Sean Curtis - Article.docx - Academics Portal Index Curtis - Ar… · Web viewUnited Kingdom as well as from a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Rwanda, bordering

Assassinations of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents 1

ASSASSINATIONS OF EXILED RWANDAN DISSIDENTS:

A STRUCTURED ANALYTIC APPROACH

Abstract

This article examines whether the Rwandan government has been involved in assassination attempts on a series of its former high-profile government members living in exile. A structured analysis of publicly available literature and interviews with subject matter experts confirms widespread suspicions. The Rwandan government is the culprit in these attacks, and as a result, Rwanda cannot be considered a peaceful and democratic state. These findings demonstrate that threats from smaller states who can operate efficiently and ruthlessly to achieve specific objectives can be equally as troublesome as threats from large, wealthy states. Likewise, states with Rwandan diaspora populations and outspoken dissident exiles face serious threats to their territorial integrity and national security. Structured analysis provides new methods to evaluate these contemporary national security problems that policymakers and Africanist scholars face while remaining adaptable to new evidence and changing security dynamics.

The return to the past

When the infamous 1994 genocide ended, Rwandans and international observers alike hoped for

a positive future without the ethereal specter of ethnic conflict hanging over the small African

state. The Tutsi rebellion, coming from southern Uganda and through the northern part of the

state, had seen future presidents Pasteur Bizimungu and Paul Kagame and their Front

Patriotique Rwandais (RPF) party claim victory over the Hutu génocidaires. Their victory was a

watershed moment in central Africa, ending a roughly 100-day massacre that took the lives of

over 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The RPF regime emerged as national heroes

with Kagame, head of the Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (RPA – the military wing of the RPF),

leading the way.

This emergence from the darkest part of the nation’s history has since been accompanied

by exceptional economic growth, putting Rwanda on the map in terms of domestic economic

capabilities and attractiveness for foreign investment.1 Rwanda’s surge made the state a “donor

darling”,2 receiving millions of dollars in aid from western states such as the United States and


United Kingdom as well as from a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Rwanda,

bordering traditionally stronger, larger, and more powerful states such as Uganda and Tanzania

and violent and troubled states such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and

Burundi, was beginning to hold its own.

Rwanda became a Lilliputian state,3 a small state exercising power typical of larger

states, not only because of its economic exploits and acquisitions of large amounts of foreign aid

but also because it had developed a robust military and intelligence apparatus that demonstrated

a capacity nearing or equal to some of the strongest states on the continent. This was evident

during the two major wars in the neighboring DRC in which Rwanda intervened in between

1996-1997 and 1998-2003. In addition, Rwanda is the most densely populated state in Africa,

containing a little less than 12.5 million inhabitants in just over 26,000 square kilometers. There

is very little space, if any at all, to suppress tensions or indeed for individuals to hide away

within the Rwandan state or the political arena in the capital of Kigali.

Despite Rwanda’s military prowess and economic success, the post-genocide era has

hardly proceeded untroubled. Involvement in the DRC has garnered heavy international

criticism. Criticism ranged from general concerns about political meddling and resource looting

in the DRC during the two Congo Wars to accusations of supporting destabilizing rebel groups

such as the March 23 Movement (M23) in more recent years in eastern DRC. On the surface,

Rwanda appears to be a modernizing, prosperous central African nation. However, major

concerns began to arise regarding this interpretation as early as the late 1990s when opponents to

the RPF, including politicians, journalists and military officials, began to disappear. These

incidences have been chronicled primarily by journalists and human rights NGOs. The academic

community has addressed the political and social conditions in which Rwandans and the


Rwandan diaspora live but has only marginally addressed the fate of dissident Rwandan exiles

who suffer attacks, some of which are successful and others not.4 This article fills this gap and

examines whether the Rwandan state can be identified as the responsible actor in these attacks.

Independent journalists and NGOs, both African and non-African, have extensively

covered these assassination attempts on dissident exiles. A report by Human Rights Watch

(HRW) particularly stands out and details the disappearances, deaths, and attacks upon various

Rwandan dissidents both within and outside of Rwandan territory.5 HRW details the

disappearances, deaths, and attacks upon various Rwandan dissidents both within and outside of

Rwandan territory. More critically however, the report addresses the responses of the Rwandan

government and rather briefly, what specific evidence can be offered to place guilt upon the

Rwandan RPF government. However, a number of countries in Africa and across the globe have

repressive governmental tactics but do not attempt to kill or intimidate dissidents outside of their

territory, especially if that territory belongs to “first world” countries. An initial scan of such

reports and news media articles gives the impression that only the Rwandan government could

be responsible.6 Nonetheless, a cursory understanding of the possibilities of the situation should

not be considered sufficient for either academics or decision-making officials.

To bridge Rwanda as a socio-political entity with the concerns of modern Rwandan

officials and the international community, the situation surrounding disappearances and deaths of

dissident exiles necessitates contextualization. This article examines how the post-genocide

regime manages political space in Rwanda and then goes deeper to highlight the nature of the

security apparatus that the leadership has at its disposal. After the background is set the analysis

uses structured analysis to determine where responsibility lies in relation to the assassination

attacks upon dissident exiles. The results of the analysis produce findings with strong


implications for both Rwanda and the states in the international community where Rwandans

live.

