Regional Differentiation Policy fbr Laborers Modern

Hiroshima Geographical Association

NII-Electronic Library Service

HiroshimaGeographicalAssociation

teffI"\ vol. 61 no. 1 pp. 22-39, 2006Geographical Sciences (ChinllCagaku)

Regional Differentiation on the Policy fbr

in Modern Japanese Colonies: A CaseChinese

LaborersStudy of Taiwan

ABE Yasuhisa*

Key words:'Ilie Policy for Chinese Laborers, Industrial Development,

the Assimilation Policy, Taiwan, Japanese Colonies

I Introduction

This paper discusses the Chinese laborer

policy in modern Japanese colonies based on

the case of Taiwan. By comparing the Japa-

nese mainland and colonies such as Sakhalin

and Korea, the paper explores the regional

differentiation and background of Japan'sChinese laborer policy In their analyses and

research of the laborer transitioning in Eastern

Asia before World War II, some Japanese

papers refer to the research oi people from

other countries including lands from where

people immigrated to Japan. In the process of

looking through these papers I found that there

are many studies related to laborers moving

from Korea into Japan. After 1980 the number

of these studies increased significantly The

studies of Sugihara and Tarnai eds. (1996), Nish-

inarita (1997) are outstanding. 'Iliere

has also

been much research on Chinese laborers immi-

grating to Japan and the corresponding immi-

gration policM such as that of Kyo (1989, 1990a,

1990b), Yamashita (1991) and Hashimoto

(1996), and others.

" Faculty oi Humanities, Kyushu University

Yamawaki (1994) has pointed out that

when investigating the foreign laborer policy, it

is necessary to combine the immigration proc-

ess of Korean and Chinese laborers to analyze

the situation more fully. He loeks carefu11y at

the immigration policy of two periods: the latter

part of the 1890s and the beginning of the 1920s.

The present paper further explores the

questions posed in these previous researches.

As many of these previous studies shove when

one exarnines the foreign laborer immigration

policy during that period of time, the incoming

and outgoing policies held by the Japanese

government should be made clear. At the

same time, it is necessary to study regional

differentiation in the foreign laborer policy

among the many Japanese colonies at that time.

For the colonies of modern Japan, especially for

Korea and Taiwan, the characteristics of the

governing policy lay with the highly independ-

ent legislation of the colonial government.

The colonial governments had the right to

make appropriate policies towards foreign and

outside laborers according to the conditions of

the colony (Abe, 2004, p, 157).

Some of the representative studies on the

foreign laberer policies in the colonial area are

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HiroshimaGeographical Association

ABE Y.: Regional Differentiation on the Policy for Chinese Laborers in Modern Japanese Colonies: A Case Study ef Taiwan

those of Odauchi (1924), Kaseya (1997),Matsuda (2003) on Korea; Matsuo (1937),

Shibuya and Matsuo (1943), Wu (1991), and

Ichikawa (1999) on Taiwan. Abe (2001) also

explored the employment pelicy for the

Chinese labor force based on the case of Sakha-

lin. But these papers clidn't focus on the

contradiction between the merits and demerits

of accepting Chinese laborers.

flherefore,

they

also didn't discu$s regional differentiation of

this contradiction in Chinese laborer policies on

the Japanese mainland and its colonies.

Based on previous studies and using

'Ileiiwan

cluring the 1920s and 1930s as an exam-

ple, the author has already examined the

regional differentiation and background of the

employment policies of Chinese Iaborers by

comparing Japanese mainland and colonial

areas such as Sakhalin and Korea in interim

reports (Abe 2003, 2004)i), But in the present

paper I have paid more attention to the contra-

diiction between the fo11owing two points: 1. The

industrial profits obtained from using Chinese

laborers, 2, The inevitable etiects on the

assimilation policy were caused by the increas-

ing number of Chinese laborers.

Oguma's (1998) research may be referred

to concerning this point. He subtly analyzes

the governing policy based on the circum-

stances of Korea and Taiwan, which were the

main colonial dlstricts oiJapan, He points out

that in the colonial governing policies of

modernJapan an assiinilation direet governing

poHcy and non-assimilat.ion indirect governing

policy existecl at the same time, and that this

becaine the focus of debate of the colonial

government,

Proven by the successful examples of

23

23

Okinawa, Hokkaido and Sakhalin, an assimila-

tion policy could be an effective way to put a

newlyobtained land under Japan's governing

control. Compared with these areas, howeveg

the local inhabitants in Taiwan and Korea were

too much different from the governing inhabi-

tants in terms of language, history and culture.

This made it almost impossible to carry out an

assimilation policy (Not well-deserved even if it

had been possible). The politicians who held

this idea believed that, in those areas an indirect

governing policy should be pronioted; that is,

they preferred to ]et the local governors do

their job (Besides, this kind of indirect gove.rn-

ing policy made the different treatment towards

the local inhabitants more bearable; for exam-

ple, by giving them the right to participatc in

the government). However, for a newly arisen

imperial eountry like Japan, facing the military

t.hreat of European countries and America.

furthering its colonial gov ¢ rnmcnt was neces-

sary Thu$ there were also rnany people who

preferred an assimilation policy, Accordingly,

for a long time, Japan maintained an eclectic

governing policy

wnen studying the Chinese laborer policy

in the colenial areas, I consider it necessary to

pay much attention to thc debate between

assimilation, which places national security

first, and non-assimilation, which plaees deve.lop-

menL first (Abe, 2e04, p. 158).

For the present study, I have collected

many related materials that haye becn edited by

the governmental office and preserved in the

Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. I have also analyzed a local

newspaper, Taiwan Daily Newspaper, preserved

in the National Diet Library.




24 tegenyF\61-1,2006

II ModernJapan'sChineseLaborerPolicy

One investigator wrote on the Chinese

laborer policy of modern Japan as follows: `"Ibe

so-called 1899 foreign laborer policy of modern

Japan is like this: as foreign and outside

laborer, Japan can employ Chinese laberers and

Korean 1al)orers. And between the two, Japan

gives the priority to the Korean laborer" (Yama-

waki, 1994, pp. 286-288).

