged the credibility of the elections.
Some of those who participated in the elections sought for justice in the law
courts based on the allegations of fraud, threats of violence and inability to
cast their votes. Violations and irregularities reported by election observers
included polling locations opening late, closing early, or not opening at all;
errors on the ballots; underage voting; vote buying; ballot box stuffing and
theft; and falsified results sheets. Media reports also documented widespread
incidents of thuggery and coercion at polling places.
33
A delegate from the US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI)
mooted that in many places and in many ways the whole electoral process
failed to represent the true interest of Nigerians. In her opinion, the
cumulative effect of the whole process substantially compromised the
integrity of the electoral process.
Furthermore, the European Union stated that the elections did not live
up to the hope and expectations of the Nigeria people and therefore the
process cannot be considered to have been credible. The Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) delegation was similarly
critical, suggesting that "irregularities and the sporadic violence characterized
and challenged the validity of the elections". The US based International
Republican Institute (IRI) called the elections "below acceptable standards",
noting that the resolution of election disputes would be "critical" to restoring
the credibility of the country's democratic process.
In the aftermath of the elections, the outgoing president acknowledged
the flaws witnessed in the conduct of 2007 elections but suggested the need to
accept the result as the extent did not warrant invalidating the results (CRS,
2011). The research project conducted by IFES-Nigeria, on the 2007
elections, recorded an unprecedented scale of violence. It aimed at collecting,
documenting, reporting and mitigating incidences of electoral violence in
Nigeria. DFES verified and reported a total of 967 incidents of electoral
violence. The reported incident included 18 death/killing from January 13 -
April 30, 2007 (IFES-Nigeria, 2007). The human rights report also estimate
the total number of people killed in the election related violence to be about
300.
34
However, in his inaugural speech, President Yar' Adua conceded the
election was flawed and subsequently constituted an electoral reform
committee to recommend changes to the electoral institutions. The changes
aimed at restoring the credibility of the electoral institution and enthroning
transparency in the electoral process. The changes made under the
administration Goodluck Jonathan, who took over power, following the
untimely death of President Yar'Adua, and thus, set the trajectory for the 2011
general elections.
In the next chapter, we will examine the 2011 elections, paying
attention to the presidential elections and the post-election violence that
occurred mostly in the Northern part of Nigerian after the announcement of
the results of the presidential elections.
35
CHAPTER THREE
3.1 Major causes of the 2011 Post Election Violence in Nigeria
In Nigeria, since 1999, the Peoples Democratic Party led government
has failed to perform ‘positive function’ which is every-where a
primary duty of the state. Raphael (1976) in Nyewusira and Nweke
(2007:33) write that the ‘positive function’ of the state is to promote
general welfare and maximize social goals in the society. Such medial
care, education, portable drinking water, good roads, electricity, good
transportation services and employment. According to Nwosu (2005),
the provision of these services has helped many developed nations to
‘maintain social cohesion and domestic political support’. This ‘social
cohesion and domestic political support’ is lacking in Nigeria due to the
inability of government under People’s Democratic Party to perform
‘positive function’.
Poverty in Nigeria could be seen as a product of inequality in the
distribution of wealth and opportunities in society. Nigeria is one of the
countries with wide gap between the poor and the rich. Wage disparity further
aggravated poverty in Nigeria. The rich wage differentials among politicians
and employees had further aggravated poverty in Nigeria. The rich get richer
while the poor get poorer. Resources are distributed to favour the privileged
class.
In the course of this research, we will classify poverty into two forms;
material poverty and spiritual poverty simply. Material poverty is defined as
lack of what a human person needs to live a normal, true and genuine life. It is
seen as disease because it distorts person’s worth and destroys his dignity and
pushes him/her to live a miserable life. In material poverty a victim whether a
person or a country like Nigeria lacks basic needs of life like food, shelter,
clothing, access to health and education. In spiritual poverty, a victim lacks
36
love for others, does not have regard for others’ interest, is always concerned
with his own interest and prepared to ride roughshod over others to achieve
his or her selfishness. Lying, dishonesty, blackmailing, conspiracy, greed,
murderous impulse, etc are his or its constant companions. In Nigeria where
poverty is accommodated and crowned as a king, courtesy of bad managers of
the country’s abundant resources, the bitterness it arouse in the people had
made the country vulnerable to violent eruptions with enormous costs in terms
of lives and property.
3.2 Poverty as Catalyst for Political Violence in Nigeria
The trend of human development in Nigeria even at 52 years of
nationhood is worrisome. The number of people living on less than one dollar
per day is on the increase. (Agba A. M., Ogaboh & Ushie E. M, 2009) that,
Poverty remains a serous problem to the country. And we cannot celebrate in happiness Nigeria’s 50th anniversary when far greater proportion of our population are poor and miserable. How can we truly celebrate our nationhood at 50, when majority of Nigerians live in poverty in the midst of plenty?
The incidence of poverty in Nigeria is very high, with over 70 percent
of the population living in poverty (Ottong, 2006; Abiodun, Agba & Ushie,
2007) it was estimated in 1980 that 17.7 million Nigerians were poor, in 1985
the number increased to 34.7 million, while in 1992 and 1996 it was 39.2
million and 67.1 million respectively. In 2004, during Obsanjo’s regime, the
population living in poverty skyrocketed to 75.5 million (Federal office of
statistics, 1990, Agba et al, 2007; Gbrabe, 2009).
37
Source: UNDP (2008:240)
United Nations Development programme (UNDP) 2008 report as
demonstrated above shoes that between 1999 and 2008, about 70.8 percent of
Nigerians spend less than one dollar a day; 52 per cent had no access to
portable water, while 39.0 per cent survive to 40 year from birth. It further
revealed that average national poverty in Nigeria between 1999 and 2008 was
34.1 percent as compared to Senegal 33.4 percent and republic and Benin 29.0
per cent.
While lofty and laudable poverty eradication programmes abounds in
Nigeria, it is even more worrisome that most of these programmes fizzle out
midstream while others do not see the light of the day. The implication is that,
the very proponents of these programmes get richer while the intended
beneficiaries get poorer. It is in this vain that the northern part of Nigeria
where poverty and its attendant level of illiteracy is very high, resorted to
protest the peoples Democratic Party government manipulation of election
results.
38
The street boys called the Almajiri are vulnerable to violence as a result
of illiteracy and poverty. They (Almajiris) blamed the federal government of
Nigeria for their predicaments. The northern Mallams believed that, the PDP
government from inception could not cater for their needs and did not perform
it positive function.
They believed that the high voter turnout during the election will give
them ample opportunity to change the government in power, that could not
alleviate poverty, since the inception of democratic rule in 1999.
3.3. An Overview of the April 2011 Presidential Election
Nigeria went to the polls in April to vote for members of the National
Assembly, governors and president in the fourth nationwide elections since
the return to civil rule. (John Campbell and Banjoko, 2011:2) opined that,
since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, the political system has been
susceptive to corruption on grand scale, giving way to high rate of poverty and
fallen standard of education. Thus poor conduct of elections invariably brew
political intimidation and violence by the teaming poor and less educated
youths.
Furthermore, the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections were seen to have been
put together by Nigerian elites, who facilitated the fraudulent Nigerian
election process. The same elites failed to put in place people oriented policies
and programmes geared toward alleviating poverty and reducing illiteracy
level in Nigeria, especially the Northern part of the country.
However, the 2011 elections marked a paradigm shift in the conduct of
elections in the history of Nigeria. The successful prediction of the outcome of
the 2011 presidential elections by Campbell and Banjoko 2011 came as no
surprise. They predicated that:
39
April 2011 elections will be a qualitatively different election in comparison to previous elections. Although predictions are heavily in Jonathan’s favour for re-election, never before has there a riprap to a Nigerian general election like this:
• His mandate as he stands to alienate significant groups in the north.
