"V"'"~-

Stephan Leibfried *, **

Social Europe. Welfare State Trajectories

of the European Community

ZeS - Arbeitspapier Nr. 10/91

Zentrum für Sozialpolitik (Centre for Social Poliey Research)

Universität Bremen Postfach 33 04 40

W-2800 Bremen 33

August 1, 1991

* Center for Soeial Policy Research and Speeial Research Unit 186 ofthe German National Seience Foundation, both Bremen University; presently at the Center for European Studies of Harvard University.

*. I am grateful to Jutta Allmendinger, ClauB Offe, Elmar Rieger, and Bernd Schulte for commentB, advice, and promt help and to Jutta Mester and Torsten Schaak for help with the literature.

2

Outline

Social Europe - An Introduction 3

Europe's Non-Soda! State 7

A Classical Threshold: Entitlements versus Largesse--Europe Trapped as Welfare State 16

The Community as a Welfare State: Some Classifications 19

Convergence of National Welfare Programs: Towards a European Procedural Welfare State? 22

Welfare State Trajectories of the European Community 26 The Structural Funds as Integration's "Second Leg": Toward a

Compensatory European Welfare State ..................... 29 Community Agricultural Policy and its "Decoupling": Toward a Residual

European Welfare State ................................ 31 The ''Thirteenth State" or the "Sodal Policy Queue": Toward a

Supranational European Welfare State ..................... 33

Futures of Sodal Europe - A Summary 36

References 43

Table 1: The EC and the Welfare State--Between Non-Issue and Issue ... . . . .. 20 Table 2: Welfare State Defined ............................ ;........ 22 Table 3: Models of "Sodal State" Integration under Migratory Conditions . . . . .. 27 Table 4: The EC and the Welfare State Defined--A Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 38

3

Social Europe - An Introduction

Throughout postwar history sodal policy and European integration were linked in

significant ways; Already in its beginning, when the Rome Treaty was discussed in the

mid 1950s (BIT /IAA 1956; ColJins 1975, 2: 21 ff.; Heise 1966), and when the EC was

still bifocal--centered around France and Germany--, France had ventured to make

socia! policy an encompassing issue of EC competency. In the early 1960s Germany's

reform government under Willy Brandt was pleading for a "Sozialstaat Europa", for

"Europe as a Social State" (cf. Lodge 1978; Hennigsen 1989; Weinstock 1989, 1973).

German sodal democrats did so still within the framework of the original EC 6, the

European Community as constituted by the six founding members.

In the late 1980s, when the EC--with the joining of the United Kingdom--had become

trifocal, a discussion on the "social dimension of Europe" (cf. Däubler 1990; Leibfried

1991a, b), of "Soda! Europe" matured: This was prompted by two EC enlargements-­

southern European and Anglo-lrish--which had brought decreasing "soda! cohesion",

and by the Single European Act of February 28, 1986 with its "pure Single Market"

focus. These developments resulted among others in the Community Charter of .he

Fundamental Sodal Rights of Workers of December 19891 (cf. inter al. Schulte

1991c), a political declaration, as yet of little practical use in fordng "sodal state"

building at the EC level. In earlier drafts the Charter dealt with the "Fundamental

Social Rights"--of all Europeans--, but in the final Coundl version the delimiting suffix

"of Workers" was added. This illustrates the problems the EC has to acquire responsi-

1 This Charter has been passed by 11 EC members with the u.K. voting against it. The Charter is not legally binding, but declaratory in nature. Its basic "rights" are: freedom of movement; right to gainful employment; improv~ment of living standards and working conditions; right to sodal security; right to organize unions and to collective bargaining; right to training and education; gender equality; right to co-determination in the factory; right to health protection and safety standards; child and youth protection; protection of the aged and the disabled.

Schulte points out that the leading role of the "freedom of movement" (section 1 of the Community Sodal Charter) reaffirms the EC's "negative integration" approach to sodal policy: Social citizenship is only seen as an instrument for mobility (Schulte 1991c: 26) and not as a "European status positivus". On the charter cf. also Silvia 1991; Addison/Siebert 1991.

4

bility for all European dtizens, to establish a European "sodal dtizenship"--and that

the EC presently is limited to "the employed". Universal sodal policies at the EC level

are blocked twice: by EC incompetency for most sodal policy topics and by a

restriction of any competency it might still possess to "the employed".2

To place Sodal Europe in context, one should take into account that expenditure for

sodal protection varies widely in the Cornrnunity. In 1984, for exarnple, the EC 6

members spent as % of GNP: Belgium 29,6%, France 29.4%, Gerrnany 28.5%, Italy

27.3%, Luxemburg 25.2% and the Netherlands 32.8%. The newer members spent:

Denrnark 28.9%, Greece 20%, Ireland 23.9%, Portugal 15.2%; United Kingdom

24.6% (cf. Schulte 1991c: 7? Germany thus spends relative to its sodal product

twice as much on sodal policy as Portugal. Average income per inhabitant in the

European north (Denrnark, Germany, Netherlands) is about 2.5 times that of Por­

tugal. Spending by sodal policy areas (lowest versus highest share) is also quite

different in foeus: On health Portugal spends 48.4% of its sodal budget and Greece

19.6%. On aging policy the Netherlands spend 31.2% of the sodal budget whereas

Greece spends 70.5%. Onfamily policy Greece spends 2.9% whereas Ireland spends

12.1 %. (Schulte 1991c: 8)

Why bother with Sodal Europe?

A European sodal union, in my mind, goes to the heart of "a new European

Cornrnunity". If Europe is to preserve an identifiable "[ace" vis avisjapan, the USA and

the formerly sodalist countries4, it should consider what it still stands for in the post-

2 This limitation already hampered the European COal and Steel Cornrnunity (ECSC): "[The Treaty of Paris'] concern with partial integration necessitated a limited view of what sodal policy is about by emphasizing the link with economic policy and confining the area of sodal policy to a concern with employrnent problems" (Collins 1975, 1: 104).

3 On Spain no reliable data seem to exist.

4 The consequences of the deve10pments in middle and estern Europe on sodal seeurity in the older and younger democrades of the Cornrnunity have been analyzed at a conference at the University of Roskilde in April 1991 (cf. also Deacon/Szalai 1990).

5

1992 process. Market economy, parliamentary democracy, mixed economy ... --these

characteristics are found in many nations all over this globe. But cross-sectiona! equal­

ity and ''socia! security" "is characteristic only for this [European-S.L.] part of the world"

(van Langendonck 1991). The "socia! state" then should rightfully become the Euro­

pean "trademark" after 1992, not "free trade" and the "Single Market".

Moreover, at least in the long run the constitutional nature of the EC may turn on

sodal policy issues. After all, such issues--and eultural ones--are considered to be the

piece de resistance of nationhood today. Sodal policy has grown with national

dtizenship beeing the mantle. A Community, which cannot be labeled international

because of the legal doctrines of direct effect, supremacy and pre-emption (cf. Weiler

1986a) in the domain of "negative integration", and a Community which may not be

labeled "state" in the traditional sense, as it has no universal but only "sectoral" autho­

rity--power in bits and pieces--might weil cross the structural threshold to "a new func­

tional statehood" if sodal and educationals policy--issues of "positive iotegratioo"--were to

become part of the Community's central domains. Here, Europe might acquire a

fitting "Hausgut" (Scharpf 1985: 335), a fust European domain proper.

Finally, it is advantageous to foeus on sodal integration rather than only on political

integration as an entering wedge into post-1992 European unification (cf. for a

contrasting opinion: Schulte 1991c: 28 ff.). Starting with social integration--in a

continental context--automatically implies juridified, individualized strategies, in short

it implies: Europe-wide entitlements. This will undo the 'Joint decision trap" (Scharpf

1988, 1985) of cooperative federalism which is responsible för the impass of much of

European as weil as much of German policy--as Scharpf has shown repeatedly: The

link 'state (EC) - dtizen'6 replaces an unc1ear and many leveled "policy entaglement",

S In educational policy signs for a breakthrough are much mpre vigorous than they are for sodal policy (incomes transfer policy lmd social services); cf. on education policy Sieveking 1990; de Witte 1989.

6 Income seeurity creates a "direct exchange between citizen and state, which by­passes other social institutions" (Banting 1982: 51). Therefore such transfers would be most fit to be europeanized.

6

which comes about when two, three ar four levels of state actors--e.g., local, state and

federal governments--and now also the Community government--are trapped into a

joint decision within one big mbsidy scheme without dear mies (van Langendonck

1991) and dear responsibilities. A social integration strategy would also be advan­

tageous, because it would function as a "forcing mechanism" for EC ~olitical integra­

tion. Whereelse could you obtain legitimation far such European welfare entitlements

but from a European Parliament? The reverse would not work: Political union would

not necessarily force social integration.

The "Social Community" of Europe may basically still be just a promise--a hope, a

dream. But, let us explore it. In this study I investigate some of the institutional po­

tentials and pathways of sodal policy in Bmssels, of a possible "growth sector" in post-

1992 Europeanization: Will social protection become a genuine European concern? If

so, what might the trajectories of a European welfare state be?

First, I will argue that "Europe" presently is a non-socia! state. The role of the EC in

social policy is marginal, especially as it is confronted with strong national welfare

states like they prevail in European--in contrast to historical American--"federalism". I

will, in a second step, describe the threshold Europe needs to cross after 1992 if it is to

become a "social state", meaning a public organization buHt on entitlements, rather

then on "largesse". Third, I provide a typological outline of some possible logical ways

in which the EC might relate to welfare state activity. I will confront, fourthly, the way

by which crossing the social state threshold at the Community level is avoided: by

accenting the "procedura! politics" of harmonization or convergence. Several emergent

welf are state pathways, which mayaiso turn out to be--in parts or in toto--"sodal state"

passages, and this is my fifth point, are already accessible at the EC level. I will try,

with imagination, to draw some consequences from present EC institutional settings,

projecting them onto welfare and sodal ~~ate development models as they exist in

Europe. Sixth, I will summarize general perspectives for a European welfare state:

Will we progressively develop a Social Europe, or will European nations be going

"Dutch" in Europe--to each according to his feasible greed?

