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Regime Change in American Foreign Policy: Military Interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya

(Preliminary Version)

Maria Helena de Castro Santos (University of Brasilia)

Ulysses Tavares Teixeira

(University of Brasilia)

ABSTRACT The recent American military interventions in the Middle East brought to the careful consideration of academics and policy-makers the exporting of democracy as a U.S. foreign policy pillar. The Bush Doctrine conferred to democracy an essential role in fighting terrorism. Obama’s foreign policy states that America will not play an active role in the building of democracy in target states, a task that should be left for the local population. We will analyze the military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya to comparatively assess these regime change strategies. While the traditional literature on exporting of democracy by the use of force still seems deeply normative and optimistic, the recent Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) literature is rather pessimistic, pointing to very few and specific variables – like economic development, religious and ethnic cleavages and previous democratic experiences – that should be present in the target countries so that democratic interventions could work. Our analysis will take as a reference the FIRC literature, but while their approach is mainly quantitative, we draw on mini case studies of the three military interventions to qualitatively explore the FIRC variables which would foster or hinder regime change. Prepared for the Panel “The Use and Effectiveness of Foreign Military Interventions” of the International Studies Association 57th Annual Convention: “Exploring Peace”, Atlanta, Georgia, March 16-19, 2016.

I. INTRODUCTION1

The recent American military interventions in the Middle East brought to the careful

consideration of academics and policy-makers the exporting of democracy as a U.S.

foreign-policy pillar.

In previous works,2 we assessed the importance of democracy vis-à-vis security in the

foreign and defense policies of the post-Cold War American presidents. Specifically, we

have demonstrated that the Bush Doctrine conferred to democracy an essential role in

fighting terrorism in the rogue states, that is to say, security in the long run would

require democratic regime-change in the target countries. Obama and his Secretaries of 1 This paper contains partial results of a broader research project. The most efficient research assistantship of Thais Soares Oliveira, Pedro Bernardes, Vitória Sacramento Moreira, Francisco Almeida, Mila Campbell, Rebeca Vieira and Isabela Franciscon are well acknowledged. The support of the National Research Council (CNPq) by means of undergraduate and senior researcher fellowships was essential to the completion of this article. CAPES also contributed to the research development with a doctoral fellowship. 2 Castro Santos (2010a), Castro Santos and Teixeira (2013a; 2015)

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State and Defense, by their turn, indicated explicitly and repeatedly that America should

not play an active role in the building of democracy in the target states, a task that

should be left for the nationals themselves. At this point, democracy seemed not to be

considered a necessary condition to reach local, regional or American security.

However, a more careful investigation showed that if this stand was true in the cases of

Iraq and Afghanistan – troops retrieval and the promise of backing nationals to build

democratic governance –, the same could not be said in the cases of Libya and Syria

when the Arab Spring broke out. In fact, the president and his secretaries frequently

enough indicated rather assertively that the United States would provide support, arms

and military training to the moderate-opposition groups indicated by American

intelligence provided they engaged in the building of liberal-democratic institutions.

Strong diplomatic pressures were put on “American allies, old allies and new allies” to

help assuring the required democratic regime-change.

Summing up, we suggested that directly or indirectly democracy seems to be a requisite

for security and political stability of America and of the target countries, at least since

September 11.

The research question that follows is then: is it possible to export democracy by the use

of force? These are questions of great importance to top decision makers of Western

countries who choose this foreign policy strategy.

While the recent literature on exporting of democracy by the use of force still seems

deeply normative and optimistic, the Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC)

literature is rather pessimistic, pointing to very few and specific variables that should be

present in the target countries so that imposition of democratic regime changes could

work, such as the degree of prosperity, the level of ethnic and religious homogeneity

and the previous experience with democracy. This literature also investigates the type of

intervention, identifying if after the removal of the autocratic leader the intervener

retreats to the backstage, if it follows the imposition of a new leader or the restoration of

the previous one; if the removal of autocratic political institutions and the active support

to the building of new democratic institutions is a concern for the intervener, and how

much effort the intervener is willing to provide (resources and commitment). Some

authors subsume those characteristics into two broader categories: institutional

intervention and leadership intervention (see below). An important question of the FIRC

literature – which will be referred here as well – is: what are the prospects for civil war

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in the target countries as a consequence of military intervention as opposed to the

desired successful democratic regime change?

The FIRC literature is predominantly quantitative. The aim of this literature is to test the

statistical association between the principal independent variable (the foreign-imposed

democratic regime change) and the dependent variable (democratization), and under

which conditions this association prevails (type of intervention, level of development,

level of ethnic-religious fragmentation, and previous experience with democracy). The

aim of our work is to establish how the variables influence each other, identifying

mechanisms and processes. To accomplish this task, we should resort to qualitative

methods, in this case, case studies and process tracing. Due to time constraints,

however, we will only be able to provide here preliminary mini-case studies. Emphasis

will be put on the variable ethnic-religious fragmentation.

The first section of this paper will review the FIRC literature. The second will analyze

the FIRC’s variables in the selected cases before the interventions. It follows the

analysis of the influence of the independent variables on democratization in the

aftermath of the interventions. Finally we will provide a comparative analysis of the

results in each case and offer some suggestions.

II. THE FOREIGN-IMPOSED REGIME CHANGE (FIRC) LITERATURE

What do we know about the effectiveness of the exporting of democracy by the use of

force? The recent so-called Foreign-Imposed Regime Change literature (FIRC) will

provide the theoretical basis for this inquiry. Their basic research questions are: Is

foreign-imposed regime change by democratic states an effective means of spreading

democracy? How stable are the foreign-imposed democratic institutions?

We should note, to begin with, that the leading authors of this literature show some

divergence on the definition of its basic concept. Thus, for Downes (2010), foreign-

imposed regime change

(…) is the removal of the effective political leader of a state at the behest of the government of another state. Interveners typically also empower a new leader and sometimes impose a set of new institutions, but all that is required for a case to qualify as FIRC is if an external actor displaces the political leader of the target state. (p.5)

A few pages ahead the author adds to this definition “the threat or use of force” as the

usual means to remove the leader of a sovereign state (cf. DOWNES, 2010, p.19).

