Resource Recovery From Municipal Solid Waste

Resource

Chapter 7

RecoveryFrom Municipal Solid Waste

Contents

Pageintroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....147

Alternative Resource RecoveryTechnologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Centralized Resource Recovery—A CaseStudy of the Recycle Energy System,Akron, Ohio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

The Community Setting. . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . . 149Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150The Recycle Energy System Technology. . . . . . . . . 150The Akron RES Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Source Separation and Resource Recovery—A Case Study of the Bronx FrontierDevelopment Corp. Composting Project,New York City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

The Community Setting. , . . . . . . .,...., . . . . . 155Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156The BFDC CompostingTechnology . . . . . . . . . . . 157The BFDC Composting Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Critical Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161Public Perception and Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . 161Essential Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162Financing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163institutional Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Page

Federal Policy . . . . . . . ..................164Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

of 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , 165Other Laws Having an Impact on Resource

Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166Issues and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

List of Tables

Table No. Page19. Projected Profit and Loss Statement, Akron

RES Project, 1980--2004 . .................15420, Projected Costs of Two Aerobic Composting

Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16021. Projected Cost/Revenue Balance, Bronx

FrontierProject. , . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

List of Figures

Figure No. Page

26. Operational Flow Chart, Recycle Energysystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

27. BFDC Open-Windrow Composting Process . . . 158

CHAPTER 7

Resource RecoveryFrom Municipal Solid Waste

IntroductionPublic and private organizations throughout the

United States are investigating and investing intechnologies that will recover resources frommunicipal solid waste (MSW).l Two increasinglyserious problems—those of waste disposal and re-source supply—are compelling them to do so:

The United States annually generates more than135 million tons of MSW. Its disposal is a rapidlygrowing problem for many areas of the country,where such traditional methods as open dumping,landfill, uncontrolled incineration, and oceanburial are too expensive or environmentally unac-ceptable. At the same time, MSW contains overtwo-thirds of the national consumption of paperand glass, over one-fifth of the aluminum, andnearly one-eighth of the iron and steel. If burned,the combustible portion of this waste would beequivalent to about 1.9 percent of the Nation’s an-nual energy use.

Resource recovery . . . recycling, and reuse cancontribute to the wise and efficient use of mate-rials, to conserving energy, to preserving the envi-ronment, and to improving the balance of trade byreducing our dependence on imported natural re-

sources. By using materials more than once, virginresources can be conserved for ourselves and for fu-ture generations.2

Major environmental legislation enacted duringthe 1970’s ruled out several previously acceptablemethods of solid waste disposal, and this put pres-sure on State and local governments to find inno-vative ways of disposing of MSW. At the sametime, supply disruptions and price increases, suchas the 1973 oil embargo and the recent OPECprice hikes, have caused uncertainty about the fu-ture availability and cost of energy and other rawmaterials. This uncertainty has in turn led togreater efforts to conserve these resources and,where possible, to recycle them for further use.Consequently, to the extent that alternative tech-nologies for solid waste disposal can also recoverenergy and materials from MSW, they can reducethe cost of community services and promote localdevelopment, as well as serving the interests ofhealth, environmental protection, economic well-being, and national security.

1 As defined by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of1~76 (PublIc Law 94-580), sec. 1004, these “resources” include bothenergy and materials.

2Materiuh and Encrg> From jMunwipu/ Waste (two VOIS., Washing-ton, D. C.: Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, July1979), vol. 1, OTA.M-93, p< 3.

Alternative Resource Recovery TechnologiesAn earlier OTA assessment has identified two

major methods for recovering energy and materi-als for recycling from MSW: source separation andcentralized resource recovery. Source separationconsists of programs to separate recyclable mate-

~Ibld., ~speclally ap p. C ; (or a more extensive sur~”ey of research in

this area, see U.S. Bureau of Mines, Bureau of Mines Research on Re-s o u r c e Recowr>, Reclamutton, Utd[tatlon, Dsposal, and Stabd[zanon,Bureau of Mines Information Circular 8750, (Washington, D. C.: De-partment of the Intermr, 1977).

rials at the waste source and then collect themthrough such -methods as curbside collection, com-munity recycling centers, industry-sponsored re-cycling programs, and commercial and industrialmethods of source separation. These programs arethe only available method by which wastepapercan be recovered for recycling into new paperproducts, and they also recover significantamounts of glass and ferrous and nonferrousmetals. Industry-sponsored programs, for instance,

147

148 l Assessment ofTechnology for Local Development

collected 25 percent of all the aluminum beveragecans produced in 1977. In addition, separated yardwastes and other organic matter can be compostedto produce soil-enhancing materials.

Centralized resource recovery, in which mixedwastes are processed at a central facility, also canrecover energy from MSW either by producingsteam or by converting the organic components ofthe waste into some form of fuel. The upper limiton energy recovery from MS W would equal about1.9 percent of current annual energy consumptionin the United States, and the recovery of all of therecyclable materials would save an additional 0.4percent—the energy it would require to producethese materials from virgin sources—for a totalenergy savings of 2.3 percent of current consump-tion. Technical and economic factors will keepenergy recovery to a fraction of this potential forthe foreseeable future; nevertheless, centralizedresource recovery can play a small but significantrole in conserving energy.

A number of alternative technologies for recov-ering materials and for burning the combustibleportion of MSW or converting it into fuel are atvarious stages of development. Commercially oper-ational technologies include the comporting oforganic wastes and the magnetic recovery of fer-rous metals, as well as two types of energy recoverysystems: the mass incineration of raw MSW in wa-terwall furnaces or small-scale modular incinera-tors; and several processes that recover solid ref-use-derived fuel (RDF) from separated and treatedwastes.

Developmental technologies, which have beendemonstrated in pilot operations but not in full-scale plants, include several processes for recover-ing aluminum and glass from the waste flow, aswell as two methods of energy recovery: pyrolysissystems, in which the wastes are distilled at hightemperatures to produce medium- and low-Btugases and liquid RDFs; and landfill methane re-covery, in which the gases produced by biologicalprocesses are removed through wells and treatedto produce pipeline-quality methane. There is suf-ficient pilot experience with these systems to esti-

mate full-scale performance, but technical andeconomic uncertainty is greater than with com-mercially operational systems.

Experimental technologies, which are still beingtested in laboratories and pilot plants, includeprocesses for the recovery of nonferrous metalsand wastepaper from MSW, as well as two furtherenergy recovery processes: anaerobic digestion, inwhich a mixture of methane and carbon dioxide isgenerated through bacterial action in a processsimilar to the activated sludge system of waste-water treatment (see ch. 8); and a waste-fired gasturbine. In addition, considerable research hasbeen done on several hydrolysis processes, inwhich ethyl alcohol (ethanol) is produced from theorganic portion of MSW through either acid treat-ment or enzyme action. There is as yet insufficientinformation to predict the technical or economicfeasibility of any of these technologies.

This chapter consists of case studies of two proj-ects that are applications of commercially opera-tional technologies: the Recycle Energy System inAkron, Ohio, an example of centralized resourcerecovery through the waterwall combustion of rawMSW for steam generation as well as materialsrecovery; and the Bronx Frontier DevelopmentCorp. project in New York City, an example ofsource separation and the recovery of organicmaterials through comporting. Although theseprojects differ in scale and complexity as well asprocess and product, both are approaches to localdevelopment based on the assumption that solidwaste is not a useless end-product to be disposedof, but rather is a resource that can be recoveredand used in ways beneficial to the community.

In the case of Akron, the approach involvesusing solid waste as a fuel to generate energyneeded for space heating and manufacturing inthat city’s business district. In the case of theBronx, it involves transforming organic refusefrom a produce market into compost, which isthen used to reclaim otherwise infertile land forparks and urban farming. Both present alter-natives to the conventional techniques and in-stitutional arrangements for dealing with MSW.

.

Ch.7 Resource Recovery From Municipal Solid Waste 149

Centralized Resource Recovery-A Case Study ofthe Recycle Energy System, Akron, Ohio4

The Community Setting

Akron, population 269,000, is located in north-eastern Ohio. The city’s economy centers ontrucking and manufacturing industries, primarilythose involved in rubber production. Manufactur-ing sector employment declined by 20 percent be-tween 1960 and 1970, while service sector employ-ment increased by almost 40 percent. Employmentpatterns in the rubber industry, the major em-ployer, reflect these local trends: older plants havebeen phased out and hourly jobs eliminated, whileGoodyear and B. F. Goodrich have invested mil-lions of dollars in administrative and research fa-cilities. Nevertheless, the manufacturing sectorstill employed 38 percent of the city’s work force in1970, compared to a national average of 26 per-cent.

