i RETURN TO CGRCULATINr COPY RESTRICTED

IREPORTS DESK Report No. EMA-13aI /ITHII TO RF RPFTIRNFD Tn RFPORTS DFSKI WITHINI S'EE iA {IN CFIINTRAI FiLES

This report was. prepared for u,e withn te lank an' 'its ciflliated organdf-avionz. lThey do not accept respon'sibility for its accuracy or completeness. The report mayviv WC pvubIliseu' nor I,u 'eibe quoteu u srepresenring their views.l

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION ANT) DEVELOPMENT

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

TTTNTISTA

August 31, 1969

Europe, Middle East andNorth Africa Department

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

F o r e w o r d

The nresent report. nrenared at the reauest of the Tunisianauthorities, is confined to a study of the State-owned enterprisesand the stpns that couild be taken to i Trrnrn thnir nit1ation.Many of the strengths and weaknesses noted in some of Tunisia'sStateoi-.ued entDrprises ar f-olndl eso in certni private enter-prises, so that some of the measures recommended would apply equallyTsT~1 1 +f^ +.ho 1 n.+.Qw

Ir. this; concin s reea" ed that -- Jar.uar 'In 10A8.La& IJULOA JflAJ.LLUA~.. .. 1. ~~..LL¼ WAUO U ' U~UtJ".4. I -. I -

the Bank circulated among the Consultative Group a memorandum onprivat -4 r.ve-st.ment in%- si TmTr 6-,) -40ic -- 4--Ae 4-- 4trends

of private investment and the related policy of the Tunisian Govern-m,ent.

±III repUrtL- Was prepa-ed.U 011 lI1i L)oni±.i 01he basisL LU±UU oUf± IiclUlected

in Tunisia from February 10 to March 15, 1969 by a mission headedby Mr. Andre Nespoulous-Neuville and including IMessrs. Anyan Civin-giroglu, Alain Pignon (consultant) and Dickin Drew (consultant).Tne final version was arrived at in the course of discussions withthe Tunisian authorities held on July 28 through 30, 1969.

TABLE OF WOiTTR1TS Pape IJo.

SUTMARY

INTROnTT('TTOTIT

THE_ DIFFICULTIES

enera1 4m .pressions

Shortage of key-personnel 9TJnd,ers+ia.r+ion of the- Afi+c'ties 9

Investments 9Role oP 4he Pl^n 0

Weakness of the machinery for limiting investments 10IF±lyLementation ofI 'nvestJentJs andUIU4L WS probLJer,.s I1

Use of foreign technical assistance 12r,.L±ect on econoUi-LU developraenLt I2-

Management 12The siinwia ± ar i.actor

Management policy 13Accounting 14Criteria of good management 14Confusion of the lines of responsibility- bet-weenlthe enterprises and the authorities concerned 15

RECOONE1qDATIONS 17

Progress already made 17Steps to be taken 18

A. Internal reorganization of the enterprises 18B. Manpower training 20C. Determining the efficiency of enterprises 20

(a) Specific action 20(b) Financial overhaul 20(c) Price policy 21

D. Distribution of responsibilities and duties 22(a) The problem in context 22(b) Operational responsibilities 24(c) Investments 26

E. Mobilization of private savings 27

ANJEX 1 - List of State-owned enterprises and short noteon the activities of the major State-ownedenterprises

ANNEX 2 - Operating framework of the State-owned enterprises

ANNEX 3 - Financial situation and capital structure of theState-owned enterprises

TABLES -

S u m m a r v

1. The Tunisian rfTvArnment t s nnol cv towards thn enternrises showsa remarkable continuity. The Government's attitude to the three formsof enternriqsej nrivatej S.tat-owned I/ nnd ncooperaive iS one off nPmtrq-lity. It has called on each to contribute to national prosperity, settingaside its owm pnrtficuilnJ" inurests, +ijo-1 nnr to seek toai rzArse 'r7In turn, it offers to each the same tax advantages and the same investmentinre-an.t;x.res

2. In addition to nationalization and the bsuyng out of' foreigncompanies, the Tunisian Government believes that State-owned enterprises

So ' be o ,,edI eter in 4the pub"Jc sendce a. r^astructura.1 sectors,~M LA. W %A~U LJ.UALUL J..L1 U41W PLAULLL., QV V L~, dMLi. JL I .L " UL Du%,U .. %J~.JJ. "

or in the event of lack of initiative on the part of the private sector,o also in oder to help to star-t up new form-ILs of economic activity.

t!~ - t - t n t .2 t t..

3. ice indueperluence, lb is thle Sbabe-owneu enterpiises thab havebeen the main investors, particularly in the industrial sector. It seemsthat tlis is in part due to the preponderance of capitai-intonlvte eiter-

prises in the succesive plans -- a trend that wias already evident in theTen-Year Outlook (Perspectives Decennales) -- the establisnment of wnichlies in the hands of the State, unlike the smaller labor-intensive enter-prises that generally depend on private initiative. In the case of thelatter, it is also likely that, with the exception of tourism, in whichprivate capital has recently shown an interest, private investors haveeither felt that the prospects were not sufficiently inviting or that theguarantees offered them were insufficient in spite of many incentives(see memorandum on private investment, TUN 68-3), confirmed in the recent-ly published Investment Code.

4. The likelihood of development of private investment in sectorsother than tourism remains small, and this situation is reflected in the1969-72 Plan. It seems regrettable to the extent that one of Tunisia'sprincipal advantages in seeking to conquer foreign markets and make upfor the limitations of domestic outlets lies in the richness and qualityof its own labor force and in their remarkable adaptability.

5. A large number of State-owned and private enterprises haveperformed disappointingly since independence. So far as the State-ownedenterprises are concerned, this is difficult to explain in a country inwhich government officials are capable and dedicated to the public inte-rest and where many of the managers of enterprises do not spare theirefforts. Continuity of operation of the former foroign companies upontheir conversion to State-owned enterprises has presented few problems.However, in the case of the establishment of new State-owned enterprises,or of substantial exDansion of the operations of existine enterorises. thecomplexity of the preliminary studies required and the start-up diffi-culties and management problems anpear to have been inderestimated.

1/ For the definition of State-owned enterprises, seefootnote 1, page 1.

- ii -

6. Most new investments have been decided on by the public autho-rities and undertaken either by existing companies lacking the means to

evaluate profitability and, consequently, acting as executing agents forthe authorities, or by new enternrises brought into being for the pur-pose. The desire to achieve the investment targets of the Plan and, atthe same time , to obtain the financing needed has led to overhasty p^e-liminary studies and has often compromised production targets and invest-ment profitabilitv. Errors have been made in domestic market studies,and unfavorable contracts placed with suppliers of equipments. Initialcapital provision has not+. alway bn h suffT- ient to meet unforeseenadditional investment outlays and to cover any losses in the first yearsof operation and requirerments of working capital. This has necessitatedimpromptu financing with bank overdrafts, which has overloaded operating

acc1-t &n heped to confuse f nar.cal results.- n,,A i1 - ~ .~~v~.+- v.l ca, +-

7.T~ 4-1, ~+ ,*h In tvysaQ+r.nt screening is entrusted

to the same departments as are responsible for investment promotion.Ueither the enterpris se themselves, which are urged by the pnihli autho -

rities to invest and lack the means to judge the profitability of pro-jec, nor the banks and the Central Bank, which do not appear to playany significant role in investment decisions, nor the M-inistry of Finance,whih is - 0Pe 710 anning, have any s+1+atftrT res-WII.LcI ± L-~ JsnLrgdai--± 4Ale ±L I U.LI LI±1±i Li 1v~ -~

ponsibility for ensuring that arguments in favor of caution are heard.

8. In the management field, the shortage of key personnel, whileit is diminishing, remains acute. Accountants are often nothing .orethan bookkeepers and directors of finance, when they do exist, performa subsidiary role. The Pr6didents Directeurs Genkraux often work inisolation, lacking the knowledge or the ability to establish an effectivcComite de Direction working as a team. Their quaiifications are moreoften technical than administrative or financial. For lack of adequatedata, managers and supervisory authorities are unable to make forecaststhat amount to anything better than simple extrapolations of past expe-rience. As the selling prices of the products are generaily fixed onthe basis of the actual production costs, and the accounts are obfuscatedby inadequate capitalization and by unorthodox accounting practices, the

profits or losses of these enterprises provide no basis for judging howfar their activities are economically justified and to what extent theirmanagement is efficient.

9. This outline cannot possibly take into account the many indi-vidual variations of situations. A number of examples of success and

effective reorganization bear witness to the quality of human resources,whenever there has been sufficient opportunity and time for the T1unisians

to acquire the necessary experience.

- iii -

10. In the face of such a complex situation, the Mission's recommen-dations must be manifold. Actually, the Government and the enterprisesshould contemplate a large-scale program of reorganization extending overten years or so and calling for courage, continuity of efforts, andpatience; all qualities with which Tunisia is generously endowed.

11. It s obnvious that msuh a reorganization program should involveboth an internal restructuring of the enterprises and the training of keypersonnel. A start has already been made* Cost accoulnting has beenintroduced into some enterprises. A number have called on outside con-si' ants to advisecn their moden±ization. The training of key nersonnel;

an approach dear to a Government that has for long laid great stress onVr'nd st-.pJd -. DL*eJ V4i, sJ..h.o' beaS s n. professionalsshould be provided with career and remuneration prospects.

12. The Government and the enterprises should make greater use ofexter,.al techuni. 1 ass-istance.no1, r .otI oU--Ly to h1elp WI+. Uzi, Morg'ization.

of the enterprises, but also to ensure their effective management untilsuchi a t s.LImile as DWLELsian Key personneiL are 1-hemselUve1 s LVadIy t asV sUe

full responsibility. It is most desirable that the consultants engagedtvo train key personnel in new enterprises hnould ue speciali-sts intraining rather than the experts made available for the assembly andstvart-up of plants. The employment of foreign experts may well be oneof the most profitable investments open to Tunisia and may even deserveto be accorded higher priority than new investment projects.

13. As far as the management of the enterprises is concerned, itwould appear that any future approach must involve a very substantialdevolution of responsibility by the supervisory authorities to themanagers of enterprises and by the latter to their subordinates. IWiththis in view, the Mission recommends that priority should be given toproviding the enterprises with the key personnel they lack and that theinspectorate should only be strengthened on a modest scale, as it willremain relatively ineffective as long as the enterprises have notachieved a minimum degree of organization. It is also essential toprotect the enterprises against inhibiting over-regulation, particularlyin the fields of recruitment, conditions of service and remuneration,and against excessive zeal from the autonomous public agencies, suchas the Centre National dtEtudes Industrielles and the Institut Nationalde Productivit6 et de Gestion des Entreprises /1. The services ofthese agencies should preferably be provided on a paying basis so as tomake it quite clear that they are in fact service agencies and notadditional supervisory agencies.

/1 National Center for Industrial Research, and IJational Institutefor Productivity and Management of Enterprises.

14. It is essential that the criteria of sound management beeJ4-e A more pr ecey * . Cer UdaiIA LUecll±l i-1C bt l d bU e UUU S- Ca UE i ;U

at the stage of company reorganization. The most valuable of thesewouLd still appear to be profit. To make use of this, it would fliLsbe necessary to put the finances of State-owned enterprises on a soundbasis by capia creases, repay-ment of bank advances, repurchase bythe State of unproductive participations in other State-owned enter-pr-ises, anUd paymF,-,ent of its debts by tne State. The method of fixingprices should be changed, adopting as a basis international price levels,plus the appropriate customs duties. It would help to make accountsclearer if the State were to assume direct responsibility for exceptionalsocial charges imposed on enterprises. It would thus be possible to settargets for enterprises extending over several years, in terms of theirfinancial results, and thus to have a measure of the productivity ofenterprises and thereby of the efficiency of their managements.

15. In the investment field, it appears urgent to install mechanisirsthat will provide for a better balance between the pririe mover andbraking functions. This is largely a matter of general policy. Inpractice, a reform of this kind could be made in many ways. One of these,following naturally from the Government's policy of neutrality as betweentypes of enterprises, would be to allow the State-owned enterprises acertain measure of autonomy that permits them to prepare and financetheir investments in the same way as the private enterprises within theframework of a common policy formulated by the Government for both typesof enterprises and providing for similar incentives and similar forms ofregulations. Another iway in which this could be done would be to strength-en the government departments or parastatal agencies responsible, onthe one hand, for preparing projects and, on the other, for exercisingcontrol over their profitability. A third possibility would be to entriistthe supervision and possibly the financing of the investments of theState-owned enterprises to an entity not directly under the authority ofthe Plan, such as an investment bank or the Societ6 Niationale d'Investi>-sement , which would administer a special investment fund for the State-owned enterprises.

16. As alreadyr suggested in the memorandum on private investment(TLu 68-3), private savings could probably be mobilized more fully thanthey are at present, either for new investments, princinallv in thelabor-intensive industries, or to relieve the State of part of itspresent narticinations in the State-owned enterprises. Tn this connecti3-rit is important that the management practices of Societ6 Financiere etde Mestion (.SOFTGrE) shoild riagidly follow orthodox lineq so as toinspire confidence in an as yet unventuresome saving public. ConvertibIehnnds might. hp noptdn nq n nannt nf' ino rnina the reourcs at hdisposal of the soundest enterprises. These last two measures, although

e in scpe c-d help to develop the budd_ng capital market.

Introduction

1. Thanks to its remarkable political stability and the continuityof its leadership, Tunisia is in a position to formulate and implement along-term economic policy. The Ministry of Planning and Finance has hadonly one head since it was established early in 1961. It is thereforeno surprise to find the Government's policy toward State-owned enterprises'expressed in much the same terms in both the 'Ten-Year Outlook for 1962-197111 and in the recently published "Plan for 1969-1972". t

2. The Tunisian Government believes that State-owned enterprisesshould be established in the public utility sectors (e.g. power and trans-portation); in the basic sectors requiring a scale of investments beyondthe capacity of the private sector (e.g. iron and steel, mines); in caseswhere the private sector is failing to discharge its responsibilities(e.g. textiles); or where the State wishes to launch a new business(tourism) or to establish a pilot sector (canning). In addition, enterprisesthat were in existence prior to Independence have been nationalized inorder to bring them under Tunisian control (See paragraph 7 below).

3. This policy can only be fully understood in the context ofTunisia's nolitical doctrine. The Tunisian authorities are setting high

and ambitious goals for their country. Without attempting to give a fullaccoi-nt of whnt, "Sooialismr Destourien"t represents. it is essential tomention that this political doctrine seeks to promote the betterment ofman /< through accelerated transformation of his mental structures andintensive education; that it aims at replacing the supremacy of emotion byreason /. ; that it presupposes that man can suhordinate his personal andprivate interests to the common good and work for it A and -that it advocatesa standard of conduct ConsiStent wit the ideals.

original and workable. Many of them are willing to devote considerablep-s-a efr',,,+ +t to s rea; their' v ie n+. -nil lcels n nd amongyst all

sectors of the population. The conviction that they are working for a

/1 In translating the French IlEntreprises Publiques", the term "State-ownedenterprises!! h'as been preferre rEto^ 1,PUb._cetr-pLSeS"y, in orderl to

avoid any confusion with public utilities. The report covers all enter-prises s-uujzec to the Tu.isian law ofL £ebU<UO.Ly J L'JJ, i*e "O

Societes Nationales et Societes d'Economie Mixte " with the exception ofregional and muDi cLpa± uouaIis anu uo UcLLpanL1 i Ln L wh1ihpvate inte-

rests have a majority share. The list of these enterprises is given inAnnex 1. The various categories of ' -tuerprises Publiques!! are descri-bed at the beginning of Annex 2.

/L2 "Perspectives Decennalespp.. 89 and 90; EcononTh anid Social Development;Plan for 1969-1972, pp. 10 and 11.

/3 Plan for 1969-1972, p. 7.

/L National Seminar on Coordination of the Sectors of the Economy. EconrcmiCand Social Conmission of the Destouir Socialist Party, Tunis, Sept.. 19;.

political renaissance that, if sucessful, could not fail to have reper-cussions beyond the courntryts frontier; is probably one of the reasons

for the excellent spirit of cooperation and enthusiasm /1 displayed by+he 1leaders.

5. Th2.e Tu,nisian auSthorities maintain a n.eutral attitude towardthe three main types of enterprises: State-owned and partially State-owned,private arnd cooperative. They clanm to be neutral in the sense that they

refrain from showing a doctrinaire or theoretical preference for any onetype of enterprise, and that they try as far as possible to provide al1forms of enterprises with similar operating conditions, and to allow fairco-mpetition bet-ween them. In particular neutra"y is achieved throughequality of taxes. Cooperatives, however, seem to be favored in practice,because the auMthorities Ithink that they are more apt to attain the ideal

of commwuity of interests proposed for all. Conversely, the ideal ofnational cooperation set for private enterp-ises, as for the other formsof enterprise, is so far removed from the principles on which these enter-prises traditionally function -- particularly- the overriding role of the

profit motive -- that the private enterprises are somewhat uncertain abou,cthe intentions of the Government toward them. Al'though not discriMinatedagainst, they must not obtain too high a profit, as this would appear tobe at the expense of other sectors of the nation. Profits are, however,more palatable if they derive from exports than from domestic market salc;-and if reinvested rather than distributed, as distribution may be suspectas serving selfish ends. Hence the distinction between dividends, belowa reasonable ceiling, and "superdividendst", above that ceiling.

6. Within the group of State-owned enterprises, no preference isshown by the Tunisian authorities in the form of State participation ofone kind or another. Such enterprises take every conceivable form: whol;,-State-owned, majority or minority State participations in associationwith private capital, domestic or foreign; participation in associationwith other State-owned enterprises, customers or suppliers. In some

sectors, such as fertilizers, competition with the private sector exists;in others (steel, tobacco, etc.) each enterprise enjoys a monopoly.

7. Annex INo. 1 lists 77 State-owned enterprises by sector and bytype (purely administrative "offices", "offices" with at least a partiaLL.;

industrial or commercial function, industrial and commercial enterprises-some controlled by the State and some by the Societe Tunisienne de Banquo).It shows in which companies foreign shareholders play an active managemelit role. It is accompanied by a memorandum briefly indicating the most im-portant of the State-owned enterprises and the nature of their activitfi.

/1 This enthusiasm is tempered with a saving sense of realism when itcomes to day-to-day decisions, as indicated in the World Bank reportof AUlust 31 ; 1962 (paragraph 7a).

8. Some of the public enterprises existing prior to Independence1A. -,- _- -'I. ~ __ --: --_ t IM .2 -4 _ 4cn nto -+__ Al_%WmcameSt1 - OIJM,a-uwLv V wLLV sAAC 1V.LVJ.ACL.A.LCJdJ.UAS l LIJ I 7'Jr, -1 vIL 1cuIIJJ.L V

companies placed under government control in 1960 and nationalized in1963), through expiry of a concession (radiroads, immediately afterIndependence), through sequestration followed by negotiation (Societ6Nationale du Liege, 1962). Some oI them still nave some foreign parti-cipation in their capital (e.g. Sfax-Gafsa, Siape, El Bouniane), althoughdecision-making is in Tunisian hands. Tnose that are engaged in theexport trade generally encounter difficulties, principally because ofobsolescent equipment and high production costs in relation to those oftheir competitors.

9. Of the entorprises established since Independence, specialmention should be made of the oil-prospecting and oil field developmentcompanies founded in association with foreign partners providing thetechnical know-how. The other industries are chiefly import-substitutionindustries (Societe Tunisienne du Sucre, Sogitex, AMiS) with the exceptionof the Societe Nationale Tunisienne de Cellulose, which processes esparto gr,into cellulose for export. The import-substitution industries enjoy adomestic market protected by import prohibitions or quotas.

10. The following tables show the share of State-owned enterprisessince 1960 in total investment for the enterprise sector and for theeconomy as a whole and the sectoral breakdown of the figures for State-owned enterprises. From independence until 1962, when the provisionalThree-Year Plan entered into effect, the Tunisian Government followeda liberal policy. Since the private investments did not materialize,the Government has initiated a vigorous policy of public investment.

Gross Fixed Investment

Millions of Dinars (Current Prices) Prov.

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 19_3

Public enterprises (a) 5.2 15.3 19.0 27.0 37.4 60.4 55.5 47.6 3'5?

Total enterprises (b) 25.7 35.8 34.3 41.8 54.7 75.5 72.4 70.4 63.9

Total economy / (c) 59.5 68.3 76.2 88.6 105.1 132.3 128.9 126.7 117.9

Percentagesa,/b 20 4>3 55 65 68 80 77 68 5i

a/c 9/1 29 99 9 (A 1 l.7 A _ _, I.

Src Tunisian Nncudn pational accons and priata Buset....

Source: Tunisian National Accounts and Financial Bud2eti..

I .

Breakdown of State-Owned Enterprise Investment, by Sector

INillions of Dinars (Current prices)(prov)

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1966

Agriculture 1.6 4.2 2.6 6.2 2.4 4.3 1.7 3.8 1.8

NIines and petroleum 0.8 0.9 0.7 2.0 2.4 13.0 17.7 13.7 7.7

Power 1.6 0.9 5.7 7.8 6.1 7.1 6.o

Nanufacturing 1.2 5.8 8.9 10.2 20.0 26.7 11.1 9.4 8.1

Transport andcommunications 1.3 2.9 2.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 10.6 7.3 7.8

Tourism 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.2 3.6 3.5 1.3

Cormiterce and otherservices 0.3 o.6 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.9 2.4 2.0

Housing 0.9 1.5 2.0 0.9 0.9 1.3 o.4 1.1

Source: Tunisian National Accounts and Financial Budgets.

11. Apart from the invesm+vents of the oil companies, made chieflybetween 1965 and 1967, and the investments in power production, which havobeen practically consta.t since 1964, most nnvestment by State-owned enter-prises has been made in the manufacturing sector, particularly in 1964 and1 965. TIrnve.et-", of' S+a+=.r-Y.edA enterprw1. ses deln n I9A7 anr. 19QA,

as did all Tunisian investment in those two difficult years.

12. In industry including power, investments of the State-owned enter-prises, ¶7nyV;? Vn, +I,a- the (1 h lewr.l of Df ),Q. 48 illion in 19QAI6 f'e11 t

D 22 million in 1968 and are expected to remain at that level in 1969. Onth.e other_ -id,n thle last- t.hree 'years ofC thne 1Plan (107_0-1972 theyare

IJS . J LS& .~ U ~ JO i ,L.L~, .J *A I ..LV.LA S, I I '- - I 7 I _ _

expected to rise once again to some D 40 million a year. Investments inLU.L J..tAO .J.,y ±_I;LJUU.U±Jr Lt,U.LU±)Lt-ULik LJy P.L-_LVC1Uu 1 ulII.PI-O O ii ..L L v . " s~4'-

1965 between D 5 to D 10 million and are expected, according to the 196?-I172G rLJIn, UU re1main atl s abouti 9i or T LI IV M-LLI.I.Idil. lThe LlUlSii± ofL.I.

the Plan cite as the explanation for this projection the continuing deartho.f priLvatAe capitaL.J CLL &n p±VJet;%;. ri.LVCat eIntUelpr.i aCppearl to bU Lhesita

to invest in anything but tourism, for which the prospects for privateinvestLUent are favorable. Any iucrease Ln Ind-usrial in-vestm1ent duringthe last 3 years of the Plan will therefore depend primarily on the State-owned enterprises.

13. The only statistics available for an analysis of the relativeimportance of State-owned enterprises by sector are those indicating thenumber of employees. The following table is based on figures includea -nthe 1969-1972 Plan and in two documents from the Department of Indust-.and on data obtained from various sources with respect to the uersonr.eZio. 3,taf.e-ownied enterorises.

- 5 -

Employees of State-owned and private enterprises

Employees of' 1Naior Industrial Total Percentagest.ate ous-nd ndIAULr.clJ.L/ 1 Wt.L'PJLs £AlplUJ'MlI,1en

enterprises enterprises- /2 /3 a/b a/c

a b c d

,L;iAes aA peroleum 15,i60 1 ,D5 U I,0 159 25,000 100 ,5

Electricity and gas 3,300 3,300 3,186 8,500 100 100

TraiLsportation 13,800 n.a. 16,751 )) 59,000 54

Piblic works 2,800 n.a. 14,211 )

Other industries 16,774 24,232 41,710 130,500 69 40of wh`ch

Food 1,728 5,022 8,772 34 20

Textiles 3,799 4,799 7,441 79 51

Chemicals 1,575 2,811 3,489 56 45

Wood and paper 1,001 1,131 4,994 88 20

Iron and steel )itietallurgy ) 3,511 L.820 8.20L 73 13hechatnical )

Duilding )materials ) 4,254 4,481 5802 95 73Building )

:-Uiscellaneous 906 1,162 3,002

fotal industries 46,834 n.a. 91,823 223,000 60

Coim'erce and banks 73,000

Services, including+,niirim 1207,000

tfiTn.i n sai n 9474C f, JUl

A01ric,11ltulre52,0iF{mj C~1 ,j c1ffifoFishnng 3,500 ,6,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.74 UUUJ

~~__ ___ _ _UU

TOI'P AT

/1 L-tased on So.m charact-er i stics o-ftemj inoustr-ia enterprisas, 1S 7-19Department of Industry, December 1966 (the basis for distinguisbing betweenmaj-or industUrl . enterprises and industrial elterpr.ies is not ;nown).

/2 Based on Census of Industrial Activities 1967 (1966 data), Departz.,ent ofIndustry-, De'z.'ber 197.

/3 Economic aid SociAl Deveioyaent plnn i -1972. F1gurs in this coliun incl':cunemployed.

14. According to the above table, State-owned industrial enterprisesemploy only about 5O,00o personis. If banks, commerce and tourism (SHTThas 2,000 employees) are added, the total comes to about 60,000 or 6 percent of the total active population of 1,053,000 as given in the Plan.This proportion does not truly reflect the importance of the State-oTmedenterprises, in the first place. because more than 50 per cent of theactive population of Tunisia is employed in agriculture. The followingproportions are more significant : the 50,000 nersons employed bv State-owmed industrial enterprises represent at least 70 per cent of all thepersonnel of the major industrial enterprises (less than 73;653 nersnnS)/1and 50 per cent of the personnel of all industrial enterprises ( 91,812nersonsY includingo smanll zinust.rie,q suciih nQ srmnll qiarries or smr lshoemakers.