7

Europe's Non-Social State

There is as yet no "European Sodal State" to speak off. Nevertheless an EC sodal

policy exists, which does not supranationalize the policy field but leaves it mostly at

the nationalleveF. Sodal policy and cultural issues may turn out to be the last natio­

nal prerogatives of the 12 EC members. The Community, however, centers on issues

of "interstate commerce", on removing trade barriers, on "negative integration"--or so

it may seem at first. Norbert Reich (1988: 7), nevertheless, correctly refers to a "sudal

statization" ("Versozialstaatlichung") of the Comrnunity, as the Community develops

fields like consumer protection, ecology, equal opportunities, but also health

protection and industrial safety--in short, general "security policy" ("Schutzpolitik"), not

just "sodal security". Most of these polides are marginal to traditional sodal policy

("income transfer prograrns") domains, but they are strongly juridified at the

Community level.

Only the effects of national (sodal) policy on migrant workers are a central EC is­

sue8: For this group national systems are "coordinated". But migrant workers [rom EC

7 Exceptions are: "Sodal policy" vis avis EC public servants and exemptions from all national sodal security schemes given by the EC to Euro-companies which allow these companies to contract out all risks in a Euro-uniform way. One such exemption was made for Airbus (cf. van Langendonck 1991; Leibfried 1991b: 20 ff.). These aspects of European sodal policy are until now, to my knowledge, not very weil researched.

8 Quite a few articles of the Rome Treaty touch upon sodal policy: Art. 51 em­powers the Coundl to implement the free movement of the employed within in the EC in sodal policy: regulations 1408/71 of June 14, 1971 and 574/72 of March 21, 1972 have established the rules of coordination. Art. 117 is about improving the living standards and the conditions of work and about making them progressively uniform ("levelling-up"). Art. 118 makes the Commission responsible for supporting cooperation among its members in sodal issues. (Both articles do not imply a strong legal mandate.) Art. 119 grants a strong legal mandate for gender equality in the labor market. Art. 120 guarantees the obtaining national minima on paid vacations. Art. 121 allows the Coundl to delegate responsibility to the Commission pertaining to migrant workers. Art. 122 obliges the Commission to include a chapter on the development of sodal conditions in its Yearly Report to the European Parliament. Arts. 123-128 provide for the European Sodal Fund (ESF). Art. 130a I (added via the SEA) is about the harmonious development of the EC as a whole, and about diminishing the welfare disparities between regions and the uplifting of the regions least favored.

8

member states are only a minority among all migrants in todays EC 12. About 2

million of 140 million European employed are actually European migrants. If we

include the depedents then 5 million of 340 million inhabitants are European

migrants (Schulte 1991c: 33; Soysall991: 32). Normal Community coordinative (social)

policy - the major area of EC regulatory activity in this field - thus addresses only 1.4%

of the European emplayed and 1.5% of the European population. In addition there are

at least 5 million employed citizens of "third states" - mostly from Northern Africa,

Turkey or Jugoslavia - on EC territory and additionally their 3 million dependents.

Many of them belong to the real poor of Western Europe - an issue the EC should

also take up. But coordination does not apply to them, it applies to EC citizens only. ,

In all dimensions but one national policy systems have stayed separate, remaining

faithful to different traditions and logics, being coordinated only. Qnly in respect to

gender equality in the labor market--Art. 119 of the Rome Treaty (cf. int. al. Raasch

1990)--did the EC itself promulgate some substantive norrns. In EC practice routine

coordination is contras ted with a goal of "harmonization", with establishing some com­

mon social policy structure in all 12 national settings. Harmonization has repeatedly

been an EC slogan, but was only rarely implemented successfully.

Social policy has been called a "step child" of European integration (Bellers 1984:

246). This status has been reaffirmed by the Single European Act of 1986. More than

300 "1992"-measures were agreed on at the European surnmit of Milan in July of

1985. None of them pertained to social policy. In the second half of the 1980s the reac­

tions to the glaring absence of any welfare state issues--and the polemics about "social

. dumping"--have made "social cohesion" .and the "social dimension" a European issue

again. The SEA excepted all "Single Market" measures from unanirnity and allowed

for majority rule in the Council. It left social policy issues--but for essential health

and safety requirements--under the old regime of unanimous rule, thus giving veto

politics full reign. Interestingly enough Germany, which--together with the United

Kingdom--has blocked supranationalization of social policy in all of the 1980s, has

recently made ouvertures for majority rule in this area (Oever 1991; Schulz 1991). If

this were to become official EC policy it would free the Commission's hand in social

9

policy considerably.

Integration has focussed on the "citizen of a market" ("Marktbürger"; Grabitz 1970),

on "European market liberty" ("Europäische Marktfreiheit"; Oppermann 1987: 57 ff.)-­

most certainly not on citizens' rights, on social rights vis it vis the supranational

Community (Pieters 1989b, 1990a, b9). Accordingly, social policy has mainly stayed

an adjunct to the four freedoms of movement of goods, persons, services, and of

capital, "( ensuring) an area without internal frontiers"IO.

Relevant EC activity in social policy has relied on the free movement of persons, on

Art. 51 of the Rome Treaty. EC-citizens--and their families--moving within the

Community may cumulate their respective social security rights and are not to be

discriminated againstll. The Treaty thus presumes that social policy basically

remains "within" the national state and is unaffected by the EC mantle. National dif­

ferences are to be respected and only "coordinated" in case of need.

Did this come about because the Community lacked alternatives? This is not the case.

The EC from its very start took a different approach when it set up a European

9 There is a broader debate on the "constitutionalization" of social rights at the national and at the EC level, which would broaden ECJ competence substantially. I cannot go into detail here. It may suffice, to indicate that mostly only "minimal protection" is thought wise at the Community level. Also there is the discussion about the role which the Social Charter of the Council of Europe rnay still fulfill.

10 Art. 8 A of the EC Commission White Paper, as ammended by the SEA - quoted according to Moravcsik 1991, 19.

11 In terms of class the Community's growth of social policy has been somewhat ''from the bottom up", not "from the top down". Art. 51 of the Rome Treaty aimed at the untrained southem workers migrating north (who in his own setting in the South would not be considered "bottom" but "labor aristocrat"). This was the typical situation of the 1950s and 1960s. Today white collar or well-trained blue collar employees or self-employed are typical - and they migrate from any member state to any other member state (Pieters 1991a: 75).

As yet this does not. reflect in EC regulation. The emergent regulation of private pension benefits is a clear sign that the ECs social policy is recognizing changed pat­terns of migration.

10

Sodal Fund (ESF) in Articles 123 - 128 of the Rome Treatyl2. The ESF is directed

to retrain and relocate the European unemployed--and it does not affect any other

groups or take any other measures. Originally the Fund was to address the Mezzo­

giorno!3. The ESF is a separate institution at the European level and has become an

independent instrument of European policy. Individuals do not hold entitlements

against the ESF, thus it conforms to a welfare state and not to a "sodal state" pattern,

and it works through national governments and their national programs. National

hegemony over sodal policy is not broken by the ESF. In a traditional welfare state

framework EC action would be conceptualized as "Iargesse" (cf. C. Reich 1975, 1964).

The ESF budget amounted to about 3.56 billion ECU (about 7 billion Mark) in 1987,

that is about 6% of the EC budget (Schulte 1990: 85)14. In addition there is the

somewhat larger European Fund for Regional Development (EFRD)15, finandng in­

frastructure projects also in the EC 12 periphery.

While ESF and EFRD were budgeted with 7.75 billion ECU or 16 billion DM, a

share of 13.7% in the EC budget in 1988 (cf. Schulte 1980b: 84 f.), the 1992 EC

12 The European Coal andSteel Community (ECSC) of 1951 had already developed similar and more specific programs, also funding sodal housing for its clientele.

13 The EC 6 was homogeneously northern also in terms of developed welfare statism. The Mezzog!orno was the only larger exception to this pattern.

"Northem welfare statism" is an implicit base of the Rome Treaty: in 1957 the EC 6 were pushed toward institution building in the welfare state domain only at the margin, because such areas were marginal in the EC 6 (ESF - Mezzogiorno). The enlargements of the EC, especially the second one leading to EC 12, have destroyed this homogeneity. Welfare state issues have become broader and more intensive forcing mechanisms at the EC level, attracting institutional and (tentative) regulatory attention (this comparative historical argument is extended in Leibfried 1991b: 6 ff.).

14 This is less than Germany spends for children allowances. Nevertheless the Structural Funds (ESF, EFRD) spend significant amounts in terms of the GNP of peripheral EC countries. 3.8% of Portugal's, 2.6% of Ireland's and 1.6 % of Greece's GNP, for example, have such origins, amounting to 15% of Portugal's and 10% of Greece's gross investments (Ermer et al. 1990: 99).

15 The EFRD is a 1972 spin-off from EAGGF-Guidance (see footnote 35 below) which gained its independent standing in 1975 (cf. Konegen 1984a: 235; Konegen 1984b). In 1988 4.19 billion ECU or 9 billion DM were spent by the EFRD, which amounts to 7.4% of the total EC budget (Schulte 1990b: 84 f.).

