1

Sales v. Barro

This case originated from the ejectment complaint filed by the petitioners against the respondent, his wife, and all persons claiming rights under them before Branch 28 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.  In their complaint,[3] the petitioners alleged among others that (1) they are owners of the lot described and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT ) No. 262237[4] of the Registry of Deeds of the City of Manila; (2) the respondent constructed a shanty thereon without their consent; (3) the respondent and his co-defendants have not been paying any rent to the petitioners for their occupation thereof; (4) the respondent and his co-defendants refused the formal demand made by the petitioners for them to vacate the subject lot; and (5) the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay 464, Zone 46, 4th District, Manila issued the necessary Certification to File Action.[5]

In his answer, the respondent denied the allegations of the complaint, and essentially claimed that (1) his construction of the temporary makeshift house on the lot was tolerated by the petitioners, considering that he acted as the caretaker thereof; and (2) he does not remember receiving any demand letter and summons from the barangay and so he was surprised to know that an ejectment complaint was filed against him.[6]

In its Decision[7] dated September 27, 2004, the MeTC found in favor of the petitioners.  It held that the respondent, his wife, and all persons claiming rights under them, being possessors by tolerance, can be validly ejected from the lot at any time and after due notice.  It then directed them to vacate the lot, pay P5,000 a month from January 2004 up to such time that the lot is actually turned over to the petitioners, and pay P10,000 as attorney’s fees.

The respondent appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the assailed MeTC decision.

Unfazed by the decision of the RTC, the respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.  After finding the complaint to be substantially lacking in the requisite allegations that would make out a case either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer,[8] the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and accordingly dismissed the petitioners’ complaint.  The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition on the basis of the lower tribunals’ lack of jurisdiction, and

accordingly DISMISS respondents’ ejectment complaint.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the motion.  Hence, this petition on the following grounds:

I.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS’ EJECTMENT COMPLAINT ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE THE JURISDICTIONAL FACT OF PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION.

II.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ASSUMING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT.[10]

Simply put, we are asked to resolve:  (1) whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint; and (2) whether the respondent was already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Anent the first issue, the petitioners argue that the complaint was for unlawful detainer, and hence, there was no need for them to allege prior physical possession of the lot. They further contend that their position that the complaint was for unlawful detainer is supported by the claim of the respondent in his answer that “he made a temporary makeshift structure on the lot to serve as his living place and that the same was tolerated by the petitioners considering that he acted as caretaker of the property.”[11]  For his part, the respondent insists that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the complaint.[12]

After carefully examining the averments of the petitioners’ complaint and the character of the reliefs sought therein,[13] we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that the complaint was for forcible entry, and that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed it.

2

There are two reasons why we could not subscribe to the petitioners’ submission that their complaint was for unlawful detainer.  Firstly, the petitioners’ own averment in the complaint “that the defendant constructed a shanty in the lot of the plaintiffs without their consent,”[14] and the relief asked for by the petitioners that the respondent and his wife“pay the amount of P10,000 a month beginning January 2004 as for reasonable rent of the subject premises,”[15] clearly contradict their claim.  It must be highlighted that as admitted by the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration[16] before the appellate court, and as evidenced by the TCT No. 262237 annexed to the complaint, the petitioners became owners of the property only on January 6, 2004.  By averring that the respondent constructed his shanty on the lot without their consent and then praying that the MeTC direct the respondent to pay them rent from January 2004, or from the inception of the respondent’s occupation of the lot, no other conclusion can be made except that the petitioners had always considered respondent’s occupation of the same to be unlawful from the very beginning.  Hence, the complaint can never support a case for unlawful detainer.  “It is a settled rule that in order to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the owner’s permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession.”[17]

Secondly, the nature of the complaint is neither changed nor dependent upon the allegations and/or defenses made in the answer.  As we had previously stated in Cañiza v. Court of Appeals,[18] “it is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.”

