Psychoanalysis or Mind and Meaning

functioning’ whose manifestations co-exist and are superimposed (p. 840); eachof these zones is characterized by an unconscious domain (‘repressed sexualunconscious’, traumatic unconscious, etc) which the analyst must take intoaccount. Taking up the idea expressed by Freud in 1923, according to which‘individual psychology is also a social psychology’, Jean-Claude Rolland writeswith regard to ‘borderline or psychotic cases’: ‘‘The subjective organisationrevealed by these tragic situations, like the analytic situation it engenders, ismore akin to group psychoanalysis than to individual psychoanalysis’’ (p. 902).These treatments require us ‘‘to modify the narcissistic and libidinal rapport wehave with our theory’’ (p. 903).

The analysts who were invited to put forward their ideas in this book show howthey try to resolve, at theoretical and practical levels, the challenge posed by thetreatment of non-neurotic cases, and also how they attempt to create the optimalconditions for psychic work to take place. It is clear how the analyst’s work hasbecome increasingly complex. Thought is given to the metapsychology of the ana-lyst’s mental functioning during the session and thus to a re-elaboration of the con-cept of countertransference. In the space of this review, I have not been able toshow sufficiently the extent to which the clinical cases cited are explicit and partici-pate in the theoretical developments proposed. This book, which is at the forefrontof contemporary psychoanalysis, constitutes an exceptional working tool for thosewho wish to keep abreast of metapsychological and clinical advances. And finally,to repeat Andr� Green’s own words, this book offers a thorough and ‘‘in-depthrenewal of the discussion’’ on technical, clinical and theoretical problems.

More than interesting, this book is fascinating!

References

Freud S (1895). Project for a scientific psychology. SE 1,281–397.Freud S (1914). Remembering, repeating and working through. SE 12,145–56.Freud S (1919 [1918]). Lines of advance in psychoanalytic therapy. SE 17,157–68.Freud S (1920). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE 18,7–64.Freud S (1923). The ego and the id. SE 19,3–66.Green A (1976). The borderline concept. In: On Private Madness, 60–83. London: Karnac, 1997 (Original pub-

lication, Hogarth Press, 1986).Green A (1982). La double limite. In: La folie Privee. Psychanalyse des cas-limites, 293–316. Paris: Gallimard,

1990.Heimann P (1950). On countertransference. Int J Psychoanal 31,81–4.Parat C (1995). L’affect partage [Shared affect]. Paris: PUF.

Dominique Baudesson29 rue Censier, 75005 Paris, France

E-mail: [email protected]

Psychoanalysis or Mind and Meaning

by Charles BrennerThe Psychoanalytic Quarterly, New York, 2006; 140 pp; $25

Charles Brenner’s new book, Psychoanalysis or Mind and Meaning (Brenner, 2006),is the fifth in a series that includes An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis

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Int J Psychoanal (2008) 89 ª 2008 Institute of Psychoanalysis

(Brenner, 1955), Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory (Arlow andBrenner, 1964), written with Jacob Arlow, Psychoanalytic Technique and PsychicConflict (Brenner, 1976), and The Mind in Conflict (Brenner, 1982). They mark thesteady evolution of the thinking of this imaginative and straight-talking clinicianand theoretician. The journey began with a forceful defense of ego psychology andstructural theory and has now arrived at an unadorned natural science psychologyof intrapsychic conflict and meaning.

Psychoanalysis or Mind and Meaning is an intense 138 pages long, with 96 pages oftext and 42 pages of appendices. The text is a concise, careful statement of psycho-analytic theory and practice as understood by Brenner after 60 years of practice andacademic study. He begins with a powerful defense of psychoanalysis as a naturalscience and of the supreme importance in psychoanalysis of sustaining a scientific,analytic attitude. He emphasizes the importance of meaning as contrasted with eco-nomic or structural factors, a theme which runs through the book like a red thread.He confronts and rejects the primacy of the repetition compulsion and economicaspects of trauma over meaning, making his case for the primacy of meaning whileremaining firmly within the boundaries of deterministic science. Meaning derivesfrom the inevitable conflict of the pleasure principle with reality and with the dan-ger situations inherent in the object relations and body experiences of childhood.The compromise formations which emerge from conflict become the content ofmental life, both ‘normal’ and ‘pathological.’ The resulting inhibitions, symptoms,fantasies, dreams, slips and errors of daily life and all other complex mental contentare compromise formations, expressions of meaning:

Anything a patient says or does, anything in the analytic material, has the same potential,whether it be a nocturnal dream, a daydream, a symptom, a manifestation of transference,or, for that matter, a slip of the tongue, a chance remark, a rush of tears, or a burst oflaughter. Everything is a compromise formation that is the result of conflict resulting fromchildhood sexual and aggressive wishes. Not just dreams. Everything.