Like many other northern industrial cities,Akron has experienced a decline in the economicactivity of its central business district over the last20 years. While most of the retail stores havemoved to the suburbs, however, there has beensome development of educational, office, andgovernment facilities. The University of Akronhas grown considerably and has made capital in-vestments of $65 million in the city since 1965.The old Quaker Oats mill has been converted intoa successful shopping mall, hotel, and officebuilding, and Ohio Edison has built a new head-quarters in the Cascade Plaza complex. City andcounty agencies also employ a significant numberof people in the central business district.

Most of these offices, as well as the surroundingchurches, hospitals, shops, and other businesses,use steam for space heating and hot water. The

—4Materlal in this case study IS based on the working paper, “Solid

Waste Fired Steam Plant,” prepared by Randall Constantine andJonathan Feld for the Harvard Workshop on Appropriate Tech-nology for Communlt}~ Development, Department of City and Re-glona] Plannlng, Harvard Un~versity, May 15, 1979; background in-formation on Akron was made available by the city’s Department ofPlannlng and Urban Development,

steam is supplied by the local utility company,Ohio Edison, but since 1948 the company haswanted to abandon its outmoded steam operationsand concentrate on providing electrical energy.The cost of providing steam energy from anti-quated central plants had become more expensivethan onsite production, and Ohio Edison’s down-town plant was in violation of Federal environ-mental standards. Two of the major energy usersin Akron’s central business district, B. F. Good-rich and the University of Akron, operated theirown powerplants and did not purchase powerfrom the utility. However, both institutions en-countered problems with their plants; Goodrich,in particular, was also in violation of Federalemissions standards, and compliance would haverequired major capital expenditures. In addition,both institutions were faced with rising demand ata time when the cost of fossil fuels was risingrapidly.

At the same time that problems were developingin the energy supply for the central business dis-trict, Akron and surrounding Summit Countyalso began encountering problems with the dis-posal of their solid waste. As early as 1969, theadverse environmental effects of landfill disposalwere becoming increasingly apparent: raw garbagewas an unstable fill, generated noxious odors, andspoiled the landscape. In addition, the HardyRoad landfill, the city’s major facility, was pro-jected to be filled within 15 years. New sites weredifficult to locate because of the high populationdensity and stricter environmental standards; in1976, the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) indicated that it would not approve furtherlandfill sites in the Akron area. If the sites werelocated farther from the city, however, the cost oftransporting garbage to them would increase sig-nificantly.

It was in this context that, in 1968, planners inAkron began searching for an alternative solid

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150 l Assessment of Technology for Local Development

waste management system. Any new systemwould have to meet five major objectives:

1. processing the widest range of solid wastewithout special handling or sorting;

2. reducing the volume of waste to a minimumresidue for subsequent landfill;

3. reducing air pollution;4. making any new disposal system compatible

with an urban setting; and5. keeping solid waste disposal costs at their cur-

rent levels.

After considering pyrolysis, site compacting, rail-road hauling, incineration, and continued landfill,the city turned its attention to the Recycle EnergySystem (RES), which would incinerate solid wasteto generate steam energy.

Development

When Akron began searching for a solution toits waste disposal problem in 1969, B. F. Goodrichdonated $15,000 for a feasibility study of an energyrecovery system. The study concluded that, al-though the system was technologically feasible, itwould not be economical for the city to generatesteam from garbage unless there was an increase intotal demand for steam, particularly in the sum-mer months when most users employed electric airconditioning. For this reason, and because of thelarge capital investment involved, the city did lit-tle to pursue the project at that time.

The 1973 oil embargo rekindled interest in ener-gy recovery systems, and the project regained mo-mentum. The greatest support for the project camefrom the City Council, particularly its President;the Mayor, on the other hand, was reluctant tocommit the city to the large capital investment re-quired for the development of a new technology.Unable to solicit Federal support, the city’s Plan-ning Department borrowed $1 million from Ak-ron’s revenue-sharing funds to finance a prelimi-nary engineering study.

This time the study, conducted by the engineer-ing firm of Glaus, Pyle, Schemer, Burns, andDeHaven, was more favorable, and the city re-tained an investment banking firm, Prescott, Ball,and Turbin, to float bonds to finance the project.The design work proceeded smoothly, but the un-

derwriters had difficulty raising the necessary cap-ital, in part because of problems encountered by

similar plants elsewhere and in part because of thefirm’s lack of familiarity with this type of project.

In mid-1976 another banking firm, Dillon, Read& Co., agreed to help float the bonds for the proj-ect, and with their assistance additional steamusers were found and contracts between them andthe city were negotiated and signed. By December1978 financing was completed and constructionbegan. Once the details of the project took form,the Mayor and other members of the city govern-ment became more active in their support.

Photo credit: Teledyne National

The Akron Recycle Energy Systembecame operational in 1979

By November 1979 the plant was operating at60 percent of capacity and was due to reach 100percent by the end of the year. The city owns thesite and the plant, but Teledyne Industries isresponsible for actually running the plant, and auser committee performs in an advisory and infor-mational role.

The Recycle Energy SystemTechnology

The RES process is an example of a technology

for centralized resource recovery—that is, it canrecover energy and recyclable materials from col-lected, mixed MSW. It combines a waterwall com-bustion systems with an air classifier for density

5waterwall ~ombu5tion system5 h a v e hcen used Commercially inEurope since World War II; other communities in North Americausing these systems include Saugus, Mass., and Hamilton, Ontario,

Ch. 7–Resource Recovery From Municipal Solid Waste l 151

separation and a magnetic separator to recover fer-rous materials. According to previous studies,these technologies are estimated to achieve a wastereduction efficiency of 70 to 80 percent by weightand 85 to 95 percent by volume; a ferrous materi-als recovery efficiency of 90 to 97 percent; and anenergy recovery efficiency of 59 percent. c

Figure 26 is an operational flow chart of theAkron RES plant. The sequence of events at thefacility is as follows.7

Solid waste is delivered to the RES by garbagetrucks, tipped into a pit, and carried up to theshredders by means of inclined conveyor belts.Closed circuit cameras monitor the pits and con-veyor belts to watch for unsuitable kinds ofwaste—although the RES is designed to accept awide variety of refuse, it cannot process liquids,large objects, or tanks of compressed gas. Un-suitable refuse is removed from the conveyors byan overhead crane.

Two pulverizer shredders force the wastethrough a shredding grate, and the shreddedmaterial is fed through a stream of rising air—anair classifier—that separates refuse according todensity. Heavy material is then passed through anelectromagnetic device that separates ferrousmetals (for recycling) from nonferrous metals (forlandfill). Low-density material, which will beburned, is conveyed to a storage bin and then,when fuel is needed, fed into the boiler.

Fuel and air are fed into the boiler through jetsin the boiler walls in order to ensure uniform com-bustion. About half of the fuel burns while fallingthrough the boiler; the rest burns as it rests on thebottom grate. Flue gases pass through electrostaticprecipitators, which remove particulate matter,

6Materds ad Erter~ From ,Munwpd Ware, op. cit., pp. 99-100,tables 32, 33, and 34. “There is currently no standard accepted way toevaluate the energy recover y efficiency of resource recover y s ys -tems . . . . System energy efficiencies can be calculated in terms of theenergy content of the fuel produced, and in terms of output energyavailable as steam. ” The 59-pmcent efficiency of the RES is in termsof the latter.

TG]aus, Pyle, Schemer, Burns, and DeHaven, “Feasibility Study ofSol[d Wasre Reduction Energy Recovery,” September 1977, and “Re-cycle Energy for Central Heating and Process Steam, ” June 1977. In-formation on the operational characteristics of the plant is as pro-jected by the designers; since the plant has been fully operational forsuch a short time, it is difficult to evaluate how accurate these claimsare. Other resource recovery plants have not operated with the re-Ilablllty their designers expected.

and are then evacuated through the smokestacks.Both the bottom ash from the boiler and the flyash from the electrostatic precipitators are loadedinto trucks for removal. Should shredded waste beunavailable to fire in the boiler, because of eithermechanical failure or inadequate waste supply, theplant can fire up three auxiliary oil burners fed bya 200,000-gal reserve tank.

Solid waste has an average heating value of4,500 to 5,500 Btu/lb, compared to 10,000 Btu/lbfor coal. The major problem in using raw waste asa fuel is the fluctuation in its consistency and,therefore, its heating value; it tends to createsurges of energy when incinerated. The RES inAkron will minimize this effect by shredding thewaste, putting it through a density separator, andthen storing it to ensure a mixture with a moreuniform heating value. The air jets and pneumaticfeed system in the boiler are also designed to pro-vide the burner with a uniform feed. With thissystem, the shredded waste ultimately has a rela-tively uniform value of 6,500 Btu/lb.