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, what the petitioners actually filed was a fatally defective complaint for forcible entry, considering that there was no allegation therein regarding the petitioners’ prior physical possession of the lot.[19]  In Tirona v. Alejo, we held that “in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction:  first, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property; and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1,[20] Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.” [21]

The petitioners’ allegation that they are the registered owners of the lot miserably falls short of satisfying the required averment of prior physical possession.  As we had clarified and stressed in Tirona, “the word possession as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, means nothing more than physical   possession, not legal possession  in the sense contemplated in civil law.”[22]

Finally, was the respondent already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC to try the petitioners’ complaint?  The petitioners argue that the respondent is already estopped because the respondent failed to assail the jurisdiction of the MeTC at the earliest opportunity and actively participated in the proceedings before it.[23]  The respondent counters that he could not be held guilty of estoppel because he questioned in his answer and pleadings petitioners’ allegation that he was served a demand letter.  By questioning the veracity of the allegation of the existence of a jurisdictional requirement, he, in effect, questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC in trying the case.[24]

It is well-settled that a court’s jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.  The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.[25]  The rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of action or subject matter of the case.[26]  In any event, even if respondent did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the case.  In this sense, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction may even be ordered by the court motu proprio.[27]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

3

MEDINA vs GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

The propriety of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (Branch 276) in Civil Case No. 98-233 is the sole issue in this petition for review on certiorari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals nullifying said writ.

Petitioners are the grandchildren of Pedro Medina from two marriages. In his first marriage to Isadora San Jose, Pedro sired three children: Rafael, Rita and Remegia; in his second marriage, this time to Natalia Mullet, Pedro had five: Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Crisanta and Rosila. Except for Balbino and Crisanta, all of Pedro's children likewise bore children, the petitioners in this case.1

On June 5, 1962, Pedro, his brother Alberto Medina and his niece Nazaria Cruz (Alberto's daughter) executed a notarized Contract to Sell in favor of respondent Greenfield Development Corporation over a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City, then in the Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 100177 (Lot 90-A) and measuring 17,121 square meters.2 A notarized Deed of Sale covering said property was subsequently entered into on June 27, 1962, in favor of respondent, and this time signed by Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz, as vendors.3

Thereafter, a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage was executed on September 4, 1964 in favor of respondent over Lot 90-B covered by TCT No. 100178, measuring 16,291 square meters. Signing as vendors were Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz.4

By virtue of these sales, respondent was able to register in its name the title to the two parcels of land with TCT No. 100578 covering Lot 90-A and TCT No. 133444 covering Lot 90-B. These properties were consolidated with other lots and were eventually registered on July 19, 1995, in the name of respondent under TCT Nos. 202295, 202296 and 202297.5

On November 6, 1998, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 98-233, an action for annulment of titles and deeds, reconveyance, damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order, against respondent and the Register of Deeds of Makati.6 Included in the complaint are the heirs of Nazaria Cruz, as unwilling co-plaintiffs.7 Petitioners allege in their complaint that they are co-owners of these two parcels of land. While the titles were registered in the names of Pedro, Alberto, Cornelio, Brigida and Gregoria, all surnamed Medina, they alleged that they were recognized as co-owners thereof. In support of

their case, petitioners maintain that the deeds of sale on these properties were simulated and fictitious, and the signatures of the vendors therein were fake. Despite the transfer of the title to respondent's name, they remained in possession thereof and in fact, their caretaker, a certain Santos Arevalo and his family still reside on a portion of the property. On July 13, 1998, petitioners caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the titles. After discovering the annotation, respondent constructed a fence on the property and posted security personnel, barring their ingress and egress. Thus, petitioners sought, among others, the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent and its agents and representatives from preventing petitioners to exercise their rights over the properties.8

Respondent denied the allegations, stating that petitioners have no valid claim on the properties as it is already titled in its name by virtue of the public documents executed by their predecessors. As counterclaim, respondent alleged that Santos Arevalo is not petitioners' caretaker and it was them who employed him as caretaker.9

On January 18, 1999, the trial court issued its resolution granting petitioners' prayer for injunctive relief.

the Court of Appeals11 rendered its decision nullifying the trial court's resolution, 

the sole issue in this case is whether or not the trial court erred in granting petitioners' prayer for injunctive relief. 