(p. 65)

Brenner reaffirms the equality of depressive affect with anxiety as an instigator ofdefense, one of his important contributions to affect theory. The theme of meaningreappears in his definition of affect as a combination of either pleasure or unplea-sure with an idea. This is a notable departure, among many he makes, from an eco-nomic explanation.

Brenner defines psychoanalytic treatment as ‘‘the process by which a pathologicalcompromise formation becomes a normal one’’ (p. 95). This is notable for what isnot psychoanalytic treatment. It is not the resolution of conflict (this he considersan impossibility), the acquisition of insight, the formation and resolution of atransference neurosis, the elimination of primitive defenses or any of the other com-monly stated goals of psychoanalysis. Its task is the replacement of pathologicalcompromise formations, those that interfere with life, by normal ones.

Psychoanalytic technique is not a compendium of rules or suggestions. Decisionsabout technique follow, above all else, from an analytic attitude, that is, from a sci-entifically based, consistent concern for understanding and for asking ‘why?’

An analyst should always be trying to understand. If one were to try to describe a properanalytic attitude by a single word the word would be ‘‘Why?’’ Why did this thought followthat? Why this emotional expression just now? Why did the patient act in just this way

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ª 2008 Institute of Psychoanalysis Int J Psychoanal (2008) 89

outside the analytic situation? Why this or that behavior in the past? Why these plans, orlack of them, for the future? And, always, why this response to what the analyst just said orto the analyst’s silence?

(p. 50)

In a delightful discussion of commonly debated details of treatment technique hisanswer is always: What would assist the psychoanalytic method of treatment withthis patient? For example: how often should a patient be seen – two, three, four orfive days a week? He points out that an analytic attitude and analytic work canoccur with any frequency of visits. Greater frequency provides more continuity. So,meet as frequently as possible. It’s as simple as that.

In the final portion of text, Brenner discusses how modern conflict theory, theawareness that ‘‘every thought and action is, at one and the same time, a gratifica-tion of pleasure-seeking wishes of childhood origin and a defense against thosewishes – i.e., a way of minimizing the unpleasure associated with them’’ (p. 74)affects our understanding of how the mind works. In this section he describes arevised understanding of the stages of mental functioning, how the compromise for-mations that constitute our moral code are formed, and how they enter into crea-tivity, daydreams and cultural phenomena including religion and politics.

The appendices, five in number, are extended footnotes on issues discussed in thetext. They include detailed discussion of:1. The requirement and importance of changing theory when confronted with new

or more complete psychoanalytically derived facts, as exemplified by Freud’swillingness to change his theories of repression and anxiety when presented withsuch facts.

2. A corollary of psychological determinism, namely that the analyst is interested inevery thought and action as a meaningful link in the fabric of an individual’slife.

3. Anxiety is understood as unpleasure, plus an idea of danger and depressive affectas unpleasure, plus an idea of past catastrophe.

4. Defense is not a restricted group of mechanisms but a mode of functioning ofthe mind that can utilize any mental content to mitigate either the unpleasure,or the idea aspect of anxiety or depressive affect, or both.

5. An expanded explanation of his conclusion that the structural theory, ‘‘a theorythat the mind is best understood as a group of functionally identifiable and sepa-rable structures, … is not a valid theory and should be discarded’’ (p. 133).Charles Brenner’s books and articles have always provoked intense admiration

and controversy. These attitudes reflect his concise and emphatic conclusions fromdecades of psychoanalytic practice and, even more importantly, they also reflect thetruly pioneering nature of his thought. Paradoxically, his constant pressure tounderstand and revise has occurred while he has also appeared to many to be thelast bastion of Freudian conservatism. As Exhibit A for his changing views, in thisbook he has established an empirical, scientific psychology of meaning, a beach-head in the territory usually associated with the less rigorous, less bounded thinkingof advocates of relational, relativistic psychology. I can only imagine the startledlooks of the postmodernists at finding the doyen of structural theory in their midst.Equally startled and, I suspect, dismayed are those whose scientific convictions arebound to the structural theory as a bulwark against the inroads of postmodern

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hermeneutics (the interpretation of meaning) for here there is no structural theory,no ego, id or superego. Brenner is directly and clearly talking about a psychology(though not a hermeneutics) of meaning rather than about a psychology that fea-tures the vicissitudes of drive discharge within the cross-currents of modifying egoand superego functions and substructures.