• Bribery, intimidation and corruption (all mainstays in previous Nigerian
elections) will be less prevalent in this instance due to increased
international pressure. Registration has been its most successful this
year, although some of the electorates have been barred from polling
stations.
• Increased presence of social media (particularly the exponential growth
in mobile phones) will have a significant impact on the electoral
process although it’s too early to say how. Although utilization of social
media could help minimize election rigging and greater activism on the
domestic front, its development within Nigeria has also brought with it
serious implications, Goodluck Jonathan has been deemed ‘the
Facebook president with an audience in the tens of thousands (more so
than many Western leaders). Many experts cite this as the reason for a
sense of greater public engagement, although the claim from some
international NGOs that there is widespread enthusiasm has been found
contentious..
• The traditional political elites have become fractured thus making the
elections a real horse race. This increased sense of competition has led
many politicians to appeal to ethno-religious groups to a much greater
extent, raising fears that this might create greater friction amongst
groups known to descend into sectarian conflict.
40
The April 2011 election was therefore a true reflection of the predications
above. The victory of President Goodluck Jonathan was indeed foretold.
There was little or no manipulation by the ruling elites in the electoral process
as was the case in the past. The presidential pool was a radical departure from
the old electoral process in the past. The presidential poll was a radical
departure from the old electoral process in terms of transparency, voting
procedures, result collation and declaration. Apart from the pre-election
violence recorded in some parts of the country, the elections themselves were
largely peaceful, well-organized and, in the opinion of many Nigerians and
the international community, fair and reflective of the population will. The
media played a very instrumental role, especially the new media. Intimidation,
thuggery, corruption, god-fatherism were at the minimum.
3.4 Political Activities that Preceded the 2011 Presidential Election
In spite of the ugly trends set in the 2003 and 20007 elections, the 2011
elections presented an opportunity for Nigeria to renew her commitment to
credible and transparent elections. Therefore government’s approval and
enactment of the recommendations of Electoral Reforms committee became
imperative for the success of the 2011 elections. Some of the key
recommendation of the 22 member committee headed by justice Mohammed
Uwais include:
• Removal of the Independent National Election from the direct control
of the Presidency and abolishing of State Electoral Commissions.
• INCE Chairman to be appointed by the National Judicial (NJC) rather
than the president (the NJC would forward the name of the selected
nominees to the senate for ratification following a period of public
advertisement).
41
• Determination of election petitions by tribunals should take no more
than four months, and appeals a further two months, making a total of
six months.
• Establishment of new legislative bodies to deal with electoral offences.
Such bodies would include: Electoral Offences Commission (EOC),
Constituency Delimitation Commission (CDC), and Political Parties
Registration and Regulatory Commission (PPRRC). (Final report,
Commonwealth Observer group 2011).
The executive arms, after wide consultations with major stakeholders,
produced a white paper from the reports and forwarded the drafts bill to the
legislature. The new electoral bill was passed by the National Assembly. The
2010 electoral act and other amendments were subsequently signed into Law
by President Goodluck Jonathan.
The National Assembly was, however, criticized for excluding some
key recommendations of the Uwais Committee such as the procedure for the
appointment of the Chairman of INEC and the creation of an Electoral
Offences Commission.
3.5 Change of the INEC Chairman
The death of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in May 2010 determined
the succession of vice president, Goodluck Jonathan. The emergence of the
new president also brought about a change of baton leadership in the
administration of the electoral body. Thus, in June 2010, the president
appointed Professor Attahiru Mohamadu Jega as the chairman of the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). He was selected on the
basis of his reputation, and in recognition of the role he played in the Electoral
Reform Committee (ERC) that was established to review the electoral process
and the legal framework after the gigged and disputed 2007 elections. The
appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega, then the Vice Chancllor of Bayero
42
University, Kano, as the Chairman of INEC was applauded both within and
outside Nigeria, as Professor Jega was hailed as a man of integrity having
opposed military dictatorship during his term as a leader of the Academic
Staff Union of Universities. The appointment of the seasoned academic and
civil activist restored the confidence of Nigerians in the credibility of the
electoral commission. (CRS, 2011:5).
Zoning Issue
Zoning is essentially a power-sharing agreement among members of
Nigerian political parties, most notably the country’s ruling political party, the
PDP. It is an arrangement designed to promote inclusiveness and therefore
stability among Nigeria’s main ethnic groups from the north and south.
As soon the campaign for the 2011 elections began, the issue of zoning
the office of the president cropped up. A mere inter-party issue was turned
into a national discourse. The gentlemen agreement to rotate the office of the
president between the northern and southern regions had been the policy since
1999; however, the demise of President Yar’Adua revived the zoning debate.
President Obasanjo, a Yoruba from the South-West had completed the
constitutionally allowed two terms as the president of Nigeria. He was
succeed by Mr. Yar’ Adua, a Fulani from the North-west who died in office.
Following his death, his vice Dr. Jonathan, of the Ijaw minority ethic group in
the South took over the mantle of leadership to complete the term.
Advocates of the zoning arrangement were opposed to Dr. Jonatha’s
candidacy. They argued that as former president Yar’Adua (a northerner) had
not completed his term before his demise and could have expected to serve
another four year term, therefore, the presidency should again fall to the
North. Within this context, a group of influential northern Nigerian politicians
from the PDP named former Vice-president, Atiku Aubakar (who had by now
returned to the PDP), as their consensus candidate toe challenge Dr. Goodlukc
43
Jonathan, in the presidential primaries. Despite all the political horse trading,
President Goodluck emerged with a landslide victory. At the primaries held on
13 January 2011, President Jonathan won 2, 736 of the votes compared to
Alhaji Abubakar’s 805, although controversy surrounded the procedure and
tactics used for the primaries. In an attempt to placate the Northerners, Dr.
Jonathan declared tha,t should he be elected President, he would only serve
for one term (Final report, Commonwealth Observer group 2011:11).
Voter’s Registration
In other to be eligible as a voter, certain conditions must be fulfilled.
The voter must be
A citizen Nigeria
• At least 18 years of age
• Ordinarily resident in, working, in, or originating from the area covered
by the registration centre
• Registered to vote
The criticisms that trailed the use of the 2007 voters register led INEC to
undertake a fresh voter’s registration exercise for the 2011 general elections.
This singular move helped in restoring confidence in the electoral system.
The 2007 experience and the recommendations of the Electoral Reform
commission (ERC) was therefore the driving force of the move. Voter
registration was conducted using Direct Data Capture machines at some
120,000 registration centers across the federation. Approximately 240,000 ad
hoc staff was recruited and trained, mostly enrolled from the National Youth
Service Corps (NYSC).
Registration started on 15 January 2011 and was initially scheduled to
last for 15 days. This period was later extended by a week across the country
and again by a further 48 hours in some States. At the completion of
44
registration on 7 Feb 2011, preliminary figures indicated 67, 764,327
registered voters had been captured. Following a period of verification and
clearing of the register, and some final submissions from States, this figure
had risen to 73, 520, 040 by the time INEC published the certified voter
register on 2 March 2011.
The registration exercise did not go without some problems. The
election administration admitted that there were inaccuracies regarding
number of registered voters. Omissions of names on the list, a problem
apparently widespread and that became clear during elections days, was more
likely due to technical problems. Multiple registrations were a concern during
the registration exercise and attempts were made to remove false and
duplicated names. In some parts of the country, the high turn-out of underage
voters was also obvious, especially during the elections proper, particularly in
the Northern regions. Furthermore, in many instance NYSC members
conducting the registration exercise were put under pressure to allow for the
inclusion of underage registrants (Final report, European Union Observer
Mission 2011:2).
