11

Prospects for Nuclear Prospects for Nuclear

Disarmament in S. AsiaDisarmament in S. Asia

R. R. RajaramanRajaraman

Emeritus Professor of Physics Emeritus Professor of Physics

Jawaharlal Nehru University Jawaharlal Nehru University

New DelhiNew Delhi

22

BackgroundBackground�� Alarmingly soon after turning nuclear in 1998, S Asia was Alarmingly soon after turning nuclear in 1998, S Asia was

hit twice by serious criseshit twice by serious crises------ the the KargilKargil border war in 1999 border war in 1999 and the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, and the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, leading to an eyeballleading to an eyeball--toto--eyeball confrontation between full eyeball confrontation between full deployed forces across the border deployed forces across the border

�� Serious though they were, fortunately neither crisis Serious though they were, fortunately neither crisis escalated further. Since then Indoescalated further. Since then Indo--Pak relations have Pak relations have improved and a dialogue is proceeding over the past 3 improved and a dialogue is proceeding over the past 3 years on different fronts. It progresses in fits and starts years on different fronts. It progresses in fits and starts but, for example, a bilateral Agreement addressing nuclear but, for example, a bilateral Agreement addressing nuclear dangers was just signed last month.dangers was just signed last month.

�� As of now, both governments have shown themselves to As of now, both governments have shown themselves to be responsible and capable possessors of nuclear be responsible and capable possessors of nuclear weapons . Notwithstanding occasional bluster and weapons . Notwithstanding occasional bluster and threatening noises, they are unlikely to initiate deliberate threatening noises, they are unlikely to initiate deliberate nuclear attacks, barring extraordinary developmentsnuclear attacks, barring extraordinary developments

�� No accidents, pilferage, unplanned detonations or major No accidents, pilferage, unplanned detonations or major Snafus and bloopers so far.Snafus and bloopers so far.

33

Despite the ThawDespite the Thaw�� But the Kashmir problem still remains unresolved .But the Kashmir problem still remains unresolved .

�� There are increasing terrorist attacks on Indian soil, many of There are increasing terrorist attacks on Indian soil, many of which the Indians suspect are supported, if not by the Pakistan which the Indians suspect are supported, if not by the Pakistan government, then by rogue elements in its Army and intelligence government, then by rogue elements in its Army and intelligence service (ISI)service (ISI)

�� Hence the possibility of renewed hostility between the two Hence the possibility of renewed hostility between the two countries is not closed.countries is not closed.

�� Meanwhile there has been no interruption in the further buildMeanwhile there has been no interruption in the further build--up up of their respective nuclear forces. of their respective nuclear forces.

�� India's nuclear doctrine, which speaks of a triad of air, land, India's nuclear doctrine, which speaks of a triad of air, land, and and seasea--based assets with multiple redundant systems, continues as its based assets with multiple redundant systems, continues as its blueprint . blueprint .

�� In turn, President In turn, President MusharrafMusharraf has repeatedly assured his nation has repeatedly assured his nation that its nuclear assets and its missile program would not be rolthat its nuclear assets and its missile program would not be rolled led back.back.

�� Already Already ≈≈ 100 weapons are estimated to exist in the sub100 weapons are estimated to exist in the sub--continentcontinent

�� Fissile material for making more are being steadily accumulated.Fissile material for making more are being steadily accumulated.

44

Unlike the NPT NW states, whereUnlike the NPT NW states, where……

�� The process of arms reduction has been going on in The process of arms reduction has been going on in

both the US and (USSR) Russia through bilateral both the US and (USSR) Russia through bilateral

treaty. treaty.

�� The overall size of the British and French arsenals The overall size of the British and French arsenals

also seem to have leveled off. UK has brought down also seem to have leveled off. UK has brought down

its force to just 4 submarines carrying about 200 its force to just 4 submarines carrying about 200

warheads. warheads.

