R4D Skytrain transport planebroadcast appeals to surrender.About 150 individuals answeredthe call, but most of them turnedout to be South Korean laborerswho had been forced into serviceby the NKPA. Chance-Vought F4UCorsairs from Marine FighterSquadron 323 then droppedbombs, rockets, and napalm uponthe remaining NKPA. The lastmajor action of the "guerrilla hunt"occurred when two battalions of

the 1st Marines, commanded bythe division's former logistics offi-cer, Colonel Francis M. "Frank"McAlister, who replaced newlypromoted "Chesty" Puller on 25January, routed an estimated bat-talion of the 27th NKPA Regiment,south of Samgo-ri. More than 75enemy were killed and anunknown number were seriouslywounded by the time the NorthKoreans fled the field of battle on5 February. Only scattered resis-

tance by diehard individuals orsmall groups was reported toheadquarters from then until theMarines departed Pohang.

Enemy deserters told interroga-tors that disease and low moraletook a heavy toll. They reported anNKPA battalion commander hadbeen shot for desertion and thatGeneral Lee was immobilized bysevere depression. Other measuresof enemy desperation were thatwomen were increasingly being

Marines and South Korean laborers bring a Marine casual-ty down from the scene of a skirmish with North Koreanguerrillas. During the month at Pohang, Marine nonbattle

casualties outnumbered battle casualties by a ratio of nineto one.

17

\aLuri! \i I \ k(

drafted to serve as porters andcombat troops were donning cap-tured American clothing to covertheir escape. Although the 10thDivision still could muster about1,000 men, captured dispatchesindicated CCF headquartersordered the remaining NKPA tobreak out of the Marine encir-clement. General Smith's Situationreport to Eighth Army headquar-ters on 11 February stated that theenemy had been appreciablyreduced and declared "the situa-tion in the Division area is suffi-ciently in hand to permit the with-drawal of the Division and theassignment of another mission."Armed with this knowledge, intel-ligence officers at Eighth Armyrated the 10th Division as combatineffective, and General Ridgwaydecided the 1st Marine Divisioncould be put to better use else-where.

There were several importantadministrative changes in the 1stMarine Division at Pohang. On 2February, Brigadier General Pullerbecame the assistant division com-mander when Major GeneralEdward A. Craig departed for theUnited States. This was the first ina series of command changeswrought by new rotation policies.In the next three weeks, 12 of 16maneuver battalions would changehands. Thirty officers and 595enlisted men, all former membersof the 1st Provisional MarineBrigade, were sent back to Pusanto await conveyance to the UnitedStates. That much-longed-for trans-portation arrived when the troopship USS GeneraljC. Breckinridge(AP 176) delivered 71 officers and1,717 enlisted men of the 5thReplacement Draft to Pohang on16 February. These new arrivalswere rather hurriedly assimilatedand they brought the 1st MarineDivision back up to fightingstrength just as it shipped Out for

central Korea. Unfortunately, thecombined U.S.-Korean Marineteam was broken up again, On 2February, the independent 5thKMC Battalion was transferred to XCorps Headquarters, and GeneralSmith learned the 1st KIvIC

Regiment would stay behind whenthe 1st Marine Division moved out.

There were no pitched battles orepic engagements at Pohang, butthe Marines had rendered anenemy division ineffective. Marinebattle losses during the period 12January to 15 February numbered26 dead, 148 wounded, and 10missing in action. There were alsoa large number of nonbattle casu-alties, primarily the result of frost-bite or minor injuries, mostreturned to their units. Enemycasualties and non-combat losseswere estimated at more than 3,000men. The "guerrilla hunt" was also

particularly useful for training andphysical conditioning. Constantmovement over rough terrainensured all hands were in goodshape, rifle squads and mortar sec-tions developed into coherent andtactically proficient units, and mostof the 3,387 Marine replacementsgot at least a brief taste of combatconditions. With respect to opera-tions, the Marines functioned as atruly integrated air-ground team.Although there were few opportu-nities to use Marine close air sup-port, VMO-6's Consolidated OY"Sentinel" light observation aircraftand Sikorsky HO3S-1 "Dragonfly"helicopters served as airbornescouts and rescue craft while bub-ble-top Bell HTL helicopters weremost often used as aerial ambu-lances. Indeed, the 1st MarineDivision was so well honed afterPohang that five decades later

MajGen Smith distributes clothing donated by the Marine Corps League toKorean children in one of the nearby villages. 'No attempt is made to obtain anexact fii, "Smith said, "as there is not time."

18

The Enemy

In the spring of 1951, the forces opposing the UnitedNations Command consisted of more than a half mil-lion men of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA)

and the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) under theleadership of Chinese General Peng Teh-Huai. The CCFplayed no role during the initial stages of the KoreanConflict, but the Chinese Fourth Field Army servingunder the questionable rubric "Chinese People'sVolunteers" began secretly infiltrating North Korea in thefall of 1950. Such cooperation was nothing new; theCommunists in China and North Korea had oftenworked together in the recent past. North Korea hadbeen a Communist sanctuary during the Chinese CivilWar, and North Korean volunteers fought side-by-sidewith the Chinese Communists since the mid-1930s.

The NKPAThe North Korean People's Army, more formally the

In Mm Gun, entered the Korean Conflict as a well-armed and well-trained military organization. The NKPAwas modeled after the Soviet Red Army and was pri-marily armed with Soviet-made weapons. Speciallyselected veteran officers attended Soviet military schoolsin 1948 then became the cadre around which the NKPAwas built. A few senior leaders and many enlisted menwere veterans of the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA),which fought side-by-side with Mao Tse Tung'sCommunist guerrillas who successively defeated theJapanese during World War II and Chang Kai Shek'sNationalists during the Chinese Civil War. The Koreanvolunteers returned to North Korea in 1949 and werepromptly integrated into the NKPA.

In the summer of 1950, the In Mm Gun rolled overthe surprised and outnumbered South Koreans. But, justas the victorious NKPA prepared for its final thrust tooust the United Nations from the Pusan Perimeter,General Douglas MacArthur conducted one of the mostsuccessful amphibious operations in military historywhen X Corps, spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division,landed at Inchon and then quickly recaptured Seoul.Outflanked and cut off from its supply bases, the NKPAwas quickly routed and its remnants fled to the dubioussafety of North Korea with the U.N. in hot pursuit. Thesudden intervention of the CCF around Thanksgivingstopped MacArthur's northern advance, and byChristmas the United Nations Command was in fullretreat. At that time the disorganized and demoralizedNKPA underwent a complete make over. The NKPA wasplaced under Chinese command and was reorganizedinto light infantry units similar to those of the CCF.

During the spring of 1951, the Marines faced theNKPA V and H Corps. These units were armed withheavy mortars and machine guns, but only occasionallyreceived adequate artillery support. The 10th NKPA

Division was the guerrilla force the Marines encounteredat Pohang. The NKPA V Coips screened CCF movementsand acted as the rear guard battling the Marines on theCentral Front.