Nevertheless, registration process was generally acknowledge ad having
improved considerably with respect to those previously organized
3.6 Pre Election Violence
In the run-up to the elections, Nigeria witnessed patches of violence in
different regions. Several hundreds of people were killed in political
motivated, communal and sectarian clashes across the country. The human
rights group, Amnesty International, documented some of these violence and
killings in a publication titled; Nigeria loss of life, insecurity and impunity in
the run-up to Nigeria’s elections (March 2011). The group claimed that over
50 people were reported killed in election related violence. It claimed to have
received reports of threats or politically motivated attack. Richard Nima, was
45
killed when he was attacked by unknown gunmen. A former human rights
activist with the Movement for the survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP).
The Local People Division opened an investigation into the attack and killing
of Richard Nima. However, officers demand money from his wife, Esther
Nima, in order to carry out the investigation. The police have also failed to
offer her any protection despite the fact that she has received a number of
threatening telephone calls. She and her seven month old baby are now in
hiding (Amnesty international 2011).
Beside the killing of Richard Nima, reports of election related violence
was received. Also, there were reports of threats, politically motivated
assassinations, intimidations of political candidates. Clashes between
supporters and use of excessive force by security personnel in the run-up of
the April 2011 elections. The report cited incidences of sectarian violence in
and around Borno State since July 2010, which left over 50 people dead.
According to the report, the killings were believed to have been carried out by
members of the religious sect Jama atu Ahalis Sunna Liddaa Waati Wal Jihad
(Boko Haram) in communal and sectarian clashes in Plateau State since 24th
December 2010.
The report, however, decried the failure of the government to bring the
perpetrators of these criminal acts to justice or take effective measures to
prevent future violent clashes. It warned that failure to take effective measure
to stem the tide of violence will foster a climate of impunity and create
conducive conditions for the escalation of violence in the April 2011
elections. The cases below were culled from the report of election related
killings carried out by Amnesty International in the run-up of elections:
Amnesty International had received numerous reports of election related
killing and attempted killings in recent months, including killings of political
46
candidates and their supporters; and of demonstrators and bystanders in the
context of election-related demonstrations.
On 9 January 2011 four people died when violence broke out at the
rally of former presidential adviser and governorship candidate, Timi Alaibe
in his hometown in Bayelsa State.
On Friday 28 January 2011, Engr. Fannami Gubio, the All Nigeria
People’s Party (ANPP) candidate for Borno State governor; Alhaji Modu
Sheriff, the brother of the current governor of Borno State; and six other
people including a 10 year old child, were shot dead.
3.7 Presidential Election
The level of preparedness of the electoral commission to conduct a
credible election was not in doubt, given that financial and moral support from
the government and civil society groups. Security officials were also on the
alert to ensure a smooth and violence free election. Under a headline
captioned: “SSS, in mind game, readies dungeons for politicians”, the
Guardian newspaper of Monday 28 March 2011 reported that “the SSS at the
weekend took politicians on tour of the cells to demonstrate its zero-tolerance
for violence in the polity”. The cells loc located at the Maitama office of the
State security Service (SSS) are underground cells and therefore ventilation is
a luxury. According to the SSS Director-Director-General, Mr. Ekpeyong Ita,
The security agencies are capable of containing any possible breakdown of law and order before and after the election. We will continue to work on politicians’ minds where they brew all these crises...the minds of politicians are the battlefields.
The inspector General of Police (IGP), Hafiz Ringim, in his own case,
said that no fewer than 240,000 policemen and women would be deployed for
next month’s general elections...each of the 120, 000 poling units would have
47
at least two policemen (Guardian newspaper, 11 March, 2011). The INEC
Chairman declared in the Guardian Newspaper of 23 March 2011,
For INEC, I can say categorically and convincingly that we are ready for the election, the question should be, are the lawyers and politicians ready?
The independent Electoral Commission (INEC) scheduled the elections
to hold on three consecutive Saturdays, on the 2nd, 9th and 16the April for the
National Assembly, Presidential elections and governorship elections
respectively, however, to the surprise of many Nigerians, the chairman of
INEC, Prof. Attahiru Jega, on the 2nd April, 2011, unceremoniously
announced that the elections would be rescheduled due to logistical delays.
The entire timetable of the elections was therefore adjusted; the national
assembly elections, presidential and state elections were rescheduled to April
9, April 16 and April 26 respectively. The CRS noted that for some, the delay
reinforced concerns regarding the credibility of the poll, but others argued that
the “trial run” allowed INEC the opportunity to identify and address some
deficiencies, particularly related to the voters’ register. Gubernatorial elections
were not held in 10 states where post-2007 election court cases led to the
overturning of election results or the rerun of elections (CRS) 2011:6 .
The final report by the commonwealth team on the National Assembly
elections which was held on the 9th of April was quite positive. The election
was said to have been largely peaceful, with few security related problems
reported at the polling stations. However, a number of ugly incidences took
place in some parts of the country. The report noted that a bomb attack on the
INEC office in Suleja, Niger State, on the eve of the elections killed about 20
persons, and injuring others. Majority of the people killed were National
Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members serving as ad hoc staff. On the
Election Day another bomb attack left noting less than three people dead, at a
48
polling station in Maiduguri, Borno State. A further incident took place when
security operatives uncovered a truck filled with explosives in Kaduna.
Furthermore, the turn out on 9 April was considered low in comparison to the
2nd April. The reason for the low turn-out might have been caused by the sense
of insecurity as a result of bomb blasts, as well as the frustration and cynicism
that was occasioned by the botched election of the previous week.
The presidential election took place on the 16th of April 2011.
Generally, there was more turn out of voters in the presidential election than
in the election held the previous week. The new voting process certainly
contributed to the success of the 2011 elections.
INEC interdicted a modified open ballot system for the election. This
system had been tried and tested during the 1993 elections, an election which
was later credited as the most credible election in Nigeria’s electoral history.
It was also used for the by-election in 2010. Under this system the process is
organised in separate periods: in the morning voters are accredited, and at a
designated time following the accreditation, voting takes place and afterwards
the counting of votes is undertaken at the polling station. It is a fairly
uncommon procedure. INEC stressed that in the Nigerian context, this system
has a number of advantages which minimise the chance of impersonation and
fraud. Accreditation was to take place between 08.00 and 12.00. Voting was
to be conducted from 12.30 and would end when all the accredited voters who
had queued at 12.30, had voted. The key prescribed procedures for
accreditation and voting were as follows:
• The voter presents a Voter Card (Only a Voter Card is acceptable for
accreditation and voting)
• The poll Clerk verified the photo against the register and checks the
name and Voter Identification Number.
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• The register is ticked to left of the name to indicate that the voter is
accredited.
• Indelible ink is applied to the nail of the appropriate finger of the left
hand.
• At 12.00 the queue for accreditation is closed and the process is
complete when the last person in the queue is accredited.
• At 12.30, the assembled accredited voters form a queue and a Poll
Assistant or Security officer stands at the end of the queue, no person
arriving after this time is allowed to vote.
• The ballot box is opened and shown to be empty to all, then it is sealed.
• The voter presents her/his Voter Card.
• The finger is checked for ink to prove accreditation.
• The voter register is ticked in the box to the right of the voter’s name.
• Indelible ink is applied on the nail of the right thumb.
• The Presiding Officer issues ballot paper(s).
• The voter votes in the voting cubicle in secret and folds the ballot
paper(s) after marking the paper(s).
• The voter leaves the cubicle and places the ballot(s) in the box (es) and
departs. Some other key aspects of the process include:
• Each ballot paper must be signed and stamped on the reverse by the
official issuing the ballot(s) in the presence of the voter-not in advance.
This validates the ballot(s).
• Blind and physically challenged persons may be assisted to vote by a
person of their choice.
• Voting is by an inked thumb print.