�� There is far less compelling reason in these countries There is far less compelling reason in these countries

for producing more weaponfor producing more weapon--usable fissile materialsusable fissile materials

�� Indeed four NPT NW states have formally (and I Indeed four NPT NW states have formally (and I

believe, China informally) suspended production of FM believe, China informally) suspended production of FM

for weapons. for weapons.

55

Recent NW statesRecent NW states

�� By contrast new NW states like India and Pakistan feel By contrast new NW states like India and Pakistan feel

that their nuclear forces (few dozen warheads each) that their nuclear forces (few dozen warheads each)

are still at the growing stage. are still at the growing stage.

�� These countries feel they donThese countries feel they don’’t yet have an adequate t yet have an adequate

arsenal for their security needs and donarsenal for their security needs and don’’t want to cap t want to cap

their FM production yet. their FM production yet.

�� They do support the evolution of some form of a They do support the evolution of some form of a

worldwide FMCT regime, worldwide FMCT regime,

�� but meantime, with the quiet confidence that FMCT but meantime, with the quiet confidence that FMCT

will take some time to materialize, they are continuing will take some time to materialize, they are continuing

to protect and improve their capability for making to protect and improve their capability for making

fissile materials, e.g. terms of the Indofissile materials, e.g. terms of the Indo--US dealUS deal

66

Estimated weapons grade plutonium production (in kg per year)

3232~ 160~ 160135 135 2020--25259 9 Annual Annual

future future

production production

(kg)(kg)

104104~ 520~ 520-- 130130414414234234Cumulative Cumulative

production production

(kg)(kg)

so farso far

Weapon Weapon

EqwtEqwt

TOTALTOTAL

stocksstocks

Spent Spent

alreadyalready

BreederBreeder

(after (after

2010)2010)

DhruvDhruv

aa

CIRUSCIRUS

(Until (Until

2010)2010)

( The technical results here and the rest of this talk are from collaborative work with Z. Mian, A.H. Nayyar, and M.V. Ramana.

Science and Global Security, volume 14, nos. 2-3, 2006and International Panel on Fissile Materials, www.fissilematerials.org)

77

Annual ReactorAnnual Reactor––Grade Grade PuPu production (in kg) from production (in kg) from

UnUnsafeguardedsafeguarded PHWRPHWR

2007 2010 2014

0.0

500.0

1000.0

1500.0

2000.0

2500.0 Assuming they have enough UraniumAssuming they have enough Uranium

Existing stocks as of May 2006 is 11.5 tons

1 weapon≈ 10 kg

88

PakistanPakistan

�� PakistanPakistan’’s main source of fissile material s main source of fissile material

so far has been the U enrichment facility so far has been the U enrichment facility

at at KahutaKahuta

�� These are mostly P2 type centrifuges of These are mostly P2 type centrifuges of

about 5 SWU eachabout 5 SWU each

�� Estimated cumulative stock of Estimated cumulative stock of WGrWGr U at U at

present 1,300 kg . That is about present 1,300 kg . That is about 6565

warheads worth. warheads worth.

99

Future productionFuture production�� Estimates are that Estimates are that KahutaKahuta now may have a capacity of now may have a capacity of

about 13,000 about 13,000 --22,000 SWU/yr22,000 SWU/yr

�� At At ≈≈160 160 SWUsSWUs per kg of 90% enriched U at a high tail per kg of 90% enriched U at a high tail fraction of 0.5% they can produce 80fraction of 0.5% they can produce 80--138 kg of 138 kg of WGrUWGrUper year (per year (44--7 weapons7 weapons) at ) at KahutaKahuta alonealone

�� There are reports of more centrifuges at There are reports of more centrifuges at GolraGolra, , SihalaSihalaand and GadwalGadwal

�� Pakistan has also started a Pakistan has also started a WGrWGr PuPu line at the 50 line at the 50 MWthMWthreactor at reactor at KhushabKhushab, presumably to make smaller , presumably to make smaller weapons to fit on their missilesweapons to fit on their missiles

