Searching for Order in Social Motivation

Searching for Order in Social MotivationAuthor(s): Bernard WeinerSource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1996), pp. 199-216Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1448921 .

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Psychological Inquiry Copyright 1996 by 1996, Vol. 7, No. 3, 199-216 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

TARGET ARTICLE

Searching for Order in Social Motivation

Bernard Weiner Department of Psychology

University of California, Los Angeles

Regularities in social motivation are derivedfrom a causal analysis of the ability-effort distinction, which has implications for perceptions of responsibility. A responsibility analysis is then extended and applied to reactions to the stigmatized, help-giving, and aggression. The relation between explanation in terms of processes and mechanisms versusfunction is examined. Finally, an attempt is made to integrate social motivation with some aspects of intrapersonal motivation.

In this target article, some of our knowledge about human motivation is arranged, ordered, and systema- tized. The goal of this endeavor is to establish a few basic rules of human conduct, particularly in regard to social behavior. To attain this objective, three overlap- ping scientific activities are differentiated-description, classification, and explanation. In addition, two types of explanation-mechanism (process) versus function-are identified. Then a conceptual system incorporating these components is presented that I believe captures some of the fundamental principles of social motivation. Finally, there is a beginning attempt to encompass interpersonal (social) motivation and intrapersonal motivation within the same general framework.

This target article is an extension of ideas expressed in earlier publications (see Weiner, 1993, 1995). How- ever, as these issues are restated their logical foundation and schematic representation becomes increasingly simple and somewhat more precise (at least, to me). This, in turn, has augmented the empirical range or fertility of the conception, as well as increasing my understanding of its limitations. This article highlights the course of my argument regarding the centrality of responsibility judgments in social motivation.

Description

Although exceptions are imaginable, the initial step in the formulation of basic laws of behaviors is descrip- tive, or the gathering of empirical facts and evidence. In the theory advanced in this article, the initial empirical relations on which all other observations were built

relates to evaluative judgments in achievement-related contexts.

Achievement Evaluation

The prototypical investigation concerning judgments of others in achievement contexts was conducted by Weiner and Kukla (1970). Students were depicted as succeeding or failing on an exam. This outcome information was factorially combined with accounts of each student's ability level and effort expenditure, the domi- nant causes of achievement performance. Thus, for example, in one condition that student was characterized as high in ability, low in effort, and failing an exam, whereas in a contrasting condition the student was depicted as low in ability, high in effort, and succeeding. The respondents were asked to evaluate (provide feedback to) each of these hypothetical students.

The data from one investigation reported by Weiner and Kukla (1970) are shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the outcomes ranged from excellent through fair, bor- derline, moderate failure, and clear failure. Further- more, evaluations ranged from maximum reward (+5) to maximum punishment (-5). Figure 1 reveals, as would be expected, that positive outcomes are rewarded more (punished less) than are negative outcomes. Of greater importance in the present context, high effort or motivation (M) is rewarded more for success and punished less, given failure, than is lack of effort or motivation (-M). Conversely, low ability is associated with somewhat greater reward and less punishment than is high ability. This is in part because, given this set of information, low ability accompanied by high effort and success is particularly valued, whereas high ability



WEINER

5

4-

3

2 Cl 0

Z -3 ~ r p Ability and Motivation (AM)

-4~ -No Ability and Motivation(-AM) A-~ - d ANo Ability and no Motivation (-A- M)

-5- I I I I

EXC. FAIR BORDER. MOD. FAIL CLEAR FAIL.

OUTCOME

Figure 1. Evaluation as a function of outcome, effort, and ability. From "An Attributional Analysis of Achievement Motivation, " by B. Weineraand A. Kukla, 1970, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15, p. 3. Copyright 1970 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

in conjunction with low effort and failure is especially admonished.

The simplest representation of the causal data for failure shown in Figure 1, which are of particular importance in this article, is:

failure - lack of effort -4 high punishment; and failure - lack of ability -4 low (or no) punishment

These relations between causality and achievement evaluation have been often reported, replicated in numerous cultures, and can be accepted as empirical facts (see review in Weiner, 1986).

Judgments of the Stigmatized

A number of other bodies of empirical evidence are pertinent to the discovery of the regularities of social motivation that will be championed in this article. One

set of findings that emerged well after the investigations of achievement evaluation pertain to reactions to the stigmatized. In one pair of illustrative investigations, Weiner, Perry, and Magnusson (1988) examined the relations between stigmas and a number of attitudinal and affective variables including liking, anger, and sympathy. In these studies, reactions to 10 stigmas (e.g., AIDS, Alzheimer's disease, obesity, paraplegia) were investigated. The data revealed that individuals with somatically originated problems such as Alzheimer's disease and blindness elicited less negative reactions than did persons with behavioral or mental-originated problems such as abuse of a child and drug addiction. The negativity of responses toward others with behavioral-based stigmas including AIDS, obesity, drug addiction, and the like have been reported in many investigations and also can be taken as empirical facts (see, the review in Jones et al., 1984).

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SEARCHING FOR ORDER IN SOCIAL MOTIVATION

These two phenotypically disparate sets of relations (low effort is punished more for achievement failure than is lack of ability; mental and behavioral stigmas are reacted to with more reproachment than are somatic stigmas) should be kept in mind as I turn from description to classification, a somewhat more advanced level of scientific advancement.

Classification

Classification in psychology takes many forms, from the grouping of external stimuli to the categoriza- tion of internal mechanisms and behavioral reactions. The taxonomic system of importance here bears on the differences between ability and effort as the causes of achievement success and failure and a corresponding distinction between biology and behavior as the causes of stigmatization.

There are as many causes of achievement outcomes as the imagination doth allow. Failure, for example, may be due to lack of effort, the absence of ability, poor strategy, bad luck, the bias of teachers, hindrance from peers, illness, and on and on. In a similar manner, and now considering the affiliative domain, a social rejection might be due to poor interpersonal skills, the desired partner already has plans, the other regards you as "sloppy," and so on.