15. In recent years, the State-owned enterprises of Tunisia haveheenme a snihirt of increasfng concern to the rjiisiafn 2u+hnr,+,cc and tothe W4orld Bank. For numerous reasons, the State-owned enterprises havehAbn u1nahle to generate suffi4cetQ osaving ad ha rosed a incr e as- X

ingly heavy burden on the public finances. A large number of State-ownedenterpriens re unale to provde a4the authorities reponsible for +1,Plan with accurate financial reports and reliable forecasts, a factorT.4%.^ch comp,licates Ile manage.mer.t o0 -I-e pu-uli"c flnar.ces and redue 4the~ ~UbLjJ.J.LI UV ILC i±awiiu U. WCl ~ULJL-L±U _ ±nwxe cUIU UlI1"

quality of the overall projections used in annual economic budgets andeconomlc and social development plans. Conscious that the action alreadytaken by the Government itself and by the enterprises should be comple-maentd in the autumn of 1968 the Tunisian Government requested that aWorld Bank mission study the State-owned enterprise sector in Tunisia,gi-vng particular attentioin to industrial and commercial enterprises. TleMission was instructed to seek out the principal reasons for the weak-nesses of the State-owmed enterprises in the context oI their generairole in the Tunisian economy, and to make recommendations to the TunisianGovernment on the various measures that might be taken to improve theeconomic and financial position of State-owned enterprises.

16. The MIission did not study the cooperatives or the seven largeagricultural r"offices'i that are to be converted into cooperatives, or theregional and municipal public enterprises. The Miission obtained theaccounts for 1967 for 61 of the 77 enterprises listed in Annex No. 1,and, in some instances, more recent accounts and/or forecasts for 1968,1969 or for the four years of the Plan (1969-1972). It visited 53 ente.-prises. It did not receive information in the case of only 7 of the77 enterprises, having neither been able to get in touch with the managernor to obtain the accounts. Contact with the enterprises was in everycase confined to conversations with top management, and the presentreport is based on their statements. The IMission was well received andfelt that the discussions of all problems had been sincere and open.

J' The basis for distinguishing between major and other industrialenterprises is not known.

-7-

17. *an analy-s is of. I'le mIJ diffiUcultLUS teUer- 1Cedby 1 u- l

enterprises in Tunisia will precede the statement of the 11ission's recom-mendations. Since the Mission was -not asked to study L-nisia'ts privateenterprise sector, no syster,matic analysis of the problems of these enter-prises was made. It is likely, however, that many of the dJ1f±fcul±is uosome State-owned enterprises are shared by certain private enterprises,and that these difficulties stem more from the level of developmentattained by the Tunisian economy than the particular character -- State-omned or private -- of the enterprises.

4'

I. THE DIFFICULTIES -/

General impressions

18. At present most of the Tunisian State-owned enterprises are notin good shape. For 1967; the total of the before-tax profits of allState-owned enterprises, excluding banks, STAR (insurances) and SOFIGES(irnestment company). amnounts to D 7.3 million. However. the profitsof the agriculture and foodstuffs and petroleum sectors, which enjoy

.oooisa hih priceps total D 9.6 million. Thus, the other

State-owned enterprises together made a loss before tax of D 2.3 millionin 19A7 9/. To take o,n3y a few of the more important ones, the El Fouladh

steel mill recently began operations with the handicap of a 100 per centover~=estimate of demand i_ the domestic .market, 3/ and it can o.nly hopeto break even by charging high domestic prices and with the aid of exportsubsidies. Sfax-G±' sa is faced davhl proble.s ar-Ising in connection withthe quality of the phosphates, the high level of investments required to

develop production and the uncertainty of the m-arkets. SIAPE sulfferedlosses in 1966 and 1967 and will probably just break even in 1968 and

in ~ I j -1 -±~......-. - cYv'Tm~ hlra.yu1V, !4J . ±bU WOVI-ou ~L LpI1.LL I1U oIA Ji " W ..'.I--.-199 y. I wrml-ou' equipm-,ent needs to be replaced. SzOGITrv hns p%ranc-

tically lost all of its D 6 million equity. The present quality of itsproducts wouid probably not mleet foreign competition even with high tariffprotection. Most of the transportation enterprises, while making themost of obsolescent stock, are in -urgenrt need of modernization. Owherenterprises, however, present a more promising picture. STEG, for example,is being modernized. Althougn SNTC initially suffered from plant sodefective that after a few years consultants recommended that it should

be closed down, it seems to have entered a new phase aind to have made a

remarkable recovery. The small automobile assembly plant, STIA, has

overcome s mnce it started production, a multitude of techiical problem.s,mainly stemming from the small numbers of vehicles assembled on each line

Such successes illustrate the quality of the men and their ingenuity iD

compensating for the inadequacy of the means at their disposal. The only

reason why Tunisia lacks key personnel is that it has not yet had enoughtime to provide the necessary training and to acquire the requisite expe-rience.

J Some of the difficulties described in this chapter, such as theshortage of key personnel, apply equally to the private enterprises,which were not studied by the Mission.

/ See Table 4 and Annex 3 : Financial Situation and Capital Structureof Public Enterprises.

3/ The contraction of the market is ascribed by the Plan authorities to

a deliberate slowdown in construction following the completion of

El Fouladh.4/ The private enterprise NPK, which manufactures the same product, i3

also in a difficult situation.

Shortage of key personnel

19. Tunisian enterprises suffer from a serious shortage of key per-sornvl not 'an inusual situation in aq rjpv lpl:c country. The key nersnnc;e1

of enterprises existing prior to independence have gone, taking with themtheir experience, their anJagerial skills and leaving only their patternsof action. The new heads of the nationalized enterprises have been wiseenough± to retain vese patterns oI action. Thus, many enterpr-ses 4in ths

category are reminiscent in every way of comparable small] European enter-prises of tWenty years ago. Foreign, participation hioas Co-.4nued lsof these. Without being actively involved, it renders services in thetechnical field and in sales. Foreign participants appear to confiLnethemselves to retaining their existing share in the investment, whilstbeing, on the wnole, reluctant to engage in aury f-urther investment.

Underestimation of the difficulties

20. The fact that industrial enterprises continued to operate irnTunisia without major problems probably contributed in some cases tounderestimation of the difficulties of establishing new industries. Inother cases, the difficulties were probably not underestimated, but con-siderable risks were deliberately taken so as to make possible thelaunching of a new activity, with results that did not always come upto the original expectations.

21. The underestimation of difficulties or acceptance of appreciablerisks is not difficult to understand in the context of a dynamic andvigorous country. The 6lite are anxious to display their ability and seeno reason why they should not eventually perform as well as the heads ofpre-Independence enterprises. They are familiar with the sequence ofinvestment operations and with the managerial positions for which eachcompany must make provision. But they lack experience of the exactingand rigorous standards to which preliminar-y studies must conform if the;jare to lead to profitable investments, and of the complexity of theoperations necessary to manage a growing enterprise that must contin-uously hold its own in face of world competition. They have not beendismayed by the difficulties, thanks to their confidence -- on occasionexcessive -- in their ability to contrive effective solutions as theneed arose. The progress made in planning, however, has been graduall:jcorrecting this tendency, particularly during the last few years.

Investments

Role of the Plan

22. One of the most important objectives of the Plan is the gradualreabsorntion of the unpmnemn_oyed. Considering the necessarily limited rateof expansion of agriculture, reabsorption of the unemployed calls for amin'uimim level of industrial invest-tment. The 'Ni-nisian authorities have

had to find both viable projects and the means to finance them, foreignfinancing being in their riew, the bottleneck. A major share has nJen

- 10 -

allocated to large capital-intensive government projects, and too littleto small labor-intensive projects financed mainlv by private enterprises,which are harder to identify in advance and whose cost is difficult topredict. 1/ At a given stage. the new nrojects needed to realize thegoals set have been chosen, regardless oi- whether or not, at that time,market and feasibility studies existed or were reliable. Tf no existingenterprise was capable of carrying out a project, a special enterprisewas brought into being for this purnpose. In the Plnn, investments arelinked to an increase in production and in savings, but investments arethe first st.ge to p jmn1mopvnPted. It seems, howTever, that the desireto implement investment targets at all cost has sometimes taken precedenceover 211 other targets, leading to neglec+ of the conditions essen+i 1 tomeeting the production and savings targets as well. For some years now,ho.wever, the plan autUhorities have been growIng m'ore exacting, with respe.tto preinvestment studies and more anxious to improve the productivity ofthe enter-rises. Tiny of the c-rent problems stem. fro past decis-ons,and the situation may be expected steadily to improve.

TWealness of the machinery for limiting investments

23. While having a single Ministry of Planning and Finance makesfor effective irmplellenteatlion- of the Plan, it has the urawback of replaciLgthe traditional form of organization, in which the financial departmentsare responsible for advocating prudence, as opposed to those whose functionis to call for action, by a different type of organization, in which theinvestrmient screening and promotion functions are both performed by thesame service within Planning Department. In the case of expansion ofexisting enterprises, managers have felt encouraged to give priority toinvestment and to adopt an imaginative approach and have often left itto the Government to determine whether or not the return on the investme'Itwould be adequate. Even if they doubted the profitability of an invest-ment, they were hardly in a position to judge whether the political orsocial advantages outweighod the economic wealmesses.

24. Nor is the function of investment restraint exercisedoutside the Government or the enterprises themselves. Whether the inves..-ment relates to the establishment of new or the expansion of existingenterprises, the commercial banks have not as a rule made a detailed

1/ The W4orld Bank economic report of April 1963 (paragraphs 45 and 177),commenting on the Ten-Year Outlook for 1962-1971, drew attention tothe following dangers : excessive concentration on large public pro-jects to the detriment of less predictable private projects, excessiveimportance of capital-intensive industries whereas over the long termTunisia must draw its strength from the use of its human resources;and a tende-ncy to adhere rigidly to the Plan whereas development is in-herontly an organic rather than a mechanical process.

- 11 -

analysis of its profitability or of the financial viability of theenterprise, since thev felt confident that the Government would notabandon enterprises that it was helping to set up or expand. Moreover,the Central Ban.k does not appear to pnrtic-ipate in the financing ofinvestments until the co.mercial banks have been called upon to supplycapital1 defiienciwes.

2.s a consequence, the same peoel-, at a high level, must actboth as the "driving force" for the Plan and as the "brake" for theMrnistry of Finarnce. Wvhlen these two conflicting fnctior.s are exercisedby the same persons or agencies, there is a risk that one or the other-will becomrle dom-Iinant, It appears, inA- fact, that Vhe Justifications forthe investment have been too readily accepted as valid, without a suffi-ciently severe critical eval-uation. I1 it appeared t>hat the substantiat-ing data were not sound, but that a choice had to be made between imme-diate execution of a project that was probably, b-ut not certainly, jus-tified, and delaying the project for several months or several years inorder to obtain more solid Justification, the chances were that prioritywould intentionally and wittingly be given to its speedy execution ratherthan to firming up of the evidence in its favor.

Implementation of investments and financing problems

26. In some cases, the desire to invest quickly, the risks incurredwith respect to the quality of the preliminary studies, and the inade-quate capital resources available locally for initial investment havehad a number of unfavorable consequences which, though their effect hasnot been widespread in scope, have tended to generate a chain reactionin certain enterprises. Loans from international organizations or goverrn-ments have sometimes been rejected because of their slowness. The hasteof the Tunisian negotiators has sometimes placed them in a weak positionvis-a-vis foreign suppliers offering credit and probably also vis-a-vistheir domestic suppliers. Contracts have been entered into without

adequate guarantees as to price, quality and terms of installation. Thenationality of a supplier has, on occasion, been taken as a kind of gua-rantee because it belongs to a country whose government was seeking tohelp Tunisia. 1/ Unforeseen expenditures have frequently arisen duringthe execution of contracts, and defects in the equipment delivered haverequired further expenditure to correct them. Other gaps have graduallyemerged: lack of staff, accessory installations, materials or localintermediate products, whose quality needed to be improved. The start-upperiod has often been prolonged. Errors in the market studies have coreto light. Since the initial capital was insufficient, additional inves`,ifC!texpenditures, unforeseen losses in the first few years, or even the workIngcanital needs, resulted in substantial call on bank financing, chiefly

1,/ NTC : a corporation originall-r formed with a 50 ner cent equityparticipation by the supplier and with the support of an AID low

in the form of overdrafts. In turn, the high interost rate charged onbank advances have +tnded to increase the deficits. At everA,r stage th+.management of the enterprise has refused to accept full responsibilityfor +he diffic.ties enco,tered, as it Ts r + no 1 cl -Tr enough inl irn1 1r0(r

the decision to invest and in the preparation of the investment. In suchcases, Ith 1 ,Je e nt.erp-rise h1as actwe%d rL C. LlU Like a generca"'L cont-SractJor engagedby the State on a cost-plus basis.

Use of foreign technical assistance

27. Frequently foreign technical assistance has been used onlyfor the installation of equipment and the start-up of manufactu-arig plants.In many cases, however, the technici.ans proved well-qualified to under-take the installation and start-up of equipment, but to have very littleknowledge of staff training. They did give some initial guidance, but nottraining of a kind that provide a grounding for continuous career deve-lopment. In the second place, the training often came after the instal-lation of the equipment, with the result that the period of trial anderror extended for several years after the start of operations. Finally,for such technical assistance personnel, the training function took secondplace and had to be completed as soon as possible, whereas, if trainingspecialists had been called in, their sole concern would have been forthe successful outcome of the training program, and the correspondingtechnical assistance contracts would undoubtedly have made provision forthe program to last as long as it was actually needed. In the absenceof such measures, technical assistance projects have failed to providethe new TLnisian enterprises with effectively trained key personnel, andthe new enterprises, as well as the old, continue to suffer from a short-age of qualified professionals.

Effect on economic developmant

28. The energy devoted to investment has borne fruit, in the sensethat the i nvestm e n t goals of the last Plan have been attained. On tr.eother hand, its production goals have not been attained, and, so far asits financial results are concerned, losses have frequently been recordec.in place of the expected profits. The social objectives of err.ploymenthave often been exceeded, as the enterprises engaged or kept more staffthan they needed. Whenever the enterprises have shown a loss, however,Tunisia has moved further &way from, rather than closer to, its economic"take-off". i.e. the time when it will be able to generate enough savinesto finance its investments without foreign aid.

IManagement

The human factor

29. In both old and new enterprises, the tendency to underestimatemanagement responsibilities has not been inhfrior to the underrating

of investment difficulties. In some cases a President Directeur G6neral(PDG-) wivhout+ +techcal, financial or commercial qualifications has beenappointed. In other, more frequent, cases the main qualification ofthe PDG is tech-ical, .whereas in the work of a PDG- it is managerial exne-rience and financial knowqhow that are essential, rather than technicalknowledge.

* ±U U±c dUJUI r%T% U~ .~IU d 1ULIL~ . I~-30. Thle 0 lga' Lon of PDuGs tuo att'end a 'large n aber of meetl.g is

understandable in a country where the Government wants to involve allsectors of the pop-uation in its efforts. It cn, however, put an exces-sive burden on PDGs absorbed in their day-to-day tasks because they havenot yet mastered ltne problems of their enterprises or delegated authority.

31. PDGs are often too isolated. Tney have not been able to esta-blish a true Mianagement Committee (Comite de Direction), constituting ateam.

32. The function of Director of Finance, in the true sense, isvirtually unknown. Frequently, the person holding that title is simplyan accountanit and of lower status than a director of administration ora sales manager.

33. Some personnel managers do no more than calculate the payrolland disburse it. No regard is paid to whether remuneration adequatelyreflects quality of work; there are no career charts enabling each staffmember to determine the benefits he may hope to receive from promotionand the efforts he must make to gain it; and there are no promotionpolicies associated with vocational training schemes, and no forecastsof staff requirements in the light of the anticipated pattern of growthof the enterprise.

34. Great efforts in personnel training are being made at thenational level but these cannot replace action within the enterprisesthemselves. Presidents and personnel managers are sharply aware of theneed for improving staff training, but enterprises have hardly the meansto put such programs into effect. The on-the-job training undertakenso far appears rarely to have been effective. Party cells, which seemto play a more important role within the enterprises than trade unions,are active in instruction in basic literacy, but seem to show relativelylittle interest in vocational training.

lIanagement policy

35. Many enterprises lack what should be essential elements of amanagement policy: a clear definition of their objectives and of allthe means needed to attain them. This is attributable not only to thelack of the physical wherewithal in the form of records and cost accountsand to the inadequacy of general accounting, which rules out forecastsby qny means other than extranolation (usually outimistic) of the figuresfrom earlier years, and it is also because the enterprises do not al~rays

feel the need to define its objectives; so that, for instance, an enter-prise jeopardizes its sales bv failing to gather information on consu-

mers' needs and preferences.

36. The consequence of these management policy shortcomings areproduction stoppages for wpnt of snar nparts or for lack of maintenance,despite an overabundance of maintenance staff, 1/, the build-up of exces-sive inventories of finished products, inadaouate control at the variousstages of production, negligence in the handling of customer and otherdebtor accountS, c

37 ew enteY -ses -acont- n as a mnnragerent tool - Because

it is not an essential instrument of measurement, accounting has fre-quent.ly been r, isusek. e-at4-g,-- r-- l-trs hvben dressdr lin- vrrpn.~.jU~L ui.~y U~Z~I uiI±_J.LL . U11.16 I. 06L - I- - *.-.s U..

expenditures (such as personnel traininig) have been charged to esta-I- - - ) - -/ Q^mD+A rmaq

U±lisIuIe11 cost, /, depreciation has been understated, _/, --m

as a result of underevaluation of fixed assets. ,/ Subscriptions byState-owned enterprises to the capital of other State-owned enterpriseshave not been written off when found to be unprofitable and when theinvestment they represent has dUepreciated. InventoriVs have often beencarried at a figure unrelated to their market value. 51 Z?ew enterpriseshave made adequate provision for doubtful debts. LiabLilites have beenunderestimated.

Criteria of good management

38. The above weaknesses appear to be largely attributable to acause that lies deeper than the lack of means or their mis-use, na-,mely, tothe absence of criteria of good management.

39. Domestic prices are approved by the Direction du Commerce of

the Yiinistry of Planning and Economic Affairs. For this -pu-rpose eachenterprise submits a breakdowm of its prime costs to the Direction duCommerce. Prices do not ordinarily include an adequate return on the

capital invested, especially when the margin of profit is calculated

1/ To obviate these difficulties, some enterprises have concludedmaintenance contracts with specialized foreign firms (El Fouladh,SOGITEX).

2/ E.g. El Fouladh, SOGITEX, Sfax-Gafsa.3/ E.g. SHTT:/ E.g. STEG

/ E.g. SOGITEX, O01A, MIS. Many enterprises do not know the realcost of inventories, for want of cost accounting.

- 15 -

as a percentage of costs. Analysis of the costs is not sufficientlydetailed1 to af-'ford a measurement of product-rit" The Dlrection duCommerce has too smiall a staff to be able to make effective use of theinfonrmation. Ehren if it did th '- necessa- s' ff, +he dat+n furnshJd

by the enterprises would hardly enable it to make reliable comparisonswith the cO9 of imported products. TTually, therefore, the Directiondu Commerce simply approves the requests of the enterprises.

40. The general method of fixing prices offers no incentive toreduce p,roduction co,sts. It does not always mak-e it poss-ibe to obse-re

the principle, laid dowTn by the Government, that prices of productsmntrtact~~~s d by.li nle.erprises should notu lue X gher U11 hoeo

similar imported products, including customs charges. It is partlyresponsible for the fact that Tunisian enterprises are not sufficientlycompetitive and do not generate sufficient savings through their profits.riL-es set highl for social reasons tend to lead to the maintenance ofhigh costs, which, in the end, defeats the social objectives.

41. When enterprises make a profit, they generally cease to be asource of concern to tne authorities responsible for them, even if theirprofits are the result of an import and sales monopoly (e.g. CTS, Officedu Commerce, R6gie des Tabacs). They are not expected to make any effor-tto reduce their costs. When enterprises show a loss, their managers fre-quently attribute this, in addition to the level of the officiallyapproved selling prices, to many causes that they lay at the door of theGovernment, such as insufficient capital participation by the State,leading to high bank charges, social policies pursued at the State'srequest -- sometimes including even the engaging or retention of anexcessively large number of employees -- and delays in payments by theState or by other State-owned enterprises.

42. Because the financial results of an enterprise do not providea reliable measure of the quality of its management and frequently dependon external factors, the interest taken by its manager in improving suchresults is often subordinated to other objectives. Short-term achieve-ments of a social character are regarded with more favor than long-rangefinancial results that have little significance. The volume of investme.tand the level of production become more important than costs and profitsas criteria by which to measure the performance of an enterprise.

Confusion of the lines of responsibility between the enterprises and theauthorities concerned

43. many managers feel no responsibility for the financial resultsachieved by their enterprises, relying on the State to solve any financialcrises, while not being in a position even to provide the authoritieswith the basic data needed for formulating long-term programs of reorga-nization. Up to now, the authorities have taken only emergency action,in the form of replenishment of the resources of those companies whose

- 16 -

situation is mnost ori-taTl The fact that it has requested the presnt+report is evidence, however, that the Government is aware of the needfor remedial measnqres of afm.ore f'indnm.entnl n,nmna,

4 From the -nvestment stage to that of ay reorgnization thatmay be necessary, many essential decisions rest with both the authoritiesnnd the managers of enterprises, without it --eir, psib to iAnt4ifyspecific lines of responsibility. This confusion of responsibilities,added to the absence of tanagerent crisesan reves it ihepossible to ove-luate the performance of the enterprises and removes the normal penaltiesfo-r fn-FI,n-a

II. RECOfi0NiEDATIONS

45. Considerable progress has been made in recent years in someof the State-owned enterprises ; a great deal remains to be clone in allof these.

Progress already made

46. Reorganization programs, sometimes energetic, have been under-taken either on the initiative of the enterprises themselves or on thatof the supervisor; authorities, or else in agreement with the WorJdBankin the case of enterprises financed by it (SOTEDE, OPLIJT, Studies inprogress for SNOFT). A system of cost accomnting has been introducedduring recent years or will shortly be introduced in about a dozen State-owned enterprises. Some enterprises have engaged foreign consultants,chiefly accountants, who have been given the task, in addition to theiroperational duties, of training the Tunisians who will succeed then.STEG has already taken the step of calling in international consultantsfor auditing and accounting. Mention has already been made of theimpressive reorganization of SNTC (paragraph 16).

47. Besides the settlement of certain Government debts to theState-owned enterprises, tranisfers of State funds to these enterprises,in the fomn of capital participations or development subsidies, excludir,goperating subsidies and export bonuses, amounted to D 13.8 million in1967 and D 10.3 million in 1968. This represents a considerable effortas will be seen if these figures are comnared either with the net valueof the assets of all the State-owned enterprises which, at the end of1967 was n 172 million- or with t.he total sum that. the State wousld stil'

have to disburse in order to settle the balance of its debts to theseenternrises nnrl at the snm.e t;ie. to hringf their caninal up to a nnrmAn

level, a figure which is estimated in paragraph 60 below, at D 50 millioll.

48. In the exercise of its supervisory fwuction 21/ the Administra-tion has renvcdrP morn i nfnrm..t3 r +.hnn in th.e past, twhnrks tO the Law

of February 12, 1965. At the end of 1968, for the first time, the At:--n-% t+rnt-i on rmon4%mr hcAno+ fnorecast fvom al1 -Ihea an4-rr in rIioot.+-'

together with their investment forecasts and corresponding financingpl ans in -ciiffN-ent. t4-te, for +ha nreanra+ion of t-ha r:on,-- anr'nnti-cll

(comptes economiques) for the ensuing year. The meetings with the supier-T7zisn vr nn+.hnori 4|+ at n4- rsh h 4-ha fnwore4cat are 44 ancusaaA or 4-hae flflpl~7fl+*r

approved, make for a better dialogue between these authorities and thoenterpr ea a . IFTr,ne e,rpe--4 4 aion I nF r invest-.14en4 t I-,&a been 4-4 -1-nn u,,-p a as

-&af- 4.4. VLd 0tl Uj. .SAv ousLau .a tO4 juj. ~ U a

is no longer possible for the manager of an enterprise to decide upon,or carry oul, a large-sc0t."Le JLnves0.-±enVU, oubtaining fluds f)or U1±0atL purpose

through a bank, without authority from the Ministry of Planning andv F-cIUe axIU Lom ubli Uovelnor Co UIe UecI ura_L nan&.

/ For description of the supervisonr function of the publiC

anithoritiess, see Anne-x 2, oages 3 to 6.

- 18 -

49. The scope of these improvements is still limited, however,and some of the basic reasons for past mistakces, such as the absence ofcriteria for good management, the confusion of the lines of responsibi-lity and the inadequacy of the machinery for controlling investment, havenot been sufficiently corrected. In view of the wide variety of tuheState-owned enterprises and of the reasons for their poor performance,there can be no simple answer to their problems. Solving these problemswill call for a series of measures consistent with one another and inharmony with the aims of the Government. It would be possible to shortenthe time required to carry out reorganization programs if all thoseconcerned bear in mind that they are engaged in an operation of widescope extending over a period of at least ten years and cailling for agreat deal of courage, firmness and sense of continuity on their part,qualities with which Tunisia is well supplied.

Steps to be taken

50. The various tvyes of measures recommended by the M11ission aregiven below. (i) There is no doubt that the State-owned enterprisesneed internal reorganization and that the training of key personnelshould be speeded up. (ii) The I'iission stresses the need to lay downsome. means of m-easuring efficiencvy to this end. it suggests that pricepolicy should be oriented accordingly, and that the enterprises shouldbe plac-ed on a sounnd finnncial footing as soon aS possible. There isroom for discussion of the form such measures could take. (iii) Therecommendations put forward by the +- i zssion on the innprtj rinirniy of res-ponsibility between the Government and the enterprises are based on

hn - ni+ 4hn- +4vmin -1 n-trnl ^PA f r,!3 ~+ i rmr 'h¶ +,hp .- iimvruiso~rv 11]tho-exl.rien c but -he opt-a.w lee of delegation hr the s-''er"i"'r ah

rities to the enterprises depends on GTovernment policy. The hlission has,-lshe to-A4- be reali4sti n.+g t eomenain u, hl eo

gnizing the pragmaticism and imagination showni by the Tunisian authori-tie, it h'as no't re'rainel fron, suggestiIng -14-L.y c ocetn

points and proposing fresh solutions.