�� Current stock of Current stock of PuPu should be about 90kg (should be about 90kg (18 weapons18 weapons) ) and growing at 12kg per yearand growing at 12kg per year

�� New reactor being built at New reactor being built at KhushabKhushab. Originally estimated . Originally estimated it to be 1000 it to be 1000 MWthMWth which could generate 200 kg of which could generate 200 kg of WGrWGrPuPu per year. US and Pak officials have since claimed it is per year. US and Pak officials have since claimed it is much smallermuch smaller

1010

The BuildThe Build--up goes onup goes on�� Therefore, despite the Thaw , the nuclear arsenals on Therefore, despite the Thaw , the nuclear arsenals on both sides are steadily growing. both sides are steadily growing.

More fissile material is being produced and weapons More fissile material is being produced and weapons assembled. assembled.

Bigger & longer range missiles are being developed Bigger & longer range missiles are being developed

Command and Control measures getting consolidated. Command and Control measures getting consolidated.

�� If one goes by the rate of growth of fissile materials on If one goes by the rate of growth of fissile materials on both sides, there will be well both sides, there will be well over a hundredover a hundred nuclear nuclear weapons worth on weapons worth on each sideeach side within a decade. within a decade.

�� With arsenals of this size, clearly many potential With arsenals of this size, clearly many potential dangers exist, of low probability but of catastrophic dangers exist, of low probability but of catastrophic consequence if they do happen consequence if they do happen –– related to physical related to physical accidents, unintended launch due to command failures accidents, unintended launch due to command failures or misjudgment, misuse by rogue elements, terrorists.. or misjudgment, misuse by rogue elements, terrorists..

�� These are not new to this audience and thoughtful These are not new to this audience and thoughtful people in this country have worried about them people in this country have worried about them decades. So I wont elaborate on the dangers here.decades. So I wont elaborate on the dangers here.

1111

Urgent need to start disarmamentUrgent need to start disarmament�� In S Asia these dangers are compounded by the In S Asia these dangers are compounded by the

geographical proximity of the two countries (a geographical proximity of the two countries (a GhauriGhauri

missile, on a depressed trajectory from Lahore will take missile, on a depressed trajectory from Lahore will take

only 7 minutes to reach New Delhi). only 7 minutes to reach New Delhi).

�� There is no time for any meaningful early warning or There is no time for any meaningful early warning or

for mutual consultations to prevent a single act of for mutual consultations to prevent a single act of

accidental or hasty launch from escalating into a full accidental or hasty launch from escalating into a full

scale nuclear war. scale nuclear war.

�� Even a non nuclear missile attack can be misconstrued Even a non nuclear missile attack can be misconstrued

and trigger an unintended nuclear war.and trigger an unintended nuclear war.

�� Given all this, the urgent need for nuclear disarmament Given all this, the urgent need for nuclear disarmament

in the region is self evident. What are the prospects of in the region is self evident. What are the prospects of

such disarmament ? such disarmament ?

1212

Is anyone worried about the growing Is anyone worried about the growing

S. Asian nuclear arsenal ?S. Asian nuclear arsenal ?

�� No groups with any significant weight either in S No groups with any significant weight either in S Asia or abroad!Asia or abroad!

�� After the initial applause following the 1998 tests, After the initial applause following the 1998 tests, there has been no serious discussion in the Indian there has been no serious discussion in the Indian political arena about our having gone nuclear, either political arena about our having gone nuclear, either in the parliament or in election campaigns. in the parliament or in election campaigns.

�� In policy making circles, there is no need felt to In policy making circles, there is no need felt to even slow down the growth of the nuclear arsenals, even slow down the growth of the nuclear arsenals, let alone get rid of them altogether. Any suggestion let alone get rid of them altogether. Any suggestion of total nuclear disarmament would be met with of total nuclear disarmament would be met with indifference if not derision. indifference if not derision.