Communist Chinese ForcesThe Communist Chinese Peoples Liberation Army

(PTA) was a massive, mostly illiterate, peasant army thathad been fighting for almost two decades without abreak in 1951. Its sheer size and vast combat experi-ence made it a formidable opponent. The PTA was,however, basically a light infantry force that possessedfew tanks and its artillery arm was vastly undergunnedby western standards. In November 1950, Mao TseTung sent more than 500,000 men into Manchuria andNorth Korea. The men entering Korea called themselves"Volunteers," but were labeled "Communist ChineseForces" by the United Nations.

Initially, the CCF was actually the Chinese FourthField Army in Korea. This organization was divided intogroup armies, armies, and divisions. The 10,000-manChinese divisions included only about two-thirds asmany troops as an American infantry division but, iron-ically, mustered a much larger number of "triggerpullers" because the spartan CCF had so few supportpersonnel. A CCF division was lucky if it had more thana single artillery battalion armed with 120mm mortars or76mm antitank guns. The lack of fire support, motortransport, and modern communications dictated CCFtactics, which primarily consisted of night infiltration ormassive frontal or "human wave" assaults conductedunder cover of darkness. The Marines encountered theCCF 39th, 40th, and 66th Armies during the fightingaround Hwachon in the spring of 1951.

19

Marine historian Edwin H.Simmons reminisced about thattime, stating: "The 1st MarineDivision in Korea was the finestfighting outfit I ever served with";no small praise from a combat vet-eran of three wars.

While the 1st Marine Divisionwas busy rebuilding at Masan andchasing guerrillas at Pohang, thevastly outnumbered Eighth Armycontinued to fall back in whateventually became the longestretreat in American military history.But, as soon as the CCF ThirdPhase Offensive ran out of gas,General Ridgway resumed offen-sive operations. In mid-January, heinitiated the first in a series ofdrumbeat attacks that eventuallycarried U.N. forces back above the38th Parallel. Unlike the recklessrush to the Yalu the previous year,however, this time Eighth Armyrelied upon cautious advances,which were both limited in scopeand closely controlled by higherheadquarters, carefully coordinat-ed actions intended to punish theenemy as well as to gain ground.In general, Ridgway eschewedflanking movements and objectivesdeep in the enemy rear. Instead,numerous phase lines strictly con-trolled U.N. activities and attackingunits kept pace with those on eachflank. The Marines—except forpilots flying close air support mis-sions—-missed the first threeoffensive operations (Wolfhound,Roundup, and Thunderbolt), butthe 1st Marine Division was des-tined to play key roles inOperations Killer, Ripper, Rugged,and Dauntless.

Each of Ridgway's successiveoperations was more ambitiousthan the previous one. By mid-February, the Eighth Army hadgathered momentum and was on

the move all across Korea. At thattime the U.N. front was held fromleft to right by the U.S. I Corps, IXCorps, X Corps, and units of theSouth Korean army. The UnitedNations Command was in theprocess of rolling back theCommunists in western Koreawhen General Ridgway met withGeneral Smith at Suwon in lateJanuary to discuss the 1st MarineDivision's next mission. Ridgwaywanted to send the Marines to cen-tral Korea, but Smith lobbied hardto have the 1st Marine Divisionplaced on the far right flank inorder to stay near the coast. Smithnoted that his division was theonly Eighth Army unit trained foramphibious operations and addedthat a position near the sea wouldallow the Marines to make maxi-mum use of naval gunfire and car-rier-based air, supporting armswith which they were intimatelyfamiliar and well-practiced inusing. Such a disposition wouldalso allow the Marines to usePohang as the principal port ofentry, a factor that would ease thelogistical burden by shorteningsupply lines. Amplifying, Smithpointed out that "the 1st MarineDivision with a strength of approx-imately 24,000 was larger that anyof the Army infantry divisions orROK divisions at this time and inthat there were single . . . supplyroutes, for the corps and the divi-sions and it would be less of astrain upon transportation and lessof a logistical problem to supply asmaller army division or ROK divi-sion inboard, well inland in Korea,than it would be in the case of theMarine division." This was a criticalconsideration because it wouldreduce overland transportationproblems. Marine trucks were bothfew in number and in poor shapeafter hard use at the ChosinReservoir. Smith's logic won overthe Eighth Army commander, and

20

after that meeting Ridgway direct-ed his staff to prepare plans for theMarines to remain on the eastcoast.

Unfortunately, these plans wereovercome by events before theycould be put into effect. The cata-lyst for the movement of the 1stMarine Division into central Koreawas the third battle for Wonju, avital communications and road linkwhose loss might well force theevacuation of Korea by U.N.forces. Wonju was put at great riskwhen Hoengsong, located about10 miles north on Route 29, waslost. This near disaster occurredwhen the Communists launchedtheir Fourth Phase Offensive inwhich the CCF 40th and 66thArmies and the NKPA V Coips ini-tiated a series of devastatingattacks Out of the swirling snowbeginning on the night of 11-12February. The U.S. X Corps suf-fered a serious setback when threeRepublic of Korea Army divisionsdisintegrated and combat supportelements of the U.S. 2d Divisionwere cut off and then annihilatedin "Massacre Valley" just north ofHoengsong. The 23d Infantry wascut up, the artillery overrun, and"only 800 had come in so far andonly one in twenty had weapons,"General Puller told Smith. With thekey city of Wonju threatened and XCorps reeling back, GeneralRidgway had no choice but tocommit what he called "the mostpowerful division in Korea" to"where a great threat existed tothat portion of the Eighth Army'slines." On 12 February 1951,General Smith received a warningorder to prepare the 1st MarineDivision to move to Chungju insouth-central Korea "on 24 hours'notice at any time after 0700, 14February." As Major Martin Sextonlater commented: "The 1st MarineDivision was deployed right in thecenter of Korea and its amphibious

lii

Mountain range roughly parallelsthe east coast where its irregularcliffs severely limit the number ofsuitable landing areas and provideno spacious flat lands to supportagricultural or urban development.There are few east-west overlandlinks, and the only north-southroute in the east runs tenuouslyalong the narrow coast. Numerousfingers of the Taebaek intermittent-ly reach west across the centralcorridor creating a washboard ofalternating river valleys and spinyridgelines. The flattest expansesare located along the west coast,an area that includes both Korea'smajor port Inchon and its largestcity, Seoul.

General Smith's new ordersfocused Marine attention upon thecentral corridor, and all major com-bat actions during the spring of1951 would take place in thatzone. The dominating terrain fea-ture was the Hwachon Reservoir, a12-mile basin that blocked thesouthern flowing Pukhan Riverusing a sizable dam. The reservoirwas located just about at thepeninsula's dead center. It provid-

Marines move up to the front during Operation Killer, the fourth of the so-calledRidgway Offensives. During that action, the Marines advanced up the Som RiverValley from Wonju to Hoengsong against light to moderate resistance.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6851

A Marine light machine gun team boards a train for the trip from Pohang toChungju in central Korea. The 1st Marine Division was to be positioned astridewhat LtGen Matthew Ridgway considered to be the logical route for the expectedenemy counterth rust.

agricultural land. Trans-peninsularcommunications, particularly roadsand railways, are hampered bygeography. The craggy Taebaek

capabilities destroyed at the sametime."