A. Internal reorganization of the enterprises

51. To begin with, it is essential that the enterprises should beproviUde wit h41 Ue 1 vuer daUUWa vl az itlU proper X -r ect or sAvvX .0. vv) v

accounting should be instituted where it does not yet exist, providingfor the preparation and interpretation of the necessar- information. Onthe one hand, this information should enable management and the super-visory authority to tak-e be-tter stock of current situationLs, to settargets for each company, to specify the means to be employed in reachij7nthose targets and to compare the res-ult achieved -with the forecasts. Onthe other hand, it should provide management with advance warning ofany operating difficulties or oI any shortcomings in discharging fun.ctiCn-sat the supply stage, in the course of production, in the handling ofstocks and in the administration of staff, so that the managemen't maytake the necessary remedial action.

- 19 -

52. In view of the magnitude of the task to be accomplished, thedesired results would be achieved more rapidly if simultaneous use weremade of the services of consultants with specialized knowledge of parti-cular enterprises or particular sectors, and of experts in the particulartechniques in the case of studies at national level (wage and salarypolicy for example) and in particular activities undertaken within eachenterprise (training for example).

53. It would also be useful to mitigate the Dresent shortage ofkey personnel by enlisting the aid, on a temporary basis, of foreignprofessionals to a greater degree than at present. Of course, thetraining of Tunisian professionals would have to be carried out inparallel with this. both outside and inside the enternrises concerned(see below). As has been mentioned above, the consultants selected toreorPan 7ze the Pn+.Prnrr iq 1 uil nnt. n,?of>*qcznrJ 1 hr! t.hnsp who are be,st

qualified to train the professional staff. A more extensive use offoreign profession.als w-ould appear to be onenof the best methods ofreaching, as fast as possible, the stage at which such personnel willno longer be required, anAd herefore the one most consistent with nationalaspirations. Although the cost of such assistance could be heavy, itcould y A i ald very hl re if t c , s are l c Tn

the Missionts opinion, priority should be given to the reorganization ofesting enterprises, rah i tlhL t Lfresh L J.i1. vese 4in± th,-o

enterprise sector, and the corresponding sums ought to be included inthe PlCar., ar.d J-1 Ule vestwI.ut b-udget, either of eachi of u1e enterprlsesin question, or of the State. An attempt might also be made to obtaini±fLiancial assistance from b abroad.

,. It is quite possible that expert viewis on a particular enter-prise may indicate that it is not viable as it is now set up /1.

55. Staff cuts may also be recommendable not only for the purposeof relieving an enterprise of unnecessary expense, but also because thepresence of redundant staff tends to prevent proper use of the regularstaff.

/1 This would likely be true in the case of AMS. In such instancesthe most desirable solution would be either to close down the enter-prise and find some other use for its machinery, such as, for instance,its transfer to apprentice schools, or to undertake a major overhaulof the company, including technical changes, and the opening of foreignmarkets, possibly in connection with a foreign participation in thecapital of the company.

- 20 -

B. Manpower training

56. The Government of Tunisia has long considered the bettermentof man as a primarv obiective. The present efforts of training of exe-cutives and other key personnel should be stepped up. The opening nextautumn of part of the TTniversitv for the training of executives, withthe assistance of Tunisian teachers who are business school graduatesand of a number of foreign teachers nrovided under a US A[D program.appears to mark an important step forward. A desirable course would beto forecast the managerial And professin2n1 needs of t.he enternrisesover a longer period, and to embark upon both short and long-term theo-reticnl nni practical training program.-s In the short term existing keypersonnel would have to be used to the full extent of their presenttechnical capacity and this capac ty developed to the maximum. In thelong term, the aim would be to organize a system of promotion on a meritbasis extending from the time at which personnel leave school ulntil theyreach the highest posts. This system would have to be sufficiently pro-gressive for eacli official to master the dUJes of a given level beforebeing promoted to the next higher level.

C. Determining the efficiency of enterprises

57. Measuring the efficiency of State-owned enterprises is a diffi-cult task in any country, particularly wIhere an enterprise enjoys a dejure, or de facto monopoly, or where it has a social purpose to fulfill inaddition to its economic function. It appears, however, that to ranagean enterprise and steer it forward without some way of measuring itsefficiency is a practical impossibility.

(a) Specific acti-on

58. Specific action might be taken at the time a reorganizationplan is introduced, such as, for example, the laying down of certaininternal standards of productivity. The efficiency of an enterprise,whatever its economic lay-out could be measured by relating production toproduction factors (manpower and capital), and by the multiple ratiosemployed elsewhere, provided that these are adapted to the special needsof each enterprise. Whether an enterprise is private or State-owned,profit is still the most significant overall measure of its efficieincy,as well as the safest guide to follow in choosing amongst the variousoptions with which it will be faced throughout its existence.

(b) Financial overhaul

59. Before the financial results of an enterprise can be used tomeasure its efficiency, it is first necessary that its financial struc-ture be sound; that, whenever necessary, its assets be reduced to theirtrue value, valueless items being posted as losses; that its own capitalbe brought up to the level required to balance the fixed assets and the

- 21 -

working capital, and that bank overdrafts either be cancelled or reducedto a level consistent with fluctuating seasonal requirements. The Stateshould pay its debts to the enterprises, while at the same time collect-ing arrears of taxes. Inter-enterprise particioations should be abo-lished or else taken up by the State, except in a few cases of mutuallycomDlementarv activities.

6o. This nreliminarv rearrangement wzould renresent a transfer offunds from the State to the State-owned enterprises in an amount estimatedbv the Ti;nion tn bp Ahoiit. Tn gn Tmill;in nt. the Pncd f'f 1967 Tt. wonuldpermit the repayment of bank overdrafts used to finance fixed investmentand of med&ivm-te'rm 1onnsn to the exrtent. the Alat-er are csive, nd the

refund, to a number of enterprises, of their participations. As a resultof +he repaAyments receivted from borrowers nd the additionnl depositsmade by companies in a healthy financial situation, the banks could them-senlves reduce thei;r calls osn the Pr tral Banko *h nlr t.he repnaymentby the State of the amounts it owes to the State-owned enterprises could-3o4s I-r e c-i4 -d,+ 4 -t -. , ,s -- 4--4- 4--h i-a-. -he -1- anao'ach

LLA .L-J J .tJ . L% -- A v L.XA* QUAfl± 0. Vv a z USf U 4L%t ILA L .k-* 0 ' j .j.LLJI 5)4. ~"0.'Aenterprise, each bank, the Central Bank and the Government in respectto a-LJl o herA.s WoU.LL 'd remmL.LIa- vL±irLULJ- unchm-4ged whL - u- acituLLuaO1 CL cuJe Vi.oz /debtor relations would be restored. At the end of this clearing operation,VIeSO ateV I s U vi La ir.deUt;ednesIZs t-o SWhe S'tat-e-ovnneud entaer-ises wo-ldin essence, be converted into an obligation on its part towards theCenrju fL Dank-l. jIis comLu[nLIrlenJt rright subseq-aently bu reuduced in varluuo

ways, in particular by the transfer to the private sector of certainState participations (see paragraphs 82 and o6 below). An operation ofthis magnitude w-iould necessitate an impartial preliminary study, whichmight for instance, be entrusted either to international technicalassistance or to foreign consultants. All this would undoubtedly needchanges in the various ceilings that are currently imposed on the State'sindebtedness to the Central Bank, and on the rediscounting operationsof the commercial banks at the Central Bank.

61. Whilst the State is still unable, for one reason or another, tomake the required disbursements, actual financial results of the State-owned enterprises should also be cxpressed neJ- of the additional financialcharges they bore for lack of inadequate capitalization, so as to showwhat these results would be under normal conditions.

62. With the same end in view all additional expenditures imposed,for instance, for social reasons on the enterprises by the authoritiesshould be separately accounted for and, if possible, counterbalanced bysubsidies so that the profits of the enterprise continue to be a measureof its efficiency.

(c) Price policy

63. The results achieved by an enterprise would contiinue to haveno significance if the selling prices were fixed in such a manner asto balance the costs of production, whatever these might be. The

reorganization of its finances would therefore have to be accompanieduy The formulation of a price policy linked mLore directly to the targetsset for the economy. As the Tunisian authorities are well aware, theTunisian economy, because of its size, cannot expect large scale deve=lopment in the long term without meeting international competition. TheMission therefore considers that prices should be fixed primarily inrelation to the levels of international prices, allowance being made forthe degree of protection required during an interim period, preferablyas part of a program of graduated reduction of such protection.

64. As regards EL Fouladh steel, for instance, the selling priceon the domestic market should preferably be closer to internationalprice-levels, and the loss in revenue offset by a State subsidy. Thissteel is mainly used on investment projects and any increase in itscost may result in misleading estimate of the return on these projectsand lead to certain distortions in investment priorities. Horeover,such action would not place any additional burden on the finances ofthe State, inasmuch as the steel consumers are themselves publicly-ownedenterprises supported by the State. Finally, it is healthier for anenterprise to live with a deficit and seek to reduce it, than to procureits financial equilibrium through high selling price.

65. Restructuring the finances of the enterprises and readjustingselling prices for their goods and services would make it possible toset targets for them, in terms of financial results, over periods fromthree to five years. These targets would be set after discussion betweenmanagers of enterprises and their supervisory authorities, and themanagers would agree to their own effectiveness being judged in termsof the extent to which their results measure up to the targets.

D_ nDistribution of resnonsibilities and duties

(a) The problem in context

66. A diffielilt problem is that of the distribution of decision-making responsibility between the supervisory authorities and theState-oTwned enterprises and, withinl the enterprises, between the M\-anagingDirector and the Board. A further problem which should be consideredatj '*~ O- the"n LhJ te , is that of the., Jee,lnatoTr -_nCtins arged resnpe

ively by the banks and by the supervisory authorities.

67. The experience of other countries tends to show that thegreatest efficiency is achieved w.hen State=owned enterprises operateunder conditions very similar to those with which private enterpriseshave to con.tend. This indicates that the State should act essentiallyas if it were an ordinary shareholder, concerned only with the successiul

conduct of the enterprise, that the risks attached to the exercise ofpersonal aut,ho-.iuy. by- tIhI-agn Director shoulnd be lessened by entrust-ing the Board with responsibility for taking major decisions, that theBoaru should consist of persons w>h0ose experie.nce serves too complement thatof the Managing Director in various fields, and lastly, that the enterprise,thrutough t &a U decisive role of the banks whose aid it is obliged to enlistshould not be allowed to engage in ventures that it does not have the finanr-cial resources to sustain. ±1, however,, the Suate retains +>Lk main deci-sion-making authority, it is more prone to delegate to a single man, theManaging Director, the exercise of those responsibilities ite is wisling to relinquish. The Board is then deprived of a large part of itsusefulness and its role is, in fact, fulfilled by various Ministerial com-mittees. Similarly, the banks have no opportunity of forming a judgmentas to the expediency of expenditures decided upon at Government level and,if they are asked to finance enterprises, are justified in requiring govern-mental guarantees.

66. If present relations between the State-owned enterprises, theirsupervisory authorities and their banks more closely resemble the secondof the systems described above than the first, this situation would appearto be more the outcome of pragmatism than of a doctrine. The Governmentassigns to the State-owned enterprises the same tasks as to the private

ones, both types of enterprise being required to work for national pros-perity within the framework of the general aims of the Government. The

State-owned enterprises, like private enterprises, are required to keep aclose watch on productivity and to make a profit. If in the past the majordecisions have been taken by the public authorities in the case of most

enterprises, it seems it was hardly possible to operate differently, sincethe enterprises were not equipped to set their objectives themselves. On

the other hand, it has happened that, when a Managing Director has appeared

to be able to handle on his own the various problems facing his enterprise,he has been allowed the greatest latitude by the public authorities, withouthowever, their not relinquishing their right to participate to major discus-

sions and to exercise surveillance. The climate of human relations inTunisia favors wide delegation of powers. xen in positions of responsibi-lity are all on fairly close terms with one another so that the public

authorities know whom they can trust: in addition it has often been theMissionts impression that the PDGs readily identify with their enterprisesand spare no personal effort on their behalf.

69. The Mission believes that the ability available is best used

through wide delegation of powers, both by the supervisory authorities t-nthe Pr6sidents DireAteurs Mnenranx of enternrises and by the Pr'sidentsDirecteurs G6n6raux to their subordinates. Nevertheless, even thoughthe Mission can recommend wit…o - -reservatien t Mn-aing Directors ofenterprises be given maximum responsibility in operational matters, theext+en to which responsibility can %n be l degann to them in regard tninvestment decisions depends on choices that only the Government can make.

(b) Operational responsibilities

70. The Mjission recommends that reinforcement of key personnel ofenterpari ses l2hi1 b vi ren prnio+r- oe r ew nn n of the A t IrnA1

surveillance staff. It is more important to provide Presidents DirecteursGCeneJra-uX writlh tAh ..eans of dALShg.Ang thlei~r olJJVLA . resp on r.ore

efficiently than to increase the number of economic and financial ins-pectuors -VThA,Ose e.ffectiver.ess is 1i.,Uite whils the4 entrprse 4they ------- l

do not possess a single economist or financial expert and the accountanthuimsel- is no m..ore utuhaC b. a O b .keelpe. ILL Ul41 p.ts, Q1e L,LC% U.LU1J±A UO iiiLoJu

useful supervisory staff are those who can assist the enterprises incarr-ying out thei- inter-nal tasks. A lmost all -g graduates leavingthe university who can be assigned to the public-enterprise sector sho-uld

rt 4.UrJUned r)o ass4iurie responsiuliuty WlbfJl wLthi eii d vuvy wflcJ-±

number being earmarked to reinforce the body of inspectors.

71. It would be essential to allow the Presidents Directeurs G6ne-raux of the State-owned enterprises all possible latitude in the appoint-ment, promotion, discharge and remuneration of staff. The present ten-dency of the Government would appear to be, on the contrary, to add tothe body of regulations to which the staff of State-owned enterprisesare subject. A special code already applies to such staff and it isunderstood that their pay-scales may also be subject to regulation,widening the gap between them and the scales paid in the private sector,and bringing them more into line with those in the public sector. Sucha trend could have a paralyzing effect on the State-owned enterprisesand jeopardize permanently their chances of improving their internalstructure and increasing their efficiency. It is particularly importantthat workers should be provided with incentives in the form of bonusesthat are linked to output, and such a system can only be viable if acertain risk of arbitrary decisions on the part of management is accepted.Whenever management's discretion is subject to limitations, the bonussystem inevitably ends up as an across-the-board pay-increase and thusloses its "raison d'^tre". Generally speaking, anything that tends tobring Civil Service procedures into the State-owned enterprises and tointroduce into them the safeguards employed in the Civil Service millalso tend to paralyze their freedom of action. Fewer disadvantageswould accrue from allowing a very wide degree of responsibility to themanagements of the enterprises, at the risk of a few abuses that wouldbe corrected subsequently, than from trying to prevent abuses by cir-cumscribing the enterprises with inhibiting regulations.

72. With the same object, care should be taken to protect theindependence of responsibility of managers of enterprises against en-croachment hy certain autonnmous public AntiMP s. For examp le. allrecruitment must now be channelled through the '?Office de la FormationProfessionnelleet del ltploit J, which was setup to assist the

If VocatiJJ.onal. QLLL.LLI O.L±4£LL JJIL IA -loL, L .LOffice

operation of the labor market, and perhaps also to prevent abuses inthe recruitment of staff. As a result, the enterprises are often involvedin unnecessary formalities and subject to some pressure by the Officeto appoint the candidates of its choice. A preferable and more efficientprocedure would probably be to make the use of the office's servicesoptional, i.e. the Office would assist the enterprises whenever calledupon to do so rather than set itself up as a supervisory agency exer-cising excessive control over the choice of staff.

73. A similar comment might be made with respect to the "InstitutNational de Productivite et de Gestion des Entre2rises" 1/ and to the"Centre National diEtudes Industrielles" i . It is important that theassistance furnished by these two institutions should not only be ontionalbut also paid for. The mere fact of payment would help considerably inidentifving these institutions as servie-e agencies rather than as addi-tional supervisory bodies. It would exercise a favorable influence onthe staff of the institutions hyv roviding the-m wi th an added incentiP vto justify the cost of their activities by the quality of their services,and make their action more effective on the principle that advice paidfor is more frequently heeded than when free.

74. There is a danger that the pressure brought to bear on theState~-ow .d eneIse STTM Po" examp'le%, especially bhy the nres nndby public opinion, to reduce the extent to which they call on foreignte^hn i c 'C.1 assistance car. place thLenn at a a diLsadvn.tage visJ...Vis p", va+eenterprise, which has more freedom of action in this respect. This

VViU.J~L .JL-L±L~ IJ WJ.L WL4 ULMJ UU.L .L il 1JIt.U"u.J.Ly W.L ll L l-1., I".o i04Ua.l-ewo'U ofit-Wt h oiyo nurdiywQ respect to Stteowned and private enterprises that the Government is seekcing to follow.It would be helpful if hne freedom of managers of enterprises to seekforeign technical assistance, when this appears necessary to them, couldbe protecteed against such outside pressures.

75. Not only does a wide degree of autoriomy for the maragers appeardesirable on any count, but it seems that an extension of this autonomymight prove to be a most effective incentive. It would therefore appear-desirable that, whenever an enterprise has achieved the financial resultslaid down for it, its manager be allowed an increasing measure of dele-gated authority to plough back profits for new investment within the en-terprise. This might take the form of an increase in the maximum amountthat the manager can invest out of the enterprise's own resources,without authorization from the supervisory authority.

N/ National Institute for Productivity and Yanagement of Enterprises2/ iJational Center for Industrial Research.

- 26 -

(c) Investments

76. The foregoing chapters have shown how costly the failure to carryout sufficient studies on the profitability of investments can be, a failurethat often springs from the desire to move too fast. Even now, it seems there isdanger that the zeal to achieve a high level of investment within fixed periodsof time or, in other words, to complete an investment program within theterm of a single economic budget or under one Plan can lead to errors. Suchinvestments may have the effect not of advancing, but of postponing, the datebY which the anticipated increase in output will be achieved, and of delayingstill further the point at which the enterprise will achieve the savingstarget set for it. The need to improve the qualitv of preliminary studies iscertainly recognized by the Government and the setting up of the Centre Nationald t Etudes Tndustri elles bears itnresq to this. Also the O1overnment insists thatthe preparation of each project should be started long before the period inwhich the investmynnt is pninnned to take nlace. Tt would seem; however. thata final step has still to be taken: it should be recognized that compromiseswith the qunli+v of profitability studies are not admissible, even if thesupervision or refinement of such studies would delay the investment providedfol" ; n fho Plan._ry i_ _ _ va

77i T a hvar1A 'iJo. wLay1s o prJV.LPLr ULth q.ua.'4ty of pS jJJ. Vra-L

studies and of achieving a better balance between the authorities responsible-o rn 34ing i.e tres and 4t1--se -wbose 4tasks-titosre hm Va;u

combinations of the three methods outlined below could be used.

78. One method would be to give certain enterprises the same autonorWWiLUith Zc wo UU wesftlMenU as it is recommended that they should have in themanagement field. Not only would they then be free to use their own profitsand reserves, but they could seek local or international financing, or elseagree to allow technical partners to participate in their capital, in whichcase they would have to convince such investors of the soundness of the invest-ment. For their profitability studies these enterprises might seek the helpof the Centre Nationai des Etudes Industrielles, on a fee-paying basis, orengage private consultants. Such investments would no longer be decided uponby the planning authorities, but authorized by them upon the same conditionsas private investments,-- the increased autonomy would not ent iJ a relaxationof controls. This presupposes that these enterprises are effectively reorga-nized and their staff is sufficiently competent and experienced to enablemanagement to assume responsibility for such investments.

79. A second method, towards the adoption of which the present effortsof the Government appear to be directed, consists in strengthening the agenciesand departments responsible for carrying out or supervising the preliminarystudies. These are the Centre National des Etudes Industrielles, responsiblefor industrial promotion and the carrying out of special studies of industrialsectors or individual projects, and the administrative departments that studyprojects before they are submitted to the Investment Committee, particularly

- 27 -

uhe D-sAodes Etude A-- rie of -h Dieto de lT-Ast- -4 u.4Je I.LJJ V.L±V U.LL fl, jL±U.2 UEUIVIa-E± UJ. Ul AJ II JJ C U L.LIJ± UV L 4. A4.LLLLO Ul .JL

The advantage of this method is that it is easy to apply, as itinvolves few changes in the present organizational Utr-ucture. Itsdrawback is that it may not be able to make sufficient improvementin the balance between the accelerator and braking functions inll theinvestment field.

80. A third formula would be a separation between the Planauthorities and the administrative authority or the agency responsiblefor supervising the profitability, and possibly also for the financing,of the investments. A common method of procuring this separation isto interpose an investment bank between the State-owned enterprisesand their supervisory authorities. In the case of Tunisia, its capitalcould be subscribed by the State-owned enterprises themselves, with orwithout outside contributions. Another formula which merits study,aimed particularly at avoiding dispersion of effort, would consistin entrusting to the SNI, on a fee basis,the administration of aninvestment fund set up specifically for the State-owned enterprises.

81. This method would be particularly useful if those Tunisianswho have had most experience in the investment field, and in nego-tiating with foreigners, particularly for suppliers' credits, wereassociated with this investment bank, thus enabling all State-ownedenterprises to benefit from their experience.

E. Mobilization of private savings

82. In view of the heavy burdens alreadv imposed on the State'sfinances by the State-owned enterprises, and of the further burdensthey will be called unon to bear, one might ask how far the load car-ried by public savings could be relieved by private savings.

83. In cases Twhere a State-owned enterprise has only been set uph'.aiise of the failuire of nrivate enternrise to meet a particular need,it would appear to be the policy of the State to transfer that enter-prise to the private sector as soon as a groun of nrivate entrepreneurscan be found to take it over.

84. Whether the State remains a minority shareholder in a semi-public c n, or whether it ithdra n entirely, priv2te entrPnrePnePrswill only be interested in assuming control of a company if they receiveadequate guaratees of independence. It will 1ne rnllr be easier toreassure private purchasers if the State withdraws completely, but thismay depend upon the merts of each particular case.

85. If t4.h.e State vJ.shes to retai4n efftcve cor.trol over ar. er.ter-

prise, there may be cases in which it can do so and still sell part ofIbis sIC.L es. It m,a Ub iLn a manoIIUyLLU± "¶I"-s±lO U IIIa.LA.LIJG UrL'%- h .e prjn

shareholder, if the rest of the capital is sufficiently diluted. Fur-

- 2R -

thermore,its influence will be greater than that represented by the merenumber of the shaes it holds, by Virtu_e of the simple fact that the enter-

prise depend for their existence on the many authorizations it issues

(prices, imports, etc.).

86. The sale of State=owned shares to the public rml ght, in the

case of certain enterprises, be effected more easily through Soci6te

Financiere et de Gestion (Sofiges) thaan by a direct offering, either

by Sofiges seeking to create a market for such shares by selling and

repurchasing them, as opport--nity arises, or by Sofiges sellingr its

own shares. Since Sofiges was set up for the purpose of mobilizing

savings from still timid and inexperienced private investors, it s

essential that its activities should be strictly orthodox. Its hold-

ing in any given company should not exceed a certai, percentage, sothat it never has to assume responsibilities for which it is not quali-

fied. In particular, its share portfolio should be above criticism.

The State should therefore buy back the shares of a number of companiesof questionable soundness in which Sofiges took an interest of 50 percent or more in June 1968. /

87. Another formula that would appear to deserve study would bethe issue of convertible bonds by those State-owmed enterprises which

are in the strongest financial position, as for example Tunis-Air. The

dividends distributed during the years following the issue of thesebonds would have to be sufficiently high to induce bondholders to con-

vert them at a later date into shares producing a higher return.

88. Finally, it seems that the remarks on the Perspectives Decen-

nales in the World Bank report of April 1963 are still applicable. In

the long-term view, the advantages that Tunisia enjoys over its foreign

competitors lie in the quality of its labor force and in the potential

for growth, both in quality and quantity, of the talents at its dis-

posal. The great promises of the Perspectives, based on an intensive

development of education, can only-be realized by making full use of

the employment opportunities presented by such labor-intensive indus-

tries as textile, leather, food processing, light metals and, of course,

tourism. It so happens that these are, on the whole, small and medium

scale industries that, by their nature, lend themselves to private

rather than to public investment. The projected fall in the share of

private investment in industry from 33 per cent in 1969 to 17 per cent

in 1970, followed by a progressive improvement to only 21 per cent in 1972,

evidence the reluctance of private investors to enter the industrial fie3d..

This reluctance may be connected with the uncertainty of entrepreneurs atoul

the intentions of the public authorities with respect to this sector.

It might be advantageous for the Government to restate its iintention

1/ AIMS; Union GrnArale: Tianufacture Tunisienne de C6ramiques.

- 29 -

to maintain for a long period the nresent incentives to Drivateinvestment, as described in the Investment Code recently approvedby Parliament. to confirm its policv of nAiitralitv and of equalitvof treatment for State-owned, private and cooperative enterprises,annd to deifine the limits tha. T,will be nAgn.i d to +he + operativesp

in the industrial sector.