These diverse and manifestly different causes have common characteristics or properties and therefore they may be genotypically similar despite phenotypic dis- similarities. For example, ability, effort, social skills, and being sloppy all describe (are internal to) the person, whereas teacher bias, hindrance from peers, and the desired date being busy all place causality external to the person. It repeatedly has been found that locus is a fundamental property of phenomenal causality (see Heider, 1958; Rotter, 1966). It therefore may be stated that lack of math ability and being sloppy are, in at least one feature, similar respective causes of achievement failure and affiliative rejection in that they are internal to the actor. In a similar manner, teacher bias and the desired date having already made plans share the property of external causality.

A second causal property that will prove to be of great centrality in this article is controllability, or the degree to which a cause is volitionally alterable. Lack of effort is perceived as controllable or personally changeable. In addition, characteristics including "slop- piness" are often judged by others as alterable-the causal agent can try to be better dressed, and so forth. Lack of effort as a cause of achievement failure and being viewed as untidy as a cause of social rejection therefore are in some sense alike in regards to their causal properties-both are internal and controllable.

Furthermore, low aptitude as a cause of math failure and the desired partner already having prior commitments as a cause of affiliative rejection also are alike in that they would be construed as not controllable by the causal agent. Just as causal locus, controllability again and again has been identified as a basic dimension of phenomenal causality (see review in Weiner, 1986).

There is most likely one, and perhaps two, additional underlying properties of causality. These relate to the generality of causal explanations over time (causal stability) and over situations (causal globality). For example, low general intelligence as a cause of math failure tends to be considered stable over time and general across situations, whereas affiliative rejection due to the desired partner having a prior engagement is likely to be considered unstable over time and an appropriate explanation only in this specific context (see Peterson et al., 1982; Weiner, 1986). There is a vast array of evidence supporting the position that locus, controllability, and stability/globality (which, for reasons of simplicity, are combined here) are the only replicable properties of phenomenal causality (see review in We- iner, 1986).

Ability and effort would be classified as internal to the causal agent. On the other hand, ability tends to be considered uncontrollable and stable/global, whereas effort is controllable and unstable/specific. These two causes therefore are similar in one basic attribute, but differ in two other fundamental characteristics (see Table 1).

Given this analysis, differences in reprimand for failure associated with ability versus effort ascriptions cannot be traced to the locus dimension of causality (considering this a dichotomous classification of internal versus external). On the other hand, inequalities in the reactions elicited given failure can be ascribed to either of the two remaining causal properties. It is known, however, that if one is perceived as "lazy" (controllable and stable/global) or merely as not exert- ing effort on this occasion (controllable and unstable/specific), reprimand nonetheless is voiced in the face of failure. Additionally, if one lacks general intelligence (uncontrollable and stable/global) or fails at a task because of an injury (uncontrollable and unstable/specific), then reprimand is relatively withheld given nonattainment of a goal. Hence, only the controllability dimension of causality covaries with punish-

Table 1. Dimensional Analysis of Ability and Effort

Causal Dimensions Ability Effort Locus Internal Internal Controllability Uncontrollable Controllable Stability/Globality Stable/Global Unstable/Specific

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ment for failure. Given this conclusion, the prior findings reported by Weiner and Kukla (1970) may be represented as:

lack of effort failure - - punishment

controllable causality

lack of ability failure - no punishment

uncontrollable causality

Taxonomic Significance

A specific fact in and of itself is of less interest than what that evidence more broadly represents. It is of great importance that lack of effort is punished more than lack of ability given failure. But it is of greater significance to realize that causal controllability, which is substantiated or materialized by lack of effort, gener- ates greater punishment than does causal uncontrollability, which is embodied within low ability (aptitude). This importance becomes apparent when it is realized that the causes of mental and behavioral stigmas generally are considered controllable (e.g., promis- cuous sex as a cause of AIDS; overeating as a cause of obesity) and thus they differ from the causes of somatic stigmas, which often are construed as personally uncontrollable (e.g., a genetic anomaly as the cause of Alzhe- imer' s disease). Hence, the two sets of phenomena presented earlier related to achievement evaluation and reactions to the stigmatized can now be embraced within the same conceptual analysis or framework:

achievement failure due to lack of effort -+ controllable causality - reprimand

mental / behavioral - based stigmas

achievement failure due to low ability -+ uncontrollable causality - no reprimand

somatic - based stigmas

Note that in this context, causal dimensionality makes possible explanatory generalization.

These sequences should be stated more generally, however, to capture the obsevation that what typically are labelled as behavioral and mental stigmas on occasion are perceived as due to uncontrollable causes (e.g., obesity caused by a thyroid problem), whereas at times somatic-based stigmas may be construed as due to controllable causes (e.g., cancer because of smoking). Thus, a more adequate representation of the data is:

achievement failure controllable causality - reprimand

uncontrollable causality - no reprimand stigma

The generalization just revealed is of importance, but achievement evaluation and reactions to the stigmatized surely do not represent the core of social behavior. When considering the laws of social motivation and research related to causal controllability, two other areas of study are of special significance in that they form the very heart of social psychology. They are helping (altruism), or going toward others, and aggression, or going against others. I next turn to these two motivational domains, guided by and essentially repeat- ing the interpretations of achievement evaluation and reactions to the stigmatized. However, the examination of aggression reveals that a theoretical obstacle is faced; the solution to this difficulty paved the way for further theoretical progress.

Help-Giving

Two well-known investigations provide the foundation for a causal approach to help-giving (consistent with the analysis of achievement evaluation, I will examine the earlier, generative research). These studies differ from the research already reviewed on achievement evaluation and judgments of the stigmatized in that they took place in the field rather than the laboratory, although experimental manipulations were introduced.

In an early investigation conducted by Piliavin, Rodin, and Piliavin (1969), a confederate fell to the floor on a subway train while other experimenters observed the spontaneous tendencies of the riders to help the needy individual. In one condition, "the victim smelled of liquor and carried a liquor bottle wrapped tightly in a brown bag," whereas in a second condition he "carried a black cane" (Piliavin et al., 1969, p. 219). Thus, there were two causes of the need for aid. It was found that the person with the cane received help on about 95% of the occasions in which he fell, whereas the drunk was aided on only about 50% of the incidents. Furthermore, the assistance was given sooner to the cane-carrying person.

