PUBLIC RECORD - mpts-uk.org · MPT: Professor REDDY 1 PUBLIC RECORD Dates: 1 to 12 April 2019 29 April 2019 11 November to 17 December 2019 Medical Practitioner’s name: Professor

Record of Determinations –

Medical Practitioners Tribunal

MPT: Professor REDDY 1

PUBLIC RECORD Dates: 1 to 12 April 2019

29 April 2019 11 November to 17 December 2019

Medical Practitioner’s name: Professor Akhilesh REDDY

GMC reference number: 6077281

Primary medical qualification: BChir 2003 University of Cambridge

Type of case Outcome on impairment New - Misconduct Impaired

Summary of outcome Suspension, 9 months.

Tribunal:

Lay Tribunal Member (Chair): Ms Michele Clare

Lay Tribunal Member: Ms Ann Bishop

Medical Tribunal Member: Dr Noel Bevan

Legal Assessor: 1 to 5 April 2019: Ms Julia Oakford 8 to 15 April 2019 29 April 2019 11 to 22 November 2019 2 to 17 December 2019: Mr Julian Weinberg 25 to 29 November 2019: Mr Andrew Lewis

Tribunal Clerk: 1 to 7 April 2019 12 April 2019 29 April 2019: Mr Michael Murphy 8 April 2019: Mr Edward Kelly




11 November to 17 December 2019*: Ms Esther Morton *with the exception of: 28 November 2019: Ms Jean Gleeson 6 December 2019: Mr John Poole 13 December 2019: Ms Rachel Horkin

Attendance and Representation:

Medical Practitioner: 1 April 2019: Present (in person) and represented 2 to 12 April 2019 29 April 2019: Not present but represented 11 November to 17 December 2019: Present (via Video Link) and represented

Medical Practitioner’s Representative: Mr Selva Ramasamy Counsel, QC, instructed by the MDU

GMC Representative: Mr Tom Gilbart, Counsel, instructed by GMC Legal

Attendance of Press / Public In accordance with Rule 41 of the General Medical Council (Fitness to Practise) Rules 2004 the hearing was held partly in public and partly in private. Overarching Objective Throughout the decision-making process the Tribunal has borne in mind the statutory overarching objective as set out in s1 Medical Act 1983 (the 1983 Act) to protect, promote and maintain the health, safety and well-being of the public, to promote and maintain public confidence in the medical profession, and to promote and maintain proper professional standards and conduct for members of that profession.




DETERMINATION ON FACTS - 10/12/2019 1. This determination XXX will be read in private. As this case concerns Professor Reddy’s alleged misconduct, a redacted version will be published at the close of the hearing. Background

2. Professor Reddy qualified in 2003 and in 2008 joined the Institute of Metabolic Science at the University of Cambridge (‘UOC’), where he was allocated laboratory space, facilities, and an office. Professor Reddy remained in full-time employment with UOC until November 2016. This post was part-funded by a grant from the Wellcome Trust Foundation.

3. In or around May 2013, Professor Reddy was approached about applying for the position of the Crick Chair of Clinical Sciences at the Francis Crick Institute (‘FCI’). In June 2014, following an interview, Professor Reddy was offered the position. He was to be employed by University College London (‘UCL’) and his full-time employment with UCL commenced on 28 September 2015.

4. At the time his employment started the FCI building was not yet completed. Professor Reddy continued both with his research at UOC and with clinical work at Addenbrooke’s Hospital in Cambridge. He did not resign from UOC where his full-time employment continued until 30 November 2016.

5. The GMC alleges that Professor Reddy’s failure to inform UCL that he remained in full-time employment with UOC, and his failure to inform both the UOC and UCL that he was in receipt of two full-time salaries, was dishonest.

The Outcome of Applications Made during the Facts Stage

6. On 1 April 2019 Mr Gilbart, Counsel for the GMC, made an application pursuant to Rule 17(6) of the General Medical Council (Fitness to Practise Rules) 2004, as amended (‘the Rules’), to amend a typographical error in paragraph 5 of the Allegation. There was no objection from Mr Ramasamy, Counsel for Professor Reddy and, having accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor, the Tribunal determined to grant this application. The Tribunal’s full decision on this application is included at Annex A.

7. On 2 April 2019 Mr Ramasamy applied for the hearing to be adjourned XXX, in accordance with Rule 29(2) of the Rules. Mr Gilbart did not oppose this application, and the Tribunal determined to adjourn proceedings until 3 April 2019 in the first instance, XXX. The Tribunal’s full reasoning is included at Annex B.




8. On 3 April 2019 Mr Ramasamy gave the Tribunal an update XXX and requested a further adjournment until 4 April 2019. Mr Gilbart did not oppose this application, and the Tribunal determined to grant this further adjournment. The Tribunal’s full reasoning is included at Annex C.

9. On 4 April 2019 Mr Ramasamy again requested an adjournment, XXX. Mr Gilbart did not oppose a short adjournment, and the Tribunal determined to adjourn until 8 April 2019. The Tribunal’s full reasoning on this application is included at Annex D.

10. On 12 April 2019 the Tribunal was given a further update XXX, and was provided with evidence indicating that he was unable to attend the hearing in person. The Tribunal determined to adjourn the hearing until 29 April 2019, with a view to relisting the hearing. The Tribunal’s full reasoning is set out at Annex E.

11. On 29 April 2019, having had sight of updated information XXX, the Tribunal determined to adjourn the hearing until 11 November 2019. The Tribunal’s reasoning on this decision is included at Annex F.

The Allegation and the Doctor’s Response

12. The Allegation made against Professor Reddy is as follows:

Paragraph One Between 1 August 2008 and 30 November 2016 you were in full-time employment with the University of Cambridge (‘UOC’). Admitted and found proved

Paragraph Two From 28 September 2015 you were in full-time employment with University College London (‘UCL’). Admitted and found proved

Paragraph Three You failed to inform UCL that you remained in full time employment with UOC. To be determined

Paragraph Four Between 28 September 2015 and 30 November 2016 you:

a. were in receipt of full time salaries from both UOC and UCL; To be determined b. knew you were in receipt of two full time salaries; To be determined




c. failed to inform UOC and UCL that you were in receipt of two full time salaries. To be determined

Paragraph Five Your actions as described at paragraphs 3 and 4c were dishonest by reason of paragraphs and 4b. Amended under Rule 17(6) To be determined

The Admitted Facts

13. At the outset of these proceedings Professor Reddy admitted Paragraphs one and two of the Allegation, as set out above, in accordance with Rule 17(2)(d) of the Rules. In accordance with Rule 17(2)(e), the Tribunal announced these admitted paragraphs of the Allegation found proved.

Witness Evidence

14. The Tribunal heard oral evidence from the following witnesses, called on behalf of the GMC:

• Professor A, Professor of Neurology at UOC and Head of Department of Clinical Neurosciences at Cambridge (retired), in person. Professor A also provided a witness statement dated 23 March 2018;

• Dr B, Head of Grants Operations at the Wellcome Trust (‘Wellcome’), by video link. Dr B also provided a witness statement dated 24 May 2018;

• Professor Sir C, Professor and Head of the Clinical Biochemistry Department at the UOC, in person. He also provided a GMC witness statement dated 21 March 2018;

• Sir D, Director of the Francis Crick Institute, by video link. Sir D also provided a witness statement dated 20 April 2018;

• Mr E, Director of Operations for the Faculty of Brain Sciences at UCL, in person. Mr E also provided a witness statement dated 5 April 2018;

• Professor F, Dean of the Faculty of Brain Sciences at UCL, in person. Professor F also provided a witness statement dated 28 March 2018;

• Mr G, Finance Manager for the UCL Institute of Neurology, in person. Mr G also provided a witness statement dated 11 May 2018;




• Ms H, Assistant Director (Post Award) for Research Services at UCL, in person. Ms H also provided a witness statement dated 26 March 2018.