Based on this policy, most cities ef the Japa-

nese mainland including Tokyo, strictly

excluded Chinese laborers. Firstly, in the

early part of the 1920s, the control of incoming

Chinese laborers became stricter. From the

late 1920s through the early 1930s, the policy

became that of forcing the Chinese who had

already moved or settled in Japan to leave the

country, The policy was originally aimed at

excluding those Chinese who committed

crimes such as theft, but soon it also included

those who worked without permission or came

into the country illegally (Abe, 2000, pp. 702-

704).

Enhancement of the policy also affected

the residential patterns of the Chinese laborer,

In the early 1920s, the number of Chinese labor-

ers who moved to Japan increased drarnatically

At that time, they were scattered throughout

the Oushima, Minamiseniu, and Mikawashima

districts of 1[bkyo (Abe, 1999, pp. 32-34). 11iese

areas were not only where Chinese laborers

took up residence, but also where blue-collar

Japanese and Korean workers lived (Nishi-

narita, 1997, pp, 66-67). If the Concentrated

Area can be defined as "the

area where one

ethnic group's population is obviously higher

than that of other ethnic groups", then the situa

tion in Tokyo in 1920s shows the preliminary

formation of a Chinese Concentrated Area

(Abe, 2004, p. 159).

However, because the Japanese govern-

ment's policy in the 1920s was always the strict

control and forced repatriation of Chinese labor-

ers, a Chinese Concentrated Area never came

into being. On the contrary, the number of

Chinese laborers decreased continuously.

Indeed, in the process of industrial develop

ment, such as mining, the manufacturing indus-

try and basic construction, the lack of local

laborers showed itself clearly As a matter of

fact, on the Japanese mainland, when people

encountered situations such as military prosper-

ity or reconstruction after a natural disaster, the

government also considered a plan to hire more

Chinese laborers legally (Abe, 2004, p. 159).

For example, in July of 1917, military prosperity

caused by World War I led to a lack ef laborers.

In the construction of a shipyard in Yamaguchi

prefecture, the restriction against Chinese labor-

ers was reconsidered and lifted for some time

(Yamawaki, 1994, pp. 118-119). Additionally,

after a strong earthquake in Tokyo in 1923

caused the collapse of over 100,OOO buildings, a

building contractor asked to be allowed to

employ 500 Chinese laborers (Abe, 2001, p,

102). Whether these plans were carried out is

not certain, but the Japanese government

seemed to have problems with hiring Chinese

laborers,

In contrast, in the Japanese colonies such

as Korea, Taiwan and Sakhalin, a different

policy towards the Chinese laborer was'held

because the policy independence of the colonial

governments had been ensured ("Chinese"here refers te the people who had Chinese

-24-




ABE Y.: Regional Differentiation on the Policy for Chinese Laborers in Modern Japanese Colonies: A Case Study uf Taiwan

nationality; it does not include the inhabitants in

Taiwan whe already had Japanese nationality).

Of course, because Korea, Taiwan and

Sakhalin had differences in the population of

colonized people and the initiative of the govern-

ment, they also had differences in the condi-

tions for receiving Chinese laborers. As Abe

(2001) showed, the Sakhalin colonial govern-

ment took the most prudent attitude towards

the hiring of Chinese laborers, This was

because over 90% of the people were from the

Japanese mainland. Financially speaking, the

Sakhalin colonial government relied to a great

extent on central governmental subsidies (Miki,

2000). Compared with Taiwan, the financial

independence of Sakhalin was much lower.

I£ gally speaking, the Sakhalin government had

to adopt the same policies as the .Iapanese main-

land since it did not have its own legislatien

rights. Its rights had been confined to the

administrative aspects (Yamamoto, 1992, p,

118), So in Sakhalin, there werc two opposing

ideas: 1) allow the hiring ef Chinese laborers

and 2) forbid the hiring of Chinese laborers.

Some people did not want to go against the

policy held by the Japanese mainland,

Moreover. just as on the Japanese main-

land, Sakhalin had a great number of Korean

laborers coming in from the Marltime Province

of Siberia. It had plenty of cheap laborers for

its industrial development. In addition, some

industrialists, centered in Toyohara-cho,

thought that Chinese laborers' habit of saving

their salaries and sending most of it back to

China was harmfu1 to the local industry. 'Ihus,

the Anti-Chinese-Labor Campaign broke out

(Abe, 2001, pp. 108-111). All these things

together meant that thc hiring of Chinese labor-

25

ers lasted only from 1923 to 1927.

The author illustrates that the import of

Chinese laborers was forbidden on the Japa-

nese mainland, and was allowed partiy in Sakha-

lin, in contrast to being allowed widely in Korea

and Taiwan (Fig. 1).

In Taiwan, the governor had an independ-

ent budget and stopped accepting the central

governmental subsidies after 1905, Taiwan

also had its own legislation rights. In Korea,

though it still used the central government

subsidy, it hacl legislative independence from

the very beginning based on the "previous

example" of Taiwan. 'lhus,

compared with the

Japanese mainland and Sakhalin, the Korean

government's poliey toward the coming and

gQing of Chinese laborers was also ditterent

(Oguma, 1998, pp. 136, 147-150).

According to research by Matsuda, the

control of Chinese lab()rers was not so stricL in

the 1920s, There were only some warnings or

admonitions given to employers. But since the

1930s, the government had adopted the same

strict policy as the Japanese mainland. The

inilux of Chinese laborers had made the under-

developed Korean laborer market worse, and

had some negative effects on the employment

of Korean inhabitants, Even so, the control of

Chinese laborers was still not so strict in the

1920s; the main reason being that the Kore.an

government was worried that the Chinese

government might strengthen control of the

immigration policy for K{)reans (Matsuda, 2003,

pp. 321-323, 330, 332-335).