Critics of the technology employed in the REShave raised a number of doubts about its success.The waste may “bridge” or jam in the pits or in thestorage bin; the dead weight of the waste maydamage the rams or the conveyor belts; soot andbottom ash may collect in the boiler, causing fre-quent shutdowns for cleaning; and increased cor-rosion of the inside boiler walls caused by burning100 percent garbage may decrease boiler life. Thesystem’s proponents feel that, despite these possi-ble technical problems, the project’s risks are ac-ceptable.

The RES borrows selectively from technologiesalready in use by other industries, interjecting in-novations and new designs where necessary, toproduce a system that can deal effectively with theproblems of burning solid waste. The boiler wasdesigned especially for the RES: higher thermal ef-ficiency allows the system to work at lower tem-peratures; suspension burning and the constantmixing of air and fuel inhibits corrosion caused by

oxidation of the boiler walls; and steam jets havebeen installed to clean soot from inside the boilerbefore corrosion can recur. Where other problemsmay arise, backup and alternate systems have beenbuilt into the plant, and contingency funds havebeen set aside to finance necessary modifications.

152 l Assessment of Technology for Local Developrnent

Figure 26.—Operational Flow Chart, Recycle Energy System

SOURCE: Teledyne National.

Ch. 7–Resource Recovery From Municipal Solid Waste 153

The Akron RES Facility

Akron’s RES plant has been fully operationalfor less than a year, and the data have been insuffi-cient to assess the system’s impact on the envi-ronment. However, it typifies the current state ofknowledge with regard to both pollution abate-ment and occupational safety and health. Air forthe boilers will be pulled in from the plant,creating a negative air pressure that should pre-vent dust and 1itter from spreading to the sur-rounding area. The plant grounds will be pleasant-ly landscaped and well maintained, both as furtherprotection against litter and to be estheticallypleasing. Little water will be discharged from theplant, and the combustion of shredded wasteshould produce fewer toxic gases than the combus-tion of coal. EPA is now monitoring pollutionfrom resource recovery facilities as they come online and is developing a data base which, if itproves necessary, should facilitate the develop-ment of further control technologies.

About 76 percent of RES revenue comes fromthe sale of steam, which is sold at prices com-petitive with Ohio Edison’s rates. Steam userswere required to sign 25-year contracts with thecity in order to assure investors of the economicviability of the project; users who would not signlong-term contracts are required to pay a 20-per-cent surcharge.

Another important source of revenue is the tip-ping fee of $3.50/ton charged to haulers whodump their waste at the RES, which accounts for16 percent of its revenues. The fee is lower thanthat charged at other dump sites in the area, andbecause the RES is centrally located haulers’transportation costs are also less than to moreremote sites. However, in order to further assureitself of a steady and sufficient flow of wastes, thecity has taken a controversial approach: it passedan ordinance requiring all haulers to deliver to theRES. Private haulers currently have a suit pendingagainst the city challenging the legality of this or-dinance. 8

Another 8 percent of RES revenue comes fromthe sale of recovered ferrous materials. The city—.

8Gkmu IIIOU Lundf[//, Inc., et d. v. CI[> of Akron, et J. Case C78-65A of the N(>rthern Dlstrlct, Eastern Division of the Federal DistrictCourt of Ohio.

74-435 0 - 81 - 11

currently plans to landfill nonferrous byproductsof the RES, but potential uses also exist for thesematerials, and their sale could provide additionalrevenue. F1y ash and soot, for instance, can beused as construction fill or as a cement additive.An earlier OTA study projected potential marketsfor recovered aluminum, paper, and glass as wellas iron and steel, that should exceed anticipatedlevels of recovery through 1995.9 Akron has notdepended on this source of revenue to make itsRES project profitable, but it has provided incen-tives to Teledyne Industries, the plant operators,by giving them a portion of any revenues they cangenerate from the sale of reclaimed materials.

Total capital costs for development and con-struction are estimated at $56 million. Net oper-ating revenues (total revenues less operating ex-penses) are projected to be $5.4 million in 1980,$5.7 million in 1981, and about $6 million per yearfrom 1982 through 2004 (see table 19). Net profitsafter debt service, interest, and equipment replace-ment are expected to be over $1 million per yearfor the entire 25-year period.l0 While the RES isdesigned to generate income, however, the use ofthis income is restricted to the RES itself and can-not be mixed with general municipal funds. Anyprofits must be used to retire bonds early or toreplace capital equipment.

Construction of the RES has assured downtownbusinesses of a reliable source of reasonably pricedsteam energy. As a result, some of them havebegun long-needed renovation, and economic ac-tivity in the downtown area has been infused witha sense of optimism and confidence. The RES hasalso produced environmental benefits: the com-bustion of MSW produces fewer toxic gases thanthe coal-fired Ohio Edison plant; by reducing thevolume of its wastes by 80 percent, the city hasalso reduced the pressure on its landfill and ex-tended its useful lifetime; and RES residues pro-vide inert fill that produces no odors, attracts norats, and therefore does not need to be covereddaily with dirt.

9,Materials and Energv From ~Munictpu/ W’USCC, op. cit. p. 63. How-e~’er, the prices users would be willing to pay and the quality they’might demand could present barriers to the profitable sale of largeamounts of recovered materials If resource recovery were w’ldelvadopted.

IQhlo water De\,elopment Authcmtv, O~~ICtUl Stuttmwnt on the R~-

cycle Energv Retenue Bonds, 1976.

—


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Hiw-*-

. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .

Source Separation and Resource Recovery-A CaseStudy of the Bronx Frontier Development Corp.

Comporting Project, New York City11

The Community Setting

The South Bronx is a large collection of poorneighborhoods whose unofficial boundaries haveexpanded tremendously in the last few years. Itsacres of rubble-strewn lots and vacant buildingshave made it a symbol of urban decay, and recentdata illustrate the area’s serious problems. Duringthe first half of the 1970’s, it experienced a severepopulation decline and a high rate of buildingabandonment, with some neighborhoods losing

Photo credit: Bronx Frontier Development Corp.

Abandoned buildings and rubble-strewn lots became asymbol of urban decay during the 1970’s

more than 50 percent of their population. *2 Familyincome levels in the area are extremely low, withmore than 25 percent listed below the poverty linein 1975. Unemployment rates are high, especiallyamong the young, and less than 25 percent of thearea students entering the city’s academic highschools end up graduating.

As one city planner pointed out, however, theseaggregate facts mask different trends within

I IMaterla] in the following case study is based on the working pa-per, “Bronx Frontier Comporting Operation,” prepared b y B e t hSiegel and Ann Verrilli for the Harvard Workshop on AppropriateTechnology for Community Development, Department of Cit y andRegional Planning, Harvard University, May 15, 1979.

IZData drawn from New York City’s Housing and Vacancy surveyof 1975.

specific neighborhoods. 13 Although urban blightappears to be spreading to certain areas that hadformerly remained stable, other neighborhoods–those that had been the most visibly devastatedand had the highest crime and arson rates and themost school crowding—are now showing some im-provement. There is a feeling in some of theseareas that opportunities for progress really doexist.

There are obstacles, however, to realizing theseopportunities. One of these is a long tradition ofnoncooperation among various elements withinthe South Bronx community and within its com-peting political organizations. Not only is theredistrust among groups, but also among individualresidents. As one community worker observed,“People in this neighborhood are scared; theywon’t even talk to people in the next-door apart-ment. It took us three months to form a tenants’association in one building. Nobody would talk toanybody else. ”

Most residents see housing and jobs as the mostimportant local concerns; they attach less impor-tance to human services and open-space issues.However, some community organizations believethere is a great need to develop programs that helpresidents help themselves. One such way to orga-nize people and give them a sense of self-worth, aswell as skills and supplemental income, is urbangardening.

The Bronx Frontier Development Corp.(BFDC) is a nonprofit organization that wasformed to aid in the redevelopment of the SouthBronx. Through its principal activity, comporting,it hopes to contribute to efforts undertaken byseveral neighborhood groups to revitalize the com-munity by reclaiming barren land with parks andurban gardens. Comporting is a process that re-claims organic solid waste by converting it intohumus, an effective soil conditioner. Comporting

I ~Peter Canti]lo, New York City Department of Planning, BronxBorough Office,

t$


Photo credit: Bronx Frontier Development Corp

Urban gardens help revitalize communities

also provides an opportunity to recycle the organiccomponent of MSW productively, while simul-taneously relieving the pressure on dwindling ur-ban landfill sites.