Following the close of voting, ballots are counted at the polling station and the
result is also announced at polling station. Poll officials are to undertake the
50
requisite ballot account, for instance verifying the number of ballots used and
issued against the number of persons indicated as having voted. Following
this, ballots are sorted into piles according to voters per candidate, with
rejected ballots separated. Votes are then to be counted out loud one for each
candidate. At the completion of the count, the result is announced to those
present and is to be posted in a conspicuous place. The materials and paper
work are then to be packed up and delivered to the respective Ward Collation
Centre. Results sheets can be signed by Party Agents, though non-signature
does not invalidate the result, and Agents can also receive a copy of the result.
Collation, verification, announcement and posting takes place at each
ascending administrative level. For the National Assembly elections these are:
Ward/Registration Centre; Local Government Area; Federal (House of Reps)
Constituency Collation Centre; Senatorial District Collation Centre. For the
Presidential Election the result is transmitted from the LGA level to the REC
at the State level and thereafter to INEC Headquarters at the National level.
Results for the National Assembly elections are announced by the respective
Returning Officer for each Senatorial and House of Representatives
constituency. For the Presidential Election, INEC at the national level collates
the result and the Chairman, as Returning Officer, announces the final result.
Final Report Commonwealth Election Observation Team, 2011:33.
The presidential pool was therefore a radical departure from the old
electoral process in terms of transparency, voting procedures, result collation
and declaration. INEC employed university professors many of whom were
vice chancellor to collate the result. (Newswatch, 2011:10). Voters were said
to have demonstrated a high degree of enthusiasm and determination to vote,
and in many cases endured long queues under the hot sun. The conduct of the
election suggested that, by and large, INEC had taken on board the lessons
51
learnt from the conduct of the National Assembly Elections the previous
week.
The presidential election was peaceful in most of the polling centers
across the federation. Security was adequate while national and international
observers monitored the exercise. This is evident in the report of the
Newswatch of May 2, 2011.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4.1 Post Election Violence and National Integration
On 18 April 2011, two days after the presidential votes, Jega made the
following announcement:
By the powers conferred on me by the constitution and the electoral act, I, Attahiru Muhammadu Jega, hereby certify that I was the returning officer for the presidential election held on April 16, 2011. That the election was contested, that the candidates received the following votes: Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan of the Peoples Democratic Party, PDP, having satisfied the requirement of the law and scored the highest number of votes is hereby declared winner and returned elected. The result is signed by me the returning officer on April 18, 2011.
The declaration above marked a new beginning in Nigeria’s democratic
process. By this, Africa’s largest democracy reaffirmed its belief in
democracy as an indispensable tool for National Integration. Indeed, the
campaign slogan of the ruling party, “a breadth of fresh air” became clearly
apt for the occasion, as was evidently perceived form the joy and happiness
with which voters especially form the south East and South South geopolitical
zone welcomed the result. There was a sense of brotherhood among the
citizens irrespective of ethnic, culture and religious differences. The victory
could be felt in the air; the declaration was the expression of support for
Jonathan who was described as an individual that represented a paradigm
shift. (Newswatch 2011:12).
Domestic and International observers poured out praises for what was
described as unprecedented freedom and fairness in the conduct of the
election. The United State saw it as Nigeria’s most successful election since
53
its return to civil rule in 1999. While the European Union observes singled out
the general orderly and peaceful process made the election remarkable. The
cynical and negative comments made by some national and foreign media
houses, and even the so called political analysts, prior to the elections, became
drowned in the pool of praises. The IRI and NDI delegation both termed these
elections a key step forward, while documenting areas for improvement. The
African Union delegation called the legislative and presidential elections
“credible and creditable and reflect(ing) the will of the Nigeria people”
commonwealth observers declared that “previously held notions that Nigeria
can only hold flawed elections are now being discredited and this country can
now shake off that stigma and redeem its image (CRS 2011:9).
The praises went to the Independent National Electoral Commission,
INEC, chaired by Professor Attahiru Jega, for their instrumental role in
organizing a credible election, and especially for restoring the glory of the
electoral body. Major improvements have been registered with regard to voter
registration, accreditation and counting phases. The elections raised strong
domestic expectations, as exemplified by the high turnout rates. Civil society
organizations were also praised for their crucial role in monitoring the voting
process and in educating citizens. New social media also played an
instrumental role in the collection, analysis and dissemination of information.
Adams Oshimole, the governor of Edo State, described the presidential
election as successful and peaceful, praises INEC for making appreciable
improvement over the last election. He also appreciated the role played by the
security agents in ensuring credible election. In his word,
It doesn’t matter how people voted, what matters is that they all voted peacefully, no intimidation, no harassment, no ballot snatching and no shooting (News watch May 12:13).
54
The contribution made by the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC),
whose members worked as ad-hoc staff for the elections was also highly
commended. The approximately 240,000 corps members who discharged their
duties with professionalism and diligence were seen as source of pride and
hope for Nigeria. The young Nigerians, a large number of whom were women
showed dedication and courage of helping to deliver a transparent electoral
process, often in difficult conditions. In acknowledging the good work of
INEC and the Youth Corps member, the US Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs. Johnnie Carson, said that Nigeria should be extra ordinarily
proud of these young men and women who managed this process in a fair
way.
However, the irony of the whole mood of the presidential election, as
described above, began to unfold when the presidential post election violence
broke out in some Northern states. As soon as the result was declared and that
PDP’s candidate, Goodluck Jonathan emerged winner of the election, the
Almajiri and Mallams in some Northern states took to the street. These poor
and mostly illiterate people went on rampage, crowds shouting Alhaji Buhari
descended on their targets. They attacked Christians and also some Muslims,
who did not support Buhari’s candidature, burn houses, government
establishments and places of worship. They (Almajiri’s) targeted the personal
property of PDP chieftains in their states for instance the House of senator
Mohammed Uwaisu Kuta was burnt to ashes, while in Kaduna, the house of
the vice president Namadi Sambo was attacked. Nigerian youths who are
serving the mandatory One Year in the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC)
also became target. Reasonable number of these corps members were killed
and others injured there was a raising concerns about whether it was time to
scrap the scheme since the youths become easy targets during political and
sectarian crises in the North (Yakubu Joseph 2011:9).
55
The attacks on the National Youth Service Corps member thus became
a matter of national concern as threatened the peaceful co-existence of
Nigeria. Surprisingly, there was no reports of corps members of northern
origin attacked or murdered in the southern part of the country even as some
of them would obviously have been part of electoral duties (Newswatch June
2011:5). This chapter thus posits that the NYSC scheme which established to
address the issue of National Unity is today threatened by the menace of
electoral violence.
4.2 Presidential Post Election Violence
The preamble of the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria reads:
We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria having firmly resolved to live in unity and harmony as one indivisible and in dissolvable sovereign state under God dedicated to the promotion of Inter-Africa Solidarity world peace, International Co-operation and understanding….
The assertion above was denounced as fallacious with the recent eruption of
violence in the aftermath of the highly acclaimed April 2011 presidential
elections. It thus raises the question of true National Unity and brings this
question to the fore: Is Nigeria dancing on the brink?
The (HRW 2011) reported that the deadly elections-related and
communal violence took place mainly in the 12 Northern states. The violence
began with widespread protests by supporters of the main opposition
candidate Muhammadu Buhari from the Congress for Progressive Change,
following the re-election of incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, the candidate for
the ruling People’s Democratic Party. The protests degenerated into violent
riots or sectarian killings in the northern states, Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno,
Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kastina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara.
Relief officials estimated that, more than 65,000 people have been displaced.
56
According to the Christian Association of Nigeria, the umbrella
organization representing the majority of Christian churches in Nigeria, at
least 170 Christians were killed in the post-election riots, hundreds more were
injured, and thousands displaced. The organization also reported that more
than 350 churches were burnt or destroyed by the Muslim rioters across 10
northern states (HRW 2011).