Limited space for political expression

After the Tutsi-led RPF formed the new government in 1994, what little influence the miniscule

number of Hutus had left after the genocide was soon wiped out. This was accomplished through

a combination of domestic deaths and disappearances alongside the unofficial forced exile of

predominant Hutus and their sympathizers in the state and society. Filip Reyntjens identifies two

main waves of departure for public figures from Rwanda, among a continuous pattern of exile

for Rwandans with dissident views, in 1995 and in 2000.7 The first, in August of 1995, saw

Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu and Hutu Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga resign and

go into exile while Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito resigned but died, apparently of natural

causes,8 in 1997. Twagiramungu continues to live in exile today, managing The Rwanda Dream

Initiative – Rwanda Rwiza (RDI-Rwanda Rwiza) opposition political party, while Sendashonga

was shot and killed in Kenya in 1998. This was the first signal to the outside that the balance of

power had gone awry in Rwanda.

The pattern continued until the second wave when Speaker of the National Assembly

and Tutsi genocide survivor Joseph Sebarenzi resigned in January 2000 and fled to North

America, Prime Minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigema resigned in February 2000 and left for North

America, and President Pasteur Bizimungu resigned in March 2000 for “personal reasons” but

was soon after charged with financial indiscretion and fraud and jailed in Rwanda despite an

offer of Ugandan asylum.9 President Kagame pardoned Bizimungu in 2006 and he continues to

live in Rwanda today.10 A third wave can be added to Reyntjens’ pattern, starting from the late

2000s and continuing to the early 2010s. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, former RDF Chief of


Staff, Head of Intelligence, and Ambassador to India went into exile in 2010 to South Africa and

has survived several assassination attempts, including being shot in the stomach in June of the

same year. Likewise, Patrick Karegeya, former Director General of RDF External Intelligence

went into exile in South Africa in 2007 and was found dead from strangulation in a Johannesburg

hotel room in January 2014.

These three waves suggest that the forced resignations and exile of policymakers occur

when they come into disagreement with the Hutu-RPF political establishment and particularly

President Kagame. Each of the aforementioned individuals who went into exile left shortly after

disagreements on Rwandan state policy were aired to and heard by the ruling regime.11 During

and in between these three waves, numerous individuals from the common citizenry all the way

up to the political ranks have been killed, disappeared, or gone into exile.12 It has become such a

noticeable pattern that Rwanda’s post-genocide history can be divided into two periods: 1994-

1997, the multi-party period; and 1997-present, the one-party period or RPF dictatorship. Clearly

Rwanda is still struggling with its ethnic and political identity in ways similar to the pre-

genocide period.

Even since the inclusion of a limited number of Hutu among the predominantly Tutsi

RPF government that emerged after the genocide, feigning diversity has become a hallmark of

the Rwandan post-genocide era. If a seat is not won by the RPF then a number of “opposition”

parties in coalition with the RPF will win those seats. Most genuine opposition parties such as

the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) and the Mouvement républicain national pour la

démocratie et le développement (MRND) have been outlawed and the RPF-led coalition parties

provide the appearance of choice when in fact the only choice is to support Paul Kagame and his

RPF party. For example, the September 2013 elections for Rwanda’s legislative bodies saw the


RPF coalition take over 75% of the overall vote which boasted an impressive 99% turnout rate.13

Reports from both the African Union and the Commonwealth Secretariat (Rwanda joined the

Commonwealth of Nations in 2009) lauded Rwanda’s National Election Commission (NEC) for

their efforts in democratic elections.14 These praises could be attributed to a narrow focus on the

direct conditions surrounding the elections. Nonetheless, the existence of positive reports does

not mean that the socio-political conditions are conducive to free and democratic elections. Much

of the RPF’s repression is not conducted openly but quietly and the effects are mirrored in large

voter turnouts supporting the regime.15 Jailing dissidents or forcing them to escape into exile are

two common regime tactics designed to keep genuine dissent from being legitimized in the

tightly controlled political atmosphere. More worrying is that dissidents who have been forced to

leave Rwanda may still be within the lethal grasp of the RPF.

Government control of Rwanda’s political environment is key to the enforcement of the

RPF’s policies. Africanist scholar Andrea Purdekova has addressed the overriding issue of

Rwandan state surveillance, specifically within Rwandan territory, by positing a specific

understanding of how power is distributed in the state. Rather than understanding political power

(coming primarily from Kigali) as being decentralized she suggests that power is dispatched by

the RPF regime.16 Purdekova writes:

What we witness is not devolution of power to conceive and decide, just the devolution of implementation. Sprawling administration, multiple responsibilities and imihigo, in the final balance, do not point to decentralisation of power, but rather to dispatching of power through which, sure enough, control becomes more effective and compliance increases.17

The post-genocide Rwandan political structure and system of surveillance can thus be

understood as a central power that enforces its political will through threat of intimidation and

violence. Decision-making hardly becomes more autonomous or free when moving further from


the President’s seat in Kigali and provincial and local governance structures only reflect the

unquestionable will of the ruling regime.

