Paul Mattick

446

Paul Mattick. Texts /2

447

Reform or Revolution

Paul Mattick

TEXTS /2

1971-1983

Contents

5The American Economy: Crisis and Policy

11Americas War in Indochina

21Die Gemischte konomie und ihre Grenzen

30Arbeitsteilung und Klassenbewutsein

50Der imperialistische Imperativ

58ber den Begriff des Staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus

65Peter van Spall spricht mit Paul Mattick

69Economic Crisis and Crisis Theory

69Preface

701. Bourgeois Economics

922. Marxs Crisis Theory

1113. The Epigones

1364. Splendor and Misery of the Mixed Economy

191Interview with J.J. Lebel 1975

196The New Capitalism and the Old Class Struggle

211Kapitalismus und kologie

226Economics, Politics and The Age of Inflation

226Preface

227Chapter 1: The Crisis of The Mixed Economy

241Chapter 2: Deflationary Inflation

257Chapter 3: The Destruction of Money

271Chapter 4: On the Concept of State-Monopoly Capitalism

277Chapter 5: State Capitalism & the Mixed Economy

289Chapter 6: The Great Depression and the New Deal

306Spontaneity and Organisation

320Interview with Lotta Continua

325Introduction to Anti-Bolshevik Communism

329Rosa Luxemburg in Retrospect

1980

357Reform or Revolution

3581. Introduction

3642. Capitalism and Socialism

3753. Reform and Revolution

3874. The Limits of Reform

3935. Lenins Revolution

4136. The Idea of the Commune

4197. State and Counter-Revolution

4388. The German Revolution

4439. Ideology and Class Consciousness

The American Economy: Crisis and Policy

Source: Root and Branch, No. 3, 1971, pp. 14-18.Transcribed: by Thomas Schmidt;

Since capitalist economic policy must make no mention of the exploitation relations underlying the capitalist mode of production, economists and politicians must seek solutions to economic problems in terms of market phenomena. It all seems quite simple. The periodic shortage of profit which results from the laws of capitalist development appears on the market as a lack of demand, which hinders the expansion of production and so of new investments. When this state of affairs takes on a protracted character, the state jumps in to increase demand through public spending.

This indeed revives production, but has no effect on the profit situation itself. Goods produced in the public sector are paid for by the government with funds taxed or borrowed from the private sector; so that what appear as new profits for the businesses with government contracts are subtracted from the profits already realized on the private market by other businesses. Nevertheless, the economists measure capitalist progress by the increase of production as a whole, lumping together profitable and unprofitable production. Although only the profitable part of production makes possible the accumulation of additional capital, growing total production simulates the conditions of a general upswing. The conditions experienced since the second world war can thus be celebrated as a boom, and taken as proof that capitalism has succeeded in abolishing the crisis cycle through state interventions in the economy.

This optimism was to an extent borne out by the facts, thanks to a rapid rise in the productivity of labor resulting from the extended application of science to technique during and after the war. However, unprofitable production has grown more quickly than profitable. The diversion of profits to the former has led to a further decline in accumulation, and the solution to this problem is now in turn sought in a restriction of public expenditures. The increased production based on governmental deficit financing which is, on the one hand, held to be a solution to crisis, is on the other , also held responsible for a continuing crisis situation, perceived in the form of growing inflation.

The bourgeois economists cannot understand their own economy. Just as they see insufficient demand as the cause of stagnation, they see inflation as the result of an increased demand, effected by the state-induced production, meeting a supply which ostensibly has not grown. Prices rise, it is said, because too much money seeks too few goods. It follows that a decline in demand through the restriction of public spending will end the inflation, if at the cost of growing unemployment. If public spending cannot be reduced, demand for new private capital must be diminished through higher interest rates, which also brings unemployment. Nothing can be done about this. For under todays conditions there is only the choice between inflation and unemployment. To be sure a market equilibrium could be produced through a general reduction of wages and a further increase in labor productivity. But this solution is blocked by the wages policy of the trade unions and the prices policy of the monopolies; such a solution would require bringing prices and wages under government control.

