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Second Front, Second Time:Counter-Terrorism and USPolicy toward Southeast AsiaCatharin E. DalpinoPublished online: 28 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Catharin E. Dalpino (2002) Second Front, Second Time:Counter-Terrorism and US Policy toward Southeast Asia, Cambridge Review ofInternational Affairs, 15:2, 345-354, DOI: 10.1080/09557570220151371

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Cambridge Review of International Affairs,Volume 15, Number 2, 2002

Second Front, Second Time: Counter-Terrorism and USPolicy toward Southeast Asia

Catharin E. DalpinoBrookings Institution

As the war in Afghanistan began to wind down in late 2001, the Bush adminis-tration turned its attention to possible second fronts in the global campaignagainst terrorism. In short order, Southeast Asia emerged as the logical choicebecause, presumably, policy goals for this region there were modest andattainable. Despite evidence of al-Qaeda links to Islamic extremist groups in theregion, moderation remained the prevailing trend in Southeast Asia, particularlyin comparison with the Middle East and South Asia. Moreover, the administra-tion could expect to make common cause with the region’s governments, whichhad been battling growing threats to internal stability since the Asian economiccrisis of 1997–98. Fortunately, there was little prospect of state-sponsored terror-ism, and therefore no issue of forcing a regime change, as there had been inAfghanistan. Beyond a focus on Southeast Asia itself, cooperation among Amer-ica’s allies on political support and logistical concessions (such as base establish-ment and �yover rights) might be important to help stage and implementmilitary operations in other regions.

Initial reactions to the events of September 11th from the region’s leaders hadbeen uniformly supportive. Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri wasthe �rst leader of a Muslim-majority country to visit the United States after 11September 2001, although the solidarity she voiced was couched in the admon-ition that both countries were the victims of terrorism, a reference to theproliferating insurgencies and communal tensions in Indonesia. If there was aquid pro quo for Megawati’s endorsement of the global campaign, it was in theUnited States’ acceptance of Jakarta’s harder line in the fundamentalist provinceof Aceh. Following on Megawati’s heels to Washington, President Gloria Maca-pagal-Arroyo of the Philippines and Thailand’s Prime Minister ThaksinShinawatra offered the support of Southeast Asia’s two treaty allies of theUnited States, two societies with signi�cant Muslim minority populations.Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir put aside decades of rhetoricalsquabbles with the United States to appear personally at the US embassy inKuala Lumpur to sign the condolence book for the victims of the terrorist attacksin the United States.

As the autumn wore on, however, the US bombing in Afghanistan forced allfour leaders into more quali�ed positions in the face of protests from theirMuslim populations. This diminution of support was obvious at the Asia Paci�cEconomic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shanghai in late October whenMahathir attempted, albeit in vain, to move forward a resolution condemning

ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/02/020345–10 Ó 2002 Centre of International StudiesDOI: 10.1080/0955757022015137 1

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346 Catharin E. Dalpino

the bombing. Nevertheless, it was obvious on both sides of the Paci�c thateradicating, or at least stemming, the course of terrorism would bene�t both theUnited States and Southeast Asian nations, although pursuing too close arelationship with the US could in�ict short-term damage on the region’s politicalleaders. In December plans were announced for a joint US–Philippines military‘training exercise’ in the southern Philippines province of Mindanao, whereseveral Islamic separatist groups were based. The target of this campaign wasostensibly the Abu Sayyaf, a dwindling group of extremists cum bandits whowere continuing to terrorize both Filipinos and foreigners with kidnappings forransom and hostage beheadings. Although Manila maintained that it could �ndno links to al-Qaeda in the present-day Abu Sayyaf, American of�cials were notconvinced.

