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Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

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Page 1: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Post Election Vote Auditing

Fritz Scheuren

University of Chicago

Page 2: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Murphy’s Corollary

If you did not check it, then it did go wrong!

Page 3: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Outline of Remarks

• Systems Thinking

• Sample Vote Verification

• Forensic Statistical Additions

• Exit Polls

• Better Together

Page 4: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Systems Thinking• Appreciation of Complexity• No Single System Owner• Political Party Roles• Media Roles• Voters’ Trust and

Participation

Page 5: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Proactive Response Needed

Benchmarking and Sharing What Works

Page 6: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Audited Votesand Voter

Surveys

Ishikawa (Fishbone) Diagram

TrustworthyVoting System

TestedBallot

Trained Pollworker

CertifiedEquipment

SecuredTabulationEducated

Voter

VerifiedIdentity

Page 7: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Sample Vote Verification

• Key to Accountability

• Transparency and Randomness

• Rules of Evidence (Florida?)

• Build A Body of Practice

Page 8: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Forensic Statistical Additions?

• Exploring Official Results for anomalies

• Confirming Outliers and Inliers• Linking Present to Past Patterns• Developing Lessons Learned

Data Bases, Persisting

Page 9: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Ohio Scatterplot of Kerry Difference Between Actual and Predicted Vs. The Total

(Trending 84 - 04)

-60,000

-40,000

-20,000

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

0 200000 400000 600000 800000

Total Vote of Two Parties

Dif

fere

nce Electronic

Punchcard

Scan

Cuyahoga

Franklin

Hamilton

Page 10: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Cuyahoga Scatterplot of Kerry Difference Between Actual and Predicted Vs. the Total

(Grouping Precincts 00 - 04)

-300

-200

-100

0

100

200

300

0 300 600 900 1200

Total Votes of Two Parties

Dif

fere

nce

Page 11: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Exit Polls• Warren Mitofsky• Not a Substitute for Sample

Audits• A Weak Fitness for Use Standard• Badly Misunderstood, Redirect

and Replace

Page 12: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80

Bush Vote Proportion In 2000

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

Bu

sh V

ote

Pro

po

rtio

n In

200

4

Whether the exit poll

overstated Bush or Kerry

Exit Poll Overstated Bush

Exit Poll Overstated Kerry

Bush Vote Proportion In 2000 and 2004 For the Ohio Sample Precincts

Page 13: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

More on Refusal Versus Fraud Alternative – 2000 v. 2004

• Are Precincts with Gaps Different?

• Data Does not Support this!

• Actual Results Are Similar not Different

• Scatterplot Shows Rough Similarity

• Distributions Virtually Identical

• Mitofsky “Bias in Refusals” Hypothesis Supported Instead

Page 14: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Still More on Predictive Value of Exit Poll v. Actual Results

• Another Look at Gap over time

• 2004 Exit Poll v. 2004 Actual Gap

• Versus 2000-2004 Change

• Fraud Hypothesis would Predict

• Gap is Correlated to Change

• Correlation only 0.03 However

Page 15: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

-0.30 -0.20 -0.10 0.00 0.10 0.20

Difference Between Actual and Exit Poll 2004 Bush Vote Proportion

-0.10

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

Dif

fere

nce

Bet

wee

n 2

004

and

200

0 B

ush

Vo

te

Pro

po

rtio

nBush Vote Proportion Comparison For The Ohio Sample Precincts

Page 16: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Better Together

• Cooperation Already High Among Election Officials

• Bring in Skilled Outsiders, Statisticians. Computer Specialists, …, As You Have

• Include and Inform Critics• Make Accountability Evident

Page 17: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Media and Marketing

• Approach Media Ahead of Time

• Seize this Timely Moment

• Stress New Tools, Learning Style

• Conduct Demonstration Sample Audits and Get the Word Out

Page 18: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

National Election Scorecard

• National Voter (Customer) Survey

• Build on 2006 Ohio Proof of Concept

• Put “Horror Stories” in Perspective

Page 19: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Fully Auditable Election

• Prepare prior data ahead of time, so analysis can be real-time

• Continue to use Exit Polls but adjusting for the bias in them, if possible.

Page 20: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

More Examples

• Create and train election officials in new process recording and Sample Vote Verification Standards

• Make sure software is fully tested and as close to tamper proof as possible

Page 21: Post Election Vote Auditing Fritz Scheuren University of Chicago

Many [email protected]