Ten years later, Barnes, Ickes, and Kidd (1979) examined help-giving in an academic context. They had experimenters pretend to be classmates of other students, whom they called to borrow class notes. Two experimental conditions conveyed the reasons for need, which in this investigation corresponded to the ability- effort distinction used in the study of achievement evaluation. In one condition, the experimenter communicated that the notes were needed because "I just don't seem to have the ability to take good notes," whereas in a second condition the confederate stated: "I just don't seem to have the motivation to take good notes" (Barnes etal., 1979, p. 369). Barnes et al. (1979)reported amuch

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higher rate of agreement to help the student in the low ability rather than the low motivation condition.

The experimental findings by Piliavin et al. (1969) and Barnes et al. (1979) have been replicated many times (see review in Schmidt & Weiner, 1988). These data may be descriptively represented as:

a. falling in - illness subway - help given

no class - low ability notes

b. falling in - drinking subway - help withheld

no class - lack of notes motivation

It has been documented that alcoholism and lack of motivation to take notes are perceived as personally controllable, whereas illness as the cause of falling and lack of ability to take notes both are not subject to volitional alteration (see Schmidt & Weiner, 1988). Hence, these data may be more broadly depicted as follows:

need for help - uncontrollable causality -+ help given

need for help - controllable causality -+ help withheld

That is, help-giving in these contexts may be conceptu- alized with the same structure as was imposed on achievement evaluation and reactions to the stigmatized, which also included perceptions of causal controllability as a key variable mediating between an event (state) and the elicited reaction.

Aggression

Keeping with the format of the prior part of this article, I will again call attention to prototypical investigations that have played a central role in the study of aggression. Here both experimental manipulation and correlational research have made important contribu- tions to the interpretation of aggressive responding from a causal perspective.

Prior to examining this research, I do want to make it clear that much of aggressive behavior, as well as helping behavior, is not subject to a causal or attributional analysis. One might help one's mother, for example, without considering the controllability of her need state, for kin relationships certainly influence prosocial conduct. In a similar manner, when a bully takes the toy of another, or when a robber threatens harm, it is unlikely that the doer of these deeds has engaged in an attributional search and is concerned about causal controllability for an act that the other has committed. The

aggression considered here is retaliatory or reactive rather than proactive, and even given this restriction it certainly is acknowledged that there are many determinants of aggression other than causal perceptions. But, of course, this should not be taken to mean that aggression instigated by a causal understanding of a negative act committed by another can be ignored.

One set of investigations bearing on an attributional approach to aggression adhered to a deception paradigm. In these experiments, a subject received an aversive stimulus (e.g., shock, a loud noise) from an experimental partner (who may have been a confederate or did not "actually" exist but was thought to be in an adjoining room). Information was then conveyed that the partner did or did not know the effects of her action, was or was not aware of the level of aversive stimulation that she had administered, and the like. Thus, the partner was portrayed as having intended or not intended the misanthropic results of her conduct. After undergoing this negative experience, in conjunction with the additional information, the subject was provided the opportunity to respond aggressively toward this person (see Dyck & Rule, 1978; Epstein & Taylor, 1967; Nickel, 1974). In this manner, experimentally manipulated inferences of personal accountability were related to behavioral aggression (retaliation).

This research consistently has found that subjects' overt aggression matches the intensity of the aversive stimulation that they believe the partner intended to administer, rather than the level of shock, noise, and so forth that they actually experienced (see Ferguson & Rule, 1983). Thus, the findings can, in part, be depicted as:

intended -+ retaliation high aversive stimulation -+

not intended -+ no retaliation

A second pertinent literature, which is much less focused, is correlational and concerns the untoward actions of aggressive children and adults labeled as spousal- and child-abusers. Here again the attention of attributional research is on the beliefs these individuals have that provoking actions "on purpose," thereby jus- tifying their own "retaliation." Indeed, as already discussed, even among nonaggressive individuals the person who believes that another acted with malicious intent feels justified in the endorsement of aggressive behavior. It therefore follows that persons who tend to be aggressive may be prone to perceive that others acted with such intent.

In one of the original studies guided by this line of reasoning, Dodge (1980) first identified aggressive and nonaggressive boys based on teacher and peer ratings. The children, who were tested individually, were given

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a puzzle-assembly task to complete with the possibility of winning a prize. During the middle of the task, they were interrupted and taken into an adjoining room where they could view a puzzle supposedly being worked on by another child. At this time, they "over- heard" a bogus intercom system conveying that, at the same time, this child was examining their partially completed puzzle. The child was then heard destroying the puzzle. Three experimental conditions conveyed that the damage was done on purpose, accidentally, or that the cause of the damage was unknown. After receiving this information, the subject was left alone in that room to observe if he would retaliate by damaging the other child's puzzle.

In the hostile intent condition, both aggressive and nonaggressive children responded with retaliatory aggression, whereas in the accidental damage condition they acted with aggressive restraint. But in the ambiguous condition, the aggressive children behaved more aggressively than did the nonaggressives. Similar findings have been reported by Graham, Hudley, and Wil- liams (1993), Nasby, Hayden, and dePaulo (1980), and others (see review in Crick & Dodge, 1994).

The experimental findings in regard to biased perceptions of intent among spousal- and child-abusers is less definitive, but certainly is suggestive. For example, in a study of abusing mothers MacKinnon-Lewis, Lamb, Arbuckle, Baradaran, and Volling (1992) had parent-child pairs of subjects make inferences about intentions in a series of hypothetical events that were ambiguous in regard to their intent. A representative story told to the mothers was the following: "Pretend you and your child are playing a board game. You are almost to the finish line and you are winning. Your child knocks the pieces off the board onto the floor" (p. 406). Responses to the inquiry of "Why do you think your child would do this?" were then coded for hostile intent (as opposed to accidental behavior). In addition, the mother and child were observed while participating in two gamelike tasks. It was found that negative perceptions of the other's general intent were related to the likelihood that the individuals would initiate a negative or coercive exchange during the game.