Development 14

The initial idea of “greening thewas inspired by a 1974 editorial in

South Bronx”the New York

Times written by the vice-chairman of the CityPlanning Commission, Martin Gallent. The edi-torial proposed that the city undertake a programof at least temporarily greening some of the vasttracts of rubble with parks and gardens untillonger range plans could be developed. He sug-gested that opportunities for job-creating and in-come-producing ventures such as tree farms, nurs-eries, and cash crops be explored.

The editorial attracted attention throughoutthe city, and one local activist, Irma Fleck, decidedto see how such a project could be brought about.Talking with local residents, urban gardening

l+ InfC)rmatlon ~)n the history of Bronx Frontier Development Corp.IS drawn from interviews with staff; from its publication, “BFDC’SLc]ng Term G(]als, History and Background;” and from “Taming theSouth Bronx Frontiers,” Quest, December 1978/January 1979.

Photo credit. Bronx Frontier Development Corp.

A big grin of pride

groups, city planners, and local officials, Fleckquickly established that community interest ex-isted. She also found a major obstacle: the lack ofgood topsoil. The soil under the rubble was infer-tile, depleted of nutrients, and contaminated withlead and other toxic substances. Importing topsoilwould be prohibitively expensive for community

groups or even the city.

Comporting seemed to be the best way to pro-duce the necessary topsoil at lower costs. Humus,

Ch. 7–Resource Recovery From Municipal Solid Waste l 157

produced by the natural decomposition of organicwastes, would provide nutrients and improve min-eral and water retention; combined with clay andsand (which could be obtained by crushing rub-ble), it would produce good topsoil. The nearbyproduce terminal, Hunt’s Point Market, could pro-vide plenty of compostable vegetable wastes. Theproject also offered a way to provide employmentand training for local residents, as well as a senseof purpose through community involvement,something Fleck considered essential to the long-term redevelopment of the South Bronx.

Discussions with New York City urban garden-ing groups and with the Institute for Local Self-Reliance indicated that a comporting programmight work. The Institute, a Washington-basedtechnical assistance group, studied its economicfeasibility and reported in July 1976 that, with acapital investment of $250,000 for equipment andfirst-year operating costs, a comporting operationcould be developed. Furthermore, if half of thiscompost were sold commercially, the operationcould become self-supporting in another year.Armed with this information, Fleck and Jack Flan-agan, a police community affairs officer in theSouth Bronx, were able to obtain seed moneyfrom the Community Services Administration(CSA) and additional funding from several privatefoundations.

The comporting operation was envisioned as atwo-phase process. Phase I would involve settingup the comporting facility and distributing thecompost free of charge to community gardens andparks. Phase 11 would consist of generating revenueby marketing the compost in bulk to the privatesector (e.g., nurseries and farmers) and perhaps tocity parks departments.

BFDC found that it had to file a long reportwith the New York State Department of Environ-mental Conservation, which had ruled that thecomporting operation was a Solid Waste Manage-ment Facility and would have to comply with allthe relevant regulations.15 During 1977, BFDCsigned contracts with the private waste haulersserving Hunt’s Point Market for the delivery of

15See “Technical Report on the Bronx Frontier Development Cor-

poration Comporting Project,” submitted by BFDC to the New YorkState Department of Environmental Conservation, 1976.

vegetable refuse and with the suburban city ofNew Rochelle for leaves, and then leased a 3.7-acre city-owned site. Equipment was purchased,staff was hired, the site was prepared, and in June1978, the first batch of compost was produced.

The BFDC Comporting Technology

The two major comporting processes are anaero-bic comporting, in which microbes (bacteria andfungi) that do not require oxygen break downwastes in a sealed container; and aerobic com-porting, in which microbial action takes place inthe presence of oxygen. Anaerobic comporting re-quires less frequent attention, but it is a muchslower process and gives off highly objectionableodors. Aerobic comporting, on the other hand, isrelatively odorless, faster, and, because it gives offmore heat, more effective in killing disease-carry-ing organisms. Most comporting systems, in-cluding BFDC, are aerobic. l6

Aerobic decomposition involves a succession ofmicrobe populations, each species reaching a peakpopulation under different nutrient and tempera-ture conditions. The temperature range withinwhich the microbes can survive and function mostefficiently is limited, so temperature control is amajor concern. They also require a supply of nu-trients (oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen,phosphorus, and potassium being the most impor-tant) to thrive and reproduce; when these ele-ments are plentiful and properly balanced, decom-position is more rapid. The most importantmeasure of nutrient balance is the carbon-to-nitro-gen (C/N) ratio, which should remain between20:1 and 30:1. An excessively high C/N ratioslows decomposition and inhibits plant growthwhen the humus is applied to the soil; and ex-cessively low C/N ratio can be toxic to themicrobes and later to plant roots. Since wastematerials vary in their C/N ratios, the properbalance is often achieved by combining two kindsof wastes in the system—for example, MSW andsludge from wastewater treatment. Moisture and

———..—.160ther ~ommunltles Using Compostlng processes include: Durham,

N. H.; Burlington, Vt.; Tom River, N.J.; Bangor, Me.; Upper Occo-quan, Va.; Windsor, Ontario; Camden, N.J.; Phi ladelphia , Pa. ;Washington, D. C.; and Los Angeles, Calif. (Source: Jerome Golcl-stein, editor of In Business and Compost Science, The JG Press, Em-maus, Pa. )

—


oxygen content are also important, and can be 4.controlled by a number of methods.

When BFDC first began operation, it used aversion of the aerobic process known as “openwindrow” comporting, which consists of six basicstages (see figure 27):

1. Compacted wastes, such as leaves and vege-table matter, arrive daily by truck. The leaves 5.are stacked at the edge of the site, and theorganic wastes are piled in a receiving area.

2. Laborers hand-sort the waste to separate outnoncompostable materials, which are setaside for later pickup by the carting service.

3. The waste is laid out in windrows (long rec-tangular piles about 10 ft wide and 4 ft high)with a base of 3 ft of leaves topped by 1 ft oforganic wastes, equaling three volumes ofleaves to one volume of vegetable waste.Since the organic wastes can be very wet, theleaves serve as a bulking agent and help ab-sorb some of the moisture.

The wastes are shredded and mixed by run-ning a compost-turning machine through thewindrow several times. Volume is reduced byabout 60 percent during this step, and shred-ding also reduces the size of the particles sothat a greater surface is exposed to microbialaction, thereby accelerating decomposition.

Comporting begins. Over the next few weeks,decomposition is rapid as bacteria beginbreaking down the material and heat is gen-erated. During this period, workers monitorthe windrows daily to check temperature,moisture level, oxygen content, and C/Nratio. The compost-turner is run through thewindrow approximately three to five timesper week to aerate the pile and redistributeheat and moisture. After about 2 weeks, themicrobial activity begins to slow down andless frequent turning is required. The next 4to 6 weeks allow the compost to mature anddry out. When temperature, C/N ratio, and

Figure 27.—BFDC Open-Windrow Composting Process

non.comciostables

Hunt’s Point cartingMarket service

Vegetable Dumped and covered

waste hand sorted refusecontainers

25 yd3*d”1 5 yd3*d-1organiccompostables

I

New RochelleComponents

Leaves mixed-windrowed

75 ydl*d-l 95 yd3*d-1

vPackagingdistribution

Finalprocessing

blending

BCompletedcompost

dessicated1-4 weeks

57 yd3*d-1

SOURCE: Bronx Frontier Development Corp.

other measures indicate that the humus isstable, it is ready for shipment.

6. After it is mechanically screened to removepieces of plastic and glass, the compost is de-livered to community gardens, where it ismixed with sand and clay and applied to the

soil.

The principal drawback to the open-windrowtechnique, however, was that it could produceonly a relatively small volume of compost o nBFDC’s 3.7-acre site. In order to transform theoperation from the level of demonstration to thatof a self-sustaining business enterprise, BFDC hasturned to a second version of the aerobic process:“aerated pile” comporting. In this technique thecompost piles are not turned; instead, electricblowers force air through them by means of per-

forated pipes placed through the piles. BFDC hasinstalled a 40-kW wind turbine to run the blowers.

Since receiving a grant in 1979 from the Nation-al Center for Appropriate Technology (NCAT) tomake this change, BFDC has expanded its capabil-ities in several ways. Its compost piles are nowmore than twice as large as those permitted by theopen-windrow technique, comporting can be car-ried out in the winter. The increased temperaturesgenerated inside the compost piles also allow forthe safe inclusion of manure and/or sewagesludge. This combination of inputs, called “codis-posal” because it combines wastes from two majorwaste streams (MSW and sewage), is a technologythat one expert views as “the wave of the future. ”17

17Dr lames F. Parr, Iaboratc>ry c h i e f , B i o l o g i c a l Waste Manage-

ment and Organic Resources Laboratory, Agriculture and Environ-mental Quality Research Institute, U.S. Department of Agriculture,personal communlcatlon, July 25, 1980.