The Korean peninsula can beroughly described as a 600-by-iSOmile parallelogram that descendsever downward from theManchurian border and also slantsdown from the hilly eastern one-third that abuts the Sea of Japanuntil it gradually levels off alongYellow Sea to the west. The penin-sula can be easily divided into sev-eral unique geographic areas: twohorizontal sections, one in thenorth and one in the south, com-prise the basic economic sectors;three vertical sections—the east,central, and west corridors—eachcomprise about one-third thewidth of the peninsula. Most ofNorth Korea is rugged mountainterritory whose fast-flowing riversprovide the water and electricpower necessary for industrialdevelopment. South Korea, on theother hand, includes most of the

21

Nttini! Ie t ''l( 12 \ .'2' I

Operation Killer

ed pre-war Seoul with most of itswater and electricity, but that wasno longer true. The HwachonReservoir did, however, have sig-nificant tactical value. Just north ofthe 38th Parallel and at the south-ern edge of a mountainous shelf, itmarked both the political and geo-graphic divisions of North andSouth Korea. This barrier effective-

ly channeled all movement toeither the east (Yanggu) or west(Hwachon), and the side holdingthe dam could threaten to floodthe low-lying Chunchon andSoyang Valleys at will.

Korea's central corridor alsoincluded all of the major commu-nications links between both theeast and the west and the north

22

and south. A string of road junc-tions spiraled south along Routes17 and 29 from Hwachon at rough-ly 15-mile intervals. These includ-ed Chunchon, Hongchon,Hoengsong, and Wonju—each ofwhich would become a majorobjective during the Ridgwayoffensives on the Central Front.

Beginning on 16 February, theMarines mounted Out from Pohangby regimental combat teams forChungju. Fortunately, by that timethe CCF and NKPA were beingpounded by air and artillery untiltheir attacks ran out of steam northof Wonju. Thus, when the Marinesfinally arrived at Chungju, theycould be used to spearhead a U.N.counteroffensive, a closely coordi-nated pincer attack by the U.S. IXand X Corps intended to trap theNKPA III and V Coips calledOperation Killer. Eighth Armyreleased the 1st Marine Divisionfrom direct control when it joinedMajor General Bryant E. Moore'sIX Corps for Operation Killer, atwo-phase drive up the Wonjubasin to retake and secureHoengsong. An Army officer,General Moore had served side-by-side with the Marines atGuadalcanal in 1942. He orderedGeneral Smith to seize the highground south of Hoengsong hop-ing to cut off enemy forces to thesouth by denying them use of theirmain egress routes. AlthoughSmith lost tactical control of the 1stKMC Regiment when the Marinesdeparted Pohang, U.S. Armyartillery and transportation unitsreinforced the division. Particularlywelcome additions were the much-needed vehicles of the U.S. Army's74th Truck Company, and the "RedLegs" of the 92d Armored FieldArtillery, commanded by Lieuten-ant Colonel Leon F. Levoie, Jr.,

c

USA. This was a first-rate Armyself-propelled howitzer unit thathad rendered outstanding supportat the Chosin Reservoir. Theartillerymen of the 92d were, asMajor Martin J. Sexton noted,"trained basically as Marines are inthat they were essentially riflementoo, if not first."

On 19 February, Smith andPuller attended a commander'sconference. There, they learnedthe 1st Marine Division was to bethe focus of the main effort forOperation Killer and wouldadvance with the 6th ROK Divisionon the left and X Corps to theright. General Ridgway's orderswere to "seek out the enemy andinflict the greatest possible dam-age." In Marine terms, OperationKiller was going to be "buttonedup"; all U.N. forces were to keepclose lateral contact, to maintaintactical integrity at all times, and tostrictly adhere to the timetable.

Units would not bypass enemypositions and had to stop at eachphase line even if there was noenemy resistance. Regrettably, theconference closed on a less thanhappy note for the Marines.Generals Smith and Puller weretaken back to learn OperationKiller was to kick off in less than48 hours, too short a time to movethe entire division to the line ofdeparture. The Marines were fur-ther dismayed when they weredenied the use of a dedicatedMarine fighter squadron. Theirarguments to hold up the attackuntil the entire division could beassembled were dismissed byRidgway who also refused to inter-vene to assure the Marines ade-quate close air support. In spite ofMarine objections, H-hour was setfor 1000 on 21 February.

General Smith elected to usetwo regiments (the 1st and 5thMarines) in the attack and keep

one, the 7th Marines, in reserve.The line of departure was locatedjust north of Wonju. The area inthe Marine zone was uninviting, tosay the least. In the words of offi-cial Marine Corps historian LynnMontross: "There were too manycrags [and] too few roads." Rocky,barren, snow-covered ridgesboxed in the narrow Som Valleywhose lowlands were awash withrunoff from melting snow andflooded by overflowing streams.The weather was terrible, "a mix-ture of thawing snow, rain, mud,and slush," according to 3dBattalion, 5th Marines' command-ing officer Lieutenant ColonelJoseph L. Stewart. The axis ofadvance was generally northwestalong Route 29, which was sarcas-tically known as the "Hoengsong-Wonju Highway" (it was actually aprimitive one-lane packed-dirt trailtotally unsuited to support vehicu-lar traffic) that generally paralleled

LtGen Ridgway ordered Eighth Army troops to "get off the makes its way up a difficult trail during Operation Killer.roads and seize the high ground." Here a Marine patrol National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6952

23

lI\IrI )IV a! !)itiv I'hot() ull)I!11ent Jai—F$ 1

A Marine Corsair circles after delivering napalm upon a suspected enemy posi-tion near Wonju in central Korea. The controversial breakup of the Marine air-ground team by Ffth Air Force in 1951 remained a touchy and unresolved issuethroughout the rest of the Korean Conflict.