1313

The public sentimentThe public sentiment

�� Sadly, the S Asian public is also quite comfortable with, Sadly, the S Asian public is also quite comfortable with, and indeed proud of having gone nuclear. and indeed proud of having gone nuclear.

�� True not just of the man in the street, but also much of True not just of the man in the street, but also much of the intelligentsia, including my fellow professors, the intelligentsia, including my fellow professors, bureaucrats, company executives, doctors bureaucrats, company executives, doctors …………. .

�� I know some influential voices in India that would want I know some influential voices in India that would want even bigger arsenals. even bigger arsenals.

�� Serious concern about the growing nuclear force is Serious concern about the growing nuclear force is largely limited to peace activists. But they have an largely limited to peace activists. But they have an impact only on a small fraction of the public and none impact only on a small fraction of the public and none on policy makers.on policy makers.

�� [In fairness, public indifference bordering on [In fairness, public indifference bordering on complacency in the face of large nuclear arsenals was complacency in the face of large nuclear arsenals was not invented by the S Asians ! We are only following the not invented by the S Asians ! We are only following the pattern set by earlier NWS] pattern set by earlier NWS]

1414

Nature of the S Asian Arms control communityNature of the S Asian Arms control community

�� India and Pakistan spent a long period as nonIndia and Pakistan spent a long period as non--nuclear weapon states nuclear weapon states in a nuclear world, when they built up a substantial body of exin a nuclear world, when they built up a substantial body of expertise pertise on nuclear diplomacy and geoon nuclear diplomacy and geo--political strategy, both in the political strategy, both in the Government and in think tanks, universities and the Press. Government and in think tanks, universities and the Press.

�� But there is no corresponding But there is no corresponding technicaltechnical arms control community in arms control community in S.AsiaS.Asia outside the government. Even nine years after the 1998 tests outside the government. Even nine years after the 1998 tests there are barely a handful of such people between the two large there are barely a handful of such people between the two large countries put together. countries put together.

�� Practically no expertise on nuclear technology (civil or militarPractically no expertise on nuclear technology (civil or military) exists y) exists in universities. The larger science community, funded almost entin universities. The larger science community, funded almost entirely irely by government grants, generally keeps away from all controversiaby government grants, generally keeps away from all controversial l issues. issues.

�� Department of Atomic energy is the sole source considered Department of Atomic energy is the sole source considered respectable by policy makers, whose technical inputs on the needrespectable by policy makers, whose technical inputs on the need for for and feasibility of disarmament come solely from the Bomb makers.and feasibility of disarmament come solely from the Bomb makers.

�� The international arms control community, which does have tons oThe international arms control community, which does have tons of f such expertise, has largely replaced the S Asian nuclear crisissuch expertise, has largely replaced the S Asian nuclear crisis by by those in Iran and N Korea as the those in Iran and N Korea as the ““dayday’’s flavors flavor””. This is understandable . This is understandable given their priorities. But the S Asian problem remains as seriogiven their priorities. But the S Asian problem remains as serious as us as before.before.

1515

Dim Prospects right now for Total Dim Prospects right now for Total

DisarmamentDisarmament

It is this combination of It is this combination of

�� A largely indifferent public and polityA largely indifferent public and polity

�� A lack of appreciation by security strategists A lack of appreciation by security strategists

(i) of the dangers of nuclear weapons(i) of the dangers of nuclear weapons

(ii) of the changed world view on the (ii) of the changed world view on the

limitations of nukes as warlimitations of nukes as war--fighting weapons fighting weapons

�� A feeling that our nuclear enterprise has only A feeling that our nuclear enterprise has only

““just startedjust started””

�� A protected, revered and expanding nuclear A protected, revered and expanding nuclear

technocracy,technocracy,

�� that makes the prospects of nuclear disarmament that makes the prospects of nuclear disarmament dim in South Asia. dim in South Asia.