This kind of diplomatic problem also

occurred on the Japanese rnainland with regard

to the immigration of Japanese te the United

Stat.es of Arnerica, The research of Yamawaki

25 -




26 temprv"61-1, 2006

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Widely allowed

Forbidden

Partly allowed

Japan or its colonies

Fig. 1 Flows ofChinese laborers in theJapanese Empire duting the 1920s

Sources: Abe (2oo1), Kyo (1990b), Mutsuda (2003), Matsuo (193D, Yamawaki (1994), etc.

shows that in the Japanese gQvernment, espe-

cially in the Foreign Affairs Office, some people

worried that it would affect the immigration

policy of the U.SA, if Chinese laborers were

eliminated entirely Cfamawaki, 1994, pp. 159-

161), Throughout the 1920s, the policy in the

Japanese mainland was to promote the strict

control and limitation of Chinese laborers and

force those in Japan to go back to China.

Although this policy would affect the immigra-

tion of Japanese to the United States of Amer-

ica, this concern did not greatly affect the policy-

rnaking of the government.

However, in Korea, making use of legisla

tion and administration rights, the government

carried out a Chinese laborer policy which was

different from that on the Japanese mainland.

As will be illustrated in this papeg the two colo-

nial governments of Korea and Taiwan had

great independency. This was because in

these colonies the inhabitants were mostly Kbre

ans or Han Chinese, not "Japanese",

and in this

circumstance `"Ib

Respect the Former Habits"

became a main principle of the colonial govern-

ing. This differed frQm the Japanese mainland,

and these two colonies had fewer restrictions

-26-




ABE YL: Regional Differentiation on the Policy for Chinese Laborers in Modern Japanese Colonies: A Case Study oi Thiwan

against importing Chinese laberers. At that

time, however, the Japanese empire was a

nation-state based on the concept of being "Japa

nese". In this empire, the assimilation policy

had become a principle for governing the local

inhabitants. Of course it could not bear the

unlimited importation of Chinese laborers to

Taiwan where most of the population was

already Han Chinese (Abe, 2004, pp. 160-161).

Therefore, the regional differentiation and

background of Chinese laborer policies on the

Japanese mainland, Sakhalin, Korea and Taiwan

may be summarized as shown in Table 1, In

regard to the importation of Chinese laborers,

there were three positive factors [ 1), 2), 3) in

Table 1]: 1)Industrial needs for Chinese laber-

ers, 2) Diplomat.ic factors, and 3)Geographicalf

historical distance. And there were three

factors against importation [ 4), 5), 6) in Table

1]: 4)Anti-Chinese-[.abor Campaign by the

native population, 5)Effect on the assimilation ot

the native population, 6)Legislative independ-

ence of colonial governments irorn mainland.

Tlable 1

colonies before 1930s

27

Among these factors, as a result of the studies

in Abe (1999, 2000), the author guesses factor

4) (and anxiety over its worsening) was taken

very seriously by the Japanese government and

resulted in the forbidding of the importation of

Chinese laborers on the Japanese mainland.

Conversely in Korea, according to Matsuda

(2003), importation of Chinese laborer$ was

widely alluwed because of factor 2). In addi-

tion, factor 6) did not apply to Korea. In Sakha-

lin, according to the results of Abe (2001),

although factor 1) was important (because of

the difficulty of importing Korean laborers),

factor 4) and factor 6) restricted the importation

of Chinese laborers. Therefore, it can be said

Chinese laborers were partly allowed in Sakha-

lin, Moreover, the author will discuss the

following point regarding Taiwan in this paper.

While in Taiwan, factors 1) and 3) were impor-

tant, factor 5) : Effect on the assimilation of the

native population, also was great. So, therc

was a scrious contradiction between positive

factors 1), 3) and negative factor 5), So, in

The regiunal differentiatien and backpround of Chinese laborer policies in Japan and its

` i

/1 i 1

..L. Ilittle /, }

:[::I ll

Importation ofChineselaborers

Japullese IluL it litlle t'airly close happenedmainland important

Sakhalin fairly great few not close happened

li.ttle important fairly closc not confirmedKore.a

lgreat few close notconfii'rr]ed'l'aiwan /

(!990b), N'Ial.suda C200U), Mntsu" (1937), YaT-awnTci C1994)

27

litae

1inlelittlcgreat

Note/ The author guessed

backbroui]{l of Chinese iaberer po'li[/ie' g''b'ri'st':i oTi Abe {2000)

,elc.

iorbidden

Pari.1.y allowed

widely allvwed-

)Iili.9.l}' allowed

,Abe (2001), Abe (2e04), Kyo




28 thgeIP}i?61-L2006

Taiwan, Chinese laborers were widely allowed

before the 1930s, but importation came to be

restrieted atter the 1930s.

III Outline of the Chinese Laborer Policy

and the [Ilransition of the Population

The Taiwan government's basic principles

and laws concerning the hiring of Chinese labor-

ers were as follows: "Control

Chinese Landing

on Taiwan Ordinance", which was made to

prohibit the incoming of Chinese in the name of

maintaining social order in 1895, shortly after

Japan took over Taiwan. In the years of 1898

and 1899, after loosening some of the restric-

tions of that ordinance, the government intro-

duced the "Control

Chinese 'Ilea-making

Labor

Rule" and "Control

Chinese Labor Rule". In

September of 1904, it implemented the "Revised

Control Chinese Labor Rule". Though there

were still many restrictions, it did not change

the principle of allowing Chinese laborers to

come to Taiwan (Matsuo, 1937, pp, 10-38).

According to the "Revised

Control Chinese

Labor Rule", when Chinese laborers went to

coLoLoDosg-oLoAE]=60,OOO

sD,ooe

40,OOO

30,OOO

20,OOO

10,000

Taiwan, they were required to carry a certificate

signed by the Chinese Labor Agency under

permission of the government. The laborer

was required to land at the designated point

and present the certificate2).

However, in 1904, when the "Revised

Control Chinese Labor Rule" was in effect, the

number of laborers allowed te enter was 10,OOO

(could be acljusted as neecled). In fact, the

number of Chinese laborers was 10,307 in 1911,

and it was increasing each year (Fig. 2).

By the end of 1935, the number had climbed to

41,702 (53,937 including non-laborer Chinese).