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Peic and Reiter (2010) provide a definition that includes the change of leaders and

political institutions as well:

The term ‘regime’ has been used by scholars sometimes to refer to a leader and some times to refer to political institutions. Foreign-imposed regime change, therefore, can mean an externally imposed change in either leaders or political institutions, though in practice it is often both. (p.454)

Enterline and Greig (2008) focus specifically on FIRCs by democratic countries, which is

the focus of this paper. They add another element to the democratic FIRC definition:

(…) imposed democratic regimes are democratic governments installed by a foreign power in which the foreign power plays an important role in the establishment, promotion, and maintenance of the institutions of government. (p.323)

The authors further clarify that the FIRC definition involves “more than merely

encouraging or facilitating leadership change, but necessitates restructuring entirely the

domestic political system of the target state.” (p.323)

Taking the democratic FIRC definitions altogether into consideration we will come to

the following definition: (1) the removal by an external actor of autocratic leaders

and/or autocratic political institutions by the use of force; (2) the imposition by an

external actor of a new leader or the restoration of a recently overthrown ruler to office;

(3) the playing by the intervening external actor of an important role in the

establishment, promotion and maintenance of a new democratic political system in the

target state. In this work, we will consider a democratic FIRC the external actor

intervention which includes at least the first characteristic listed above.

The democratic FIRC literature is typically concerned with both the effect of a foreign

actor intervention on the triggering of civil war in the target state and with the

effectiveness of democratic imposition from abroad. The literature is characteristically

quantitative and analyzes a great number of FIRCs cases that occurred along the 20th

century, sometimes beginning the analysis as early as in the 19th century. Its distinctive

trait is the focus on internal features of the target countries, looking for independent

variables that could explain the success or failure of FIRCs.

Concerned whether FIRCs influence the onset of civil wars, Peic and Reiter (2010)

analyzed 40 episodes of leader removal by another state that occurred between 1920 and

1940. They concluded that FIRCs following interstate wars both significantly decreased

the likelihood of interstate conflict and significantly increased the chances of intrastate

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conflict. This is because FIRCs wreck state infrastructural power and impose change in

the political institutions of the target state. Downes (2010) explores another intervening

variable: the imposition by the intervener state of a new leader or the restoration of a

recently overthrown ruler to office. He analyzed 100 events over almost two centuries

and concluded that new leader FIRC significantly increased the odds of a civil war in

the target country over the following five or ten years, while restoration FIRC decreased

the risk of civil war. He also tested some conditional variables and discovered that new

leader FIRC is especially damaging for domestic peace when combined with defeat in

an interstate war and in poor or ethnically heterogeneous countries. These findings

might be particularly important when it comes to the American FIRCs in Afghanistan,

Iraq, and Libya as it will be seen below.

Downes and Monten (2010) addressed the main question of whether intervention is an

effective means of spreading democracy. Claiming that there is no consensus answer to

this question, they see the debate divided between optimists, pessimists and those who

make conditional arguments.

Among the optimists are foreign and defense policies decision-makers. In previous

works (CASTRO SANTOS, 2010; CASTRO SANTOS and TEIXEIRA, 2013a and

2013b) we indicated that Bush and Obama as well as theirs Secretaries of Defense and

State think that democracy is transferable to any society or culture and that external

variables have a positive effect in the democratization process. This would be true

regardless of poverty, ethnic fractioning or absence of democratic experience in the

target countries, especially if enough time and resources are given to nation-building

operations. Downes and Monten (2010) point to some empirical support to the optimist

view in the academic research literature. In fact, some authors of this vein claim that

military interventions are often necessary to remove abusive political and military

institutions (cf. for instance BERMEO, 2003). Others qualify this assertion suggesting

that military interventions have a positive effect on democratization only if the objective

of these interventions was explicitly to democratize the target countries (see for example

MEERRIK, 1996 and PECENEY, 1999).

More recent studies, however, stress that success in imposing democracy by the use of

force is not only rare but it might be counterproductive as well. Frequently cited is the

study of Bueno de Mesquita and Down (2006). They found that be the intervener the

United Nations, the United States or other democracy, the target countries experience no

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significant increase in the level of democracy between ten to twenty years after the

intervention. The explanation they offer for this result is that democratic leaders care

most about their own political survival and democratic nation-building does not serve

this purpose. Frequently autocratic leaders, who do not have to take into careful

consideration the needs and interests of their people, can undertake policies that benefit

the target states.

Another group of authors focus on factors that can facilitate the successful democratic

FIRCs. The level of effort (resources and commitment) put forward by the intervening

states is considered to influence the level of success of democratization on the target

countries. Dobbins (2003), making use of the nation-building literature, uses this

approach to compare cases of American interventions since World War II, taking as

main indicators of effort the number of occupation troops and the amount of economic

aid per capita.

Another set of arguments attribute to certain conditions of the target countries the

success or failure of the use of force in the exporting of democracy. The conditions most

focused upon are: the level of wealth; the extent of ethnic, religious or social cleavages

in the society; and previous democratic experience by the target state. These variables

are examined to determine how much they affect the survival of imposed democracies.

In this vein, Enterline and Greig (2008) found that the survival of democracy is strongly

conditioned by the process by which the regime is imposed and the social and economic

conditions from the state hosting the imposed polity.

Downes and Monten (2010) tested those main findings, adjusting the research designs

for possible selection bias of the target states. To evaluate the level of democracy the

authors used the Polity index. They found that states that experience democratic FIRCs

remain on average firmly rooted in authoritarian regimes. Moreover, those target states

gain no significant improvement in democracy as compared to similar states that did not

experience intervention. The tests for the conditional arguments showed that in fact the

effects of democratic imposition are influenced by the levels of economic development

and ethnic heterogeneity in the target states. Thus, FIRCs led by democracies do better

in ethnically homogeneous and relatively wealthy states and loose ground in more

heterogeneous and relatively poor countries. As for the intervener’s amount of resources

and commitment spent to democratize the target countries, be it modest or huge, it is

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also more likely to meet with success when the target is relatively wealthy and

ethnically homogeneous.

Coherently with those findings, Enterline and Greig (2008), compare the cases of West

Germany and Japan with Afghanistan and Iraq:

West Germany and Japan represent near ideal cases for the successful imposition of democracy, because of their high levels of prosperity and low levels of ethnic and religious differences. Yet, this is not the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, two states that are sharply divided across ethnic and religious lines. (p.345)

Thus, Afghan and Iraq, showing “ (…) lower levels of economic development relative

to West Germany and Japan, (leave) fewer resources to divide amongst contending

groups within both societies” ( p.345). This is particularly true in Afghanistan, the

authors add, “a state that is among the poorest in the world” (p.345).