Photo credit: Bronx Frontier Development Corp.

A compost turner aerating vegetable waste at BFDC


The BFDC Composting Facility

BFDC estimates that at full capacity their opera-tion could be run by one skilled person, but be-cause of their commitment to creating jobs theywill have eight people on the staff. Except for thetechnical supervisor, the staff consists of local res-idents. Most of the skills involved are relativelysimple and easily acquired: hand-sorting, oper-ating the compost-turner and a front-end loaderused to arrange the windrows, maintaining andrepairing the equipment, and performing tests tomonitor conditions in the piles.

The process appears safe, although a few precau-tions are required. BFDC provides gloves, ear-plugs, and safety goggles to the staff; it carries in-surance against accidents; and it complies with avariety of Federal, State, and city health regula-tions. To ensure product safety, BFDC (with theassistance of EPA and the Cornell University Ex-tension Service) tests the compost for heavy metalssuch as lead, cadmium, and zinc. The majorsource of these contaminants is automobile pol-lution, which enters the waste stream through theleaves of roadside trees. Tests are also performed atthe garden sites on a regular basis. To date, all ofthese tests have indicated that the BFDC compostis safe.

Economics.–It is difficult to calculate whatthe total costs of the project are or how to separatethem into development costs, capital costs, andoperating expenses. In part this is because so muchof the equipment, labor, and services have beendonated or subsidized. ’8 There are also indirect

lslt Seems charaCterktiC of many of the projects OTA studied (par-

ticularly those v’here nonprofit organizations are involved) that tra-ditional cost-accounting procedures are inadequate. This is especiallytrue for cost items that are donated or subsidized. As a result, when

overhead and administrative costs that cannot beallocated specifically to the comporting operation.Finally, since the project is still in the first phase ofits development, it is also difficult to forecast whatoperating expenses will be when it is fully opera-tional. Nevertheless, based on past expendituresand fiscal estimates prepared by BFDC,19 it is pos-sible to approximate some of the costs for the proj-ect’s open-windrow process. These costs are pre-sented in table 20, as are the projected costs of theaerated-pile process. These projections suggest theeconomies of scale that might be achieved by fullimplementation of the aerated-pile process. Notethat unit costs decline from over $30/yd3 for aprocess rate of 50 tons per day (tpd) to only$10/yd 3 for a process rate of 200 tpd.

Revenue comes from tipping fees charged towaste haulers and from the sale of compost, eitherin bulk or in bags. BFDC intends to undertake amarket study to evaluate the potential market forits compost, but while preliminary research pointsto a strong demand for the product, potential rev-enue from sale of the compost is limited because ofprior commitments the group has made for its use.BFDC has promised 2,640 yd3/yr over the next 2years as its matching contribution for a $1. 1-mil-

unit costs are calculated (based on total costs excluding donationsand subsidies) and compared to those for commercially available pro-ducts, project proponents can often deceive themselves (and the com-munity) into believing they are producing a less expensive product.The fact is, from a societal point of view, that these subsidized itemshave a real value and (if unit costs with the subsidy were the samewhether commercially produced or produced by the nonprofitorganization) this value is the price society pays to purchase the “un-quantifiable” benefits of the project.

19’’The Bronx Frontier Comporting Operation: Current Status,Spring 1979,” prepared by BFDC for the New York State Depart-ment of Environmental Conservation, New York State Environmen-tal Facilities Corp., and New York City Department of Sanitation,Apr. 20, 1979.

Table 20.—Projected Costs of Two Aerobic Comporting Processes

Open-windrow process Aerated-pile process

50 tpd 100 tpd 50 tpd 100 tpd 200 tpd

Capital investment. . . . . . . . . . $360,040 $360,040 $518,800 $530,400 $543,400Operating expenses/year. . . . . 170,079 170,079 122,500 146,200 186,800Total annual expensesb . . . . . . 228,156 228,156 206,960 232,960 272,480Unit cost of compost/yd3C . . . . 33.81 16.90 30.67 17.26 10.09

alncludes site preparation.bIncludes Operating expenses, amortization of capital investment, and depreciation of capital equipment.CBased on process output of 6,750 yd’3yr at 50 tpd, etc.


lion grant from the Department of Interior, theNew York State Department of Parks and Recrea-tion, and the New York City Department ofParks. The grant was given to South Bronx OpenSpace Task Force, a coalition of two other com-munity groups trying to build miniparks on 15 va-cant lots in the borough. In addition, the Frontierhas provided more than 2,000 yd3 of free compostto urban gardening groups in the South Bronx.

The remainder of the compost will be availablefor sale. Table 21 illustrates the projected cost/revenue balance and shows the extent to whichoperating costs and total annualized costs can bemet with various combinations of bulk and bagsales.

Table 21 .—Projected Cost/Revenue Balance,Bronx Frontier Development Corp.

100 yd/day 200 yd/day 400 yd/day

Bulk sales . Doesn’t cover Covers Covers totaloperations operations annual costs

Bag sales. . Covers Covers total Covers totaloperations annual costs annual costs


The project also offers distinct benefits to theprivate haulers who dispose of vegetable wastesfrom the Hunt’s Point Market. Because the locallandfill site in the Bronx is overloaded, thesehaulers have had to transport wastes to a landfill

in Queens. The Frontier dumping site in theBronx not only saves them fuel, but also chargesthem substantially less than the city landfill.Dumping fees at the BFDC site are only $l/yd3 foruncontaminated vegetable wastes and $1.50/yd3

for waste in nondegradable packages, compared to$3.50/yd 3 at the city landfill. This disparity inrates suggests that the dumping rates charged byBFDC are lower than they need be. Raising them,it has been suggested, would generate additionalrevenue and thereby improve the project’s abilityto sustain itself without further Government sub-sidies or grants.

Although BFDC’s compost project cannot by it-self alleviate the monumental waste disposal prob-lems of New York City, it could, if adopted byother neighborhoods and boroughs, help extendthe life of local landfills. A Government wastemanagement expert has said that communitiesthroughout the Nation should be able to replicateBFDC’s comporting operation and its plans for co-disposal of sewage sludge, thereby multiplying itsenvironmental benefits.20 In addition, if the proj-ect becomes a commercial success and offers localresidents the opportunity to learn marketableskills by participating in a business enterprise, itcould also play a role, albeit very small, in address-ing the social and economic problems of the SouthBronx.

‘“Parr, op. cit.

Critical Factors

Public Perception and Participation

The degree of public participation in the deci-sionmaking process varied considerably in thesetwo resource recovery projects, primarily becauseof the different institutional settings. The RES wasa municipal project, planned and executed in con-ventional ways by the Akron city government.The BFDC project, on the other hand, was setupas a community development corporation; assuch, it tried to involve the community through aboard of directors roughly representative of theSouth Bronx. Day-to-day management decisionsare made by project staff, but the board of direc-

tors has final approval on all BFDC programs.However, it is not clear how active a role theboard of directors played in formulating policy forthe BFDC, nor whether all sectors of the com-munity felt adequately represented by the board.

BFDC, through its active role in coalitions likethe Open Space Task Force, is becoming an im-portant organizing force in the South Bronx, butits experience demonstrates the difficulty of bring-ing community interests together. It has had dif-ficulties in reaching the grassroots level of com-munity organization. In addition, like other urbangardening groups, BFDC has reportedly en-

1620 Assessment of Technology for Local Development

countered opposition from traditional politicalleaders of New York City’s minority community.These leaders tend to identify themselves withmultimillion-dollar housing projects and job train-ing programs; they feel that low-cost, self-help ap-proaches to redevelopment could be used as an ex-cuse by Federal, State, and local officials to with-draw support from projects that involve moremoney. BFDC’s answer to these criticisms hasbeen that self-help projects create the necessarypolitical and psychological foundation for re-development that previous efforts often lacked.BFDC’s success in overcoming this opposition willdepend on its ability to form coalitions with otherself-help groups and to create a broad base of sup-port from community residents.