The facts, however, contradict such explanations. That prices are not determined by impossibly high labor costs is shown by the fact that despite increasing productivity workers real wages have not risen since 1967. That the problem is not one of an excessive demand is implicit in the fact that almost a fourth of American productive capacity lies unused. (If more goods arent produced its because they couldnt be profitably sold.) Supply has exceeded Demand and nevertheless prices have risen yearly by around 7.2%. The deflationist policy of the last two years has not affected this situation in the least, though hope springs eternal that it will slow the tempo of inflation. In reality supply and demand have nothing to do with the inflation, just as monopolistic price and wage policies are not causes of the inflation but its results.

Inflation and deflation have always been forced on capital as means by which workers wages may be adjusted to meet profit requirements. The capitalist ideal is stability; this, however, comes into conflict with the necessities of accumulation, so that capitalism develops through a crisis cycle. Up to the second world war capitalist crises were principally characterized by deflation: production would be curtailed, workers fired, wages cut, capital values destroyed, and prices lowered. Through this process of decline and ruin a new balance would be struck between the profit requirements of the surviving (and now more highly concentrated) capital and the actual production. The increasing intensity of these crises led to attempts to neutralize them by means of inflation. With inflation, prices can be made to rise faster than wages. This reduces labors share of the social product and so augments profits and furthers capital accumulation.

With the growth of the public sector inflation acquires another role: as the means by which the non-profitable character of government-induced production finds partial compensation in higher prices for goods produced in the private sector. The unproductive expenditures of the state are financed in part through loans and in part through taxes. The government money- and credit-expansion in itself implies rising commodity prices and the depreciation of money. As the capitalists see it, lack of profit derives on the one hand from existing wage levels and on the other from the imposition of taxes on capital. The burden of unprofitable on profitable production, then, appears to the individual capitalist as a decrease in his earnings, which he seeks to offset by raising his prices. What is really happening is that total production is growing faster than total profit; this shows up in the fall of the average rate of profit. Under these conditions, a monopolistic price policy secures the needed profit at the expense of competitive capitals. (Its ability to do this must however disappear in the course of time as total profits continue to shrink.) The workers, finally, only try to adjust their wages to the higher prices.

If private capital does not succeed in outstripping the expansion of the unprofitable state sector through a relatively faster private capital accumulation, then what lies behind the continuing inflationary trend is the slow decline of the profit-oriented market economy. In the absence of an accelerated capital accumulation, a renewed deflation seems required as the basis for a new prosperity. The novelty of the present situation lies in the fact that deflation and inflation are being applied at the same time. Higher prices accompany diminishing production, the appearance of prosperity that of crisis. This double attack on the existing wage and working conditions expresses American capitals need for accelerated accumulation within its own borders and in the framework of the world economy. The sharpened international competition, including the imperialist policy, requires as basis the greater exploitation of workers in this country.

Since the capitalist state is not to compete in the market with the private capitalists it serves, its contribution to production must take the form of public spending which is useful to capital. This means first of all paying the expenses of imperialist power politics, which works in the best interests of private capital. The costs involved can be considered a kind of social investment, which may open up new profit possibilities or keep existing ones safe. It must be remembered that America has through two world wars become the strongest imperialist power. American capital has to a great extent replaced European capital in Canada and South America, made large investments in nearly all European countries, and brought colonies formerly under European control under its own. The oil of the Middle East is now for the most part in American hands, and in SE Asia American capital is trying to win supremacy over this area of great promise. Without imperialist competition America would not have become what it is today. Capitals need to expand makes imperialism as necessary as it is desirous, and the power already won determines the degree of imperialist aggressiveness.

PROBLEMS OF IMPERIALISM

To be sure, the imperialist policy contains its own contradictions, which in the end can be traced back to those of capitalist production. While imperialism is a necessity, it is also a danger which can lead to deeper economic disorder. Public spending can somehow be controlled within a national framework; this is no longer possible in the case of war, since the enemy has a share in the decision-making. In the great wars of the past everything, so to speak, was at stake; they ended after a couple of years with the destruction of one side and the victory of the other, permitting rearrangements of international economic and political power. In the era of the atomic bomb, however, the imperialist powers themselves draw back in fright from such a war, with the result that their actual war activities threaten to take on a permanent character, and therefore yield no visible fruits. The American war in Indochina has led to the disappointment of imperialist expectations. Instead of creating possibilities for further expansion it has only deepened the difficulties of profit production and has enlarged public expenditures.