Rwanda severely lacks freedoms of speech and press exactly because of these threats of

intimidation, violence, and disappearance.18 Two pervasive concepts, those of genocide credit

and genocide amnesia, work psychologically to mutually reinforce physical threats to safety.19

Dissidents are quickly labeled génocidaires or Interahamwe (see endnote) which consequently

mixes vicious political castigation with varying degrees of public ostracization.20 The

psychological aspect, fully exploited by the Rwandan government, seeks not only to utilize

genocide credit to gain sympathy from the international community but also to prey on and

encourage genocide amnesia. This amnesia does not cause Rwandans to forget the genocide but

rather to ignore that the pre-genocide pattern has been re-created under the RPF-Kagame regime.

This occurs while Rwandans fully relate every aspect of their lives to the genocide in a narrow

fashion that upholds the views and actions of the current regime.

The socio-political nexus has become so deeply ingrained in the current state structure

that it is not initially visible upon observation from the outside. This ingrained nature may

explain why the aforementioned election observation groups produced praiseworthy reports. The

deception is not evident until the layers are peeled away from all of the relevant demographics. If

the RPF regime is responsible for extraterritorial assassinations it is not unlikely that it would

conduct covert operations abroad in the same fashion. That is why in the analysis, evidence is not

only examined for its potential to point directly to Rwandan involvement in the assassinations,

but also to see if it points to actions that facilitate a larger Rwandan attempt to cover up

operations.


The systemic management of repression

The Rwandan state relies on a powerful security apparatus to intimidate and threaten dissident

citizens and officials. The Rwandan judicial system works in concert with the security apparatus.

The judiciary is a tool for the regime to delegitimize opponents. The judicial system does not

encourage the death of dissidents but since the RPF regime controls the judicial system along

with every other part of government, judicial rulings are nonetheless reflective of RPF policy.

Nyamwasa, Karegeya, and a few other former Rwandan military officers were tried in absentia

in 2011 and sentenced to twenty years in prison.21 The voices of political figures such as

President Kagame suggest a policy line for the RPF leadership regarding dissidents that can be

interpreted as more sinister and more clandestine than that of court trials.

The structure of the security apparatus is critical to the affirmation of centralized state

power for the RPF. Figure 1 identifies within this structure each sector that would play a role in

an assassination attack.22 The entire security apparatus is overseen by the RPF regime and is

under President Kagame’s control. The divisions that are most critical to the execution of

extraterritorial assassination are the Ministry of Defense (Rwanda Defense Force – RDF), the

Presidential Guard and the Office of the President. In Rwanda, power is completely concentrated

at the top, and as a result, any major decision is devised and ordered from the highest RPF

offices, that of President Kagame likely in association with that of Minister of Defense James

Kabarebe.23

Kabarebe rose up beneath Kagame during the RPF rebellion and played an instrumental

role in Rwanda’s two wars in the DRC where he was a senior military official for both states. He

has not strayed from Kagame’s side throughout his entire adult life and was an ideal choice for

Kagame as the most senior military official in Rwanda to solidify RPF rule. The Rwandans who


led the rebellion in the early 1990s grew up, fought, and took part in political and social life in

Uganda. These leaders did not return, some of them even spent a significant amount of time in

Rwanda until their benefactor, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, helped them launch the

rebellion that successfully unseated the genocide government in 1994. Among this core,

individuals like Kabarebe have remained loyal to Kagame, while others such as Karegeya have

chosen dissent.

This situation has effectively limited power to a few select individuals and allows

Kagame to have complete autonomy over decision-making in every sector. It is highly unlikely

that President Kagame did not have the final say in the orders of RPF-directed assassins. A high-

risk decision with widespread political implications such as an assassination would certainly not

be made by anyone outside of the President and his cabinet, particularly in a state like Rwanda.

As a result, the hypothesis that Kagame is responsible for attacks on high-profile dissident exiles

is examined in detail in the analysis. In light of the structure of the security apparatus, and more

specifically that sub-section of the security apparatus that would deal with assassinations, a

pattern of power concentration appears. To take this pattern into account the subsequent analysis

will involve two parts: the three individual cases for each assassination and the relevant divisions

and capabilities of the security apparatus.


Ministry of Defense - Minister of Defense: James Kabarebe- Chief of Defense Staff: Patrick Nyamvumba- Army Chief of Staff: Major General Frank Mushyo Kamanzi

- Army Chief of Staff- Reserve Chief of Staff- Air Force Commander- Support Services: Administration; Intelligence (Directorate of Military Intelligence); Operations; Logistics; Political Education; Peacekeeping- Combat Units: Four Army Divisions: 1st- Kigali; 2nd – East/North; 3rd – West/North; 4th – South/West - Combat Support Units: Tank Unit and Artillery Regiment- Special Forces- Training Centers/Colleges

Presidential Guard See Ministry of Defense - Battalion of close bodyguards- Infantry motorized battalion- Outer ring battalion forces- Missile Squadron- Artillery Regiment- Support Services: Administration; Intelligence; Operations; Logistics