Similar research has been conducted with spousal- abusers as the experimental subjects. For example, husbands in violent, distressed but nonviolent, and normal spousal relationships were given a number of unpleas- ant hypothetical situations that involved their spouse. The extent of their endorsement of the belief that the wife acted with negative intent was examined. The data clearly revealed that violent husbands attributed greater intent and blamed the wife more for conduct that may have aroused jealousy, rejection, and public embarrassment than did husbands in distressed but nonviolent

relationships and husbands in nondistressed families (Holtzworth-Munroe & Hutchinson, 1993; see Holtzworth-Munroe, 1992).

In sum, the laboratory research making use of a retaliatory shock deception paradigm, and correlational research assessing the relation between real-life aggression and the tendency to attribute hostile intent to others, is consistent in documenting strong intent-retaliation linkages.

It would seem, then, that for some events help-giving and aggression will be subject to a similar interpretation, one that also can be used to explain achievement evaluation and reactions to the stigmatized. Prior to elaborating this position, however, a conceptual difficulty must be acknowledged.

Are Causal Controllability and Intentionality Equivalent?

In the analysis of helping behavior, the key mediating concept was causal controllability, whereas in the explanation of aggression, the key mediating variable was intentionality. There are many reasons to contend that controllability and intentionality are quite distinct concepts. Thus, the argument that helping and aggression have been subject to an identical attributional analysis could be considered fallacious. Among their differences is that controllability, in this causal context, refers to a property of a cause: Effort is considered a controllable cause of failure, whereas aptitude is not. On the other hand, intention refers to the motives or goals of a person. One did or did not intend to (desire to, want to) harm or annoy another.

However, closer inspection of these two concepts reveals that they share the attribute that both are antecedents to or components of a more encompassing inference, that of personal responsibility. Inferences of responsibility require that the causal agent have free- dom of choice, or free will (see, Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Shaver, 1985). Hence, a person failing because of a lack of effort is deemed to be personally responsible inasmuch as one can choose to expend effort or not. On the other hand, one does not make a decision about aptitude. For this reason, failure because of lack of aptitude does not result in a judgment of responsibility.

In a similar manner, intention also is a crucial antecedent or determinant of perceptions of responsibility. It has been clearly established that one is held more responsible for an intentional rather than an accidental occurrence, as exemplified in the distinction between murder and manslaughter, and greater punishment is given for intended rather than unintended consequences, where there is the presence of a "guilty mind" (mens rea).

204




Given a distinction between controllability and responsibility, it also follows that there may be instances in which causal controllability is not accompanied by judgments of responsibility and reprimand for failure. For example, one is not reprimanded for failure to put forth school-related effort if there was a need to take care of one's sick parent. This justification (the act serves a higher moral goal) is viewed as a mitigating circumstance that frees the person from responsibility (see Schonbach, 1985). In a similar manner, an intended aggressive action carried out by an individual who could not distinguish right from wrong by virtue of age, mental state, culture, and so on would result in the absense of a responsibility judgment as well as no (or diminished) punishment, despite the presence of controllability.

Although the foregoing analysis begins to approxi- mate what might be considered laws or rules of social motivation, it is next argued that the representation is incomplete. What is missing is an emotional component, a mechanism that is argued to provide a link between thinking (judgments of resposibility) and doing.

Role of Emotions

Imagine your feelings when your child is doing poorly in school because of a refusal to do homework or when an athlete on your favorite team is "loafing." Not only are there thoughts about controllability and responsibility, but there are feelings of anger. You are mad at the rebellious child and the lackadasical athlete. Anger is an accusation, or a value judgment, that follows from the belief that another person "could and should have done otherwise" (see Averill, 1982, 1983; Frijda, 1986; Reisenzein & Hoffman, 1990; Roseman, 1991).

Again both laboratory manipulation and self-report correlational research support this view of anger, although responsibility judgments may not be the only precursor of this feeling (see Berkowitz, 1993). Return- ing to the previously discussed research in which perceptions of the intent of others was manipulated in a laboratory deception design, this experimental approach also frequently included reports of anger. As Ferguson and Rule (1983) concluded in their review article: "Malevolently intended harm most facilitates anger and aggression. When people receive information that another person deliberately intended harm, they become angrier than if the other person did not intend harm" (p. 65).

Supporting this laboratory research are studies conducted by Averill (1983), for example, that asked persons to report about recent events that made them angry. In his research, more than 50% of these incidents were

considered "voluntary," that is, the harmdoer was fully aware of the consequences of the action and the act was perceived by the victim as unjustified. The next largest category of situations that gave rise to anger (30%) was associated with an avoidable harm that was not neces- sarily intended but the act was perceived as subject to personal control, such as an injury resulting from neg- ligence or carelessness. Hence, nearly 80% of the contexts eliciting anger involved ascriptions to negative prior actions for which the other person would be held responsible (see Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982, for a replication of these findings).

In addition to being a consequence of a thought about responsibility, anger also has been considered a stimulus for subsequent action (see Averill, 1983; Frijda, 1986). As will soon be examined in detail, anger is hypothesized to provide a bridge between thinking and conduct. Anger directs the experiencer of this emotion to "eliminate" the wrongdoer, to go toward that person and retaliate with some form of aggressive action, or to go away from that person to withhold some positive good and establish further distance. Anger therefore is viewed here as a "goad" or an emotion that "pushes" the person to undertake self-protective and/or retaliatory actions. In addition to this, anger "frightens" the offender by communicating that harm will be recipro- cated (see Trivers, 1971; these points are elaborated in the following sections of this article).

In contrast to the linkage between responsibility and anger, the absence of responsibility given the personal plight of another is associated with sympathy and the related emotions of pity and compassion. Thus, a person confined within a totalitarian state (situational causality), athletic failure because of a physical handicap (internal, uncontrollable causality), and school failure because of the need to care for a sick mother (a mitigating circumstance or justification) are typical predica- ments that elicit sympathy inasmuch as the person is not held responsible for his or her negative plight.