Downes and Monten (2013) conclude, however, that the above indicated preconditions

for democracy are not sufficient to bring about positive regime change. Building on the

argument of various authors (Peceney, 1999; Meernik 1996; Peic and Reiter, 2010 and

Saunders, 2011), they offer a distinction between institutional FIRC and leadership

FIRC. The former type of intervention, besides ousting the autocratic leader, should

overthrow old political institutions and build new democratic ones (elections,

parliaments, constitutions) in order to be successful. The latter occurs when the external

intervener only removes the autocratic leader, leaving intact the old authoritarian

institutions. In this case, regime change fails.

Finally, Downes and Monten (2013), after their extensive review of the FIRC literature

and the careful testing of its hypotheses, offer a theory for foreign-imposed democratic

regimes change. Expressed in a set of interrelated hypotheses, the theory takes into

consideration the effects of external (type of intervention) and internal (preconditions

for democracy in the target countries) variables on regime change. Their conclusions

tell us that while leadership FIRC’s has no effect on democratization, the effect of

institutional FIRC’s on democratization increases as targets’ level of economic

development increases, as targets’ level of ethnic homogeneity increases and if targets

have previous experience with democracy. However, democratization is unlikely to

occur if either of these two factors is absent: preconditions to democracy or intervener

actions toward institutional reforms (cf. p.107).

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It is our purpose to qualify these assertions based on quantitative methods, by unveiling

the processes and mechanisms by which the type of foreigner interventions and targets’

democratic preconditions are linked to the prospects of democratization in the selected

cases or, in opposition, to civil war. We will use the qualitative methods of case study.

III. CIVIL WAR OR REGIME CHANGE? RECENT AMERICAN INTERVENTIONS IN

AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND LIBYA

According to the FIRC hypotheses none of the cases here under consideration –

Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya– is likely to experience a successful democratic FIRC. In

fact, the totality of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a positive result is not

present in any of the cases. It is true that Afghanistan and Iraq experienced an

institutional FIRC (Bush), but at the time of the intervention both countries showed high

religious and ethnic fragmentation and no previous experience with democracy.

Afghanistan was and still is one of the poorest countries in the world and the Iraq

economic situation, despite large oil revenues, had been heavily hurt by the Iran-Iraq

and Gulf wars, as well as by U.N. sanctions. Libya presented a high degree of religious

and ethnic homogeneity and a relatively higher level of development based on greater

oil revenues, but American and UN sanctions due to Khadafi’s involvement in terrorist

activities and the decline of oil prices in 2009 led to deteriorating economic conditions.

Libya did not enjoy previous democratic experience and, moreover, the type of foreign

intervention it suffered could be considered of the leadership type (Obama).

III.1. Afghanistan and Iraq

For the Bush administration, regime change in the target countries was directly linked to

al Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S., and became the cornerstone of a far-reaching and

proactive foreign policy doctrine. The attacks of September 11, 2001 gave Americans a

heightened sense of their own vulnerability, and in their aftermath, the Bush

administration opted for a strategy of reaction based on American military power,

preemptive action, unilateralism and democratic regime change around the world. The

interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), although important in themselves,

are even more noteworthy as manifestations of this new strategy, which became known

as the Bush Doctrine.

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Afghanistan3

Democratic preconditions

Historically, Afghanistan has never experienced democracy. Quite on the contrary, it

has been dragged into violent civil war for decades. In 1978, the country suffered a coup

d’état followed by the instauration of a communist regime, which opened up the way to

the Soviet invasion in 1979. The country has faced civil war since then. Even when the

Taliban seized power in 1994, its dominance included chiefly the capital and its

outskirts. In the rest of the country, especially in the rural areas, civil war kept going.

Prolonged civil war strongly depleted Afghanistan’s already scarce resources. One

major consequence of this continuous civil war was the huge amount of mines displayed

on Afghan soil, despite the uninterrupted efforts to free it from this threat since a decade

before 9/11. The UN considered Afghanistan one of the countries with the greatest

number of mines in the world. In a predominantly rural country, agriculture was

severely jeopardized by the mines threat, the limited resources, the drought and bad

transportation infrastructure. UN sanctions in 1999, imposed to the Taliban regime,

worsened even more the economic conditions of the country.

Since the 1950’s social scientists have been concerned with the relation between level

of development and democratization. Lipset (1960) is the first author to suggest that the

more the level of development improves the more a country is likely to become

democratic. Huntington (1968) suggests that countries with middle level income are

more prone to engage in democratization than countries with high (no incentive to

regime change) or low level income (in poverty, people barely provide for their

existence). In the 1990’s, Przeworski et al. (2000), making use of advanced statistical

instruments, showed that the direct association between level of development and

democratization is true up to countries with US$ 6,000 per capita income. Above this

level, regime change is unlikely.

Even if there were no full consensus in the literature that deals with the economic

development and democracy relation, one can accept that the chances of a very poor

country to turn democratic are rather slim. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in

3 The analysis of the Afghan case benefited from the undergraduate monograph of Vitoria Sacramento Moreira, “Imposição de Democracia e Fragmentação Social: uma análise da intervenção Americana no Afeganistão” (Institute of International Relations, University of Brasilia, 2015), under the supervision of Castro Santos. Cf. also Queiroz (2012).

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the world, scoring a GDP per capita of US$119.9 at the time of the American military

invasion in 2001 (World Bank Data, 2015). It is true that the country economic situation

improved significantly and continuously since the American invasion – GDP per capita

reaching US$633,6 in 2015 – probably on account of the infusion of billions of dollars

in international assistance and investments as well as remittances from Afghan

expatriates, and the improvement of agricultural production due to the ending of a four-

years drought. The new higher economic level, however, is still not sufficient to pull the

country out of poverty.

Another important precondition for democratization in the target countries is, according

to the FIRC literature, the ethnic-religious homogeneity. The more homogeneous a

country the more it is likely to become democratic.