The accuracy of Washington’s selection of a second front was unfortunatelyunderscored in January when Asian police and intelligence of�cials uncoveredan extremist network with cells in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and thePhilippines. The Jemmah Islamiah had fresher and more direct ties to al-Qaeda,and apparently a history that could link them to the events of September 11thand other terrorist attacks. These revelations came as a particular shock toSingapore, which had held itself out as a regulatory haven in a neighbourhoodthat was increasingly ungovernable. The evidence pointing to Indonesian Is-lamic teacher Riduan ‘Hambali’ Isamuddin as the network leader caused con-cern as well. If Singapore was once thought by US policymakers to be a bulwarkagainst terrorism in the region, Indonesia could be expected to be the soft spotbecause of the complicated role that Muslim groups presently play in thepolitical dynamics of the country. The Singapore arrests also raised the issue oftactics. This is to say that the most lethal of extremists and potential terroristsmay best be pursued with intelligence gathering and policing, rather than withformal military forays into guerrilla warfare.

With this policy shift, several broad questions concerning US counter-terror-ism efforts in Southeast Asia—and US relations with the region—are laid bare.What discontent fuels extremism in Southeast Asia, to the extent that it ispresent? Is the current state of US–Asian relations a suf�cient base upon whichto build a new policy of counter-terrorism? What Cold War legacies and whichpost-Cold-War issues are likely to colour Asian and American views of theterrorist threat and the prospects for cooperation? Is the US–Philippine exercisean appropriate model for counter-terrorism in other vulnerable spots in theregion, or did the Singapore arrests render the joint campaign anachronisticbefore it had begun? How will US actions to �ght terrorism in other regionsaffect the campaign in Southeast Asia? With the possibilities for contagion andforeign links to indigenous groups, will the existing regional framework inSoutheast Asia help or hinder attempts to curb terrorism?

The Limits of Extremism in Southeast Asia

Concepts of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism, political Islam and terrorismhave become con�ated and confused since September 11th. Because the focus ofUS counter-terrorism has been on apprehending a group with Middle Easternorigins, despite rhetoric about a global campaign, working de�nitions havemigrated toward the radical end of the spectrum. One task in formulating

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counter-terrorism policy in Southeast Asia will be to disaggregate the conceptsand clarify the de�nitions.

In contrast to the image of a radical ‘street’ in the Middle East, the broaderMuslim citizenry of Southeast Asia is inherently moderate and sees littlecontradiction between Islam and modernisation, or Islam and capitalism. Severalfactors have in�uenced the development of a less militant form of Islam in theregion: Asia’s comparative economic success; more open societies; and well-established pre-Islamic traditions (Buddhism, Confucianism).1 Southeast Asia’sethnic and religious diversity encourages the pursuit of tolerance, if the resultsoften fall short of the mark.

It is therefore necessary to recalibrate the spectrum of Islam with respect toSoutheast Asia. By and large, fundamentalist Muslims in the region do not seektheocratic rule in the political system, unlike those in Iran in the late 1970s andin Afghanistan in the 1990s. Rather, their primary concern is to make Muslimshari’a law the applicable code for Muslim populations. This obviously has thepotential for abuse of certain ethnic and ethno-religious groups, particularlynon-Muslims in Muslim-majority areas. In Malaysia in the late 1990s, forexample, Islamic groups demanded that all citizens be subject to Muslim law, apossibility that Kuala Lumpur quickly quashed. However, promulgation ofshari’a law need not be a radical step if procedures are in place to enableMuslims to choose between that code and civil law, and if civil law is preservedfor non-Muslims. The feasibility of this option is exempli�ed by Thailand, whichhas followed this system in its southern provinces for decades. Nor is Islamiceducation necessarily a conduit for extremism in Southeast Asia. The madrassa/pesantran (Islamic school systems) in Indonesia are not breeding grounds forradicals, as they were in Pakistan.2 In most countries of the region, the politicalprocess is regarded, in principle at least, as a way to encourage power sharingamong ethnic or religious groups. In Indonesia, for example, three-quarters ofMuslims voted for pluralist parties in the last presidential election. The �rstpresident of Indonesia to be democratically elected in over thirty years was aMuslim cleric, Abdurrahman Wahid, who led the country’s largest Islamic civicorganisation. An avowed moderate and strong secularist, Wahid tried (butfailed) to normalise Indonesia’s relations with Israel in his brief tenure andIndonesia never recognised the Taliban as the legitimate government ofAfghanistan.