According to the tabulation presented to the conference by the
representative of the Inspector-General of Police (IGP), “the post-election
violence in some parts of northern Nigeria claimed the lives of 514 civilians
and six policemen (perhaps the 10 innocent youth corps that were brutally
murdered); 75 civilians were injured; 165 churches and 53 Mosques; 444
vehicles and 1,442 houses were either burnt or destroyed”. Further, 22, 141
persons were displaced. 45 police properties, 16 government properties and
987 shops were burnt (Daily Independent, 4th June, 2011).
Various groups have given accounts on the perceived causes and nature
of the post election violence. For some, it was a premeditated attack; others
see it as having political, social, ethnic or religious undertone. The accounts
above, taken from various sources; interviews, press release, newspaper
articles and commentary gives voice to the different groups that were affected.
4.3 Poverty Level in Kaduna and the 2011 Presidential Postelection
Violence
The city of Kaduna is known for its business and politics. This
characteristics were paralyzed and lost its vibrancy when political violence
engulfed the city following the announcement of the 2011 presidential
election result in favour of Goodluck Jonathan. The abrupt reaction of the
Mallams (teachers) and Almajiri followers in Kaduna, was attributed to high
rate of poverty and level of illiteracy among the perpetrators (Human Right
Watch, 2011). In Kaduna and Nigeria in general, poverty implies norms for
57
the minimum quantum of resources. The poverty line synthesizes a judgment
as to what minima would be below which is unacceptable situation of
deprivation or hardship would exist. Basically inadequate food, clothing, fuel.
Rent and transportation. Which is obtained among the Mallams and their
followers in Kaduna and other northern towns and cities. The distribution of
income among the poor Mallams and Almajiri (follower) indicate their
relative levels of deprivation (Sen. 1976).
However, families requires minimum necessities to survive. The capital
income figures has been used by governments to measure development
performance. The minimum poverty income approach is the easiest to
understand and mostly used. The poverty line which can be defined from the
Nigeria concept as the income levels, is considered to be the demarcation line
between the poor and the none poor. Though the income poverty line
measurement does give an approximation of the extent of poverty, it does not
take into consideration the inequalities between the households at different
poverty levels or the problems of the degree to which the incomes of the poor
fall below the poverty line.
Income distribution of population to determine the monthly level of poverty in
Kaduna, Nigeria
NO INCOME BRACKET (USS) POPULATION
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
0-50 51-190 200-360 361-500 More
51 20 4 11 14
Source: (The World Bank 2009)
Data analysis of the population shows 75% of the total population is
below the poverty line this is translated to those within the income bracket of
0-50 USS contains 51% of those that are below the poverty line, 51-190 US$
is 20%, and 200-350 US$ is 4%. Out of population of 14%, as reflected in the
pie chart below.
58
Sources: (The World Bank 2009)
Poverty profile in Kaduna Nigeria (%)
Looking at the above chart, the Mallams (Quramic Teachers) and
Almajiri (followers) are far below poverty line and are vulnerable and expose
to all sorts of social vices including violence that erupted after the 2011
presidential election in Kaduna city of Nigeria.
Kaduna state is divided along religious and ethnic line and has suffered
the highest death toll during the three (3) days of violent rioting. The inferno
gulped hundreds lives and properties worth Billions of Naira. The
Hausa/Fulani ethnic group, most of whom are Muslims, make up the majority
in northern Kaduna. This is because of their failure to embrace western
education and it tenets. The Hausa/Fulani considered western type of
education as Eurocentric and fall short of Islamic norms and standards thus,
they prefer the Quranic education which is not used in conventional school
and works parallel to western ethics.
The Human Right Watch (HRW 2011) reported that in predominantly
Christians towns and villages of southern Kaduna state, including the Zonkwa,
Matsiga, and Kafanchan, the riots metamorphosed into sectarian violence. The
59
sectarian clash left more than five hundred (500) people. According Muslim
and Christian teachers interview by Human Rights Watch, the vast majority
of the victims in these areas are Muslim. Human Rights Watch estimates that
in northern Kaduna State, at least one hundred and eighty (180) people,
possibly more, were killed in the cities of Kaduna, Zaria and environs.
According to media reports and journalists interviewed by Human Rights
Watch, dozens of people were also killed during riots in the other northern
states.
Human Rights Watch conducted more than 55 interviews with
witnesses and victims of the violence, Christian and Muslim clergy, traditional
leaders, police officials, civil society leaders, and journalist. Below are some
of the incidents recorded by the HRW in Kaduna State:
• A lecturer at the Nuhu Bamali Polytechnic, a college on the outskirts of
the city of Zaria, describe to Human Rights Watch how a mob of
youth chanting pro-Buhari slogans cornered four Christian students
and a Christian lecturer in the staff quarters of the campus and beat
them to death with sticks, clubs, and machetes on April 17.
• In the city of Kaduna, Christians and Muslims who found themselves
on the wrong side of the river during the riots were bludgeoned to
death by marauding mobs. Churches and mosques were torched in the
city. Civil society leaders said that Christian travellers were dragged
out of their vehicles by mobs of Muslims and killed on the main road
leading to the north of the city. Mobs of Christians also torched
vehicles on the expressway leading through the city’s southern
neighbourhood, killing Muslim motorists.
• A human rights watch researcher visited the town of Mararaba Rido on
the outskirts of the city of Kaduna. Dozens of houses and shops were
60
razed on the ground, and the main mosque was torched, with anti-
Islamic graffiti and the inscription “Jesus is Lord” inscribed on the
burnt walls of the mosque. According to one of the Muslim leaders, 28
Muslims were killed, while hundreds of others fled the area and as a
result were unable to vote in the gubernatorial election.
• Men from the predominantly Christian Bajju ethnic group in the town
of Zonkuwa burned six of the town’s mosques, as well as homes,
shops, and vehicles of Muslim residents. Witnesses said that violence
began late in the afternoon of April 18 and continued throughout the
night. By mid-morning on the following day, the Bajju men had killed
or displaced nearly all of the town’s Hausa-Fulani residents. One of
the District Heads acknowledge to Human Rights Watch: “The boys
here made it total, they would not relent”.
• According to one of the Muslim leaders in Zonkuwa who participated
in the burial of the victims, and showed Human Rights Watch photo
documentation of the mass burial of corpses, 311 Muslims, nearly all
of them men were buried in a mass grave in Zonkuwa later that week,
while the remains of 24 others, many of the corpses charred beyond
recognition, were buried in one of the town’s wells, Christian leaders
in Zonkuwa told Human Rights Watch that 10 Christians had also
been killed in the town and surrounding communalities. No churches
were destroyed.
• In the neighbouring town of Kafachan, clashes between Muslim and
Christian youth continued unabated throughout the night of April 18.
Christian and Muslims leaders told Human Rights Watch that by the
next morning at least 20 Christians and 34 Muslims had been killed.
The mobs torched hundreds of homes, shops, and vehicles, and razed
61
to the ground the central market. Twenty-six mosques and four
churches were burnt or destroyed. One of the leaders from the Igbo
ethnic group, the vast majority Christians from south-eastern Nigeria,
told Human Rights Watch that 11 Igbo residents were killed in
Kafanchan. While 224 of their houses and 837 shops, many of them in
the central market were burnt.
The Southern Kaduna People’s Union (SOKAPU), in a press release
assessing the post-election violence in Kaduna and some Northern states
opines that it was politically motivated violence to carefully select and attack
Christians, their places of worship and properties. This twist therefore
debunked the violence happened on a large scale, simultaneously showed a
particular trend. The report also note that the targets of the attack by the
rioters were the Christians, their properties and their churches. Furthermore,
they raised the following question; what is the relationship between
Christians, their churches and their properties and elections that warranted the
attacks by the rioters? When did Christians become a political party? The
reports concluded that the attacks were clearly an indication that crisis was
premeditated or prepared long before the elections. It therefore urged the
panel investigating the post-election violence to fish out the commander-in-
charge and the foot soldiers that perpetrated the dastardly act.