Army.Unfortunately, a series of events

beyond General Smith's controlhampered the start of operations.Transportation shortfalls meantthat the 7th Marines would not beimmediately available, so the 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, command-ed by Lieutenant Colonel Glen E.Martin, a reserve officer who hadbeen awarded a Navy Cross andserved as a platoon and companycommander during World War II,was designated the 1st MarineDivision reserve for the first phaseof Operation Killer. Snarled traffic,sticky mud, General MacArthur'svisit to the 187th Airborne's zone,and the lack of trucks conspired topostpone the planned jump-offtime. But, even with the logisticalproblems, the assault units of the

Generals MacArthur, Ridgway, andMoore, the Marines advancedrapidly in a torrential rain opposedonly by some ineffectual long dis-tance small arms fire. ColonelFrancis McAlister's 1st Marinesmoved up the muddy road in acolumn of battalions (LieutenantColonel Donald M. Schmuck's 1stBattalion, Major Clarence J.Mabry's 2d Battalion, andLieutenant Colonel Virgil W.Banning's 3d Battalion, respective-ly). Colonel Raymond Murray's 5th

maintained the high ground byhugging the regimental left bound-ary. The Marines made it almostfour miles the first day and thencovered half as much ground thefollowing day. "Unlike the Inchon-Seoul Campaign," recalled Private

Marines had a harder row to hoeadvancing north (actually climbingup and sliding down the snow-covered terrain) across a series ofsteep ridges and narrow valleys.Lieutenant Colonel John L.

Hopkins' 1st Battalion, withLieutenant Colonel Joseph L.

Stewart's 3d Battalion in trail,

the Som River. The final objectivewas an east-west running ridgelinesouth of the ruins that had oncebeen Hoengsong. The enemydefending this area was identifiedas the 196th Division from ChineseGeneral Show Shiu Kwai's 66th

5th Marines—just like their WorldWar I predecessors at Soissons—had to double time to get to theline of departure in time. Luckily,there was little enemy resistance.Under the watchful eyes of

Marines advance across a fog-filled valley in the Wonju-Hoengsong sector sup-ported by machine gunfire. Elaborate weapons positions, common in the latterstages of the wai were unusual during the seesaw fighting in the spring of 1951.

24

;1'

Niiiiiitl rliie&, I'Iii SI()

First Class Morgan Brainard, "wewere not moving out with what weinfantrymen could recognize as aset goal, other than to kill gooks,and to move the lines steadily backnorth."

The first real resistance occurredwhen the 1st Marines, moving withthe 1st and 2d Battalions abreast,and the 5th Marines in colunm,neared Objectives A (Hill 537 andRidge 400) and B (Hill 533), over-looking Hoengsong. The 1stMarines was stopped by smallarms and heavy automaticweapons fire from Hill 166 on theleft and dug in for the night.Supported by air and artillery, the1st Marines secured the heights at1015 on 23 February. That after-noon, the 1st and 2d Battalionsconducted a successful flankingattack to take the final hill line andwere overlooking Hoengsong asdarkness fell. The 5th Marineswaited in vain that same morningfor an air strike before mounting atwo-battalion assault to clear a pairof hills on the left. The next morn-ing, a mechanized patrol from the1st Marines passed through

Hoeng-song on its way to rescueseveral survivors still holding outin Massacre Valley where U.S.Army artillery units had been over-run almost two weeks earlier. TheMarines found a gruesome sight.Burned out vehicles, abandonedhowitzers, and more than 200unburied dead lay strewn acrossthe valley floor. This movementalso stirred up a hornet's nest.Enemy mortars and artillery rangedthe ridgeline held by the 1stMarines. The major combat actionof the day then occurred whenMarine cannoneers of MajorFrancis R. Schlesinger's 2dBattalion, 11th Marines, bestedtheir CCF counterparts in the ensu-ing late afternoon artillery duel. Bydusk on 24 February, all Marineobjectives for the first phase ofOperation Killer had been secured.The Marines had suffered 23 killedin action and 182 wounded thusfar.

The follow-on advance had towait almost a week. Operationswere placed on temporary hold forseveral reasons. One major reasonwas that General Moore, the IX

Corps commander, died followinga helicopter crash. Additionally,the low ground around Hoeng-song had become a rain-soaked,muddy, impassible bog. Bad roadsand poor weather stopped theMarines in their tracks because theassault units needed ammunitionand food before they could renewthe attack. Additionally, the Marinedivision was still fragmentedbecause the 7th Marines wasstranded at Wonju where a severegasoline shortage idled mosttrucks. This shortfall was com-pounded by the poor trafficabilityof the road net, which had becomea gooey morass due to the inces-sant rain. Army and Marine engi-neers labored night and day toshore up the deteriorating roadsand bridges, but the supply situa-tion became so critical that air-drops—-an inefficient methodheretofore used for emergenciesonly—had to become a logisticsmainstay. Thirty-five airdrops wererequired to resupply the assaultelements of the 1st MarineDivision. Marine transport planesaugmented the U.S. Air ForceCombat Cargo Command partici-pated in such drops all across theU.N. front. Also used in the resup-ply effort were 1,200 cargo han-dlers of the South Korean CivilTransport Corps. These hard-work-ing indigenous laborers toiledunder the direction of divisionCivil Affairs Officer First LieutenantOliver E. Dial. These hardy indi-viduals each carried up to 50pounds of supplies on A-framebackpacks to the forward mostMarine units.

On 24 February, Major GeneralSmith became the third Marine toassume command of a major U.S.Army formation (Brigadier GeneralJohn A. Lejeune had commandedthe U.S. 2d Division in France in1918 and Major General Roy S.Geiger commanded the U.S. Tenth

Marine riflemen move across a frozen rice paddy during the drive back to the38th Parallel. Although there were a few sharp actions, Operations Killer andlater Ripper were remembered as "a long walk" by Capt Gerald P. Averill in hismemoir Mustang.

National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A6869

25

$1

V Ill

Army at Okinawa in 1945) whenhe took over IX Corps afterGeneral Moore's fatal heart attack.Smith's reception at Yoju was sub-dued, according to his aide, MajorSexton:

It was a very modest andunassuming entrance that wasmade when General Smithstepped out of the helicopterand was met by General[George B.] Peploe, who wasthe chief of staff of IX Corps.A brief introduction to thestaff—the corps staff of-ficers—followed, and I wouldsay that it was approximatelyan hour, possibly an hour anda half after General Smith'sarrival, that the first decisionwhich he was required tomake arose. It involved aseemingly complicatedscheme of maneuver whereinIX Corps would execute aflanking maneuver to envelop

a sizable North Korean forcewhich lay in front of the leftportion of X Corps' zone ofaction. After deliberation withthe G-3 and the chief of staff,the decision was forthcoming.It was simply "No, thankyou." At which time, the G-3excitedly called his . . . G-3 ofX Corps, repeated thesewords and happily hung upthe phone. As there were atthis time smiles all around thestaff, it was my impressionthat the general had beenaccepted rapidly.The following day, Smith con-

ferred with General Ridgwayregarding future operations.Although Ridgway warmed Smithwith glowing words of encourage-ment, he concluded by saying "hedidn't know what the WarDepartment would do." Smithknew. Despite the recommenda-tions of U.S. Army Major General

26

Frank E. Lowe, sent to Korea byPresident Harry S. Truman to eval-uate American units, that Smith beelevated to corps command, it wasobvious no Marine general wasgoing to be allowed to do so on apermanent basis; accordingly,Smith's tenure lasted only until amore senior U.S. Army generalarrived in Korea. He also asked forrecommendations as to the futureemployment of the 1st MarineDivision, to which General Smithreplied that he knew "of no betteruse for the Division than to Contin-ue north on the Hoensong-Hongchon axis" as the main threatwould come from that direction. Inaddition, Ridgway announced thatOperation Killer would not resumeuntil 1 March and that he wanted achange in zones to reorient thedivision more to the north. The LXand X Corps boundary was shiftedwest in accord with the EighthArmy commander's wishes. To dothis Brigadier General Puller, whowas filling in as the 1st MarineDivision commander, rearrangedthe Marine dispositions. He pulledthe 5th Marines out of the line tobecome the division reserve andmoved the 7th Marines up into theline on the left to replace a SouthKorean unit that had been holdingthat position.