BFDC also provides an interesting example ofhow local residents temper what might have been,in view of the limited expertise and resources avail-able within the community, unrealistic objectiveson the part of the project staff. The staff generallytook a broad view of the problems of the SouthBronx, but they were often overly ambitious intheir attempts to address a wide range of issueswith limited resources. The staff has spent much oftheir time fundraising, publicizing, and developingnew programs; as a result, they have sometimesneglected the progress of the comporting opera-tion, the core of the project. Day-to-day opera-tions were often left to the onsite crew, who hadtoo little expertise to deal with some of the prob-lems that arose. Although many of the delays inthe comporting project were beyond local control,part of its inefficiency was caused simply by thelack of management at the site. In many instances,the board of directors played an important role by“keeping the staff’s nose to a specific grindstone.”The board recognized the dangers of trying to ac-complish too much and urged the staff to concen-trate on the existing comporting operation ratherthan initiating new programs.

By contrast, the RES project in Akron wasstrictly a municipal undertaking, using traditionalmodes of urban planning and decisionmaking.When the city’s Planning Department began in-vestigating waste disposal strategies in 1968, thecriteria used to evaluate the alternatives werelargely technical, economic, and environmental.There is no evidence that any attempts were made

to involve the public in the evaluation processthrough such devices as neighborhood studygroups or public hearings. This approach typifiesthe way in which many municipalities go aboutmaking decisions on large, capital-intensive proj-ects: they have been considered to be technicaland economic decisions, rather than matters forpublic opinion or review (see chs. 7 and 8). In thecase of Akron, not even the project’s financing re-quired public approval, because the revenue bondswhich helped finance the project were issued by aspecial authority. Neither will the county’s andcity’s general obligation bonds require public ap-proval, since they will not increase the total mu-nicipal debt service above the existing spendinglimits.

The Akron steam users, a group with obviousinterests in the project, played a very small role inthe initial design and development of the RES.During contract negotiations over steam prices,users expressed resentment at not having beenconsulted; it was they who proposed forming anUsers Advisory Committee. At first the city re-sisted, but it later agreed to the idea in order toallay user fears and accelerate contract bargaining.The committee will help spread information aboutRES to other users and will provide a forum atwhich to discuss common problems and dif-ficulties. Although it has no official authority, thecommittee is perceived by the users as an effectiveway to exert their influence collectively.

Essential Resources

One of the most important technical issues con-fronting any attempt at resource recovery is thevolume and quality of the waste stream: what goesinto the process greatly affects what comes out,whether the waste is composted or burned. Bothprojects offer low tipping fees and other incentivesto haulers, but problems remain.

Although Hunt’s Point Market in the Bronx is agood source of compostable organic waste, a greatdeal of nondegradable material such as plasticwrappings and containers was included in thematter dumped at the project site. To correct this,BFDC developed a formal system for sorting andseparating the waste at Hunt’s Point Market, butthus far the private carters have resisted any col-

Ch. 7–Resource Recovery From Municipal Solid Waste ● 163

lection plan that would force them to pick up anddump organic wastes separately. In addition, theunion opposes having drivers and helpers separatewaste unless new contracts are negotiated with thecarters. The Hunt’s Point merchants, for theirpart, view any source separation plan as some-thing that would benefit the carters; as an incen-tive, they want collection fees lowered. Because ofthe complexities involved, BFDC thinks the onlygeneral solution would be to have source separa-tion mandated by a legislative act. In the mean-time, it is attempting to establish a wider range oforganic waste sources: BFDC accepts Christmastrees gathered by the City Parks Department andis also negotiating with local race tracks to obtainstable wastes.

The technical and economic viability of theRES in Akron is affected by the quantity as well asquality of its input waste. Its most critical need isfor a large, constant supply of combustible refuseso that it can meet its steam contract obligations.Any shortfalls must be met by using auxiliary oil-fired boilers, at substantially increased cost, andfrequent use of the auxiliary boilers could causethe project to be economically untenable. For thisreason, the outcome of the lawsuit brought by pri-vate carters against Akron will materially affectthis technology’s ability to compete economicallywith alternatives. It should also give other cities anindication of whether the legislative method ofcontrolling the waste stream will work.

Financing

BFDC has relied primarily on foundation grantsfor the purchase of capital equipment and on CSAsubsidies for operating and administrative funds.BFDC’s goal is to achieve self-sufficiency throughthe retail sale of compost, but like many new smallenterprises BFDC has had short-term cash flowproblems. This has made it difficult to cover op-erating costs while the project is being expanded toan economically viable scale of production. Projectrevenues from the open-windrow process were in-adequate to cover operating costs, but full imple-mentation of the more efficient aerated-pile proc-ess could cover total annual cost (see table 21).The profits could then be used to fund the newprograms BFDC would like to undertake in thefuture.

Optimally, BFDC might have spent severalyears at the 50-tpd process rate, operating at a def-icit, in order to gain needed technical and man-agerial experience, but this schedule would haverequired either medium-term debt or subsidies tocover operating deficits. This option remainedclosed so long as BFDC’s only source of operatingcapital was short-term grants limited to a specificuse. This type of financing created two problems:first, staff time was diverted from project manage-ment to the search for new grants, leaving littletime to correct problems or to prepare marketsurveys for its compost; second, new grants wereoften given only for new projects, and still morefunding was required to cover the additional coststhese projects entailed. 21 In this connection,BFDC came up with the concept of “consortiumfunding:” to avoid becoming restricted by depend-ence on money from a particular foundation, it in-stead sought small contributions from a number offoundations.

Financing for the RES in Akron has been sup-plied through both revenue bonds and general ob-ligation bonds, which seems to be the mostcreative use of municipal debt instruments utilizedin any of the cases examined in this study. Thecity retained the underwriting firm of Dillon, Read& Co., Inc., which had extensive experience withmunicipal bonds in general and with revenuebonds in particular. The firm also had extensiveexperience in financing other resource recoveryand solid waste disposal facilities, including thosein Toledo, Ohio, Hempstead, N. Y., and DadeCounty, Fla.

Dillon, Read’s first decision in structuring the fi-nancing was to provide more money for the proj-ect: in addition to raising funds for constructioncosts and overruns, they established contingencyfunds for cost overruns and any necessary modi-fications after the plant became operational. Theyalso recommended the local hauling legislation

zlo~e examp]e of these problems is the windmill that BFDCerected in the fall of 1979 to provide electricity for the planned aera-tion technology before the latter was even in place. The staff saw thepotential for using wind power at the site; the group’s fundraisers sawthe opportunity to obtain a grant specifically for using wind power;and their proposal was accepted. However, this project diverted stafftime and resources from the prlnclpal operation—comporting. Whilewind power represents an exciting addition to the project, at presentit may be more important to develop a secure market for BFDC’Scompost.

164 ● Assessment of Technology for Local Development

and long-term steam contracts to ensure adequatesales revenues to cover the bonds. As a result, debtservice coverage was reduced from 175 percent to150 percent, which in turn provided an additional$16 million without increasing Akron’s debt serv-ice payments.

The city and county participated in the perma-nent financing as well, each selling $5 million ingeneral obligation notes. These notes were adver-tised and sold publicly without the assistance of anintermediary. Proceeds of the notes were used tobuild steam lines to B. F. Goodrich, the Universityof Akron, and City Hospital; a portion was alsoused as a construction contingency fund, to bespent if revenue bonds proceeds were insufficient.Any proceeds remaining after completion of con-struction were to be used to retire outstandingdebts.

Institutional Factors

Institutional problems in the development andimplementation of source separation and central-ized resource recovery programs include thefollowing:

●

●

●

●

uncertainty about cooperation by household-ers, businesses, and others who generatewaste;

uncertainty about cooperation by local wastecollectors and haulers;

opposition from competing landfills;

arbitrary or inflexible application of healthand environmental standards; and

s problems arising from fragmented and over-lapping State and local jurisdictions.

Source separation programs like BFDC are par-ticularly prone to problems of noncooperation bywaste generators and haulers. Centralized resourcerecovery projects like the Akron RES are morelikely to be hampered by problems of overlappingjurisdictions. Both types may experience problemsarising from the application of health and en-vironmental standards, plus those of competitionfrom existing disposal systems. The suit against theAkron hauling legislation was brought by a land-fill operator as well as local haulers, and if the suitsucceeds it may reduce the project’s supply of com-bustible wastes.

BFDC, on the other hand, has had problemsnot only with the waste sources at Hunt’s PointMarket and the local haulers, but also with over-lapping jurisdictions and insensitive applicationof environmental regulations. The New YorkState Department of Environmental Conservation(DEC) ruled that the comporting operation was a“solid waste disposal facility, ” which meant that itwas subject to all of the rules and requirements forconventional landfills, incinerators, and dumps.BFDC had to submit permit applications not only

to DEC but to the State Environmental FacilitiesCorp. and the New York City Department of San-itation, and the time spent developing the sup-porting documentation caused significant delaysand increased costs. BFDC also found that itcould not include stable wastes in its comportingoperation because of an city regulation that pro-hibits transporting manure except a sealed truck.