Extremist Muslims in the region are likely to be involved in political duelswith the central governments over issues of decentralisation and related econ-omic and social problems. However, they do not usually identify or alignthemselves with international extremist networks with anti-Western agendas.These movements are intensely indigenous, in that their concerns are almostexclusively local, as opposed to the global grievances of al-Qaeda and like-minded groups.

1 Satu P. Limaye, ‘Islam Asian-Style’, PACNET 1A, 4 January 2002, Paci�c Forum, Centrefor Strategic and International Studies, Honolulu, www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0201.htm

2 Presentation of US Ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph L. Boyce, to the UnitedStates—Indonesia Society, 10 January 2002, Washington, www.usindo.org/Briefs/Ralph%20Boyce.htm

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348 Catharin E. Dalpino

Challenges to Moderation

However, as the Singapore arrests clearly demonstrated, none of these trendsprecludes the possibility that Southeast Asia can host (or provide) individualswho are part of international terrorist networks. In most of the region, bordersare porous and law enforcement, internally and across borders, is lax. Similarly,international �nancial transactions, which have accelerated dramatically in theregion in the past decade, �ow with little notice and few restrictions. Theseregulatory problems affect all Southeast Asians, Muslim or not, and theirsolutions require extensive legal and �nancial reforms. Unfortunately, these arelong-term processes, leaving open dangerous windows of opportunity for bothlocal and international extremists.

Nor is it unthinkable that Southeast Asia could produce home-grown extrem-ism (and even terrorism). Two threats arising from Muslim discontent arepresent and growing in the region. In Indonesia and Malaysia, the danger is insmall extremist groups within the national political elite hijacking the politicalprocess and, eventually, radicalising a signi�cant portion of the Muslim com-munity. Wahid’s ouster, no doubt due in some part to his own erratic perform-ance as President, was also a function of the struggle between moderate andhard-line Muslims, with extremists winning the round. Also in Indonesia, andthe Philippines as well, separatist provinces threaten not only to underminenational unity, but to destabilise the entire region. If Aceh were to secede fromIndonesia, for example, the southern province of Mindanao would be embold-ened to follow suit. At the present time, the odds are against either of thesetrends—struggles within elite political circles and separatist movements—coming to full fruition and realising their aims, but the trend in recent years hasbeen worrisome. More relevant for counter-terrorism policy, individuals in eachof these camps have the potential to develop links to Middle Eastern and SouthAsian Muslim radicals.

Why has there been a rise in extremism in Southeast Asia? There is no singleanswer, but one obvious watershed was the Asian economic crisis of 1997–98. Atthe height of the crisis in Indonesia and Malaysia, Muslim social groups werecompelled to �ll gaps in services that governments were no longer able toprovide, boosting the rationale for political Islam. In Indonesia, the crisisprecipitated the fall of President Suharto in 1998. In the decade prior, Suhartohad manipulated extremist Islamic groups, �rst repressing them and latersupporting them, as a means to control his factionalised military and as a hedgeagainst democratic opposition.3 Although the democratic transition in 1998–99discredited hard-line Islamists for a brief period, they took advantage of thepolitical chaos of the Wahid administration and, above all, Jakarta’s loss ofcontrol in the provinces to stage a comeback.4 The latter was a major cause ofincreased violence in several provinces: Aceh and West Papua (formerly Irian

3 For a detailed study of this, see Jacques Bertrand, ‘False Starts, Succession Crises andRegime Transition: Flirting with Openness in Indonesia’, Paci�c Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3, pp.319–340, Autumn 1996.

4 Testimony of Robert W. Hefner, Institute on Religion and World Affairs, BostonUniversity, before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Paci�c, Committee onInternational Relations, US House of Representatives, Washington, 12 December 2001,www.house.gov/international relations/raba1212.htm

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Second Front, Second Time 349

Jaya), where secessionist movements intensi�ed; and the Molukkus and Kali-mantan, where Muslim–Christian con�ict produced thousands of casualties.

