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Rental costs in Europe The influence of a regulated
Rental Market
Montserrat Pareja Eastaway University of Barcelona, Spain
Housing Market Challenges in Europe and the US – any solutions available?
Session 4: Housing Policies in Europe
Oesterreichische Nationalbank September 29, 2008
Vienna
2
<<Regulation per se is neither good nor bad.
What matters are the costs and benefits of
specific regulations under specific market
conditions>>
(Turner & Malpezzi, 2003:15)
3
Contents
1. A change in the economic scenario
2. Dynamics in the rented sector in Europe
3. Regulating the rented market
4. The Spanish case • General scenario
• Tenure
• Rental Regulations
• Macroeconomic context
• New initiatives
5. Conclusions
4
1. A change in the economic scenario
• Economic crisis…about
recession?
• Financial crisis…the subprime
issue
• Stock exchange market
instability…crash?
• Slow down of the real state sector
…bursting house price bubbles
Since the beginning
of August 2007…
a structural
economic
change?
5
1. A change in the economic scenario
• Real estate sector mostly affected
• Housing market collapse (paralysis!)
– Speculation and huge increase in construction (or basic infrastructure developments) in certain areas
– Increase in the number of fraud and political extortion cases
• Downward trend in real housing prices
• Disequilibria in the mortgage/Disposable income ratio of families
Image: Montserrat Pareja
6
2. Dynamics in the rented sector in
Europe
• Increase in homeownership.
• Fall in size and quality of rented dwellings
• Decrease in social programmes oriented to facilitate access to housing: the rented sector as an alternative to social housing
• Increase in affordability problems
7 Source: O’Sullivan & De Decker (2007)
Private rented housing,
% housing stock
8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Aus
tria
Italy
Ger
man
y
Spa
in
Neth
erland
sUK
circa 1980
circa 1990
circa 2000
Source: ECB, 2003
2. Dynamics in the rented sector
in Europe
9
3. Dynamics of the rented sector
• Real rents have increased in the long run (except for Portugal and Denmark) – Cost of construction land
– Cost of housing services
– Quality improvements
• The real rent is less cyclical than house prices and fluctuations are usually linked to regulatory reforms.
Trends in rents
10
2. Dynamics in the rented sector in
Europe
Mediterranean regimes (-)
(Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Spain)
Liberal Regimes (+)
(UK, Ireland)
Social Democratic
Regimes (+/-)
(Denmark, Finland,
Sweden, Norway)
Corporatist Welfare
Regime (-/+)
(Belgium, France,
Germany, The Netherlands)
Source: O’Sullivan and Pascal De Decker, 2007
Private rented regimes in Europe
11
2. Dynamics in the rented sector
in Europe
a. The strictness of rent controls may have reduced rental accommodation
b. Ownership has become more attractive given
- Lower cost of mortgage credit
- Favorable tax/subsidy policies
- Expectations of capital gains from rising housing prices
Why the share of rented dwellings has decreased since 1980?
12
3. Regulating the rented market
Looking for efficiency when the market is not “competitive”
Information asymmetry
Landlord monopolistic power
Sunk costs of tenants
Regulation as a balance of interests between landlords and tenants
Reasons for rent regulation (Haffner et al, 2008. EJHP)
13
3. Regulating the rented market
a. Provision of affordable accommodation
b. To avoid segregation
c. To redress the landlord-tenant negotiation
d. To limit rent volatility (debate: is this a market failure?)
Reasons for rent controls/ regulation in Europe? (ECB, 2003)
14
3. Regulating the rented market
a. Regulations governing how the initial rent will change in a multi-year contract
b. Control on the initial rent negotiated in a new contract
c. Regulations governing contract termination (eviction)
Fundamental aspects in rent control systems
15
3. Regulating the rented market
• 1st generation: freeze on nominal rents (2nd decade
of XX century)
• 2nd generation: automatic rent increase (from 1970’s
onwards, inflation control mechanism)
• 3rd generation: rent control within a tenancy and not between tenancies
Typologies of rent regulation (Arnott , 1995)
16
3. Regulating the rented market
• Protection against higher rents due to high transaction costs for the sitting tenant
• Protection to guarantee a reasonable return of the landlord
• Protection against segregation - regulation of all types of contracts- (all people can rent at a price below market rent)
• Protection against monopoly-related rents higher than the market
• Protection against the “short-term price effect” (overshooting) (increase of demand and inelastic supply)
Typologies of rent regulation (Lind, 2001)
17
3. Regulating the rented market
• Most EU countries have moved to a system that allows annual rent indexation in a simple way (i.e. CPI, housing costs).
• Also provisions on renewing contracts (limits to landlord negotiation power)
• Widespread agreement in policymakers that rents should reflect market conditions
• Most EU countries have moved towards a process of decontrolling rents in new contracts
• Most EU countries have shown a tendency to allow free negotiation of the duration and contract termination rules.
What’s the situation of the rented market regulations in Europe?
18
3. Regulating the rented market
• The problem of slow regulation transition: Revision of rents and conditions of old contracts. One-off adjustments?