1616

Aim for Capping the ArsenalAim for Capping the Arsenal

�� Quite obviously, demanding full disarmament of Quite obviously, demanding full disarmament of South Asia at this stage will not yield results. South Asia at this stage will not yield results.

�� But the more modest goal of capping the arsenal But the more modest goal of capping the arsenal soon may have better prospects.soon may have better prospects.

�� South Asian nuclear forces are still relatively South Asian nuclear forces are still relatively small . If further growth and consolidation could small . If further growth and consolidation could be stopped soon, it may be possible eventually be stopped soon, it may be possible eventually to roll back the arsenal.to roll back the arsenal.

�� It is the first step on the road to full It is the first step on the road to full disarmament. disarmament.

�� It will lower the various nuclear risks in S AsiaIt will lower the various nuclear risks in S Asia

�� It will also lower proliferation urges among other It will also lower proliferation urges among other potential NW statespotential NW states

1717

DeterrenceDeterrence

�� But even capping the arsenal will not be easy But even capping the arsenal will not be easy to achieve. It requires evolving a consensus to achieve. It requires evolving a consensus among people with different shades of among people with different shades of opinion on the nuclear issue including the opinion on the nuclear issue including the majority who feel that nuclear weapons are majority who feel that nuclear weapons are a necessary evil to a necessary evil to deter deter our nuclear our nuclear neighbors. neighbors.

�� Most of them are not hawks by nature. Most of them are not hawks by nature. Their concern for deterrence, misplaced or Their concern for deterrence, misplaced or not, must be addressed if a consensus is to not, must be addressed if a consensus is to be evolved to stop the onward march of be evolved to stop the onward march of nuclearisationnuclearisation. .

1818

Minimal Arsenal for DeterrenceMinimal Arsenal for Deterrence

�� It is for this reason that I have been trying, for several It is for this reason that I have been trying, for several years, to get a discussion going on how large an years, to get a discussion going on how large an arsenal of warheads is really called for in India, even arsenal of warheads is really called for in India, even accepting the need for nuclear deterrence. accepting the need for nuclear deterrence.

�� More recently, help on this endeavor came from More recently, help on this endeavor came from unexpected quarters unexpected quarters -- the Bush administration ! The the Bush administration ! The IndoIndo––US Deal generated widespread discussions in US Deal generated widespread discussions in India, in which the desired size of our arsenalIndia, in which the desired size of our arsenal–– until until then a holy cow then a holy cow -- was debated even by conservative was debated even by conservative columnists.columnists.

�� The arguments I have been trying to push go, briefly, The arguments I have been trying to push go, briefly, as follows:as follows:

�� Deterrence relies on possessing a nuclear capability Deterrence relies on possessing a nuclear capability that can inflict, even after a first attack by the enemy, that can inflict, even after a first attack by the enemy, a second strike capable of causing a second strike capable of causing ““unacceptableunacceptable””damage to the other side. damage to the other side.

1919

How much Damage is How much Damage is ““AcceptableAcceptable”” ??

�� Now, just a couple of 15Now, just a couple of 15--20 kiloton weapons dropped on 20 kiloton weapons dropped on Lahore and Karachi (or New Delhi and Mumbai) would Lahore and Karachi (or New Delhi and Mumbai) would kill half a million people immediately in addition to kill half a million people immediately in addition to causing massive destruction, disease and panic. causing massive destruction, disease and panic.

�� Surely, that should already be "unacceptable damage" to Surely, that should already be "unacceptable damage" to an even remotely responsible leadership and deter them an even remotely responsible leadership and deter them from from initiatinginitiating adventures that could bring such a adventures that could bring such a response.response.

�� A leadership that finds this "acceptable" as a price for A leadership that finds this "acceptable" as a price for some political, ideological or conventional military gains, some political, ideological or conventional military gains, is beyond the pale of rationality .is beyond the pale of rationality .