Because of the unstable pelitical situation on

the Chinese Mainland after 1936 and the

economic depression, the number of Chinese

laborers coming to Taiwan increased to 49,312

(60,192 including non-laborers). In the next

year, the number of non-laborers had decreased

by 1,455 but the number of laborers.had

increased by 7,710 (raiwan Government, 1930,

Matsuo pointed out that because of the iail-

ure to distinguish between "laborer"

and "non-

laborer" (Matsuo, 1937, p, 39), many Chinese

o

n n " to O T- CV co

ot ot ot m year W- T- T- T-

Fig. 2 Number of Chinese laborers landed, returned and resident in Tlaiwan

Seurces: Matsue (1937, pp. 91-113), Shibuya and Matsuo (1943, pp. 428-429)

Note: Numbers in this figure are greater than tl]e real number of Chinese because they include dead and missing people.

-28-




ABE Y.: Regional Differentiation on the Policy for Chinese Iaborers in Modern Japanese Colonies: A Case Study ei Taiwan

people who were included in the "non-laborer"

categery were actually engaged in labor. [Ihe

reasons for the increasing number of Chinese

laberers are as follows. Geographically,

Taiwan is close to the Chinesc Mainland and

from ancient times it has had a close historical

relationship with the Chinese Mainland

(Taiwan Government, 1937). Plus, at that,

time, with the development of the mining and

manufacturing industry, Taiwan was short of

laberers and cheap labor was urgently needed

(Abe, 2003, p, 336),

According to reports of the timc, the

reason for the shortage of local laborers was

that most of the local people were engaged in

agriculLure. During the times they werc busy

with their crops, they were not available for the

labor market. And because of the warm

climat,e and cheap living expenses, most of the

local pceple did not need to work long to make

a living, and were not eager to work more than

thcy had to (Matsuo, 1937, pp, 72-77), For

the above reasons, local people's salaries were.

relatively high compared with prices. It was

said that these high salaries often hindered

industrial development, tmd public undertakings

(Abe, 2003, p. 336)3).

Apart from the lack of laborers, the follow-

ing reasons also lect to the acceptance of

Chinese laborers moving into Taiwan. First,

there was no competition with other ethnic

groups, such as Japanese and Korean, as in the

Japanesc mainland. Second, there was no Anti-

Chinese-I.abor Campaign like the one led by

the industria]ists in Sakhalin. Aiid third, as

Chapter II illustrated, from the legal aspect, the

'r'aiwan

government madc it possible to adopt a

different policy t.ewards Chinese laborers

29

because it had highly mdependent policy-

making rights (Abe, 2003, p. 337; Abe, 2004, p.162).

The Nangoku Company had always

monopolized the recruitment of Chinese labor-

ers in the Taiwan market. According to their

information, the main occupations of Chinese

were not. only factotums, carpenters, textile

workers (including knitters) which were relatcd

to industrial development, but also many occu-

pations such as agricultural worker, fisherman,

cook, barber and rickshaw man (as shown in

Table 2). Apart from this, the occupation

column included "family"

sincc 1919 because

the number of family member of the Chinese

laborers was increasing every year. It is

conjectured that aiter the "Revised

Control

Chinese Labor Rule" was enacted, seasonal

Chinese laborers gradually settled in Taiwan

(Fig. 2). Comparing the incoming number of

Chinese laborers and the inhabitant number

over years, one discovers that, the inhabitant

number accounted for the main percentage of

the Chinese population. The seasonal laborer

number was comparatively large, but as the

years went by thc nurnber uf inhabitants

increased, showing that they finally settled

down in Taiwan (Abe, 2003, p, 336; Abe, 2004,

p, 162).

IV Contradiction between Industrial Devel-

opment and the Assimilation Policy

The Taiwan government did not takc any

drast.ic measures against the sharply increasing

number of Chinese laborers, unlike on the Japa-

nese mainland and Sakhalin begore 1931.

Though Chinese laborers had contributed

much to the economic development of Taiwan,

29



Hiroshima 　Geographioal 　Assooiation

30 地理科学 61− 1，2006

Table　2　Number 　of　Chhlese　laborers　by　occupa 廿on 　i皿 Taiwan

　　　：　　　　factotum

．．一．．一斗一　．．　　　旨

，。x孟11worker 　I

　　103

　　200

ca「pen ’

　　ter

　　　94

rickshaw

　　man

　　　　59

agricultural

worker 　and

且sher −mancookIbarberconfbc

−

　tioner．

tea−　　　　　　　familymaker

total

2，38119041905 14　　　　 10114 　　　　　　2　　　　457　　1　　−　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　．　6931

，468 102 一 1　　　　 42　　　　　　　　　　　 i

105　　　　3　　　　ト292　！　一

一一一

　2，953

190619072，165

一

281　　 178 50 80　　　　 67101 　　　　　　5　　　　385　　1　　一 4，229　　　　・390　1258 113 84　　　　 90112 　　　　8

　　　　I　　　　 I360

　…　一

　　　　十4，759

19082 ，375　　 479487 327 69　　　　 94

　　　　．．147　　　　　12　　　　267　　　　一

19092 ，908　　 761678 539 63　　　 141　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　．194　