Military Reserves; Maritime Unit; Air Force

- Reserves Chief of Staff: Lieutenant General Fred Ibingira- Reserves Deputy Chief of Staff: Jerome Ngendahimana- Ag. Chief of Staff: Brigadier General Joseph Demali

- Reserves- All demobilized military members turned into reserves and reincorporated into the general population- Maritime Unit- Lake Kivu- Presidential home on Lake Muhazi- Air Force- Helicopter Squadron

Ministry of Internal Security (RNP) - Sheikh Harerimana Mussa Fazil - Police Headquarters- Provincial Headquarters- District Headquarters- Police Posts

Office of the President - Venantia Tuglreyezu - National Security Service – Secretary General - External Intelligence; Immigration and Emigration; and Internal Security

Ministry of Local Government - Francis Kaboneka - Local Defense

*All divisions overseen by RPF Regime led by President Paul Kagame (Prime Minister - Dr. Pierre Damien Habumuremyi until 24 July 2014, 24 July 2014 to present – Anastase Murekezi). All positions current at time of writing.24

Figure 1. The Rwandan Security ApparatusDivision Name – Division Head – Division Components


The RPF under fire

The response of RPF officials and President Kagame to accusations of internal repression and

attacks on dissidents abroad has been disturbing and relatively unrevealing. There is a constant

appeal to genocide credit coupled with aggressive rhetoric against anyone who disagrees with

regime policy. No one in the leadership has, of course, accepted the assassinations as being

conducted by Rwanda but has vehemently lashed out against anyone suggesting that the RPF

government may have been responsible. The example of official responses to the recent

strangling of Patrick Karegeya is telling.25 Prime Minister Pierre Damien Habumuremyi claimed

that “Betraying citizens and their country that made you a man shall always bear consequences

to you.”26 Minister of Defense James Kabarebe stated that “When you choose to be a dog, you

die like a dog, and the cleaners will wipe away the trash so that it does not stink for them.

Actually, such consequences are faced by those who have chosen such a path. There is nothing

we can do about it, and we should not be interrogated over it.”27 Finally, According to President

Paul Kagame: “Rwanda did not kill this person [Karegeya] – and it’s a big no. But I add that, I

actually wish Rwanda did it. I really wish it.”28

The level of disgust conveyed at Karegeya by his RPF critics is indicative of the

polarized and repressed socio-political debate in Rwanda. Sendashonga and Nyamwasa

experienced similar rhetoric and many dissidents face, either before or after they go into exile,

trumped up charges related to spreading genocide ideology or fraud, embezzlement, and

corruption. The response strategy seems to be tripartite: distance, delegitimize, and avoid but

never forget. The regime attempts to distance itself from the death and apparently stalls

investigations that point towards its involvement in the attack. Efforts are made to delegitimize

opponents through aggressive rhetoric, criminal charges, and appeals to genocide credit and


amnesia. After this, the government avoids questions about the disappearance or assassination by

ignoring them or talking around them.29 Irrespective of their involvement in the assassination,

Rwandan officials and their sympathizers make every attempt to keep trails leading back to them

cold. Despite increased pressure following recent attacks on Nyamwasa and Karegeya, the

government has been relatively successful with this denial strategy as opposed to its more

heavily scrutinized military involvement in eastern DRC.

A structured analysis of government responsibility

An analysis of competing hypothesis (ACH) is now used to examine RPF leadership culpability

in extrajudicial and extraterritorial assassinations of Rwandan dissidents. This structured

analytical technique, used in the realm of national security intelligence, is particularly helpful

because it clearly poses questions, addresses those questions with evidence, and helps in

organizing conclusions. The analysis considers three propositions regarding RPF responsibility

in these attacks. Following the ACH method, available evidence is then determined to be

consistent, inconsistent, or neutral to each proposition, and each hypothesis is examined

individually as well as in comparison to the others. This method combines the disparate findings

of academics, journalists, NGOs, bloggers/social media users, and a host of other sources into a

compilation that represents a near totality of the available open source evidence that has been

mounted for and against Kigali. The propositions explore the possibilities that the Rwandan

government is directly responsible, that the Rwandan government is indirectly responsible, and

that any actor unconnected to the Rwandan government is responsible for the assassination

attacks upon three high-profile dissident exiles: (a) Seth Sendashonga, (b) Faustin Kayumba

Nyamwasa, and (c) Patrick Karegeya.