Arguably, the 1st MarineDivision had the most difficultassignment of any unit in theEighth Army. It had to cross amuddy triangular open area andthen eject a dug-in enemy from aridgeline located about a mile-and-a-half north of Hoengsong. PhaseLine Arizona, as the final objectivewas known, consisted of five dis-tinct hill masses (Hills 536, 333,321, 335, and 201). The 1stMarines' commander, ColonelMcAlister, assigned two intermedi-ate objectives (Hills 303 and 208)as well. The nature of the terrain,which required a river crossing

An automatic rifleman supported by another Marine with a carbine fires into aCommunist-held position. Because of its great firepower, the BrowningAutomatic Rfle was the most vital weapon of a Marine fire team.

—S

1951

and prohibited extensive vehiclemovement, dictated a complexscheme of maneuver. The 7thMarines on the left would have toseize the hills in its zone to elimi-nate flanking fires before a battal-ion of the 1st Marines advancingthrough the 7th Marines' zonecould assault its assigned objec-tives on the right. The CCF rear-guard, consisting of elements ofthe 196th and 19 7th Divisions, wassituated inside a sophisticatedreverse-slope defense systemanchored by log bunkers andzigzag trenches immune to directfire. Where possible, the Marineswould use fire by tanks and self-propelled guns to reduce point tar-gets, but emplacements on reverseslopes would have to be hit byunobserved close air support orhigh angle artillery and mortarfires. This meant if the Chinesedefended in place the Marineswould have to reduce the reverseslope defenses using close combat.The most important terrain obsta-cle was the chilly, chest-deep, fast-flowing Som River. During the ple-nary conference Colonel McAlisterwas informed that no engineer

support would be available andwas further told the river was notfordable. Major Edwin H.Simmons, commanding 3dBattalion's Weapons Company,offered a solution. He recommend-ed building a "Swiss bent bridge"composed of "A" shaped timberplatforms with planking held inplace by communications wire.This field expedient did the trick,and the 3d Battalion safely crossedthe Som the night before the attackbegan.

The battle for Hoengsong was aclassic four-day slugging match inwhich the Marines slowlyadvanced against dug-in enemytroops under the cover of a widearray of supporting arms. On thefirst day (1 March), the 11thMarines fired 54 artillery missions,Marine Grumman F9F Panther jetsand Corsairs flew 30 sorties, andMarine tanks lined up like a row ofbattleships using their 90mm gunsto clear the way. ColonelLitzenberg's 7th Marines movedout with Major James I.

Glendinning's 2d Battalion on theleft and Major Maurice E. Roach,Jr.'s 3d Battalion on the right head-ed north toward Hills 536 and 385respectively. Lieutenant ColonelBanning's 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, which was in the 7thMarines' zone, moved in echelonwith Hill 303 in the 1st Marines'zone on the right as its final goal;concurrently, the other two battal-ions of the 1st Marines held fastand furnished fire support. Threeartillery battalions (3d and 4thBattalions, 11th Marines, and theU.S. Army's 92d Armored FieldArtillery Battalion) were on call tosupport the 7th Marines. MajorWebb D. Sawyer's 1st Battalionpatrolled the left flank and main-

A Marine tank pushes through the wreckage from ambushed U.S. Army units,which clogged the road to Hoengsong. Bad weather, poor roads, and supply dfficulties held up the Marines more than enemy resistance during the spring of

The shattered remains of Hoengsong as they appeared after the four-day battle.During the battle, the 11th Marines fired more than 50 artillery missions while1st Marine Aircraft Wing Corsairs and Pa nther jets flew 30 sorties in support.

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo supplement, Mar51

27

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National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC361108

MajGen William M. Hoge, USA, seatedin front, was sent out to relieveMajGen Oliver P. Smith, who had beengiven temporary command of IXCorps.

tamed contact with the 6th ROKDivision. The assault battalionsadvanced about a half-mile beforethey came under heavy mortar andautomatic weapons fire, then werecompletely halted by a minefield.With the main attack stalled anddarkness closing in, it was decidedto wait until the following day tofinish the job.

At 0800 on 2 March, both regi-ments jumped off. In the 1stMarines' zone, Banning's 1stBattalion went after Hill 303 on theleft using a flanking attack whilethe 2d Battalion—well supportedby rockets, artillery, and tanks—passed through the debris ofHoengsong, then took Hill 208 onthe right with a frontal assault.Both attacks went smoothly, andthe 1st Marines secured its inter-mediate objectives by midday. The7th Marines, assisted by air strikesand 1,600 rounds of artillery,gained about a half-mile on theleft. The toughest fighting occurredin the 2d Battalion's zone wherethe Marines had to crawl forwardover rocky terrain. Unfortunately,Phase Line Arizona remained out

of reach when darkness fell.The attacks on 3 March to

secure the heights north of"Massacre Valley" featured thebloodiest single day of the opera-tion. The 1st Marines secured Hills321, 335, and 201 after some verytough hand-to-hand fighting whichrequired the intervention ofCaptain Thomas J. Bohannon'sCompany A. The 7th Marines alsocontinued the attack against adetermined foe. Major Sawyer's 1stBattalion was called up fromreserve to take and secure Hill 536on the extreme left. The 3dBattalion then attacked Hill 333with fire support from the station-ary 2d Battalion. It was slow goingfor both assault units, and neitherwas able to secure its objectivesbefore nightfall despite suffering14 killed and 104 wounded sincedaybreak. These same two assaultbattalions determinedly "went overthe top" amid snow flurries thenext morning (4 March) only todiscover most of the enemy hadquietly slipped away during thenight. Combat clearing dutiesended at dark with the Marinesfirmly in possession of Phase LineArizona.

The Marines had suffered almost400 casualties (48 dead, 345wounded, and 2 missing), whileeliminating an estimated 2,000enemy in two weeks of combatnear Hoengsong. The bottom line,however, was that Operation Killerclosed on an anticlimactic note.The Marines drove the enemy outof Hoengsong, but GeneralRidgway was dissatisfied with thepunishment meted out. Althoughall terrain objectives had beentaken, the enemy had deftly avoid-ed a costly set piece battle andslipped out of the United NationsCommand's trap. As a result, theEighth Army commander ordereda new attack, Operation Ripper, tobegin immediately.