Since the individual corporations do not participate equally in the state-controlled production, one part of capital subsidizes another part. The capitals which do not profit from the war turn, if not on ideological then on economic grounds, against the apparently unsuccessful war policy. Since the war involves continuing inflation, a part of the middle class has also lost interest in it. The workers have up to now been the least opposed to it, perhaps since many fear that their jobs depend on war and armaments. Obviously opposition to or acceptance of the war are not determined only by economic motives, but such considerations are bound to give one attitude or the other particularly expressive force. At any rate a growing war-weariness is developing which under certain circumstances can be dangerous for the imperialist policy.

It would however be incorrect to trace Americas economic difficulties exclusively back to the war in Indochina. They are due, as pointed out above, to a tendency to crisis inherent in the capitalist mode of production and relatively independent of this war. The success achieved through the Second World War is already a thing of the past. The capital increased through this success now requires a correspondingly greater mass of profit in order to continue to expand at the same tempo. Thus yesterdays success itself becomes tomorrows obstacle. When the mass of profit adequate to the expansion of the existing capital can no longer be obtained expansion transforms itself into stagnation. That the gains made through the World War and its aftermath are not sufficient to solve the accumulation problem of American capital is visible in the very fact that it has been necessary throughout the whole post-war period to ward off unemployment through growing public expenditures.

Since the capitalist economy is not centrally coordinated, it is naturally unable to frame policies to control its development: to decide at one time on a rising and at another on a declining state of business. Rather, production expands when profits grow, and contracts when profits shrink. When we speak of economic policy we refer only to measures taken by the state to influence the economy in one direction or another, within the limits imposed by the cyclical nature of capitalist development. The state can use the tax system, state credit, and control of the money supply to affect business conditions. Through the scarcity of money and the rise in the interest rate that goes with it production and investments are slowed down. The same end is accomplished through the raising of direct or indirect taxes on capital. With the limitation of production in general, the profitability of weaker capital is especially lowered, and the resulting restrictions in business activity and bankruptcies produce unemployment which is no longer absorbed by additional public expenditure. The final aim of the whole process is also the primary goal of all capitalist production, namely the increase of profits, in order to achieve a new prosperity on the basis of a changed capital structure.

The deflationary course introduced by the Nixon administration was in this regard successful. According to Arthur F. Burns, head of the Federal Reserve System,

Reductions in employment have occurred among all classes of workers blue collar, white collar, and professional workers alike. Indeed, employment of so-called non-production workers in manufacturing has shown a decline since March that is unparalleled in the post-war period.

Because of these vigorous efforts to cut costs, the growth of productivity has resumed, after two years of stagnation. In the second quarter of this year, output per man-hour in the private nonfarm economy rose at a 4 per cent annual rate, and the rate advanced to 5 per cent in the third quarter. These productivity gains have served as a sharp brake on the rise in unit labor costs, despite rapid increases in wage rates. [New York Times, Dec. 8, 1970]

Although it has escaped this expert that real wages already ceased to rise since 1967, it cannot be doubted that unemployment, which according to official data affected 6% of all wage workers at the end of 1970, made possible greater exploitation and lowered production costs. But this cost-cutting has had little effect on the continuing rise in prices.

Nixons policy was thus a disappointment while it indeed slowed the pace of the economy, it did not end inflation. Inflation without unemployment, it is now said, has only given way to inflation with unemployment. But capital must make profits in all situations, and that of inflation with unemployment suits it well. Solomon Fabricant, another expert, drew these conclusions:

In fact, to have maintained an inflationary policy in 1969 would, I believe, have postponed the recession only at the cost of a far worse recession later, when the rate of inflation had accelerated to an altogether intolerable level. [New York Times, Nov. 8, 1970]