Figure 2. Analyses of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) for Assassination Culpability in Three Case Studies of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents30

Cases and Evidence PropositionsA. Seth Sendashonga 1 2 3Was a victim of a previous assassination attempt31 C C CSacked/forced to resign from government position before exile32 C C NWas part of an RPF opposition movement in exile33 C C NOpenly disagreed with RPF policies both before and after exile34 C C NRPF history of dissident repression, detention, and torture35 C C NPrevious deaths of other dissident exiles36 C C CMan arrested for first attack in 1997 was employee at Rwandan Embassy in Nairobi37 C C NRwanda refused to revoke diplomatic immunity for arrested Embassy employee38 C C IFirst RPF member preparing to testify at ICTR39 C C CRPF-Kagame already under significant criticism for previous suspected attacks40 I I CAt least two Ugandans arrested in connection with death41 I C CWith aid of Twagiramungu was creating lists of those murdered by the RPF/RPA42 C C NRwandan diplomat expelled from Sweden in 2012 for "refugee espionage"43 C C ILondon Metropolitan Police warn Rwandan exiles of threat to safety from Rwanda44 C C IRwanda in talks with FDLR militias to end eastern DRC insurgency45 I I CRwanda involvement in both DRC wars and recent rebellions such as the M2346 C C IWas in planning stage of bringing ex-FAR soldiers to train in Tanzania to fight RPF47 C C IAttempted abduction of exile in Uganda during most intense post-Karegeya scrutiny48 C C CEuropean and U.S. diplomats tell RPF not to do "anything like this" there49 C C IDissenting foreigners - academics, journalists, officials - banned from Rwanda50 C C I

B. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa 1 2 3Was a victim of a previous assassination attempt51 C C CSacked/forced to resign from government position before exile52 C C NWas part of an RPF opposition movement in exile53 C C NOpenly disagreed with RPF politics both before and after exile54 C C NFound guilty in absentia by Rwandan courts55 C C NWife claims Kagame said in Parliament he would kill Nyamwasa56 C C IRPF history of dissident repression, detention, and torture57 C C NPossible use of Akagera Park as a secret training ground58 C I IPrevious deaths of other dissident exiles59 C C CClaims to have evidence of RPF culpability in Habyarimana plane crash60 C C IRPF-Kagame already under significant criticism for previous suspected attacks61 I I CTapes of Col. Munyuza attempting to get exiled Mr. Higiro to kill Nyamwasa62 I C IRwandan diplomat expelled from Sweden in 2012 for "refugee espionage"63 C C ILondon Metropolitan Police warn Rwandan exiles of threat to safety from Rwanda64 C C IRwanda in talks with FDLR militias to end eastern DRC insurgency65 I I CRwanda involvement in both DRC wars and recent rebellions such as the M2366 C C IAccused by Rwanda of involvement in Kigali grenade attacks from 2010-201367 C C IAttempted abduction of exile in Uganda during most intense post-Karegeya scrutiny68 C C CEuropean and U.S. diplomats tell RPF not to do "anything like this" there69 C C INyamwasa's guard in South Africa was tipped off about a "Rwandan hit squad"70 C C INyamwasa's guard was overpowered, the home ransacked, Pretoria caught no one71 C C CDissenting foreigners - academics, journalists, officials - banned from Rwanda72 C C I

Cases and Evidence PropositionsC. Patrick Karegeya 1 2 3Sacked/forced to resign from government position before exile73 C C NWas part of an RPF opposition movement in exile74 C C N


Found guilty in absentia by Rwandan courts75 C C NRPF history of dissident repression, detention, and torture76 C C NPossible use of Akagera Park as a secret training ground77 C I IPrevious deaths of other dissident exiles78 C C CNo perpetrators caught in relation to death79 I I IRPF-Kagame already under significant criticism for previous suspected attacks80 I I CParallel intimidation of outspoken regime critic and genocide hero Rusesabagina 81 C C IKagame: "…I actually wish Rwanda did it [kill Karegeya]. I really wish it."82 C C ITapes of Col. Munyuza attempting to get exiled Mr. Higiro to kill Karegeya83 I C ISouth African police have refused to release hotel CCTV footage of alleged assassins84 I I CStrangled rather than shot as other high-profile dissidents were85 I I CRwandan diplomat expelled from Sweden in 2012 for "refugee espionage"86 C C ILondon Metropolitan Police warn Rwandan exiles of threat to safety from Rwanda87 C C IRwanda in talks with FDLR militias to end eastern DRC insurgency88 I I CRwanda involvement in both DRC wars and recent rebellions such as the M2389 C C IAccused by Rwanda of involvement in Kigali grenade attacks from 2010-201390 C C IAttempted abduction of exile in Uganda during most intense post-Karegeya scrutiny91 C C CEuropean and U.S. diplomats tell RPF not to do "anything like this" there92 C C IVisited by Apollo Kiririsi, a shady Rwandan businessman, the night before his death93 C C NDissenting foreigners - academics, journalists, officials - banned from Rwanda94 C C I

Results

For the analyses conducted the results are displayed in Figure 3:

Figure 3. Results of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) for Assassination Culpability in Three Case Studies of Exiled Rwandan Dissidents

Proposition 1 Proposition 2 Proposition 3C I N C I N C I N

A. Seth Sendashonga

17/2085%

3/2015%

0/200%

18/2090%

2/2010%

0/200%

7/2035%

7/2035%

6/2030%

B. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa

19/2286%

3/2214%

0/220%

19/2286%

3/2214%

0/220%

6/2227%

11/2250%

5/2223%

C. Patrick Karegeya

16/2273%

6/2227%

0/220%

16/2273%

6/2227%

0/220%

6/2227%

11/2250%

5/2223%

For Propositions 1 and 2, both of which suggest Rwandan government involvement in the deaths

of the selected individuals, at least 73 percent of the evidence collected is consistent with the

proposition in all three cases. For proposition 3, the only one which does not imply Rwandan

involvement, Seth Sendashonga’s case has the highest amount of consistent evidence at only 35

percent. As far as consistent evidence is concerned, those propositions alleging Rwandan


involvement in the assassination attacks contain the most evidence by a considerable number of

percentage points.