Consequently. SOKAPU made the following recommendations:
• That the federal Government should convene, as a matter of urgency, a
National Sovereign Conference to discuss and address fundamental
issues concerning our co-existence as a nation within Nigeria e.g. the
structure of Nigeria zoning, religion, among others. It is clear that
power sharing (zoning) should no longer be the preserve of political
parties. It must assume a centre stage of our existence as a nation.
62
• That the Federal and Northern States governments should embark on
massive industrial and agricultural development to engage our qualified
and not so qualified youths productively.
• That a military base be established at Kafachan without delay in order
to protect the lives and properties of the people in that area.
• That education should be made compulsory and free at the primary and
secondary school levels while the Federal and state governments should
implement very rigidly their polices on education for the Almajiris and
the Area Boys and their likes in other parts of Nigeria. The parents of
these youths must be identified and sanctioned for their failure to live
up to their parental responsibility. There must be a functional legislation
against parents who specialize in breeding babies without a thought as
to what it takes to bring them up in fear of God.
• That the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) must
ensure that politicians, no matter their status, abide by their Code of
conduct and that Nigerians should feel free to belong to any political
party of their choice and be free to choose their leaders.
• That for peace, progress and stability to exist and be sustained, Gurara
State be created out of the present Kaduna State. The source of mistrust
and acrimony, its political power and the control of state resources
where the politicians from the northern part have created the impression
that they were born to rule and consequently always use Islam to wipe
up sentiments against the Southern Kaduna people.
• That a Platform for Dialogue among northern minorities and the major
tribes be established to discuss our differences including our religion,
politics, culture, structure and the general interest of every ethnic group.
63
It was also recorded in the media that the same pattern of violence in
Kaduna spread to other Northern States where residents, especially of
southern or Christian extracts became easy target for the aggrieved supporters
of the Northern candidate. In this way there were threats to national unity,
which President Jonathan likened to the vents that leading to the civil war
(Newswatch June 2011:5).
4.4 The Role of the Security Forces in the Post-Election Violence
The role played by the security services in the post-election violence
has also been questioned. The question of nipping the supposedly coordinated
violence in the bud by security officials has been a major source of concern.
Positive and negative reports have trailed the role played by security
operatives. The HRW reported that in many of the northern towns and cities,
Christians found refuge in police stations and military barracks. In southern
Kaduna state, Muslim women and children flocked to police stations for
safety. The police successfully protected people in many cases, but they were
largely ineffective at controlling the rioting and violence in other places,
Human Rights Watch found. In several cases, witnesses told Human Rights
Watch that it was often not until soldiers were deployed to affected areas that
the violence was halted.
Both the police and the military were implicated in the excessive use of
force and other serious abuse while responding to the rioting and sectarian
violence. Human Rights Watch documented eight cases of alleged unlawful
killing of unarmed residents by the police and soldiers in the cities of Zaria
and Kaduna, and received credible reports of more than a dozen other
incidents.
Human Rights Watch also received credible reports that the police and
soldiers in Kaduna, Gombe and Bauchi States systematically beat people
rounded up during or after the riots. Many of the detainees charged at Chief
64
Magistrate’s Court in Kaduna city had fresh scars on their backs, journalists
who attended the hearing told Human Rights Watch. In the town of Azare, in
northern Bauchi State, witnesses told Human Rights Watch that detainees
were severely beaten by soldiers and police. One of the detainees’ hands was
reportedly broken, while another detainee was hospitalized as a result of the
beatings.
“The Nigerian authorities should investigate these credible reports of
unlawful killings and abuses by members of the security forces, “Dufka said.
“The use of violence by rioters, mobs, and state actors alike needs to be
stopped.
Two witnesses interviewed by the Human Rights watch described how a
police officer shot and killed some people inside Tudun-wada neighbourhood
of Kaduna city on the morning of April 18. A construction worker described
what he saw:
Around 8: 30 p.m. on Sunday night (April 17), the day after the
elections, people started burning tyres (in the streets). The police came and
started shooting and we ran away. On Monday morning, around 8:30 to 9
a.m., some people started coming out and burning tyres again. The police
returned and pursed one of the people into Suliman’s compound. Two
policemen entered the compound. One was in mufti (civilian dress), he had a
red Manchester jersey, and was wearing a helmet. The other policemen ask
him why he shot him inside his house. He answered, “if I shoot him, I can’t
miss, I can’t waste my ammunition for nothing. “The policemen then left.
Before we could take him to the hospital he was dead. (HRW April 2011).
Corinne Dufka, a senior West Africa researcher at Human Rights
Watch urged the government to promptly investigate these credible reports of
unlawful killing and other abuses by members of the security forces, while
65
noting that the use of violence by rioters, mobs, and state actors alike needs to
be stopped.
Sources: BBC world
4.5 Post Election Violence and NYSC
Perhaps the most heart wrenching that occurred during the post-election
violence was the gruesome attacks and murder of the innocent and patriotic
young Nigerians who brought to bear a different dimension of transparency in
66
the electoral process. The threats of the political violence to the NYSC were
indeed a threat to National Unity.
In Bauchi State, rioters targeted members of the National Youth Corps
Service, who served as ad-hoc election staff. According to media reports, on
the afternoon of April 17 in Giade, a rural town in northern Bauchi State,
rioters attacked the youth corps members in the town. The youth corps
members, who were from southern Nigeria, ran to the local police station to
seek refuge, but the rioters stormed the police station. The mob killed the
police officer of duty and burned down the police station, a journalist said.
They raped two of the female Youth Corps members then hacked them to
death with machetes, along with five male Youth Corps members. In total,
rioters killed ten youth corps members in the state. This singular act as well as
other security threats posed to the NYSC during and after the election has
instigated a national debate on the continued existence of the scheme and its
usefulness in promoting national unity viz-a-viz the recent happenings.
4.6 Origin and objectives of the NYSC
The following information culled from the official website
(www.nysc.gov.ng) of the National Youth Service Corps gives us an idea of
the origin and primary objectives of the scheme: The NYSC scheme was
created in a bid to reconstruct, reconcile and rebuild the country after the
Nigeria Civil war. The unfortunate antecedents in our national history gave
impetus to the establishment of the National youth service Corps by decree
No. 24 of 22nd May 1973 which stated that the NYSC is being established
“with a view to the proper encouragement and development of common ties
among the youths of Nigeria and the promotion of national unity”.
As a developing country, Nigeria is further plagued by the problems
attendant upon a condition of under development, namely: poverty, mass
67
illiteracy, acute shortage of high skilled manpower (coupled with most uneven
distribution), woefully inadequate socioeconomic infrastructural facilities,
housing, water and sewage facilities, road, healthcare services, and effective
communication system. Faced with these almost intractable problems, which
were further compounded by the burden of reconstruction after the civil war,
the government and people of Nigeria set the country, fresh goals, and
objectives aimed at establishing Nigeria as:
• A united, strong and self-reliant nation;
• A great and dynamic economy;
• A land of bright and fully opportunities for all citizens; and
• A free and democratic society.
• There is no gain saying the fact that the future of any country depends
on the youths. The youths of Nigeria acknowledge this fact, and have
consistently laid claim to the nation’s leadership.
• While one may give credence to the saying that leaders are born, not
make, one must also concede to the fact that leadership in a modern
society requires a certain degree of preparation and orientation before
the assumption of that role.
• The universities and other institutions of higher learning are first and
foremost committed to the advancement of learning and knowledge,
training of people for good citizenship. Little wordier that the products
of these institution have been accused of being too elitist in their
outlook, of not identifying with the plight of common man, and of
inability to appreciate predicament of the vast majority of our people
who live in the rural areas.
• It was need to look beyond the immediate present and to think of the
future leadership of the country that necessitate the mobilization of look
68
beyond the immediate present and to think of the future leadership of
the country that necessitated the mobilization of certain categories of
our youths through the National Youth service Corps Scheme. This was
done with a view to giving them the proper guidance and orientation
relevant to the needs of the country. The national Youth Service Corps
Decree No. 24 which has now been repealed and replaced by Decree 51
of 16th June 1993 was then formally promulgated.