：　　　10　　　　342　　　　一

5，4487

，158

19103 ，391　 1ρ99890 750 102　　　 193　　　　　「　230　　　　　10　　　　301　　　　−．

8，851

19113，589　　104371

，102 786 90　　　 254264 　　　　　11　　　　412　　1　　一 10β07

19124，239　　1

，7311

，415i 　 814 95　　　 370353 　　　　　　　　　　　一

　　　　　　　　　　ト

15　　376　… 11，989

19134 ，222　　 1，9721 ，581 932

　　　　　　　　．．381 33　　 303 一 12

，776

19143 ，650　　1，9841 ，4981 ，274

　　　　　 88．．　　　　 122

「．　　442

　　423．　　439428

　　　　　66　　　　466 一 13，120

155　　．．．．187

465　　　　　87　　　　532E　

一1915．．．．一．．．1916．．．．一．．一．−1917

　　3，129　　1，965−．　　　　 …

　　2，839i2 ，191．　　．　　　　　　　 1

　　2，776 …2521

1，457　　 1，585

1，478　　 1，437　　　　　　　　　　　　　　．1

，601　　 1，465

509454 　　　　　194　　　　569　　　　一

13，51513

，731

622　　　 565473 　　　　 352　　　　688　　　　一 15，332

19183 ，1932 ，9241 ，780　　 1，448 421　　　 633443 　　　　407　　　　842　　…　　一 16β29

191919203，2583 ，1032 ，012　　 1，172 878　 …641

．1　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　「

　　　 371　　 804459　　　　　　　　　　　　 478

3β313 ，1812 ，384　　 1，5ユ3 1ρ80　　 674I　　　　　　 I460　　　　 351　　　　766　　　　　99718

，05220

，53324

，59519214 ρ82 　　3β88． 3，117　　 L758 1，326　　 861635 　　　　371　　　　7191 ，597

19224 β39　　34883288 　： 1，890 659　　 3728261 β9325 ，336

1923．

4，520　　3。6393 ，5911 ，641

1，292　　　 838

1。249　　　 863

．　 656 … 2β1026 ρ03

19244 ，326　 3，7133 ，5351 ，805　　　．．．．．6334273848808782 ，669旨26，278

19254 β17　　　4ρ15　　　3β36

1，2171232 8258526404079323

，267…28，119

19265 ，515　　1　4β69　　　4，455　　　　　　旨

1，9631

β01 1221 876 9713 ，461　30，220

19276 ，4384 ，763　 4，712 8966866924685009633 ，521　 31，993

5，170　 4，752　　　　　：

1，7371

，838

1，2051

β20 9166965149513 β57．34，53119281929

　　　　旨

75918

，789 1，655 8987035239154 ，16636 β95

1930… 8，952　　　　…1931　 7575

5，3545

，574　　．．．−5

，191

4，6305

，0511

，7871

，7351；

　　　1，979． 926715 … 586

4，7031

，671　　　 1

，948 894630 　　 4799488444

，7734

，72339

，05036271

14

，211　　…　　1

，519　　　　　　1，

782　　　…　919　　　　　　i580　　 469

　　．．．．

35，10237

，419

1932　 7，268

1933　 7，6035

，110

　　　　．．．5，2814 ，425　　　　1，551　　　　　　1，630　　　　1ρ62621 　　 616713671i5

，2956

β55

1934　　95065 ，6584 ，966　　　　1，753　　　　　　1，655　　　　1，260　i　　　　　　　　　 697　　　．−859

1935　 102486 ，2565 ，688　　　　10895　　　　　　1，706　　　　1，450　　1，018 …

776　　8，211

871　 10，45143

，75649

，012

1936　 11，2126

，3706 β58　　 10892 1

，757　　　　1，519　　1，132

　8381

，0511　　　　．．．．．　　94110 ，79152 ，052

Source；Matsuo〔1937，　pp．91−113）Note：Numbers　in　this　figure　are　greater　than　the　rea1 　number 　of 　Chinese　because　they　include　deud　and 　missing 　people，

30

N 工工一Eleotronio 　Library 　



H#oshimaGeographicalAssociation

ABE Y,: Regienal Differentiation on the Policy for Chinese Inborers in Modern Japanese Colonies: A Case Study of Taiwan

further increasing the number of Chinese labor-

ers coming inte Taiwan would go against the

assimilation policy that the Japanese empire

promoted in Taiwan, where most of the popula-

tion was Han Chinese,

Modern Japan intended to form a centrally

governed nation-state, in which the concept ef

"Nation"

meant the "Japanese"

people. This

concept would combine all the people from

different regions or with various ethnic back-

grounds. But in Taiwan, the Han Chinese

already accounted for most o"he population.

If the government had continued to import

Chinese laborers without Japanese nationality,

it would obviously destroy the assimilation

policy, whieh was intencled to Lurn the local

people into `CJapanese".

I suppose that even in

the government itself, the debate on accepting

Chinese laborers rnust have been rathcr ficrcc

(Abe, 2003, pp. 337-338; Abe, 2004, pp. 163-

164).

In 1929, under the support of the, Chine,se

government, tbe Chinese in Taiwan advocat(id

the opening of "Cliinese

Schools" for all holders

of Chinese nationality, and a campaign to estab-

lish such schools was started. Facing this

situation, the Taiwan government refusecl to

allow the schools. The importance of thc

assimilation policy was shown clearly in the

explanation of the reasons for prohibiting the

Chinese Schools. Following are some of the

reasons given fer opposing the opening o"he

Chinese Schools.

1. It is not proper to establish Chinese

Schools at this tirne as it may lead te unwanted

incidents.

2. Since it is di[ficult to distinguish rriain-

land Chinese from local Taiwanese, it woulcl be

31

impossible to prevent the local people from

entering the Chinese Schools.

3. The Chinese language teaching in the

Chinese Schools would be detrimental to the

Japanese language teaching in the public

sehools.

4. In addition to the public schools, all

the Japanese teaching institutions and groups in

villages woulcl be affected if Chinese Schools

were to be established.

5. Some local Taiwanese are obsessed

with the Chinese language, The opening of

Chinese schools would enceurage this tendency.

6. It would provide opportunities for

t,hose who insist on the selldetermination ef

peoples, which would hinder the assimilation of

the Taiwanese people.

Z The scheols would encourage the

ethnic identity of Chinese pcople.

(Some omitted.)

8, Some Taiwanese people are against

assimilation and would welcome the schools.

This would interfere with the governing of

Taiwan, and se cannot be permitted.

[Basecl on Taiwan Soutokufu (1934)reprinted in Ichikawa (1999, p. 16)]

For the reasons outlined above, from the

view point ot the international interaction princi-

ple, it was permitted to open Chinese schoo]s

on the Japanese mainland arid Korea, but not in

Taiwan, although it alse belonged to the `Vapa-

llese Empire", The baekground was obvious:

The Chinese schools would affect the mixing of

the peoples ancl it would hincler their assimila-

tion4). Of coursc, one should not mix the

establishment of educational institLttions and

the acceptance ot laborers together, but I

believe that between the two problems some of

31




32 thgeN"61-1,2006

the points were substantially the same CAbe,2004, p. 164).