The interruption of the inflationary trend appears to be not only a national; but also an international necessity, since the American situation is closely bound to that of the world economy. The dollar is a reserve currency. On its stability hangs that of the international currency system, and so that of the world market. International agreements set the relations of other currencies to the dollar, which itself is at least theoretically- based on a fixed gold price. During the last ten years, the buying power of the dollar has fallen by more than one fourth. With this the dollar reserves of other countries have also depreciated, and the preference for exchanging dollars for gold has risen. The constantly increasing loss of its gold backing makes the dollar continually more problematic as world money and reserve currency, and with it the worlds money system. Thus, while the depreciation of the dollar makes

for higher profitability in so far as prices rise faster than wages, it tends to undermine the existing international money system, which rests on the parity of the dollar with other currencies. A greater efficiency in international competition has up to now granted American capital a positive balance of trade, which however has been accompanied by a negative balance of payments because of great capital exports and the war in Indochina. The dollars spent by the government found their way abroad, since profits promised to be greater there than in America, and an increasing part of the world economy was brought under the control of American exploitation. The acceleration of international economic activity was thus in part tied to Americas inflationary policy and for a long time met with no serious opposition. But with the increasing competitive capability of European and Japanese capital, these countries turned against the American capital export advanced by inflationary means. It is not to be expected that these countries will forever submit their own capitalist interests to the inflationary necessities of America, just in order to preserve the dollar standard.

At all events, the accelerating inflation, national and international, appears to slip from the control of the American regime and to harm capital more than profit it. In addition to de- and re-evaluations of other currencies, it has forced an international inflation. This has undermined the international agreements reached anyway only with difficulty, and points to a general financial crises. In addition the rapidly climbing dollar prices decrease the international competitive ability of American capital and its commodity exports have fallen in relationship to imports. Between 1962 and 1968 American exports grew from $21.4 billion to $34.2 billion. In the same period however, imports climbed from 16.4 to 32.4 billion dollars , so that the positive balance of trade was rapidly disappearing. That it still exists to a small degree is due not to the commodity exchange between Europe and America but to that between America and the underdeveloped countries. With the disappearance of the trade surplus, the pressure is on the payments balance through greater capital exports and the costs of imperialism continued to grow, and thus contributed to the decision to halt the inflationary trend.

This decision came the more easily as the war situations in Indochina and in the Middle East had seemingly lost much of their menace, allowing America to stabilize the costs involved. The temporary limitation of capital exports poses no great problems for the capital already invested, since the latter can now make use of a newly developed European capital market to find funds for further growth. An artificial reserve forced on the International Monetary Fund, the so-called Paper Gold, serves as backup to the American gold reserves, and resumed European capital exports to America aid the payments balance. In the breathing space produced by this conjunction of factors it appeared quite possible to brake the inflation. The social consequences such as unemployment will be put up with as a necessary price to pay in order to push forward from the inflationary to a more stable form of capital production.

PRODUCTION GOES DOWN

This appears to be an illusion. Indeed, total production fell in 1970 for the first time since 1958 but without change in the price level. By the end of the year there were 5 million unemployed and nearly 15 million on welfare. Every week around 300 firms and more than 3,000 independent businessmen declare bankruptcy. The increasing productivity of labor has certainly improved profitability, but not by enough to make new investments attractive. Orders in the machine tool industry are lower today than they have been for twelve years. The calculated reduction of economic activity has turned into a general decline, the social consequences of which cannot be foreseen. The Nixon administrations first response was an attempt to push the economy up again by means of a greater reduction of taxes on capital, and a lowering of the interest rate; but it was quickly compelled to return to the inflationary tactics of the past. For 1971 a deficit of between 15 and 20 billion dollars and a corresponding expansion of the money supply is foreseen in order to return to full employment.

To be sure, full employment is defined as allowing up to 4% unemployment. But in order to do justice even to this definition, according to economic experts, yearly production must climb by 6% in real values. But in view of the decline in production at the years end, even this 6% growth rate itself unrealistic would not suffice to produce full employment, and this the less so as, in so far as planned new investments are known, all industries are striving to lower their investments for 1971 by between 5% and 9%. The unemployed will not find jobs in the private sector of the economy, so that the full employment program can be realized only through a new wave of inflation (i.e., government-induced production).