11

budget request of the Commission asks for 37 billion DM for ESF and EFRD, and

thus shows a share of 29% for both Funds--pushing agrieulture's budget share back to

56%16. The EC has reached the target it had set itself in the 1988 Reform of the

Strnctural Funds: to double the budget available to the Funds by 1992. The level of

north-south redistribution has been increased: Net contributors to the EC budget are

located in the EC center, in the north--mainly Germany, France and Britain, but also

Belgium and Luxemburg--, whereas net receivers are found in the periphery--mostly in

the south and in Ireland. Since CAP transfers are biased towards northern European

agriculture, the periphery's net gain is achieved via the Structural FundsP

Narthern European welfare states are ''bribing'' their southern co-members through

ESF and EFRD, protecting their nortbern social policy infrastructure from being

challenged and their societies from contributing in a major way to European

redistribution. In the eyes of rieh northern European welfare states large ''welfare dis­

parities" ("Wohlfahrtsgefälle") are perceived vis a vis the periphery. The northern per­

spective far development is exemplified by a resolution in 1990 of the German Na­

tional Association of Insurance Science and Social Security POlicy18, an organisation

which has insurers, policy personnel and academics as members: "Coordination

instead of harmonisation. Neither today nor in the forseeable future may national so­

dal security systems be harmonized. The reason for this are the great differences

between these national systems, which have historical, political and economic causes"

(quoted from Schulte 1990: 282).

16 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung July 25, 1991, no. 170, p. 13; July 24, 1991, no. 169, p. 13: "Der EG-Haushalt platzt aus allen Nähten. Von einem heißen Herbst in Brüssel/Umzugskosten der Beamten nicht gedeckt". The budget is based mostly on members' contributions, which presently are fixed to a ceiling of 1.2% of the cumulated GNP of the member states.

17 Spain has been the major southern actor pushing for increases in the two Structural Funds.

18 Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und -gestaltung e.V. (GVG). The quotation is from "GVG-Leitlinien für ein soziales Europa" (Köln 1990). Schmähl 1990 and von Maydell 1990 present a typical extended argument for this position (cf. also Schmähl 1991).

1~ -~~

12

In turn, peripheral countries are trying to upgrade these Structural Funds by exacting

an entry fee [rom weIl-to-do new individual applicantsl9, mostly from EFfA20

•

Presently Austria, Sweden, and others are applyirg21. In the mean time also

Switzerland has joined22• But there is a membership stop unfil 1993, until the

internal market has been completed and until the currency as weIl as the political

union have been agreed to and ratified. Austria and Sweden would be potential net­

;layers23, and a worthwhile entry fee could be forthcoming. A similar "package deal"

nad also laid the base for the second enlargement of the EC, when Spain and

Portugal were adtnitted a decade ago--the doubling of the Structural Funds discussed

19 In the third Yearly Report of the Comtnission on the Conimunity's Employment situation Social Policy Comtnissioner Vasso Papandreou stressed in July 1991 that regional disparities in the Single Market between center ("north") and periphery have slightly increased, which is attributed to two factors in the periphery: stronger demographie growth and job loss in the agricuItural sector. "Buying power" per capita in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece are less then 70% of the northern average, a fall­back to the distributional situation of 1975. Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung July 19, 1991, p. 12: "EG-Wohlfahrtsgefälle wird nicht verringert. Dritter Jahresbericht der EG­Kommission zur Beschäftigungslage".

20 As EFfA members today remain: Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Austria, Switzerland and Uchtenstein. Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Denmark had broken ranks earlier (see also fn. 28).

21 In addition Malta and Zyprus are applying, and Turkey's 1987 application has been put on hold as presently unacceptable. Some Eastern European countries, like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, leave no Goubt, that they see association as a transitory stage to membership. Therefore an EC with about 20+ members tnight be sight. It seems that the northern comtnissioners in Brussels are pleading for an EC 20+,

whereas comtnissioners from the south are rather sceptical about it. The U.K pushes for enlargment as an antidote to increasing "federalism" at the Community level, also hoping to deemphasize EC social policy activities, thus remaking the EC into an EFfA

22 Von 1993 ab ein eigenes Wirtschafts-Europa für 380 Millionen Bürger. Zusammenschluß von EG und Efta/Europäischer Wirtschaftsraum/"Binnen­marktähnliche Verhältnisse", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 246/43 D,23.10.1991, p. 1,2.

23 Austria is expected to contribute 2.2 billion DM per year to the Community but will only receive 2 billion from the EC in return. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 1, 1991, no. 176, p. 5: "'Eine Bereicherung für die EG'. Komtnission in Brüssel erwartet reibungslosen Beitritt Österreichs")

14

will EFfA-welfare states be affected? (cf. Kosonen 1991; Kuhnle 1991) Nowadays,

after the u.K. and Portugal have left EFf A, distinct welfare state camps in this treaty ..

organization are easier to ascertain than they were in the original EFfA 7+1,18. The

original EFfA was more heterogeneous than the EC 6: There were industrialized

countries like Britain and Sweden, as weil as newly industrializing countries like

Norway, Finland, and Portugal29•

Today one could associate "the EC model" with an emphasis on income trarJSfers

("distribution states"3O) and the EFfA, especially the Nordic model, with being "pu­

blic service states" (Kosonen 1991: 7-9; Esping-Andersen 1990; Leibfried 1991a: 15

ff.)31. While with respect to poverty "variation within the EC is enormous" (Kosonen

1991: 11), poverty is lower in the EFfA group and more homogeneously so. The

average unemployment rates, which were sirnilar in the EC and EFfA in the 1960s, is

now four times higher in the EC than in the EFfA countries (ibid.: 12), where rates

also went Up32. While there is no coherent EC social state model, there is more of

(a nordic) one in the remaining EFfA members (ibid.: 14).

28 Original members of EFfA were: Austria, United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. Finland was only associated.

29 In the Rome Treaty welfare statism was made an implicit base for the integration process. Already due to wide welfare disparities among EFfA members a commitment to a social dimension was out of the question.

30 These states are biased to turn towards a compensatory welfare state model--this model is discussed below. .

31 Of the new EC entrants, Britain and Ireland, have moved toward the "distribution states", whereas Denmark has stayed weil in the camp of the "public service states" (Kosonen 1991: 20).

32 But, "Therborn (1986: 52) remarks that a11 low unemployment countries are outside the EC, and that crucial aspects of the employment policies in these countries would hardly have been possible had they been members of the Community. If this is so, the increase of the unemployment rate may indeed be at least partly explained by the integration process" (Kosonen 1991: 19). If the EFfA countries were to join the EC, this rnight affect EC social policy in two ways: The peripheral coutries (regions) rnight try to exact a raised entry price (StrUcturalFunds). The entering countries rnight try to force a European macro-econornic employment policy.

15

This Scandinavian Model of a "public service state" is very likely to be negatively

affected by European integration, be it through RES or EC membership (cf. also

Kosonen 1991: 21). Probably the impact of integration on the EFTA countries is

much more significant then the impact of EFTA on the EC: This is due to EFTA

members' much smaller size (20 million residents). But it is also generated by the

constraints a Single Market will place on the "public service state" of EFTA nations,

be it on public sector growth, on full employment policy, on a high female labor

market participation rate, etc. That the EFT Astates might shift the balance at the

Community welfare state level, moving Brussels toward a "service state", seems less

likely.

Beyond former EFTA members, a third enlargement might also include Eastem

European countries. Recent EC developments emphasizing Structural Funds then

might be reversed or refoeused. Present movements toward a stronger European Soci­

al Union presupposes a Western European "closed shop". Here, welfare disparities

are bounded and still manageable. If Eastern Europe were included, welfare

disparities, which are now still peripheral in the EC--in terms of the number of

people affected, geographical area, and concentration--, would be expanding radically,

become dominant, and would be hardly manageable at a supranational level anymore.

If EC membership expanded further east, the Community would devolve to a

"eustoms union plus free trade zone" baseline or it would become openly "two track".

If, on the other hand, Eastern Europe stayed outside the EC and the Community

accepted central responsibility for its development, a second ring of "Funds" might be

institutionalized in Brussels. This would foeus redistributive efforts at the EC level

more strongly and would open up an institutionalized arena for conflict between

North-South and West-East flows of redistribution.33

33 Similar processes can now be observed in intra-German revenue sharing. Unification has set West-East redistribution in competition with intra-West German South-North redistribution.

16

A Classical Threshold: Entitlements versus Largesse--Europe

Trapped as Welfare State

If European institutions themselves are to cross the threshold to entitlements and are

to become part of a European "social state", they would have to constitutionalize

"social citizenship" and would need to incorporate social rights into European

administrative law. Then Europe would not just recognize "market citizens" (civii

rights), and eventually political citizens, but would introduce the status of rights vis a vis European government, including "social citizenship". If "social citizenship", as Ralf

Dahrendorf (1985: 94) suggests, is "the final stone in the arch which holds up the roof

of citizenship", the European edifice still needs some work.

Presently the threshold to a "social state" is not even crossed in the area where

Europe already has assumed features of being an, albeit, fragmented, federal welfare

state: in the Community's Agricultural Policy (CAP)34. Even if the threshold to a

European social state were crossed in agriculture, this could not be contained to that

sector, or even, and this is most significant, to the EC level: Consequences would be

feit especially by those member states, which have not yet constitutionalized social

rights. These states would face continuous pressure by an EC social state, pressure

directed against their political and legal culture. Let me detail these points.

CAP has--so it is gene rally agreed--brought the EC dosest to "federal competency"

(Scharpf 1988, 1985), to "institutionally developed forms" (Rieger 1991a: 2)35 on par

with US or German federal standing. The EC has created a highly organized and

dosed CAP system, regulating 90% of agricultural produce and practically all income

of EC farmers (and of food producers), that is of 7% of the Ees gainfully (civii) em-

34 The threshold could have already been crossed in one sector in earlier EC history, however, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which had a strong supranational profile to begin with (cf. Collins 1975, 1; Dichgans 1980; Diebold 1959; Haas 1968; Lister 1960; Wittkämper 1984).