However, disconfirming evidence presents potential flaws in the propositions and

assumptions and directs observers toward alternative propositions. Proposition 3, suggesting no

Rwandan involvement, had the highest percentages of inconsistent evidence at 35 percent, 50

percent, and 50 percent for cases A, B, and C respectively. Inconsistent evidence was highest for

Patrick Karegeya’s case but still only reached 27 percent in regards to both propositions 1 and 2.

The proposition excluding Rwandan involvement has a much larger percentage of inconsistent

evidence compared to far smaller percentages in propositions 1 and 2. These findings indicate

that the propositions suggesting Rwandan responsibility for the attacks have sturdier bodies of

evidence than the proposition that an actor unconnected to the Rwandan government is

responsible.

Neutral evidence was a non-factor for propositions 1 and 2. This is likely because the

work of most writers, reporters, and commentators tends to point directly at Rwanda or away

from it (although the former is far more common). This paradigm in reporting on Rwanda and its

exiles manifests itself with a number of neutral pieces of evidence in regards to proposition 3,

alleging no Rwandan involvement. This is not unexpected as opinions and writing on the subject

have never produced any credible argument that implicates actors unconnected to the Rwandan

government. The Rwandan government and its beneficiaries will point away from Rwanda, often

rather vehemently, but not in any specific or operable direction.

What to do going forward?

Available evidence overwhelmingly incriminates the Rwandan government, unquestionably led

by Kagame, for the assassination attacks on these three individuals. Further examinations into


the disappearances and deaths of other prominent individuals and common citizenry both inside

and outside of Rwanda could reveal similar results. One or two of the listed pieces of evidence

for each case alone may not be enough to make conclusive statements about guilt but the bodies

of circumstantial evidence constructed for each case suggests the Rwandan government is

responsible.

Combining various types of evidence into one open-source analysis sheds comprehensive

light on the assassination attacks inflicted upon Seth Sendashonga, Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa,

and Patrick Karegeya. What was largely a group of disparate analyses of this problem is now a

unified picture of the situation that strongly implies Rwanda, and specifically President Paul

Kagame, is involved in the operations that have led to the deaths of Seth Sendashonga and

Patrick Karegeya and the injuries of Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa. Additionally, it is highly

likely that groups or individuals unconnected to Rwanda are not responsible for the attacks.

While there is minimal evidence against Rwanda’s involvement, there is not a dominant piece of

evidence that would come close to getting Rwanda off the hook. Rwandan officials do not seem

to care how their actions are perceived outside of Rwanda. Had Rwandan officials been able to

counter the accusations placed against them,95 there would perhaps be a shred of credibility to

Rwanda’s argument. President Kagame’s “We didn’t kill them, but we wish we did” approach is

hardly convincing.

These findings highlight not only the need for states to keep a watchful eye over the

Rwandan diaspora and important associated figures, but also the need to the monitor the flows of

peoples across their borders and the potential security threats that smaller, third-world states can

pose. No longer is the only statal threat from large countries with high-tech weaponry but also

from smaller ones who can operate efficiently and ruthlessly to achieve specific objectives.


Diasporas and refugees, especially those who may possess critical knowledge or hold significant

influence within their state of origin or its peoples globally need to be listened to. Their access to

and understanding of the situations facing certain individuals and groups are likely to be deeper

and more nuanced than an outsider’s view. With these analytical results in hand, more effective

thought and policy can be formulated surrounding the assassinations of exiled Rwandan

dissidents.

Notes

1 “Rwanda.” World Bank, 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda.2 Filip Reyntjens, “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world: Governance in post-

genocide Rwanda,” African Affairs 110 (2011).3 Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2009).4 Filip Reyntjens, “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world: Governance in post-

genocide Rwanda,”; Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006; Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Andrea Purdekova, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: surveillance and state reach in Rwanda,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 49 (2011), 486-487.

5 “Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch, January 28, 2014.6 See, for example: “Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch; “Gen. Kayumba Shooting

[analysis],” The Independent, June 27, 2010; “Kenya: Inquiry into assassination of Rwandese opposition leader in exile urgently needed,” Amnesty International; Josh Kron and Jeffrey Gettleman, “London police warn Rwandan dissidents of threat from their government,” The New York Times, May 20, 2011; Geoffrey York and Judi Rever, “Assassination in Africa: Inside the plots to kill Rwanda’s dissidents,” The Globe and Mail, May 2, 2014.

7 Filip Reyntjens, “Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematising ‘Liberation’ and ‘Democratisation’,” Third World Quarterly 27 (2006): 1105-1106.