• The purpose of the scheme is primarily to inculcate in Nigeria youths
the spirit of oneness and brotherhood of all Nigeria, irrespective of
cultural or social background. The history of our country since
independence has clearly indicated the need for unity amongst all our
people, and demonstration the fact that no cultural or geographical
entity can exist in isolation.
4.7Core values of NYSC and the Effect of the Post-election Violence
• To inculcate discipline in Nigeria, youths by instilling in them a
tradition of industry at work, and of patriotic and loyal service to
Nigeria in any situation they situation they may find themselves.
• To raise the moral tome of the Nigerian youths by giving them the
opportunity to learn about higher ideals of national achievement, social
and cultural improvement;
• To develop in the Nigerian youths the attitudes of mind, acquired
through shared experience and suitable training which will make them
more amenable to mobilization in the national interest;
• To enable Nigerian youth acquire the spirit of self reliance by
encouraging them to develop skills for self:
• To contribute to the accelerated growth of the national economy;
69
• To develop common ties among the Nigerian youths and promote
national unity and integration;
• To remove prejudices, eliminate ignorance and confirm at first hand the
many similarities among Nigerian of all ethnic groups; and
• To develop a sense of corporate existence and common destiny of the
people of Nigeria. In order to achieve the objectives in subsection (3) of
this section, the service corps shall ensure;
• The equitable distribution of members of the service corps and the
effective utilization of their skills in area of national needs;
• That as far as possible, youths are assigned to jobs in state other than
their states of origin;
• That such group of youths assigned to work together is as representative
of Nigeria as far as possible;
• That the Nigerian youths are encouraged to eschew religious
intolerance by accommodating religious differences;
• That members of the service corps are encouraged to seek at the end of
their one year national service, career employment all over Nigeria,
thus promoting the free movement of labour;
• That employers are induced partly through their experience with
members of the service corps to employ more readily and on a
permanent basis, qualified Nigerians, irrespective of their States of
origin.
This laudable initiative designed by the then military government of General
Yakubu Gowon to foster national integration is therefore standing the test of
time. It is evident said that calls for the scrapping of the scheme have been
louder after the killing of 10 corps members in Bauchi State. The topical issue
has led some Nigerians and key stakeholders in the country to advocate for the
70
scrapping of the scheme. To these set of Nigerians the “programme” no longer
serve the purpose for which it was established.
However, another groups has also argued that the objects of the scheme
many prominent Nigerians has opposed to the scrapping of the scheme
altogether. They feel that it will be tantamount to throwing away the baby
with the bath water, while insisting on the vitality of the scheme to economic
and socio-culture development.
The Newswatch of May 2011, reports that the initiator of the programme,
Gen. Gowon, had the following to say.
I wanted to develop Nigeria and of course, I wanted to keep Nigerians together as one and by so doing would lead us their places of birth so that they could know one another, get used to what ordinarily could have been differences among them and live together with that understanding in peace and tranquillity ...I must say that the loss of the lives of those young people in parts of our country in the service of their nation hasn’t portrayed those responsible for the sad development as loyal and patriotic people, it is barbaric.
Most of the state governors, in acknowledging the contribution of the
NYSC to National integration and cohesion urged the federal government not
to scrap the scheme, but to review the scheme by providing adequate welfare
packages and securing the lives and properties of youth instead of scrapping in
to enable the nation derive maximum benefits from it. (The Nation, June 19
2011). As a reaction to what seemed to be in agreement the demands of the
governors and other stakeholders, the President Goodluck Jonathan
emphatically declared that the NYSC scheme would not be scrapped because
of its unifying benefits. He further pledged to review the scheme and make it
more practical, functional and profitable for Nigerian youth. Also the federal
government announced a 5 million naira compensation for each slain Corp
71
member’s family. Similarly, the President also approved automatic
employment to the victims (234 next, May 2011).
National Integration has always been a problem since the conception of
the conception of the Nigeria state. It is still a problem today and will continue
to be a major concern in the years to come. However, the National scheme has
been designed to reduce the friction generated among people of various socio-
cultural and discreet linguistic groups, and to help in identifying more and
owe grater loyalty to a central movement, show willingness to remain in the
system and not threaten or make it bid to take the exit option. In summary, it
aims to bringing about National integration. The individual and collective
effort to actualize this aspiration will go a long way in fostering a united,
peaceful and greater Nigeria.
72
CHAPTER FIVE
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations
5.1 Summary
This research work titled; Elections and political violence in Nigeria:
An evaluation of post 2011 presidential election in Nigeria” was designed to
investigate the role and extent of high rate of poverty and level of illiteracy
amidst the intricacies behind the presidential post-election violence in 2011,
which erupted in the northern part of Nigeria where rate of poverty is very
high. Despite commendations from national and international observes for
unprecedented freedom and fairness in the management of election, the 2011
presidential election in Nigeria has been described as most violent given that
the post election violence claimed over eight hundred (800) lives in three
days. The violence also displaced about sixty five thousand (65,000) people as
reported by the Human Right Watch. Among the victims of this ugly incident
were youth corps members who were gruesomely and unjustifiable murdered
while discharging their duties as ad-hoc staff of the independent electoral
commission (INEC). These killings, particularly of the NYSC members thus
generated a heated polity, threatening in Nigeria national integration and
peaceful co-existence in Nigeria.
In this work, the poverty rate in Nigeria with particular reference to the
northern states, an assessment of monthly income distribution of the
population of Kaduna State was carried out to determine the level of poverty
in Kaduna State. Population data shows that 75% of the total population is
below the poverty line. The idea above gave rise to the research question:
Did the high rate of poverty and level of illiteracy contributed to the post
election violence in the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria?
On this basis, we generated the following hypothesis;
73
The high rate of poverty and level of illiteracy contributed to the 2011 post-
election violence in Nigeria.
To prove the above hypothesis, the work was divided into five chapters to suit
the explanation and elucidation of the hypothesis.
Chapter two of the research work examined or rather x-rayed elections and
violence in Nigeria. In this chapter, we traced the origin of elections in
Nigeria from the promulgation of the elective principle in 1922 to the recent
held 2011 elections and the violence that occurred before, during and after the
elections. Emphasis was placed on the general election, particularly
presidential election which partly forms the main corpus of this work. We
noticed that, elections organised under military regimes seemed to be less-
violent than those conducted under civilian administrations.
The third chapter of this work exposed how poverty and illiteracy in
Nigeria caused the 2011 presidential post-election violence. In this chapter,
the world Bank reference line in 2010 was used to analyse the rate of poverty
in Nigeria, particularly Kaduna state where the post-election violence
casualties was high. The data analysis of the population shows that 75% of the
population is below the poverty line. This is evident in the income distribution
table and pie chart in the chapter that unveiled the income distribution of
population to determine the level of poverty in Kaduna.
In the fourth chapter we discussed in detail the manifestations of post
election violence which ensued with the announcement of the presidential
election result in favour of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. The horrific killings
which occurred mostly in the Northern part of the country led to the loss of
lives and properties worth billion of naira. The violence was said to have been
instigated by the Quranic Mallams, the Almajiri’s supporters of Buhari, the
presidential candidate for the CPC (Congress for Progressive Change).
74
The fourth chapter was titled post election violence and National
integration. The death of some members of the National Youth Service Corps
(NYSC) who served as ad-hoc member in the elections gave rise to this title.
The unholy killing of innocent southern corps members posed a threat to the
laudable objectives of the scheme and indeed to the national integration of
Nigeria which the scheme, among other things, strives to foster. In this
chapter we noted that there were concerted calls on government to scrap the
scheme while other stakeholders demanded to unify Nigeria and develop
future leaders. Also the bold move made by the government to carry out a
review of the scheme is commendable, although it is long overdue.