35 I am endebted to E1mar Rieger (1991 a, b) who explored the Community's agricuJturallandscape in some detail, including its social dimensions.

17

ployed36• The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)37

was built on well-entrenched national polides and can still rely on parallel natk.nal

legislation and administration, which protects national agricultur:ll producers and

assures them adequate incomes.

A transformation of an EC sectoral incomes policy into a sodal state regime did not

even take place with CAP although a juridical approach is quite attractive to the

Community. After all, legal instruments dominate EC activity--and not a supranational

spending or taxing power. European integration has been and is at its core about

"unification in law". An expansion of the EC legal domain into sodal rights could

leave the national taxing, spending and organization powers untouched. Such a

strategy, though it has much to recommend itself, still could not overcome the

obstades en route to a European social state as outlined above.

Inspite of its providing a "welfare state for farmers" the EC has not constitutionalized

or juridi ed the dient -state relationship: Clients have no entitlements vis a vis the

Community. Though CAP sets most of the relevant economic and administrative

parameters for national agricultural prograrns, the formation of farmers' rights--if such

36 Comparing todays agricultural employment with the situation obtaining at the start of the EC the data are: Italy 40% in 1951 versus 9.3 in 1989, France 28% in 1954 versus 6.4% in 1989, Germany with 23% in 1951 and 3.7% in 1989. (Rieger 1991a: 13, fn. 13 citing Flora)

37 The EAGGF is an EC institution based on Art. 40 cf the Rome Treaty (and regulation 17/64) and created to finance agricultural prograrns and basically relies on two regulatory mechanisrns, price and incomes policy. Its first section, called EAGGF­Guarantee, overlooks price support prograrns and price policies in general. EAGGF­Guidance, its second .section, is in charge of looking at causes and consequences of the price prograrns and of financing long-term structural prograrns. EC agricultural funds go mainly towards EAGGF-Guarantee, which benefits the better to do (center-northem) fanners operating with a relatively adequate and efficient structure of firms. The guidance section, which attends to straight income transfers to the less weil to do fanners (in the periphery-south), is about macro-economic and social policy and has been systematically under-funded. For an analysis in detail cf. de Benedictis et al. 1990; Rieger 1991b; Rosenblatt 1988).

18

national rights exist at all38--is still tied to the nation state. This EC welfare policy

for one dass segment has not given rise to an EC "social state fragment", to a formal

status, a structure of rights which ensures autonomy from market forces--here for far­

mers--, though this has typically been the route of providing social security for the

employed in Europe's national welfare states.

A transformation into rights is even less Iikely for the less important Structural Funds­

-with their haphazard impacts--or otherEC social action. Under present institutional

constraints, all roads to an institutionalization of social citizenship at the Community

level seem dogged. Individual social rights are locked into the nation state. Only civil

rights presently find an indirect EC forum, especially with the European Court of

Justice (ECJ)--but these rights often have far-reaching consequences for social rights

(cf. inter al. Leibfried 1991a: 24 ff.; Steinmeyer 1990).

A step to constitutionalize social rights at the EC level, even if taken in one sector

only, would have serious repercussions, especially if it were to spread to other sectors.

In the original "bifocal" EC this would have been less important, since both Germany

and France share a highly juridified conception of the "social (policy)" sphere. This

situation prevails on the continent, as most nation:; partake in a common (Roman

law) tradition of codified and intensively court policed law. But since the 1980s the

u.K. has become an additional major actor in an EC 12. The U.K., however, is a

"welfare state", and not a constitutionalized "social state", relying on juridified "new

property" (C. Reich 1975, 1964).39 Denmark and Ireland are similar to the u.K. in

this respect (cf. Schulte 1991: 20).

To expand the legal regime of the EC from negative to positive integration, and

further into the terrain of social policy, would not only interfere with national

"domestic policy hegemony". It would also for some nations constitutionalize national

38 At the national level only farmers social security institutions proper are firrnly and systematically built on entitlements in the EC 12 (cf. Rieger 1991a: 22, fn. 22).

39 Naturally this gives the U.K. also more institutionaI leeway to dismantle or reshape welfare programs than, for example, Germany (cf. Ogus 1990).

19

spheres of action which were hitherto much more prone to a regime of "largesse" than

to one of entitlement. This would already as a matter of legal practice come elose to

a revolution in domestic policy for at least one major EC actor (cf. Schulte 1991c: 17

ff., 20).

The Community as a Welfare State: Some Classifications

Since the we1fare state at the EC level in many respects is a "non-issue", let us first

elarify analytical concepts in a taxonomy (cf. Table 1): In most respects welfare is not

held to be in EC competency (cf. box 1), even though Joseph H. H. Weiler takes "the'

view that the European Community's competences are written in such a vague way

that the Community, given the political will, can just about do anything" (1986b:

11)'0--i[ unanimity obtains. Also, the EC may be thought competent, but may not

want to, or may not be able to, make use 0/ its competence (cf. box 3).

Then, the Community might shy away from strong sodal policy involvement by proce­

duralising social justice, 'harmonizing' approaches of the EC 12 on a voluntary basis or

trying to "talk member states into 'convergence"'--for example by introducing "due

process" through government by comrnittee and Community Recommendations. Such

approaches may lead to "procedural" adjustments for national programs, as for

example in the welfare area (box 2). Finally, the EC may actually develop and

implement social policy programs, as in the Structural Funds or when the Community

gets involved in "hard law" by promulgating coordinating--or, a rare case,

40 That there are no "constitutional roadblocks" in the Rome, Treaty is also vindicated by ECSC precedents with respect to the Paris Treaty. The ECSC at first "concentrated its energies on housing, the free movement of labor and readaptation issues. By 1966, however it was giving special attention to problems of adult education and managerial training, to the effects of mechanization and automation on the labour force, to the development of rational housing policies for a number of regions, to the reception and training of migrant workers and to the definition of principles for accident prevention in iron and steel." But "it is worth recalling that neither housing nor occupational training were specifica!ly mentioned in the Treaty 0/ Paris a!though they /ormed a major part 0/ the High Authority's socia! actions as the executive came to see the type 0/ social need that existed'~ (Collins 1975, 1: 105; emphasis mine - S.L)

20

harmonization--regulation (box 4).

Most of the Community's post-1992 problems are presently buried on the Zeft side of

Table 1 (especially box 1, less box 3): The EC--especially the Council not so much the

Commission--treats social policy quite cavalier as a "non-issue" moving EC 12

"federalism" towards a (pre-) New Deal social policy blockade at the Community level

(cf. Pieters 1991a: 90, 1990c; Leibfried 1991a: 24ff.41). But, let us take an optirnistic

approach and look for the Community's emergent welfare state properties and foeus

on the right side of Table 1: Here the Community's activities make national "social"

policy an issue (boxes 2 and 4). I willZook first at box 2, diseussing the "procedural

approach" to social policy, which dorninates at the EC level.

Table 1: The EC and the Welfare State--Between Non-Issue and Issue

D A welfare state at the EC level maybe defined as:

a non-issue in an issue in

competence procedure 1 2

substance substance 3 4

If we classify some of CAP and of the Structural Funds activity as positive social

policy (box 4) and take the EC to be a state-like organization42, we may start

wondering about the Community's welfare state characteristics and how they might

develop post-1992.

I

i

41 Another comparative approach on the USA and Canada is presented by Crijns et al. 1990. The federal perspective of the EC is discussed also by Everling 1989, Pieters 1991c, and Scharpf 1988, 1985.

42 The Community's state-like organization rnight be federal, confederal or condorni­nial - or a hybrid of some sort - or belong to an unknown type of the fourth kind (cf. Schmitter 1990).

21

Though the EC is no "sodal state", in its major activities it is a welfare "state"

nonetheless: a public organization involved in a major way in defacto delivering some

sodal security to some, though not within an entitlement framework. Only in the small

area of coordination--and in the harmonization of "gender equality"--is the EC and

espedally the ECJ involved in "sodal state" activity in a more classical and strict

sense. But such activity is rather limited by purpose ("coordination") and topic

(migrant workers; less so with gender equality).

When we classify EC sodal policy activity in a more substantive welfare state

framework, we note that the EC does not deal with all groups in similar intensity. It

deals in a major way with one group (farmers), but in one respect only (prices ->

incomes). Also it addresses some other groups--"problem groups" within the European

periphery--and also "regions" lacking infrastructure, but it does so in a haphazard

fashion, with respect to some risks addressed experimentally in "projects" (Structural

Funds). The EC may therefore be characterized as a fragmented welfare state as can

be seen in box 1 of Table 2, a table which gives an overview on the definitions used.

With respect to "coordination", which pertains to "migrant workers" only, the Ees

pro-rating and other effects on sodal rights might already be considered as part of a

segmented welfare--or, here, social--state (cf. box 3, Table 2): For these workers Com­

munity regulation deals with (almost43) all risks--insofar as these risks are pre-covered

in national legislation.

..

43 But "dire poverty" (cf. Leibfried 1991 a: 27ff.; Pieters 1991a: 77; Steinrneyer 1990, 1989)

22

Table 2: Welfare State Defined (Detailing Box 4 of Table 1)

1 I,

A welfare state may address

some groups most groups (categorical) (universal)

some risks f:ragmented partial Pertaining 1 2

I to I

! most risks segmented comprehensive 3 4

--_ .. -

Now we may wonder whether the post-1992 Cornrnunity has a potential to move from

box 1 to boxes 2 or 3--possibly even to box 4 of Table 2. After discussing the

"procedural option" (= Table 1, box 2) I will explore the institutional potentials at the

Cornrnunity level for different welfare state trajectories along the corridors shown in

Table 2.