I am a member of the generation of analysts that grew up imbibing the psycho-analysis depicted by Charles Brenner. i.e. 1959–1989. For us, Brenner’s books andpapers have been a bedrock guide to psychoanalysis. He has been our generation’smodel of analytic rationality and integrity. Some, it is true, have seen his unequivo-cal positions as barriers, impeding the way to new paradigms such as those of SelfPsychology, Intersubjectivity and those that advocate the primacy of the narrative.Throughout the adulation and controversy he has been, for me and for many oth-ers, an inspiring advocate of a rational, consistent, conflict-based scientific theoryof psychoanalysis. And, like the theory or not, what a relief it is to escape from thepuzzling neologisms and vague ideas of many authors to his clear unambiguousthinking and writing. As we have seen, what is less well recognized, even denied, isthat he has also shown a remarkable capacity for change, drastic change, withoutan abandonment of his basic postulates. This is true not only of the present bookbut of the two preceding volumes as well. Though the postulates of psychoanalysisare the same here as in An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis, in each of thesubsequent volumes there are new ideas and a progressive slimming down or preci-sion of psychoanalytic theory. The changes are refinements resulting from the dataof psychoanalytic observation as understood by Dr Brenner. Mind as Meaning isthe culmination of this series of books, bringing the most revolutionary of his sug-gested changes in psychoanalytic theory, a complete rejection of structural theoryitself, replacing it with ‘modern conflict theory’. Clinically, it is a psychology ofconflict and compromise formation but, more fundamentally, it is a rigorouspsychology of meaning.

The most basic of Brenner’s postulates is his conviction that psychoanalysis is anatural science and the analyst a firm adherent to a scientific attitude:

The concept of science is only definable as a way of looking at the world and, more impor-tantly, of trying to understand it. For practical purposes, science is less a noun than anadjective. It is a way of looking at as much of the world as is available to us. It is an attitudetoward the entire universe, an attitude that is characterized by certain beliefs that distinguishit from the other ways of looking at the world.

(p. 4)

Those beliefs include determinism of mental life as of all natural phenomena,a cause–effect continuum of the linked chain of each person’s mental events.Axioms follow from this deterministic point of view. The mind operates in a deter-ministic fashion. The mind can be investigated. The mind can be known.

His second postulate is the existence of unconscious mental life:

We believe today, first, that events in mental life are always causally related by their meaningand, second, that consciousness, though an important characteristic of the operations of themind, is by no means a necessary one.

(p. 107)

Experience has shown that the psychoanalytic method is the ‘best method forinvestigating the human mind’ because of its unparalleled access to unconscious

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mental content. The psychoanalytic method seeks understanding, ‘the understand-ing that is most consistent with psychoanalytic data’. To employ the psychoanalyticmethod, the analyst must have an ‘analytic attitude’, an awareness of the determina-tive nature of human mental functioning and, with this in mind, employ his curios-ity and an ever present ‘Why?’ to further understanding:

Why does this thought follows that? Why this particular emotional expression just now?And always, why this response to the analyst’s comments, or to his silence?

(p. 50)

At this point one of Brenner’s most distinctive contributions becomes decisive.The data of psychoanalysis are the meanings of human actions, utterances, thoughts,symptoms, of all human activities. Each instance of meaning, each thought, eachaction, each choice is a compromise formation, an outcome of dynamic conflictinvolving (a) the pleasure-seeking sexual and aggressive wishes of childhood, (b)affects – anxiety, depressive affect or both – and (c) defenses. The conflicts persistfrom childhood through adult life, taking on new forms and coloration with chang-ing circumstances both external and internal. They are expressed in modified com-promise formations. Daily adult life is impelled by the goal of achieving pleasurethrough the realization of sexual and aggressive wishes of childhood. These wishesare shaped by anxiety or depressive affect or both, in response to childhood dangersituations associated with those wishes. Processes of defense modify the resultingconflict while allowing a measure of pleasure by altering wish or affect.