15. The Tribunal also received a witness statement from Ms I, HR Business Manager for the Clinical School at UOC, dated 19 December 2018. The Tribunal did not hear oral evidence from Ms I.

16. On behalf of Professor Reddy, the Tribunal received witness statements from the following witnesses who were not called to give oral evidence:

• Dr J, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, dated 27 February 2019;

• Dr K, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, dated 28 February 2019;

• Dr L, Director of the Addenbrooke’s MND Care & Research Centre, dated 27 January 2019

• Sir M, Senior Consultant to FCI, dated 28 February 2019.

17. Professor Reddy provided his own witness statement dated 29 February 2019, and also gave oral evidence at this hearing.

Documentary Evidence

18. The Tribunal had regard to the documentary evidence which includes, but is not limited to:

• Various correspondence between Professor Reddy and the Wellcome Trust;

• Various correspondence between Professor Reddy and UCL/ FCI;

• Various correspondence between Professor Reddy and UOC;

• Notes from a UCL Investigation Meeting dated June 2017;

• Some documentation and transcripts from Professor Reddy’s disciplinary hearing at UCL;

• Professor Reddy’s CV;

• Professor Reddy’s bank statements and assorted documentation relating to a mortgage;

• XXX.




The Tribunal’s Approach

19. In reaching its decision on the disputed facts, the Tribunal has borne in mind that the burden of proof rests on the GMC and it is for the GMC to prove the Allegation. Professor Reddy does not need to prove anything. The standard of proof is that applicable to civil proceedings, namely the balance of probabilities. Applying this standard, the Tribunal must ask itself whether it is more likely than not that the events in question occurred.

20. The Tribunal has considered each outstanding paragraph of the Allegation separately and has evaluated the evidence in order to make its findings. It has taken into account the submissions made by both parties and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor, which is a matter of record.

Witness Credibility

21. In reaching its decision the Tribunal first had regard to the overall credibility and reliability of the witnesses.

GMC witnesses

22. The Tribunal considered the witnesses called on behalf of the GMC to be credible, honest, balanced, and generally consistent. A number of them attested to Professor Reddy’s exceptional skills and undoubted contribution to the profession. None of the GMC witnesses were aware of the ‘full picture’ in the same way as Professor Reddy, but they were all able to provide detail in relation to their specific area of knowledge and/or their interactions with Professor Reddy.

23. The Tribunal noted that Professor F erroneously believed he was present at Professor Reddy’s UCL interview. When this error was pointed out to him during his oral evidence he accepted his error graciously. The Tribunal considered that this enhanced the credibility of his evidence generally. The witnesses did not consider the transferring of grants to be particularly complicated or out of the ordinary. Overall the Tribunal found the witnesses called on behalf of the GMC to be helpful, credible, and reliable.

Witnesses of behalf of Professor Reddy

24. In their statements, the witnesses consistently described Professor Reddy as a committed and well-respected scientist, and the Tribunal had no reason to doubt the sincerity of their evidence. Professor Reddy is a man of good character who is highly respected in his field. The witnesses were aware of the reasons for this hearing and all stated they found it difficult to believe that Professor Reddy had been dishonest.




Professor Reddy

25. Professor Reddy was an articulate witness, and the Tribunal noted that he is highly respected in his field and of good character. However, the Tribunal observed that Professor Reddy had difficulty directly answering a number of questions put to him by Mr Gilbart. By way of example, Mr Gilbart took Professor Reddy to a letter he wrote to the Medical Director at Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust on 27 February 2017 about his dual salaries, and asked Professor Reddy how he had managed to ‘misexpress’ himself in this letter. Professor Reddy was unable to provide an answer, stating: ‘I don’t know’. The evidence given in this letter (namely Professor Reddy’s assertion that any overlap between UCL and UOC would be temporary and that he would pay back any overpayment incurred) was contradicted by his witness statement, where he stated that he believed UOC and UCL had ‘come to an agreement about balancing payments from the two institutions’. In oral evidence, he was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for this apparent inconsistency.

26. Similarly, when Mr Gilbart asked what account Professor Reddy gave at his UCL disciplinary hearing, Professor Reddy answered that he could not remember. The Tribunal did not find it credible that Professor Reddy could not recall an event of such importance.

27. Professor Reddy wrote in his witness statement that between August and November 2015, he was ‘barely attending to other tasks, and mostly remotely’ following XXX. However, Professor Reddy had attended a meeting with Sir D and others and sent numerous work-related emails during this period; when questioned about this Professor Reddy accepted that, despite his difficulties, he was still dealing with work-related matters.

28. Professor Reddy was also asked about his assertion that he did not check his bank statements until February 2016. The Tribunal did not find it credible that he did not check his bank account prior to February 2016 given the documentary evidence. The Tribunal did not accept that Professor Reddy was financially naive. He had set up a number of savings accounts, he had put in place regular transfers, and made two significant payments to his offset mortgage. The Tribunal also noted Professor Reddy’s meticulous attention to detail in negotiating the terms of his contract and salary package at UCL.

29. Professor Reddy is clearly a highly intelligent man and an exceptional scientist. However, in his oral evidence he appeared forgetful and was, at times inconsistent, which undermined the credibility and reliability of his evidence generally.

30. Having considered the credibility of the witnesses, the Tribunal went on to consider the disputed Paragraphs of the Allegation, as set out below.




The Tribunal’s Overall Determination on the Facts

31. The Tribunal has determined the facts as follows:

Paragraph One Between 1 August 2008 and 30 November 2016 you were in full-time employment with the University of Cambridge (‘UOC’). Admitted and found proved

Paragraph Two From 28 September 2015 you were in full-time employment with University College London (‘UCL’). Admitted and found proved

Paragraph Three You failed to inform UCL that you remained in full time employment with UOC. Found proved

32. The Tribunal first considered whether Professor Reddy had a duty to inform UCL that he remained in full-time employment with UOC. If there was no duty, then there cannot have been a failure on his part.

33. The Tribunal considered it self-evident that a person cannot undertake two full-time jobs simultaneously. It had regard to the letters dated 4 July 2014 and 28 August 2014 from UCL to Professor Reddy, which make clear that his appointment at UCL was to be a full-time post. In addition, Professor Reddy accepted in oral evidence that he knew he was a full-time employee at UCL and was subject to a contract of employment. Given this, and Professor Reddy’s acceptance that he had not resigned from his full-time employment at UOC, it follows that, in accepting the UCL post, Professor Reddy had a duty to inform his new employer (UCL) that he was still employed by a previous employer (UOC) in a full-time capacity. Having found that there was a duty, the Tribunal next considered whether Professor Reddy failed in this duty.

34. Professor Reddy accepts that he did not formally resign from UOC, writing in his witness statement that:

‘There was no formal resignation – I did not give [UOC] a resignation letter.’

However, he denies that this was a failure, adding:

‘At the time, it was my genuine belief that all necessary people were fully aware of the position. With the benefit of hindsight, I regret not being more proactive in ensuring that I specifically notified UCL of the situation. However, at the time, I thought that my employment situation was clear and widely known.’




35. The Tribunal therefore asked itself whether Professor Reddy’s employment situation was ‘clear and widely known’. In so doing it had regard to the correspondence between Professor Reddy and UCL/UOC, as well as the evidence provided by administrative and academic staff at UCL and UOC.