At the national level, it should be noted, most northem European welfare states44

have already moved on to box 4 of Table 1. So, the Cornrnunity today does not act in

a "welfare state vacuum" as the US federal govemrnent dill in the 1930s45•

Convergence of National Welfare Programs: Towards a European Procedural Welfare

State?

The Community's effective"social state" access to social policy is limited to

44 For a more extensive comparison of European poverty regimes and a review of the literature cf. Leibfried 1991a.

45 The US in its federalization of social policyhas moved from box 1 (post-civil war military and agriculture) towards box 2 (with the New Deal; cf. Sko9loljlkenberry 1983). Due to lack of health insurance arld categorically-restrained income transfers the US still today would be cbissified as a "partial welfare state" (Schmitter-Heisler 1991: 4) and not as a "comprehensive" one (box 4).

23

"coordination"--the case of migrant workers--and only rarely was there effective

"harmonization"--as in the case of gender equality. Let me provide some detail to

these two cases and their development potentials:

Coordination vis a vis migrant workers rests on regulation 1408/71 and 574/72 and has four basic principles: non-discrimination of citizens of other member states in "social security"; which state is to decide legally contested cases; cumu!ation of insurance speIls and of times of employment (''pro-ratization'~; the right to export social entit­lernents to any member state (cf. inter al. Pieters 1991a: 74).

If we speculate about post-1992 developments wc should also consider broadening "coordination" regulation. Coordination might be expanded to new social groups, like civil servants and students, or to all persons who are citizens of EC member states, not just to the employed or self-employed and their dependents. Or coordination might even address all EC residents, be they citizens of member states or not (Pieters 1991a: 75-77). Also coordination might expand into new policy territory: The ECJ has induded most welfare C0l11pOnents in coordination already, but programs addressing "dire poverty" are still considered national prerogatives - this might be changed. Also, additional elements of "social security" in a functional sense - like private pension schemes - could be induded in coordination - and thus be exported more easily. With the changing dass structure of migration this wou!d seem quite sensible. Against strong national resistance (Schmähl 1991, 1990 b-d) the Commission is presently drafting such legislation. Post-1992 changes will also affect private insurance ("free movement of services"), for example life insurance. This topic cannot be explored here (but cf. fn. 11).

It is also worthwhile to explore the Community's policy horizon starting with the case of "gender equality" and harmonization: Step by step operative general principles of this sort might be added to the Community stock of regulation on social security and general policy and thus increase ECJ leverage. Such new general principles might be: non-discrimination because of nationality, age, and farnily status; principles of social security financing and administration, of information and advice of welfare state dients, and of minimum risk coverage.

Harmonization of this sort might also take on a "conservative" bent. Legislation at Community level might guarantee present national protection levels - a ''pre-1992 freeze clause" (Pieters 1991a: 84). The Rome Treaty already demonstrates this approach in Art. 120. At that time France was strongly lobbying for this dause - and, unsuccessfuIly, for a guarantee of other major parameters of the French social state. Art. 119 of the Rome Treaty on "gender equality" was the other French success of 1957.

Coordination means avoiding a European welfare state and harmonization has mostly

proved a cu! de sac. To break through this social state impasse the Commission has

developed a "new" variant of an old strategy: "convergence" (Pieters 1991a: 78; Schulte

1990a, 1991b). The member states are to agree voluntarily on goals and principles of

24

sodal security (Schulte 1991b: 285), espedally in the areas of health, unemployrnent,

inability to work, age and family46. The Commission has already developed a propo­

sal for a "Recommendation of the European Coundl on the Convergence of Goals

and the Policy of Sodal Protection" (Commission 1991). Some of these Goals have

made their way into the Community Sodal Charter. The Commission therefore has

set its course on devising "procedures", setting up committees etc., such that social

policy in the EC might converge--without the EC actually broadening its sphere of

competence and setting any legal constraints47•

One area in which convergence is of special concern to the EC is welfare. Here the . EC presently is already involved in its third poverty program (Henningsen/Room

1990; Room et al. 199048). The Community Charter on the Fundamental Social

Rights of Workers provides for a 'minimum income' by stipulating a right to "suffi­cient benefits,"9. The Commission is about to propose "Recommendations on Common Criteria about Sufficient Benefits and Means, which are to be Provided by the Soda! Security Systems'.so (Schulte 1991a). Such ,a--legally not binding-­Recommendation of the Coundl would address procedural issues like (Schulte 1991a: 2lf.): (1) A right to welfare, that is its juridification; (2) a principle of needs adequacy; (3) means-testillg; (4) subsidiarity; (5) adequacy of aid to farnily contexts (size, anti-discrimination rules); (6) With respect to other risks welfare recipients shou!d be integrated into normal social security systems, as in health, unemployrnent, pensions; (7) friendly administration; (8) swift court remedies; (9) principle of

46 In addition the Commission wants to employ the ESF and informational as weil as educational means to contribute to "convergence" (Schulte 1991b: 290, co!. 1; Pieters 1991a: 88 ff.).

47 The ECSC in its time had embarked on similar passages leading into nowhere (Collins 1985, 1: 104ff.).

48 These works also provide some background on the earlier poverty programs.

49 According to section 10 of the Community Social Charter "müssen alle, die vom Arbeitsmarkt ausgeschlossen sind, weil sie keinen Zugang dazu fanden oder sich nicht wieder eingliedern konnten, und die nicht über Mittel für ihren Lebensunterhalt verfügen, ausreichende Leistungen empfangen und Zuwendungen beziehen können, die ihrer persönlichen Lage angemessen sind." There is also a special section 26 on minimum income for the aged, so "muß jeder, der das Rentenalter erreicht hat, aber keinen Rentenanspruch besitzt oder über keine sonstigen Unterhaltsmittel verfügt, ausreichende Zuwendungen, Sozialhilfeleistungen und Sachleistungen bei Krankheit er­halten können, die seinen spezifischen Bedürfnissen angemessen sind".

50 Translated from German: "Empfehlungen zur Aufstellung von gemeinsamen Krite­rien betreffend ausreichende Leistungen und Mittel, die in den Sozialschutzsystemen vorzusehen sind".

25

"internal harrnonization": welfare levels should be in balance. with other minima, be it in tax, labor, family or social security law or in garnishment procedures; (10) principle of "reintegration", be it into the labor market or into society ("insertion" services).

The 'minimum income'SI is one of the first points of the EC action program to be implemented--naturally it may not emphasize the employed but must foeus on all European citizens, thus broadening the "Community of the Employed". The present recommendations are mostly "due process" proposals, sidestepping at this time any clear recommendation on "amounts" and "sufficiency", even though they are not binding. This speaks to an approach that interfers as little as possible with rate setting and the like--welfare proper--and provides only for common principles in the administration and judicial treatment of welfare.

Convergence--or harmonization--in the EC 12--or even more so in an EC 20+ --is

likely to be a futile exercise. First, already each country needs "internal

harmonization", since it has different social security systems for different social

classes. Thus, there are not just 12.systems, but x times 12 systems to harmonize or to

stimulate into convergence (Pieters 1991a: 78 f.). Second, "harrnony" in social policy

has been blocked repeatedly at the Community JeveJ--why should "convergence" fare

differently? The Single Market is now putting economic development on a

convergence track mostly by "harmonizing" the EC 12 member states' legal structure:

The track embraces most factors of production which are responsible for different pro­

ductivity levels in the EC 12: taxes52, labor law, fiscal discipline or even monetary

union.S3 Will the so-called "social costs" be the last factor of production still set on a

divergence track or put on "freeze"--and held onto by national govemrnents as their

last "reservation area"? (Leibfried 1991b: 6-10; Pieters 1991a: 79-83) While member

states may slowly be losing control over most of their economic and fiscal instruments

in the Single Market they might seek "compensation" here, be it in power and legiti-

51 This wording was used in the Commission's draft of the Community Social Charter, but Jeft out by the Counci1.

52 Harmonization of taxes will automatically affect and most likely erode the structure of primarily tax-based welfare states in the European North, like the Netherlands and Denmark. These welfare states are loosing the [iscal base for their institutionalization of"social citizenship".

53 The diversity in these factors was the reason given for not inc1uding social policy on the EC agenda of action in the Rome Treaty of 1957 - and cementing national responsibility for social policy (cf. BIT /IAA 1956; Collins 1975, 2)

/

26

mation or instrumentaIly.54 When economic competition grows and market situations

converge, sodal policy might be reinstrumentalized as economic policy to improve the

national competitive situation in the Community--using the last national policy

instrument available for that purpose. ss

If harmonization or convergence, "procedural politics" (box 2 of Table 1), are a cul de

sac today--are there other avenues through which the Community might develop sub­

stantive welfare state features (box 4 of Table 1; all boxes of Table 2)?

Welfare State Trajectories of the European Community

One proper view of post-1992 integration potentials of the Community in sodal policy

is ''from the bottom up", looking from "within" the national state up to the EC, up to

Brussels. Seen from sodety in most continental nations this automatically produces a

"social state" tunnel vision - and not a "welfare state" perspective: Tbe continent relies

predominantly on a formation of sodal rights as it has developed in northem Europe.

Table 3 is informed by an "evolutionary", historical perspective on a "Vergemeinschaf­

tung" of sodal rights: Tbe scheme starts with extemalizing all social problems or costs in

the European Poor Laws--a pure export model. Tbis strategy monopolized approaches

to sodal problems in the 19th century and worked weIl into the 20th century. Devel­

opment in the 20th century then tumed to individualized cost sharing (or individuali­

zed "buy out") approaches, possibly moving toward some more global cost sharing.