Afghanistan it is a highly fragmented country. The Pashtuns (40% of the population)

are predominantly Sunnis and occupy the political and military leadership. This major

ethnic group is composed of various smaller groups. They are not family based and in

fact there is great hostility and competition among cousins. Leadership and power are

always in dispute. Moreover, these groups are flexible and fluid. Each group defines a

set of principles and values, the pachtunwali, where honor has a prominent role. The

pachtunwalis also change over space and time. The Tajiks constitute the second major

ethnic group of the country (30% of the population). They are not organized in tribes,

but their identification is strongly local. While the Pashtuns control the major part of the

political and military arenas, the tajics predominate in the government burocracy. The

Turkmen and the Uzbecs (12% of the population) have a Turkish origin and are

predominantly Sunni. They have gotten some prominence in the national scenario

during the Soviet war. The Hazaras (15% of the population) constitute the largest Shia

community in the country. They are hostile to the Pashtuns, have their own armed

militia and enjoy political significance in the country.

The prolonged civil war had the major consequence of intensifying the social cleavages

and weakening the tribal nature of the country. At the end of the Soviet dominance,

each group had acquired arms and had the control of its own territory. Today each group

fights for power (political, economic, military) in their own behalf, not in the name of

an ethnic or religious ideology.

The relevant political unit is nowadays the quawn, that could be defined as a local or

regional solidarity group. Asked to which quawn they belong, Afghans could point to an

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ethnicity, a regional area, a small village, a group of people with the same profession or

with common political objectives, and this order can change. The tribe is only one

possible choice of identity. The question is equivalent to ask people which are their

strongest ties of solidarity. Moreover, the social groups in Afghanistan are known for

their extremely flexible and changing nature on account of internal or external facts.

They are not hierarquical, which jeopardize negotiations.

Religion served as a tie among rebel groups during the Soviet dominance. Non-tribal

groups emerged and took advantage of local family rivalries, like the Mujahedins.

Taliban emerged in this war context. It has a conservative religious ideological basis,

not tribal or ethnic. Thus, although the majority of its members are patchun, Taliban is

opened to other ethnic groups.

It is important to mention, finally, the warlords, usually former commanders of the

Mujahedins during the Soviet war. Those warlords take territories and impose their

ideological regimes.

Institutional Intervention

Taliban was opposed principally by the Northern Alliance, composed of Tajiks, Uzbeks

and Hazaras, and supported by Iran, Russia and India. After 9/11, when the United

States invaded Afghanistan, the Alliance was assisted with money, airpower and

targeting from U.S. Special Operations Forces. In few weeks Kabul was taken.

The Alliance also participated in the Bonn Agreement, signed in December 5, with the

objective of setting a timetable for achieving peace and security, reconstructing the

country and building democratic institutions. As the Chairman of the Interim

government Hamid Karzai was chosen, a Pashtun leader then commanding the siege of

Kandahar.

The misleading reading of the social cleavages in the target country led U.S. to choose

as the new leader the member of the major ethnic group. In June 2002, a Loya Jirga

(traditional form of national consulting) was called and Karzai was confirmed as the

chief authority during the transition process. In 2004 he was reelected and a

Constitution was enacted. The American calculus was that, as a member of the major

ethnicity which traditionally dominated the leading political and military roles, Karzai

would have control over his fellow members of his ethnicity at the national and the local

level. This is not what has happened. His influence was circumscribed to a relatively

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small group. He did not reach the local level, organized in independent quawns. The

result was a weak, non-legitimated and corrupt govern.

Another important consequence of this American misleading interpretation of the

Afghan social and political cleavages was not to give the proper attention to the political

dynamics at the local level. Thus, in the aftermath of the military invasion, Americans

concentrated their actions on building formal national institutions. We can then follow

successive presidential elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014, all with fraud accusations by

the looser candidates; the promulgation of a national Constitution in 2004; and

parliamentary elections in 2005 (the first one in 30 years) and 2009. The political

communication between the center and the local rural areas continued, however, very

difficult.

The Bush administration reached the peak of 33,700 troops in Afghanistan in 2008,

while Obama more than tripled this number, reaching 100.000 troops in 2012. The total

cost of the Afghan war is estimated in one trillion dollars.

Despite the material efforts of the Bush administration and the commitment to build

democratic institutions in Afghanistan, the erroneous interpretation about the social-

political basis of conflict in this country, taken as ethnic and tribal, and the disregard of

the political dynamics of the local level significantly contributed to the failure of regime

change. Obama, whose actions can be considered typical of a leadership intervention,

continued to promote presidential and parliamentary elections. However, coherently

with his style, he accomplished his presidential campaign promise to retreat American

troops from the country, which he did in December 2014.

Afghanistan displayed in the year of the American invasion democratic indexes of 7

(Freedom House: not free) and -7 (Polity IV: autocracy). Fourteen years later the

Freedom House index improved slightly: 6 (still not-free). Polity IV, in 2013, does not

show an index for the country, indicating the category of “failed/occupied”. With these

results one can hardly say that imposed democratic regime change was a success in

Afghanistan.

Iraq4

4 The analysis of the Iraqi case benefited from the undergraduate monographs of Thais Soares Oliveira “A Exportação de Democracia e a Qualidade do Novo Regime: um estudo de caso do Iraque”, 2014, and Francisco Aderbal de Almeida Junior, “Understanding the Islamic State Insurgency: the origins of the

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Democratic Preconditions

Modern Iraq was formed in the post-World War I period when Great Britain pieced

together the provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul from the ruins of the Ottoman

Empire. The country lived under British rule until its independence in 1932, and was

then governed by a monarchy, overthrown by a military coup only in 1958. After a

decade of political chaos (1958–1968) the Baath Party seized power. In 1979 Saddam

Hussein took direct control of the government and installed a dictatorial regime, which

survived until the American military intervention in 2003.

Iraq has never had any democratic experience. In 2002, before the intervention, Saddam

Hussein’s regime scored 7 at Freedom House and -9 at Polity IV indexes, characterizing

one of the most repressive regimes in the world. More than that, to the country, it lacks

a sense of national identity. Strong ethnic, tribal, economic, and sectarian cleavages

created throughout its history persist to date. These same conditions that have prevented

Iraq’s political stability in the past are considered by the FIRC literature as obstacles to

a successful imposition of democratization and as leading towards civil war.