�� Such leadership, in any case, cannot be relied upon to Such leadership, in any case, cannot be relied upon to feel deterred even by the prospect of a larger attack.feel deterred even by the prospect of a larger attack.

2020

So, Who Needs a Hundred Bombs ?So, Who Needs a Hundred Bombs ?

�� Given that a successful attack on a few major Given that a successful attack on a few major cities with a couple of 20 kiloton weapons each cities with a couple of 20 kiloton weapons each would inflict unacceptable damage, it is not clear would inflict unacceptable damage, it is not clear why the notion of deterrence should call for why the notion of deterrence should call for dozens, let alone hundreds, of weapons.dozens, let alone hundreds, of weapons.

�� The present stockpile of a few dozen weapons The present stockpile of a few dozen weapons will more than suffice if used will more than suffice if used ““countercounter--valuevalue””, , even after taking into account due redundancy. even after taking into account due redundancy.

�� It would be better to keep the arsenal minimal It would be better to keep the arsenal minimal and concentrate oneand concentrate one’’s energies in improving s energies in improving survivability, accuracy and reliability, so that a survivability, accuracy and reliability, so that a successful second strike capability is assured.successful second strike capability is assured.

2121

The China FactorThe China Factor

�� India's nuclear strategy is of course designed also with China India's nuclear strategy is of course designed also with China in mind. in mind.

�� The deThe de--nuclearisationnuclearisation of a region with three contiguous of a region with three contiguous nuclear nations is obviously a very complicated matter.nuclear nations is obviously a very complicated matter.

�� But the preceding arguments for capping the Indian arsenal But the preceding arguments for capping the Indian arsenal hold just as much when applied to China as the adversary. hold just as much when applied to China as the adversary.

�� The assured prospect of, say, The assured prospect of, say, NanjingNanjing and Shanghai receiving a and Shanghai receiving a couple of bombs that would kill half a million people should be couple of bombs that would kill half a million people should be ample for deterring today's China, regardless of Chairman ample for deterring today's China, regardless of Chairman MaoMao’’s past rhetorics past rhetoric

�� Furthermore, China is now focused strongly on pursuing its Furthermore, China is now focused strongly on pursuing its economic growth. It has plenty on its plate to translate this economic growth. It has plenty on its plate to translate this growth into equitable domestic prosperity. It is extremely growth into equitable domestic prosperity. It is extremely unlikely to initiate any adventure against India that could inviunlikely to initiate any adventure against India that could invite te nuclear retaliation against any of its major cities. nuclear retaliation against any of its major cities.

�� In China's perception its main external threat comes not from In China's perception its main external threat comes not from India, but the US, NMD, TaiwanIndia, but the US, NMD, Taiwan……. .

2222

No Need to match ChinaNo Need to match China

�� That China has hundreds of nuclear warheads That China has hundreds of nuclear warheads

does not negate the argument for capping the does not negate the argument for capping the

Indian arsenal at a much smaller number. Indian arsenal at a much smaller number.

�� The tenets of deterrence do not require that The tenets of deterrence do not require that

your arsenal match that of your adversary, but your arsenal match that of your adversary, but

only that it be capable of inflicting damage that only that it be capable of inflicting damage that

is unacceptable to the other side. is unacceptable to the other side.

�� Recall that China itself has been content to stay Recall that China itself has been content to stay

with just a few hundred weapons, even though with just a few hundred weapons, even though

the U.S. and Russia, which it views as its main the U.S. and Russia, which it views as its main

adversaries, possess several thousands of them. adversaries, possess several thousands of them.

2323

In Short, In Short,

�� In summary, S. Asian arsenals are more than In summary, S. Asian arsenals are more than sufficient at existing levels for any reasonable sufficient at existing levels for any reasonable requirements of deterrence. requirements of deterrence.