Finally, the framework of "national domestic hegemony" might be recast "from

54 Sodal policy discussions in the larger member states which are also major EC actors, like Germany, seem to cultivate "national prerogatives" (Schmähl 1990, Maydell 1990). Authors from smaller northem EC states, from the Netherlands (Berghman) and Belgium (Dispersyn, van Langendonck, Pieters, and Van der Vorst), are among those voidng stronger dissent, though they are not typical for their state's offidal position or the academic mainstream in their country.

55 Pieters (1991: 80 ff.) discusses Dutch examples on reforrns of sodal policy which were legitimated by gaining higher competitiveness in the EC.

27

Table 3: Models of "Social State" Integration under Migratory Conditions

CONSTRAINTS MODELS CHARACTERISTICS EXAMPLES

National Export the foreigner is re- Old Poor Law hegemony moved, back to the for social country of origin policy obtains all costs for trans- Newer

fers to foreigners Poor Laws are shifted to (Special country of origin Cases)

Pro- individualized EC: present Rata cost sharing pension

between countries*) regime

global cost sharing ?1) between countries*)

Buying total transfer private into the with individual sector Foreign account*) technique System only

- Automatie costs for total Scandi-Incopora- claim are navian tion into picked up by practice, the "last country" e. g. , in "Foreign" (Nordie Welfare pensions System State Integra-= Import tion Model)**)

Suprana- "Thir- eosts and rights no EC tional eom- teenth are uniformly example peteney for State"***) supranationalized (indireetly: social po- the Communi-liey is ae- ty's eivil eomplished servants)

Sourees: *) van Langendonek 1991; **) Henningsen 1990: 1772); ***) Pieters 1989. Footnotes: 1) National example: Treaties between panel doctors and siek funds in Germany do not itemize strictly. They provide for aglobai payment strueture first to the Panel Doetors Asso­ciation and then within the assoeiation to individual doetors.

!

2) Bernd Henningsen writes about Seandinavia as a "modell of a deeoupled system": "The countries of the Nordie Community have created a 'social space' ('soziale Gemeinschaft') which guaran­tees amongst them the mutual reeognition of soeial rights. That is, every eitizen has a right to social transfers wherever he or she may live, independent of (Seandinavian) nationality, inde­pendent of plaee of first entitlement. Among these eountries there are no eompensatory transfers any more."

28

within", creating a pure '1m port model", in which all costs would be intemaliZed: A "for­

eigner" would be routinely treated as if he had always been a "native" and would be -

automatically incorporatedS6• Tbe level of social state "Vergemeinschaftung" pre­

sently reached by the Community is "invidualized cost sharing between countries", the

"pro rata model".

But what are the prornising institutional potentials at the Community level for a

further development of a European "welfare state", looked at ''from the top down"? To

answer this question let me go into more detail about three major institutional

Community trajectories which may have some potential for extending a European

welfare stateS7: All of these trajectories fit into one of the boxes of Table 2 above.

Even box 4 will be filled in the end.

First, I look at the Strnctural Funds, playing out their compensatory potential to the

social state's full. Second, I foeus on CAP, wondering whether Strnctural Reform there

points us in a different welfare or social state direction--like Basic Income. Third and

last, I will diseuss !wo visions: Tbe "thirteenth state" by Danny Pieters, who--through a

social code--envisions an entering wedge into a Communitarian welfare state of the

20th century. Also, a "European Social Policy Queue" is foreseen, buHt in conscious

parallel to the European Monetary System (the "snake") and pointing us towards a

comprehensive European welfare state.

S6 Characteristics of the national social seeurity system may make it more or less likely that foreigners are dealt with in such a way. A universal social seeurity system, which is only marginally oriented towards contributions and work record and not very hierachical, is much better equipped to "nativize" strangers by incorporating them into the welfare state than is a system with the opposite characteristics.

On the other hand very hierarchical systems, like the Germll{l one, have been rather flexible in nativizing certain ,,!oreigners" by inventing biography: This was the case in formes times with GDR refugees and is still today with "Aussiedler" from Eastern Europe. Even though these people are culturally more distant to the average (West) German mentality than most EC Europeans, they were swiftly incorporated into the welfare state and treated as if they had been present in Germany all along.

57 I am focusing on monetary transfers, not so much on services, even though there is another interesting welfare state potential there. (for an exploration of the educational dimension cf. Allmendinger/Leibfried 1991).

29

The Structural Funds as Integration's "Second Leg": Toward a Compensatory European

Welfare State

The two European funds (ESF, EFRD) are "so meager that they appear to be

completely inadequate to solve the problems at hand" (Scharpf 1988, 1985: 324).

Germany alone dedicates more resources to child allowances than the Community

devotes to either 0/ these funds. Nevertheless since the mid-1980s both Funds have de­

veloped as a ''second leg" of the 1992 integration process, 92the "Single Market" being

the "first leg". Thus, the SEA of 1986 has achieved a manifest institutional,

organizational and ideological breakthrough for an instrurr."nt of the European

welfare state. This "second leg" draws additional strength particularly from the

European Court of Ju~tice (ECJ)S8, which has systematically increased legal

pressures pointing towards European standards in educational and social polio/9.

The creation of a European Economic Space between EC and EFfA in October

1991 also included such a "second leg".

Rebuilding the two Structural Funds into a ''second leg" of the 1992 process

symbolizes that horizontal fiscal equity (revenue sharing)60 and social redistribution

between member states have become "forcing mechanisms" at the European level.

The Funds have developed into important bargaining chips between center and peri­

phery in the process of market integration within a Western Europe "closed shop". As

the European pressure system which connects market and social integration is more

58 If the USA around the turn of the century was "a state of courts and parties" (Skowronek) then the EC today is "a state of the European Court and EC technocrats". The most comprehensive USA-EC comparison has been undertaken by Cappeletti et al. The idea, that the most natural comparative material for the EC process is found in the USA seems to be most intensively held b lawyers (cf. inter al. Zweigert 1963).

59 The mechanisms here are amongst others: an ever widening understanding of the term "employed"; broad interpretation of "social benefits" to include all welfare state programs, going far beyond social insurance, except for "pure" welfare (classical poor law); extensive understanding of Articles 128 and 135 of the Rome Treaty, which deal with education.

60 The last systematic treatment is dated: Franzmeyer/Seydel 1976.

30

tightly linked--be it through a unified currency or a Common Economic and Budget

policy of the 12 member states--the pressures for and chances of an ever wider

breaktrough for a European welfare state also grow.

These Funds partly compensate, though mostly symbolically, the peripheral regions of

Europe and are routinely added onto national prograrns61• The Structural Funds

have .mostly been prisoners of national dilemmas and do not have a truly European,

an independent policy focus. Structurally the Funds are incompatible with a welfare

state built on entitlements. The EFS and the EFRD do not have direct and

standardized relationships with clients, they rather cultivate relationships with staffs

and provider groups mostly at the national level.

What would happen, if one radicalized the present "Fund approach" in thinking about

a European "sodal state" perspective? The EC welfare state would turn into a regime

of comprehensive compensation for "integration damages". The Funds could expand in

many directions: They could move from delivering transfers (servi-::es, incomes and

infrastructure) in an experimental, haphazard ("project") way to systematic and stan­

dardized delivery across Europe (new instruments). They could address additional

damages and evolve new forms to compensate for them (new risks). They also could

become more comprehensive by addressing all Europeans damaged by the integration

process (new groups).

If the evolution of the European welfare state took that direction the German

compensatory welf are state modef-Z would basically be extended to the Community

level. The German model is labeled compensatory because it focuses (ex post) on pay­

ments for damages and not (ex ante) on prevention through social services. The

61 There has been some loosening here as the Commission has short-circuited with regions and other subnational authorities. Short-circuiting more EC-prograrns with citizens is still a long way off. In education, though, as prograrns like ERASMUS show, the situation is rather different from the start.

62 On a contrast of this model to other European approaches cf. Leibfried 1991a: 18 ff.

31

German approach is not--as is the Scandinavian Model (Leibfried 1991a: 16 ff.)--built

around comprehensive labor market participation, but around comprehensive

"Versorgung", a provision of livelihood. This version of a European welfare state

would not address all European citizens but only the losers o[ European integration

("Europäisierungsverlierer") who mostly reside in the European periphery. Maybe it

could also be directed towards those who merely tolerate European integration without

gaining much from it ("Europäisierungsdulder"). But, if we continue in this line of

speculation, such a European welfare state would not absorb all the risks these

persons are exposed to but only those which can be attributed to further European inte­

gration.

Community Agricultural Policy and its "Decoupling": Toward a Residual European

Welfare State

The CAP is the only large EC institutional domain--absorbing about 56% of the

proposed 1992 budget--which has achieved a "[ederal standing" at the European level.

Only here do we find an independent policy sphere, comparable for example to impor­

tant federal policies in Bonn or Washington, DC. Only here do we find an

autonomous Community tax base, a partial emancipation from national "dues".

CAP's structural components ("EAGGF-Guidance") do not yet playamajor role. In a

restrictive turn in price policy at the beginning. of 1980s the EC in its official Green

Book tried to contain uncontrollable growth of CAP expenses and proposed

"decoupling" in the rnid-1980s63: A "Iong-term reform of CAP" was to orient "toward

areturn to the market". The Green Book "called for a reduction in price supports and

a realignment with world prices, together with direct support to farmers' income parti­

ally and selectively decoupled from the quantity of products generated" (de Benedictis

63 Here again the North-South divide after the second enlargement becomes significant, since the number of member states increased that did not benefit from CAP's major guarantee element. In essence this implied "a diversification of the instru­ments of intervention, which were increasingly divorced from the achievement of common objectives and increasingly related to a more equitable distribution of financial resourees among member states" (de Benedictis et al. 1990: 173).

32

et aI. 1990: 175; emphasis mine - S.L.)64.