People thought it would be a problem that

holders of Chinese nationality would aiifect the

smooth assimilation in Taiwan, Matsuo (1937,

pp, 86-87), who studied Chinese laborers in

Taiwan and is frequently referred to in this

paper, pointed out in the end of his book that`"I'aiwan

has becorne beautiful, It has a devel-

oped road system, excellent sanitation facilities

and developed industry And it will become

better and better, But the people who benefit

most from these improvements are not the

people from the Japanese mainland but the

people who have settiled in Taiwan. [[1ierefore,

if we can't turn the Taiwanese people into real

Japanese as soon as possible and can't increase

the number of Japanese people settled in

Taiwan, it will bring great loss to the Japanese

Empire."

There were also sorne people who held the

opinion that from the labor management point

of view, it was a problem that they relied mainly

on Chinese laborers: "If the Chinese laborer

didn't go in and out of Taiwan, or if they

returned to China now because oi war reasons,

no one can say what would become of Taiwan.

ff war broke out the Chinese couldn't wotk like

this anymore, and the problem would become

severe" (from a speech by Maruyama, member

of the Taiwan Mining Society, published in the

Taiwan Daily Newspaper on September 6, 1937),"There

are 2,OOO Chinese laborers in the

Kinkaseki mine. If a crisis comes, they will al1

return to China. Considering such circum-

stances, I believe we must employ Taiwanese

laborers. ... this is a national undertaking which

is more important than profitmaking" (from a

speech by Nakajima, member of the Ninma

Kniuing FactorM published in the 'faiwan

Daily

Newspaper on September 6, 1937). 'Ihe

indus-

trialists had a range ef opinions about this.

In fact, an incident that had occurred in

1931 made confiict between government bureau-

crats and industrialists inevitable. This was

the Manchuria Incident, After the Manchuria

Incident, the governors adopted stricter control

of Chinese laborers. After 1932, as ene part of

the reinforcement of management, the number

of the Chinese who were forbidden to enter

Taiwan or who were forced to leave was greatly

increased, There were 231 such people in

1932, 418 people in 1933, 409 people in 1934,

and 314 people in 1935. Though the number

once decreased, there was a sudden increase in

1936 to 685 people Crable 3). The reason for

the decrease in 1935, as the Taiwan govern-

ment explained, is that `The

Chinese people are

careful not to be punished by the police"

(raiwan government, 1937), 'Ihough

the laboF

ers were aware of the strengthened measures

and tried not to do anything that would make

[[hble 3Number of Chinese forbidden to enter Thiwan or forced to leave (1932-1936)tttt

le.s2 1933 1934 1935 1936

forbiddentoenter 62 60' 179

forcedtoleave

total

169231 358

74335I1 92222

506

418 409 314 685

Source: [faiwan Soutokufu (1937)

-32-




ABE YL; Regional Differentiation on the Policy for Chinese Laborers in Modern Japanese Colonies: A Case Study of Taiwan

them be forbidden to come into or be forced

out of the country, the number of people

punished in 1936 still went up greatly (Abe,2003, p. 339; Abe, 2004, p. 165),

Quoting from one of the officers in a

construction company who employed Chinese

laborers, 15,OOO Chinese laborers came into

Taiwan in 1935, and the number was 10,OOe in

1936 before May. But because of a govern-

mental notice, the total number allowed in 1936

was 12,OOO. If not for the government limita-

tions, the number of Chinese laborers coming

inte Taiwan should reach 20,OOO in 1936, based

on the situation before the notice that year.

(From a speech by Fujie, a member of the

Okura Construction Corporation, published in

the Taiwan Daily Newspaper on September 5,

1937.)

Apart from this, if t.he number ol laborers

engaged in one certain job increased drasti-

cally, the policy of the government would

always be to limit the entry ol Chinese laborers.

For example, frorn a statement in one of the

books of Shibuya and Matsuo (1943), "in

one

corncr of Taipei, there are a lot of barber and

noedle shops that were surely opened by

Chinese". it can be interred that there were a

lot of Chinese people who t.ook up the occupa-

tion of barber, But one governmenta1 burcau-

crat once said, "Barbers

have not been allowed

to come into Taiwan recently, so I expect the

number of these people did not increase much"

(from a speech by Sasaki, Minister of Taipei

State, publishcd in the Taiwan Daily Newspaper

on Septembcr 9, 1937). From his speech it

can be seen that the government tried hard to

prevent the cencentration of Chincsc laborers

in one certain job, so that they would not have

?3

33

much power over that occupation CAbe, 2004, p,165).

Government bureaucrats claimed that: 1.

For the occupations such as in the military

industry, Chinese laborers should not be

employed; 2. Chinese laborers can only be

employed after signing a centract, which should

state clearly thejob and time limits, and when

the contract is completed, the laborers should

be urged to go baek to their ceuntry; and 3.

Contact between Chinese laberers and the local

people should be prevented by isolating the

Chinese in certain areas. Through the limita-

tion of occupations and strengthened controls,

the government tried to reduce t,he chance of

contact between the Chinese laborers and the

local peoplc (Abe, 2004, pp. 165-166).

For cxample, the same governmental

bureaucrat also pointed out: "The

workers for

iTiilitary use should comc} from the Japanesemainland while the workers for mining or knit-

ting may be irnported from China or Korea"

(from the speech of Sasaki, Minister of Taipei

State, published in the Taiwan Daily Newspaper

on October 2, 1937). Other governmental

bureaucrats espoused similar measures: '`Nowa-

days, because of economic needs, we have no

choice but to import Chinese workers. For

those Chinese, we should limit the places

where they can live and the chanees for them

to go out. ... In addition, we should limit their

working period, After the determined period,

they should be sent back to their own country.

We should adopt all kinds of measures to limit

them, ,,, during the hiring period, they should

be ]imited to one fixed job and after the jeb is

dene, we should employ a new batch ot work-

crs" (from a speech by Ebana, Minister of




34 rkpaS}761-L2006

Taipei Superior Faculty, published in the

Taiwan Daily Newspaper on October 2, 1937) 5),

The books of Shibuya and Matsuo

described the situation during World War II as

follows. "Most

Chinese who gather together

are workers. There are about 2,300 Chinese

workers in the Kinkaseki Mine. But if we

don't look carefu11y, we can't see them because

this mine is in the mountains", 'Ihis

concentra

tion of Chinese workers might be the result of

managing and limiting Chinese laborers by the

government.