In Iraq, the aforementioned geographical divisions are reinforced by sectarian and

ethnic differences. The former province of Basra is mainly populated by Shia Muslims;

Baghdad and Mosul, by Sunnis. Overall, the Shia account for approximately 60 percent

of the population, and the Sunnis 35 percent. The sectarian divide is strong for political

and religious reasons. Since the days of the Ottoman Empire, military and political

power had been concentrated almost exclusively in the hands of the Sunni Arab

minority, which had profited from this unequal distribution of power and resources.

Resentment had often led the Shia to rebel. Though not a homogenous group, their

target had traditionally been to destroy the secular nature of the regimes. More radical

Islamic groups, such as al-Dawa and SCIRI (today political parties), made clear their

intentions to spread the Islamic revolution by violence.

Iraq is also divided along ethnic lines. The central and southern regions of the country

are Arab, while the northeastern region is predominantly Kurd, with minorities of

Turkmen and Assyrians. Statistically, Arabs sum 80 percent of the population and

Kurds are around 15 percent. The Kurds have never accepted a central Arab authority,

frequently manifesting their resistance through violent uprisings. Saddam Hussein organization and the role of the US policy of exporting democracy” (2015), both under the supervision of Castro Santos.

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treated theses rebellions with increasing brutality over time, even using chemical

weapons. From 1961 to 1991, the Kurds conducted a low-level civil war against central

authorities. At times, as in 1975, 1988 and 1991, the war reached full-scale proportions.

After 1991, the Kurdish region gained an autonomous status, with its own political

institutions, armed forces and a functioning civil society.

Containing these domestic uprisings was a costly enterprise by itself, but Saddam still

had to deal with other major economic burdens, such as the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980’s

and the Gulf War in the 1990’s. Economic sanctions imposed by the UN followed

through and paved the way to severe economic crisis, worsening significantly the public

services and especially depriving the middle class. Since economic information was a

matter of state security, statistics are uncertain, but the Economist Intelligence Unit

(2014) has some estimates. In 1989 the Iraq GDP was around 39 billion dollars but after

the imposition of the UN sanctions this index went down more than 70% in the middle

1990’s. Iraq’s GDP recovered significantly between 1996 and 2000, increasing from

10.6 to 33 billion dollars, only to decrease again until the year of the intervention.

It was in this scenario that the democratic foreign imposition of regime change took

place in 2003. In his efforts to resolve the Kurdish problem and to sustain the Sunni

hegemony, Saddam Hussein had relied heavily and frequently on the use of patronage

and violence. This cycle of violence – whether inflicted by the government or by

opposition groups – had only escalated in intensity over time. It is no coincidence that

Iraq’s most brutal leader (Saddam Hussein) was also its most durable.

At this point, a FIRC scholar would have said that even though Bush opted for an

institutional FIRC, the domestic conditions of Iraq were far from favorable to

democratization. The 35 years of Baathist rule left a highly traumatized, divided and

impoverished society – not the most conducive environment for democratic institutions.

Institutional Intervention

From the perspective of the Bush Doctrine, the Baathist regime in Baghdad paved the

way for putting together the apparently distinct problems of terrorism, weapons of mass

destruction and the need for ‘offensive defense’. With the American military capacity,

removing Saddam’s ruling elite was no hard task. But stabilizing the state structures

after the intervention, and then imposing a sustainable transition to democracy, was a

much more complex and difficult mission. In fact, for the Bush government, a

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combination of ideological optimism, insufficient planning and misperceptions about

the domestic conditions of the Iraqi society has meant that the aftermath of the fall of

Saddam has been far more troublesome than the removal of the autocratic leader itself.

This failure has had consequences far beyond Iraq, the region or indeed the United

States itself.

When the major combat operations in Iraq ended on May 1st, 2003, Saddam Hussein

had been successfully ousted from power but the once prevailing political institutions

were also broken. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),

led by American officials, was created with the mission to stabilize the country, transfer

the power to an Iraqi transitional power, and to develop a constitution. After the UN

passed a resolution giving the U.S. and the U.K. the status of occupying powers, on

May 22, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) substituted for ORHA, enjoying

executive, legislative and judiciary powers while the state infrastructure was being

rebuilt and the Baathist Party disintegrated. In July the CPA appointed a transitional

authority, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), constituted of 25 members from 6 parties,

most of them Shias who had been in exile during Saddam’s government. The role of

IGC was to assist the CPA on the transitional phase of regime change.

In June 2004, IGC and CPA were dissolved and a provisional government, allied to the

United States was constituted, with an Arab Shia as prime-minister. The first elections

were held in 2005 to choose the members of the Transitional National Assembly. The

Sunnis boycotted the elections and the majority of the seats were occupied by Shias.

The Assembly indicated a Kurd for President and an Arab Shia for Prime Minister. Two

months later the Iraqis were called to choose the members of the Council of

Representatives. This time the Sunnis showed up to vote, but the Shias got the majority

of the seats again.

As expected, the American occupation had as a consequence the end of the historical

Sunni dominance in the country, pushing them to a position of resentment and fear of a

Shia revenge, who were ascending to power after decades of submission. The Shias, for

their turn, feared the return of oppression, while the Kurds managed to reinforce their

grip on the north of the country. Failing to recognize these differences, the American

government missed the fact that the capture of a dictator represented the closure of only

one of several internal disputes: the deposition of Saddam. And while the Kurds had an

autonomous territory and the Shias had successfully entrenched themselves into the new

16

polity, a significant part of the Sunnis, even if legitimate local authorities, have been

denied participation in the new governments due to alleged alliances with the Baathist

regime or links with terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda.

All these ethnic-religious resentments and fears led to what has been called the Iraqi

insurgence, referring to the hostilities directed to the provisional government and to the

occupation military forces. Dozens of insurgent groups shared the goal of ousting the

foreign occupation forces from the country and fighting to control strategic areas. Every

person related to the transitional government or to the American forces were potential

targets. Terrorist attacks started as soon as May 2003. In 2006 and 2007 the attacks

scaled up and the situation was considered approaching civil war in terms of the

deepening of cleavages, the number of deaths and the number of refugees. The attacks

came from groups that sympathized with extreme Islamist branches, by former squads

of the Baathist regime or from Sunni nationalist movements. According to ACNUR,

there was more than 1.5 million Iraqi refugees in 2006 and this number scaled up to 4.8

million people in 2008 (16% of the whole population).