But when 'income transfers' are" jecoupled" and transformed from supporting priees

and absorbing surplus to a direct income transfer, agricultural policy directly tums info

sociat policy, though a sodal policy limited to one sector and to one status group. A

guaranteed basic income for European farmers is at the moment--and that is no­

table--thought to be a general remedy also in the quarters of continentalliberal

market orthodoxy. In the struggle against agricultural sderosis the end seerns to justify

all means. This discussion is at the moment strictJy seperated from another, more

marginalized, discourse about EC wide basic ineome--though both discussions take

plaee at the EC level, and are Comrnunity funded.65

Onee agricultural "produce" policy has been transformed into a straight incomes

policy, it will be much harder to insulate the new policy domain from other European

daimant groups66, however fluid their state of organization might be. "Log roJling"

among member states contained within the agricu1tural sector might be overcome and

replaeed by cross-sectoral, dass-style bargaining. This could lead to EC-wide

continuous controversies about and bargaining over turning the new agricultural po­

licy into an ever more comprehensive EC soda! policy. The first "decoupling" (from

prices) would merge into a second "decoupling" (from agriculture). Also, the southern

extension of the EC 12 brought states with substantial farming populations into the

Comrnunity: In these states a basic minimum income for farmers is much doser to a

General Basic Income for each citizen. In the original "EC 6" the agriculturally

64 This process goes hand in hand with a slow erosion of the Comrnunity "interest triangle" which had its base in the "food industrial complex". In the last decade new "groups" have politidzed the CAP scenery: "consumers, environmentalists, countries with which the EC has relations in GATI, and groups interested in the development of sectors other than agriculture" (de Benedictis et al. 1990: 175).

65 The "BIEN" (Basic Income European Network) network of researchers functions as an exchange and "lobby equivalent" for a General Basic Income to be reached via Walter Van Trier, Bosduifstraat 21, B 2018 Antwerp, Belgium.

66 To transform farmers into nature wardens and to pay them for this public service (Hrubesch 1987: 47) does not seem to be a weil protected new insulation.

33

employed have whithered away and are not structurally important in politics anymore

(see fn. 36).

If a European "social state" perspective is applied to this transformation of

agricultural policy, a radicalized outIook reveals a structure of individual entitIements

which conforms with a regime of comprehensive citizenship benefits. Contrasted with

the German compensatory regime (see above) this would expose another distinct

foundation for a European sodal state. Thomas Humphrey Marshall's hopes for sodal

citizenship as a post-WW 11 English perspective would resurface on the Co=unity

level--after having foundered in Margret Thatcher's England. Such benefits would

address all European dtizens, either independent of their means as a basic income or

means-tested as welfare67• Though some might consider this as including ail socU

groups, the scheme would not absorb all risks but address only the risk of failing

income. Naturally this approach could be expanded further--but this would be a third

"decoupling".

As Wolfgang Streeck (1990a: 17) has shown, the EC has achieved its most important

policy gains in the labor market with post-industria! topics such as gender equality and

also with ecological issues. This post-industrial stance would also be fitting for a

general basic income :'.pproach, if it builds on EC dtizenship and not on labor market

attachment, be it with or without duration.

The 'Thirteenth State" or the "Socia! Policy Queue'~ Toward a Supranational European

Welfare State

Relying on the history of legal integration in the USA (cf. Zweigert 1963; also

Cappeletti et al. 1986 ff.) one could think of a Co=unity model or "uniform code"

67 In his major works on poverty policy Hauser has developed such a perspective (using the US experience) already from 1980 onwards (1980, 1983, 1987). He proposes not just an harmonization of European welfare law, but also an AFDC-like scheme of supranational revenue sharing of the Co=unity. It could espedally compensate the poorer regions of Europe.

34

for social security ("Sozialgesetzbuch") developed by the Commission for its 12

members. The code might then be adopted within some corridor of choice by

member states. Such a proposal is--per se--not very attractive, since in Western

Europe developed welfare states are on the ground alreadf8. Also in the

Community there is as yet no full functional equivalent for the role which the legal

profession played in unifying US law69•

Danny Pieters has added a different spin to such aproposal, which he baptized "the

thirteenth state" (Pieters 1989a, 1991: 85 ff.). At the Community level he goes "post­

coordinative": Pieters envisions an autonomous, comprehensive ("all risks"70),

cootribution based, "unitary" European Social Security System (ESSS). The system

would address mi grant workers only. Membership could be optional: migrants may

choose to remain in the present framework of coordination. Or, amigrant worker

may be automatically transfered from the national system to ESSS. If ESSS were to

emulate benefits in the systems of the three major European actors (France,

Germany, and the United Kingdom) it would already be better than most systems in

the EC 12. If, in addition, benefits were upgraded, it should be a rather attractive

scheme. Such upgrading is a sensible policy for the Community as it would place

premiums on intra-European mobility (Pieters 1991a: 83fl. It would be attractive to

transfer national accounts to the ESSS. The system might be subsidized by the EC,

just as many national systems are also subsidized by member states.

68 In the 1970s there was an official initiative within the EC to supra-nationalize unemployment insurance (the Marjolin plan). It foundered because the major actors resisted.

69 The ECJ comes dosest but cannot rely on a base broad enough to be a functional equivalent.

70 It should be kept in mind that in the last decade migrant workers in the EC 12 have been weIl qualified and weIl paid (cf. fn. 11). The proposed ESSS will start Europan social insurance at the top of the social pyramid, not at its bottom. It can afford to have less "Iourdeur" in its contributions while offering good insurance.

71 The ESSS would create problem of intra-firm inequality. Two sorts of social protection would co-exist in one work setting.

35

With ESSS the Comrnunity would be lifted in one sweep from a segmented welfare to

a segmented sodal state plateau. Since the ESSS for migrant workers72 could also

selve as "a target system for European harmonization" (van Langendonck 1991), it

could orient employers and employees towards a European bargaining system 73 and

point the way to a comprehensive European soda! state74• Such a development is not

t·~ be expected--at least not soon. Nevertheless, this "EC 13" model serves as an

aTlalytical device and illustrates what it really means "to europeanize Europe via Eu­

ropean Social Policy" (Henningsen 1989).

The ''European Soda! Policy Queue" (ESPQ) is another variant of going comprehen­

sively European in sodal policy, proposed mainly by Michel Dispersyn (1990; cf. also

Pieters 1991a: 87 f.) and his collaborators (Dispersyn et al. 1990). It is modeled after

the "European Monetary Queue", as its "second fiscalleg". The ESPQ is primarily

about levelling-up through fiscal redistribution within the 12 European soda! budgets

(European social budget sharing), and to do so from richer to poorer member states.

The ESPQ relies on some uniform statistical indicators about basic I.'arameters like

coverage and "level" of sodal security--as for example percent of GNP spent (sodal

budget)--and on Comrnunity reference country scores and EC averages, which are

determined first as a base line and then updated yearly. If protection relevant to these

parameters in member states is decreased EC 12 consultation and concerted EC

(anti-"sodal dumping") action are triggered. If a member state was quite below the

72 Pieters points out that the system could be extended to the upper ranks of white co/lar employees ("leitende Angestellte") of companies operating under a European Charter or operating in more than one member state. It could also be opened to any dtizen of the EC who voluntarily wants to join, whether migrant or not. Access might be controlled through collective bargaining. Whichever strategy is chosen, it is likely that Europe would "comrnunitarize" some of the "good risks", leaving the non-so good ones to the national systems.

73 In German sodal policy history the introduction of white collar insurance (1911) had sirnilar functions.

74 The system would give rise to an "upgrading competition" between the supranational and the national systems. In Germany this is already the case between the white collar and blue collar siek funds.

36

protection average to begin with ihe ESPQ-mechanism would intervene to "level-up"

protection until some "adequate" standard was met, which had been determined

normatively by the EC 12 in advance. Countries above average should consult in the

ESPQ-mechanism about how to contribute to "uplift" protection in countries below

average.

The ESPQ is a model airning a!most in a straight way75 at a comprehensive

European welfare state (Table 2, box 4).76 It is, therefore, the most radica! view of

Europe's welfare state future. But, on the other hand, it is just the most radical ana­

logy to the European Monetary System. The ESPQ answers to the econornic

transformation of European econornies - and to the European Monetary System -

with a corresponding level of complexity in social policy.

Futures of Social Europe. A Summary

The definitions proposed in Table 2 are now given more body, further detail in Table

4. The models (M) discussed above all fit the welfare state scheme of Table 2--in­

cluding box 4. On a continent from which the (comprehensive) welfare and the social

state originated and where the social state is weil entrenched in the north at the

national level, a comprehensive European version of a welfare or socia! state, though,

will be most difficult to realize at the supranationaIlevel.

M 1 and M 2n , depending on how they are set up, a!so belong to a trajectory of a

"bifureated" European welf are state (cf. Leibfried 1991a: 24 ff.). Supra-national

authorities would deal exclusively with the "poor of Europe", while national programs

remain well-entrenched in rniddle class social policy und socia! security for the

75 The ESPQ model does work by budgetary indirection, though, and does not directly structure the citizen-state relationship as a Socia! Code would.

76 If one went further with speculation about CAP and "decoupled" it a third time -we would also be moving toward box 4.

n If the Basic Income were means-tested this would certainly be the case.

37

employed78• Such bifurcation would be rather hard to overcome, as it would mean to

move forcefully into box 4 and to uproot core national programs.

M 3 with ESSS on the other hand is more likely to result in reverse bifurcation,

privileging the well-to-do of European employees--a "Berlaymont" model--.. though it

is meant to be more comprehensive in the long run19• M 4 with the ESPQ has the

least potential for welfare state bifurcation. On the contrary, it airns at a European

budgetary system for all national social policy, which is to "level-up" social protection

within the EC 12 through solid policy engineering. The ESPQ would seem a good

example of the sort of masonry needed to put 'the final stone into the arch which

holds up the roof of European citizenship'so.