36. The Tribunal first had regard to a letter dated 7 November 2014 from Mr N, Employment Contract Manager at UCL. In this letter Mr N referred to UOC as Professor Reddy’s previous employer, writing:

‘I note you were first appointed with a previous employer to the Consultant contract on 01 April 2011…’

and:

‘…In accordance with your having been appointed to the terms of the Consultant contract with a previous employer…’

37. The Tribunal next had regard to the ongoing email correspondence between Professor Reddy and UCL, and it noted that on 7 August 2015 Ms O, Senior HR Consultant at UCL, wrote:

‘I have also made contact with University of Cambridge Human Resources and confirmed with them your salary grade and start date at UCL in September’.

From this, the Tribunal considered that it would have been reasonable for Professor Reddy to assume that UOC knew he would be starting at UCL in September 2015, and that the UOC and UCL HR departments were in communication with each other. However, this email does not explicitly state that either UCL or UOC knew that he remained in full-time employment with both institutions. Similarly, the Tribunal noted the correspondence between Professor Reddy and UOC/UCL regarding his transitional arrangements. From this correspondence the Tribunal considered that it was reasonable to assume that UCL knew that Professor Reddy continued to use laboratory space and undertake clinical work at UOC. However, Professor Reddy did not explicitly state that he remained in full-time employment at UOC, and therefore it would not be reasonable to assume that UCL were aware of this on the basis of these emails.

38. In oral evidence Professor Sir C (of UOC) informed the Tribunal that the proper procedure would have been for Professor Reddy to send a formal letter of resignation to both Professor Sir C and Mr P. In the absence of such a letter, which Professor Reddy accepts he did not send, Professor Reddy remained a full-time employee at UOC. The evidence indicates that UOC believed that Professor Reddy remained a full-time employee post-September 2015, with Professor Sir C writing in his witness statement that he had assumed Professor’s Reddy’s appointment at UCL was ‘proleptic’, adding:




‘This means that … he was appointed to the position but would actually take up the appointment at a future date. For example, someone appointed to a role on 1 June 2016 might then actually take up their new position on 1 June 2018.’

39. The evidence suggests that UCL considered Professor Reddy to be a full-time employee of UCL from 28 September 2015, and that he had resigned from UOC. For example, in Professor F’s witness statement he sets out that he met with Professor Reddy in March 2016, adding:

‘…At no point during this meeting did Professor Reddy inform me that he remained an employee of Cambridge. The only reference was to clinical work, which is at a hospital and not the University’.

Professor F adds that he first became aware of Professor Reddy’s continued employment at UOC in ‘early 2017’.

40. The evidence therefore suggests that neither UCL nor UOC realised that Professor Reddy was in full-time employment with both institutions. There is some evidence to suggest that UCL may have believed Professor Reddy was using UOC facilities on a ‘grace and favour’ basis pending the completion of the FCI building, but there is nothing in the correspondence from UCL to suggest they were aware that Professor Reddy remained in full-time employment at UOC. Indeed, when UCL found out that Professor Reddy remained in full-time employment with UOC he was subject to full disciplinary proceedings, and the Tribunal considered that this in itself is evidence that UCL was not previously aware of Professor Reddy’s employment situation. Professor Reddy failed to resign from his post at UOC, and subsequently failed to inform UCL that he remained in full-time employment with UOC. The Tribunal has noted the various communications between Professor Reddy and UOC/UCL, and it recognises the administrative and logistical difficulties in the transfer of his post to UCL and how the transfer of the grant funding would be managed. However, given the evidence above, the Tribunal rejected Professor Reddy’s explanation that he believed UCL to be aware of his ‘employment situation’ in that he remained in full-time employment with UOC and UCL simultaneously. It therefore found this Paragraph of the Allegation proved.

Paragraph Four Between 28 September 2015 and 30 November 2016 you:

a. were in receipt of full time salaries from both UOC and UCL; Found proved

41. Professor Reddy has not formally admitted this Paragraph of the Allegation as he did not receive any payment from UCL in September 2015. However, in his witness statement he admits receiving full-time salaries from both UOC and UCL from October 2015 until November 2016, writing:




‘This is admitted from 30 October 2015.’

42. Professor Reddy’s partial admission is corroborated by his bank statements from this period, with which the Tribunal has been provided.

43. The Tribunal heard advice from the Legal Assessor on the use of the word ‘between’ in the wording of the Allegation. He advised that ‘between’ is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as meaning ‘in a period separating two points of time’ rather than ‘throughout a period’. The Legal Assessor also noted that the Allegation is drafted as ‘between’ rather than ‘from… until’.

44. The Tribunal accepted this advice and took the Allegation to mean ‘in the period between 28 September 2015 and 30 November 2016’ rather than ‘from 28 September 2015 until 30 November 2016’. Accordingly, on the basis of Professor Reddy’s admission as well as the documentary evidence, the Tribunal found this Paragraph of the Allegation proved.

b. knew you were in receipt of two full time salaries; Found proved

45. In his witness statement Professor Reddy denies this Paragraph of the Allegation, stating that he did not know he was in receipt of two full-time salaries. He stated that when he checked his bank balance in February 2016, he ‘became aware that Cambridge and UCL had both paid’ him. He added that, in February 2016, he believed that:

‘…UCL and UOC had come to a mutual agreement about the monies to be paid to me…’

However, the Tribunal did not find Professor Reddy’s explanation to be credible for a number of reasons. 46. The Tribunal considered that Professor Reddy’s bank statements and pre-employment correspondence with UCL show him to be adept at managing his finances. By way of example, Professor Reddy negotiated with UCL to secure a salary almost double that which he was being paid by UOC, he made regular payments to XXX and to a savings account, and during the period in question he made two large payments to his offset mortgage. On the balance of probabilities, the Tribunal did not consider it likely that, being as financially aware as the evidence shows him to be, Professor Reddy would not have checked his bank accounts from October 2015 until February 2016. 47. Professor Reddy stated that he thought that the February 2016 payments would together amount to the salary he was expecting from UCL. The Tribunal was not persuaded by this argument. In the bank statement dated 13 January to 12 February 2016 Professor Reddy was paid three sums by UOC: £XXX on 18 January;




£XXX on 25 January; and £XXX on 26 January. The latter sum represented his full-time pay. He also received £XXX from UCL, a sum which he said was ‘considerably less’ than he was expecting to receive from them. 48. When Professor Reddy appreciated that he was being paid by both institutions, the Tribunal does not accept it as credible that he would not have scrutinised his bank account. He had stated that he had expected some ‘overlap’ of pay between the two institutions, and the Tribunal finds it implausible that – if this were the case – Professor Reddy did not query the overpayments with UOC/UCL. 49. There are a number of inconsistencies between Professor Reddy’s accounts of events. As stated above, in his letter to UCL dated 27 February 2017 Professor Reddy wrote that he had anticipated some overlap of salaries, adding that he would repay any overpayment made. However, in evidence Professor Reddy said that he believed his dual payment was because UOC and UCL had come to an agreement to share the cost of his salary, with the UOC payment representing his clinical work. Mr Gilbart questioned Professor Reddy about this inconsistency during cross-examination, but he was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation. 50. Further, the Tribunal did not find Professor Reddy’s assertion that the UOC payment represented his clinical practice to be credible. The written evidence from Ms I suggested that the renumeration for Professor Reddy’s clinical work comprised a small part of his overall salary. In the year 1 May 2014 to 30 April 2015, for example, the clinical payment was £XXX plus smaller payments for on-call and a local excellence award. The £XXX paid by UOC in February 2016 was similar to Professor Reddy’s full-time net monthly salary from UOC. In the circumstances, the Tribunal rejected Professor Reddy’s evidence that he believed this sum merely to represent his clinical work. 51. In addition, Professor Reddy met Professor F in March 2016, and during this meeting discussed finance. The Tribunal considered that, if Professor Reddy believed there to be a payment arrangement in place, he would have mentioned this arrangement during this meeting or at some other time. He did not do so. 52. Lastly, Professor Reddy’s bank statements show that on 15 February 2016 he made a payment of £50,000 to his offset mortgage. Professor Reddy set out in his letter of 27 February 2017 that he knew he might have received some overlap in salary, but added that he would repay any overpayment. The Tribunal considered that, if this were the case, Professor Reddy would not have transferred such a large sum to his mortgage, without waiting to see how much money needed to be repaid to ensure that he had sufficient funds in his account to cover that overpayment. In addition, Professor Reddy was unable to provide a satisfactory answer during cross-examination as to how he would fund the repayment if called upon to do so at that time.