Federal Policy

Background

Several Acts have established national policiesand programs for technologies which reclaim ma-terials and energy from MSW. Taken together,they demonstrate Congress’ growing commitmentto resource recovery, primarily as a supplementalsource of materials and secondarily as an alterna-tive source of energy. However, these Acts alsodemonstrate a continuing commitment to large-scale rather than to small-scale projects. Because

systems appropriate for smaller communities mayhave problems not shared by large-scale systems,an analysis of current and upcoming legislationcan help to identify those areas which may need tobe addressed if these alternatives are promoted inthe future.

The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, a part ofthe Clean Air Act Amendments (Public Law89-272, as amended), was the first major law pre-scribing the Federal role in resource recovery and

reclamation from MSW. The Act recognized thecontribution of solid waste disposal to air pol-lution abatement, and it encouraged the designand testing of solid waste management and re-source recovery systems that would protect publichealth and the quality of the environment. To thisend, it provided technical and financial assistanceto State governments and interstate agencies inplanning and developing programs for solid wastedisposal and resource recovery. The Act also em-phasized the need to improve management tech-niques and organizational arrangements for col-lecting, separating, recovering, and recycling solidwastes and for disposing of unrecoverable residues.

The stated purpose of the Resource RecoveryAct of 1970 (Public Law 91-512), the second of thethree major laws, was to amend the Solid WasteDisposal Act of 1965 “in order to provide financialassistance for the construction of solid waste dis-posal facilities. ” The Act not only stressed newmethods of solid waste disposal, but also empha-sized the importance of recycling and reuse ofwaste materials. In addition to monies allotted toconduct studies in several related areas, the Actmade grants available for demonstration-scaleresource recovery systems “of all types, and underrepresentative geographical and environmentalconditions.” Further, its title II, the MaterialsPolicy Act of 1970, established the National Com-mission on Materials Policy and required annualreports to the Congress on studies of various wastegeneration, materials recovery, and waste disposaloptions, practices, and policies. Under this Actthe Administrator of EPA could fund resource re-covery demonstration projects; award grants forState, interstate, and local planning; and recom-mend guidelines for solid waste recovery, collec-tion, separation, and disposal systems.

The overall intent of these two laws, as ex-pressed in the legislative findings of the 1970 Act,was to enhance the quality of the environmentand conserve materials through the developmentof a national materials policy. Both emphasizedthat the primary responsibility for MSW collec-tion and disposal rests at the local level.

The Resource Conservation andRecovery Act of 1976

Between 1970 and 1976, when the ResourceConservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (PublicLaw 94-580) was passed, the issues of alternativeenergy sources, of materials recovery, and of tech-nological size and complexity had become moreimportant to Congress. RCRA reaffirmed that“the collection and disposal of solid waste shouldcontinue to be primarily a function of State,regional, and local agencies, ” but it also foundthat “the problems of waste disposal have becomenational in scope . . . and necessitate Federal ac-tion.” While protecting public health and en-hancing the quality of the environment remaineda major function of the Act, it also sought to en-courage the recovery of energy and materials fromMSW.

RCRA’s stated purpose was to “provide tech-nical and financial assistance for the developmentof management plans and facilities for the re-covery of energy and other resources from dis-carded materials. ” It established an Office of SolidWaste in EPA, through which all of the designatedresponsibilities except those pertaining to R&Dwere to be carried out (sec. 2007). Thus far, EPAhas provided financial assistance to approximately66 communities for feasibility analysis, develop-ment of a procurement strategy, and the solicita-tion and selection of contractors to design andconstruct facilities.

The Act also encouraged States and munic-ipalities to take a more active role in the de-velopment of resource recovery projects. It calledfor the creation of “Resource Conservation andRecovery Panels,” which were to “provide Stateand local governments upon request and withoutcharge teams of technical, financial, marketing,and institutional specialists to render assistance onresource recovery and conservation” (sec. 2003).EPA, through its Technical Assistance Panels Pro-gram, provided staff and consultant expertise inthese areas to over 160 communities during 1978and 1979. EPA also provides States with funds todevelop comprehensive plans for dealing with all


areas of MSW management, and it has establishedplanning requirements that require the removal ofState laws that impede contracting for these proj-ects. As a further aid, EPA has drafted a guide ex-plaining how States can provide technical as-sistance, financial assistance, information dis-semination, and other services to local com-munities.

Furthermore, in a notable expansion uponearlier legislation, RCRA required the Depart-ment of Commerce to promote the disseminationand commercialization of resource recoverytechnologies by providing: “l) accurate speci-fications for recovered materials; 2) stimulation ofdevelopment of markets for recovered materials; 3)promotion of proven technologies; and 4) a forumfor the exchange of technical and economic datarelating to resource recovery facilities” (sec. 5001).

The Department of Energy (DOE), like EPA,also provides funds for feasibility studies by com-munities that are considering resource recoveryprojects. DOE also conducts and funds researchinto the basic science and technology underlyingvarious processes for resource recovery.

Finally, beyond the provisions which promoterecovery of energy and materials from solid wastesgenerally, RCRA contained several specific provi-sions which bear upon the technologies’ appro-priateness for local development. The first pro-vided for information exchange among the severallevels of government, and between governmentand private firms, regarding “technical and eco-nomic levels of performance that can be attainedby various available resource recovery systems”(sec. 1008); this information on the range of avail-able alternatives should aid local governments inchoosing systems appropriate to their needs. Sec-ond, the Act required the EPA Administrator to“undertake a comprehensive study and analysis ofsystems of small-scale and low-technology wastemanagement. ” (sec. 8002) Although the subse-quent report has not received wide distribution,EPA’s Office of Solid Waste has launched a Small-Scale and Low Technology Program designed ex-plicitly to respond to the waste disposal needs ofsmall communities. This program is likely to en-courage the diffusion of small-scale technologiesthat are appropriate for local development.

There is, however, one provision in the Actwhich may mitigate against small-scale tech-nologies: section 8006 authorizes Federal grantsfor the demonstration of resource recovery sys-tems; but subsection 8006(c)(B)(2) requires that theshare paid by a Federal grant for the constructionof a project which serves only one municipalitycannot exceed 50 percent, while if a project servesmore than one municipality the grant can pay for75 percent of construction costs. This provisionmay allow several municipalities to build largerfacilities and to realize economies of scale, but itmay also cause individual communities to losecontrol over the design, financing, and operationof their own resource recovery systems.

Other Laws Having an Impact onResource Recovery

The Energy Security Act of 1980 (PublicLaw 96-29+).–Title II of this Act contains severalprovisions dealing with “municipal waste biomassenergy.” It reconfirms the Federal Government’scommitment to research, development, and dem-onstration of energy-from-waste technologies, butit also strengthens the existing mechanisms forpromoting the adoption of these technologies. TheAct broadens DOE’s power to encourage the con-struction of municipal recovery projects by in-creasing the Federal share of construction loans to80 percent and by allowing risk guarantees of up to90 percent of principal and interest (sec. 233). TheAct also allows DOE to make price support loansfor existing projects and price guarantees for newprojects (sec. 234). Finally, the Act establishedwithin DOE an Office of Energy from MunicipalWaste to administer these programs.

The Energy Tax Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-618).–This Act contains provisions that shouldinfluence resource recycling and recovery. Thefirst provides an additional 10-percent investmenttax credit (for a total of 20 percent) for the pur-chase of equipment used to recycle ferrous andnonferrous metals, textiles, paper, rubber, andother materials for energ y conservation (sec.301(c)(i)). The additional credit is available for awide range of equipment placed in service afterOctober 1, 1978. The second provision sets recy-cling targets for major energy-consuming in-dustries, including the metals, paper, textile, and


rubber industries. Specific targets will be set forthe. increased use of recycled commodities over thenext 10 years.

Amendments to internal Revenue Code of1954--Exempt Organizations (Public Law 94-568).–Section 4 of this Act requires that “the Sec-retary of the Treasury, in cooperation with theAdministrator of EPA, make a complete study andinvestigation of all provisions of the Internal Rev-enue Code of 1954 which discourage the recyclingof solid waste material, and that he should reporthis findings to Congress, along with specificlegislative proposals and detailed estimates of theircosts.” In compliance with this requirement, theDepartment of the Treasury published Federal TaxPolicies: Recycling of Solid Waste Materials (Feb-ruary 1, 1979).

The Federal Ocean Dumping Act of 1974(Public Law 92-532, as amended by Public Law 93-254).—While the general intent of the Act is theinternational protection of the oceans, one of itsmajor effects has been virtually to eliminate thedisposal of domestic solid wastes in the ocean. Tothe extent that it precludes the use of a former op-tion for solid waste disposal, this Act increases theamount of solid wastes that communities mustdeal with.