The goal of meaning-connected acts and thought is pleasure and the avoidance ofunpleasure. It is the meaning as grasped by the psychoanalytic method that consti-tutes the unique and vital data of psychoanalysis. And he sticks by this formulationof all human psychic events as links of a causal chain of meaning in the face of com-monly held exceptions. Most striking to me is his effective critique of the repetitioncompulsion, e.g., in traumatic neurosis, as an automatic meaningless causal force.

He enters into more contentious territory when he declares that when the ‘bestpossible understanding’ is determined (by the psychoanalytic method) it is consid-ered ‘true’ and should be accepted as true unless or until additional data refute thisunderstanding:

It is part of the scientific credo that any conclusion drawn from observation … is to becalled true or valid if, and only if, it is the best possible explanatory formulation of the avail-able, relevant data of observation.

(pp. 4–5)

He does not explain who determines it is the best possible explanatory formulationor how this is decided. Nor does he explain his insistence that other possible explana-tions be eliminated once the best possible explanatory formulation is determined.

As you read through Brenner from text to text you get closer and closer to theconsulting room and can hear and feel Occam’s razor scraping away excessverbiage, unnecessary distinctions, and unnecessary neologisms. An Elementary Text-book of Psychoanalysis distinguished itself as a clear, logical and easily understoodstatement of ego psychological psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalytic Concepts andthe Structural Theory, written with Jacob Arlow, marked his emphatic rejection ofthe topographic theory in all its forms and manifestations, replaced in toto bystructural theory. Cs, Pcs and Ucs were (some said) ruthlessly set aside as terms

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inconsistent with the new, more accurate understanding provided by the structuraltheory. I well recall the discomfort felt by his audience as he presented these ideas toa topographically minded Cleveland Society in the mid-1960s. A discussant tried tosmooth the differences, suggesting that there were aspects of psychoanalysis bestunderstood by topographic theory, such as dream theory, and others, such as symp-tom formation, by the structural theory. Not for a minute would Brenner hear ofit. He argued clearly and with force that if structural theory is right in its under-standing, then topographic theory is wrong, less useful, and should be set aside.

In The Mind in Conflict defense mechanisms as unique ‘mechanisms’ areabsorbed into a broader and more functional terminology, ‘the defensive operationsof the ego’. Without fanfare, cathexis and the rest of the language of energic eco-nomic theory is replaced by descriptive terms such as ‘intensity’.

In the interim from The Mind in Conflict to The Mind as Meaning Occam’s razorhas again been at work, scraping away all references to the structures of the struc-tural theory, id, ego and superego. The status of id and ego are demoted to ‘aspectsof the mind’; the functional distinctions between the two are no longer supportedby the data of the psychoanalytic method. The superego is recognized as a compro-mise formation, a product of psychic conflict.

Beginning with The Mind in Conflict there is also a new and broadened use of‘compromise formation’ as a term designating the outcome of psychological con-flict. Compromise formation is now defined as ‘everything’, ‘all mental activity’and there is a danger (but not an inevitability) that in becoming ‘everything’ it willbecome nothing.

The positions and formulations that Brenner describes are chock-full of interest-ing controversial aspects. In this final portion of the review I will comment on afew of these.

The assignment of ‘natural science’ status to psychoanalysis is not a simple oneof acceptance or rejection. Few psychoanalysts would disagree with Brenner aboutthe importance of a scientific attitude and world-view. Our bodies and our mindsare part of the material world and must be studied within that framework withoutrecourse to supernatural forces. But an investigation conducted with a scientificattitude toward the material world is not necessarily ‘natural science’ unless themethodology and the conclusions meet generally accepted boundary conditions andconform to accepted scientific method. These are admittedly arbitrary and commu-nally determined but are nevertheless important and required of a natural science.There are two contending but complementary views: that of Karl Popper and ofThomas Kuhn. Falsifiability is Popper’s basic criterion. As he points out, there isno way to prove the truth of any theory, a single counter instance will invalidate it.Therefore, to be considered a scientific hypothesis, a proposed theory must be falsi-fiable, i.e., the conditions that would reject it as false must be stated or implied.Kuhn accepts Popper’s condition but adds another, a capacity to make consistentpredictions. I paraphrase his formulation of what has become the dominant view ofthe basic requirements of all natural sciences:

Concrete predictions must emerge from the practice of the field, concrete predictions mustbe consistently achieved and concrete predictions must be rooted in an explanatory theorywhich includes means for improvement of the predictions.