28

There were several administra-tive changes during the briefrespite between the end ofOperation Killer and the onset ofOperation Ripper. On 4 March, the6th Replacement Draft (29 officersand 1,785 enlisted men) arrived,bringing with them 63 postalpouches—-the first mail theMarines received since leavingPohang. Concurrently, LieutenantColonel Erwin F. Wann, Jr.'s 1stAmphibian Tractor Battalion andLieutenant Colonel Francis H.Cooper's 1st Armored AmphibianBattalion were detached to supportthe U.S. Army crossing of the HanRiver and were thereafter sent toInchon to conduct amphibioustraining. The amphibian tractorswould not rejoin the 1st MarineDivision until it moved to westernKorea the following year. On theplus side, a 250-man South KoreanNational Police company joinedthe Marines. These "Wharrangs"primarily served as scouts andinterpreters, but were occasionallyused as auxiliary combat troops aswell. On 5 March, the day afterOperation Killer ended, GeneralSmith returned to the 1st MarineDivision upon the arrival at IXCorps headquarters of his replace-ment, Major General William H.Hoge, USA, who had quicklyflown Out from Trieste, Italy. Anengineer by training, Hoge super-vised the Alaska-CanadianHighway effort and commandedCombat Command B, 9th ArmoredDivision, during World War II, thelead elements of which seized theonly major bridge over the RhineRiver at Remagen.

Operation Ripper was the fifthconsecutive limited U.N. offensive.It would follow the same basicdesign as the previous attacks. Asbefore, the real goals were to

inflict maximum punishment andkeep the Communists off balance,but this time General Ridgwayadded a major territorial goal aswell. He wanted to outflank theenemy near Seoul and force themto withdraw north of the ImjinRiver, a movement that wouldcarry the United Nations Commandalmost back to the 38th Parallel.The plan was for IX and X Corps

to drive north with I Corps holdingin the west and the South KoreanArmy maintaining its positionsalong the east flank. The CentralFront would be Eighth Army's pri-mary arena. Hoge's plan was todrive north with the towns ofHongchon and Chunchon as majorobjectives in the IX Corps zone.Intermediate objectives includedPhase Lines Albany, Buffalo, and

29

Cairo; the final objective was LineIdaho. General Hoge inserted anintermediate phase line, Baker,between Eighth Army-designatedLines Albany and Buffalo. Theenemy in zone continued to be theCCF 66th Army, but intelligenceofficers were uncertain as towhether the enemy would contin-ue to retreat or would finally standand fight. Operation Ripper would,therefore, once again be a cautiousadvance, another limited, strictlycontrolled, "buttoned up" opera-

As in just-ended OperationKiller, the Marines would again bethe focus of the IX Corps' maineffort. A pair of U.S. Army units,the 1st Cavalry Division on the leftand the 2d Infantry Division on theright, would guard the Marineflanks. Hongchon, an importantcommunications hub located in theshadow of towering OumMountain, about five miles north ofthe line of departure, was the ini-tial Marine objective. The coarseterrain included formidable Hill930 and consisted of thickly wood-ed hills and swift-flowing streams.There were so few roads and trailsthat gravel-bottom streambedswere often pressed into use asroadways. The only thoroughfare(single-lane National Route 29)passed through Kunsamma Pass asit wound its way north toHongchon from Hoengsong, and itinitially served as the regimentalboundary line inside the Marinezone. Intermittent snow, coldnights, and rainy days meant thatthe weather would continue to bea factor with which to be reck-oned. The Marines in Korea, just ashad Napoleon's army in Russia acentury-and-a-half before, wouldhave to deal with "General Mud"as well as enemy soldiers.

The 1st Marine Division missionwas to seize all objectives anddestroy all enemy south of Line

tion.

Albany, then seize Hongchon anddestroy all enemy south of LineBuffalo and be prepared to contin-ue the attack to Lines Cairo andIdaho on order, with operationscommencing at 0800 on 7 March.One regiment would constitute thecorps reserve and would be underthe operational control of the IXCorps commander during the latterportion of the operation. The 1stMarine Division would advance upthe Hoengsong-Hongchon axiswith "two up and one back."General Smith initially placed 1stand 7th Marines in the assault andearmarked the 5th Marines as thereserve. The two assault regiments(7th on the left and 1st on theright) were to advance astrideRoute 29 with all three battalionson line whenever possible. Thedifficult supply situation leftColonel Joseph L. WinecofPs 11thMarines short of artillery ammuni-tion, so an emergency agreementbetween Major General FieldHarris, Commanding General, 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, and MajorGeneral Earl E. Partridge,Commanding General, Fifth AirForce, temporarily placed a Marinefighter squadron in direct supportof the 1st Marine Division.

The operation started

ordered. The Marines advanced inthe afternoon snow against onlylight resistance, primarily smallarms and mortar fires. The enemyonce again relied upon delayingtactics, opening fire at long rangeto slow the attackers then with-drawing before close combat couldbe initiated. Additionally, Marinetankers noted increased use ofroad mines. During the first threedays awful weather and difficultterrain were the main obstacles.The Marine attack was finallystopped in place by orders fromabove which halted the advanceon 9 March until flanking unitscould catch up. The next two dayswere devoted to reconnaissanceand security patrols as the divisionmarked time. On 11 March, theMarines resumed the advance. Thistime the enemy put up a stiff fightin the 1st Marines zone, and the 1stBattalion had to use artillery andtank guns to reduce log bunkersatop Hill 549 before that positionfell. This single battle cost theMarines more casualties (one killedand nine wounded) than had beeninflicted in the previous five days(seven wounded). The first phaseof Operation Ripper ended on 13March when the 1st Marine

as Division successfully occupied all

30

of its objectives on Line Albany.General Ridgway decided to

change tactics for the next phaseof Ripper. This time he opted tomaneuver instead of slugging for-ward on a single line. His plan wasa complex one. He decided to tryan airborne drop north ofHongchon to be coordinated witha double envelopment by the 1stMarine Division and the 1stCavalry Division, hut this boldstrike never came about becausethe Chinese 39th Army slippedaway before Ridgway's trap couldbe slammed shut. The reasons forthis were divulged in a later intel-ligence find. A captured CCF direc-tive indicated the enemy hadadopted a "roving defensive"whereby units were no longer tohold at all costs, but should defendusing movement to entice theUnited Nations Command tooverextend itself as it had the pre-vious November so the CCF couldlaunch a "backhand" counteroffen-sive to isolate and annihilate theU.N. vanguard. It was a goodscheme, but the wily Ridgway didnot take the bait. Instead ofmounting a headlong rush, hisoffensives continued to he strictly

Maj Vincentj Gottschalk, command-ing Marine Observation Squadron 6,discusses the tactical situation withCol Richard W Hayward, coininanrl-ing officer of the 5th Marines. Thehigh-wing, single-engine OY-iSentinel in the background was usedprimarily as an artillery spotter.Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A131207

Tank and infantry teams move to the flanks of the advancing Marine columnnorth of Hoengsong. The cold weather and sticky mud were as dfficult to over-come as was the enemy during Operation Killer.