Reacting to this situation, Bush devised a new strategy to deal with Iraq. In January

2007 the American government launched The Surge. More than 20 thousand troops

were sent to Iraq to reinforce the security of the region of Bagdad, protecting the

population. The idea was to bring stability to the country, creating a congenial

environment for the reconciliation of the sectarian groups. In fact, this strategy managed

to decrease hostilities against civilians, generating a more stable situation and bringing

the numbers of civilian casualties to the 2003 level. In 2008 The Surge was called off.

According to the 2008 Freedom House Report, the Arab Sunnis had improved their

political participation and the American government had managed to get the

cooperation of several tribes to face al Qaeda attacks to the Shia population. But when

Barack Obama took office in January 2009, following his electoral promises, he

announced the withdrawal of the bulk of the American troops until August 2010,

leaving behind residual troops to train the Iraqi security forces and for special

counterterrorism missions against the al Qaeda. The residual troops eventually left the

country in December 2011. Part of the Iraqi elite feared for the stability of the country

and the interruption of the democracy building after the complete withdrawal of

American troops. Obama answered that the stabilization of the regime and democracy

building were tasks for the Iraqis themselves.

17

Immediately after the American withdrawal, internal violence resumed. The tensions

between Shias and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, Muslins and Christians broke out again in

face of the lack of proper training of the Iraqi security forces, the fragility of the new

institutions, and the retreat of state authority in some regions of the country. The

number of civilian casualties (7,818) reached the level of 2008, when the country was

approaching civil war (UNAMI, 2014). These civilian deaths have been put on the

account of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a jihadist movement, created in

April 2013, constituted by Arab Sunni insurgents who act in Iraq as well as in Syria.

ISIS, Iraq’s main opposition group, is a spinoff of al Qaeda and its attacks are

particularly violent. The movement has successfully taken over important cities in the

borders of Turkey and Syria with the aim to establish a caliphate in a territory between

Bagdad and Syria.

It is worth mentioning that since the period of the American occupation, the Iraqi level

of development has improved significantly as oil production increased, even if GDP per

capita remains low. Iraq’s GDP still classifies only in the 88th position of the world.

Economic performance has not been able to mitigate the ethnic-religious cleavages by

distributing more evenly the development products. The quality of democracy has also

improved somewhat, as some liberalizations measures were implemented, but the

country still does not qualify as a democracy. By the Polity IV index Iraq has become

an open anocracy (3), still a long way to democracy. The Freedom House indexes show

an improvement from 7 to 5.5 since the American invasion, still considered a non-free

country.

Besides that, the Watson Institute for International Studies (2013) claims the American

government has spent more than 3 trillion dollars in this war. The Defense Department

informs as well that the government kept between 150 and 200 thousand troops in Iraqi

territory along the years of occupation. In spite of their huge efforts, neither the U.S.

attempts to democratize the country, nor the amount of resources spent in nation

building were able to make up for the disastrous rearrangement of the Iraqi society. In

fact, the establishment of ISIS in Iraqi territory, after the American troops withdrawal

brought civil war back to the country.

In spite of their huge efforts to make the democratic FIRC in Iraq successful, Americans

were not able to overcome the deep, historical cleavages that divide the country and

achieve a national reconciliation. The Sunni population was never really incorporated

18

into the new government and important state infrastructure and bureaucracy were

dismantled after the intervention. The results were a state that was not able to exert full

control of its territory after the Americans retreated. Terrorist groups and islamist

insurgents gained power and became much greater threats than before. The country is

currently on a civil war against the insurgents from ISIS, which has forced a return of

international military assistance. Without having been able to advance much neither in

terms of level of development nor in terms of the crafting of democracy, the democratic

FIRC cannot be called successful.

III.2. Libya

If Bush focused his presidency after September 11 on ending tyranny and promoting

democracy in the world to win the war on terror, Obama took office in 2009 with the

intention to retract from this freedom agenda. The objective was no longer to transform

domestic societies and establish democratic governments in rogue states but to prevent

al Qaeda or other extremist elements from regrouping in these countries and carrying

out violent attacks against the United States or its allies. He moved from Bush's broad

war on terror to a narrower focus on al Qaeda operatives and other terrorists who were,

in his view, threatening US security. Preemption was no longer an element of the

national security policy and he promised to retreat American troops from Afghan and

Iraq as soon as possible.

When the Arab Spring broke out, however, new challenges were put in Obama's

foreign-policy strategies. On February 2011, Libyans staged a protest demonstration

against Kaddafi’s forty-two-year rule, calling on him to step down and demanding

change and freedom. The dictator reacted with all brutality against the protesters. The

United States condemned Libya as a rogue state sponsoring terrorism and denounced

Kaddafi for waging war on his own people.

In March, the UNSC Resolution 1973 determined the establishment of a no-fly zone

under the command of NATO and actively led by the United States, France and Great

Britain. Fighting Kaddafi's army was not merely enforcing a “no fly zone”; it

constituted a direct attack on the government’s ground forces. The intervention in Libya

differed from the ones in Afghanistan and in Iraq; it was a leadership FIRC as it will be

seen below. Even if multilateral in its nature, a direct consequence of U.S. actions was

19

the removal of an autocratic leader from power, with no compromise to participate in

the imposing of democracy or the building of new democratic institutions. Democracy

was, of course, the expected result, but the transition from the old regime would be a

task for the Libyans themselves (State of the Union, 2012).

Democratic preconditions

Libya is divided into three major regions, each with its own history, culture and

traditions. Tripolitania in the west includes Tripoli, the capital of Libya; Cyrenaica in

the east with Benghazi as its capital shares cultural affinities with Egypt; and the region

of Fezzan in the south is dominated by Bedouin tribes. The vast majority of Libyans are

Sunni Muslims (96%). People of Arab and Berber heritage constitute the majority

(97%) and other ethnic groups include Tuaregs, black Libyans (descendents of sub-

Saharan Africans), the Tehbu and Duwud (CIA, n.d.). Despite this apparent

homogeneity, the country’s social configuration is made up of numerous tribal

communities and the culture of tribalism remains strong.