• The rented market remains in most EU countries segmented. Two parallel developments? Old and new contracts.
• Others…
Main difficulties
19
And…what about Spain?
20
4. The Spanish case: general
scenario
• Bursting bubble of housing prices in 2008
• Collapse in the real estate sector (unemployment, developers bankruptcy, etc. )
• Affordability problems of certain collectives (immigration)
• Social housing and the rented sector as an alternative to the private sector stagnation
Source: Barcelona Economia, 2008
21
Starts. Variation rate in the last 12 months Housing Transactions in Barcelona province
Source: Barcelona Economia, 2008 Source: Barcelona Economia, 2008
4. The Spanish case: general
scenario
22
4. The Spanish case: tenure
1950 1960 1970 1981 1991 2001
Social rent 3 2 2 2 1 1
Private rent 51 43 30 21 15 10
Rent 54 45 32 23 16 11
Owner-
occupation
46 51 64 73 78 82
Others 0 4 4 4 6 6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Tenure in Spain. 1950-2001. In percentages
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Censos de vivienda de 1950, 1960, 1970 y 1981. Censos de Población y Viviendas, 1991 y 2001
4. The Spanish case: tenure
Catalonia
25.7 % Madrid
18.5 %
Andalusia
13.9% Rest of AACC
41.9 %
3 AACC represent 58.1 %
Source: Ministry of Housing, OEVA
Amount and typology of rented housing in Spain
24
4. The Spanish case: tenure
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Number contracts Rent/sqm
Number of contracts and rents. City of Barcelona
Source:Generalitat de Catalunya, Direcció General d’Habitatge.
25
Housing prices in Barcelona (and in many
other cities in Spain) have started to show a
slight decrease in real terms, with the
exception of rental housing.
This segment has been benefited by public
policies oriented to subsidize rented
dwellings for young people.
4. The Spanish case: rents
26
4. The Spanish case: rents
• In 2006, the average rent paid in Spain was 5,36 euros per
square meter. (6,69 with furniture; 4,77 euros without)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Andalucía
Aragón
Asturias
Baleares
Canarias
Cantabria
Castilla y León
Castilla-La M
ancha
Cataluña
Comunidad valenciana
Extremadura
Galicia
Madrid
Murcia
Navarra
País vasco
La Rioja
Ceuta y Melill
a
Comunidades autónomas
Prec
ios
del m
etro
cua
drad
o
Euros/m2
España
27
4. The Spanish case: rental regulations
• Till 1980’s:
Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos 1946
• Between 1985 and 1994:
Boyer Decree 1985
• From 1994 on:
Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos 1994
28
4. The Spanish case: rental
regulations
• Till 1980’s:
Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos 1946
Freeze of rents and indefinite contracts
29
4. The Spanish case: rental
regulations
• Between 1985 and 1994:
Boyer Decree 1985
Complete liberalisation of rents and length of
contracts
30
4. The Spanish case: rental
regulations
• From 1994 on:
Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos 1994
Free negotiation of rents, minimum duration 5
years
31
4. The Spanish case:
macroeconomic context
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
mar
-96
mar
-97
mar
-98
mar
-99
mar
-00
mar
-01
mar
-02
mar
-03
mar
-04
mar
-05
mar
-06
Rent
Public debt
Returns from rented housing and public debt. 1996-2006
32
4. The Spanish case:
macroeconomic context
Interest rate for mortgages
Euribor 12
Interest rate trajectory.
33 Source: Inurrieta, 2008, forthcoming
Returns ownership (left side)
Returns rented dwelling (right side)
4. The Spanish case:
macroeconomic context
34
4. The Spanish case:
macroeconomic context
Housing prices
CPI
Source: Ministry of Housing and INE
Housing prices and Consumer Price Index (CPI). 1983-2007
35
4. The Spanish case: new
initiatives • Mediation of public sector between tenants and landlords
• Public guarantee of contracts
• Risk insurance
• Favorable financial conditions for the landlord (in case of repairs and improvements)
• Stimulus for owners of empty flats (vacancies problem)
• Fiscal advantages for landlords (Income tax: deductible rents (50%/100%))
36
4. The Spanish case: new
initiatives
• New REITs (Real Estate Investment Funds)
linked to new societies oriented to manage
and rent housing, commercial offices,
hotels, commercial centers or other types of
buildings.
37
5. Conclusions
• The rented market has been affected by other factors rather than
exclusively by rental regulations
• Regulations are stable since 1994 in Spain, rents and rented housing are not
• Macroeconomic forces are determinant to the amount and quality of the rented market
• The current situation is uncertain (in many aspects…)
• Rents and prices do not strictly follow an “expected” path
• The rented sector is nowadays one of the alternatives in Spanish housing policy
38
5. Conclusions
<< Private rented housing can play a role in
dampening overheating in the owner-
occupied housing market, and may facilitate
labour mobility. If private rented housing did
not already exist, there would be good
reasons to invent it>>
(Priemus & Maclennan, 1998: 203)