There has been relatively little research on this emotion. In one investigation, Weiner et al. (1982) asked college students to recall instances in their lives when pity or sympathy was experienced. The most frequently reported contexts were when observing others with handicaps and personal interactions with the very aged. More broadly conceived, Wispe (1991) summarized that: "one will sympathize more with a brave sufferer, in a good cause, in which one's afflictions are beyond one's control" (p. 134).

A huge literature documents that sympathy, as anger, has motivational consequences. Sympathy tends to increase prosocial behaviors such as help-giving and decreases antisocial conduct including punishment (see Eisenberg, 1986).

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Motivational Sequence

When emotional reactions to responsibility appraisals are included within the motivational sequence, the conceptual system for social motivation is represented as follows:

event (e.g., behavioral achievement reponse failure) (punish)

cause (e.g., lack -* causal -* responsibility -* affect of effort) property inference (anger)

(control- (responsible) lable)

This contrasts with the following exemplar:

stigmafized behaviorial state (e.g., response Alzheimer's (punish) disease)

cause (genetic -* causal -* responsiblity -* affect deficit) property inference (sympathy)

(uncontrollable) (not responsible)

These two illustrative sequences include the fundamental assumption that the motivational process pro- gresses from thinking to feeling to action or, more specifically, from causal understanding (or perceptions of intent) and responsibility inferences to the emotions of anger and sympathy, which then give rise to antisocial and prosocial reactions that involve reprimand, help, aggression, and so forth. Of course, other orders are conceivable. One possibility is that thinking gives rise to both feelings and actions, so that emotions have the same noncausal status as behavioral responses. Al- ternately, perhaps both thinking and feeling generate behavior, so that thoughts are both proximal determinants of behavior as well as distal influences, acting via the more proximal effects of feelings. Of course, more complex conceptions also may be postulated.

Testing the Theory

The most extensive data putting these motivational sequences to test, which then also examine the component processes regarding the effects of cognitive appraisal on emotions and the effects of emotions on

action, have been in the helping domain. Within this context a number of investigations have assessed responsibility and/or controllability, the emotions of sympathy and/or anger, and some indicator of helping, typically a judgment of aid rather than an actual behavioral observation.

The investigations pertinent to the testing of this conception are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 (for other pertinent studies that have not included an assessment of responsibility and affect, and/or have not reported correlational data, see, e.g., Skitka and Tetlock, 1992, 1993; Williams, 1993; for relevant investigations of aggression, see Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Graham et al., 1993).

The summary in Table 2 includes the investigator and the year of the investigation(s), the number and type of research subjects, the experimental situation, other information about the research, and the strengths of the correlations between the pertinent variables. In virtually all of the studies, variables in addition to those reported here were examined. In addition, some of the relevant information was not available in many of the publications.

Examination of Table 2 reveals some of the short- comings of this research: With two exceptions, the subjects were college students; the research paradigm was role-playing or simulational, with only one investigation not having helping judgments or attitudes toward welfare as the main dependent variable; controllability or responsibility was not assessed or they were reported as a combined index; two situations previously introduced by Piliavin et al. (1969) and Barnes et al. (1979) that involved falling on a subway train and asking to borrow class notes predominated (although in role-playing contexts); and I was personally involved in one half of the investigations. These liabilities weaken the generality of the findings and the conclusions that one would like to draw. On the positive side, the situations also included the lending of money; non- specific helping to persons with AIDS, to the poor, and to individuals with a variety of other stigmas; numerous situations pertinent to helping children were examined; subjects from another culture in addition to the United States (Japanese students) were represented, as well as children; and over 2,000 subjects have been tested.

Table 2 reveals consistent, systematic, and suppor- tive data in the published investigations.! Examining the correlational data shows that all of the studies

A number of arbitrary decisions were made when composing this table, although none had a significant effect on the reported data. Concerning the correlation coefficients, if only a combined affective index was reported by the investigator, then this correlation was included in both the sympathy and the anger figures. In addition, in the Zucker and Weiner (1993) studies, mean correlations were com-

206



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reporting these figures find negative associations between controllability/responsibility and sympathy (average r = -.52) and positive associations between controllability/responsibility and anger (average r = .48). These data strongly support the postulations regarding appraisal-emotion linkages.

Turning next to the correlations between thought and feelings with judgments of helping, it is evident that in all of the studies the correlations between control and help are negative (average r = -.38), whereas the correlations between emotions and helping are negative for anger (average r = -.51) and positive for sympathy (average r = .51). These correlations also are in the anticipated directions, and encourage the belief that affects may be more significant determinants of helping (or, in this case, helping judgments or intentions) than are thoughts.

More sophisticated analyses involving partial correlations, regression, and/or path analyses that provide more exacting tests of the hypothesized motivational sequence are shown in Table 3. In virtually all the investigations providing appropriate data shown in Ta- ble 3, affects are the proximal and more important determinants of help than thoughts. There is only scat- tered suggestive evidence that causal and/or reponsibil- ity inferences have an independent influence on helping intentions. It therefore must be concluded that support is strong for a thinking -* feeling -* acting sequence.

Unfortunately, there are insufficient data to determine under what conditions thinking may have a significant proximal role on motivated behavior (helping, in this case). Zucker and Weiner (1993), in an investigation that included judgments of both personal help and welfare, found that affects were the stronger pre- dictor of personal help whereas thoughts were the more significant predictors of support for governmental welfare. We therefore reasoned that the more personally involving the situation, the greater the relative importance of emotions in guiding action. Although intui- tively reasonable, much more data are needed to resolve this issue.

Conclusions About Processes in Social Motivation

What conclusions, then, can be reached about the determinants of helping, and by implication, the other

aspects of social conduct considered in this article as well as yet unexamined areas of social behavior?

1. The causes of events or states are crucial determinants of action.

2. The causes are classified into basic properties or characteristics, with locus and controllability having special social significance.

3. This causal assessment, along with other information related to, for example, mitigating circum- stances, results in responsibility inferences about the person.

4. Cognitive appraisals of personal responsibility are linked with the affects of anger and sympathy.

5. These affects have motivational significance, with anger giving rise to antisocial responses and sympathy giving rise to prosocial responses.