Since 1969, after participating in a coup d’état to overthrow the monarchy of King Irdis

al-Sanusi, Muammar Kaddafi assumed power to fight against what he described as an

ongoing revolutionary struggle against the corrosive influence of the West and the oil

companies. The alleged aim was to pursue President Nasser’s dream of a pan-Arabic

nationalism by uniting Libya against Western imperialism. It became increasingly clear,

though, that Kaddafi had quite a radical behavior. Almost immediately after coming to

power, he sought to acquire nuclear weapons as a way to gather prestige. Libya also

became a major-state sponsor of terrorism, backing several rebel and terrorist

organizations worldwide (Woodward, 1985).

Libya has never experienced a democratic regime. Its democratic indexes before the

events of the Arab Spring were 7 (non-free country), by Freedom House, -7 (autocracy)

by Polity IV. No previous experience with democracy and a stable autocracy during the

Kaddafi's years are not favorable conditions to a successful FIRC.

Domestically, Kaddafi ruled Libya by maintaining patron-client relations with tribal

communities, rewarding some with money and positions in the bureaucracy, and

repressing others. As he tightened his political grip on Libya, opposition groups began

to organize and conspire against the repression and corruption of the regime still in the

1970’s. Several of these groups, specially the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),

20

would come to play a vital role in the fall of the Kaddafi regime and the eventual

restructuring of Libya (AMDITIS, 2012).

With a small population and large oil revenues, Libya has one of the highest GDPs per

capita in Africa – reaching $13,000 in 2009 (WORLD BANK, n.d.). Libya's oil money

has helped Kaddafi fund both his foreign adventures and his domestic political power

since the 1960’s. In 1967, Libya was the fifth largest producer of oil among OPEC

states. From 1975 to1979, the Libyan economy grew more than 10% a year, and by

1981, the price of Libyan oil had increased by 208% as compared with 1975. Kaddafi

used Libya's wealth to assure his power by guaranteeing the population food, housing,

and clothing (O'SULLIVAN, 2003). The government distribution of wealth for sure

helped secure the population's acquiescence, but Kaddafi's rule still depended on

political repression and the threat of violence.

During the 1990s, Islamic opposition groups targeted regime officials carrying out

assassinations and attacks on military posts. Dissatisfaction also grew within the

military, reinforced by unpaid salaries and cuts in weapons purchases. In 1993, an

attempted military coup caused the arrest of 1,500 people, several hundreds of whom

were subsequently killed (DEEB, 2000). Nevertheless, while these incidences were a

sign of growing dissatisfaction, the regime successfully reasserted its control. By the

end of the 1990s, Kaddafi had crushed all coup attempts and nearly eliminated all

significant Islamist threat.

In the 2000’s, prosperity, a favorable condition for a successful FIRC, was not exactly

the word of the day. It is true that the country did make substantial gains once U.S.

sanctions were lifted in 2006. However, the decline in oil prices in 2009 and an

estimated unemployment rate of 20% signaled deteriorating economic conditions.

When the Arab Spring broke out, the socio-economic conditions of the country and the

legitimacy of its autocratic ruler were in decline. Without being able to handle the

internal divisions of his own population without resorting to the use of force, Kaddafi

provoked frictions that would certainly jeopardize the transition after the imposition of a

regime change.

Leadership Intervention

NATO commanded a no-fly zone operation over Libya, authorized by UNSC

Resolution no.1973 in March 2011, led primarily by the United States, Britain, and

21

France. The Resolution mandate was limited to the protection of the civil population

caught in the middle of the war between the rebels and Kaddafi loyalists, but Obama

and the American allies intensified air strikes and proceeded to oust the dictator from

power. In October 20, a convoy of 75 cars, including Khadafi’s, tried to flee Sirte, the

dictator’s hometown, but it was attacked by NATO and the Western allies. Khadafi was

caught and killed by the rebels. In October 27, the no-fly zone operation was called off.

The American intervention in the target country under Obama was typically of the

leadership type: overthrowing of the dictator without imposing a new leader or the

rebuilding of new democratic institutions, as it had occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq. In

fact, the Arab Spring protests started in February 2011 and on the 27th, with remarkable

speed, the rebels themselves cobbled a National Transitional Council – composed of

politicians, former military officers, tribal leaders, academics and businessmen – to act

as "the political face of the revolution", claiming to represent all of Libya. The Council

gained international recognition as the legitimate governing authority in Libya and

occupied the country's seat at the United Nations. This was accomplished by the rebels

themselves, as it would be the sequential building of other political institutions.

The NTC feared the militias, and bowed to their demands to appoint their leaders to

senior ministers. The Council was not able to disarm or disband the militias. In 2012,

the registered militias in the Warriors Affairs Commission set up by the NTC were

nearly 500.

In July 2012, the NTC presided over the first democratic elections and in August 2012

the Council formally and smoothly transferred power to the General National Congress

(GNC). The NTC was then dissolved. However, of the 80 seats assigned to parties in

the new legislature, only 24% was won by Islamic parties. The militias were basically

left aside.

In May 2013, after laying siege to government ministries, the militias managed to pass a

law barring from office previous senior officials from the Khadaffi regime. In October,

they briefly kidnapped the prime-minister. The armed militias went through a process of

radicalization, pressing, challenging, and increasingly controlling the GNC.

In the spring of 2014, the retired General Khalifa Haftar, who had endured two decades

of exile in the United States, tried to remove the islamists’ influence from government

in a strong military operation called Dignity. With the support of the Libyan armed

22

forces, he attacked islamist militias in Benghasi and laid siege to GNC in Tripoli. Four

days later he had GNC to call elections to the House of Representatives which was to

substitute for the Council. The second elections that followed in June showed a rather

low turnout (18%) as compared to the first one (60%). In fact, violence was outspread

all over the country and people stayed indoors. The Islamists experienced even worse

results than before.

An alliance of Islamists (including the Muslim Brotherhood), Misratan and Berber

militias, called Libya Dawn, decided to ignore the elections results, launched a six-

weeks assault on Tripoli, reconstituted the pre-election GNC and appointed a parallel

government. Haftar and the new elected parliament retreated to Tobruck and the militias

which supported them fled to the mountains southwest of the city.