(Lakatos and Musgrave, p. 247)

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No data or attitude can clothe the fact that psychoanalysis is not a naturalscience according to these accepted principles of scientific method and theoryformation. As analysts, we struggle to develop the most modest of predictions.Many of our basic concepts such as the universality of the Oedipus complex arenot falsifiable. While this does not make the concept untrue, it does place it outsidethe framework of a mature natural science, such as physics or chemistry. Thisnakedness in the face of the requirements of natural science does not suggest thatanalysts have abandoned a scientific attitude or need to relinquish the methods andcritical tools of psychoanalysis. We have a home and a comfortable home amongan illustrious group of scientists that include Darwin, Mendel, E.O. Wilson andothers who also could not meet these conditions and struggled and learned withinthe complex, ambiguous and less certain world of those who struggle to reach theassuredness of a mature natural science. They, and we, are practitioners of a ‘proto-science’. A protoscience is defined as ‘‘a set of beliefs or theories that have not yetbeen tested adequately by the scientific method but which are otherwise consistentwith existing science; a new science working to establish itself as a legitimatescience’’ (Wikipedia, 2008).

Kuhn discusses protoscience thus:

In any case, there are many fields – I shall call them protosciences – in which practice doesgenerate testable conclusions but which nevertheless resemble philosophy and the arts ratherthan the established sciences in their developmental patterns. I think, for example, of fieldslike chemistry and electricity before the mid-eighteenth century, of the study of heredity andphylogeny before the mid-nineteenth, or of many of the social sciences today. Inthese fields incessant criticism and continual striving for a fresh start are primary forces, andneed to be. No more than in philosophy and the arts, however, do they result in clear-cutprogress.

I conclude, in short, that the protosciences, like the arts and philosophy, lack some elementwhich, in the mature sciences, permits the more obvious forms of progress. It is not, however,anything that a methodological prescription can provide ... I claim no therapy to assist thetransformation of a protoscience to a science, nor do I suppose anything of this sort is to behad ...

Fortunately, though no prescription will force it, the transition to maturity does come tomany fields, and it is well worth waiting and struggling to attain. Each of the currentlyestablished sciences has emerged from a previously more speculative branch of naturalphilosophy, medicine, or the crafts at some relatively well-defined period in the past. Otherfields will surely experience the same transition in the future. Only after it occurs does pro-gress become an obvious characteristic of a field.

(Lakatos and Musgrave, pp. 244–5, my italics)

Examples of other present-day protosciences include sociobiology and evolution-ary psychology (Wikipedia, 2008). Evolution was a protoscience until moderngenetics and molecular biology supported its maturity as a predictive science.Alchemy, which was often conducted with a scientific attitude, became chemistrywhen (among other discoveries) Lavoisier discovered oxygen and its role in combus-tion, allowing him to state the falsifiable principle of Conservation of Mass with itsmany, impressively productive, predictions. A mature natural science such as chem-istry has a set of problems that can be worked on by all practitioners of the science,starting from an unquestioned common base. By ‘worked on’ I mean that the

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problems and the underlying theory are understood in a way which anticipates pre-dictive success. In contrast, a protoscience (like evolution through much of the 19thcentury and psychoanalysis today) boils with controversy, is subject to forming‘schools’ of alternate explanation, and only rarely achieves progress in the sense ofa universally agreed upon new understanding that adds predictive power to theendeavor. Protosciences may refine theory, add to knowledge, and define exemplars.They may have useful applications. In spite of its many accomplishments, psycho-analysis is not a mature predictive natural science though we all yearn for it tobecome one. We experience waves of enthusiasm and misplaced hope that a new setof findings, exterior to psychoanalysis, will propel us into scientific sureness andstability. Cybernetics, chaos theory, among others, and now, most appealingly,neuroscience have instilled such hopes. My own preference for revolutionary changetoward predictive understanding is by way of the study of the variations of humandevelopment, especially infant and child development. All such efforts (thoughmost fall by the wayside) are worthwhile, although in fact, as Kuhn states, we canonly continue to struggle to understand while we pursue the poorly bounded butoften exhilarating life of protoscientists. Until psychoanalysis achieves a moremature status we can best strive for open discussion and truly critical thinking(how many of us know how to do that?) together with tolerance for the variety ofopinions. This attitude is also part of the ‘scientific attitude’ and is to be comparedwith efforts to impose uniformity by declarations of belief, exclusionary rules,ad hominem arguments, and authoritarian dicta.