A similar shift in political dynamics has been far less dramatic in Malaysia,but could over time be very signi�cant. Religious politics are more ingrained inthe Malaysian political fabric, since Muslims have a slimmer majority (60%) thanin Indonesia. For the past thirty years, the arena of religious politics has been themulti-ethnic coalition dominated by Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir’sUnited Malay National Organisation (UMNO). As the economic crisis pro-gressed in Malaysia, however, unity within UMNO began to fray, manifested inthe dismissal and imprisonment of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Asa result, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), the leading Islamic oppositionparty, realised signi�cant electoral gains, particularly in the non-peninsularstates.5

The events of September 11th have complicated these already complexpolitical situations. Within the broad Muslim communities of both Indonesia andMalaysia, the legacy of the terrorist attacks in the United States has had amoderating effect, resentment over US bombing in Afghanistan notwithstand-ing. In Indonesia, leaders of the two largest Islamic civic organisations, theNahdlatu Ulama and the Muhammadiyah, joined in a repudiation of radicalaction. With a total of 50 million followers, these two groups are commonlyregarded as representing mainstream Muslims in Indonesia. A similar effect wasseen in Malaysia, stemming the haemorrhage in UMNO’s political strength.Beyond these attitudinal shifts, the region’s governments have taken September11th as an invitation and a justi�cation to crackdown on extremist groups. Thiswas an inevitable outcome, arguably desirable for counter-terrorism purposes.However, civil liberties have worsened in the process. Human rights groupshave expressed concerns about the wide use of internal security laws to arrestpolitical opposition �gures in Malaysia and to imprison separatist advocates inIndonesia.6

It remains to be seen whether this �rmer approach will strengthen publicsupport for counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia, or whether it will create abacklash and increase the in�uence of Muslim extremists. A related but broaderissue is whether the region’s governments can follow through on political andeconomic reforms initiated in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis. Separatistmovements in the region, from Aceh to Mindanao, are as much an expression ofgrievances over economic inequalities and resource allocation as they are adefence of Muslim communities. If central governments are not able to improveeconomic levels in these hot spots, and in the broader population, Southeast Asiacould well see another upswing in extremism, and stronger and more extensivelinks to radical groups in other regions.

5 Testimony of Angel M. Rabasa, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation, before theSubcommittee on East Asia and the Paci�c, Committee on International Relations, US Houseof Representatives, Washington, 12 December 2001, www.house.gov/inter-national relations/jend1212.htm

6 See testimony of Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director, Asia Division, HumanRights Watch, before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Paci�c, Committee onInternational Relations, US House of Representatives, Washington, 12 December 2001.

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350 Catharin E. Dalpino

US Relations with Southeast Asia: A Long, Slow Slide

Since the end of the Second World War, US policy in the Asia region has beenpredicated on grand strategic design. In the Cold War, Southeast Asia was asecond front (second to US–Russian rivalry as well as to ideological, andsometimes military, war in Northeast Asia). Despite its secondary status, South-east Asia garnered enormous importance in US foreign policy during theVietnam War. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, Southeast Asia was written out ofthe strategic design. In the wake of disproportionate attention during involve-ment in Vietnam, US policymakers overcompensated in the other direction. Inthe last quarter-century, American policy toward Asia centred on continuedtensions in Northeast Asia, on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Straits.

During this time, US relations with Southeast Asia were not necessarilynegative; rather, they were anaemic and asymmetrical. The US remained thelargest trading partner for many countries in the region, but for Americanbusiness the potential market in China (particularly as it approached entry intothe World Trade Organisation) was a greater lure. Of�cial US government policytoward Southeast Asia was ad hoc and event driven, with brief bursts of attentionto single countries: Burma after the 1990 elections and the political exile of AungSung Suu Kyi; Cambodia immediately after the 1991 peace accords; and Indone-sia after the fall of Suharto. This approach has allowed other countries—China,Japan and Australia—to take the lead in the region.

In this gradual downshift of relations with Southeast Asia, the United Stateslost several policy instruments. Economic assistance, an effective means to reacheveryday citizens, was slashed or discontinued in the majority of SoutheastAsian countries. It has survived only in Indonesia and the Philippines, whereannual levels of US development aid average US$100 and US$50 million,respectively. Southeast Asia area and language studies, generously funded bythe US government during the Vietnam War, all but disappeared in Americanuniversities. It was left to Australia to train the next generation of Southeast Asiaspecialists.