The much needed adjustment and restructuring in the service such as
the increase in monthly allowance or stipends as well as adequate
accommodation and security is indispensable in other to give the scheme the
pride and respect it was once known for.
5.2 Conclusion
In conclusion, we summarized the findings of this work around the
questions raised in the research work. The post election violence which took
place mainly in the Northern Nigeria towns and cities was attributed mainly to
the high rate of poverty and level of illiteracy. These factors were triggered by
existing burning issue of zoning arrangement in the PDP after the demise of
president Musa Yar’adua. Instigating statements by party member, poor
education, religious sentiments, institutional decay in the Nigeria, religious
intolerance and “crisis of expectation”. The failure to achieve this expectation,
according to analysts, resulted into the violence in which pro Buhari member
unleashed attack on Christians and PDP influential supporters in the Northern
part of Nigeria.
Interestingly and corroborating the statements above, the 22 man panel
set-up to investigate the cause of the post election violence has completed its
75
work and submitted to the government for further actions. The presidential
Committee on Post-Election Violence in the northern parts of the country
submitted it report stating that Congress for Progressive Change, CPC,
Presidential Candidate, major General Muhammadu Buhari’s provocative
remarks played a role in the bloody violence that led to the death of 10
members of the National Youth Service Corps, NYSC, and hundreds of others
after last April’s presidential polls.
Apart from Buhari’s utterances, the panel said that the governments’
failure to implement reports of past commissions and panels on ethno-
religious and political crises also contributed to the post-election violence and
urged the government to implement the reports. It also decried the parlous
state of infrastructure, rising insecurity and ballooning wages of public office
holders amid poverty among the citizenry and urged urgent remedies to avert
a looming disaster in the country.
Furthermore, Chukuma Innocent, the Chief executive of Cleen
foundation, a civil society group that works on justice sector reform, notes that
panels of inquiry have become a tunnel through which the government runs
away from their responsibility to bring the culprits of violence to book. He
further said that these panels buy the government time and when the problem
drops from the headlines they go back to business as usual.
Therefore, the implementation of the recommendations by the panel
will serve as test to the sincerity of the government in finding lasting solutions
to the recurring violence which has brought Nigeria to the brink of
disintegration.
5.3 Recommendations
The violence which attended the April 2011 presidential elections
indicates that the challenges to national unity are never far from the surface.
76
The continued spate of violence in Nigeria, especially the Northern Nigeria is
worrying and calls for drastic measures in other to forestall the looming
anarchy that may lead the country to the precipice.
The elections have come and gone. Winners have assumed office. The
roles played by individuals, INEC, civil society groups, the media and the
government must indeed be acknowledged. Families of victims of the post
election crisis have been compensated and government is gradually redeeming
its pledge to immortalize the “Martyrs of Democracy” who served honourably
to bring about true democracy. Thus we recommend the following:
1. Political leaders carry a heavy responsibility and we urge them to
ensure that their supporters reject violence as an instrument of politics.
This will go a long way in promoting order and sanity in the electoral
process.
2. That the Federal and Northern States governments should embark on
massive industrial and agricultural development to engage the unskilled
youths productively. As was mentioned, jobless youth were willing
tools in the hands of people who sponsored the violence. Therefore
meaningful engagement of the youth especially in the Northern will go
a long way in forestalling future outbreak of violence.
3. The Federal and northern states governments should embark on settling
street Almajiri by equipping the existing traditional Almajiri schools
with modern facilities and upgrading their curriculum. The school
curriculum should be in such a way that Islamic and western education
to be taught side by side.
4. Electoral offences commission recommended by the Electoral Reform
Committee (Uwais Committee) should be established with proper legal
backing for the purposes of effective apprehension, prosecution and
trial of electoral offenders.
77
Therefore, the implementation of the recommendation by the
government will serve as test to the sincerity of the government in
finding lasting solution to the recurring violence which has brought
Nigeria to the brink of disintegration.
78
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A Carl LeVan, Titi Pitso, Bodunrin Adebo (2007), Elections in Nigeria is the third time a Charm? Journal of African Elections, Vol 2 no 2.
CAMPBELL, J. (2010) Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Council on Foreign Relations: The Centre for Preventive Action, New York.
Etannibi E.O Alemika (2011), Post-Election Violence in Nigeria: Emerging trend and lessons, Cleen Foundation.
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Democracy in Nigeria in Olasupo, B. A. (ed.) Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Issues and Perspectives. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 31.
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(eds). The 1987-1988 local government elections in Nigeria, Vol. 1 Case Studies, Lagos. National Electoral Commission.
Nnadozie Uche (2005), History of Elections in Nigeria in Onu, G. And Momonh, A (eds). Elections and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Lagos: Educational publishers and printers.
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Okolie A.M. (2005), Electoral Fraud and the Future of Elections in Nigeria: 1999-2003, in Godwin .O. and Abubakar M. (Eds) Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, Proceeding of the Nigeria Political Association.
Olagbegi, O. P. (2004), Electoral Violence and Electoral security. Paper presented as a workshop on elections management, Enhancing INEC Credibility in conducting Free and Fair Elections for Stable Democratic Governance. Benin City, April 28-29.
Ilufoye, S, Ogundiya, I. S. And Baba, T. K. (2005), Electoral violence and the prospects of Democratic consolidation in Nigeria in G Onu & A Monoh (eds.) Elections and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Lagos: Educational Publishers and Printers, Pp 369-384.
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Amnesty international Publication (2011), Nigeria: Loss of life, Insecurity and impunity in the run-up to Nigeria’ by Amnesty International, international Secretariat, United Kingdom.
European Union (EU), Election Observation Mission, Final Reports on the 2007 presidential Elections in Nigeria Democratic Elections.
European Union Election Observation Mission (2011), NIGERIA: Final Report on April General Elections.
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Final Report of the Common wealth Observer Groups (2011) on the Nigeria National Assembly and Presidential election.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2004), Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence, Human Rights Watch, New York.
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IGBUZOR, O. (2010), Electoral Violence in Nigeria. Asaba, Action Nigeria.
J. H. Nock Barr, Bitrus Bahago, Timothy Bonett (2011) Press Conference By the Southern Kaduna People’s Union (SCKAPU): Assessment of the post-election violence that swept Kaduna and Some of the Northern states in Nigeria.
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Richard Joseph (7th October 2010), Elections and democracy in Africa: Resorting Nigeria’s leadership, a lecture delivered at the Shehu at the Shehu Yar’ Adua centre, Abuja and the Nigerian Institute of international Affairs.
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Conference Papers
Okolie A.M. (2005), Electoral Fraud and the Future of Elections in Nigeria: 1999-2003, in Godwin .O. and Abubakar M. (Eds) Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, Proceeding of the Nigeria Political Association.
Olagbegi, O. P. (2004), Electoral Violence and Electoral security. Paper presented as a workshop on elections management, Enhancing INEC Credibility in conducting Free and Fair Elections for Stable Democratic Governance. Benin City, April 28-29.
J. H. Nock Barr, Bitrus Bahago, Timothy Bonett (2011) Press Conference By the Southern Kaduna People’s Union (SCKAPU): Assessment of the post-election violence that swept Kaduna and Some of the Northern states in Nigeria.
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Ben Agade (2011) CAN, “NSCIA differ on cause of post election violence”, Vanguard Newspaper, Retrieved July 27 from: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/07/can-scia-differ-on-cause-of-post-election-violence.
Conscience Report (2011), Post Election Violence and Recurring Violence in the North: Root Causes and solutions, PM News. Retrieved August 16 from: http://pmnewsningeria.com/2011/05/10/post-election-violence-and-recurring-violence-in-the-north-root-causes-and-solutions/
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Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Post-election Violence Killed 800,” May 16, 2011. From http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800.
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