6. Affects are the primary determinants of responding; attributions may or may not have an independent contribution to doing. The relative value of feeling and thinking on behavior may depend on the personal importance or personal involvement of the actor.

The motivational process representing these components, and assuming high personal involvement, is depicted in Figure 2.

Theoretical Constraints and Advances

Although a wide swath of social concerns have been covered, obviously there are major limitations to the breadth of the conception. This approach begins with an event that someone else has engaged in or with the state of another as, for example, an achievement failure, a request for help, an apparently hostile action, or a stigma. Thus, the focus is on retaliation, reprisal, re- quital, and reparation (i.e., on reactions to another). In the absence of an event or outcome or state of someone else, the observer is unmoved inasmuch as the attribution process and inferences of responsibility are not engaged. Furthermore, all the processes related to the self have been excluded by this centering on the other. Hence, the litany of hyphenated selfs: self-actualiza- tion, self-concept, self-control, self-enhancement, and on and on, as well as the social processes and emotions that are attached to these concepts, do not fall under the present umbrella. Later in this target article a small attempt is made to also bring some of these within the theoretical fold. On the other hand, the positive features of the representation should not be overlooked. A com- parison with biological approaches to social motivation highlights one favorable aspect. Among the appealing features of a biological approach is that the same ulti-

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replicated findings (the former across empathetic sets, the latter across age groups). However, only one summary correlation was included from these investigations, Finally, the means were merely averaged and not weighted according to the number of subjects. Concerning the other coefficients, means were not computed either because of the small number of studies reporting the needed data or because the nonsignificant correlations were not specifically reported.



WENER

Responsibility Behavioral Event Cause/Type Antecedent Reaction

Achievement Lack of Causal Reprimand failure effort controllability

Stigmatizing Behavioral/ Causal Condemnation condition mental controllability Responsible -->Anger

Need for Drinking; Causal Neglect help Lack of effort controllabilty N

Aggressive Intentional Retaliation act of another

Withhold Achievement Lack of Causal reprimand failure aptitude uncontrollability

Stigmatizing Somatic Causal / No condemnation condition uncontrollability Not Responsible -->Sympathy

Need for Illness; Causal Help help Low ability uncontrollabilty

Aggressive Unintentional No retaliation act of another

Figure 2. Representation of a theory of social conduct.

mate determinants of action (e.g., survival of the self, the species, or the genetic pool) can be applied to the contrasting social behaviors of helping and aggression. That is, help-giving and aggression have the same function. In a similar manner, evidence was provided that an attributional (responsibility) approach to social behavior also can readily be applied to helping and aggression. To the best of my knowledge, other cognitive approaches concerned with helping do not extend to aggression, and vice versa. And in contrast with com- peting biological explanations such as sociobiology, the intervening proximal determinants of behavior given this conception can be experimentally manipulated and their effects on social conduct may be directly observed.

It also appears relatively straightforward to extend this conception to additional observations, both within the four categories of behavior that have been outlined as well as to other unexplored areas. In the domain of aggression, for example, it is known that outgroup status increases hostility relative to an ingroup status member. It also is reasonable to propose that outgroup membership is one antecedent or determinant that increases inference of responsibility given an untoward act. A number of other factors also are likely to affect responsibility inferences (e.g., the past history of the transgressor, political ideology of the reactor, etc.) and thus influence aggressive retaliation.

Turning from the domain of aggression, consider affiliative acceptance and rejection. Again, any variable

influencing perceptions of responsibility could have an effect here. Thus, one might anticipate that "boastful" children are more likely to be rejected than those that are "shy," although both exhibit deviant behaviors, because responsibility is greater in the former than in the latter instance (see Juvonen, 1992).

Do these extensions still leave out much of social life? Of course. But inferences of responsibility appear to be a very salient and wide-ranging construal, so that the range of convenience of the conception is rather startling.

"Ultimate" Explanations

In the opening paragraph of this target article, I pointed out that two classes of explanation must be recognized. The more prevalent one in psychology is to identify the processes and mechanisms that intervene between an event or a stimulus and the reaction to that event. This type of explanation was pursued in the prior pages.

A second type of explanation concerns the function of a behavioral reaction. That is, what is the purpose or the ultimate goal of the action? The mechanism-function distinction is well illustrated in the interpretation of why a stickleback fish attacks another stickleback fish, a topic addressed in many introductory psychology texts. It is now known that the color red, which is on the

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belly of the fish, acts as a sign-stimulus that releases an innate attacking response. This mechanism in part "ex- plains" the aggressive action. But a functional interpretation embraces the significance, or the meaning and the ultimate consequences, of the conduct. In this case, the attack response chases the fish into another territory. In so doing, there is species spreading, which enables better access to food, thereby abetting survival and reproduction.

Why Determine Responsibility and Punish?

Determining if another is responsible entails costs. It may take time and energy to reach this conclusion, thereby promoting "cognitive strain" that interferes with other thoughts and actions. Furthermore, responsibility beliefs are linked with the reaction of anger, so that an emotion is generated that ordinarily one would not "seek out" or choose to experience (this may be true of sympathy as well). Why, then, should another be punished for a transgression such as, for example, not trying, which may not create any immediate personal harm to individuals other than the actor?

It has been suggested that we should not seek mean- ingful answers to this question:

It has no rational basis. ... When we act on the authority of "ought," we are responding to an impera- tive that is just as much a product of natural selection as when we act in terms of cause-effect. ... The system of praising and blaming, or responsibility and resent- ment-the web of human attitudes and feelings itself-is simply given and beyond rational justiflca- tion. (Fox, 1992, p. 144)

Others, however, have sought for the logic and meaning of this behavior. Two lines of thought see value in causal judgments and the fixing of responsibility. On the one hand, "knowledge is its own reward." The Metaphysics of Aristotle begins as follows: "All men [sic] by nature desire to know." This motivational principle has been accepted by numerous schools of psychological thought (see, Kelly, 1955; White, 1959).

But for most psychologists, the motivation for understanding the cause of an event is that this knowledge has functional value, aiding in coping and survival (see Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967). The instrumental value of reaching a causal decision also applies to the process of finding another accountable. To paraphrase Heider (1958), a judgment of responsibility gives meaning to experience and a reality to the environment, thereby making appropriate action possible.