53. Having found that Professor Reddy knew he was in receipt of two full-time salaries, the Tribunal found this Paragraph of the Allegation proved.

c. failed to inform UOC and UCL that you were in receipt of two full time salaries. Found proved

54. Given the Tribunal’s finding in relation to Paragraph 4(b) of the Allegation, the Tribunal next considered whether Professor Reddy had a duty to inform UOC and UCL that he was in receipt of full-time salaries from both institutions. 55. Given that it was not possible for Professor Reddy to work full-time at two different institutions, the Tribunal concluded that it was incumbent on him to inform both UOC and UCL that he was nevertheless receiving two full-time salaries. Professor Reddy asserts that both UOC and UCL were aware that he remained in full-time employment at both institutions; however, the Tribunal has previously rejected this account. Professor Sir C of UOC believed Professor Reddy’s appointment to be ‘proleptic’, and it therefore follows that he assumed UCL were not yet paying Professor Reddy. Similarly, Professor F of UCL did not know until early 2017 that Professor Reddy had remained a full-time employee of UOC until 30 November 2016, and it therefore follows that he did not know prior to this that Professor Reddy had been in receipt of two full-time salaries. The Tribunal found both Professor Sir C and Professor F to be credible witnesses, and it accepted their accounts of events. 56. The Tribunal further had regard to an email dated 6 January 2017 from Mr G, Finance Manager at UCL, who emailed Professor Reddy to query his salary arrangements, writing:

‘…would you kindly clarify if you have continued to receive salary payments from Cambridge since you became an employee of UCL?’

This email suggests that, at that time, UCL was unsure of Professor Reddy’s salary arrangements. 57. There is no evidence before this Tribunal to indicate that Professor Reddy informed either UOC or UCL that he was in receipt of two full-time salaries. Professor Reddy had a duty to inform both institutions that he was being paid by them both, but instead, the evidence indicates that he allowed both payments to continue for a period of 14 months. Accordingly, the Tribunal found this Paragraph of the Allegation proved.

Paragraph Five Your actions as described at paragraphs 3 and 4c were dishonest by reason of paragraphs and 4b.




Amended under Rule 17(6) Found proved

58. The Tribunal has found that Professor Reddy failed to inform UCL that he remained in full-time employment with UOC, and that he failed to inform both UOC and UCL that he was in receipt of two full-time salaries despite knowing this to be the case. In determining whether his actions in so doing were dishonest, the Tribunal had regard to the guidance set out by Lord Hughes in the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC 67, as follows:

‘When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.’

59. In reaching its decision the Tribunal has taken into account Professor Reddy’s good character and the Legal Assessor’s advice as to how to approach the question of dishonesty in the light of that. 60. The Tribunal first considered Professor Reddy’s belief in relation to both UOC and UCL paying him a salary. Even if Professor Reddy may have believed that a period of overpayment was to be expected during his transition from UOC to UCL, he took no steps to inform either UOC or UCL about the dual payments. For a period of several months he retained money to which he was not entitled and used it for his own purposes, for example in February 2016 when making a one-off payment of £50,000 to his offset mortgage. 61. In December 2016 Mr G (UCL) emailed Mr P (UOC) stating that:

‘…We need to know if AK [Professor Reddy] has been receiving a salary from Cambridge since the 28th September 2015.’

Mr P’s response stated that:

‘…[UOC] should report expenditure first to Wellcome Trust as required and Dr. Reddy will be contacting you about this.’




On 6 January 2017 Mr G emailed Professor Reddy and various UCL addressees asking Professor Reddy to:

‘…kindly clarify if you have continued to receive salary payments from Cambridge since you became an employee of UCL?’

Professor Reddy’s response was ambiguous. He stated that:

‘The end of grant report for the Wellcome fellowship should be available soon. This will show my salary costs in Cambridge deducted until Sept 2015.’

The Tribunal notes that Professor Reddy failed directly to respond to Mr G’s email question. In any case, his response was not accurate given that Professor Reddy had known since at least February 2016 that payments from UOC had continued. In cross-examination Professor Reddy admitted that his response had not answered Mr G’s question, stating that Mr G ‘already knew’ that he was being paid twice. He added that it would have been ‘impolite’ to challenge Mr G on this matter. The Tribunal rejected that explanation and concluded that Professor Reddy’s failure to respond directly to this question was an attempt to avoid disclosing the true facts. 62. The Tribunal therefore concluded that, even if Professor Reddy initially believed that there was an overpayment which UOC and UCL would resolve between them, he subsequently retained and used some of this money for his own purposes knowing that he was not entitled to do so, having failed to directly address the overpayment with both UOC and UCL. 63. The Tribunal then considered the second limb of the Ivey test. It concluded that ordinary, decent people would consider that, by knowingly retaining salary that he was not entitled to receive, failing to take prompt action to alert the universities to the two salaries, and using the funds for his own purposes, Professor Reddy was dishonest. 64. The Tribunal therefore finds that Professor Reddy acted dishonestly as alleged and finds the facts of this Paragraph proved. DETERMINATION ON IMPAIRMENT - 12/12/2019 1. The Tribunal now has to decide whether, on the basis of the facts found proved, Professor Reddy’s fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct.

2. The Tribunal has taken into account all the evidence received during the facts stage of the hearing. In addition, the Tribunal received further evidence at the impairment stage, including:

• A reflective statement from Professor Reddy dated 11 December 2019;




• CPD certificates dating from October 2017 to November 2018;

• Professor Reddy’s 2019 CPD Diary Reflection Report;

• Further testimonial evidence from professional colleagues.

3. The Tribunal also heard submissions from Mr Gilbart and Mr Ramasamy QC, as summarised below. The Tribunal also heard, and accepted, the advice of the Legal Assessor.