ANNEX 1page 1

LIST OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND SHORT NOTE

ON THE AOTIVITIES OF THE MAJOR STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

1. List of State-Owned Enterprises

>~~~> o 0 0 H I 0 o 0

ri < 4h o0'C HCrl 0 a0 1-4 0 C.) 0 1~ T1

ri 4*3 4 HH W

en .~0 4' *d O r4 rl 0 0 E- 0 0 0

E O-4C) 05 h~ 00 4 ) U) * 0* 0a) r -i- 1-P,

0) C) V7 o~ oQ > P 0 %4 0[: *d 2 h r H W ° m Q m

° 100 4-) p- O o 4V7 O

¢ =C)C) H r).: 0 ~ I

1. Agricultural and FoodStuffs Industries

Office des cereales x x xOffice du Commerce OCT x x xOffice de llhuile (1) x xSte Tunisienne du Sucre STS x x xRegie Nationale des

Tabacs et Allumettes RNTA x x xOffice National desPgches ONP x x x

2. Petroleum ProductsSte d'Etudes et deRecherches PetrolieresTunisienne SEREP x x x xSte Tuniso-Italiennede Raffinage STIR x x x x

Ste Italo-Tunisienned'exploitation Pe-troliere SITEP x x x x

Ste Anonyme AGIP AGIP x x x x

(1) to be dissolved

AMNNY 1page 2

O) H 'd

*HA 0 0 H- 4-)>4 hd ri $~, 4O 3

+r H H O . 4-)Y 12c ,- *^

co ;4 't Q) f:R m _ @-P Hr4 0 - co) 0 !f rl *d ° ¶ ci' hf ,W -o

rn (10)o O4-' toq ) fl ° _ Ato

g o o E-t rn c ,,< H 0 -P )r C. 2Q O co

O 0e. o* C9 o 1 'HC

0 4- h > ^4O f

O ~ ~ ~ 0 0S *P h HU

o 4-j A O~ S -O. *.1 0*r -

3. lectricity - IAterSte Tunisienned'Electricite et deGaz STEG x x x

Ste Nationale d'Exploi-tation et de Distri-bution des Eaux SONEDE x x

4. Building material,CGramic. Glass. Cons-truction, Public I^rks

vSt' Nntionnl P Tmmohi-

liere de Tunisie SNIT x x xTi Atnhih (2) x xCiments Portland de

zerte ( Ciments ArtificielsTunis4ens (4) G~AT xx

El Bouniane x xP+iM_+ 0l. V.-Vantimer,t (4) x

La Tunisoise Indus-t-r-; -ie -I e (4) \ ™PTM ArC x x

Union Generale\zujiqaueerie due

Dj emal) x x xMani- _.aLure im-uisnfe

de Ceramiques x x xEurafrica-Ine Breuero x x u

(2) Small Gompany - asbestos pipes -

(3) Seauestration(4) Subsidiary of EL Bouniane

ANNEX 1page 3

ci)

i 0 0 r-i4- l-i 4- -

r1i r-P - 0 c r.D=^, h3 ° °i rdrl U U O ' a) Id

Cl, I V m_) *go z z t

= * ;~~~0~4 W *r4

g 0 * O C * 0 +w S qS

;>> O < h PsO rl C O 4-

°) ri.p hr h) W 4 O4 a)- 0H p U1

CH E 4) O: C) *H cO rl U *0 -H Q- f O ¢ :

E. Extractive IndustriesSfax- Gafsa x x xCie Nouvelle des Phosphates

du Diebel M'Dilla CIPHOS x x xSte Tunisienne d'Exploi-tations Phosphatieres (l)STEPHOS x x x

Office National des Mines ONM x xDiebel Dierissa x x x xSte Tunisienne d'EXpan-sion Mini"re s5 IPnT x X x

6. Iron and Steel, Met-e -workingand mechanical engineering

a1 Fouladh x x xSt6 Tunisisnn e de Construc=.tion et de Reparations

tecanique UV et Navales SOQ.M x , xSte des Fonderies

-*Si9 a L jUJ Li W' 5.4 V Jfl .

Ateliers Mecaniques duSzahe-l AMC x x x

Ste Tunisienne de l'Indus-trie Automobile 0i'_A x x x

M'etallurgique de Tunisie (2) xFonderies Reunies x x x x

Industries Maghr6binesde lVAluminium MiAL x x xSTUMEIAL x x x

(1) Merged with Sfax-Gafsa since.the Mission visited Tunisia.

(2) Small foundrv in rTEMI Group.

ANNEX 1page

-0

o) H ~t> h- H 0)

.,i 0 0 H o

hP U 4 U ; *<@ d Hri +) 0 + ,_

-4. rir 4.1 4-' '0U) h-C C) O

£ U)Q) 2 O C) -H

¢ 9 c) O ~~ ~ ~~C.) cid H U)

--/-/ h *rl4

~0 0 E

_ .~~~~~~~~+ 9~ U

ow U) o C 0 _Pq~~~~0

a) +D, -r-i ~ U) 0

z ~~~~~~ C. U -OH ; .i 0 0 * 0 -+to a)c-P 0)-; - -H .3

o< OH H -i) *HX ¢ U W U rl ) C) 4-i 0 0~~~~~~~0 0- - OH

7. Chemical IndustriesSte des Engrais pulv'eri-ses (1) STEP x x

Ste Industrielle dtAcidePhosphorinue et daeThrais

SIAPE x x xRaffinerie Tunisienne du

Soufre (1) xPharmTari Ce'ntrale x x x

8. Texiles1 .C rlot.hing, Let.oherHandicrafts

Com..is1-.a Gnea auxTextile et "a 1'Habille-ment CGYT4 x x x

Societe Generale des In-dus-+ri-;-es Ae TrC ,I es SOCf-ITrI,TV x x x

Office Nationale de1 I Ar4ti-4Sanat4- TTA

-L JUUL L J'. x x x

0 T.hnAc -pA ,-.-i+,v -

9'. VAtJ,ods andt U.*J ULU iue Paper'

Societe des MeublesCZ S A'Kt'r,'Q x x x

Societe Nationale Tuni-SieDne de Cellulose StVIC x x x

'O. LWJ`orJ-aJodrj± ardL DtItribution

SIoc-itLe iVi.LU1JU.JL Ues SrJ x A A

Chemins de Fer TunisiensSociece Nationale desTransports SIff x x x

Societe Tunisienne aeMarchandises STIl x x x

(1) Small company.

ADTNEX 1.page )

a) H Id

_P S- r4 0)i.r-4 0 - 40 H>4 5 H o

5- c,Sct 4 5.4 2

co 8 N4S

-P *Hi- 0 4q 0 G

0 E-0< COH -P 0 COf ,D -c

F-I

~o 0 E-~ 5~ '~ co

h z4 m CO0 DP

C) CO a)54 e A- Q 0

o :j P4Oa) .QO1 c Oo OCOho eP -Pp O C) 0O u-PC

o 0 H C) ¢ -H O ¢ .

10. Transportation andDistribution (Contd.)

Compagnie Tunisiennede Navigation CTN x x xSociete TunisienneCommerciale (1) STC x x

Societe Tunisiennedlacconage et deManuten,t.on (1) STAM x xSociete laritime dela Skhira (1) x

Tunis-Air x x xOffice des PortsNationauzx Tunisiens OPNT x x

Le Moteur x x

11. Servicesa) Printing and Pubblnshin

Imprimerie Officielle (2) x xMaison TiinisiennA de1'Edition x x

Diffusion STD x xTyrrnvynnvi fqi rlv CMnvi.Imri-me ied-rad -- Maghreb (3) x x

b) .&fl4~ LJA Sflo . U'..a n a d l > lin4tr

Agence Tunisienne de

Tunis - Afrique de Presse(,LD x x

Societe Anonyme Tunisien-ne ud rroduuction etl d. &-ploitation Cinematogra-phique SAT-EC x x

(1) Subsidiary of CTN; (2) Government Agency accorded status of enterprise(3) Very small company; (4) Monopoly of public information not very active;(5) Actually an administrative agency supported by the Budget.

AAQNEX 1

page 6

0)o) H d

*rl 0 0 H-P h4 rHi -)cr I r-l O tP :I O 0-P *H.u 0 -P4-i -us" -r 0 -

h-i C) ) 4 - a) a )4*rl $4 0 C flD O -p

-H o: O1 C) E f

CL) _P * .,A Cf A v -2 )H

O 0

E co )o * C) -w Fh Co H Cl)4-J P (CFi -rP r.- 0 -4-

>> O h PqO *r Ow WOg: o tO~~E q) h > +5 >$ *rl S rl

h 9 a) ° E0 Lr +)X @OA 0 _ +O ' C Orl ) O r U)

11. Services (Cont'd.)c) Insurance

Societe dvAssuranceset de Reassurances STAR x x x

d) MiscellaneousOffice de FormationProfessionnelle etde l'lhploi xInstitut National deProductivite et deGestion des Ehtreprises x x

Centre National dEttudesIndustrielles x x

Institut Ali Bach Hamba(1) x

Societe des Courses (2) xe) Banks and Financing

EstablishmentsSoci6te Tunisiennede Banque STB x x x

Banque NationaleAzricole BMA x x x

Banque du Sud x x xUnion Internationale

de Banque UIB x xSoci6te' Financipre et

de Gestion SOFIGES x x x

12. Tourism.Co.mmissariat Ge,nralau Tourisme et auThermalisme CGTT xT

Ste Hoteliere et Tou-ristique de 9nisie SHTT x ~~~~~~~~~x x

St"e Immobili"ere et Ho^te-liere de Kasserine (3) 5I}K x x

1 Trains newspapermen and documentation staff; (2) Monopoly of pari-mutuels; (3) Subsidiary of the Societe Nationale Tunisienne de Cellu-lose.

A[MMEX 1page 7

2. Activities of the Major State-owned Enterprises

The major State-owned enterprises included in the precedinglist are: national monopolies: Electric power and Gas (3,300 employees),Tobacco (900), Mater Supply (1,850), Sugar (500); some import agencies(Office des Cereales and Office du Commerce (400); all of the largeenterprises in the transp onsecors sea, air, road, rail, witha total of some 1.,000 employees, together with regional road transportcompanies not shown in the above list); all phosphate mines (Sfax-Gafsa,Ciphos; Stenhos: 10,100 emplovees): other major mining interests:Djerissa iron ore (700 employees), SOTE14I (essentially lead, zinc andmPrnuY'y: 2;100 mployees) and the Office National des Nines (1,200 erm-ployees); oil-prospecting and oil-field development companies foundedin association with foreign firms (Lio1 emripovees): one of the twolarge phosphoric acid and triple superphosphate plants, SIAPE (625employees, the other is a private company MPK, 420 employees)- the

El Fouladh steel mill completed in 1966 (1,240 employees); a few mecha-nical engineering industries, including the reconverted former navaldockyards of Bizerte (SOCXIENA: 800 employees), the Ateliers -Mecaniguesdu Sah' (5CPf eLmployees), STITA (auo.mob-i-le assem..bly: 35

a celulose factory (SNTC, 600 employees); a furniture factory

(K 0NklS 400J erylvoyees'), tern or so enterprises Jin tl- he buildicr ng material s

and ceramic sectors, mostly mixed economy companies with foreign capital

participations, the chief of which are D founiane (2, 00 eflmIployees),Les Cimxents Artificiels Tunisiens (a subsidiary of El Bouniane: 580employees), ana Ciments Portland de Bizerte (a sequestrated enterprisewith 450 employees); a national textile company, SOGITEX, with variousdecentralized plants (2,842 employees; the largest private text ilecompany, Slufit, has 340 employees);,a hotel and tourism company, SHTT

(2,000 employees) which coexists with a large number of private comipanies,

and the E aMacie Centrale (520 employees). Two administrative andcommercial agencies are very active in fisheries, Office National des

P^sLnd (700 employees) and handicrafts (Office National de l'Artisanat,550 direct employees; 11,000 craftsmen employed on a regular basis and6,ooo craftsmen on a temporary basis). Among the biggest State-owned

enterprises are two banks: Soci6te. Tunisienne de Banque and the BangueNationale Agricole (the two accounting for over 2/3 of all domesticlending and receiving about 40% of all deposits) and the largest insu-rance company, STAR, covering 40% of the entire insurance market.

ANIEX 2Page 1

ANNEX NO. 2

Operating Framework of the State-owned Enterprises

a) Legal Status

These enterprises fall into a number of different legalcategories, as apprtent ±ru, Uhlt WdUe ranigei of wir± duyVles

Office, Commissariat, Regie, Institut, Centre, Societe Tunisienne,Societe- Nati-ionaie.

All have financial autonomy. Some, like the Ofiice des Mines,perform a purely administrative function and are in fact no morethan administrative departments detached from the main body of theGovernment. The Office des Mines used to be a Government departmentand it might become one again. Other "COffices" perform administrativefunctions as well as engage in industrial and commercial operations.The Commissariat General au Textile et a l'Habillement is essentiallyadministrative, although it is authorized to engage in commercialoperations. The Office des Peches, originally purely administrative,has rapidly extended its activities to several sectors of industryand commerce -- even to banking, as it provides credit for fisher-men. The "Offices" have no capital, but receive budget appropriations.The Regie Nationale des Tabacs et Allumettes is an industrial andcommercial agency operated directly by the Government.

The State is the sole shareholder in all stock companies that havethe word "Nationale" in their styles. (e.g. Societe NationaleImmobiliere de Tunisie (SNIT), Societe Nationale des Chemins deFer Tunisiens (SNCFT), Societe Nationa'e des Transports (SNT) ).But there are also other such companies as, for example, SocieteTunisienne d'Electricite et de Gaz(STEG).

Mixed Economy Companies are companies in which either theState or public bodies have direct or indirect, majority orminority capital participations.

The "Societes Anonymes", whether national or of mixed economy,are subject to the Commercial Code. There are no administrativecourts.

National and mixed economy companies, together with the"Offices", are subject to a number of special laws, in additicn totheir own statutes. The status of their personnel is fixed by the

ANNEX 2P-ge=

law of June 3, 1968 regulating, inter alia, recruitment, promotionand discipline, and making provision for the remuneration of suchpersonnel to be fixed by decree. According to information gatheredby the Mission, decrees now in preparation will introduce pay-scales at a level in between those in force in the civil service andthe somewhat higher levels of remuneration in the private sector.It is to prevent the svDhonine off of civil servants by the State-owned enterprises that pay levels in the latter are to be broughtnearer to those in the civil service.

The law of February 12; 1965 places a n:uber of additionalobligations on these agencies in order to bring them under moreeffentive cn-trol. Among other things, it reLuires their boardsto meet at least once each quarter to discuss an agenda previouslyreported to t-he supper 4vsor aut+hori+ties. Cperational forecasts fo"each year must be drawn up by October 1 of the preceding year.Lnvestmen+ forecasts and fin-ncing programs are to be prepared inaccordance with Plan procedures and submitted within periodsspecified by the Ministry of Plaanning and Economic Affairs. 1/ Theannual accounts are to be closed before May 1 of the following year.le above forecasts ard annual accouar.tUs hiave to be subrUtid fL o I JLapproval to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs andpresen.ted to .`hp National Assembly in the form of a report.- Liquiditystatements have to be sent each month to the Ministry of Planninga.du Elconu-,-fule Affairs.

Although the term "Societe d'Economie NLixte"' (Mixed EconomyCompany) in the Law of February 1965 appears to cover companies-with indirect State participation, as it does in the Law of June3, 1968, the subsidiaries of Societe Tunisienne de Banque (STB)nave apparently not, so far, been subject to the former law.

All transfers of Government funds to State-owned enterprises,either as an initial contribution or as a subscription to theinitial capital or to a capital increase, are, as budgetary ex-penditures, subject to Parliamentary authorization. Nevertheless,the State has frequently arranged for enterprises in a sound financialsituation to subscribe in its stead. Moreover, in emergencies, theGovernment can furnish capital to the State-owned enterprises inthe form of Treasury advances, pending completion of the legalformalities for a capital increase and the obtaining of Parliamentaryapproval. Parliament is not involved in transfers of capital fromSociete Tunisienne de Banque (STB) to its subsidiaries.

When several members of the Board of a State-owned enterpriseare appointed by the Government, one of them is designated as thespecial Government representative with authority to speak on behalfof the Government.

1/ Late 1968 when the economic budget and new plan were being- drawn up, was the first occasion on which the Government

succeeded in obtaining operational and investment forecastsat one and the same time.

ANN@EX 2Page 3

Some Government agencies have industrial and commercial functions.

The Direction des Ponts et Chaussees (Civil Engineering Department)

of the Ministry of Public Works maintains highways. The Service de

lfHydraulique Agricole (Agricultural Hydraulic Engineering Section)

of the Ministry of Agriculture undertakes hydraulic engineering

projects. There is some talk of converting these services into

State-owned enterprises. They were not studied by the Mission.

State-owned enterprises no longer enjoy legal or regulatory

privileges giving them an advantage over competitive private enter-prises. They were tax-exempt until the end of 1965. This exemption

was extended in the case of most public enterprises up to the end of

1966, but was then terminated. INhile the salaries of their staff,

especially that of the Managing Director, are below the level of

corresponding salaries in the private sector, the saving is usuallymore than offset by an excessively large staff engaged or retainedfor political or social reasons, In practice. it would seem that theauathorities are fairly successful in maintaining State-owned and

private enterprises on a footrwn of equal competition.

b) WNI+teille t

The concept of "'Ttelle" embraces all sponsorship and controlof the enterprises by the Government.

Parliament is aware o~f financial difficulties in certain of theState-owned enterprises and of the situation. of enterprises rec eivigregular subsidies of various kinds, such as SNCFT, through itscontrol over their b-udgetary appropriations. Also, as indicated

previously, it is now better provided with information, presentedto it systematica'l-y under the 'Law of February- 12, 1965. ITaddition, the Government submitted overall and detailed reports toParliament on the performance of 'he public sector in l961i, 1965and 1g966. These reports were discussed, but no vote was taken onthem. In 1968, parliamentary groups are reported to have initiatedinspection tours of some of the larger State-owned enterprises.

Government "Tutelle" is, in principle, carried out by two

different Ministries: tne "technical" Ministry responsible forthe enterprise (Industry, Public Works, etc.) and the Ministry of

Planning and Finance covering all 'ndusuixes. Tor u present, Minister of Planning and Finance is at the same time Minister ofIndustry, Mjinister of Commerce, M'linister of Agric-uture andMinister of Education, so that most of the national enterprises,though subordinate to two different Ministries, are in fact subjectto the authority of a single Minister.

Enterprises in the two large sectors of Textiles and Tourism,are subject to "Commissariats Generaux". in 1967 tne CommissariatGeneral au Textile et a l'Habillement (CGTH), with increased authority,

ANNEX 2Page 4

succeeded the Office National du Textile. Its responsibilitiesinclude export promotion and clothing. The Commissariat General auTourisme et au Thermalisme controls Societe Hoteliere et Touristiquede Tunisie (SHTT) and is active in the fields of promotion,development, technical assistance, research and infrastructurefinancing, chiefly drawing on budgetary funds.

Supervision tends increasingly to take the form of meetings heldat the Ministrv of Planning and Finance to discuss the affairs ofa given enterprise and concerned with the approval of its annualaccoints, with its investment and finanGing program, or. if theenterprise is in financial difficulties, with a financial re-organization planr In additoin t to the 'PrA:Jrdnt MrscteurGeneral, possibly supported by a financial expert, these meetingsare iuuinlly attendd by representai of the Pannning DNpartment.

of the Finance Departments and of the technical Ministry concerned

Ivhen the Plan is being prepared, she investment prog-m ofenterprises are similarly examined and discussed by sectoralco.U ----- -- A s-u,co--,4m4-ees -4+. -L. of privat 4-e-- Uenterprise and of the large organizations concerned.

Direct contacts between the Presidents Directeurs GenerauxadlU LAMth 1iL1nisbLe' OUr in 9U0IU cadbtb WIti r1'itib± UUU OULULUc1 ._-

self also play an essential role.

Within the Ministry of Finance and Planning, the departmentthat most closely follows the activities of the State-ovmed enter-prises is the State-owned Enterprise Section of the Division forControl of the Execution of the Plan. Tnis section appears to befairly well informed about what goes on in the State-owned enterprises,largely through personal contacts with the Presidents Dlirebteurs-Generaux but still lacks the documentation and personnel neededto fully discharge its function. It prepares monthly statementsshowing the financial position of the major State-owned enter-prises on the basis of the information it receives from them. Itis therefore relatively well-informed on the current situation,but has much less clear a view of future trends. it lacks tnemeans to analyze the documents it receives, uncover managementerrors, and correct unrealistic forecasts. Its letters to enter-prises approving accounts or budgets do not therefore as a rulecontain any comparisons with financial documents for previousyears or any very constructive criticisms.

The enterprises are not required to present their annualfinancial statements as of December 31 until May 31 of the followingyear. Most of them are not in a position to have these readybefore May or June. There are a number of exceptions: some produce

ANNEX 2Page 5

thir staterments early, in March or April, whereas the statementsof others do not appear until October or November. Belatedreporting of financial results to suinervisorv departments holds

up corrective action and leads to a situation in which all fore-casts a-e made on the basis of, information that is at least 6months old.

All Tunisian enterprises are required by law to comply withthke natior.a Plar - 0 -able, wM;c1h should make for clea-rer companrisons

of accounts and help with the preparation of overall data for theState-owned enterprise secto r. This adv&ntage is p dstvov1ethrough the variety of methods used by the various enterprises toevaluate their assets and their inventories,in coputing depreciation,etc.

There are 6 Economic and Financial Comptrollers, each of whomhas supervisory responsibiliy for 5 to 8 SUaue-o-wn,ed enterprises.Another 13 persons, in addition to their principal duties, actas Economic and Financial Comptrollers, each having responsibilityfor 1 to 6 enterprises. They attend Board meetings and have aright of veto. Tne statutes of some companies (such as STEG orthe Regie des Tabacs) provide for the exercise of prior controlby these comptrollers in the form of approval of expenditure com-mitments. Formerly, the Economic and Financial Comptrollersreported direct to the Minister. Since the beginning of 1968they have been under the Division of Economic and Financial Controlof the Planning Department. In practice, they are very largelyleft to themselves. Each organizes his work as he sees fit andthey are usually unaware of what action is taken on their reports.They are unequal in authority and experience and their training ismore often in taxation than in economics or finance; they havemore or less ready access to the enterprises. For all thesereasons, the Economic and Financial Comptrollers, despite theirgood intentions, are, on the whole, ineffective as at present con-stituted.l/

The Auditors ("Commissaires aux Comptes") play a token role.At best they confine themselves to confirming that the annual re-ports of a company are consistent with its accounts. This auditis sometimes so superficial that it may, for example, overlookdiscrepancies between the value of inventories at the end of oneyear and at the beginning of the next.

l/ The law of February 12, 1965 requires that the "Offices",National Companies and Mixed Economy Companies shall all beequally subject to the General Inspectorate of AdministrativeServices, attached to the "Secretariat d'Etat a la Presidence",but,. so far, such inspection appears, in practice, to have beenlimited to the civil service.

ANNEX 2Paee 6

The sunervision function of the technical Ministrv is exercisedthrough certain specialized Ministries, such as the Ministry ofTran.spnrt.. FPor the groin of mqniufactfirinP industrisq anr onnwer itXI - r_ _ _ -_ _-- _D _ _ -- -- - -

is performed by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, morenpi'+.i rii1 r thisouic,h the Teprtnmen+. of' Tndtiiiq+.r al Productiiron and

the Department of Mines and Power. The Department of IndustrialProduction covers .ha food procssa- mecha,nical engineering

construction and miscellaneous industries, but not textiles(which c om.e under the Commissiara General au Tex+ile et a 1'Habillement) or tobacco, which is under the Ministry of Finance.The1 Dlylisio. dAes- Etudes Gener,rales (.Dwivrision oIf General Sztudies)

is responsible for considering the economic and financial aspects~. .L. .L&'LVVQ UIVALVLI. JJ.LWJ U%'U "IA .LJULO. ILJLVO %'U4'JAI.L416 LA4LUV.L 9L4L%7 JJUjj x u-

ment of Industrial Production.

The Government supervisory agencies described above collect theof ten sket c,l.-Y Ainform,at-ion supplied b,-y t- he e nt-erprises, but Utheyhave no means of measuring their efficiency and output.

The degree of autonomy allowed to an enterprise depends largelyupon the personality of its President Directeur Generai and on itsfinancial situation. It may happen that the President DirecteurGeneral nas reason to believe that the Government has completeconfidence in him as he has already proved his managemeilt ability.His Board meetings and annual financial statements afford him anopportunity to report to the supervisory authorities on the progressof his enterprises and of his projects, but he continues to enjoycomplete freedom of action. In the past some Managing Directorsmay have enjoyed excessive freedom of action as their personalstanding enabled them to ignore the supervisory function of theMinistries, but if such a situation still prevails, there cannotbe more than a single case. The progress made in this directionby the supervisory authorities appears to be attributable to theirefforts to cooperate with Managers rather than subject them toauthority.

c) Role of the banking sector

The banks that service the State-owned enterprises are: theSociete Tunisienne de Banque (STB), 51% of the capital of which isState-owned, together with about 10 small and medium-sized commercialbanks, in one of whichl/ STB has a majority participation. TheSTB itself is larger than all the others put together. It was theSTB which, until recent years, bore the brunt of the overdrafts andmedium-term loans granted to State-owned enterprises. In the lastfew months, some effort has been made to transfer to the othercommercial banks some part of its loans and advances. With theexception of the control exercised by STB over a number of enter-prises, the banks play only a very limited role in the life of theState-owned enterprises. They make available to them the funds

1/ LlIJnAon Internationale de Bananie.

Page 7

fovr wahic-h thpv annlv. in the form either of overdrafts or of long-term credits, but have no authority to lay down the conditionsto which the enterprises Rhnild he suhiect before receiving suchassistance. The result is that they do not weigh the enterprises'abilityir to rpar And that their lnsnn can he ihstified by commercial

standards only if they entail no risk, irrespective of whether theQ+ ae guarr.te i expl 4 cit 4 ^4 + 4ri r1 pl.

U 5 ~AtA vA,J_ A. L4±S UJ LU SJ _ f - *

u / Lv- U c L M V1uSJLkUf ULD X uu. L j U -IcL%.

Iwo ager;cies deserve a special placeL-0 '-in zn1- 0%,%c^iLA of th

framework within which the State-owned enterprises operate, be--- - - .Lt ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~A, 4 la cause of the services they can rendtr tbhs enterprises, whil

assisting the supervisory authorities to perform certain pro-motional and regulatory functions. They are thlle Institut [at4onal n uv

Productivite et de Gestion des Entreprises (National Institute forProductivity and Management of Enterpr:ses) and the Centre_Naiona.des Etudes Industrielles (National Center for Industrial Researc7T).