8 Robert McGill Thomas Jr., “Alphonse Nkubito Dies at 42; Ex-Rwandan Justice Minister,” The New York Times, February 21, 1997; Nkubito had survived two assassination attempts before his death but had also been overweight and previously suffered from health issues.

9 Reyntjens, “Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematising ‘Liberation’ and ‘Democratisation’,” 1105-1106.10 Bizimungu has also remained silent since his pardon, meaning he is allowed to stay in Rwanda as long as he

does not engage in any anti-regime activities.11 Nyamwasa, Radio France Internationale; “Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.12 “Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.13 African Union Commission, “”Final Report of African Union Election Observation Mission to the 16-18

September 2013 Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Rwanda.” African Union, 2013.14 African Union Commission, “”Final Report of African Union Election Observation Mission to the 16-18

September 2013 Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Rwanda.”; Commonwealth Expert Team. “Rwanda Legislative Election (Chamber of Deputies).” The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2013: 1-29.

15 For one example of repression leading up to elections see: “Rwanda: End attacks on opposition parties,” Human Rights Watch, February 2, 2010.

16 Andrea Purdekova, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: surveillance and state reach in Rwanda.”

17 Ibid; For imihigo, see Purdekova, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: surveillance and state reach in Rwanda,” 10-12.

18 Anonymous scholar, email to author, June 12, 2014; Anonymous former foreign correspondent to Rwanda, email to author, June 18, 2014; Robert Mukombozi, email to author, June 16, 2014; For a fairly comprehensive list of the deaths of disappearances of dissident Rwandan public figures, see “Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.

19 For genocide credit see Filip Reyntjens. “Rwanda, ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship,” African Affairs 103 (2004); For genocide amnesia see Susanne Buckley-Zistel. “Remembering to forget: Chosen amnesia as a strategy for local coexistence in post-genocide Rwanda,” Africa, 76 (2006).

20 Génocidaires is a French word referring to those who took part in the killing during the genocide; Interahamwe is a Kinyarwanda word referring to the Hutu genocidal paramilitary group that escaped to the DRC once the genocide itself had been stopped. The most well-known group containing Interahamwe are the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR).

21 “Exiled Rwandan ex-spy boss murdered in South Africa,” Reuters, January 2, 2014.22 Constructed with great aid from Robert Mukombozi, email to author, June 16, 2014; See also the

“Government” section of Republic of Rwanda. “Republic of Rwanda.” Accessed July 3, 2014. http://www.gov.rw/.23 It could be argued that the Presidential Guard’s directives and capabilities are only centered on protecting

President Kagame. However, the intelligence, operations, logistics, and forces close to the President cannot be assumed to be unconnected to or not trusted with tasks related to external operations or intelligence; Robert Mukombozi, “Nyamwasa: Museveni wrong on Kagame,” The Observer, July 2, 2014.

24 “Kagame sacks prime minister, cabinet reshuffle expected,” New Vision, July 23, 2014; For a listing of current officials see Republic of Rwanda, “Republic of Rwanda,” Accessed July 3, 2014. http://www.gov.rw/.

25 “Rwanda: Repression across Borders.” Human Rights Watch; Louise Mushikiwabo, Twitter post, January 5, 2014, https://twitter.com/LMushikiwabo; Habumuremyi, Twitter post, January 6, 2014, 6:26 am, https://twitter.com/HabumuremyiP.; “President Kagame: Betray Rwanda, face consequences,” Associated Press,

January 13, 2014.26 Pierre Damien Habumuremyi, Twitter post, January 6, 2014, 6:24 am, https://twitter.com/HabumuremyiP.27 Gahiji Innocent, “Gen Kabarebe On Karegeya: ‘When You Choose To Be A Dog, You Die Like A Dog’,”

News of Rwanda, January 11, 2014.28 Matina Stevis and Thorold Barker, “Rwanda President denies role in ex-spy chief’s death,” The Wall Street

Journal, January 23, 2014.29 For a classic example of President Kagame deflecting and avoiding pointed questions about assassinations of

dissidents see: Paul Kagame, Interview with Zeinab Badawi, HARDtalk, July 12, 2012.30 The ACHs can be read as follows: the listed case (A,B,C) identifies the individual who was attacked and

beneath the name is the evidence collected during the analysis that is relevant to that individual. Some evidence is unique to certain individuals while other evidence is shared. The letters to the right of the evidence indicate whether the piece of evidence is consistent (C), inconsistent (I), or neutral (N) to each listed proposition. Totals are displayed in the results chart in Figure 2.

31 “Kenya: Inquiry into assassination of Rwandese opposition leader in exile urgently needed,” Amnesty International.

32 “Kenya: Inquiry into assassination of Rwandese opposition leader in exile urgently needed,” Amnesty International.