An inference of responsibility for a social transgression such as not trying, for having a behavioral-originated stigma, or for aggressing against another has additional functions. This is perhaps best articulated in arguments advocating the sentencing of those who have engaged in criminal activities. The functions and purposes of a verdict of guilty and subsequent punishment (as well as reprimanding another for not trying, not giving help to others who failed to help themselves, and so on) include:

1. Reform, so that the individual "learns a lesson" and therefore is less likely to engage in the same action again. This is consistent with utilitarian principles of punishment.

2. General deterrence, so that others are informed that they will be punished if they engage in such behavior. This also is a utilitarian principle of punishment, one that is general rather than specific to the transgressor.

3. Moral education, so that society is educated about what is good and what is bad. This is related to general deterrence, and again represents a utilitarian function.

4. Retributive justice, so that we give others their "just deserts." A moral balance is thought to be established by an "eye for an eye" or a "tit for tat" philosophy, and this forms the basis for the most prominent theories of justice (although not without rebuttals).

But why might there be "retribution" if there has been no personal "harm," as is the case when responding toward a student who wants to borrow your class notes, or to one with a behaviorally instigated stigma? Indeed, "strict liability," or punishment in accord with the amount of damage, which is part of the foundation of our legal system, seems to be totally out of place in the previously mentioned settings.

One may therefore have to probe still deeper and further back from the proximal causes and seek even more distal causes that relate to function and why trying or not trying, for example, is more than a personal decision. When considering the general welfare of society, it is presumed that all must "carry their weight" and, although it could be maintained that lack of effort most harms the "lazy" individual, it also is the case that the entire society is adversely affected. If, for example, a role-appropriate member of a prehistoric group does not aid in hunting, or in the preparation of food, then that person would hamper or tax the entire group by not contributing to the good of society. The individual who does not try in school (has a behavior-originated stigma, etc.) asks others to sacrifice their "personal fitness" for his or her well-being. It is likely to be assumed that lack of effort at school subsequently will cause the individual to be a burden on society. Thus, it is consistent with

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long-term utilitarian as well as retributive principles to punish lack of effort, or personal responsibility for a negative state, event, etc.

In sum, punishing students for not trying in class, reprimanding those with behavioral stigmas, withhold- ing help from the needy who have not helped themselves, and aggressing against others who committed hostile acts "on purpose" are both functional and moral acts, guided by personal theories ofjustice. Theological tenets and the legal system therefore seem to be playing a major role in the shaping of everyday (i.e., noncrimi- nal) conduct, influencing a wide range of human endeavors and reactions to these endeavors. Finally, process and function go hand in hand: Motivational processes and mechanisms are intimately linked with promoting the goals of preservation of the self and society, a position long-ago articulated by motivational theorists such as Hull (1943).

A Few Closing Thoughts

I conclude with brief discussions of a few unrelated but nagging topics that I find fascinating and pertinent to theory building related to social motivation.

Strong Versus Weak Theory

A distinction has been made between strong versus weak theories (see Eysenck, 1993). According to Eysenck (1993):

For weak theories, positive results are much more important than negative results, because a positive result from testing a deduction from a theory suggests both hypotheses and K [assumptions] are correct ... For strong theories, negative results are much more important, as the role of K has been much reduced. (p. 245)

Given a responsibility analysis of social conduct, relatively little is now learned if lack of effort is punished more than is lack of ability as a cause of failure; if AIDS due to promiscuity is reacted to with less sympathy than AIDS caused by a blood transfusion with contaminated blood; and so on. The nomological network supporting these facts is so strong that theoretical progress is not made given confirmation of these hypotheses. On the other hand, if a culture or group or situation is found in which these relations do not hold, or are reversed, then this could serve as a springboard for much theoretical alteration and great insight into that culture, group, or situation. It is perhaps now time for the conscious search for conditions in which theoretically driven hypotheses might not be confirmed.

Naive Psychology

I started this target article with the obvious fact that students who do not try are admonished more than those without ability. I then documented that subjects express little positive regard toward individuals with behaviorally originated stigmas such as drug addiction. It also was reported that individuals do not help others who have brought about their own problems and are likely to aggressively retaliate against others who have committed hostile acts on purpose. None of these findings should be surprising to the reader; they are in accord with common sense, or general knowledge.

But I attempted as well to show that these phenotypically diverse phenomena can be comprised within the identical theoretical framework. This is beyond the creation of the "person on the street," who is not concerned with conscious systemitization of knowledge and the imposition of order. Yet these are precisely the goals of science.

There is no reason to believe that the contents of everyday psychology, including much of the data we use, as opposed to psychological processes, are beyond the knowledge of the person on the street (see Kelley, 1992). But this should not create fear that psychology is obvious, a fear so deep among social psychologists. Rather, at times, psychology is the study of the obvious or the everyday.

Content-Grounded Versus Process-Grounded Theories

Motivational theories are derived from a consideration of a particular content domain. There are, for example, theories of achievement, affiliation, aggression, altruism, and so on, to start with the beginning of the alphabet. But I have serious doubts that a "complete" theory of achievement, or aggression, or altruism can be articulated. It is known, for example, that helping is influenced by the number of others available to help, the genetic relationship between the potential helper and the victim, perceptions of responsibility for the need, and on and on. In a similar manner, aggression is known to be influenced by the outdoor temperature, perceptions of responsibility for a prior hostile act, and on and on. It seems unlikely (to me) that a general, within-domain theory can be formulated that captures the tremendous diversity of antecedent, and perhaps sufficient, conditions, none of which is necessary for the expression of the behavior under consideration.

An alternative approach is to search for processes and mechanisms that cut across psychological phenomena. As indicated earlier, I have no illusion that causal beliefs, perceptions of responsibility, and linked affects

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can account for all of achievement evaluation, attitudes toward the stigmatized, help-giving, or aggression. But I do think that these mechanisms have content-generality and thus provide a basis for a theory of social conduct that transcends content domains.