Institut National de Productivite et de Gestion des Entreprises

The Institut National de 1ProductJvit6 et de.Gestion desEntreprises was founded in 1963 and its staff has grown rapidly.At the time of the Mission's visit it consisted of some 40operational personnel (excluding secretarial staff) together with9 foreign technical assistants. Apparently, most of the Tunisianprofessional personnel graduated at university or equivalent levelssome 2 or 3 years ago. The Institute is concerned with all forms ofenterprises -- Stated-owned, private or cooperative. Its object isto radically change the thinking process of the managers and torationalize methods of work. It operates by direct action at theenterprise or sector level, involving a diagnosis of problems andthe formulation of recommendations, and by indirect action in theinformational (seminars, symposia, conferences) and training fields.It has apparently made a special effort to assist in the launchingof the new cooperatives. The action so far taken by it in theState-owned enterprises sector has been confined to some partialstudies for Sogitex and to 3 general studies on Societe Hoteliereet Touistique de Tunisie (SHTT). The Institute does not seem tohave succeeded in gaining the confidence of SHTT's management,which in part explains why its report is theoretical in characterand dees not appear to provide a basis for practical reforms.

Centre National des Etudes Industrielles

The Tunisian authorities have for long been seeking to in-tensify the promotion and improve the preparation of industrialproiects. This function, formerly entrusted to the Division of

ANNEX 2Page 8

Industrial Development of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce,was recently transferred to the Centre National des Etudes In-dustrielles, founded in August 1968 with assistance from the UNSpecial Fund. The foreign staff include the Director and hexnerts in the followine fields: industrial Drogramming, marketing,food processing industries, chemical industries, mechanical en-gineering industries. The TUnisian staff of thirteen, all with atleast a degree in economics, are divided into teams. The presentwork progra-m of the Cent+er conprises market studies, sectorstudies and studies for certain enterprises (SIAPE and ICM, A9S).

ANNEX 3

page 1

Financial Situation and Capital Structure of Public Ehterprises

The financial situation of the publics enterprises, excludingbanks, STAR (Insurance) and SOFIGES (Investment Company) at December 31,1967, on the basis of the figures presented in the published financialstatements of the enterprises is shown in Annex Table 1.

The aggregate situation can be summarized as in column a)of the following table. It includes a number of mis-statements,mainly over-statements, of net assets. An adjusted financial situationtaking into account known mis-statements can be presented as in columnb).

In this table, short-term loans are shown as a f'inancingsource, rather than being offset against current assets in order todetermine the amount of net assets, for the reason that in certainsectors, notably steel, textiles and tourism, short-term loans are beingused to finance essentially long-term investment.

The following explanation of the differences between the twoabove situations, item by item. will also serve as an illustration ofthe financial weaknesses of public enterprises.

Net intangible assets

Net intangible assets shown in the published financialsatiments include D. 8 million of past losses, (nf T.Thirh SOCTYXD 1.7 million and El Fouladh D 1.9 million) and D 1.4 million ofresearch Pypenses, which shouldha ha hbeen written off against govern-ment subsidies (shown as long-term loans by ONI) given for thatpulrnnse= T'heyi also includei Tn 1° m-illlonnporcigadrsc

expenses relating to the petroleum sector, of which D 14.5 millionare belngiv-IV' _am-.r ti Zed. a nl that- portio ofr Tn 1.5 riC o r +i-g +o%SI.IS UJJ~LS 'flJL. -4~ Ujj~ .ALJU tJJ. IS '4*_2 *I..J..4.J L -.a JL

5--'

unproductive research for which no amortization has been provided hasbeeni cosLid er ed at thig 4J...L Ist'ge to be of. doU LJUJbtf ' vaOLue, and.-'- wri t.U ten offl,

as well as past losses, against capital and reserves in the adjusted

LIetz u-ixe" assetso.'. .L_ _ _._J..1 0._.1J.JI..V.V.0. _1.'II

iLxeu assets are probably oversaueud in tlhe published state-ments due to the inclusion of further intangible assets wrongly capi-balized which should have Deen cnarged to current expenditure. D 2.6million of such assets can be identified and there are probably otheritems in the petroleum sector (SITEP) which are however being amortized.

ANNEX 3page 2

Millions of Dinars

Beforeadjustment After adjustment

a b

- Net intangible assets 26.4 15.7

- Net fixed assets 187.5 188.7

- ParticiDations and otherinvestments 30.2 26.9

24h.1 231.3

- Net current assets (excludingshort-term finnnce) 68.5 62.6

Net assets (excluding loans) 12 6 293=9

- Capital 120.8 120.8

- Reserves h.1 hZ 1

Less: Accumulated losses andcurrent eypen di4ures ca.pit a-~~~ LL.L .L~~~~~~~~~~~~LJ L~~~~~~~ ~~~~.Ap~~~~~~LJ~~U.L U AJ.e

lized, provisions notcreaeu anud depreciatiOndeferred, etc (column b) (13-8) 152.1

- Profits for 1967 8.7 8.7

Less: Current expenses capita-A.L6zeu, p rUv-`IS 0nLs io hucreated and depreciationdeferred, etc (coluinn b) k.u 6.7

Less; Deferred depreciation(column a) (2.4)

172.2

- Medium and long-term loans 97.8 92.5

- Short-term loans 42.6 42.6

312.6 293.9

Of which reserves of "offices" D 8.9 million:

AI.sEX 3page 3

Furthermore inadequate or deliberately reduced rates ofdepreciation amounting to D 1 million have been employed by certainenterprises (of which SHTT is estimated at D 0.7 million).

Offsetting the above overstatements however are construc-tion in progress not recorded in respect of SHTT of the order ofD 4.7 million.

Participations and other investments

Of the participations, some D 12 million represent parti-cipations in other public enterprises. In general the enterprisesshow participations at cost (usually nominal value) with no amortizationto take into account the actual underlying asset value of the invest-ment. Since most of these cross participations are made in lossmaking enterprises needing new capital to remain solvent. the valueof the participations is probably overstated.

A considerable factor contributing to the liquidity problemsfacing the enterprisesis the significant amount owed by the State tothe enteprises on current account a-n J-incded in u-npid receAv abes(STEG D 3 million; Sfax-Gafsa D 3.8 million), thus forcing the rele-v--t+ LA_+ aetrprs so to +a ro ov.nn over -A-Ira.. *. ,r -,; nr 4-i+ h- -A,V ati U. cL4 uOJ £'C p'. LiiJ .5 G SQI 1 V W.5 V.S VLi V Li V&4J 5WV%J flLU( l.aJ t . a Pi

rates of interest.

In addition, the inter-enterprise position on receivablesand payables would appeau to be extremLely complex due to non-paylentby those enterprises in a poor financial situation, again forcing

A z ] ~~~~~~~_ 1 _ _ _ __ -3 _ _ - > XI - D' I _: 4. :' - -oUti'her enepurs to z U V dU L iU .

It would also seemr that inter-enterprise balances are notin agreement as of December 31, 1967 and that a detailed study isneeded of such balances in order to : a) establish the true position;and b) arrange the necessary settlements, so that the presentartificial situation of the profitable financing the loss makingenterprises be remedied.

Apart from this artificial receivables situation, extremelyhigh inventories are shown by certain of the major loss making enter-prises (SOGITEX D 7.5 million, El Fouladh D 3.3 million, ONA D 1.6million and AMS D 1.2 million). In view of the general lack of inven-tory provisions for obsolescence and over-evaluation throughout thepublic enterprise sector, coupled with the past losses and forecastsales for the above enterprises, it is apparent that inventoriesgenerally (and thus current assets) are overstated. It was not possi-ble to estimate the extent of this over-evaluation for the group of

AxMEY 3

public enterprises. As an example, AMS inventories are admittedto be over-valued by 100% and require a provision of D 0.6 million.

Net current assets are also overstated due to unrecordedwork in progress of at least D 4.7 million in respect of SHTT referredto above.

Further adjustments to net assets should also be made inrespect of the overstatement in ONN of a receivable of D 0.5 millionand an understatement of payables by SOTIMACO of D 0.1 million.

Capital and Reserves

The breakdown of the capital structure of the enterprisesat December 31, 1967, was not available. An analysis of the structureas of December 31. 1968. based on the latest available information,including capital increases in 1968, is shown in Table 2. The capitalof banks, an insurance company and an investment company is alsoadditional information included in this table but has an immaterialeffect on the overall nosition. Fer the purnose of this table thecapital of the government-owned "offices" is considered to be the"cranital" nlii- th re 1eservesq 2S shnin i the finan rial stEitements.

The total capital of D 151.6 millinn in Table2 as ofDecember 31, 1968, is therefore approximately comparable to the capi-tal of D 120.8 m4'1ion at December 31, 1967, plus reserves attributa-ble to offices of D 8.9 million.

It can be seen that the government had direct participationinthe pulcnerprises ox- D iiO.l .-J"Jlon, ar.d4 ta. other public-;.J.L h pub jl icJLeL t V ±j L. ~ UL Li1 .LLJ.!L IILL±.L.LIJ Ii,CLrL LA UL' UJLAi~

enterprises owned D 11.8 million,private interests D 27.2 million,( e. O ~ > L 2.,.A% -- .. 'I11-

w±ith puUl±.L agencie (a a cuu-i ociale) anLd s -- puUbLj.c interests

(as SNI) making up the balance of D 2.5 million. Foreign investmentin the petroleum sector amounts to D 16.1 Uillion, out of total privateinvestments of D 27.2 million.

The participation of certain enterprises in other publicenterprises was referred to in page 3 above and is a result of the govern-mental method of solving the financing requirements of loss makingenterprises on an ad hoc basis by recourse to those showing a favora-ble cash position at the time the financing was required.

Profits

The aggregate corrected post tax profit of D 6.7 million isstated after receipt from the Government of current subsidiesamounting to some D 1.8 million. The actual profit for the year 1967generated by the enterprises themselves as shown in Table 5 is there-fore D 4.9 million. However, D 8.2 million of this profit is contri-buted by the agriculture/food and petroleum sectors which benefit frommonopolies and preferential pricing structures. The remaining sectorstherefore contributed aggregate actuial losses of D 3.3 million.

MA,5TRY 'I

page T

ul, a pre-ax basis as sho-w, in Tabe 4 aggregat eroViamounted to D 7.3 million of which agriculture/food and petroleumsectors contributed D 9.6 mi'lion and the remaining sectors lossesof D 2.3 million.

A major factor contributing to the losses is the largeamount of finance charges borne by the enterprises. As shown inTable 4 such charges for 1967 aggregated D 6.6 million (excludingthose borne by KL Fouladh for which the information was not madeavailable to the mission). D 1.7 million of these charges wereborne by the agriculture/food and petroleum sectors and D 4.9 millionby the other enterprises.

Capitalization

The above charges result from the general undercapitali-zation of the public enterprise sector and the forced reliance ofthe enterprises on credit. Excluding the petroleum sector (whichwas part financed by foreign loans of some D 15 million and bank6verdrafts of D 6 million at December 31, 1967), it is estimatedthat a minimum of D 35 million is required in order to rationalizethis situation either by capitalization of existing loafns or in-v_jection of further capital by the State where necessary;. It isestimated that a further D 10 million is due by the State on currentaccount.

A breakdown of this estimate based on the latest informa-tion available for each enterprise is as follows:

Dinar millions

Capitalization of loans Total'hl±u± . teUrml ediIm/ long term

MVanufactuare Tunisiennede Ceramiques / Dec. 67 .7 .7

Union Generale 2 Dec. 67 1.4 .6 2.0

S0TMI /3 Dec. 67 .6 1.4 2.0

ES Fouladh A Dec. 67 4.1 8.0 12.1

SIAPE / Sept. 68 .7 .7

SOGITEX /6 end. 68

fI -, 1 ~4 1 (for ecast) 0e

(provisional) 6.8 6.8

TOTAL A 18.1 16.5 3h.6

(Footnotes continued on page 6)

ANINTEX 3-page 6-

h Tn iddition to an inerease in canital of D 5 million alreadvmade in 1968.

2 Capitalization of finance provided by STB - the controllingshareholder. T.h.e capital was howevr increas^ in 19Q68R hut

the excact amount of this increase is not known to the Mission.

/3 This would seem to be the minimum necessary capitalization inadditionUJV Cto LI.L increase in %captlJ_L of DD CM6 milli.on alre dymade in 1968.

/4 This is the mimimum necessary to rationalize the debt/equityratio of 17:3 at December 31, 1967, and is in addlt.ion to acapital increase of D 2.5 million made in 1968 which wouldhave been absorbed by the losses of 1968. Further increaseswill be necessary depending on future losses.

L It is understood that a capital increase of D 0.7 million isplanned for 1969.

/6 This increase is the absolute minimum necessary and dependsvery much on the results for 1968 and 1969 for which onlyextremely unreliable forecasts are available.

/7 This estimate, based on the provisional situation at December31, 1968, is made after transformation of D 4 million overdraftsat December 31, 1967 , into medium term loans at December 1968.The total loan position however remained approximately the same:

1967 1968

Long/Aiedium term loans 2.7 5.7

Overdrafts 10.8 6.8

13.5 12.5

/R No nrovision has been -made in the above estimates for therequirements of AMS which should best be wound up before fur-ther lrge tradIng losses nre incrred=

ANNEXA 3page 7

Previous--performance and future forecasts

In order to complete the assessment of the situation at December31, 1967, previous performance and future forecasts of the public enter-prises are summarized and commented on be'low. /a indicates the contribu-tion of the agriculture/food and petroleum sectors included in the aggre-gate. Further details are shown in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6.

Dinars million

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972Table 3

Annual investment 53.8 44.7 38.4 27.5 29.1/< ~~~9.5 14.o 9.2 -7.4 3

Tnbl Ie )4

Surplus before tax,dner eaoa1

nance charge 12.7 18.9 21.8 33.3 27.7 37.1A 2.9 5.2 9.1 16.5 13.0 13.6

Depreciation 7.8 9.5 13.0 19.4 21.6 23.1/a 2.0 2.3 2.4 5.1 5.4 5.7

Finance charges 1.8 2.t 4.0 6.6 4.8 4.5/aS .4 .4 .9 1.7 1.6 1.5

Profit before taxL- 3.1 7.0 4.8 7.3 1.3 9.4

/u .5 15 4.8 9.6 5.7 6.44 1/2 2-

Tabo±e /5

Profit after tax 2.9 6.4 2 4.9 2 11.4

/a .5 1.5 3.9 8.2 7.3 8.0

Cash flow 10.6 15.9 15.7 24.3 24.7 35.3 33.3 34.8 37.9/a 2.5 4.8 7.2 13.3 12.7 13.9 11.5 11.4 11.4

Table 6

Transfers receivedfrom the State:-increases in capitalor capital 8 isubsidies o. .4 13.6 ui 9.3 10.1 .

/a .3 .7 .8 1.2 1.2

-current subsidies 2.7 3.2 1.8 2 ), 2.4 18 1.8 1.8

-Export subsidies .6 .6 .6 .6 .6 .6

Other subsidies planned for new enterprises, not subjects of this report,aggregate D 6.1 million for 1969-1972.

(Footnotes continued on page 8)

page r

A Profits are stated before receipt of subventions d'exploitation from

the government and have been adjusted for known errors in profitspublished by the enterprises. Adjustment has not been made for otherlosses, either capitalized or not provided for by the enterpriseswhich cannot be identified with particular years. Such items

amounted to approximately D 12.7 million at December 31, 1967, ofwhich depreciation deferred or not provided was D 1.7 million.

/2 In 1968 and 1969, the profit before tax is shown to be less than theprofit after tax for the agriculture/food sector. This apparentanomaly is explained by the lack of forecast of pre-tax profits forthe Office du Commerce for which the relevant detail is thereforenot shown in Annex Table 4. Profits after tax of D 1.7 and D 1.9million have been obtained from the cash flow estimates of the autho-rities. Based on previous yearst results it would seem that pre-taxprofits of D 3 million could be expected for these years, with acorresnonding increase in the overall public enterprise surplus andprofit before tax.

/3 The sharp decrease in 1966 is largely due to El Fouladh and SOGITEX.

a The decrease in 1968 is largely due to the Office des Cereales, initiallosses of SONEDE and increased losses of SOGITEX.

/ The probably overoptimstic f-recast for 1969 is largely attributableto:

a) reduced losses of El Foouladh, SOGITTEX and the industriesExtractives, and

b) the switch from looses to profits of SONME.

Forur year plan L196-l968

In the three years fromii 196,-L967 investmlent in the enterprisesamounted to D 137 million. Planned investment for 1968 was D 27 million.In the same four year period the sector has received aggregate: actual/planned capital injections and subventions d'equipement of D 39.6 millionand subventions d'exploitation etc. of D 11.3 million.

Post tax profits for the period amounted to D 16,6 mullion of whichD 20.9 million was contributed by the agriculture/food and petroleum sec-tors. The equivalent pre tax profits, taking into account note , wereD 23.4 million and D 24.6 million respectively.

On this basis, sectors other than agriculture/food and petroleum havetherefore contributed aggregate post and pre-tax losses of D 4.3 andD 1.2 million respectively. However it should be noted that, as indicatedin /1 above, this result is stated before accumulated losses of D 12.7million at December 31, 1967.

ANNEX 3page 9

1969-1972

Detailed enterprise forecasts are not available for 1970.The cash flow estimated by the authorities for 1969-72 at D 141million coimared with D 80 million for 1965-68 is considered to beextremely overoptimistic, especially since the D 80 million shouldhb reduced by ctmuln+Jtive losse of Df 10 million. PYclnive of d,pnre-ciation, at December 31, 1967.

Aggregate capital injections and pubsidie- planned amountto D ho .hX million for existing enterprises and D 6. million for newenterprises not subject of this report.

T a b I e s

ThA f'nIlnTi;ng Tables are in' i language. -Traslationof their titles and headlines is given in a covering note.

Tahle 1: Pi nncial situation ^.f S+a+e=owned I'TSente.- s h,y setor

Table 2: Capital structure of State-owned enterprises and inter-ente rpIse invtestment s .

Table 3: State-owned enterprises' investments

Tale' :) P'r0fit 4eoe-«- v-u before ta,dercivo and-1- ._. W V4. J. ± _ _'Lu uV V n L i.& wCLAU DUL-.LUO IJZLV- Ld.A, UIdPZrFt.Ld L,.QIc anU

finance charges

Table 5: Cash flow of State-owned ent-erprises

Table 6: Transfers frpm the State to State-owned enterprises

Tabie 7; Various percentage comparisons between financial resultsand sales or capital employed and between finance chargesand loans.

TRANSLATION OF THE TITLES AND HEADLINES OF THE TABLES

Table 1Title: Financial Situation of Public Eterprises by Sector at

December 31, 1967 (thousands of Dinars)Columns:

1. Net intangible assets - start up and research costs2. Net fixed tangible assets3. Investments in public and nrivate enternrises. and other

investmentsL,= Net. cuirrent assts (liabilities) P.cluding short term

loans5. Short.trm bank andt otherlon

6. Medium and long term loans7. Net assets8. Capital90 Reserves at Decem+ber 321 1 964

10. Profit (loss) 1967'11 .n_F la deep 9rec4at-ion.L.L. Ulz" 'err.eLLU %A .iL Vj.W&j

12. Total representing net assets

Table 2eo a7 J_ U L .VLA UU.Vtj U± ULAtU XUU±JA.L. rJUULjJ U .ZJ a1.JU ±LJWUti-

Etreprise Investments Based on the Latest Available-- t.n u n~ , ntO0

Inf±ormnation to eDeinber 31,~ 1968UColumns:

1. Total capital2. State )3. Social security and other Government offices)4. Other State-owned enterprises )Shareholders5. Mixed enterprises )6. Private )7. In the same sector)participation in other State-owned8. In other sectors )enterprnses

Table 3Title: Public Enterprise Investments from Plan Documents

Table 4Title: Profit before Tax and Surplus before Tax, Depreciation

and Finance ChargesColumns:

P = Profit (losses) before taxA = DepreciationF = Financing chargesS = Surplus (deficit) before depreciation and financing

charges

-2-

Table 5

P Profits after taxA - ' 4J- -A =UepreciaktLuI nE = Savings

Table 6Title: Transfers ±rVMi the StAtU tO th rub'c CElterprises,

Increases in Capital, subsidies for Purchases ofEquipment together with ct2rrent subsidies--anud-.Export Allowances

Columns:

1. Current2. Current Plan3. Total4. Plan5. Total

Table 7Title: Percentage

Columns:

1. Profits (losses) before tax expressed as a percentageof sales

2. Profits before tax as a percentage of capital employed3. Surplus before tax, depreciation and finance charges as

a percentage of capital employed4. Finance charges as a percentage of loans

TABLEAUX 1

SituaLtion financiere des Entreprises Publiques par secteurau 31 decembre 1967

(en milliers de Diciars)

Immobi:Lisations Irmobil isations Participation Fonds de! Decouvert Prets a ActiLf net CapiteLl Reserves au Profit/ Aiaortis- TotalIncorpor5lles - Corporelles aux entrepriLses roulement net bancaire ou mo;yen ou 31 decembre (Perte) samen4t representantfrais (d'etabILs- Nettess publiques, pri- actif (passif) autres prets long ternre 1966 1967 differee actif netsement et de vges et autres excluant prets a court termerecherche nets investisserments a court terme

Industries agri.coles et alinientaires 28 7.405 5.253 18.375 3.028 875 27.158 12.983 11.107 3.o68 27.158

Piroduits petroliers 18.995 25.2135 311 4.256 6.178 16.580 26.089 20.632 297 5.160 26.o89

Autres industries:

Electricite et eau 33.7136 1.136 3.910 1.395 16.352 21.085 8.878 11.781 423 21.085

Materiaux de construction,cAramique, vrerre, batimeent,travaux publics 320 7.9148 12.960 4.600 3.481 10.635 1'1.712 6.450 4.803 459 11.712

Industries extractives 1.828 114.874 7.317 8.169 2.055 11.230 18.903 12.2507 13.336 (1488) (1.242) '18.903

I9 dustries a iderurgiques,metallurgiqxues et mscanicLues 2 .389 24.542 10 2.652 6.945 18.995 3.653 4.950 748 (20.o45) 3.653

Industries chimiques 33.1140 330 3.359 2.072 556 14.201 2.2599 2.215 (4) (3091) 4.201

Textile, habiIlemenat, cuir,artisanat 1 .683 13.121 142 8.694 4.803 10.342 8.495 9.873 (464) (86) (82E) 8.495

Bois et ameuiblement, papier 4.152 252 2.971 1.030 732 5.613 5.411 310 (108) 5.613

Transports et distribution 791 38.521 2.285 3.921 205 7.664 37.649 30.373 5.185 2.091 37.649

Total autres industries 7.011 140.08l4 24.432 38.276 21.986 76.5o6 111.311 80.5:11 32.917 242 (2-3751) 111.311

Ibyprimerie et edition 1422 9 1.911 505 1.837 682 799 356 1.837

Information et publicite 928 46 914 366 702 600 110 (8) 702

Tourisme 404 13.369 118 5.6L.2 10.898 3.511 5.124 5.350 (98) (128) 5.124

TOTAL 26.438 187.493 30.169 68.554 42.595 97.838 172.221 120.778 145.132 8.688 (2.375') 172.221=/ An= = _ == _= == _s= =_ t _= e

1/ Assurances, banques et tarne societe dt1nvestissement ne sont pas incluels dans ce tab:Leau

TABLEAUX I page 2

Situation f.ancmt-re dee Etrept-pias Pobliquoa par secteur

au 31 cL6cembre 1967

(en illiars de Dinars)

bmooblil^sattonis Participation Fonds doIncorporelles - ImtbiLisetLons a s eotrepts-es roulie&t net lDdcouvartfratls d'6tabltl- CarporelLes publiques, pri- extif (pasaif) baneaire ou Pr6itoa i oyen ILctif not Capital Reeorves aot Profit/ Aaortieoanamto TotalseTeant at de Nottes sge. et autres excluant prits autres prits ou long tarme 31 diceabre, (Porte) diffgts represectant actifreche _IM irve-tis.e..ents 4 court terne A court t-rme 1_66 1967 net

Industoles agrtcoles et alimentalresONP 28 1.778 33 494 630 1.703 46211 1.075 166 1.703 /1Office doe c"rlaiaa 792 4.C80/2 2.07,2 132 6.816 3 46671 6.277 69 6 812 7JOCT 297 1.037- 9.712 2.398/3 8.64,3 7.oo57T 1.610 8.648 LISTS 2.056 76 1.812 242 3.702 1 .70S-- 1.556 4t6 3.702RNTA 2 .482 27 4.255 WS/4 6.293 3.350 _2.199 7b456.9

-i -~ N .23- 44 _ -M - -75 = ±M- kA IM U

/1 Ofl'ices iLnLgralesnt financis par ls gourerneent. Le capitai et lee r4semrvs, tela oitils figraent su0r le bilno dec offices, repr6sentent la wsae des contribtiflns/subv"lntLons gouverm,antales , pltus ou mnoi le nomedoeo surplua ou. des defiCits cumulde.

t2 Rpt-isente es.entiailaunt lee prt-ta aux coaperatives.

/3 PArts de A.I.D. et:.

ji M14t a ;la constru:tion po ur o noeLVOlle usine.

tS A4r;s tranafert au tr-sor de 12.5142.

Prodoitt petroliareSERIEPT 14.323/1 483 204 1138 i95 14.803 15.120 (317) - 1L.803STIR 91 4.977 100 220 .1LD k.24B 3.212 555 481 4.248SITti 4.529/2 17.280/3 4.836 5.038 15.179/4 6.478 l.300/5 50 5.128 6.478AGIP 52 2.5bS 7 (1.038) 1.006 560 1.0D0 9 C449) 560

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~w r -s:~ 20^f 21.2;2 9612 j/1 Y compris lee frals de renherches capitalLs.s pour 18.832, m ains rtiesement do 4.526, soit uat not de 14.304.