In 1937, after the outbreak of the Japan-

China War, Chinese laborers were almost

entirely forbidden. Mer 1938, there were only

several hundred non-laborers who came into

Taiwan each year (Shibuya and Matsuo, 1943,

pp. 428-429), In theJapanese mainland after

the outbreak of the Japan-China War, the

number of the Chinese who came into Japan

inereased because of the instability of the

Chinese political situation. This also reflects

the stricter controls adopted by the Taiwan

government after the 1930s (Abe, 2004, p. 166).

V Conclusion

This paper takes Taiwan as an example

from among the colonies ef modern Japan. It

discusses the regional differentiation in the

policy towards Chinese laborers in Taiwan,

compared with the Japanese mainland and

other colonies against the background of the

times,

The policy in the Japanese mainland was

characterized by the strict control policy but in

the colonies the management was relatively

loose compared with the Japanese mainland.'Ihe

government adopted a strict policy of shut-

ting out Chinese laborers in the big cities of the

Japanese mainland. In the early 1920s, the

control of incorning Chinese became stricter,

From the latter 1920s to the beginning of the

1930s, the government forced the Chinese who

had already come into or settled in Japan to go

back to China.

Imperting Chinese laborers may have

caused competition between Chinese and the so-

called "Japanese

people" from the rural areas of

Japanese mainland or Korea. This competition

was worried about most in the Japanese main-

land. Especially in some big cities, there were

many cheap laborers ceming frorn the rural

areas of the Japanese mainland and Korea. So

in the Japanese Empire during the 1920s and

30s, there was a relative surplus of laborers in

theJapanese mainland (Abe, 2004, p. 166).

In contrast with this situatien, in colonial

areas such as Sakhalin, Taiwan and Korea, the

goverrmient could not secure a sufficient supply

of cheap laborers from the Japanese mainland

and colonies owing to various economical and

political conditions, The only selution was to

import laborers from China. Although they

were all Japanese colonies, the respective back-

grounds of Taiwan, Korea and Sakhalin were

different, so the policies on importing Chinese

laborers were also different, In Taiwan, no

matter what their ethnic background, the

number of the laborers with "Japanese national-

ity" was insufficient. This became one main

reason for importing Chinese laborers,

Chinese laborers also existed in Sakhalin. But

because there were already many Korean labor-

ers coming into Sakhalin, it was possible for the

Sakhalin government to employ Koreans

instead of Chinese. Therefore, compared with

-34-




ABE YL: Regional Differentiation on the Policy for Chinese Laborers in Modern Japanese Colonies: A Case Study of Taiwan

Taiwan, Sakhalin was less eager to import

Chinese laborers as cheap labor and so the

hiring of Chinese laborers only lasted from

1923 to 1927.

Apart from this, during the period of the

Japan-China war, the problem faced in Taiwan

was the assimilation pelicy toward the inhabi-

tants, The government had to be very alert to

the entry of Chinese laborers because increased

importation of Chinese laborers would be detri-

mental to the unity of the people of Taiwan who

might lose their identity as anation of the Japa-

nese Empire. It is easy to believe that the

Taiwan government had a negative attitude

towards the unlimited entry of Chinese laborers

because of the thought of assimilation. And

just because of that, from the time the Taiwan

government began to import Chinese laborers

in 1904, it adopted a pQlicy which put a limit on

the number of Chinese laberers (Abe, 2004, p.

167).

Inoking at the actual numbers of incoming

Chinese, however, we can easily see that

compared with the Japanese mainland and

Sakhalin, the policy in Taiwan was ineompletc.'lhis

can be seen especially in comparison with

Sakhalin, which was also a eolony In Sakha-

lin, the Korean population aecountcd for only

2,7% of the entire populatien, But the Sakhalin

government imported Chinese laborers for the

purpose of lirlliting the employment of KoreEms.

This was because the government worried that

the increasing number of Koreans would affect.

the unity of the nation (Abe, 2001, pp. 117-120).

Then what was the real differenee between

the policies of the Taiwan and the Sakhalin

gevernmenLs? In Taiwan, the `local

inhabitants"

were Han Chinese, and they were the rnajority

35

of the population, It is easy to see that the

assimilation policM which tried to turn the local

people into Japanese, was already very difficult

to implement, If the government employed

more Chinese laborers, the difficulty would

become even greaten Even so, the number of

Chinese laborers increased to over 10,OOO with

the permission of the Taiwan gevernment CAbe,

2003, p. 340; Abe, 2004, p. 168).

What was the background of the differ-

ence? I think the extent of the assimilation was

different. Among the population in Sakhalin,

the percentage of mainlanders was over 90%.

Sakhalin could therefore easily adopt the same

policies as in the Japanese mainland. But in

Taiwan, the Han Chin ¢ se accounted for the

major part of the population, Even among poli-

ticians, governors and intellectuals, it was

considered that promotion of assimilation

would be very difficult and so many people helcl

the opinion that the assimilation policy should

be abandoned and indirect governing adopted,

They also suggested putting the emphasis on

industrial development and the saving of govern-

mg costs.

However, criticism towards the non-assimi-

lation policy was also rather severe. As

Oguma said, the background for the assimila-

tion policy was ingrained. For Japan as a new

imperial country, facing the military threat of

the European countries and Arnerica required

that it carried out assimilation no matter what

the cost in order to hold on to the right to

control Taiwan (Ogt]ma, 1998, pp. 70-146).

One point that must be mcntioned is that

after the Manchuria Incident and the outbreak

of the .lapan-China War in the 1930s, the mili-

tary situation between Japan and China had

-35-




36 rkNpt7

become tenser, In a place like Taiwan where

there were so many Han Chinese, it is not hard

to imagine the urge for ever stricter control of

Chinese laborers. After the Manchuria Inci-

dent in 1931, the government reinforced the

control of Chinese laborers under that urge.