Personal Motivation

As is well-accepted, the broader the generality of a theory, the greater its power and contribution to the scientific goal of creating order in the Universe in the simplest manner possible. Throughout this target article, I have attempted to document that the theoretical principles first derived from an analysis of achievement evaluation generalize to other aspects of social motivation. But personal motivation explained by intrapsychic processes seems to be beyond the range of this conception. Can, then, a responsibility-based theory of social motivation be integrated with a theory of personal motivation? If so, then perhaps some of the self-related processes that have been ignored can be brought under the theoretical scaffold.

There is a central finding related to achievement performance that corresponds in importance to the observation that lack of effort is punished more by others when a cause of failure than is lack of ability. This fact is that if personal failure is ascribed by the actor to insufficient effort, then performance on the next occasion or opportunity to attain this same goal is better than if the prior failure is attributed to lack of ability (see Bandura, 1986; review in Weiner, 1986). That is, performance is relatively enhanced if it is accepted that the prior failure was caused by a lack of "try" rather than to the absence of "can."

This finding, considered in conjunction with the data related to achievement evaluation, may be depicted as:

-* performance increment achievement failure - lack of effort

- reprimand from others

- performance decrement achievement failure - lack of effort

-* no reprimand from others

Intrapersonal Motivational Sequence

Following the logic of this article, if inferences of responsibility and the linked emotions of sympathy and and anger direct social behavior, then self-perceptions of responsibility and their associated emotions should influence intrapersonal motivation. Without reviewing the evidence here (see Weiner, 1986), an abundance of data suggest that perceptions of self-responsibility (elicited by low effort ascription) give rise to guilt,

which enhances motivation. On the other hand, inferences of nonresponsibility (elicited by lack of ability beliefs) elicits shame ("all others can, but I can't"), which inhibits motivation. Thus, the intrapersonal sequences linked with effort and ability ascriptions can be represented as:

failure -+ lack of ability -+ uncontrollable -+ not responsible -

shame and embarrassment -+ performance decrements

failure -+ lack of effort -+ controllable -+ responsible -+ guilt - performance increments

Integrating Social and Personal Motivation

It is now possible to examine the interrelation between social and personal motivation. First, consider the consequences of lack of ability ascriptions for failure on interpersonal evaluation and personal motivation:

sympathy -* no punishment

failure -* lack of ability -* uncontrollable -* not responsible

shame -* performance decrements

These sequences suggest that sympathy (the other- directed emotion) and shame (the self-directed emotion) are complementary and congruent. Furthermore, if there is a naive understanding of the laws of motivation, then sympathy and lack of punishment from others in certain contexts will lead an individual to believe that the other ascribes his or her failure to uncontrollable causes (e.g., low ability), which should then increase that individual's personal beliefs about lack of controllability and nonresponsibility, thereby increasing shame and producing performance decrements.

There are indeed research investigations in support of these hypotheses. For example, Meyer et al. (1979) created scenarios in which a teacher was described as providing feedback to two students who did not perform well on an exam. One of the two students received negative feedback in the form of verbal punishment, whereas the second student was the target of no negative communication. Subjects were then asked to infer which student the teacher perceived as less intelligent. The data clearly revealed that the student not receiving negative feedback following failure was viewed as relatively unintelligent. These findings have been con- ceptually replicated by Graham and Barker (1990).

Even more compelling evidence was gathered by Graham (1984) in a laboratory investigation. Graham varied affective feedback to school-aged children fol-

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lowing induced failure at an achievement task. In one of the conditions the "teacher" conveyed sympathy through both verbal and nonverbal cues (soft voice, leaning forward, looking into the eyes of the other). The recipients of this feedback were then asked to ascribe their failures to ability and effort. It was found that sympathetic feedback increased personal attributions to lack of ability. Furthermore, lack of ability attributions were related to low expectancy of success, as well as to lack of persistence at the task.

Now consider the consequences of lack of effort ascriptions for failure on interpersonal evaluation and personal motivation. The two sequences that have been proposed may be depicted as follows:

anger -* punishment

failure -* lack of effort -* controllable -* responsible

guilt -* performance increments

These sequences suggest that anger (the other-directed affect) and guilt (the self-directed affect) are complementary or congruent. Hence, if anger from others is "accepted," then there should be increased inferences of self-responsibility, which raises guilt and improves performance. The research reviewed by Meyer et al. (1979) and by Graham (1984) also examined these hypotheses. In one condition in the investigation by Meyer et al. (1979; see also Graham & Barker, 1990), teacher feedback to a student following failure was anger. Research participants viewed the failure of this hypothetical student as due to lack of effort, and the student was perceived as high in ability. And when Graham (1984) communicated anger to children following their failure, using cues such as a loud voice, those individuals tended to ascribe their poor performance to lack of effort. This was related to high subsequent expectancy of success and increased persistence.

From a functional perspective, all these relations may be understandable if the assumption articulated by Heider (1958) that both "can" and "try" are necessary for goal attainment is accepted. If failure is caused by (or is perceived as caused by) low aptitude, which is constant over time and not controllable, then success cannot be reached. It therefore would be dysfunctional (in most instances) to continue to expend effort. Hence, it could be argued that mechanisms (such as emotions like sympathy and shame) have evolved that promote help-giving while (again in most instances) preventing the person from persisting in the face of an unattainable goal (see Janoff-Bulman & Brickman, 1982). It also is

not functional to punish lack of ability inasmuch as this has no instrumental value for achievement strivings.

On the other hand, effort is modifiable and unstable. Hence, failure due to lack of effort gives rise to reactions such as anger and guilt, which promote increased "trying" (see Trivers, 1971). Further, it is functional to punish lack of effort, for increasing the expenditure of energy has instrumental value.

In sum, a larger theoretical framework is forseeable that embraces interlocking social and motivational processes and functions. Although achievement was used as the illustrative psychological domain, this analysis should be applicable to other phenomena examined in this article, and ideally to other motivational domain, this analysis should be applicable to other phenomena examined in this article, and ideally to other motivational domains that were not addressed.

Notes

I wrote this article while supported by the National Science Foundation Grant DBS-9211982.

Bernard Weiner, Department of Psychology, Uni- versity of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024.

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