/2 FrP-in do Rtchearche at de Frospection non cmtortis mar to 'Pet ont dc Sud".

13 compris ftala do recet-chh, do prc5pacti.cn do rotage et d'installattcn capitalidis pour 20.251, moles aniortoanmment de 3.405 50it net 76.-47. Nous ne-ones p- aeud dl.rcmnticon noun poreisttant do raira lt distincticn netreLee ionobilisaticns corporelLeas et incorporelles.

Ajj Preits d'AGP de 4.529 at de Banques Italianne- pour 10.650.

/5 Capital po,rte a 5.000 en 1968.

ElectrLcitc et eau3TIO; 33.786 1.136 3.910 1.395 16.352 21.085 8.878 11.781/1 432 21.085SON IDE - Pao applicable

/1 Y crnpris subavntions desquipaant de 5.08:2.

TABIFATIK 1page 3

Situation financi.ere des Fatrepriseo Publiques psr sootoen

au 31 d~co,bre 1967

~en millioers do macare)

Cnmob2Llsatiarc -a - Participation Rondo domncorporolles - Jaaobiltaations acx entroprises roulesset not O

6couvert

traln d'6tablts- Carporellsn publiques, pri- acetif (pasesif) ban-afre no P-r6

ta noyoqn Ac'ifS not, Capital Reserves au Protit/ Anortiosoeents Totalseonlnt et de Neottes v6es et acitros omclua~nt pr

6to autros prats cu long terse 31 dceambre (Perte) dit6r6so reprosontaict euctif

rocher~che iavestisaementa akcourtiterme court_tormso-_ _ __ 196,6 1967 _ _ net

Matoriaca do const;ruction, ceramuiqooveflO bittiment, travaux publics

REST ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~913 9.456 /1 :19 9.1 9172 1 .207 110 923 176 .1.207El Anabib 1.4014 I.&i6 201 2.219 2.000 - 219 2.219Ciotants Portl-ai 10 559 26 (375) 53 167 403 (79) (i5s) 167CAT 1.338 6515 2 .11 9 4.112 1.10 2..881 129 4.112El louniane 4 341 2.316 (uS8) 2.673 2.500 150 23 2.673Bititsont 31 c1 730 36 776 704 562 144 7763DT]34A2 - 14 71 2516 i83 42 242/5 508 152/6 314 42 508lanutkac turo Tun"ion d raiq 8. 1 .498/10 324 1.474/8 34j 66i37 4)10o6Union G~ndrale 2 112 co 6:22 1.929/fl 60k/U2 (16) 167T2 92 (L) _16)

-S2-0- 7-948' 12.960 ___ Uf87 i 35 11.712 0 7_8 11 .712

L.T cuopris los battiments temirsda no on canstruction pour 4.857, et les valoura realosables i long terms (acomcptes our ontos, etc) 4.508 finacncen par /2 don prAtn a long terme do gouvernement.la valour do racist dea actions des ancieoa actiunnatros, nla paz, oncoro et! pro,vtsionn6apour m nntont esoun a 200.

/4 Capital portS a 300 an 1968 vraisonblabi.ooont par capitaJisation do rosarvos.15 La muntani do pr-et a' lozng terms repr&sonte la soas due aout anciens actiinnalros aer on montant correspondeni qL4 figure mr 1 actif do bilaon* Co 'compte a' ragu.Larisarr do 242 est crainomblablomont inicorporel ot

pourrait etro imput4

sur lea roisrrms./6 Capital portd £ 500 on 1968.

/7 Portes d'exploitatien oar lo premior oeorcice (1966).

/B Pret S.T.B.

/9 Capital port4

a 500 on 1968. /11 Pr,(t S.T.B. priscipaloeent./10 Pan d'aaaortiososeimen cunaptabilio

4s on 1966 ot 1967, eaii9 4 150.. /1 2 Capitol partno i 70 on 1968

1ndus trios extractivosSFAX: GSAP 276/1 6.730 2.504 5.205/2 1.127 1 .280 12.352 5%.w 7.592 - (240)/& 12.352CIPIDS 126,17 1.501 224 (5633 209 1.079 1.003 76 3 1.079STiltDS 433 1 87 100 3 517 640 (45) M7)L 517boj. Ojnss .

410,16 320 4.496 2.5214/11i 7.839/7 911 1.185/8 (266) (8)/a Z2911/82023241 i6 ~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~556 21 1 .678- 2.255 1.407 1.041 -(193)4 .2f

sonmi i6 5.334/10~____ 29 863) Sip 2.108S/31 -1.789 3.06 /12 (107) /2Sa) 1.89

/I Con froms do rhehrcho ont ;ti intial.aoot pansi,. pa portes et profits so 1967 isa l'enatrepriso, no vaulont pas fairo upparaltro one prte smer cot exorcice, adocid4 finalenont do los coaptabilinor a train d'otabliseo-sent.

/2 One sosne dee 3.817 duo pa i'Etat a l.a sui.te do la consion do Chastn do Far do Stax ost comepriso dons los alsarn roalis1.ablos.

a3 24C d'anorlidsamenst do I'oeorcice 1967, oct et4 dittfer4n, lat socidti no veoloact pas fairo apparaitre do parte sun cot oxorcico, octs no,te /1 . La pert. roelle do 1'oorcice etait do 516.

/4j Cosmma pour ls Stax Gatsa (vots note /1) cola rapri.stet des train do roocorche initialosont passes par Inrtes at profits.

15 Comme pour lo Star Gafsa (~our note i) les asntant; total des azontis-sants diftoros pour l'oxercico 196;7 a nckit Is ports a 45. la parts reoflo oat do 123.

/6 Prams do prospoction ot do rocherche nun asurtis * Cos fruis porraeont etro imputes our lea subarentionodu gnou-rineoont.

Li Preto ot subvontisons do l'EItat 7.239, ot CR55 600 pour partici.pations ot Crain do rochorche.

/8 Offices int&gralenont tinances par lIEtat., Is capital ot lon resorves roprinawtont la sceas don subvatLono, pils nou wsoi les surplus u. es o deficits cuceuls.

/B Porte apron, couvntion d'onplcitatinn do 120.

/9 A,crtissomrntsi dIfferes on 1965 do 6i, on 1967 do 132, cola etant l.a perto roello do 1967.

/10 Y conpris dons train do prospectioc ot do rechorche pour 3.153, noins auortiasoeoent do 588B, suit 01 not doe 2565. Con fruin dci.vnt itre iriptnen our le capital et coosted~ren, cosmme perto.

/11 PNot do 0114 a SOTME do 1965 ooregistr~ par SOTE4][ enmma pret a asyen/long teame at pa ONM cuone valour re'atabo6 ec- oro

112 Capital pne'ti a 3.665 on 1968.

113 Adocrtinsemsnt diffter6 do 338 on 1966, 393 on 1967,, La pa-to r4

elle on 1968 oct do 438 plus 393, suit 831.

TABLiAUX 1 page 4

Situation financiSre des Etreprises Publiques par secteur

au 31 decembre 1967

(en illietrs de Ditars)

Iemobilisations Participation Fonds deIncorporeles - IoobiLisatuons aux eatreprises roulesent ne t Dgc,uvertfrais d'htablis- Corpirelles publiques, pri- actSf (passif) bencsire on Prits a moyen Actil net Capital Rsesrves au Profit/ AoiDrtissesnts Totalseant et de Neotes veos at autres excluant preits entree pr&ts ou long terse 31 dice=bre (Perte) differes repreaenlat actIfrecherche _o invstissementa A court terse a coiurt teone 1966 1967 _- _ -nt

Indutries aided-rgiqnee, .4

ta2lar-giques at m4caniquies

El Fouladj 1.9C0 /2 22.010 10 255 4.134 16.802 3.239 4.590 /1 42l* (1.775) 3.239SOOOME2A - BElan pas re,uSOFOFECA -AKS 456 /3 1.879 1.109 2.343 1.193 (92) 103 241 (436) (92)STIA 33 524 1.112 348 970 351 150 49 152 351tetaUurgique dc Tunie.e -Bilan pas reilu

ItAL 24 116 98 30 12 17 1 (6) 12Fondertes Maunias - 105 60 22 143 _90 33 2(/ _t43

2.389 '64.542 10 2,652 6,945 18.995 3.653 4.950 74E1 (2.016) 3.653

a Port4

a 7.200 en 1968.,

o Pertes d'expLcitation initale.s plus une soa indeternicne do frais de dkmrr-ege reels. AoortUsose nt e etA prevn sur 10 ans, une poriode tmp looxgue.

& Ca montant representefrais de dnenaage de 258 plus la. parte pour l'exorcie 1966 de 249, woins omortissesnots de 51. Aucun omortiseoeznt des imobilisations n'a ete' affectue en 1966 - estite a 100.

Industrieos chimiquesSTEP 24 17 128 65 104 35 8i (12>) 104SLAPE 2.838 241 1.o65 2.007 256 1.881 1.500 1.101 (411) (309)/L i.881Phaneacie Contral- 278 72 2.166 300 2.216 7154 1.0 t1 2.216

3.15902307 2 S5 _i.t ) _;0

a Amortisseoent diTffre en 1966.

Te.ctile, habillenernt, cuir, artisanatSOGITEX 1.683 a 11.580 25 6.270 4.521 10.342 '2 11.695 6.0DO / (477) - (82E) & 4.695ONA 1.541 117 2.424 282 3.800 3.873 131 ( 8S) /6 3.800

1.683 13.121 142 8.694 4.803 100342 8..495 9.873 (461) _8) (82E1) 8.495/1 Ce motant reprosente me printipe desfrais de demarragenon cinortis. Mais en fait il seagit en majorite des pertes noreales sur exploitation.

2 PF'ets bencairei 2.687 et prets de l'office du comoerce et entree prots gouveirntaentax, 7.655.

13 Port4e 7.000 en 1968.

/4 Asortistat differo do 267 en 1967 et de 561 pour les exero:ices anteriers.Donc le report actuel cde l'exentice 1957 et 267.

L Repressnte la co=e des subvaitions du gouvernemnt pour fonration et resorption des pertes etc. /6 Porte apres subvention du gouvernenent pour l'exer:Lce 1967 de 521.

BoLs et ameubleieont, papierSEANES 295 123 1.140 411 732 415 200 /1 i6o 551 415SNTC 3.857 129 8 619 7211 50 161) a98

Forte a 2.710 on19681.030 . iN )

/I Pacrte a 210 enl 1968.

rABLEAUX 1 page 5

Situation finonci;re des Entreprises Publiqueo par secteur

au 31 d'ceetre 1967

(en nLlLiers le Dinars)

Ionobilisations Participation Fonis de[ncorporelles - IToaobilisatiocw aux entreprillee roulenent net D6couvertfrrais dli;tablis- Corporelles publiques, pri- oct1L (paestf) bancaire ou. Prits i menyon Actif net Capital Re'serves au Profit/ As,ortissenents Totalse=ent et de Nettes vees et autrs excLuant prits autres pr4ts ou lorg tore 31 d6ceobre (Perte) diff6rds representant act11recherche ineetioseenelts a court term a court ternm 1966_ 1%7 _ _ -_ net

Transports et distributionSNCFT 7.154 3 963 87 4.417 /t 3.656 3.Eoo 575 8i /2 3.656SNT 2.665 9417 214. 95' 702 3.059 2 .078 626 355 3.059STm 879 176 370 211 1.214 .442 704. 68 1.214CTN 1.980 552 711 426 2.817 2.000 591 226 2.817STC (bilan pee reuo, petit. entrepriese)STAM 143 231 493 867 4150 22'i' 18Ei 867Skhira (bilan pas reje, petite entreprise)Tunis-Jtir 3.532 2250 769 870 /i 3.660 500 2.417 343 3.650OPNT 791 22.116 20 997 21.930 21.203 L4 727 21.930Ie Moteur 52 87 367 19 _ 141 _446 300 JQ 103 469

U- 2 38.521 2.28' 3.921 205 7.664 37.649 30.373 5.185i 2.091 37.649

L Prets etrangeir 2.651 - Prett de 1'tEtat 1.556 - Preta des Eanques 210.

L2 Benefice apreis subventLon d'exploitation 1 .188, done perte avent enbvution 1.107.

L Cr6dit a noyevoLong terse de Sud-Avi,ition pror achat d'un avion.

L Capital/subventions at prets La constructisn.

ServicesInprimerie et edition

Impriserie O(ffiielle 68 1427 500 457 4J3 500Moiaon Tunisienne de lIEdition 5 8'9 94 75 19 R4STD l395 1.243 150 /I 294 1.2i43

,gt ~~~~~~~~~~~~17 1 _=7 13_<2

/1 Port46 1 250 en 1968.

Infontation et publiciteTAP 108 21. 132 100 69 (37) /l 132SAT1'EC 820 4t6 70 570 500 41t 29 570

-7- < ,9il} '7 703 00 11 0 7o02

/1. Apres eubventLon du gouvernerent de 160.

Assurances, baeiques et societe d'invesitisseeooit

- voir anaJrses sopar4ee.

TourisneSHTT 385 12.429 /1 LL8 5.571. /2 10.793 13 2.696 5.017 5.000 /A 91 /5 (74) /5 5.017SIHK 19 940 618 105 8 107 3 18 5) (54 10

__13.369_ 5 . 04898 3.5121 __ +3r) 7L2 _M

L. En raison dee travaux en cowrs non comptabilLsts de 5.600 (d'apres Je contcoLeur financier) et des acortissemnt ion enrigistres s,r les ironobilisations.eistanteu de 700 (voir onte 5 ci-dessouo ) il y u one rdnorationdes i,nmobilisations nettes d'environ 4.900.

L2 Surevaluation d'environ 5.6CO en raoson des sommes dues an, fournioseurs (voir note 1 ci-iessus).

/t~ Pret 'i.T.B.

A Porte a 6.800 en 1968.

L. Reservs JaJores et pertes 1567 minore dun montant global d'envircn 700, do a La ion coptabilisation d'amortissoeent (voir note 1 ci-dessua). Perte apr;s prLse en clrarge des frais financiers de 250 parle gouvernenent.

TABLEAUX 2 page 1

Composition du Capital des Entreprises Publiques et Participations Inter-EBtreprises

sur la base dAe imforma tions disnonibles au 31 Decembre 1968

(milliers de Dinars)

Actionnaires Participation dans d autresCapital 1/ _________________________________ ntreprises Pu'bliques

Total Securite Autres Entreprises Dans DansEtat Sociale et entreprises semi- Prive le meme d'autres

autres offi- publiques publiques secte-ur secteursces. gouver-nementaux

Industries agricoles etal'--entaires 22.2t3 20.713 730 113 262 395 1=156

Produits petroliers 24.332 8.215 16.117

Autres industries:

Electricite et eau 8.878 8.878 1 .048

Materiaux de construc-tion, ceramique, verre,batiment, travauxpublics 7.582 3.641 1.298 10 2.633 723 395

Industries extractives 12.632 5.555 3.269 3.808 3.269 1.448

!dustries siderurgiques,meta lurgiques etm5caniques 7.969 5.916 1.650 223 180 13

incdustries chirmiques 2.348 782 1.272 ___ 27

Industries textiles,imbillemen.t, cu-ir et

artisanat 12.202 11.155 50 142 250 605 17

Bois at ameublement;papier 5.421 3.611 500 649 60 601 125

Transports et distri-bution 34.135 31.895 1.460 10 770 316 257

Total autres industries: 91.167 71.433 550 9.740 553 8.891 4.321 3.317

Imprimerie et edition 782 680 2 75 25

Information et publicite 671 492 10 57 15 97 2

Assurances 500 250 59 191 5140

Banques 4.200 2.146 161 746 11 1.136 78 2.072

Societes d'investissements 600 480 120 346

Touriame 7.150 6.190 105 572 61 222 10

TOTAL 151.615 110.119 1.558 11.842 902 27.194 4.411 7.431

= _ _ _

1/ Le capital dys "offices" 100 % etatiques a ete consider'e comme le total du -capital" et reserves (comme indique dans le bilan des offices),

ce qui represente les subventions/contributions gouvernementales cumulees, plus ou moins les surplus ou deficits cumules.

TABLEAUX 2 page 2

Composition du Capital des Ehtreprises Publiques et Participations Inter-Entreprises

sur la base des informations diLspon'Lbles lau 31 decembre 1968

(en milliers de Dinars)

Caoita]L Participation dans d'autresFotai_ Actionnaires Entreprisee Publiques

S15curittA sociz;I rutre a Entrenprises Dans le DansEtat et autres offices entreprises semi-- Prive msime d'autres

gouvernementaux publiques publiques secteur sectezrs

Industries agricoles et alimentairesOffice des P8ches 1.703 1.703Office des Cereales 6.812 6.812 545Office du Commerce 8.648 8.6413 495StA Tunisienne du Sucre 1.700 200 730 113 262 395 109Regie Nationale des Tabacs et

Allumettes 3.350 3.350 7

Produits Petroliers D;0 3 3 Ste d'Etudes et de Recherches Petrolieres

Tunisienne 15.120 3.609 11.513Ste Tuniso-Italierne de Raffinage 3.212 1 .60s 1.606Ste Italo-Tunisienne d'Exploitation

Petroliere 5.ODO 2.500 2.500Ste Anonyme AGIP 1.000 500 50C)

Electricit'e et EauSte Tunisienne d'Electricite et de Gaz 8.8718 8.787 l.048Std Nationale d'Exploitation et de

DistributLon des Eaux Non disponible

Materiaux de construction, ceramique, verre 1.048batiment, travaux publics

StA Nationale ImmobiLiere de Tunisie 110 1104El Anabib 2.000 1.300 700Ciments Portland de Bizerte 400 380 20 2C0Ciments Artificiels Tunisiens 1.102 577 52; 325El Bouniane 2.500 1.275 1.22,5 723 44Batiment 300 230 68 2'La Tunisoise Industrielle 500 346 78 76tManufacture Tunisienne de Ceramiques 600 515 8';Union Cen6rale 70 60 10

7 2 7;tZ; 5~~~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~ .2-98 Ri263 7u Industries extractives 7.5ti2 ____ __3

Sfax-Gafsa 5.000 2.500 2.500 1.334Cie NouveLLe des Phosphates du DJebel M'DLl=-

la 1.000 l.00() 1CSte Tunisienne d'Exploitation Phosphatiere 5i49 43L 21E8 10cOffice National des Mines 911 911 3.269 48DJebel Djarissa 1.407 713 69l4 17Ste Tunisienne d'Expansilon Miniere 3.665 3.269 396 259

12-. t-L2 5_.55Z_9 3.0 3.26 9 1.446

TABLEAUX 2 page 3

Composition du Capital des Ebtreprises Publiques et Participations Inter-Entreprises

sur la base des informations disponibles au 31 decembre 1968

(en milliers de Dinars)

Capital Participation dans d'autresTotal Actionnaires Entre!prises Publi.aues

Et Scnritsociale Autres Enktreprises Emds le DansEteLt et autross off:Lces entreprises semi- PriLve' m6me d'autres

rouvernementaux public ies publiciues secteur secteurs

Industries side'rurgiques,n,tallurgiques et rLlcaniqges

El Fouladlh 7.20C 5.883 1.1132 135 2Ste Tunisienne d.e Construction et deR6parations Mdcsniques et Navales 100 33 63 4 1Ste des Fonderies ?tcsniques 210 192 18Ateliers ?Fhcaniqpues du Sahel 103 141 26 36Sta Tunisienne d.e l'Industrie

Automobile 15C 50 40 60 10Mdtallurgique det Tunisie 99 67 32Industries Maghrebines de

1 ' Alumimium 17 8 9FondLeries RAunies 90 147 43

Industries chimiquesE .5* .o7Ste des Emgrais Pulveyrises 35 :35 2St4 Industrielle d'Acide Phosphorique

et. d'Ekngrais 1.50C 1.221 279 5Raffinerie Tunisienne du Soufre 45I 18 :16 15Phasmacie Centrale 764 7614 20

2.34 1.2,E2 7r zzIndustries textiles, habillement, cuir,arti sanat

Cosmiissariat Oen&al aU Textile et, al' Habillement 1.329 1.329 6Soci.te Generale des Industr-ies deTextiles 7.000 5.953 50 1142 :250 605 11Office National de l'Artisarat 3.873 3.873 -T r

Ebis et, ameublement, papierSocietd des Neucles SEANES 21C - 1129 60 1St6 Nationals Tunisierme de CelLulose 5.211 3.611 500 500 600 125

5.42 3 .6L 1 _X_ ,Transpcrts et, distribution

Ste NatiornaLe des Chenan de FerTunisians 3.00C 3.000 26St' NatioraLe des Trarnsports 2.078 2.078 2 9St' Tunisienne de Marchandises 442 297 2 143 35Compagnie Tunisienne doe Navigation 2.000 1.115 873 10 2 289 24Ste Tunisienne Commerciale 17 17Ste Tunisienne d'Acconage et, deManu,tentic,n 450' 310 140 10Ste Maritime de la Skhira 2 2Tunis Air 90C 459 441 25 84Office des Ports Nationaux Tunisiens 24.946 24.946 17Le Moteur 300 2t56 44 52

.34.135 3T19 l;.VC 1 770 31 27

IABLEAUX 2 page 4

Composition du Capital des &ntreprises PublLques at Participations Inter-Entreprises

sar la base des informations disponibles au 31 decemore 1 968

(en milliers ie Dinears)

Capital Participation dLanB d'autres

Total Actionnaires Entre )rises PubliquesSecu-ritesc i-ale Autres Entrepirises Dans le Dans

Etat et autres offices entreprLses semi- Privre' meme d'Iautrecsg&o~pvernementauu_ Ziliquss pblig xes - c se ur _ ecteur s

Imprimerie et EditionImprimerie officielle 457 457Maison Tunisienne de l'ditiom 75 75StS Tunisiefmne det Diffusion 250 148 2 75 25

7 12 -690- 2 237

Information etl PubliciteAgence Tunisienne de Publicite 71 8 314 29Tunis - Afrique Presse iC10 97 3Ste Anonymef Tunisierme de Productionet dlrixploitation Cinematographiquel 590 395 2 23 15 65 2

611 492 10 7 I '9

AssurancesSociet4 dAlLssurances et de Reassurances 5(0 250 59 191 540

BPsmques ,Socinet Tunisienne de Banque 2.000 1.043 51 90)3 29 2.010

Banque NationiLe Agricole 1 .200 400 147 4210 233 43 62

Banque du ud 1.00 703 1it 272 114.2T 2.l _i_ -IT 7T -7.072

Societte d' inYEstissementSOFIGES 600 480 1 0

Tourisme

Ste H8telidre et Touristique de Tunisie 6.800 6.004 105 409 60 222 10)Ste Immobilibre et H6teLiere de Kasserine 3'50 186 163 1

7.1'50 6.190 105 572 61 2_2 10

TABLEAUX 3 page 1

Investissements des Entreprises Publiques d'apres la documentation de base du Plan

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Total

Industries agricoles et alimentaires

ONP ,, 1.009 907 391 1.125 420 3M852Office des cereales 205 174 52 431OCT 63 47 110STS 33 159 179 185 556RNTA 173 393 1.684 258 136 2.644

Total 1.187 1.601 2.455 1.562 793 7.593

Produits Petroliers

SEREPT 2.478 2.971 879 1.553 95 7.976STIR 60 52 366 115 593SITEP 5.875 9.416 4.983 3.396. 2 .061 25.731AGIP 802 539 453 1.794

Total a. 12.1±17 6.716 5.854 2.724 36.094

Electricite et eau

STEG 7.800 6.056 10.483 6.424 6.582 37.345SONEDE 2.815 2.815

Total 7.800 6.056 10.483 6.424 9-397 40.160

Materiaux de construction, ceramique,verre, batiment, travaux publics

SNIT 941 1.312 377 1.140 1.546 5.316El Anabib 250 250C01ments Portlaond 07 117 lt8 ?q0 176 778CAT 13 138 1.867 622 310 2.95oBatiment 8 18 26Ceramique 7 1.122 277 430 1.836Union Generale 460 460

Total 1.058 2.717 2.657 2.472 2.712 11.616

Industries e-tractives-

SFAX GAFSA 3.744 1.620 1.531 789 1.426 9.110CIPi5r 1L25 868 319 302 305 24STEP1)S 35 90 26 35 122 308ONM 333 475 251 95 300 1.454Djebel Djerissa 350 145 220 276 991SOTEMI 1.350 886 35 237 2.508

Total 4.537 4.753 3.188 1.476 2.666 16.620

Industries siderurgiques, metallurgiqueset mecaniques

El Fouladh 13.656 2.109 1.018 559 350 17.687SO,^flflhAflA ci.,20 256SOFOMECA 63 17 90 170AMS 431 43 64 8 546STLt 339 147 131 501 530 l.61,8

Total 414.77 2.299 1.276 1.285 970 20.307

Industries chimiques

STEP 2 6 100 108SIAPE 317 764 350 300 1.025 2.756Raffinerie Tunisienne du Soufre 34 25 27 27 113Pharmacie Centrale 25 47 56 300 520 948

Total 344 845 437 627 1.672 3.925

Textile, habillement, cuir, artisanat

SOGITEX 9.429 1.919 625 398 1.221 13.592ONA 355 690 473 575 2.093

Total 9.784 2.609 1.098 973 1.221 15.685

TABLEAUJX 3 page 2

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Total

'Bois et ameublement, papier

SU&.J 98 52 27 3 180SNTC 100 207 34 287 408 1.036

Total 198 29 61 290 h08 1.216

Transport et distribution

SNCFT 917 81P 2.31hi 1.080 2.160 7.283SNT 734 886 628 1.222 300 3.770STM 112 648 263 455 1.478CTN 38 434 503 218 l.1Y3Tunis Air 440 1.826 516 2.086 340 5.213OPNT 565 2.907 1.906 435 5.813

Total 2.806 7.515 5.867 4.869 3.690 24*7417

Total Industries 50.539 41.101 34.238 25.832 26.253 177.963... .... ...... ...... _ _ ._.____ .......