33 “Government accused over Hutu killing,” The Birmingham Post, May 18, 1998.34 “Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.35 “Rwanda: Shrouded in Secrecy,” Amnesty International, 2012.36 “Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.37 Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental

Catastrophe, 365-368.38 Ibid.39 “Slain Rwandan was to testify at genocide court,” CNN, May 18, 1998.40 “Andrew Mwenda on Patrick Karegeya’s Death,” Youtube Video, 18:29, posted by “Francois Gatete,”

January 3, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kvxM8fWALl0.41 “Human Rights Watch and the FIDH Condemn the Assassination of Seth Sendashonga,” Human Rights

Watch, May 19, 1998.42 Faustin Twagiramungu, Faustin Twagiramungu to Rapporteur Spécial pour le Rwanda de la Commission des

Droits de l’Homme René Degni-Segui, Bruxelles, Belgique, June 3, 1996.43 Karl Ritter, “Sweden expels Rwandan diplomat,” Associated Press, February 13, 2012.44 Kron and Gettleman, “London police warn Rwandan dissidents of threat from their government.”45 Kenny Katombe, “Rwandan rebels begin to surrender, but demand talks with Kigali,” Reuters, May 30,

2014.46 Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics; United Nations, Security Council,

Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2012/843 (15 November 2012).

47 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 365-368.48 Frederic Musisi and Risdel Kasasira. “Police foil kidnap of another Rwandan refugee,” Daily Monitor, April

12, 2014.49 “Rwanda’s foreign adventures test West’s patience,” Reuters, April 5, 2014; Anonymous Great Lakes

scholar, correspondence with author, July 11, 2014.50 Reyntjens, “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world,” 3-7.51 Robert Mukombozi, “Nyamwasa: Museveni wrong on Kagame,” The Observer, July 2, 2014.52 Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, Interview with Sonia Rolley, Radio France Internationale, RFI, July 9, 2013.53 York and Rever, “Assassination in Africa.”54 Nyamwasa, Radio France Internationale.55 “Exiled Rwandan ex-spy boss murdered in South Africa,” Reuters, January 2, 2014. 56 “Gen. Kayumba Shooting [analysis],” The Independent.57 “Rwanda: Shrouded in Secrecy,” Amnesty International.58 Purdekova, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’,” 488.59 See death of Seth Sendashonga; “Rwanda: Repression across Borders.”60 Nyamwasa, Radio France Internationale.61 “Andrew Mwenda on Patrick Karegeya’s Death,” Youtube Video.62 York and Rever, “Assassination in Africa.” 63 Ritter, “Sweden expels Rwandan diplomat.”64 Kron and Gettleman, “London police warn Rwandan dissidents of threat from their government.”65 Katombe, “Rwandan rebels begin to surrender, but demand talks with Kigali.”66 Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics; United Nations, Security Council,

Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council.

67 “Gen. Kayumba Shooting [analysis],” The Independent.68 Musisi and Kasasira. “Police foil kidnap of another Rwandan refugee.”69 “Rwanda’s foreign adventures test West’s patience,” Reuters.70 The Independent Team, “State-sponsored killers,” The Independent, March 22, 2014. 71 Independent Team, “State-sponsored killers.”72 Reyntjens, “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world,” 3-7.73 Robert Mukombozi, “What Col. Karegeya said about Rwanda,” The Observer, January 2, 2014.74 York and Rever, “Assassination in Africa.”75 Exiled Rwandan ex-spy boss murdered in South Africa,” Reuters.76 “Rwanda: Shrouded in Secrecy,” Amnesty International.77 Purdekova, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’,” 488.78 See death of Seth Sendashonga and attack on Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa; “Rwanda: Repression across

Borders.”79 Geoffrey York and Judi Rever, “Africa; For Rwanda’s opposition abroad, a growing threat from home,” The

Globe and Mail, May 14, 2014.80 “Andrew Mwenda on Patrick Karegeya’s Death,” Youtube Video.81 U.S. House of Representatives, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman Royce decries targeted killings

of Rwandan regime critics abroad, by Ed Royce, Washington D.C., 2014, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/03.11.14 - State%2C Secretary Kerry%2C Express Concern about Attempted Attac....pdf.

82 Matina Stevis and Thorold Barker, “Rwanda President denies role in ex-spy chief’s death,” The Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2014.

83 York and Rever, “Assassination in Africa.”84 The Shyaka Kanuma Blog, http://focus.rw/sk/2014/04/sa-investigations-in-nyamwasakaregeya-attacks-

become-more-suspicious/, April 10, 2014.85 “Rwanda: Repression across Borders,” Human Rights Watch.86 Ritter, “Sweden expels Rwandan diplomat.”87 Kron and Gettleman, “London police warn Rwandan dissidents of threat from their government.”88 Katombe, “Rwandan rebels begin to surrender, but demand talks with Kigali.”89 Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics; United Nations, Security Council,

Letter dated 12 November 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council.

90 “Gen. Kayumba Shooting [analysis],” The Independent.91 Musisi and Kasasira. “Police foil kidnap of another Rwandan refugee.”92 “Rwanda’s foreign adventures test West’s patience,” Reuters.93 “Assassinat de Patrick Karegeya: l’un des principaux suspects reste introuvable,” Radio France

Internationale, January 3, 2014.94 Reyntjens, “Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world,” 3-7.95 Numerous attempts by the author to contact the Rwandan government and its supporters were unsuccessful.

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Sean Curtis - Article.docx - Academics Portal Index Curtis - Ar… · Web viewUnited Kingdom as well as from a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Rwanda, bordering