This lack of connection to the region made the United States disinclined andill-prepared to come to Southeast Asia’s aid during the 1997–98 economic crisis.Washington’s decision to work primarily through the International MonetaryFund (IMF), rather than on a bilateral basis with the most crisis-strickencountries, associated the US with the painful reforms and conditionality of theIMF bailout packages. As the crisis deepened, Washington focused on Indonesia,to the exclusion of Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. Resent-ment of US policy during the crisis still simmers in these countries. The crisisalso affected citizen relations between the US and Southeast Asia. Since 1997,fewer Southeast Asians have gone to the United States for education. Thisdisconnection has worsened in recent months. American tourism to SoutheastAsia has dropped dramatically with the current recession and the travel fearssince September 11th.

A remnant of the US alliance structure in Southeast Asia has survived theend of the Cold War, but the form of the alliance relationships has changeddramatically. In both Thailand and the Philippines, US bases were closed, underpopular pressure on the Asian side. Security treaties were renegotiated to allowmore �exible forms of cooperation, such as joint training exercises and landing

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rights. The tone of alliance has changed as well: the patron–client dynamic ofCold War security relations would be anathema to even the friendliest nation.

Some of the elements of the Thailand and Philippines arrangements wereincorporated into the US security relationship with Singapore, but that arrange-ment lacks the mutual self-defence provision of the Thai and Philippine treaties.Indonesia and Malaysia have always had more of an arms-length securityrelationship with the United States. During the Cold War, neither was a treatyally, although they shared anti-communist concerns with the US. Since Septem-ber 11th, however, the US has nevertheless viewed all of its former Cold Warpartners as potential allies in counter-terrorism. This calls for a new de�nition ofalliance in the region, more political than military.

A �nal consideration in US relations with Southeast Asia is the state ofregionalism there, and the role of the US in regional institutions. It is patentlyobvious that extremism and related terrorist activity in Southeast Asia areregional, rather than single-country, issues. By default, the burden of a regionalremedy will likely fall upon the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (AS-EAN), or on ad hoc arrangements made within the ASEAN framework. Forexample, an informal trilateral terrorism commission, comprising Indonesia,Malaysia and the Philippines, was established at Manila’s behest. Signi�cantly,Indonesia and Malaysia have commenced talks on strengthening managementand monitoring of their land and maritime borders. After September 11th,ASEAN convened a �rst-ever meeting of Southeast Asian military chiefs todiscuss cooperation on counter-terrorism. These are important developments,but they need to be more fully operationalised to be effective. A related issue iscoordinating ASEAN efforts with US–Southeast Asian cooperation on counter-terrorism. The United States is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),which pulls in dialogue partners from around the Paci�c Rim, but ARF has yetto take up counter-terrorism in a meaningful way. Establishing more effectivechannels between the United States and the countries of Southeast Asia as awhole will be an important element in counter-terrorism strategy in the region.

The events of September 11th have led the US policy community to redis-cover Southeast Asia, but in a narrow sense and for a single purpose. However,if the United States is to pursue even a single-minded policy, it must remedysome of the de�cits in its relationship with the region. Where emphasis is to beplaced in the new second front will greatly determine whether the concord theUS has enjoyed with Asian governments since September 11th can be developedinto a successful long-term counter-terrorism policy.

The Philippines Campaign: Strategy or Symbol?

Foreign policy is an action plan for Americans. They are often uncomfortablewith abstractions in foreign relations and sometimes suspicious of policies thatdo not draw a clear and straight line between goals and implementation. As aresult, military action frequently is seen as a solution to political problems. Thismay well be the case in short-term situations, but in longer and more complexones, such as the Vietnam War, it seldom is. Nevertheless, the military optionhas played a central role in the global campaign against terrorism with thebombing of Afghanistan. It is not surprising therefore that the US would open

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the second front in Southeast Asia with a military mission, albeit one that ismuch more modest that the Afghanistan intervention.