Imprimerie et edition

Imprimeries officielles 25 3 215 210 453STD 89 214 64 70 1437

Total 114 217 279 280 890

Infonrsation et Publicite

PP 156 97 118SATPEC 70 267 436 194 300 1.267

Total 70 282 hh2 19h 397 1.385

Total Services 70 396 659 473 677 2.275.. ,a, ,,= ,,n,, ,l =~~. . .. .....

Tourisme

CGTT 2.127 408 675 530 960 4.700SHTT 1.040 2.832 2.851 704 1.200 8.627

Total 3.167 3.2140 3.526 1.2314 2.160 13.327

T 0 T A L 53.776 44 1737 39h23 27 539 29.090 193.;565

P Profits (Pertes) avant inp~ta pag:e 1TABLEAU 4 A - Ameortissemcents

F - Frais financiersS * Surplus (Deficit) avant amiort-isseesents et f rats finianciersi

Profits avant itnspots, et surplus avant icip;ts, a,scrtisseenentPet f rais fLoiancier-s

____ 964 1965 1966 1 967 ___ 1968 __ _19699

P W ~~~ ~~F *r P A F -w -p A F7 s PF -A F S P A F S P A F S

Industries agricoles etalimientaires (604) 879 219 494 1 .71 5' 946 176 2.841 3.094 572 189 It. 155 4.445 873 285 5.603 189 1 .1123 467 1 .759 2.090 1.163 59t5 3.848

Produits 'petroliers 1.113 1.152 179 2.444 785 1.377 208 2.370 1.743 2.522 666 It.931 5.195 4.258 1.418 10.871 5.567 4.2137 1.170 11.024 4.324 4.587 886 9.797

Autree industriesg

Electricite et eau 806 1.603 209 2.618 1 .272 1.668 393 3.333 1.256 1.980 539 :1.775 423 3.570 718 4.711 (1.226) 4.884 72 3.730 814 4.836 192 5.842

Kat4riaux de construction,

clbramdqae, vernre, b 4ti.menttravau.x publics 171 212 46 429 520I 229 51l Soo 459 389 421 1.269 867 547 525 1 .935' 576 251 1,36 963 641 295 i8i 1.117

Industries extractives 463 634 63 1.160 1 .252' 1.343 2314 2.829 1.097 1.920 211 31.228 (1.853) 1.724 446 317 (892) 2.164 .328 1.600 450 2.999 349 3.798

Industries siderurgiques,metaiiurgiques et maca-niques (2.523) 220 200 (2.103) (2.119) 1.943 355 1791 (2.220) 2.012 ' 71 (37) (730) 1.832 9 1.111

Industries chiteiques 796 341 127 1.264 986 395 117 1.498 162 382 194 738 283 349 341 973 595 392 327 1.314 629 402 279 1.310

Textile, habillemient,

cuir, artisanat 485 262 264 1.011 (1791) 461 367 6,49 (1.730) 961 831 62 (874) 1.343 1.372 1.841 (1.670) 1.-348 9~20 598 (160) 1.405 830 2.075

Bois et ameublement, papier(1l.267) 673 264 (330) (762) 689 346 273 (157) 632 131 606 (108) 547 154 593 (102) 533 73 554 59 605 86 750

Transports et distribution 1 .242 1.849 366 3.457 1 .05; ' 2.045 395 3.192 984 2.607 478 4.069 1.218 3.648 503 5.365' 8i8 3.330 686 4.834 1.145 3.663 644 5.452

Total. eutres iadustries 2.696 5.574 1.339 9.609 4.141 6.830 1.903 12.8I74 (452) 9.D91 3.005 11.644 (2.163) 13.671 4.414 15.922 (4.121) 14.964 2.-713 13.556 2.848 16.037 2.570 21.455

Iicprimerie et ediition 13 6 6 25 4859 7 44 540 479 20 75 574 369 29 102 500, 244 47 84 375 405 93 91 589

ITeformsation et pablicite (96) 32 (64) (37) 121 84 (69) 93 24 (168) 127 (41) (221) 203 (18) (291) 224 (67)

Tourisme (15) 110 63 158 (491) 228 68 247 (13) 417 58 462 (378) 490 335 447 (364) 1.034 380 1.050 79 1.035 354 1.468

MOTAL 3.-107 7.753 1 .806 12.666 7.046I 9.509 2.399 18.956 4.782 13.015 3.993 21 .7 90 7.300 19.448 6.554 33.302 1.294 21.6.38 4.814t 27.746 9.1t55 23.139 4.496 37.090

No tes

/1 S et etat ne deome pas toutes ices infornmetions pour l1ensemble des entreprises pubfliqtes, pour tous ices exeircicces, en raison de l1absencc d'information pour certainec entreprisee. Lee exercices 1966 i 1969 cependantsoot giAneralement completsetc peuvent ditre considdre'e cocec representent 1'ensemble dles enireprises publiquces.

12 Pra±fi,tapsrlns soot calcules coepte non tenu dc,subvhentions du gtouvernemaent et apres rectification les erreurs identifieec comnises par lea ewtreprises dens le calcujl do leurs resultats. Aucun redree.sem,ent zn'a eteeffectue pour les amitres panics, soit, capitaflisees, suit non profisionnees par- les entreprises et pour lescluelles nonus n'avons pas etei en mestr e de d6termiwer l'exercice d'orngine. tCes perce s 'd6lc'vent approximiati-,vement A D. 12,7 million au 31 decembre 1967.

L Le Benefice de R.N.T.A. comtpris dens les incustries alinentaires et agricoles est Mtebli spree les transferte au lireson nepresentant des droitsi et taoxes sur les cigarettes etc, suit environ 12 millions par ani.

A1 Lec notes de'taillses concernmot cheque aeitreprise sur le tableau d'epargne dec entreprisee doivent e'galeteettre appliquees a cet etat.

TABLEAUrl 4 page 2

Prof its avat inspots et surplus avant asortissement et frais fiLnanciers 1'= Prof:Lta(Pertss) avant imp6taA,* AmortissemenntsF -Fraloi financiers

S Surplus (Deficit) a-ant a;aort.sseimnts et frais financiers

1964__ 6__ _ _ _ _ __ _ ___ __ 196 1968 1969

P A F S F S F A F -*' T A F

Industries agricoles et alimentaires

ONP 156 165 17 3138 31 1 97 2 3 3 51 64. 2917 67 1.28 177 360 100 637 166 350 135 651 200 4.00 120 720Office des cgriales (1.170) 67 12 (1.091) 637 88 15 7140 1:767) 93 16 (658) 69 94. 1149 312 (1.224.) 89 234 (901) 369 59 4.11 839

O"CT 2..468 18 - 2.4.86 !.84.8 27 - 2.875SS 1.10 61.7 190 1 .2c47 677 606 138 1.1.21 4... 103 106 953 607 325 36 968 797 450 98 1.345 1 .035 1.90 6k 1 .589RNTA 37k 55 __ 29 885 61 91.6 7k1. 67 811 160 214 _ 664 1.86 211.4 _ 700

Total (6Crk) 879 ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~219 1.94 1 .719 91. 17 2.61. 3.9 87 18 1.15 1..1k 873 285 5.603 189 1.103 1.67 1.759 2.090 1.6 59 .84.8

Produits petroliers

SEREPT 21 115 5 11.1 128 98 5 -231 88 5 93 81 15 96 222 90 105 1.17 1 99 127 97 1.23STIR 1.018 91.9 62 2.029 576 1.159 61 1 .7,96 687 1.i66 65 1.918 1.81 1.373 72 1 .9,26 780 1.180 62 2.022 726 1.109 50 1.885SITEP 1 .009 1.118 1.30 2.557 5;.128 :2.570 1.116 8.811. 1.560 2.770 81.8 8.178 3.1.38 3.045 562 7.04.5AGIP 7k 118 112 271. 81 120 11.2 31.3 1.7 150 166 363 (41.1) 231. 215 35 5 21.7 155 4.07 (39) 306 177 444.1

Total ~~~~~~~~~~1.113 1 .1 52 179 2.111 75 137 208 2.7 1.13 252 66 191 515 1.5 .. 8 1.7 5.6 k.8 1.170 1101 k.21 k.587 86 9.797

Electricits at sau

5T20 86 1.603 2029 2.618 1.272 1.668 3193 3.3133 1 .256 1.980 539 3.775 1.23 3.5570 718 4..711 (821) 4..520 1 3.699 71 4..080 3 1..151BONEDE (1.05) 364. 72 31 71.3 756 192 1.691

8(6 1.603 20976 2.618 122 .68 93 333 1.256 1.980 53 .775 1.3 350 71 .71 (.226) 1.81 2 370 81 .86 12 5.81.2

Mat4riaux de construction, ceramique, erre,ba timsent, travaux publics

SNIT 59 3 .19 81 89 5 15 09 37 5 182 221. 171. 7 56 237 21.7 6 50 303 270 30 55 355El Anabib 31.5 126 33 501. 114. 130 3 21.7 139 25 161.Cimoents Portland. 12 4,7 14. 73 (31.) 56 14. (273) (150) 66 13 (71) (154.) 76 1.0 (38) (201) 85 39 (77) (151) 95 53 (3)CAT (67) 1:11 61. 561 133 691. 31.5 135 5 1.85 315 206 35 556Ea Bounlane 7 1 20 91 70 21 91 91 25 116 23 22 1 1.6 26 22 1. 52 6 22 4. 32~~~tisent 3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~14 6 1 3 53 86 8 20 ii14 176 6 35 217 237 7 1.0 281. 390 8 1.0 1.38 516 9 441 5692OTIhA07 62 5 67 57 6 2 65 51. 6 7 67 1.5 7 22 71.Manufac ture Tunistenne de Ceraoiques (62) 14. (1.8) (34.) 107 73Union 0G ~rale (32) 11.6 165 279 (81.) 96 191 203

Total 171j' 212 .46 1.9 520 229 51 800 4.9 39 121 1.269 867 517 55 199 56 21 136 963 61.1 295 181 1.117

Indutries ei-tractiv,es

SFAX GAYSA 595 1.1. 1.6 1.081. 1.251. 1.90 60 1.801 1.730 1.096 103 2.929 (516) 781 206 1.71 (80) 1.100 73 1.093 1.60 1.710 85 2.255CIPHDS 57 90 1. 151 156 235 2 :193 15 228 9 252 (123) 312 19 206 107 1.20 90 617 530 51.8 120 1.1982TEP(DS 1.2 72 10 121. 76 116 6 '198 (91) 99 7 15 (123) 78 12 (33) (153) 100 30 (23) (152) 100 30 (22)ONE (2:11) 29 3 (199) (136) 18 20 (98) (120) 26 14. (80) (128) 28 29 (71) (105) 30 12 (63) (170) 30 4. (136)Djebe1l Ojerissa (167) 11.0 132 '105 77 133 75 285 (132) 132 110 110 (68) 136 51 119 (68) 136 1.0 108

SOTEMI ~~~~~~~~69 31.1 11. 1.27 (514.) 338 3 (173) (831) 393 70 (368) (593) 378 72 (11.3) (150) 1.75 70 395

Tot-al 1.63 6:11. 653 1.160 1.252 1.31.3 231. 2.8129 1.097 1.920 211 31.228 (1.853) 1.721. 1.46 317 (892) 2.161. 328 1.600 160 2.999 31.9 3.798

TAIILEAIJX 4. pg 3

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~P-Profit.aatipt tap~ M tf..f.,j. 'alts (Pert..) ae.~t im.pats

F -Fral financiesrS -Surplus (Defiolt) av,-t nnor1issent. et fralS fnntr

1, A F 2 'T F 0 969 r * P A * ' S ' .

Sssdustriaa mid;rw-gique., oata33n-gique. et e6usndque.

Ea FoubAdj (1 .93.3) 6! 7 (1.865) (1.775) 1.565 ? (210) (2.130) 1.600 7 (530) (1.009) 1.610 7 60120I871 (165) 3 (12) (107) 7 (1I0`7) (100) 2 (i00)SDFO=KFA (187) 1 12 31 (72) 33 87 21 11.1 (5) 90 8 93 (2) 5'2 9 9?AilS (24?) 11. (106) (1.36) 215 229 8 (24o) 21.0 1STIA (4.) 31. 51 81 152 66 93 311 255 82 163 500 281 1310 2 4.119Wt.:Llurgiq1., d. Tunlisia pan d.sponLbleIMAL (6) 1. 8 6Fondsri.. R~oni.. 12 6 31 21 20 6 4. 30

(2.52 3) 20(1 20C0 (2.103) (2.119) 1.94.3 355 179 (2.220) 2.012 171 (37) (738)1 .812 9 1.111

I.doStrica Chimiqu..

STEP 62 2 9 73 31. 2 21T 63 1. 2 16 61 (12) 2 31 21SlAb :238 299 59 596 1.51. 348 64 866 (1..) 309 137! 2 (1.11) 305 297? 191 338 314. 652 360 262 622Raffinoerie Mdl~n.em,du Soulr. 26 4. 1 31 27 1. I 32 20 1.4 25~ 28 4. 1 33 26 1. 1 31 39 1. 1 441Phsreaute ce,trale 1.70 -36 -58 515. 1.71 1.1 2!5 5317 51.2 67 1.0 61.9 678 36 12 728 56? 50 12 631 590 38 16 61.1

796 31.1 122 1.261. 986 395 111 1.1.98 162 382 191, 738 283 31.9 31.1 973 595 392 327 1.311. 629 1.0241 219 1.3102 1,02 19 7.31

T-atil., h.abillanmet, coir,, articagat

SOGITEX .818 190 261. 1.272 31.2 352 31.1 1.0401 (1 .169) 836 8015 1.72 (267) 1.189 1.367 2.289 (1.200) 1.228 920 91.8 360 1 .250 810 2.4.20OKA (333) 72 (261) (571i) 179 21 (391) (561) 125 26S (1.10) (607) 151. 5 (4418) (1.70) 120 _ (350) (520) 15~5 00 (31.5)

.1.85 262 21 1.11 (179) 1.1 7 6. (1.730) 961 831 61' (871.) 1.34.3 1.372 1.81.1 (1.670) 1.31.8 920 598 (160) 1.4.05 8 30 2.075

Ibis et mmebl .. st, ppi8er

SKASEX * 116 29 52? 197' 55 31 57 11.21770 (1.267) 673 261. (330) (762) 689 31.6 27:1 (273) 603 7:? 1.09 (163) 516 97 1.50 (102) 583 73 551. 59 605 66 750

(1.M67 673 261. (330) (76-2) 689 31.5 2731 (157) 632 131 606 (108) 51.7 154 593 (102) 583 73 551. 59 605 86 750

Treaport. at distribu,tion

SNOF'T 36 5;12 105 653 (881 ) 579 160 (11.2) (1.815) 736 171 (901)(1 .107) 1.668 11.5 706 (781.) 1.250 250 716 (1.51) 1.376 2115 1.120SNT 181 297 1.78 195 353 541. 252 1.32 17 696 355 1.91 9 855 1.61 51.1 15 1.017 1.89 6131 15 1.1850TH 98 1il6 1 215 137 2C8 20 365 215 280 21 52:1 122 286 26 1.31. 126 383 25 531. 185 377 3~2 591.

CTH ~~~ ~~~~~~83 '50 89 322 1:13 iC 1. 3 28(0 1.13 127 3'0 6511 726 190 25 41.STAY 51. 1.2 1. 100 2112 [0O 1 21.3 261. 69 33:1 261. 23 287Ttmls Air 371. :118 78 800 61.8 1.35 85 1 .1511 617 573 1083 1 .3711 1.66 653 89 1.208 635 775 108 1.518 51.2 8,36 119 1.4571098, 1.16 :181. 69 889 618 326 66 1.01.1 718 372 99 1.189 727 327 205 1.259 380 381 288 1.01.9 380 393 273 1 .01.6Le Notour 160 18 320 206 165 10 4. 179

1.21.2 1 .619 66 3.157 ( .052 2.0L5 395 3.1.92 981. 2.6c7 1.75 4..069 1.218 3.64.8 503 5.369 818 330 686 i,.83k1 1.11. 3.653 61.1. 5.4.52

top-,,r. .edition

Inp,leie. osfficileUc 45 1 1 56 5 61 56 6 62 64. 13 77Maison T-unisena de I'Edition. 19 5 21. (17) 6 (11) 31 6 317525 13 6 6 25 1.89 7 1.1 51.0 1.I8 16 75 5211 291. 19 102 1.15 205 35 84. 321. 310 71. 91I 1.75

13 6 6 25 1.19 7 1.4 51. 1.79 20 75 571. 369 29 102 500 21.1 1.7 81. 375 1.05 93 91 569

Informatjon et pultIirite TAP (109) 5 (101.) (157.) 18 (1365) (15~6) 36 (120) (1 917 56 (141): (231) 77 (151.) (307) 98 (209)aAT1'EC 13 27 1.0 117 113 2202 17 57 11.1 29 71 100 10 126 136 16 126 1.

(96) 32 (64.) (:7) 12,1 8,li (619) 93 2., (168; 127 ~ (l4, (231) 203 (18) (291) 224. (67)

roorien2821r 29 78 25 132 :89 195 22 2165 :16 382 16 1.314 (321.) 1.57 290 1.23 (330) 1.-000 326 996 118 1.000 298 1.1.162238 (1.1) 32 38 26 (78) :13 b.1. I (19 25 1.2 211 (541. 33 1.5 21. (31.) 31. 51 54. (39) 35 .56 1)2

(15) 110 63 15 19 )8 8 2.i3 .7 5 1.6: (378:1 1.90 3 ..7 (6. 1.031. 380 1.050 79 1.035 351. 1.1.68

'tBLEAtU15 page 1

P * Profit. apres impStsEpargne des Emtreprises Publiques A * Amsorttsoement

(en silliers de Dinars) E * Epargrie

1964 1c5 _ _ 1966 1967 1!968 1969 1970 1971 1972P A E P A E P A E P A E P A E P A TE E E

Industries agricoles ,talimentaires (604) 879 275 1.719 946 2.665 2.116 872 2.988 3 873 3.941 1.744 1.152 2.B96 3.715 1.252 4.967 4.119 3.970 3.957

Produits petroliers 1.110 1.152 2.262 784 1.37? 2.161 1.737 2.522 4.259 5.160 4.258 9.418 5.559 4.287 9.846 4.324 4.587 8.911 7.434 7.448 7.432

Autres industries

Electricite et oau I86 1 603 2.409 1 .272 1.668 2.940 1.256 1.980 3.236 423 3.570 3.993 (1.226) 4.384 3.658 814 4.836 5.650 5.368 6.010 6.622

Materiaux de construction,cer.sniqne, verre, batiment,travaux publics 145 212 357 255 229 484 161 389 550 459 547 1.oo6 776 ;14

61 1.237 1.291 796 2.0C87 2.200 2.200 2.200

Industries extractives 163 634 1.097 1.252 1.343 2.595 1.097 1.920 3.017 (1.853) 1.724 (129) (892) 2.164 1.272 450 2.999 3.449 3.855 4.248 4.470

Industries siderurgiques,m

6ta.llurgiques at niocaniqlaes (2.523) 220 (2.303) (2.119) 1.943 (176) (2.220) 2.01 2 (208) (730) 1.832 1.102 1.968 2.121 3.945

Industries chimiques 650 341 991 822 395 1.217 (68) 382 314 5 349 354 306 395 701 385 405 790 867 975 975

Textile, habillement,cuir, artisanat 485 262 747 (179) 461 282 (1.730) 961 (769) (874) 1.343 469 (1.670) 1.348 (322) (160) 1.405 1.245 1.500 1.500 1.500

Boisl et sasublement, papier (1 .267) 673 (594) (762) 689 (73) (157) 632 475 (108) 547 439 (62) 615 553 99 637 736 70 70 70

Transports et distribution 1.209 1.a49 3.058 1.030 2.04i 3.075 568 2.611 3.179 903 3.648 4.551 658 3.517 4.175 990 3.858 4.B48 5-349 5.700 6.180

Total Autres Industries 2

.191

5.574 8.065 3.690 6.830 10.520 (1.396) 9.095 7.699 (3.164)13.671 10.507 (4.330) 15.396 110.66 3.139 16.768 19.907 21 .177 22.824 25.962

Imprimerie et edition 9 6 15 292 7 299 326 20 346 356 29 385 244 47 291 405 93 498 380 380 380

InformaLtion et, publicite (96) 32 (64) (37) 121 84 (69) 93 24 (168) 127 (41) (221) 203 (18) (291) 224 (67) i60 160 160

Tourieoe (15) 110 95 (49) 228 179 (13) 417 404 (378) 490 112 (364) 1.034 670 79 1.035 1.114

TOTAL 2.1395 7.753 10.648 6.3S9 9.509 15.908 2.701 13.019 15.720 4.874 19.448 24.322 2.632 22.119 24.751 11.371 23.959 35.330 33.270 34.782 37.891

Notes

/1 Ceo; etat rie domie pas toutes lee infonaMtions pour l'ensemble des enutreprises publiques, pour tOius les exercices, en raison de l'absonce d'information pour certaines entreprises. Les exercices 1966 a 1969 cependantsooit g;neraleient, couplets et psuvent )stre corLsiddres cosine representant l'ensemble des wntrepris;es publiques.

/2 ProLts et purtes soret calcliss compte non tenu des subventions d'explottation, mais compte tenu des subventiond'oexportation du gouvernement, at apres rectification des erreurs identifiees comsises par les entrepri:esdais le caElcul de leurs resuLtats. Auaun redressenent nla ete effec-tue purr les autres pertes, Soit capitalis-es, so.i ntn pr-visionnues par les entreprises et pour leoquelles nous n'avons pas ete en nes-re ded6terminer l'exercice d'origine. Ces pe-rtes s'lijvent approximativosment l D.12.7 millions au 31 DLcombro 1967.

/3 Le BEnef'ice de R.N.T.A. compris dans les induEstries alimentaires et agricoles est etabli apros des transferts au Tresor repro:sentant des drcits et taxes sar les cigarettes, etc, soit environ 12 mil:Lions par an.

/4 La ventilaLtion de l'epargne entre benefice et amortissements pour los exercices 1970 - 1971 - 1972, n'tetait pas disponible.

TABLEAX 5 page 2P Profit (Pertee) apres impi~ts

Epargnecdes FEntreprises Publiques A .Amor-t.ssement,

E EpargpLe(ea milliers de Dingar)

.i2~... 1p4 L 1966 ___ 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972P A 6 P A E r AE A 6PA A TE66

Industries egricoles et alieentair-esONP 156 165 321 31 1 97 228 64 297 361 166 360 526 166' 350 516 200 400 600Office des c6r"les (1.170) 67 (11.103) 637 B8 725 (767) 93 (674) 69 94 163 (1 .224.) 89 (1 .135) 369- 59 428 700 700 700OCT 1.490 18 1.508 1.643 27 1.6570 1.700I 49 1.749 1.865 89 1.954 2.000) 2.000 2.000STI /1 410 647 1.057 677 6406 1 .2a3 444 403 847 446 325 1771 652 450 1.102 795 490 1.285 759~ 670 657

TotTA- 374/2ru, 95 29 885/2 61 946 744/2 467 1311 4501/2 214 664 h86/2214 L96o 0 o

Lee annees 1964-1966 rejaxianmgt lee exercicee cros en Avil 1 965, 96e 97 L'~1!67 represeantsla p~riode de huiit mois e Decembre 1967. Leg 'et)~e suivant.s se sont termsi.nela1 31 De~cembrs 1967 etc .

/2 Eine'fice restent ile esciigt6 aprs ,rsieement, au trAaor de 10.742 11.993 12.542 12.253- 19.300

Produits p6troliereSEREPT AL 21 1.15 136 128 98 226 - 88 88 - 81 81 222 90 312 199 127 326 395< 342 287STIR 1.018 949 1 .967 576 1 .159 1 .735 687 1.166 1.853 481 1.373 1.8354 780/2 1 .180 1.960 726* 1 .109 1.835 900 900 900

SITEP ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~3/3 1 .009A, 1 .161 2.127 5.128,4 2.570 7.698 4.56ci 2.770 7.330 :.438 3.045 6.483 6.0 600 600AGI? 71 88 31 980 1.20 200 41- 150 191 4li.&9 234 2~15) (') 247 216- 9 06 267 18 206 2

TotalI 1.110 I1.152 ~2. 2 7BI T-77T nTT T7M T.M 7M 4 9779.2SU 9 1947T rm T. 29t.U+ __1_ 7-&l _.-.

ZI L'exploitation de cette eocietA de recherchie acst equilibree chequte ennge per finunceemnt des ectionneires franpeis et imputation aux immobilisations incorporellee des freis de recherche, doot le montant cugus'wsl6lleve e' 14.304 (net) en 1967.

/2 Conforia6ment au Pllan, l.e, b~sefice de le S.T.I.R. eet nul en 1968 et de 92 an 1962. Aucune expl-ication ne justi-fie l'ecart entre eee sonoes et les montantsfigurant dene les comiptes de l'entreprise ci-desSUs.

/3Pes d1exploitation en 15969 et 1965.

Zkles rasultattisoot calcule's apres avofr impute aux iginobiliaations incorporallce lee frais de rec)eerche cumulee en 1967 et non amortis, du epler.mis cd Sud", pour 4.529. Cependant dlautree frets de recherche et de prospectionant St~; comptaLblieds en immobilisationscorjporelles, mais nonus neavons pee en dlinformation nonus pernattant cle valorieer ces frais.