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"buttoned up" affairs.In the 1st Marine Division zone,

General Smith retained the samebasic plan of attack. The 1st and7th Marines would mount theassault, and the 5th Marines, nowcommanded by Nicaragua-veteranand World War II Marine para-chutist Colonel Richard W.

Hayward, would be the reserve. Asbefore, the Marine advance on 14March moved forward againstalmost no resistance. The 7thMarines did not need to call forartillery or close air support, andthe 1st Marines encountered onlyscattered fire as it moved forward.General Ridgway's hopes of cut-ting off the enemy at Hongchonwere clashed when an interceptedmessage from the enemy comman-cler reported, "We must move back

Enemy troops approachingfast,' before the planned airdropcould be made. True to his word,General Liu Chen's troops werelong gone by the time a motorizedpatrol from Major Sawyer's 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, entered thedevastated town of Hongchon.Although the patrol located noenemy, it did discover a largenumber of "butterfly" homblets

dropped by U.S. Air Force aircraft.These deadly missiles so inundatedthe area that it took Captain ByronC. Turner's Company D, 1stEngineers, and all available divi-sion personnel three days to locateand disarm most of the explosivedevices before they could producecasualties. The 7th Marines alsofound a treasure trove: three

ammunition dumps that yieldedmore than two thousand smallarms; a dozen heavy machineguns; a dozen mortars; a dozenrecoilless rifles; numerous cap-tured U.S. weapons; assorteddemolitions; and four dozen casesof ammunition. This was one ofthe biggest finds of the war.

When the 7th Marines attackedthe high ground north ofHongchon on the 15th, the 2d and3d Battalions ran into a buzz saw.120mm mortars and 76mm anti-tank guns pinned them down asthey approached Hill 356. ThisChinese fire was unusually accu-rate and intense, so much so thatthree 81mm mortars were knockedout. Likewise, the enemy washolding firm at Hills 246 and 248 inthe 1st Marines zone. LieutenantColonel Robert K. McClelland's 2dBattalion, 1st Marines, performedan extremely complicated maneu-ver when it moved from the rightflank on the east across the entirezone behind the front lines,trucked up to the village ofYangjimal in the 7th Marines zone

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar51

North of Hoengsong, Marines move up into the hills. Stamina and physical con-ditioning were important during the unending series qf hill fights that led backto the 38th Parallel.

A 81mm mortar crew fires in support of an attack. Under the leadership of asergeant, a mortar squad was composed of seven Marines and was known as theinfantiy commander's "hip pocket" artilleiy.

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Mar51

31

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on the west, then dismounted for adifficult overland march to join the3d Battalion, 1st Marines, for theassault on Hill 248. Unfortunately,the ensuing joint attack—includingan air strike by Corsairs of MarineFighter Squadron 214 and plentifulmortar and artillery fire—was notsuccessful. After suffering about100 casualties, the Marines pulledback to Hill 246 as darkness closedin. Another rifle battalion joinedthe assault force when LieutenantColonel Donald R. Kennedy's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, wasattached to the 1st Marines thatnight. Fortunately, a morningassault by the 1st Marines the nextday found Hill 248 undefended.Back in the 7th Marines' zone the1st Battalion had to clear Hill 399with hand grenades and bayonetson its way to Line Baker.

Despite the progress, IX Corpscomplained of the lack of speed inthe advance. General Smith point-ed out that the division was "mak-ing a conscientious effort to com-ply with the Army's directive tokeep buttoned up and comb the

terrain." "This takes time," he said.Smith asked if there was any relax-ation of the Army directive.General Hoge's answer was " 'No,'but he still wanted more speed."On 17 March, Hoge ordered the 1stMarine Division to continue theattack to Line Buffalo and beyond.To comply, Smith moved the 5thMarines up on the left and pulledthe 7th Marines out of the line. The5th Marines advanced against scat-tered resistance and reached LineBuffalo without a major fight. Infact, no Marine in that zone waskilled or wounded in action forthree straight days. The CCF hadpulled back, but left elements ofthe 12th NKPA Division behind todelay the Marines. The biggestengagement occurred on 19 Marchin the 1st Marines' zone. There, theenemy was well dug in on a seriesof north-south ridges joining Hills330 and 381. Fortunately, the ter-rain allowed the tanks of CaptainBruce F. Williams' Company B, 1stTank Battalion, to support the 2dBattalion attack. After F4U Corsairsfrom Marine Fighter Squadrons 214

and 323 delivered napalm andhigh explosive bombs on suspect-ed enemy entrenchments, artillerypounded the objective, then tanksmoved up on each side of theridge keeping pace with theadvancing infantry. The powerful90mm tank guns eliminated enemybunkers with very accurate directfire as their machine guns keptenemy heads down. This coordi-nated direct fire allowed the riflecompanies to successfully leapfrogeach other over the next couple ofdays. This formula was so success-ful that the NKPA finally panickedon 20 March. At that time theenemy fleeing Hill 381 were ham-mered by supporting arms andinfantry fires until they were virtu-ally wiped out. With the end ofthat action the 1st Marine Divisionwas ready to renew the attack.

The advance to Line Cairo wasmade with Colonel Kim's 1st KMCRegiment, once again attached tothe 1st Marine Division. Thisallowed General Smith to use threeregiments (5th Marines, 1stKorean, and 1st Marines) on line.The 7th Marines was placed incorps reserve. The 5th Marinesmade it to Line Cairo without seri-ous opposition, but this was nottrue for the 1st Marines or theKorean Marines. The Koreansrelied upon aerial resupply as theymoved forward in the undulatingand trackless central sector. Thebiggest fight took place when theKorean regiment, supported byMajor Jack C. Newell's 2d Battalionand Lieutenant Colonel WilliamMcReynolds' 3d Battalion, 11thMarines, fought a three-day battleto capture Hill 975. The positionfinally fell to a flanking maneuver.On 22 March, the 1st Marinesencountered some fire from Hills505, 691, and 627 before reachingthe Idaho Line where it made con-tact with the U.S. Army's 38thInfantry Regiment. Elements of the

A Marine searches an enemy bunker. The Chinese often used small squad-sizedbunkers as a limited defense to cover the withdrawal of larger units.

National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-7410

32

1 St Marine Division

The 1st Marine Division wasthe senior Marine Corpsground combat unit in

Korea. By Table of Organizationand Equipment it rated 22,343 mendivided into combat, combat sup-port, and service support units. Theteeth of the division were its three3,902-man rifle regiments whichwere subdivided into a headquar-ters and service company, an anti-tank company, a 4.2-inch mortarcompany, and three rifle battalions(1,123 men), each composed of aheadquarters and service company,three rifle companies, and a

weapons company. The firing bat-teries of an artillery regiment, a

tank battalion, and a combat engi-neer battalion furnished combatsupport. Service support came fromassorted organic battalions and anattached combat service group. Aunique attachment in Korea was acomposite aircraft squadron thatincluded helicopters and observa-tion aircraft.