Issues and Options

The case studies presented in this chapter helpto illuminate a number of issues which apply notonly to incineration and comporting technologiesbut to alternative resource recovery technologiesin general. In so doing, they point out some of theproblems faced by the producers and consumers ofthese technologies, as well as suggesting a range ofoptions available to the Federal Government foraddressing those problems.

I S S U E 1 :Federal Financing.

The BFDC case study provides evidence that,even when Government funds are available, therem ay still be problems with the type of financing

provided by the Federal sources, the use of this fi-nancing by the project staff, and the approach to fi-nancing appropriate technology projects. Govern-ment grants and subsidies are most desirable for

those stages of a project that provide a social goodbut involve risks or potential returns on invest-ment that are unacceptable to the private sector.In the case of the Bronx comporting project, thefunds provided by CSA for feasibility studies,market surveys, organizational startup, and thepurchase of capital equipment all served legitimateand appropriate purposes. However, BFDC alsoneeds funds for long-range planning and ad-ministration. When money is made available foruse only on a specific new program, it may en-courage projects like BFDC to spread themselvestoo thin simply in order to obtain additional fund-ing. Capital equipment and startup funds ob-tained in this manner may mistakenly be con-sidered “free” by the staff, but these new programscarry with them present management duties andfuture capital obligations that can become atremendous drain on limited manpower andresources.

Much of the problem may lie in the attitude ofFederal programs and officials toward projects ofthis type. Local development projects like the com-porting operation might be thought of exclusivelyas a human service—as “welfare’ )-rather than as apotential new business enterprise. In such a situa-tion the grantor may not fully take into accountthe financial aspects of the project or hold thegrantee accountable for his financial decisions. Byallowing the project to become over extended, orby encouraging new programs rather than theconsolidation of existing ones, Federal support canbecome counterproductive from the point of viewof local development. These projects are not in-tended primarily to be commercial operations, noris it easy to separate social and economic objec-tives in a depressed area like the South Bronx.Nevertheless, those projects that prove to be suc-cessful economic enterprises are far more likely toprovide a basis for community organization andlocal development—and therefore serve the pur-poses of the grant programs themselves—thanthose that are restricted exclusively to providinghuman services.

Congress may wish to address this issue by re-viewing the procedures and standards by whichexisting Federal programs evaluate the financialperformance of local development projects.

168 168 l Assessment of Technology for Local Development

I S S U E 2 :Large-Scale Centralized RecoverySystems v. Modular Systems andSource Separation Programs.

Large-scale centralized energy recovery facilities,both mass incineration systems like Akron’s RESand systems that produce RDF for sale to electricutilities, have experienced significant economicand technical problems.22 The economic problemsarise from the capital-intensive nature of theseprojects, recent high rates of inflation for allcapital projects, additional capital requirementsfor plant modifications, unexpectedl y highoperating and maintenance costs, and the reluc-tance of both energy purchasers and financingsources to absorb the financial risks of the proj-ects. Furthermore, the very size of projects like theRES can result in a built-in inflexibility makingthem dependent on a large and secure wastestream (see below).

The technical problems arise from uncertaintiesabout the reliability of the technologies, unfore-seen design problems that have caused excessivedowntime and required extensive process and safe-ty modifications, difficulties with boiler perform-ance and corrosion, poor RDF quality, and re-duced system energy efficiencies. In addition, thereis uncertainty about the impact of future changesin emission-control regulations and monitoringtechniques, and a widespread perception that (inview of these financial and cost/reliability prob-lems) these technologies may become obsolete dur-ing their 25-year lifetimes as a result of futurebreakthroughs in resource recovery.

These problems and concerns are typical of newcapital-intensive energy technologies, and theyconstitute a serious barrier to the implementationof mass incineration and RDF projects. The al-location of risk becomes harder to negotiate, andsystem vendors in particular have reacted to theirnegative experience with new installations by

either withdrawing from the market or becomingfar more cautious about the risk they will absorb.This trend, if continued, could make it even more

ZZThe following discussion is drawn from a report prepared bSandy Hale of Gordian Associates, Inc., for the Electrical PowerResearch Institute, 1979, pp. 39-47.

difficult to implement similar projects in thefuture.

Option 2-A: Federal Intervention to Re-duce or Absorb Risks.–Congress might wish toinvestigate methods of risk reduction, either bymaking centralized resource recovery projects eligi-ble for tax-free bonding or by providing incentivesor loan guarantees for manufacturers and/ormunicipalities.

Option 2-B: Investigate Other AlternativeTechnologies.–Congress may wish, in view ofthe continuing economic ad technical problemswith capital-intensive, large-scale centralized sys-tems, to investigate methods for encouraging theadoption of other proven technologies for resourcerecovery. Small-scale modular incinerators, for in-stance, have been used successfully to producesteam, hot water, and hot air in institutional andindustrial applications. Individual furnace unitsare small but higher capacity can be achieved by

adding several identical modules. This designshould allow greater flexibility, and its two-stagecombustion process may also reduce particulateemission problems.23

Another possibility would be to investigatemethods of encouraging the establishment or ex-pansion of source-separation programs. Familiarapproaches include curbside collection, communi-ty dropoff centers, and commercial recycling op-erations. Such programs are labor intensive andproduce relatively uncontaminated materials forrecycling. They require greater cooperation by

waste generators and may put a greater burden oncollection, so such programs will require careful at-tention to design and implementation strategies.24

Dissemination of information on program design,combined with some form of incentive to com-munities or local recycling entrepreneurs, mightbe effective in promoting such programs.

I S S U E 3 :Control Over the Waste Stream.

Because centralized energy recovery systems aresubject to economies of scale, their viability de-pends on assured long-term access to a large supply

ZJMaterlalS and Enerm From Municipal Waste, op. cit., pp. 254-255.

241bid., p, 69.


of MSW.25 Long-term waste flow control is dif-ficult to achieve, however: other disposal optionsmay have lower costs now or in the future; coop-eration between several municipalities may be re-quired, and flow control may be resisted by privatehaulers and competing landfills. The two basicmethods to guarantee such a supply are: 1) offeringlower tipping fees than competing disposal al-ternatives, which may endanger the economicviability of the project; and 2) legislating publiccontrol of the waste stream, which is now beingchallenged in the courts. The Akron waste controlordinance, which is now before the Federal Dis-trict Court of Ohio, is therefore of national im-portance. The legal issues raised by the case, assummarized by a recent study, are as follows:

● Interstate Commerce.—The recycling of ma-terials from MSW is considered to be a formof interstate commerce as is some hauling anddisposal of MSW by private haulers. Such ac-tivities are thus regulated by a large body ofFederal statutes which cannot be preemptedby local or State legislation.

● Anti-Trust Violation.–The enactment ofwaste control legislation creates a monopolywhich violates Federal law.

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that munic-ipalities do not have the same exemption fromFederal anti-trust provisions that States are al-lowed by terms of the Clayton Act. This sets legalprecedent to the effect that cities cannot createmonopolies, which indicates that any future wastecontrol legislation may have to be enacted on astatewide basis. This, of course, is contingent upon aruling in the Akron case that waste control leg-

25The fo]lo~lng discussion IS drawn from Hale, op. cit., Pp. 47-49.

islation in general is not offensive on interstatecommerce grounds .26

Option 3-A: Amend Federal Law to Al-low Municipal Waste Control .–Congressmay wish to investigate ways in which antitrustand interstate commerce statutes might beamended to exempt MSW and/or municipal wastecontrol from their provisions.

Option 3-B: Encourage State Waste Con-trol Legislation. –If municipal waste controllegislation is found to be in violation of antitruststatutes but not in violation of interstate com-merce, Congress may wish to encourage the adop-tion of State waste control laws. In some cases, forinstance, municipalities and counties are con-strained under their State charters from enteringinto the long-term contracts (20 to 30 years) thatwould be necessary to ensure adequate MSW sup-ply for facilities like the RES; this problem is fur-ther complicated when MSW from several juris-dictions must be combined for a single facility.Two approaches have been taken: the State ofFlorida has enacted legislation requiring thatMSW set out by community residents must bedelivered to the resource recovery facility byprivate haulers; the State of Wisconsin has gone astep further, declaring that the municipality is theactual owner of the waste stream. Congress mightinvestigate the advantages and disadvantages ofthese and other State approaches, and formulate amodel waste control law to be recommended tothe States.

2bIbid., p. 49.

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Documents

Resource Recovery From Municipal Solid Waste