Electricit6 ait eauS7EG 8o6 1.6o3 2.409 1.272 1 .6658 2.94.0 1.256 1.980 3.236 - 292 3.570 3.993 (821) 4.520 3.699 71 11.080 1.151 3.717 3.,894 4.228

SONEDE ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(405) 361j (41) 7413 756 1.999 i.65i 2.116 2.394

806 i.6o3 2 .409 1.272 1.658 2.94,0 1.256 1.980 3.236 423 3.570 3.993 (1.226) 9.881j 3.658 819 4.636 5.650 5.363 6.010 6.622

Mat6rLaux de core truction, c'eramiqaeverre, batiment, tra.vaux publics

SNIT ~~~ ~~~~59 3 62 89 5 94 37 5 92 179 7 181 297' 6 253 270 30 300 350) 400 550El Anabib /1 219 126 .345 111, 130 214 - 139 139Ciinents Po~rtland 12 47 59 (343) .56 (207) (150) 66 .(84<) (154) 76 (78) (201) 85 (116) (151) 95 (56)CATr (67) 131 64 355 1:33 988 144 135 279 129 206 :3530 7/ 7 1 2 3El.Bounianie 71 20 91 70 :21 91 91 25 116 23 22 45 26, 22- 98 6 22 28Batiment 11i 6 17 27 8 35 89 6 90 144 7 '151 226 6 239 299 9 308 500) 500 50033TriMAOO 59 5 64 57 6 63 49 6 55 42 7 499lManxfacture Tuniaierne de Cgramiques (62) -/3 (62) (34) -/3 (34) .. - - 1.5 50 65UniLon O6no'rale __ 32) 146 114 84) 96- 12 64. 140 204 137 2 6~ - -

Total TI~~~~~ 212 35~77 1=29 )1 ~ 1 -3 9 __0 e)9 M1T 1J5 777 713 1.237 1.2 91 W3 2.08 22 09 220) .O/

/1 Debut dexcploitation en 1967.

L2 Ce monotant d'amor-tissement figure au Plan. aucune exp)lication ne justifie 1-cr avec des freis d-amortLisseserit normeux.

ZI Dlebut dlexploitation en 1966. Pee d1amartissaement eEL 1966 et 1967. Leamortiseeeent pour cee deax exercices poiut 4tre e'value a- 150.

A La repaitJLtion des eval.uations de ce s'ectaur 1C'ctivi.te nlest pee disponible.

TABLPAuX 5page 3

P -Protit apt

s, lapSiaE9argne des Entreprisos Publiques A hodourt±soefbtn

(an ,stIi-s do ThLinre)

1964 i965 1986 ____ 196 i 968 ---_ 196-5' 1970 1971 1972

Industrie- extractlivesEFAX OAFSA 595 443 1.038 1.25h 490 1. 744 1.730 1.onr 2.826 (516) 781 265 (860) 1.100 1.020 460 1.79 2. 170rCOPIES 57 90 147, 156 235 391 15 228 243 (123) 312 189 107 420 527 530 546 1 .o78 ) 3.300 3.650 3.800STEMSI 42 72 114~ 76 116 192 (91) s'9 8 (123) 78 (45) (4653) 100 (53) (152) 1 00 (52)08M LI (231) 29 (202I) (136) iS (1 18) (120) 26 (94) (128) 28 (100) (105) 30 (75) (170) jol (1140)Djebol 030z-±na (167) 140 (27) 77 133 210 (132) 132 - (68) 136 68 (66) 136 668 98 98 70

/1. Pertme avant subvention du giunvernosent et upree imputations sax izootilisetionz incorporfloeS des frots do recherche do prospsctinn non amuortis de 1.410 M=nul/ i 1967.

,L2 ProfitA/pertee aprds imputations dee frets doe prospbction et do rLmhaher oat dLs trava=i sd.n±ere de 2.565 cwua-leis g 1967. Aucuno ionfwtation ne paerst, mo rep-tition entre lnob±liaationa corporells8 et .Lnoorporelo, a.

Induskti-s. std&rrgtquooEl1 FoutadbW (1.930) 65 (1.865) (1.775) 1.565 (210) (2.130) 1 .6oo3 (530) (1.0o9) 1-.61c 601 1.400 1.500 3.2200000)188 (1.65) 3 (.162) (107) - (107) (100) - (100) - - ..- - 120IEPO)1PJ

2(187) 112 (75) 33 87 120 (5) 90 8• (2) 92 90 118 121 125

A)1S (249) -/A (249) (436)/2 215 (221) (240) 240 - - -- -- - -'

STIA (4) 34- 30 152 -. 66 218 255 82 337 2B1 13C0 4-11 450 500 500Notaflnrgiqtxo de TutbLie - pas dispos'ibleI88AL (6) 4 (2)Fonder.Les RAundo , 12 6 1_ i 20 6 26

(72-32) 7-2 T(L- ) 711) 1.4:3 1- 6) jL22) 2.Tf M2) =0j M.! 1M- .10 T. 12 D

,L,Pas d 'wnotsusemat linu 1966, prefer txerciLce dtozploltation. L'usotissenet pool. otre s'vsflu .8 100.

L2A Pa: do, provision pour d4preeilation das stocks en 1966 et 1567. An 31 ddcoebre 1967 le uiontm,t cumuli de is proviJsion nh6cessairo, pout S-tre gvafluJ A 600.

fcdustrtee chimiquesSTEP 62 2 64 34 2 36 43 2 45 (12) 2 (1 0) - 3 3 50 53 60 60 60SIAPES0 238 299 53) 1454 348 82 (443) 309 (134) (41) 35 10) - 338 338 - 36So 3 o 0 0Raffhrerie Tuniuieomedu Soufr. 15 4 15~ 15 4 19 8 4 12 9 4 13 7 4 11 15 4 1 115 115 115Pbalir.ial Centrals 371 - h324( 67 9 419 38298 19290 0

_ _ _ _~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' 11M_7-8 790 9' 97- 2

Thrils, abif~nt,coi , tissnat

IEOGIT fl 818 190 1.006 342 352 694 (1.169) 83.6 (333) (267) 1.189 922 (1 .200)/ 1.228 28 360/2 1.250 1 .610U 1.500 1.500 1.500O11A a Q ) 72 J26) (521) 109 (41F2) j6) 125 )61X607) 15•4 ~ ) 47) 120 (359 (50 15 35

) 7 62 ' (79) 46u 28 (1.7To) 9T (Z21 IL . T ( 3)L -1 ihSr 1

£5. Pertoci Profits ont 61;4 caloulMaprao inputatiun do 1.683 au.x ±ssiob:L2iuaticns incorporoflou. Jaflqu'en 1-967, Nous ',ynsq&n. port irpn,tunto do .ss frais conutitue on fait des d4ponses 6o fonct(ooenmnt nociscuZ imput;esoa to-rt sx tnmobilisutionsi incorpore'loes.

LiNousjavons uppriu quO coo p-eistonz, 3unt incuhorentes, plts que dine les autres sntreprtues.

~.Pones cfllvuereavant subvention d ozpUloitton do gouvern-ment.

B&is ot aneublsnest, papi.erS5ANPh 116 29 45 55 31 86 40 32 72 40 6od 72 70 70 71)SNT0C~) "g (jJ2 68 ) (273) 6co fl (163) 16 353 (02) ~84 81 59

(1.267) 673 (594) __62 689 (73) (157) 62 2 4175 (308) __7 439 7g 22. O 3 Q

TABEUAUX page 4P - Profit aprAis impSts

Epargne des 1atreprises Publjquea A AmortisenentE Epgrgne

(en milliers de Dinars)

1965 6 _ _ 1966 1967 1968 E P 1969 _i 1970 1971 1972P A P P A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A E P A E P P A P P A E P P

Transports et distributionSNCFTr /I 36 512 548 1,881) 579 (302) (1.815) 736 (1.079) (L.107) 1.668 561 (7,84) 1.250 466 (451) 1.376 92'; 925 1.200 1.600SNT 18 297' 478 195 353 548 252 43,2 681 355 491 846 3,61 ';1 1.002 389 681 1.17iE 1.200 1.200 1.200STM 75 116 151 114 208 322 115 /2 280 :195 68 /2 286 35L. 76 :383 459 111 377 4a81 494 550 610CTN 83 1501 23l3 133 104 237 49'1 127 620 226 190 416 144 , 187 331 136 195 331 330 35( 370STC 38 3 41STAM 3,3 42' 36 203 40 243 165' 6.9 :234 188 23 211Slkira 9 1 10Tunjo Air 374 343 722 648 425 1.073 497 573 1.t70 343 653 99X :381 775 1.156 325 836 1.161 1.500 1.500 1.500OPNT 416 384 8tO 618 336 954 718 372 1.t90 727 327 1.051o :380 381 761 380 393 773 900 900 900Le Iloteur 96 18 114 103 10 113 _

1.2059 1.8439 3.058 1,030 204o5 3.075 5633 2.611 3.179 903 3.648 43,.55i 658 3.517 4.175 990 3.858 4.848 5.349 5.70) 6.180

,/1 Prof Lts/Pertes calcULe avaent subvention dsexploit.tion.

Q2 B4eoeice calcuLe apres reineestissenent enonare des taxes de 412 en 1966 et 67 en 1967.

Imprimarie et editionInpr-3oerie officiel7e 27 4 31 43 5 431 56 6 62 64 13 77Mais,n Thoisienne de. l'Edition 19 5 23, (17) 6 (11) 31 6 37STD 2 6, 15 . 299 299 16 3115 294 19 313 205 35 240 310 74 38., 380 38) 380

2 6 , 15 292 7 T T 7'_ I I i 3 ,

Information et publicit,ATPTAP ,/1 (109) 5 (C4) (154) 18 (136) (156) 36 (120) (197) 56 (141) (231) 77 (154) (307) 98 (209) 160 160 160SATPLC 1 7 . 40 117 103 220 87 ';7 144 29 71 10C 10 '126 136 16 126 14=2

) 32 71S) 737 ) 121 - 72) 93 0 (3) 127 ( Ll) ol4 (1) ( 2) 224 (i) 160 16t) 160

/1 Pertes aant, subvention d'e:ploitation.

Touriene

SH3TT 29 7E 107 29 195 224 36 3332 1,18 (324) /1 457 133 (:030)A 1.000 670 1181 1.000 1.t11SIHK Q4) 32 (12) (78) 33 (45) (2.) 3 13,) (54) -- 33 (21.) _X) _ 34L *3 .(9)

(15) 110 951 (49) 228 179 (13) 417 il04 378 390 112' (364) 1.034 670 79 1.035 1.11ih

,/1 Profits/Tortes conpte tonu des frains fianciers de 250 par aot actuln t pes pr le gc rne t. Aucune information relati-e o de tels fraLs financiersen 1964, 1S65 et 19A6.

TABLEAU 6

Transferts de P'Etal ux &.treprises Publiques au titre de Parti.ipations a. Capital et

de Sob-ntions d'Equipenot ainsi qu'au titre de Sub-etions do FPonctionnemant et do Prieos d-Eportation (.peotfieoa. dans le tableau)

(en emiiers do Diners)

Actual Plan/Actusl Total Plan Total1965 /1 IUA 1U,S-7 1~* 1965 - 1968 19,69 1970 1971 1972 1969-1972

Industries agricole.et0alimntnlires Office des c6riale. 86 86

Produits phtroliers5ITEP 266 233 831 1.330 1 .200 1 .200 2.4.00AGIP 1.25

Electri.itA et osuo/SONEDE 450 450 1.567 1 .6 1.690 1 .155 6.025

MatAri.ux do contetnLion, c6raaicreverre, batiment, travaux publicsSNIT 900 370 1.270 1.000 270 970 1 .470 3.710El Anabib 200 200El Bouniane - 0 - - -

90-0 20-0 708 1.808 1.000 270 970 1 .470 3.710

Indostries extracti,eeOEm 900 1.300 220 2.4.20 300 300

- Faploitation 275 1614 120 105 664 107 107Djebe1 Djerissa 350 52 60 4.62 350 350SWTEMI 600 600 - 5 350 350 1.050

275 1.51) 1.472 985 5.146 757 350 350 350 1.807

Indwstrias side'rurgiquea,mhta i_urgiues e1 eAmcaniques

El Fouladh. 300 360 550 2.500 3.700 1.380 680 2.060. - PrUne d'-p-ntation 600 600 600 600 600 600 2.4.00

WOCOM82UA __ 175 5- 65250 2?50 5300 360 715 3.-60 4.975 600 2.3 1.530 600 5.960

Indu.stries chimiqluoe 13SLAPE 10 10 700 700

Taxtile, habillmns nt, cuir, artlsanatSOGITEl 1 .900A/ 1 .650 /A 1 .305 4.855 530 530DNA 515 751 381 290 1.937 500 500 500 1.500

o -o tlnostate. 51.7 611 521 1.70 2.151 520 297 297 297 1.1.111.062 3.264 2.552 2.065 8.943 950 797 797 79 3.341

Bois ot amooblement, papiorSNTC 6.608 /5 6.608

Transports at distributionSCFT 1.00 381 1 .481 600 550 500 1 .650S!- Exploitation 1.:500 2.118 1.188 1.165 5.971 1 .00W 1.000 1.000 1.000 4.000

CTN 800 800Tunis Air - -0 - -0~~ 1001 0 loo 1---- i00 16 IA,5520 i 001 i 'AMu i _C1.fl 1 1Y1 .n

TOTAL INDUSTRIES 5.337 8.703 13.1.89 9.81 733 775 809 687 5822.2

Imprlo.orie et AditionSTD 100 100

Information et publicitATAP 39 39

11- Exploitation, ala. 132 155 160 160 597 300 300 300 300 1.200UATPE8 7 120 235Z 20 20

13_2 220 280 199 8 359 300 30 ( 1.259

STAR 200 20 10 230

BanquesSTB - Pourn Fonda Nationald.am6lioration de Ilhabitat 200 200 200 200 800Banqu du Sud 150 185

3i ~~~150 185 200 200 200 200 800

SOTAL SERVICES 32 25 20 1191.5 5 0 0 0 .5

Tourisnm /6CG7T 2.100 791 865 3.756 1.500 1.6B0 1.680 1.680 6.540

-Exploitation, etc. 200 153 250 300 903 21.0 2140 250 21.0 9,60SHUT 200 599 1.000 1.750 3.4.19 2.000 2.000

0- -----------oo Pet(lool, 5 P,;0 ;00 250 250_____ _ 2.00 ~~~~~~~~~~~~E 2291 3._99 120 1.920 1.920975

T O0TAL 8.169 / 9.630 16.070 13.418 1.7.287 /7 12.323 10.519 9.297 8.292 1.0.531 /7

Li. Bous n'avons pas pu diaposer do toutes les infwmnationa pour IlannSa 1965. 2.700 subventions d'aepcipasunt et da participation ont eta accord" a desentreprises quo nous n avons p.s po identifier. *

/2A l'axcluaion d. GAZODUC cospria dana le plan quadriennal 1969-1972. 600 1.200 600 2.1.00A l'exclusion do I.C.M., a o o a 0 969 512 160 180 1.741

A cOmflspt ZOGOAIANE and WOGIDT a-ant la furame av- 6OGITEXZj Dana le cadre du rodreaaement finoncier do 1967, l'Etat a prois 00s char.ge la nsome do 6.608 due par la SETC ao titre do prets a court, noyen at long terms.

Cola constitoa an fail m nsaubrention nou nea paticipation au capital de UNTC, uasi cala n'. pa Atg considArA coma 1.1 dan sa l onptaa do la nation pour1967. Seulenant one esome do 1-105 cor.arecspodent a. c -Afl.srebaraa do -a

4t 4nhuos at r~loe lraab-grn a 6t coatabiisaie anus la robrioua

"-remboursementsla Pelxtgrieurl dana le compte 'Capital dea Admeinistrations--.

/6A 1lexclusion des autras rubriquos tooriatiquas U.nclueB dona le plan 1969-1 972. 929 525 525 1.979

ILI lecuindasmsc-esa Usn opie ', e ope ataset u nrpie,d -Cmtbi-lNtoaePTT 1965-68 4.736 1969-72 5.936

RTT1.523 11 1.834

TABLEt,UX 7 page 1

Pows centaces

Surlplus avent amwrtissements et fretsProf its (pertes) avant ismpts Pr-ofi ts en poorcentage do capital financisers en pourcentage do Frets financiers en pourcentage

en powrcentage des ventes plus seprunts LL /2 capital plus amsprunts Ll /2 des oeiprnts Ll

1964 15,6 25i6 I21* 196 ±,?2 196 1965 1966 1967 1968. 19659 1964j 65 155 19 67j…- -96 1964. 196 196 196 1968 1969

Industries agricoles et aUmceotairen

ONP 7.0 1.1 1.5 3.1 2.8 3.3 9.5 1.5 3.1. 7.6 8.9, 9.57 20.5 11.8 22.4. 27.3 34a.8 31..7 8.3 3.6 18.3 15.9Office dosc.. ee (6.6) .1.4 (31.6) 0.3 (5.2) 1.9OCT 12.2 11.1 22.0 25.8 22.1 26.0 - -

STS 6.9 1C0.9 8.9 15.6 14..5 17.1 8.8 14..1 10.3 15.4. 18.5 20.0 26.7 29.6 22.1 21..5 31.2 33.8 7.5 7.0 10.0 14..9 2 57.9 213.0RNTA 2.7 5 .7 4.4. 2.8 2.7 7.3 i1..6 11.0 6.7 6.7, 8.3 15.7 11.9 9~.8 9.7

Produitta Petroliors

SEREPT 1.2 5.2 . 3.0 3.5 0.1 0.7 - - 1 .5 1.31 1.0 1.6 o.6 o.6 2.8 27.8 . 3.8STIR 14..5 7.1. 83.0 5.2 6.8 5.6 29.7 8.7 18.2 8.9 3.6 12.6 59.1 58.3 50.9 35.7 35.2 332.8 6.7 - - 6.3 8.7 -SITEP 26i.7 35.4. 27.8 13.0 19.2 33.0 5.5AGIP 2.0 1.7 o.8 (7.1.) 0.1 (0.6) 3.2 4..2 3.2 p 0.2' p 11.7 17.8 21i.41 2.2 26 .5 34o.8 5.3 8.8 14..5 21.1. 15.1. 22.5

Electricits et eau

STEG ~~~~~~~~12.11 17.7 15 .3 4.7?SONEDE (35.8) 19.0

Mat6riaua do construction, ce'ra.dqee,verre,bZtiment, traauD, publics1NII 1.0.1 70.1 16.7 34..1 60.1 37.7El Asabi 22.0 8.9 - 114.3 4.7? - 20.8 10.2 6.8 16.1. 3.8 3.1Cisiests Portland 0.8 (20.5) (8.5) (7.3) (11.3) (8.1) 1.5 p p p p p 90 p p p P 75.5CAT (2.6) 22.0 135.0 12.0 p 15.0 8.7 7.7 1.:9 iP8.6 1'2 .2 13.5 I - - - - -El REunians 5141 41.l.6 418.9 18.3 16.6 4..3 2.7 2.6 3.1. 0.9 1 .0 0.2 3.5 3.1. 1.3 1.7 1.9 1.2 . - .

Batinont 1.3 2 .3 3.9 5.7 5.8 7.1 7.8 17.0 27.5 29.2 31.-6 33.-7 12.1 22.5 31..3 35.0 35.5 37.1 - - - 111.1SOT14Ar0 32.~6 29.5 2!5.1 21.6 15.1 13.3 8.o 4..6 16.3 15.8 9.9 7,.6 - 3.6 3.5 4.7?Mhnfacturo Tisedeenne do Ceramniques (36.6) p 3.8 1.3 5.9JUtics G;nra.le (3.1.) (9.3) p p 11.6 8.1 6.5 7.5

Indastries extractives

SPAt QAPSA 8.1 20.3 i6.8 (5.3) (0.8) 3.7 5.3 10.0 12.3 p p 2.83 9.7 14..! 2C.8 31.2 .7.1 13.5 5.6 1..2 6.9 8.6 3.9 3.0CmOES 3.2 5;.8 0.5 (4.41) 3.0 11.9 10.0 15.0 1.2 p 7.E8 27.9 26.4. 37.8 20.5 16.1 44-7. 61.1 - - 5.9 9.1 4.5.0 6o.0STEl'HVS 5,2 6.5 (10).5) (15.9) (19.0) (17.7) 7.8 10.1. p p p p 23.0 27.1 2.3 ;) : p 13.0 200.0 78.0 11.7 29.1 11.10ONM (25.-9) (22.8) (116.-5) (173.0) (233.3( (5666.7) p p p p p p p p p' p Ip p 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1, 0.1 0.0Djebel Djerisse (5.9) 32.2 (5.5) (2.6) (2.6) p 3.1. p p p 1..2 12.6 4..9 5.1. 5.1STFU 2.9 03.1.4) (67.7) (35.2) (5.5) 2.2 p p p p 13.6 p F p 17.6

Industries sidirsrgiquos, sngta3lurgiq.mset meesnlques

SOECRECA 7.3.3 5.7 (1.0) (0.3)0)12 (73:2.1.) (206.6) r p, 0.2 5.2 6.5STIA (0).8) 8.i 10.5 p 9.1 10.1. 9,.8 18.6 20.1. 8.1 7.1 8.8IMAI, * (3.4.) 1i4.3 6.3Ponde.ries lsunies .1.0 6.1 y.8 12.1 13. 81.2 18.2

lndustries chi,lques

STEPI 5 8 -1.9 3.1 (0.9) p 12.1. 4.7.7SISAPE 6.5 83.3 (11I.1) (5.9) - - 6.7 12.1 p p . - 16.7 23.1 0. 1 1..6 i1L.6 14.41 7.8 9.6 6.o 13.1 18.2 19.1Rafiflerie Tunistenne do Soufre 15 .0 1.5.1. 11.2 11.2 12.5 i8.iPharmacie Centrale iko1 11.7 12.7 13.5 11.3 11.1 25.6 1.1.6 22.6 26.5' 19.1. i8.4 30.7 1.7.4. 27.1 25.9 21.6 20.0 6.6 4..5 7.8 4.o0 6.0 i6.o

/1 Dan a isprsente table 0n a considers cso.= capital uti-Lse Is capital at los reserves ainsi quo, lea esiprnts aceourt et long term, en tenant cealp,! du faeiL ro dens cortataes entreprison lee es~prunti. court terse ser,est a finacorlea isvestlfls,!esot.5 a ioag torsoe.

/2 Los pertes, le can 'ch~ant, nlont pan As calculees en poir-stago do capital ntiLis4, eats sent indlquo's par is syctok (p(.

Note, LlacTeplu des fluctuations at los resultatn ertresies seregistres pAr cortales sentrprises mnetrent gee corteine do ces chiffres sent pee sors.

TABLEAUX 7 page 2

PourcentaLes

Surpills avant anmortissements et frainProfits (partes) avant isptsta froefLts en pourcentage deA capital financiers en peurcentage de Frais financiers en pourcentage

en pouroantage des vcntes plus enpranta /1 /2 capital pLun enprunts /1 /2 dees eepranta /1

12& 1965 1966 1967 1916 1969 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 196k 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1569

Textile, habiflenent, cuir,artisanat

SOGITEX 9.9 2.7 (7.9) (2.0) (12.5) 3.0 14.8 2.0 p p 23.1 6.2 2.4 11.7 7.1 2,4 5.4 9.2ORA (67.8) (60.1) (61.2) (54.5') (49.0) (40.3) p p p p p p p p - - 1.8

BEtois et a,neublement, papier

SlANES 12.5 8.8 11.3 3.5 . 19.2 9.2 7.8 5.oSNTC (68.9) (30.0) (8.7) (4.6) (2.'7) 1.4 p p p p p 1.1 p 4.3 5.7 7.7 10.1 14.5 5.8 1.3 15.7 17.8

Tranasorts et distribution

SNCFT o.4 (8.9) (16.2) (9.6) (7.'1) (3.9) o.6 p p p p p 11.6 p p 8.7 8.5 11.1 3.5 4k.3 4.3 3.2 5.7 3.6SNT 6.3 6.3 6.5 8.11 9.6 9.3 7.8 7.0 7.3 9.2 9.5 8.4 20.5 19.6 20.3 22.2 21.0 20.4 - - 1.6 1.1 1.1 o.8STM i1.4 10.1 11.0 7.5; 7.1, 10.3 12.8 13.1 15.9 8.6 8.2 10.9 28.0 34.9 38.7 30.5 34.7 34.9 o.4 4.7 10.0 12.3 10.0 10.7CTN 1.9 2.2 8.6 4.o 3.3 5.3 17.5 6.7 12.8 11.1 23.1 13.6 23.3 17.3 28.6 5.9STAM 12.9 12.4 14k.1 11.2 14.2 31.0 36.1 31.6 26.0 37.3 45.6 34.4 k _ _Tunis Air 13.6 18.5 16.7 10.k 11.14 8.8 10.3 17.4 15.0 10.3 15.7 13.0 22.0 31.2 29.6 26.7 37.6 35.8 5.5 9.5 8.0 10.2OPNT 25.6 36.2 37.9 37.5' 20.1 20.0Le Moteer 5.8 8.6 24.4 32.6 31.7 35.4 11.8 6.7

Impriserie et edition

Impriermie offivielle 20.1 21.8 21..5 21.3 9.0 11.2 10.1 10.3 9.8 12.2 11.2 12.4 -Vhison Tunisieta de l'EditLon 95.0 (73.9) 77.5 20.2 p 28.7 25.5 p 34.3STD 2.1 14.8 10.7 7.( 5.1 7.1 3.5 57.7 33.1 16.8 10.5 14.0 6.7 63.8 40.0 23.7 16.6 21.4 42.9 22.3 20.1 20.2 21.2 25.6

Infoenation et publicite

TAP (231.9) (209.6) (156.0) (184.1) (213.13)(255.8) p p p p p p p p p p p p _ _ _ -SATPEC 8.7 33.0 26.1 7.:1 1.4 2.1 8.5 48.o 12.9 3.1 1-7 2.7 26.1 90.2 21.4 10.7 23.4 23.8 - - - - - -

Tourisusa

SHTT 2.6 1.8 1.41 (10.!) (8.18) 2.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 p p 2.5 3.5 4.6 2.3 5.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 2.1 2.3SIHi (51.8) (75.7) (34.8) (35.8) (45.9) (60.0) p p p p p p 2.1 0.0 2.2 2.3 5.4 5.4 4.1 4.4 3.8 4.5 5'.9 6.1

/1 Dans La preasnte table, on a cc.nsidare corma caipital utilise le capital et lea reserves ainmi qua les enprunts a court at e log terms, en tenant comnpte du fait que dens cartaina entreprLaes lee erprunta a court tame nervast a financerlea inv)stissemients a long termsi.

/2 Les partes, le ca echeant, n'cnt pas ke callcaees en pourcentage du capital utilise, -ais sont indiquees par Le symbela (p).

NBta: L'aciplour de. fluctuations at lea resultats mctrems aaregitraes par crtaines arstreprises mentrent que certains de -e chif'fra soriLt peu surs.