Submissions

On behalf of the GMC

4. Mr Gilbart submitted that dishonesty of any kind by a doctor must be viewed as serious misconduct, and he referred the Tribunal to the case of Nandi v GMC [2004] EWHC 2317 (Admin), where Mr Justice Collins set out that:

‘…dishonest conduct can very easily be regarded as serious professional misconduct…’

Mr Gilbart reminded the Tribunal that it had found Professor Reddy’s dishonesty persisted over a significant period, and involved a considerable amount of money. Not only did Professor Reddy retain money to which he was not entitled and use it for his own purposes, he also sought to avoid giving an explanation after matters came to light. Mr Gilbart submitted that Professor Reddy’s actions are wholly inconsistent with the levels of probity and professional standards expected from doctors, and that such behaviour must be viewed as serious misconduct. 5. Mr Gilbart accepted that Professor Reddy is of previous good character, as reflected in the numerous testimonials received on his behalf. However, Mr Gilbart invited the Tribunal to consider the fact that these testimonials were written prior to the Tribunal reaching its determination on the facts, and he submitted that this affects the weight that can be given to them. Similarly, Mr Gilbart submitted that, whilst commendable, Professor Reddy’s remediation can only be of limited importance in the light of the seriousness of his dishonesty, the seriousness of the Tribunal’s findings, and the fact that his remediation was undertaken prior to Professor Reddy giving evidence and the Tribunal’s determination on the facts. 6. Mr Gilbart invited the Tribunal to consider the need to uphold proper professional standards, and he submitted that public confidence in the medical profession would be undermined were a finding of impairment not made. Accordingly, Mr Gilbart invited the Tribunal to find that Professor Reddy’s actions




amounted to misconduct, and that his fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of that misconduct. On behalf of Professor Reddy

7. At the outset, Mr Ramasamy submitted that Professor Reddy recognised that the Facts, as found proved, would inevitably lead to a finding of misconduct. He went onto state that Professor Reddy had been the ‘architect of his own misfortune’ and submitted that this was a ‘tragedy’. He further submitted that Professor Reddy recognised the importance of the public interest and public confidence in the profession, and that he would not be resisting a finding of impairment. Whilst not resisting such a finding, Mr Ramasamy invited the Tribunal to consider a number of factors, including the following:

• Evidence of remediation. Mr Ramasamy drew the Tribunal’s attention to Professor Reddy’s reflective statement, as well as the documents designed to assist the Tribunal with its decision on misconduct and impairment. He submitted that Professor Reddy has taken relevant steps towards remediation, and he invited the Tribunal to consider the CPD documentation in support of this. He submitted that Professor Reddy has provided examples of how he has learnt from the courses he has attended, and how he has put the lessons he has learnt into play with the aim of avoiding his misconduct recurring.

• The consequences of Professor Reddy’s actions. Mr Ramasamy submitted that Professor Reddy has already faced ‘significant consequences’ as a result of these events. He has faced disciplinary proceedings at UCL, he was dismissed from his post at FCI, and he was forced to stop clinical work and move to the United States of America to continue his research, leaving his wider family and friends behind. Mr Ramasamy also reminded the Tribunal of XXX, and submitted that Professor Reddy felt a deep sense of shame when looking back on events. Despite this, the Tribunal heard that Professor Reddy hopes to return to clinical practice, which Mr Ramasamy submitted is a sign of his resilience.

• Character evidence. Mr Ramasamy submitted that character evidence had been

provided by witnesses of considerable calibre, called on behalf of the GMC as well as Professor Reddy. He submitted that Professor Reddy is seen as an ‘exceptional’ individual who is held in high esteem by the scientific community, as evidenced by his current post at the prestigious University of Pennsylvania.

• Professor Reddy’s engagement. Professor Reddy has engaged fully with these

proceedings over video link, despite XXX and the time difference (with Professor Reddy currently residing in the USA). This, Mr Ramasamy submitted, is the marker of a man who respects this process.




• The particular circumstances of the case. Mr Ramasamy submitted that any dishonesty by Professor Reddy was ‘doomed to failure’. He further submitted that it was ‘curious’ that a man of Professor Reddy’s character was able to act in such an ‘unsophisticated’ way, and he reminded the Tribunal that the money in question was repaid in full.

• Risk of repetition. Mr Ramasamy submitted that the events occurred in 2015-

2016, and that there has been no suggestion of any repetition since. He submitted that Professor Reddy’s previous good character and his experience of being under the spotlight mean that the Tribunal can be confident that he will not repeat misconduct of this sort again.

The Relevant Legal Principles

8. The Tribunal reminded itself that, at this stage of proceedings, there is no burden or standard of proof and a finding of impairment is a matter for the Tribunal’s judgement alone.

9. The Tribunal must determine whether Professor Reddy’s fitness to practise is impaired today. In doing so, it must take into account Professor Reddy’s conduct at the time of events. It must also consider any relevant factors, including: whether the misconduct is remediable; whether it has been remedied; and the likelihood of repetition.

The Tribunal’s Determination on Impairment

10. In reaching its decision on impairment the Tribunal bore in mind that its primary responsibility is to the statutory overarching objective, which is:

• To protect, promote, and maintain the health, safety, and well-being of the public;

• To promote and maintain public confidence in the medical profession;

• To promote and maintain proper professional standards and conduct for members of that profession.

Misconduct 11. The Tribunal first asked itself whether Professor Reddy’s actions, as found proved by the Tribunal in its determination on facts, amounted to misconduct. In so doing, the Tribunal first asked whether Professor Reddy’s actions were in breach of the professional rules and standards he is required to abide by, namely those set out in Good Medical Practice (‘GMP’).




12. The Tribunal determined that Professor Reddy’s actions breached the following paragraphs set out in GMP:

[1] ‘Patients need good doctors. Good doctors make the care of their patients their first concern: they… are honest and trustworthy, and act within the law.’ [65] ‘You must make sure that your conduct justifies your patients’ trust in you and the public’s trust in the profession.’ [68] ‘You must be honest and trustworthy in all your communication with patients and colleagues. This means you must make clear the limits of your knowledge and make reasonable checks to make sure any information you give is accurate.’ [77] ‘You must be honest in financial and commercial dealings with patients, employers, insurers and other organisations or individuals.’

13. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that Professor Reddy did not set out to be dishonest, he dishonestly took advantage of a situation for his own financial gain. In so doing, he failed to act with honesty and integrity, he failed to ensure his conduct justified patients’ trust in him and in the profession, and he was not honest in his financial dealings with his employers. Professor Reddy’s dishonesty extended over a period of approximately 14 months and involved a substantial amount of money, albeit an agreed sum of money was repaid. The Tribunal determined that fellow practitioners would find such actions deplorable. Accordingly, it concluded that Professor Reddy’s actions in relation to all of the proven facts were sufficiently serious so as to amount to misconduct. Impairment 14. Having found that Professor Reddy’s actions amounted to misconduct, the Tribunal next considered whether Professor Reddy’s fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of that misconduct. In reaching its decision, the Tribunal had regard to relevant case law, including the approach set out by Dame Janet Smith in the Fifth Shipman report:

‘Do our findings of fact … show that his/her fitness to practise is impaired in the sense that s/he:

a. has in the past acted and/or is liable in the future to act so as to put a

patient or patients at unwarranted risk of harm; and/or

b. has in the past brought and/or is liable in the future to bring the medical profession into disrepute; and/or




c. has in the past breached and/or is liable in the future to breach one of the fundamental tenets of the medical profession;

d. has in the past acted dishonestly and/or is liable to act dishonestly in the

future.’ 15. In relation to (a), the Tribunal accepted that there are no patient safety concerns in Professor Reddy’s case, and that he has not acted in a way likely to put patients at unwarranted risk of harm. 16. In relation to (b) and (c), the Tribunal has found that Professor Reddy’s actions breached one of the fundamental tenets of the medical profession, namely that of honesty. In addition, his actions were in breach of a number of paragraphs of GMP, and the Tribunal determined that fellow practitioners would consider his actions to be deplorable. Accordingly, the Tribunal was satisfied that Professor Reddy’s actions have brought the medical profession into disrepute. 17. In relation to (d), the Tribunal has already found that Professor Reddy acted dishonestly. In asking whether there is a risk of repetition, the Tribunal considered a number of factors, including Professor Reddy’s steps towards remediation, the consequences of his actions, as well as his insight. The Tribunal acknowledges that dishonesty is difficult to remediate, but it recognises that Professor Reddy has undertaken a number of relevant courses, including ‘Openness and Trust’, ‘Medical Ethics’, and ‘Medical Professionalism’. Professor Reddy has reflected on these courses, and there is no suggestion of any repetition of his misconduct. 18. The Tribunal further noted the serious consequences for Professor Reddy, both personally and professionally. Professor Reddy faced disciplinary proceedings at UCL, lost his appointment at FCI, and is now facing action before his regulator. In addition, he has had to move to the USA to find work, meaning he is separated from his wider family. The Tribunal accepted Mr Ramasamy’s submission that the impact of Professor Reddy’s actions mean he is unlikely to repeat his misconduct, with Mr Ramasamy submitting that Professor Reddy had learnt a ‘salutary lesson’. 19. The Tribunal next addressed the issue of insight. It noted that Professor Reddy stated that he has accepted the Tribunal’s findings, and further, that his conduct fell below the standard expected of him. For example, in Professor Reddy’s reflective statement he wrote:

‘I recognise the public interest, and the need to uphold standards and the impact a finding of dishonesty could have on the public’s perception of the profession.’

The Tribunal bore in mind that Professor Reddy has shown insight into his failings, writing in his reflective statement:




‘I wish to apologise again for the actions which have brought me to a hearing before the MPTS. I believe I have learnt a salutary lesson from these events. I accept that I ought to have taken proactive steps to initiate the administrative interactions and ensure that I specifically brought the dual payment to the attention of UCL and Cambridge as soon as it became known to me in February 2016.’

20. The Tribunal therefore considered that Professor Reddy has taken appropriate steps to remediate his misconduct, and that he has shown insight into his failings. Given all the circumstances outlined above, the Tribunal considered that he is highly unlikely to repeat his dishonest behaviour. 21. The Tribunal reminded itself of the approach cited with judicial approval by Mrs Justice Cox in the case of CHRE v NMC & Paula Grant [2011] EWHC 927 (Admin) (‘Grant’). In paragraph 74 of her judgment in Grant, Mrs Justice Cox said:

‘... In determining whether a practitioner's fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct, the relevant panel should generally consider not only whether the practitioner continues to present a risk to members of the public in his or her current role, but also whether the need to uphold proper professional standards and public confidence in the profession would be undermined if a finding of impairment were not made in the particular circumstances.’

22. The Tribunal considered the positive testimonials received on Professor Reddy’s behalf, which unequivocally attest to him being of good character, and it noted that each testimonial stated that the author was aware of the Allegation faced by Professor Reddy. However, it balanced these testimonials with its findings that Professor Reddy acted dishonestly. 23. Having regard to the statutory overarching objective, the Tribunal determined that, in light of the seriousness of Professor Reddy’s misconduct, the need to uphold proper professional standards and to maintain public confidence in the profession would be undermined if a finding of impairment were not made in the particular circumstances. Accordingly, the Tribunal determined that Professor Reddy’s fitness to practise is currently impaired by reason of his misconduct. For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal makes no such finding on the grounds of public protection. DETERMINATION ON SANCTION - 17/12/2019 1. This determination XXX will be read in private. As this case concerns Professor Reddy’s misconduct, a redacted version will be published at the close of the hearing.




2. Having determined that Professor Reddy’s fitness to practise is impaired by reason of his misconduct, the Tribunal now has to decide on the appropriate sanction, if any, to impose.

3. The Tribunal had regard to all the evidence before it, as well as to the submissions made by Mr Gilbart and Mr Ramasamy, as summarised below, together with the advice of the Legal Assessor.

Submissions

On behalf of the GMC

4. Mr Gilbart took the Tribunal to the relevant sections of the Sanctions Guidance (‘SG’) in force when this hearing commenced and set out what he believed to be the mitigating and aggravating factors in Professor Reddy’s case. 5. Mr Gilbart submitted that it would not be appropriate or proportionate to take no action in Professor Reddy’s case. Similarly, he submitted that conditions would not be sufficient in order to mark the seriousness of Professor Reddy’s misconduct, adding that workable and proportionate conditions would be difficult to formulate given Professor Reddy’s dishonesty. 6. Mr Gilbart submitted that, balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, a period of suspension would be the appropriate and proportionate sanction. He submitted that suspension would send a signal to the profession and the public marking the seriousness of Professor Reddy’s misconduct, and he reminded the Tribunal that Professor Reddy’s actions were in breach of a number of key paragraphs of GMP. Mr Gilbart accepted that suspension has a punitive effect, but submitted that Professor Reddy’s behaviour was so serious that suspension remained the proportionate response. In relation to the length of any order, Mr Gilbart submitted that a period of suspension should be of sufficient duration to mark the seriousness of Professor Reddy’s actions. On behalf of Professor Reddy

7. Mr Ramasamy invited the Tribunal to consider a number of factors when reaching its decision on sanction, including the fact that Professor Reddy has cooperated throughout, that he did not set out to be dishonest, and the insight and remediation he has subsequently demonstrated. Mr Ramasamy reminded the Tribunal that, in its determination on impairment, it found that Professor Reddy was highly unlikely to repeat his dishonest behaviour. 8. Mr Ramasamy reminded the Tribunal of the consequences Professor Reddy has already faced as a result of his actions, and he invited the Tribunal to consider the time that has elapsed since the events in question. He submitted that Professor




Reddy knows that he could, and should, have behaved differently, and that his actions were wholly out of character, as evidenced by the testimonial evidence received on his behalf. 9. Mr Ramasamy submitted that Professor Reddy had adopted a ‘realistic’ stance on sanction and recognised that a period of suspension was likely. In relation to length of any suspension, Mr Ramasamy invited the Tribunal to consider the case of Kamberova v NMC [2016] EWHC 255 (Admin) (‘Kamberova’). Mr Ramasamy submitted that Professor Reddy has effectively been ‘suspended’ continuously since April 2017. He submitted that this period should be taken into consideration as per the principles set out in Kamberova, and added that a further short period of suspension would be the appropriate and proportionate sanction to impose. The Tribunal’s Determination on Sanction

10. The decision as to the appropriate sanction to impose, if any, is a matter for this Tribunal exercising its own judgement. In reaching its decision the Tribunal has taken account of the SG (February 2018 - November 2019 version) and has borne in mind that the purpose of a sanction is not to be punitive, although a sanction may have a punitive effect. 11. The Tribunal has applied the principle of proportionality, weighing Professor Reddy’s interests with the wider public interest. Throughout its deliberations the Tribunal has taken account of the requirements of the statutory overarching objective, as set out in its earlier determination on impairment. 12. The Tribunal first considered the aggravating and mitigating factors in Professor Reddy’s case. Aggravating Factors 13. The Tribunal identified the following aggravating factors:

• Professor Reddy’s dishonesty occurred during the course of his employment;

• There was a large amount of money involved; and

• Professor Reddy’s dishonesty continued for a substantial period of time.

14. In relation to the period of time, Mr Ramasamy submitted that Professor Reddy directed UCL to Mr P (at UOC) in August 2016, submitting that this action reduced the period of Professor Reddy’s dishonesty. However, the Tribunal noted that Professor Reddy continued to receive dual payments from both UCL and UOC until November 2016, and that during this period he did not address these double payments, despite the onus being on him to do so.