Today Libya is split between two parliaments, GNC (the previous to the second

elections) and the House of Representatives, two governments and two central banks

governors. The House of Representatives and its government are internationally

recognized. Egypt has been a strong military supporter as well as the United Arab

Emirates. Despite a UN arms embargo, General Haftar has air power and better

weaponry. The army is divided along ethnic lines, with Arab soldiers and Arab tribes

rallying around Dignity, while the far fewer Misratan and Berber soldiers line up with

Libya Dawn. Even so, Libya Dawn controls the bulk of the country territory, probably

on account of the support of the significant part of the today approximately 2,000

militias. It counts also with the support of Qatar, the UAE’s Gulf rival, and Turkey.

Radicals and jihadists align with the old GNC. The main militias on this side of the

game are, besides Libya Dawn (which could be considered the GNC “armed forces”),

Libya Shield (seen as part of GNC "Ministry of Defense" forces), Ansar al Sharia (an al

Qaeda affiliate), Batallion 166, Libyan Petroleum Facilities Guard, Derna Mujahedin

Shura, Abu-Salim Martyrs Brigade, Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, Ajdabiya

Revolutionaries Shur Council. Supporting the House of Representatives are the Libyan

National Army, Al-Saiqa, militias from Zintan, and al Qaqa.

Since September last year, the United Nations has been trying to put together initial

talks between the two sides toward the creation of a national unity government. So far,

the pressure to reconcile the two sides has had as a consequence the reinforcement of

the conflict between the parts.

23

Recently, along 2015, the Islamic State spread its grip along the Libyan coast, having a

"strong presence" in Nofilia, Sidra and Ra's Lanuf, putting it significantly closer to

installations in Libya's oil rich region, which has been leading to repeated clashes with

the Petroleum Facilities Guard. The presence of ISIS in Libya, brings for sure an even

greater complexity to the conflict map of this country. Reportedly, Obama has been

pressed to open a third front against it.

With the country splitted in two strongly antagonistic groups, with two governments

and a civil war, the foreign attempt to change the regime toward democracy was for sure

a big failure.

V. BRIEF TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

Is that possible to export democracy by the use of force?

The answer for the three cases analyzed here is no, it is not. Our analysis was referred to

the hypotheses of the FIRC literature, which is worth summarizing here again: when

intervention is of the leadership type, it has is no impact on democratization of the

target country; when intervention is of the institutional type, the impact on

democratization of the target country depends on some preconditions: previous

experience with democracy; level of development; and ethnic-religious homogeneity.

Due to time constraints, among these variables we have focused especially on the social

homogeneity variable.

The military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, under the Bush administration, were

of the institutional type, while the intervention in Libya, under Obama government, was

of the leadership type. According to the FIRC literature, the latter was doomed to

failure. The former could have better chances provided the democratic pre-conditions

had been present in the targets countries, which was not the case.

We here present partial results of our research with the intention of contributing to the

refinement of the FIRC literature with regard to the impact of the ethnic-homogeneity

variable on democratic regime change.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the ethnic-religious heterogeneity is obviously

present, despite a Sunni majority. However, we can conclude that this variable does not

explain the complexity of the local conflicts, like in Iraq. Neither does the tribal

24

structure, significantly weakened during the Soviet war. The wrong reading by the

United States of the local dynamics of conflict explains a big part of the failure of

regime change in this country. In fact Americans imposed as a new leader an important

member of the Pashtuns, the major ethnic group of the country, which traditionally

occupied the leading military and political positions. Their expectations were that this

new leader would have control over the Pashtuns at the local and national level.

However, it turned out that his influence was restricted to a relatively small group,

unable to reach the local level, organized in independent quawns. Americans did not

perceived as well the crucial importance of politics at the local level, concentrating their

efforts on the building of formal national institutions. The results were a weak, corrupt,

non-legitimated govern, unable to establish political communication between the center

and the local areas, least to face Taliban and al Qaeda, especially after the American

troops withdraw from the country in 2014.

The FIRC literature does not take into consideration the changing and fluid nature over

time and space of the basic local cleavages, which for sure jeopardized even more the

chances of a successful imposed democratization than ethnic-religious heterogeneity.

Limiting the analysis to ethnic-religious conflicts do not tell the whole story of social

fragmentation in Afghanistan.

The hypothesis of the ethnic-religious heterogeneity works well in the case of Iraq.

Political stability under Saddam Hussein was kept by repression and patronage. After

his overthrown, the United States imposed a new government that should be

representative of the three basic ethnic-religious groups in the country: the Shias, the

Kurds and the Sunnis, the latter a minority traditionally privileged along the history of

the country and also in Saddam Hussein autocratic government. When Americans

troops retreated from Iraq, during the Obama administration, the deep cleavages among

those groups broke loose. The Sunnis were ousted from upper positions in the Executive

and persecuted in the streets. Kurds reinforced control in their territories. Security could

not be assured by Iraqi police and Armed Forces, which created a power vacuum in vast

territories. ISIS took advantage of this situation and established control over large

spaces. The great majority of the ISIS members in Iraq is, not surprisingly, resentful

Sunnis. Today Iraq faces civil war.

The Libyan case can be said to challenge the FIRC hypothesis on the impact of ethnic-

religious conflict on the democratization of target countries. In fact, the country is

25

highly homogeneous, with Arabs and Berbers representing 97% of the population and

Sunni muslins reaching 96%. However, Libya did not manage to achieve national

reconciliation and integration after the foreign intervention, and civil war broke out. At

the early stages of the aftermath of Kadhafi’s ousting from power it seemed that the

FIRC hypothesis would test positively. In fact, when the Arab Spring reached Libya, the

rebels, in a remarkable speed, put together a National Transitional Council with the

objectives of overseeing transition and building national unity. The Council presided

over the first democratic election in July 2012 and the smooth handover of power to the

General National Congress. Notwithstanding, a few years later the country splitted in

two parts, with two parliaments, two governments and two central bank governors, each

backed by a number of armed militias. What has happened? The answer should be

looked for in the non-anticipated divide that occurred inside the Sunni-Arabs great

majority, putting radical islamists and moderate Sunnis in opposite non-reconcilable

positions.

Addressing the research question indicated above – is that possible to impose

democracy -, we have nothing but partial provisory results. It is a process very hard to

be successful. Among the FIRC variables, the ethnic-religious homogeneity seems to be

of great importance. More case studies should be done to refine the FIRC literature.

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