For the most part, the Marineswere equipped with weapons ofWorld War II vintage: small arms

included .45-caliber automatic pis-tols, .30-caliber Garand semiauto-matic rifles, carbines, Thompsonsubmachine guns, and Browningautomatic rifles; crew-servedweapons included 4.2-inch, 81mm,and 60mm mortars, 155mm medi-um and 105mm light howitzers, 4.5-inch multiple rocket launchers, and.30- and .50-caliber machine guns.Two notable new weapons werethe 3.5-inch rocket launcher andthe M-26 Pershing tank.

1st Marine Division (Reinforced)

Headquarters BattalionHeadquarters CompanyMilitary Police CompanyReconnaissance Company

1st Marines5th Marines7th Marines11th Marines1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion1st Armored Amphibian

Battalion1st Amphibian Truck Company1st Combat Service Group1st Engineer Battalion1st Medical Battalion1st Motor Transport Battalion

7th Motor Transport Battalion1st Ordnance Battalion1st Service Battalion1st Shore Party Battalion1st Signal Battalion1st Tank BattalionBattery C, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket

Battalion

Attachments1st Joint Assault Signal Company1st Provisional Truck CompanyDet, 1st Signals Operations

BattalionMarine Observation Squadron 61st Korean Marine Corps

Regiment

1st Marines encountered some stiffresistance at Wongo-ri in theTuchon-Myon hills while patrollingon the 27th. Two days later, the 1stMarines and the Korean Marineregiment extended their lines northto the New Cairo Line without afight and brought OperationRipper to a close.

On 31 March, the 1st MarineDivision mustered 21,798 men inaddition to 3,069 Korean Marinesand 234 attached U.S. Army sol-diers. Most Marines were atHongchon, but some service sup-port detachments were located far-ther back at Masan, Pohang, andWonju. Unfortunately, when theartillery ammunition crisis abatedMarine air once again reverted toFifth Air Force control, and Marineaviators were no longer in directsupport of their comrades on theground. In two major operations(Killer and Ripper), the 1st MarineDivision suffered 958 combat casu-alties (110 killed and 848 wound-ed), while inflicting an estimated7,000 enemy casualties and captur-ing 150 enemy prisoners. For fiveweeks the Marines spearheadedeach of IX Corps' advances fromWonju to Chunchon and lead theEighth Army in ground gained dur-ing that time.

Although the men at the forwardedge of the battlefield did not yetrealize it, the nature of the KoreanWar had changed radically. In fact,strategic discussions now centeredon whether to once again invadeNorth Korea or not and, if so, howfar that penetration should be. Themilitary situation was so favorablethat U.N. diplomats actually beganto entertain the notion that theother side might be ready to askfor an armistice if the pressure waskept up. The most controversialelement of strategy thus becamewhat to do when U.N. forcesreached the 38th Parallel. Aftermuch high-level discussion,

American national commandauthorities agreed to go ahead andcross, but they warned GeneralDouglas MacArthur that the con-

33

clusion of the next offensive wouldprobably mark the limit ofadvance. Concurrently, the JointChiefs of Staff informed the U.N.

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commander that, since theseactions would terminate maneuverwarfare, a diplomatic settlement toend the conflict after all pre-warSouth Korean territory had beenliberated would be pursued.Unfortunately, these high hopesfor an early end to the fightingwere dashed by GeneralMacArthur's imprudent public ulti-matum demanding that the enemyeither stop fighting or face annihi-lation. This presumptuous an-nouncement on 24 March had sev-eral far-reaching effects. First, it sooffended the Communists that it

torpedoed some promising secretnegotiations and actually triggeredan aggressive battlefield response.Second, this action also sowed theseed that later sprouted into one ofthe most famous controversies inAmerican military history.

All of Operation Ripper's terrainobjectives had been taken, butGeneral Ridgway felt not enoughpunishment had been meted outand this, coupled with a desire tosecure a more defensible line, ledhim to continue offensive opera-

tions without a break. This time heenvisioned a "double whammy" inthe form of Operations Ruggedand Dauntless. The goal of Ruggedwas to carry the Eighth Army backabove the 38th Parallel to occupy atrans-peninsular defense lineanchored upon the centrally locat-ed Hwachon Reservoir. Dauntless,on the other hand, was to be aspoiling attack to threaten theenemy's major staging area locatednorthwest of Hwachon. This wasthe so-called "Iron Triangle" thatincluded the terminus of severalrailway lines running down fromManchuria and incorporated theintersection of all major roads innorth-central Korea. Its forestedflat lands were bounded by pro-tective ridges and included thetowns of Chorwan, Pyonggang(not to be confused with the NorthKorean capital of Pyongyang), andKumhwa. The geographic shape ofthe road net connecting thesetowns gave the Iron Triangle itsname.

The battlefield situation wasvery complicated. Eighth Armyintelligence officers were not sureif the enemy was going to defendin place along the former interna-

tional dividing line or continue togive ground. Large troop move-ments into the hon Triangle hadbeen noted, but it was a point ofcontention as to whether thesewere part of a Communist "rota-tion" policy or if they constitutedan offensive build up. (Actually,both events were occurring simul-taneously; worn out elements ofthe CCF Fourth Field Army weremoving back to Manchuria whilethe fresh CCF Third Field Armywas entering Korea.) Unsure ofenemy intentions, GeneralRidgway ordered a cautiousadvance, but warned his corpscommanders to be ready to fallback to prepared defensive lines ifordered to do so. Ridgway's prima-ry intent was to seize Line Kansas,a phase line purposely drawn sothat it included the best defensiveterrain in the vicinity of the 38thParallel. In IX Corps' zone this linecarried eastward from the ImjinRiver to the western tip of theHwachon Reservoir and includedthat body of water's southernshoreline. IX Corps' axis ofadvance was to be about a dozenmiles almost due north fromChunchon astride the PukhanRiver using National Route 17 asthe main supply route. The terrainin this zone was uneven. It wasmostly flat west of the PukhanRiver, but high hills on the rightdominated the approaches to theHwachon Reservoir. The enemywas believed to be stay-behindelements of the CCF 39th Army,but it was uncertain if those forceswould flee or fight.

On 29 March, Ridgway issuedorders to initiate OperationRugged. This time the hard-work-ing Marines did not spearhead theattack as they had during Killerand Ripper. The U.S. 1st Cavalryand 6th ROK Divisions wouldcarry that load, while the 1stMarine Division was IX Corps

Tank and infantry teams search out possible enemy positions on either side qf theroad to Chunchon. Unfortunately, the mountainous terrain of central Koreahampered effective tank support.

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr51

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