Mitigating Factors 15. The Tribunal identified the following mitigating factors:

• Professor Reddy has demonstrated insight into his misconduct;

• Whilst dishonesty is difficult to remediate, Professor Reddy has taken appropriate steps to remediate his failings;

• Professor Reddy has apologised for his actions, and has expressed regret and remorse;

• Professor Reddy promptly repaid the money in question when asked to do so;

• Professor Reddy’s dishonesty was not premediated; he took advantage of (rather than instigated) the situation he found himself in;

• There has been no suggestion of any repetition of Professor Reddy’s

misconduct, and the likelihood of repetition appears very low;

• Professor Reddy is of previous good character, as evidenced by the testimonials received on his behalf, and his dishonest behaviour appears to have been out of character;

• Despite XXX, he has actively engaged with this hearing throughout; and

• Whilst the Tribunal has found that Professor Reddy continued to deal with

work-related matters from August to November 2015, it noted XXX. 16. Having considered these factors, the Tribunal next went on to consider the sanctions available to it, starting with the least restrictive. No Action 17. The Tribunal first considered whether to conclude Professor Reddy’s case by taking no action. It considered that there were no exceptional circumstances that would warrant it taking no action, and that doing so would be wholly inappropriate and inadequate, given its finding that Professor Reddy acted dishonestly. Conditions 18. The Tribunal next considered whether to impose an order of conditions. In so doing, it bore in mind that any conditions imposed must be appropriate, workable,




measurable, and proportionate. In order to be workable, conditions must be designed to meet the specific failings identified. 19. The Tribunal determined that it would not be possible to devise conditions that would address the specific failings identified, namely Professor Reddy’s dishonest conduct. Further, the Tribunal has already found that the risk of repetition is low; there is therefore no ongoing failing to be addressed through the imposition of conditions. The Tribunal therefore concluded that conditions could not be workable, measurable or appropriate. Suspension 20. Turning next to whether an order of suspension would be appropriate, the Tribunal had regard to the SG, as directed by Mr Gilbart and Mr Ramasamy. 21. The Tribunal first considered paragraph 91 of the SG, which sets out that:

‘Suspension has a deterrent effect and can be used to send a signal to the doctor, the profession and public about what is regarded as behaviour unbefitting a registered doctor...’

The Tribunal has already found that Professor Reddy’s actions were in breach of a number of key principles set out in GMP, and that his conduct undermined public confidence in the medical profession. It determined that a period of suspension would send a message to the profession and the public, as well as to Professor Reddy, indicating that his dishonest actions were unbefitting a medical practitioner and will not be tolerated. 22. The Tribunal next had regard to paragraphs 92 and 93 of the SG, which state:

‘Suspension will be an appropriate response to misconduct that is so serious that action must be taken to… maintain public confidence in the profession. A period of suspension will be appropriate for conduct that is serious but falls short of being fundamentally incompatible with continued registration... Suspension may be appropriate… where there may have been acknowledgement of fault and where the Tribunal is satisfied that the behaviour or incident is unlikely to be repeated. The Tribunal may wish to see evidence that the doctor has taken steps to mitigate their actions…’

As set out above, Professor Reddy’s misconduct is so serious that action must be taken in order to protect public confidence in the profession. However, whilst Professor Reddy’s dishonest conduct was serious, he has since taken appropriate steps to remediate (as much as it is possible to remediate dishonesty) and he has expressed remorse for, and insight into, his actions. Accordingly, the Tribunal has




already found that the risk of repetition is low. The Tribunal therefore determined that Professor Reddy’s misconduct is not so serious that it is fundamentally incompatible with continued registration. 23. The Tribunal next turned to paragraph 97 of the SG, which sets out factors that indicate suspension may be appropriate. A number of these factors are present in Professor Reddy’s case:

(a) ‘A serious breach of Good Medical Practice, but where the doctor’s misconduct is not fundamentally incompatible with their continued registration, therefore complete removal from the medical register would not be in the public interest. However, the breach is serious enough that any sanction lower than a suspension would not be sufficient to… maintain confidence in doctors…

(e) No evidence that demonstrates remediation is unlikely to be successful, eg because of previous unsuccessful attempts or a doctor’s unwillingness to engage. (f) No evidence of repetition of similar behaviour since incident.

(g) The Tribunal is satisfied the doctor has insight and does not pose a significant risk of repeating behaviour…’

24. Bearing all these factors in mind, the Tribunal determined that suspension is the appropriate and proportionate sanction. An order of suspension serves to mark the seriousness of Professor Reddy’s misconduct and uphold public confidence in the medical profession, but also recognises the remediation and insight he has shown, the low risk of repetition, as well as the mitigating factors.

25. Having found suspension to be the appropriate and proportionate sanction, the Tribunal considered that erasure would be disproportionate and unduly punitive.

Duration 26. In considering the duration of the order, the Tribunal took account of the seriousness of Professor Reddy’s departure from GMP, the sustained length of his dishonesty, and the amount of money involved. It balanced these factors with Professor Reddy’s subsequent insight and remediation, his engagement with this hearing, the fact that there are no patient safety issues, the fact that his actions were not premediated, and that he has since repaid the money. The Tribunal noted that, whilst dishonesty is always serious, there is substantial mitigation in Professor Reddy’s case.




27. Having regard to these factors, the Tribunal determined to suspend Professor Reddy’s registration for a period of nine months. This period recognises the mitigation present, but also serves to mark the seriousness of Professor Reddy’s actions, and to uphold public confidence in the profession. 28. The Tribunal had regard to Mr Ramasamy’s submission in relation to Kamberova. Mr Ramasamy informed the Tribunal that Professor Reddy has not been subject to an interim order that restricted his right to practise. As a result, the Tribunal did not consider it appropriate to take this into account in considering the duration of the order. Review 29. The Tribunal determined not to direct a review hearing. It considered that Professor Reddy was highly unlikely to repeat his misconduct. The Tribunal also notes that no public protection concerns are raised in this case. As its finding on impairment is based on public interest concerns alone to mark the seriousness of Professor Reddy’s dishonesty, it concluded that a review hearing would serve no useful purpose. DETERMINATION ON IMMEDIATE ORDER - 17/12/2019 1. Having determined to suspend Professor Reddy from the Medical Register for a period of nine months, the Tribunal next considered whether Professor Reddy’s registration should be made subject to an immediate order.

2. Mr Gilbart submitted that it was not necessary to impose an immediate order. In the light of this, Mr Ramasamy made no submissions.

3. In making its decision the Tribunal has exercised its own judgement and has taken account of the principle of proportionality. The Tribunal also heard, and accepted, the advice of the Legal Assessor.

4. The Tribunal noted that it may impose an immediate order where it is satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of members of the public, is in the public interest, or is in the best interests of the practitioner.

5. The Tribunal has already found that there is no public protection issue in this case, therefore an immediate order is not necessary to protect the public. Further, the Tribunal has already determined that a period of nine months’ suspension is sufficient in order to uphold public confidence in the medical profession. Given this, it determined that it was not otherwise in the public interest to impose an immediate order, and that doing so would be disproportionate. Lastly, it considered that an immediate order would not be in Professor Reddy’s interests. The Tribunal does not, therefore, impose an immediate order.




6. The substantive direction for suspension, as already announced, will take effect 28 days from when written notice of this determination has been served upon Professor Reddy, unless an appeal is made in the interim. Professor Reddy is free to practise without restriction during this period. If Professor Reddy lodges an appeal he will be free to practise without restriction pending the outcome of that appeal.