Indeed, it would be dif�cult to �nd a military campaign more modest thanthe present US–Philippines exercise in Mindanao. Philippine and US forces, witha combined strength of 8,000 (of which only 650 are US personnel), launchedtraining exercises in February to help the government eradicate the Abu Sayyaf,whose size is estimated at roughly 100 core insurgents. Unlike previous jointexercises, it is unusually long (six months), is staged in a combat zone, and willuse live ammunition to pursue a real enemy. Washington and Manila maintainthat American forces will serve only as ‘advisers’, a term that resonates on bothsides of the Paci�c for older generations who recall the war in Vietnam.

There are obvious political bene�ts for both countries in the exercise. TheAbu Sayyaf has destabilised Mindanao, and Filipinos would almost universallywelcome their eradication. With the arrival of US troops, President Macapagal-Arroyo has demonstrated to her constituents that she can mobilise a superpowerally to address a local threat, while showing active support of the United Statesin its �ght against global terrorism. This is a mixed blessing for her, however,since nationalists and left-leaning organisations oppose the return of Americanforces under any guise. Legal challenges to the exercise are in motion. On theAmerican side, the Bush administration gains a strong ally in Southeast Asia,which underscores the global nature of the war against terrorism.

The Philippines campaign also provides Washington with a military segueout of Afghanistan, maintaining some degree of momentum in the counter-ter-rorism campaign as a result. Given the ratio of joint forces to Abu Sayyaf�ghters, it is a chance as well to put the Powell Doctrine into practice: applyingoverwhelming force to an achievable objective. The secondary role of US forcesis doubtless meant to suggest a model for cooperation against extremist threatselsewhere in Southeast Asia, showing deference to concerns over sovereigntyand assuaging Asian fears of American unilateralism.

But despite the obvious bene�t of the Abu Sayyaf’s demise and the usefulsymbolism of US–Philippine cooperation, it is doubtful that the exercise willcontribute signi�cantly to the anti-terrorism campaign in Southeast Asia. Moreimportant, it could worsen the situation if manoeuvres should spill over to otherinsurgency groups in the southern Philippines. Mindanao is a busy battle�eld,in which the Abu Sayyaf is the smallest separatist group. The oldest separatistforce, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), entered into a peace accordwith Manila in 1996 and is the dominant political party in the new AutonomousRegion of Mindanao. However, MNLF founder Nur Misauari was arrested onthe charge of masterminding an attack against military brigades in Sulu; thereare suspicions that Misauari loyalists may link up with the Abu Sayyaf. Theswing group is the more radical Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), whichsigned a cease�re with the government in August 2001 but has yet to join thepeace accords. It is the largest insurgency group in the Philippines today, withstrong Islamic ideology. Its training camps are in Basilan, the venue of the jointUS–Philippines exercise.7

Mindanaoans worry that the presence of American soldiers in the �eld couldpull the MILF, a hundred times larger than the Abu Sayyaf, into a violent

7 Author’s interviews with Philippine defence of�cials, February 2002.

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con�ict that would destroy the prospects for a settlement. The smallest incident,they say, could create a disastrous chain of events, particularly if it involvedcivilian casualties.8 Washington supports a political settlement for Minadanao,and US assistance there has helped turn swords into plowshares by helpingthousands of former MNLF combatants become farmers. The military ‘solution’the US and the Philippines have chosen to apply to the Abu Sayyaf couldironically undermine what political progress has been made in Mindanao todate.

Even if the joint training exercise proves effective in Mindanao, because of itsquasi-combat nature it is not a model that could be replicated elsewhere inSoutheast Asia, despite the fact that the US has inaugurated counter-terrorismtraining programmes with several countries in the region. Thailand, the onlyother signatory of a bilateral security treaty with the US in the region, fortu-nately has no signi�cant extremist insurgency. Joint exercises to address internalthreats in Indonesia or Malaysia would be politically impossible. They are likelyto be unacceptable to the Muslim populations in those countries. With respect toIndonesia, it is unlikely that the US Congress would approve a joint mission,given lingering questions about human rights abuses by the Indonesian militaryin East Timor that presently prohibit military cooperation with Indonesia.Moreover, the spread of a military campaign to other corners of the regionwould meet with domestic resistance in the US; the experience of Vietnam leftAmericans with little enthusiasm for a protracted land war in Southeast Asia.With these built-in restrictions, limitations and cautions, the Philippines cam-paign is likely to be a place-holder for US counter-terrorism strategy in South-east Asia until a plan more applicable to the present-day region is found.