I don’t know what Charles Brenner would make of this discussion, though I doknow that he explicitly rejects the term ‘protoscience’ (p. 3), fearing it impliesrelativism and mushiness of thought. As I understand the term, he is himselfan outstanding example of such a scientist, particularly in his attempts to clarifyand sharpen the debate, his careful logic, and his unwillingness to worship traditionor authority. The changes in his theoretical understanding that I have outlinedprovide the best evidence that this is so. He has moved from the cumbersomepsychoanalysis of the 1950s to a set of concepts concerning development,motivation, danger, affect, conflict, compromise formation and, ultimately, meaningthat is spare, concise and can be translated into testable predictive statements andapplied to clinical practice. He, like all the great scientific psychoanalysts of moderntimes, from Kris and Hartmann to Loewald, Winnicott and Betty Joseph, hasenriched and added depth and complexity to our understanding of the humanmind … though not yet leading us into the promised land of a mature naturalscience.

In the spirit of further discussion, I will draw attention to two other debatableaspects of Brenner’s theory. The first concerns his developmental theory whichdenies the possibility of formative psychological change prior to language; and thesecond is his rejection of factors other than maladaptive compromise formations inpsychopathology. The vast amount of psychological change (learning) that goeshand in hand with brain development during the first 12 months is associated withqualities of trust and optimism (or their opposites) which Anna Freud termed ‘thefoundations of the personality’. These foundations, together with temperament(Chess and Alexander, 1996) and possibly other factors, predispose to attitudes ofinitiative or withdrawal, acceptance or doubt, trust or distrust, and other prefer-ences and tendencies, contributing to the complex of variables which define the

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later ingredients of compromise formations and thus of meaning. There is reasonto hope for better predictive understanding with the careful delineation of thesepredispositions and the resulting variables.

The second concern is with the exclusion of all other factors but compromise for-mation in determining the content of human psychology. There are obviouscounter-examples such as the autistic spectrum disorders in which brain character-istics, apparently present at birth and characterized by distinctive PET scans, pre-dispose the child to maladaptive forms of self–other interaction and aberrantexperiences of affect, anxiety, defense and sense of self. A range of early capacitiesincluding cognitive skill, motor dexterity and intact sense organs are similarly influ-ential in both health and psychopathology. It is, so to speak, letting the fox intothe hen-house to acknowledge such factors, that is, it opens the door to a wholerange of somatic variables which are without meaning in themselves but whichinfluence meaning. They may help us to understand our normality and our psycho-pathology.

Although these and other questions are important, they are minor quibbles com-pared with the contribution made by Brenner in bringing the scientific study ofmeaning into the psychoanalytic discussion. He opens up a world of psychoanalyticresearch. We might begin by asking how to fully characterize meaning as a naturalscience phenomenon and how to better understand the interactions and variedexpressions of meaning. As these and related issues are clarified, we can studyinterpretation, defense, insight, transference and other familiar psychoanalyticterms within a psychoanalytic natural science of meaning.

Every analyst should read this book. In its distinctive blue paper cover and mod-est brevity, it is reminiscent of Otto Fenichel’s (1941) Problems of PsychoanalyticTechnique. Like that volume, this is a book for the ages. The whole subject of mean-ing cries out for further psychoanalytic exploration and explication. No doubtCharles Brenner is working on the task and I await his next contribution.

Finally, I am grateful that he chose to name his book Psychoanalysis: Mind andMeaning rather than Psychoanalysis: Mind and Compromise Formation. He hasopened the door to a bright future.

References

Arlow J, Brenner C (1964). Psychoanalytic concepts and the structural theory. New York, NY: International UP.Brenner C (1955). An elementary textbook of psychoanalysis. New York, NY: Doubleday ⁄ Anchor.Brenner C (1976). Psychoanalytic technique and psychic conflict. Madison, CT: International UP.Brenner C (1982). The mind in conflict. Madison, CT: International UP.Brenner C (2006). Psychoanalysis or mind and meaning. New York, NY: Psychoanalytic Quarterly.Chess S, Alexander T (1996). Temperament: Theory and practice. New York, NY: Brunner ⁄ Mazel.Fenichel O (1941). Problems of psychoanalytic technique. New York, NY: Psychoanalytic Quarterly.Lakatos I, Musgrave A (1970). Criticism and the growth of knowledge. London: Cambridge UP.Wikipedia [internet]. Protoscience [cited 2008 September 8]. Available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Protoscience.

Scott Dowling22300 S. Woodland Road,Shaker Heights, Ohio, USA

E-mail: [email protected]

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Psychoanalysis or Mind and Meaning