7. There is no interim order to revoke.

8. That concludes Professor Reddy’s case.

Confirmed Date 17 December 2019 Ms Michele Clare, Lay Chair




ANNEX A – 01/04/2019

Application to amend Allegation 1. On behalf of the GMC, Mr Gilbart, Counsel, made an application pursuant to Rule 17(6) of the General Medical Council (Fitness to Practise Rules) 2004 as amended (‘the Rules’), to amend the Allegation. He submitted that there was a typographical error in paragraph 5 of the Allegation and that this should be corrected. 2. There was no objection by Mr Ramasamy, Counsel for Dr Reddy, to this application. 3. The Tribunal determined to grant the GMC’s application to amend the Allegation as this would cause no injustice to Dr Reddy and would make the Allegation read correctly. This amendment is reflected in the Allegation.

ANNEX B – 02/04/2019

Application to adjourn hearing 1. This determination will be read in private. However, as this case concerns Dr Reddy’s misconduct, a redacted version will be published at the close of the hearing XXX. 2. On behalf of Dr Reddy, Mr Ramasamy made an application for the hearing to be adjourned. XXX 4. Mr Ramasamy explained that Dr Reddy would be unable to attend the hearing on 2 or 3 April 2019. He submitted that an adjournment should be allowed in the circumstances and that the witnesses could be rearranged around this. 5. On behalf of the GMC, Mr Gilbart did not oppose the application. The Tribunal’s decision 6. The Tribunal carefully considered the submissions made by both parties and had regard to paragraph Rule 29(2) of the Rules which provides that:

‘Where a hearing of which notice has been served on the practitioner in accordance with these Rules has commenced, the Committee or Tribunal considering the matter may, at any stage in their proceedings, whether of




their own motion or upon the application of a party to the proceedings, adjourn the hearing until such time and date as they think fit.’

7. The Tribunal had regard to the circumstances outlined by Mr Ramasamy. XXX It noted that the GMC did not oppose the application. XXX The Tribunal determined that it was appropriate in the first instance to adjourn the hearing until 09:30 on 3 April 2019 XXX.

ANNEX C – 03/04/2019

Further Application to adjourn hearing 1. This determination will be read in private. However, as this case concerns Dr Reddy’s alleged misconduct, a redacted version will be published at the close of the hearing XXX. XXX 3. Mr Gilbart did not oppose a short delay for XXX. 4. The Tribunal determined to allow Mr Ramasamy the time to XXX. 5. Later on 3 April 2019, Mr Ramasamy presented XXX 6. Mr Ramasamy made an application for the Tribunal to adjourn until 12:00pm on 4 April 2019 for a review of Dr Reddy’s circumstances and thereafter to reconvene on 5 April 2019 for a further review. He submitted that this would assist the Tribunal as it could then make its decisions with the most up to date information. He informed the Tribunal that Dr Reddy is still keen to engage with these proceedings and has been since the outset. 7. Mr Gilbart did not oppose the application to adjourn until 4 April 2019; however, he would not cancel the witnesses planned for 5 April 2019 until further information was received. 8. The Tribunal determined to allow Mr Ramasamy’s application to adjourn the hearing until 4 April 2019 at 12:00pm XXX




ANNEX D – 04/04/2019

Third application for adjournment 1. This determination will be read in private. However, as this case concerns Dr Reddy’s alleged misconduct, a redacted version will be published at the close of the hearing XXX. 2. Mr Ramasamy presented an additional document to the Tribunal. XXX 3. Mr Ramasamy submitted that the Tribunal should adjourn to XXX; in the first instance until 12:00pm on Friday 5 April and in the second instance, if no new information was available, to Monday 8 April. 4. Mr Gilbart submitted that the Tribunal should adjourn until Friday 5 April to check for any new information. 5. The Tribunal was of the view that further information, XXX is more likely to be available on Monday 8 April. XXX It therefore determined to adjourn until 10:30 on 8 April 2019.

ANNEX E – 12/04/2019

Fourth application for adjournment under Rule 29(2) 1. This determination will be read in private. However, as this case concerns Dr Reddy’s alleged misconduct, a redacted version will be published at the close of the hearing XXX. 2. As the issue as to whether or not this hearing should continue or be adjourned in light of XXX, the Tribunal has considered whether or not to adjourn the hearing of its own motion pursuant to Rule 29(2) of the Rules. XXX 4. Mr Ramasamy submitted that Dr Reddy is aware of the Tribunal’s options of either continuing to hear, or adjourning the case. XXX 5. Mr Ramasamy submitted that Dr Reddy has a strong preference to proceed with the case. He said that if all the GMC evidence was not heard together this would not disadvantage the GMC or the Tribunal as transcripts would be obtained for the Tribunal when it reconvened. He said that the other option was to adjourn now and hear the whole case at some future time. He conceded that there was no




route open to the Tribunal that was not prejudicial to Dr Reddy, but he considered continuing with the evidence at this stage to be the route of least prejudice and would achieve the fairest outcome. 6. Mr Gilbart submitted that the GMC has no objection to Dr Reddy participating in the hearing via telephone. However, he stated that if the hearing continued now, there is a chance that the GMC’s witness evidence may not be heard in its entirety as the hearing may have to go part heard. He accepted that it was now unlikely that there would be sufficient time to conclude the case in the time allotted. Mr Gilbart submitted that at this point, XXX the witness timetable is, ‘almost unworkable’, but this could be remedied by adjourning to a new date. 7. Mr Gilbart submitted that if the Tribunal views it as inappropriate to continue the case then it should start afresh. He said that if the Tribunal decides to continue the case, it should consider further dates to hear any remaining GMC evidence. 8. The Tribunal considered the submissions carefully and has heard and accepted the advice of the Legal Assessor. XXX 9. XXX 10. The Tribunal has balanced these circumstances with the need to hear cases in a timely manner and has taken into account the wish of Dr Reddy to proceed. It has also borne in mind that this case is not one where any delay is likely to have an adverse impact on the memory of the GMC witnesses, given that its case is essentially document based. 11. The Tribunal has taken into account the witness difficulties identified by Mr Gilbart. It also considers that, with XXX, it would be prejudicial to Dr Reddy for this hearing to continue at this stage. The Tribunal has determined that it is fair and in the interests of justice that this case is adjourned to a future date when these issues may have been resolved to some degree. In reaching that conclusion, the Tribunal has borne in mind that no patient safety concerns arise in this case. 12. The Tribunal determined to adjourn the hearing until 29 April for XXX with a view to arranging a new hearing date. ANNEX F – 29/04/2019

Adjournment determination 1. This determination will be read in private. However, as this case concerns Dr Reddy’s alleged misconduct, a redacted version will be published at the close of the hearing XXX.




2. The Tribunal has had sight of updated information XXX and Mr Ramasamy submitted that thereafter Dr Reddy intends to return to the USA. 3. Mr Ramasamy submitted that Dr Reddy may well XXX to attend this hearing if it starts later in the year but that it was likely that he would have to participate in this hearing remotely. He submitted that the case should be heard as soon as possible. He submitted that it is preferable for the composition of the Tribunal to remain the same but that there is no pressing need for this. 4. The Tribunal members will be available from 14 October until the end of 2019. Mr Gilbart submitted that, having considered GMC witness availability, the hearing could re-convene on 11 November 2019 for six weeks. 5. Mr Ramasamy had no objection to Mr Gilbart’s submission and urged the Tribunal to accept the submission to re-convene on 11 November 2019. 6. The Tribunal determined to adjourn the hearing until 11 November 2019 when it will re-convene for 30 days until 20 December 2019. It will be up to the parties to liaise with the MPTS as necessary XXX.

Documents

PUBLIC RECORD - mpts-uk.org · MPT: Professor REDDY 1 PUBLIC RECORD Dates: 1 to 12 April 2019 29 April 2019 11 November to 17 December 2019 Medical Practitioner’s name: Professor