78 This looks in some respect like an unmitigated version of US development: As if the federal government in the US were only responsible for AFDC, Food Stamps, SSI etc. - and not also for "other" Social Security.

19 Such a growth pattern of social policy would conform to the evolution of the German welfare state, which trickled "from the top down": the "public servant model" (1) was expanded to white collar workers (2), to blue collar "labor aristocracy" (3), then to further risks of the employed (4) and even into the citizen's domain of welfare reform (5).

The growth of the English welfare state reverses this order by starting from (4) up­wards and downwards. The Community's start into an EC welfare state with Art. 51 (coordination of migrant workers) and Arts. 123 ff. of the Rome Treaty (ESF) looks more like the English pattern.

80 I am rephrasing Ralf Dahrendorfs thesis (1985: 94), adapted to European circumstance.

38

Table 4: The EC and the Welfare State Defined--A Summary

1 11

A welfare state may address

1

some groups most groups (categorical) (universal)

some risks fragmented partial

p~rtaining (CAP) CAP decoup-Structural led once -> Funds -> M 1: Compen- M 2: Basic sate Integra- Income and tion Losers Welfare

to most risks segmented comprehensive

(coordination; EC-civil 'ser-vants; gender equality) M 3: European M 4: European Social Securi- Social Policy ty System Queue (ESPQ) ; (ESSS) = "Thir- ESSS insofar teenth State" as it serves

as a "target system"

The "proceduraI welfare state" trajectory discussed above does not fit this scheme. For good

reason, since the EC is conceived only as a "hidden hand" coordinator writ large, trying to

induce agreements between EC members on their voluntary harmonization of still completely

national welfare schemes. There is not much genuinely European in this sort of welfare

state.

All these trajectories lead to stronger EC involvement--in directives, finance and personnel.

They will add welfare state components to the Community after 1992. Dnly in the envisioned

"thirteenth state" are these components part and parcel of a "social state" perspective. In all

other cases the threshold between welfare and social state need not be crossed by the Corn­

munity. Nationally these EC prograrns, which are dispensed pre-integrated by Brussels, may

39

weil beeome part of a "sodal state" delivery system. Member states may ineorporate EC

largesse into their entitlement landseapes, have them polieed by eourts ete., aeeording to

national standards--just as it befits the respeetive legal and politieal culture.

Eeonornie eompetition of "Europe's Would-be Polity" with the US and Japan already

triggered the dedsive step towards the 1992 proeess (Sandholtz/Zysman 1989). In the long

run systems' eompetition rnight also differentiate Europe vis a vis the USA and Japan: Giving

a European welfare state a new face, thus recasting the European bargain again. Economies

alone cannot drive political integration beyond the 1992 process. According to Tomrnaso

Padoa-Schioppa "the cement of a political comrnunity is provided by indivisible public goods

such as 'defense and security'." Whereas "(t)he cement of an econornic comrnunity inevitably

lies in the econornic benefits it confers upon its members" (1987). Is not sodal security part

and parcel of that very same "indivisible pubiic good" plus "security" argument? If so, the EC

will not thrive if viewed only as a comrnerdal venture. The Comrnunity is also an adventure

in communitarian social policy--if the logic of negative integration is not to consume its own

base. "Going Dutch" as the European social policy will damage the indivisible public good of

social protection.

Working "from sodal security down" (Pieters 1991a, 1990c, 1989) or "from poverty regimes

up" (Leibfried 1991a,b) macro perspectives for Comrnunity development become visible.

Diversity in sodal security in the post-1992 Single Market may be decreased in either of two

ways:

"The econornic import of national systems is decreased so much that differences are no relevant factor in intra-Comrnunity competition any more. Then these systems would not hinder integration, since they have been demoted to subsidiary levels--schemes of last resort ("Hilfssysteme")-which may as weil remain anational prerogative. Or ... present diversity of national systems is decreased in such a way that the existing relatively high level of protection is harmonized and then does not interfere in the competetive situation between member states in the EC" (Pieters 1991a: 83).

Nobody seems to propose or bank on the first alternative, but nobody is doing much to

implement the second alternative. Since the sodal situation and the institutional Community

bias is constructed such that inactivity supports an on-going slow process of "Ievelling-down"

40

or a "freeze,,81, the great challenge lies in actively developing the Community's we(rve and

social state capacities. If it is mostly ''beliefs and politics" (Banting 1982: 36) which account

for the peculiar structure and shape of social policy systems, the European Community--with

its common tradition encompassing religion, enlightenment, and legal structure, but also

common patterns of social protection--should provide for a good start. The shared and weil

embedded "moral economy of social protection"82 rnight weil gain the upper hand vis a vis

the competitive economy of the Single Market also supranationally. At least the institutional

bias of the Community's compact will be put to a market test: Will a "commitment to the

values of individualism and liberalism", as we find it in the USA, become a possible new

European baseline--or not? If not, what then? In the middle and long run, Iassume, the

values of "possessive individualism" will at least not win out through the back-door of a

Community welfare and social state impasse.

Revealing--and someday hopefully using--the full welfare and social state potential of the

Comml 'ity such as to allow thinking about "levelling-up" in a more comprehensive way was

one intention of my study. Project 1992 will affect European welfare states, the European

idea of a welfare state, and the Community's welfare state practice--it will do so directly or

indirectly, whether that is intended or not. The Community and its members would be ill-ad­

vised to behave like ostriches--and to continue their fatal politics of "non-issues" and "non­

decisons". If enough pressure does not come from EC-domestic policy, decisions may weil be

forced by external pressures: Immigration from Eastern Europe and from the Afro-Arab

Mediterranean Rim countries makes citizenship an issue within the EC, inc1uding I

harmonization of welfare state practice vis a vis immigrants. But how do you harmonize such

benefits, if not even "normal" welfare benefits for member states' citizens are harmo­

nized?83 Also, the EC is challenged to contribute massively to structural development in

81 This is supported by some of the features of coordination described in detail in Leibfried 1991a: Coordination enforces the export also of many "social citizenship benefits" (such as child allowances, welfare payments - not so much housing allowances) which tends to freeze or shrink universal benefits first.

82 For a weil developed argument on the "moral economy" cf. Kohli 1987.

83 Cf. areport on the Commission's position: "Angleichung der Verfahren gefordert. Vorschläge der EG-Kommission zum Asylrecht in der Gemeinschaft", Frankfurter

41

Eastern Europe, last [,ot least to fend off preventively further immigration: Imperatives of

North-South redistribution will compete and become tied up with new needs for "West-East"

redistribution. This may further politicize the struggle Over the Funds and the EC's welfare

state potential--and it will further politicize Germany's position in the EC, now that it all of

a sudden has become "Eastern Europe's wealthy gateway to the West'084.

In addition, most prognoses on EC social policy development are locked into "federal-state

zero sum premises": An EC gain in social policy competence is automatically seen as a loss

to the member states. The Canadian welfare state compact with its "regionalized nature"

(Banting 1982: 40)8S--even in the area 01 contributory pensions--might teach Europe

differently86. Maybe in half a century the EC's social policy can be Seen in this mirror:

"The result is that the ECS7 has an increasingly bifurcated welfare state. Health and social services are within member states' paramountcyBB in theory, and increasingly

Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 235, 10.10. 1991, p. 2.

84 John Tagliabue, Germany Wins Europe's Backing for Tougher Controls on Migrants, New York Times, no.A8, 771, November 1, 1991, p. A 6.

8S "In Canada this integrative role [of the welfare state - S.L.] takes on a different dimension [than effecting Titmuss' equality of status - S.L.]. Canadian politics revolves less around c1ass divisions than regional and linguistic ones, and social integration in this country has tended to mean building common bonds among various territorial units, language groups and regional cultures. Universal social programs are important in this context. They represent one of the few spheres of sharec1 experience for Canadians, an important aspect of our lives that is common, irrespective of language or region." (Ban­ting 1987: 151). Maybe, as Gunnar Myrdal (1957: 46) has argued long ago, also in the Community the expansion of the tax system and the development of social security will become the "two mighty policy trends which ... [will - S.L.] forcefully contribute[d] to equalization between regions" (quoted according to Banting 1987: 151)?

86 In Canada "Unemployment Insurance is a matter of exc1usive federal jurisiction; Workmen's Compensation is a matter of exclusive provincial juridiction; and cOlJtributory pensions, inluding supplementary benefits, are a concurrent jurisdiction, with provincial paramountcy in law and shared control in practice." (Banting 1982: 51) The federal role in non-contributory programs, where competence is legitimated by the "spending power" only, have become a matter of some controversy about the dominant role the federal government has assumed here (52 ff.).

87 I have substituted the EC for Canada.

88 I have substituted ''within member states' paramountcy" for "provincial".

42

so in practice. Income security is steadfastly an EC-federal competence, with conces­sions to member states' assertiveness taking the form of member states' involvement in supranational89 programs rather than explicit decentralization. When it comes to welfare, the Cornrnunity manifests a decidedly schizophrenie personality." (Banting 1982: 58)

Let me dose with Bernd Henningsen's (1990: 196) piece of hypothetical history:

"Just think the founding fathers of the Cornrnunity would have built it around a European welfare state, around a European social cornrnunity--instead of being fixated on a cornrnon agricultural market only ... ,,90 • Then, about a hundred billion DM per year would already provide a solid base for European educational and sodal policy, instead of the present 5 to 10 billion DM or so.

89 I have substituted supranational for national.

90 In that hypothetical case in 1992 56% (the CAP share), instead of the 10-15% percent of the EC budget reserved for the ESF would be available for social policy. On a systematic exposition of this theme cf. Henningsen 1989.

43

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