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    The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Complex Bureaucracy, Political Influence and Civil Liberties

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    Secretariat Building at United Nations Headquarters, February 23, 2017. © UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

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    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

    ABBREVIATIONS 11 INTRODUCTION 13 METHODOLOGY 19

    I. UNITED NATIONS COUNTER-TERRORISM ARCHITECTURE BODIES 24

    1. UN SECURITY COUNCIL 25 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee 25

    Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 27

    The 1566 Working Group 29

    The 1540 Committee 29

    The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 30

    Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) 32

    2. UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 34 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 34

    Ad Hoc Committee and Working Group on Terrorism 35

    3. UN SECRETARIAT 36 United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (OCT) 36

    Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) 41

    UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) 44

    Integrated Assistance on Countering Terrorist (I-ACT) 46

    4. UN AGENCIES, OFFICIES, AND PROGRAMS 47 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC): Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) 47

    Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO): Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) 48

    Key CTITF Entities 49

    5. DUPLICATION, COORDINATION, AND EVALUATION 51

    6. UN COUNTER-TERRORISM LEADERSHIP 56 Russian Federation 58

    People’s Republic of China 61

    Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 64 Egypt 68

    United States 69

    7. NEW GUIDING UN COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES 71 Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE) 71

    International Framework to Counter-Terrorist Narratives & Ideologies 72

    Fifth Review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2016) 72

    II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND UN COUNTER-TERRORISM 76

    1. HUMAN RIGHTS ENTITIES AND THE UN COUNTER- TERRORISM COMPLEX 79

    Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 79

    OHCHR, CTC, and CTED 81

    OHCHR and 1267 Monitoring Team 81

    OHCHR and UNODC 82 OHCHR and CTITF Working Groups 82

    Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism

    83

    2. ADDITIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OVERSIGHT IN UN COUNTER-TERRORISM ARCHITECTURE 85

    Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) 85

    The Office of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al- Qaida Sanctions Committee and Due Process 89

    The Focal Point for De-Listing 92

    United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center 93

    Victims of Terrorism Support Portal 93

    3. HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS IN UN RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES 94

    Security Council Counter-Terrorism Resolutions 94

    General Assembly Resolutions 94

    Definitions of Terrorism, Incitement, and Violent Extremism 95

    Preventing Violent Extremism and Human Rights 99

    4. COUNTER-TERRORISM, VICTIMS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 101

    Victims of Terrorism 101

    Cooperation with Civil Society 102

    III. MAIN PRIORITIES ON THE UN COUNTER- TERRORISM AGENDA AND THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT 104

    1. COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 105 Russia 108

    China 111

    Egypt 114

    2. PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 119 Russia 121

    Tunisia 124

    United States 126

    Mali 131

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    3. UN REGIONAL COOPERATION: THE (BAD) EXAMPLE OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO) 135

    China 138

    Russia 143

    4. RULE OF LAW, CAPACITY BUILDING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 146

    Mali 147

    France 152

    5. TERRORIST NARRATIVES AND INTERNET AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (ICT) 159

    China 162

    Egypt 165

    United States 168

    IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 170

    1. CONCLUSION 171

    2. RECOMMENDATIONS 173 UN Wide 173

    To the OCT 175

    To the UNSC 176

    2. ANNEX 1: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 179 Resolution 1373 (2001) 179

    Resolution 1456 (2003) 179

    Resolution 1566 (2004) 180

    Resolution 1624 (2005) 180

    Resolution 2178 (2014) 181

    3. ANNEX 2: CTITF ENTITIES 182

    4. ANNEX 3: ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS 184

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

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    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    The United Nations’ ability to counter terrorism is a test for its future relevance as the threats

    posed by the rise of non-state terrorist groups have challenged the UN’s raison d’être to maintain

    international peace and security. The fight against terrorism has become a key priority of the

    international community and has garnered unprecedented levels of cooperation amongst

    member states, demonstrated by the hydra-headed complex of UN bodies and entities tasked

    with counter-terrorism related issues.

    FIDH’s new report looks into the counter-terrorism complex at the United Nations in order to

    better understand the massive structure that has developed over the last two decades, the corpus

    of measures and programs it has been generating and their impact on both the enjoyment of

    human rights and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism at the national and regional levels

    UNITED NATION’S RESPONSIBILITY TO COUNTER TERRORISM

    The UN as a norm setter and convener has the responsibility for ensuring that human

    rights are centralized in all counter-terrorism activities, from gap analysis and technical

    assistance, to capacity building. In that respect, it has made human rights a central

    principle of its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy under Pillar IV. However, despite this

    commitment, the UN is at a critical juncture. The UN is faced with the major risk that the

    authoritarian states that occupy or have a strong influence in key positions in this structure

    may have the non-human rights compliant counter-terrorist policies, already applied in

    their own territories, endorsed by the international community and replicated widely.

    In the current counter-terrorism architecture, efforts are conducted in competing silos of

    subsidiary organs of the Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (UNGA) that often

    overlap in their programs and activities. This silo mentality is mainly driven by the fundamental

    division over which each body is ultimately responsible for countering terrorism. The General

    Assembly claims to be the competent organ to deal with terrorism because of its universal

    membership, whereas the Security Council is responsible for maintaining peace and security,

    which obviously includes countering terrorism. Fundamentally, the UNSC and the UNGA bodies

    have different mandates when it comes to counter-terrorism. In theory, Security Council bodies

    such as the Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) and its Executive Directorate (CTED) are

    responsible for assessing needs and providing analysis for technical assistance to member-

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    states, whereas General Assembly bodies such as the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task

    Force (CTITF) entities are responsible for coordinating and capacity building. In practice though,

    this bifurcated system actually results in a competition for resources, influence, and project

    ownership amongst the two branches.

    UN COUNTER-TERRORISM “REFORM”

    Member States, frustrated by the current state of counter-terrorism work at the UN and confused

    by its tentacular structure and multiplicity of bodies, requested the Secretary General in the latest

    review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS), to develop a proposal on how best

    to implement that strategy across all four pillars, including Pillar IV focused on ensuring the

    protection of human rights. The SG’s report proposed the creation of a new Office of Counter-

    Terrorism (OCT) to be headed by an Under Secretary General, that would take the CTITF and the

    UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) out of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and put

    them under the OCT, which was officially established in June 2017.

    Effective counter terrorism operations at the UN would be best delivered by mainstreaming

    counter-terrorism responsibilities into fewer bodies that have the independence to conduct

    evaluations of states and provide recommendations or with an overarching coordinating body

    to eliminate silos. The creation of the OCT could have fulfilled that objective. However, it remains

    unclear how the new Office, whose Head was selected by the Russian Federation, will effectively

    overcome the many challenges pertaining to coordination and resources, the increase of civil

    society involvement, and the centralization of the protection of human rights in all counter-

    terrorism efforts.

    Given that CTITF and UNCCT will remain intact,