In sum, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals was correct in nullifying the same.

Possession and ownership are two different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. Even assuming that petitioners' allegations are true, it bears no legal consequence in the case at hand because the execution of the deeds of conveyances is already deemed equivalent to delivery of the property to respondent, and prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required.28 Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, "when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred." Possession is also transferred, along with ownership thereof, to respondent by virtue of the notarized deeds of conveyances.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds justifying the issuance of a preliminary injunction, to wit:

4

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.16 Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites:17

1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;

(2) a violation of that right;

(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

Hence, petitioners' entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on their prima facie legal right to the properties subject of the present dispute. The Court notes that the present dispute is based solely on the parties' allegations in their respective pleadings and the documents attached thereto. We have on one hand, petitioners' bare assertion or claim that they are co-owners of the properties sold by their predecessors to respondent, and on the other, respondent's claim of ownership supported by deeds of conveyances and torrens titles in their favor. From these alone, it is clear that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing a clear and unmistakable right to be protected. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of

irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.

5

G.R. No.  162787

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Vs  ALONTE,

On August 10, 2001, the petitioner-appellee [herein respondent] Lourdes F. Alonte filed a Petition for the Reconstitution of the Original of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 335986 and Issuance of the Corresponding Owner's Duplicate thereof supposedly over lot 18-B of the subd. Plan (LRC) Psd-328326 containing an area of Eighty Square Meters and Ninety Five Square Decimeters (80.95) situated in the Municipality of Caloocan (nowQuezon City).                The petitioner-appellee alleged in its [sic] petition that she is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land with its improvement situated in Quezon City, bounded and described as follows:                x x x x                It is further alleged that the original copy of the aforesaid title which used to be kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was among those declared either destroyed or burned during the fire which razed the said office on June 11, 1988 (Annex “E”, Certification From the Register of Deeds, Records, p. 9). 

               Likewise, the petitioner-appellee alleged that the owner's Duplicate copy thereof was lost and an affidavit to that effect was executed and accordingly filed in the Office of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City (Annex “F”).                At the ex-parte hearing conducted on January 4, 2002, the petitioner-appellee was represented by her attorney-in-fact, Editha Alonte as evidenced by a Special Power of Attorney (Exh. “H”).  The petitioner-appellee is presently in the United States and the witness and her family together with her sisters-in-law are the ones presently occupying the house erected thereon.                The following documents were presented to prove the jurisdictional facts: 

   The adjoining owners of the subject property were also furnished with copies of the Order dated August 29, 2001 by registered mail, as evidenced by the registry return cards (Exhibits “G”, “G-1” and “G-2”) attached to the records.  There being no opposition thereto, the petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte before a Hearing Officer designated by the Court.

the RTC granted the petition. CA then issued the assailed Decision affirming the RTC judgment.  The CA held that the RTC did not err in ordering the reconstitution of the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.

6

335986 based on a photocopy because the court applied Section 3(f) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26, entitled “An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed”, which took effect on September 26, 1946.  Said provision states that “transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from x x xany other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

w/n The Court of Appeals erred in finding that there is sufficient and proper basis for reconstitution of TCT No. 335986.

   The petition is unmeritorious.

The petition for reconstitution alleged that respondent is in possession of the subject lot and it listed the names and addresses of adjoining owners enumerated in the Certification from the Office of the City Assessor dated August 1, 2001; it stated that the title is free from any and all liens and encumbrances; and it stated that a copy of TCT No. 335986 is attached to the petition and made an integral part of the petition, hence, the restrictions and liabilities appearing at the back of the copy of the TCT are deemed part of the petition for reconstitution.  Said petition was also accompanied by a technical description of the property approved by the Commissioner of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, the predecessor of the LRA, as prescribed under the last condition of Section 12 of R.A. No. 26.  Thus, the petition clearly complied with the requirements of Section 12, R.A. No. 26. 