From the beginning of the Japan-China War in

1937, Chinese laborers were forbidden to enter

Taiwan, After 1938, the only Chinese people

allowed to come into Taiwan were non-laborers,

and the number of incoming Chinese decreased

to the hundreds (Shibuya and Matsuo, 1943,

pp. 428-429). On theJapanese mainland, the

people entering from China began to increase

after the outbreak of the Japan-China War,

because of the instability of the Chinese govern-

ment. Cempared with this, the control oi

Chinese coming into Taiwan suddenly became

severe during the 1930s, This reinforcement

of the policy came under war circumstances,

The Taiwan government wanted to further the

unity of the nation, for example by forcing the

local people to change their family name to the

Japanese style and learn Japanese CAbe, 2004,

p. 168).

Based mainly on Taiwan between the

1920s and 1930s, this paper discussed the

Chinese laborer policy in modern Japanese cole

nies. Comparing theJapanese mainland and

other colonies, the paper explored the regional

differentiation in Chinese 1al)orer pelicy accord-

ing to the various baekgrounds. As a result of

this study, the author discusses the following

points. The industrial needs for Chinese labor-

ers were a great factor [factor 1) ], and the close

geographical/ historical distance [factor 3)],

was also significant in the case of Taiwan (asshown in Table 1). In addition, the legislative

61-1,2006

independence of colonial governments from the

mainland was great in Taiwan. However, in

Taiwan, there was a serious confiict between

factors 1), 3) and factor 5): Effect on the assimi-

lation of the native population, which was great.

Therefore in Taiwan, Chinese laborers were

widely allowed before the 1930s, but it came to

be restricted during the 1930s during which the

Manchuria Incident occurred,

The background of the transition in the

number ef foreign laborers was different

because the conditions in every, district were

different. Therefore, further systematic analy-

sis is necessary including plaees not discussed

in this paper such as Kantoushu, the Nanyou

islands and Manchuria. Moreoyeg the author

will try to illustrate the transition of laborers

including Japanese and Korean laborers result-

ing from the Japanese colenialism and other

factors in Eastern Asia during that period of

time. In addition, in the future, the author

would like to clarify the effect of the suzerain-

colonial relationship on the transition of labor-

ers after World War II including the present

time.

Pestscript: This study was supported by

the Scientific Research of the Japan Society for

the Promotion of Science (grant number

13001248).

Notes

1) The areas this paper compares and studies are

the Japanese mainland and three colonies (Korea,

Taiwan and Sakhalin) incorporatecl into the Japa

nese emplre.

2) The Nangoku Company, which was ajointven-

ture company lecated in Taipei, was designated as

the "Chinese

Laborer Agency", lhis company had

seven agencies in Jilong, Danshui, Tainan, Gaox-

-36-




ABE YL:Regional Differentiation on the Policy for Chinese Laborers inJapanese Colonies: A Case Study of Taiwan

Modern 37

iong, Fuzhou, Xiamen and Shantou and its major

job was to manage the entry ef Chinese laborers.

3) rusing salaries becau$e of a labor shortage also

existed in Sakhalin (Abe, 2001, p. 105).

4) At that time, with government help, some elemen-

tary schools were opened fer the local as well as for

the Taiwanese peeple in Fujian and Guangdung

provinces, which are located opposite Tuiwan. Dis-

agreement regarding the opcning oi these schools

brought a lot of criticism from the Chinese govern-

ment and public because it went against the interna-

tional interaction principle (Ichikawa, 1999, pp. 12-

14).5)

Ttiis kind of control of Chinese laberer$ wa$ very

severe in Sakhalin, as revealed by the research on

this area made by Abe (2001),

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37




38 mpmpN\61-1,2006

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dokou no futoukott sentei CThe relationship be

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ports in Karafuto). Nihon chin' Gakkai (7he Assoeia-

tion ofltiPanese GeagraPhers), Study GrouP of fKin-

dai Nihon no 7Yiki 1feisei" (In Hosei University). U)Miki, M. (2003): Senkanki karafuto ni okeru

chousenjin shakai no keisei CThe formation of the

Korean community in inter-war Sakhalin), Shakai

Keiiai Shigaku (Socio=Economic History), 68, pp.

523-544. U)Nishinarita, Y. (1997): Zdinichi chousenjin no

`lseleaiUo

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Owned by Kokkai 1[bshokan (Natienal Diet library):

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Kakyou gakkou setsuritsu wo kyoka sezaru wo teki-

tou to suru jijou. Owned by Gaikou Shiryoukan

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CIihe General Situation of Aliens Police in Showa

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(C): written in Chinese

CReceived: 2004 6. 24)

(Accepted: 2005 9. 27)

-38-



Hiroshima 　Geographioal 　Assooiation

Geographical　Sciences　voL 　6111e．1pp ．22〜39，2006

近代日本の植民地における中国籍労働者政策の地域的差異

台湾を事例にして

阿部　　康久＊

キー

ワード　中国籍労働者政策，産業開発，同化主義政策，台湾，日本植民地

　本稿では，1930年代の台湾における中国籍労働者雇川政策について，内地や樺太，朝鮮と比較し

ながら検討しながら，その地域的差異と背景について考察した。台湾においては，内地や樺太とは

異なり，中国大陸との地理的・歴史的近接性や，鉱工業の振興等の必要性から，中国籍労働者の導

入が比較的積極的に進められていた。しかしながら，漢民族住民が人冂の大多数を占める台湾では，

中国籍労働者の導入を拡大することは，同化主義的政策との問に，大きな矛盾を牛みだした。とり

わけ，1931年に満州事変が勃発すると

，総督府内部や産業界から，同化政策の強化や戦時中の安定

的な労働力の確保という観点から，中国籍労働者の増加を懸念する意見が出されるようになり，彼

（女）らに対する入島制限や強制送還処分が厳格化されていった。さらに，1937年の冂中戦争以降は，

労働者が新規に入島することは禁 1ヒされ，極めて厳格な規制が行われるようになった。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（＊

九州大学人文科学研究院）

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