�� But, right now there isnBut, right now there isn’’t enough impetus in t enough impetus in Indian or Pakistani civil society to muster the Indian or Pakistani civil society to muster the political push to stop further production of political push to stop further production of warheads or Wwarheads or W--GrGr fissile materials. But it is a fissile materials. But it is a goal worth aiming for goal worth aiming for –– one that peaceone that peace--loving loving people in S Asia and the world should support.people in S Asia and the world should support.

�� To my AntiTo my Anti--nuclear activist friends: nuclear activist friends:

A call for capping is not a sanction for or A call for capping is not a sanction for or approval of existing arsenals. But to reverse approval of existing arsenals. But to reverse anything you have to first slow it down and then anything you have to first slow it down and then stop it. Total disarmament can be attempted stop it. Total disarmament can be attempted only after that.only after that.

2424

HoweverHowever

�� It will not help for the US or other NW states to demand that It will not help for the US or other NW states to demand that India and Pakistan cap their arsenals. That would be counterIndia and Pakistan cap their arsenals. That would be counter--productive.productive.

�� Indeed, Indeed, ““cappingcapping”” has become a dirty word in India because of has become a dirty word in India because of such pressures (such pressures (egeg during the negotiations of the Indoduring the negotiations of the Indo--US Deal) US Deal)

�� ““Who are the Americans (or the British or the French) to tell us Who are the Americans (or the British or the French) to tell us to cap our strategic capabilities, when they have been holding to cap our strategic capabilities, when they have been holding much more than us for decades ?much more than us for decades ?”” , is an argument that is hard to , is an argument that is hard to counter, especially given postcounter, especially given post--colonial Third World sensibilities.colonial Third World sensibilities.

�� We in S Asia have to do it in our own enlightened self interest.We in S Asia have to do it in our own enlightened self interest.Major nuclear weapon states can only support such efforts Major nuclear weapon states can only support such efforts quietly in the background. quietly in the background.

�� More importantly, arms control in S Asia will receive a real More importantly, arms control in S Asia will receive a real impetus from outside only when the US and Russia show a more impetus from outside only when the US and Russia show a more visible and stronger commitment to continuing with their own visible and stronger commitment to continuing with their own disarmament program, down from current levelsdisarmament program, down from current levels---- which the rest which the rest of the world even now finds unof the world even now finds un--understandably large. understandably large.

�� THE ENDTHE END

2525

THE ENDTHE END

2626

Projected reactor grade plutonium production from 2007 till reactors are safeguarded

42744274TotalTotal

95095020142014

NaroraNarora--22

95095020142014NaroraNarora--11

71271220122012KakraparKakrapar--22

71271220122012KakraparKakrapar--11

47547520102010RajasthanRajasthan--44

47547520102010RajasthanRajasthan--33

Plutonium production (kg) Plutonium production (kg)

before reactor is safeguardedbefore reactor is safeguarded

Proposed date Proposed date

of safeguardingof safeguardingReactorReactor

Existing stocks as of May 2006 is 11.5 tons

2727

Uranium Requirements and Pu production for India’s

Unsafeguarded Reactors after deal is implemented

135135BreederBreeder

11001100

----1265126533833870007000All eight reactors in power All eight reactors in power

mode mode

< 200< 200467467Seven reactors in power Seven reactors in power

mode with partially mode with partially

depleted uranium cores and depleted uranium cores and

one 220 one 220 MWeMWe reactor in reactor in

production modeproduction mode

2626292910001000DhruvaDhruva

WeaponWeapon--

gradegrade

plutonium plutonium

(kg/y)(kg/y)

ReactorReactor--

grade grade

plutonium plutonium

(kg/y)(kg/y)

Uranium Uranium

demand demand

(tons/yea(tons/yea

r)r)

Burn up Burn up

((MWd/tMWd/t

UU))

ReactorsReactors

Note: All reactors are assumed to run at 80% capacity factor