Section 12.  Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Section x x x 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property.  The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c ) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet.  All documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Sections 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.

 

7

                               Section 13.  The Court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.  The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.  Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein, must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition.  The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.

337 DBP v. CA | Davide, Jr.

G.R. No. 118342 January 5, 1998

FACTS

•

Lydia P. Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease the Government; She obtained several loans from the Development Bank of the under the terms stated in the Promissory Notes; As security for said loans, Cuba executed two Deeds of Assignment of her Leasehold Rights;

•

Cuba failed to pay her loan on the scheduled dates thereof in accordance with the

terms of the Promissory Notes; Without foreclosure proceedings, whether

judicial or extra-judicial, DBP appropriated the Leasehold Rights of Cuba

over the fishpond in question;

•

After DBP has appropriated the Leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in question, DBP, in turn, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of the Leasehold Rights in favor of Cuba over the same fishpond in question;

•

In the negotiation for repurchase, Cuba addressed two letters to the Manager DBP, Dagupan City. DBP thereafter accepted the offer to repurchase in a letter addressed to Cuba;

•

After the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in favor of Cuba , a new Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food in favor of Cuba only, excluding her husband;

•

Cuba failed to pay the amortizations stipulated in the Deed of Conditional

Sale; After Cuba failed to pay the amortization as stated in Deed of Conditional

Sale, she entered with the DBP a temporary arrangement whereby in consideration for the deferment of the Notarial Rescission of Deed of Conditional Sale, Cuba promised to make certain payments;

•

DBP thereafter sent a Notice of Rescission thru Notarial Act, and which was received by Cuba ; After the Notice of Rescission, DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights of the fishpond in question;

•

8

That after DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights over the fishpond in question, DBP thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of defendant AgripinaCaperal through a public sale; Thereafter, Caperal was awarded Fishpond Lease Agreement.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

•

W/N Cuba is entitled to recover damages

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

YESArticle 2199 provides:

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent

proof that they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. In the present case, the trial court awarded in favor of CUBA P1,067,500 as actual damages consisting of P550,000 which represented the value of the alleged lost articles of CUBA and P517,500 which represented the value of the 230,000 pieces of bangus allegedly stocked in 1979 when DBP first ejected CUBA from the fishpond and the adjoining house. This award was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

We find that the alleged loss of personal belongings and equipment was not proved by clear evidence. Other than the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the existence of those items before DBP took over the fishpond in question. As pointed out by DBP, there was not "inventory of the alleged lost items before the loss which is normal in a project which sometimes, if

not most often, is left to the care of other persons." Neither was a single receipt or record of acquisition presented.

Curiously, in her complaint dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included "losses of property" as among the damages resulting from DBP's take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only in September 1985 when her son and a caretaker went to the fishpond and the adjoining house that she came to know of the alleged loss of several articles. Such claim for "losses of property," having been made before knowledge of the alleged actual loss, was therefore speculative. The alleged loss could have been a mere afterthought or subterfuge to justify her claim for actual damages.

With regard to the award of P517,000 representing the value of the alleged 230,000 pieces of bangus which died when DBP took possession of the fishpond in March 1979, the same was not called for. Such loss was not duly proved; besides, the claim therefor was delayed unreasonably. From 1979 until after the filing of her complaint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not bring to the attention of DBP the alleged loss. The award of actual damages should, therefore, be struck down for lack of sufficient basis.

In view, however, of DBP's act of appropriating CUBA's leasehold rights which was contrary to law and public policy, as well as its false representation to the then Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources that it had "foreclosed the mortgage," an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is in order conformably with Article 2219(10), in relation to Article 21, of the Civil Code. Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of P25,000 should likewise be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good. 20 There being an award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees are also recoverable.