Inflation, war, and unemployment lead to a general dissatisfaction which makes itself felt not only politically but also in the demoralization of the army. The return of part of the troops from Indochina is traceable not only to the desire to stabilize military expenditures but also to the growing unreliability of the soldiers stationed in Vietnam. Of course it is made possible only by the apparent inability of North Vietnam and the NLF to carry on the war on an expanding scale. The return of the troops, and the implied promise of a full withdrawal from Vietnam, awakened new illusions and brought the American antiwar movement, at the end of 1970, to a nearly full halt. In addition, the student movement, which focused its opposition nearly exclusively on American imperialism, without much concern with the capitalist system itself, became a victim of its own programmatic limitations and its present inability to have any real influence over the pace of events. Through the interventions into Cambodia and Laos it received a new impetus, which however lagged behind the activity developed earlier.

The economic and political difficulties of American capital should not be overestimated. In general, the discontented are opposed not to the capitalist system but only to the policy of the present administration. Likewise, the Nixon administration is concerned not so much about

the breakdown of capitalism as about its own continued existence, and constructs its policy, insofar as this is objectively possible, with an eye to the coming election. To be sure, this viewpoint is possible only with respect to domestic issues, but here it is quite feasible to increase total production and lower unemployment, if at the cost of greater governmental indebtedness. The resulting impairment of capitalist accumulation can not yet upset the system itself, since the sphere of state-induced waste production in the totality of production is still relatively small.

Control over foreign policy does not, however, rest in Americas hands alone. Without doubt the Nixon regime would welcome an end to the war on Americas terms, particularly as a situation critical for American capital is beginning to develop in South America, and as the situation in the Middle East has not lost its explosiveness. The invasions into Cambodia and Laos show that for America the war in Indochina can end only with the defeat of the NLF and North Vietnam, i.e., with the end of the attempt to unite South and North Vietnam. It depends on the behavior of Russia and China, whether US military dominance of S.E. Asia will be followed by the consolidation of American power in that area. As things stand, the renewed inflationary trend coincides with sharpened imperialist aggressiveness. Both phenomena can only drive the internal social contradictions to extremes, so that American capitalism is bound to continue in its long standing condition of social crisis.

Americas War in Indochina

Source: Root and Branch, 1971, No. 3, pp. 19-26.Transcribed: by Thomas Schmidt;

The origins of the war in Indochina are to be found in the results of the second world war. Waged in Europe, Africa, and East Asia, World War II turned America into the strongest capitalist power in both the Atlantic and the Pacific areas of the world. The defeat of the imperialist ambitions of Germany and Japan promised the opening up of new imperialist opportunities for the United States, which emerged from the conflict not only unimpaired but enormously strengthened. Americas opportunities were not limitless, however; concessions had to be made to the Russian war-time ally, which formed the basis for new imperialistic rivalries and for the ensuing cold war. The post-war years were marked by the two great powers attempts to consolidate their gains. This excluded further unilateral expansion that would destroy the new power relationships. To that end, America assisted in the reconstruction of the West European economies and the revival of their military capacities, as well as in the rebuilding of Japan under her tutelage.

The second world war provided an opportunity for the colonial and semi-colonial nations of East Asia to gain their political independence. The British, French, Dutch, and Japanese colonizers lost their possessions. At first, the national liberation movement was welcomed by the Americans as an aid in the struggle against Japan, just as at first the Japanese had supported this movement as a means to destroy the European colonizers. Even after the Japanese defeat, the United States displayed no serious intentions to help the European nations to regain their colonies. The Americans were fully convinced that they would inherit what their European allies had lost, if not in the political then in an economic sense.

The Chinese revolution altered the whole situation, particularly because at that time it appeared as an extension of the power of the new Russian adversary and as the expansion of a socio-economic system no longer susceptible to foreign exploitation through the ruling world market relations. The needs of the American imperialists were clear: short of war, they would have to contain China in Asia, as they contained Russia in Europe. This necessitated a system of Asian alliances such as the Atlantic Pact provided for Europe.

Capital is international. The fact that its historical development paralleled that of the nation state did not prevent the establishment of the capitalist world market. However, due to political interventions in defense of one national bourgeoisie against competitor nations, the concentration of capital was, and is, more difficult to achieve on an international than on a national scale. Even capitalist crises, world-embracing accelerators of the concentration process, needed the additional measures of imperialistic wars to extend the national concentration process to the international scene. The capitalistic organization of the world economy is thus a contradictory process. What it brings about is not the final accomplishment of capitalist world unity but capital entities competing more and more destructively for the control of always larger parts of the world economy.