A New US Policy for Southeast Asia?

If the United States is to realise its aims in �ghting terrorism in Southeast Asia,it must change its policy toward that region to become a fuller partner with itscounter-terrorism allies in a number of dimensions. Washington will soon �nditself faced with the expectations of those allies for greater US involvement in theregion as they de�ne it, and most certainly for greater economic assistance.Of�cials of several governments have informally raised the need for ‘MarshallPlans’ of assistance for their countries, to help address the economic and socialdisparities that make Southeast Asia more vulnerable to extremism at thepresent time. They are likely to be disappointed in this, given patterns in USdefence spending and foreign aid in the past decade, but most speci�cally inbudget requests since September 11th. The administration’s request to Congressfor the coming �scal year, submitted in February, proposed giving the Pentagonan additional US$46 billion—the largest real spending increase since the Viet-nam War—while raising foreign aid by only US$300 million, or less than 1% ofthe defence spending increase.9 Very little of that slim foreign aid increase isslated for Southeast Asia.

Three additional considerations need to be taken into account by US policy-

8 Author’s interview with Mindanaoan non-governmental leaders, February 2002.9 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, ‘To Fight Terror, Increase Foreign Aid’, Newsday,

15 February 2002. www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/op-ed/daalder/20020215.htm

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354 Catharin E. Dalpino

makers. First is the need to tailor the war to the region. The reasons for the riseof Muslim extremism in Southeast Asia suggest that the critical debate lieswithin the Muslim community itself, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia.Any US policy that attempts to in�uence that debate must obviously be handledwith the utmost care, indirectly and in the most even-handed manner possible.In the same manner, US policymakers must look below the surface of separatistand other con�icts involving Muslims in Southeast Asia, to recognize and helpaddress their root causes. This will be dif�cult for some in the US policycommunity, particularly in the defence sector. Old habits related to counter-in-surgency die-hard, as the Philippines campaign demonstrates.

It will also be important for the United States and Southeast Asia to reconciletheir de�nitions of ‘terrorist’. The US de�nition is overly narrow, con�ned toeradicating extremist groups that threaten the United States and its allies, andignores the profound social and economic issues that fuel the extremist problemin Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the Southeast Asian de�nition may beoverly broad. In the semi-democracies in particular, it appears that the concepthas been stretched to include opponents of the regime in any guise. For bothtactical and moral purposes, a consensus on the nature and limits of terrorismmust be found. If it is not, resentment in Southeast Asia is likely to climb. If theUS does not recognise (with assistance as well as rhetoric) the root causes ofextremism, Southeast Asian governments will quickly decide that US interests,rather than Southeast Asian ones, are predominant in counter-terrorism cooper-ation. If Southeast Asian governments use counter-terrorism as an excuse forpolitical repression, there is little hope that extremism will be reduced in theregion, all the more so if the United States is associated with such repression.

Lastly, the United States must realise the true meaning behind its ownbumper-sticker slogans about terrorism being a global problem, and calculatethat its actions in other regions will have an effect on counter-terrorism cooper-ation in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian Muslim reactions to the bombing inAfghanistan have moderated somewhat, because the military campaign has beenrelatively brief, and because very few Southeast Asian Muslims are inclinedtoward Talibanism. However, the protests in Southeast Asia were a warningsign of the region’s likely reaction to future US policies, whether those in whichMuslims appear to be under attack, or those in which state sovereignty isapparently ignored. For example, the Bush administration should factor thisconsideration into any plans to operationalise the administration’s newly an-nounced concern about the ‘axis of evil’, in which two Islamic countries and oneAsian country are targets. While increasing its attention to one region, SoutheastAsia, the United States must take note of the connections that Southeast Asiansnow have to several other regions in the world.

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