This process is inherent in capital accumulation, which reproduces the fundamental capitalist contradictions on an always larger scale. With capital accumulation still the determining factor of social development, we re-experience more extensively and more intensely the experiences of the past with respect to both competition and the internationalization of capital. To regard the world as destined for private exploitation is what capitalism is all about. If, at the beginning, it was predominantly a question of exporting commodities and importing cheap raw materials, it soon turned into the export of capital for the direct exploitation of the labor power of other nations and therewith to colonization in order to monopolize the new profit sources.

The end of the colonial system did not remove the twofold capitalist need to expand internationally and to concentrate the profits thereby gained into the hands of the dominant national capital entities. Because capitalism is both national and international it is by its very nature imperialistic. Imperialism serves as the instrumentality for bridging national limitations in the face of pressing international needs. It is therefore silly to assume the possibility of a capitalism which is not imperialistic.

Of course, there are small capitalist nations which flourish without directly engaging in imperialistic activities. But such nations, operating within the frame of the capitalistic world market, partake, albeit indirectly, in the imperialistic exploits of the larger capitalist nations, just as on the domestic scale many small sub-contractors profit from business given to them by the large prime contractors producing for the war economy. Not all capitalist countries can expand imperialistically. They find themselves more or less under the control of those nations which can, even if this control is restricted to the economic sphere. It is for this reason that some European observers see a form of neo-colonialism in the recent expansion of American capital in Europe, and others press for a more integrated Europe able to act as a third force in a world dominated by imperialist powers.

The contradiction between the national form of capital and its need for expansion, which recognizes no boundaries, is intertwined with the contradiction between its competitive nature and its urge for monopolization. In theory, a competitive economy flourishes best in a free world market. Actually, however, competition leads to monopoly and monopolistic competition, and the free world market leads to protected markets monopolized by political means. Monopolistic competition implies imperialistic struggles to break existing monopolies in favor of new ones. The economic form of competition takes on political expressions and therefore ideological forms, which come to overshadow the economic pressures which are their source.

This transformation of economic into political-ideological issues has become still more confounded through the modifications of capital production brought about by way of social revolution. The planned economies of Russia, China, and their satellites not only disturbed the monopolistically controlled world market but tended to prevent its further expansion under private-capitalist auspices. To be sure, there was not much capitalization in the underdeveloped parts of the world. International capital concentration resulted in the rapid development of existing capital at the expense of potential capital in subjugated countries. Lucrative markets, and cheap foodstuffs and raw materials increased the profit rates in the manufacturing nations and therewith hastened their capital accumulation. Beyond that, however, it was expected that a time would come when further expansion of capital would include its intensified extension in the underdeveloped parts of the world.

Capital is not interested in the continued existence of industrially-underdeveloped nations per se. It is interested only to the extent that this state of affairs proves to be the most profitable. If a further development of backward countries should be more, or equally, profitable than investments in advanced nations, capitalists will not hesitate to foster their capitalist development just as they hastened it in their own countries. Whether or not this could ever become a reality under the conditions of private-capital production is a question the capitalists cannot raise for their own continued existence is clearly bound up with the capitalization of the underdeveloped nations. They thus cannot help seeing in the formation and expansion of state-controlled systems a limitation of their own possibilities of expansion and a threat to their control of the world market. For them communism means the formation of super-monopolies which cannot be dealt with by way of monopolistic competition and have to be combatted by political-ideological means and, where opportune, by military measures.

In their opposition to communism the capitalists do not merely object to a different economic system. They also condemn it for political and ideological reasons especially since, convinced that the economic principles of capitalism are universal principles of economic behavior, their violation seems a violation of human nature itself. They do not and cannot afford to understand the dynamics and limitations of their own social system. They see the reasons for its difficulties not in the system itself but in causes external to it. From this point of view, it is the erroneous and depraved creed of communism which subverts society and robs it of the possibility of working itself out of whatever difficulties arise. It is thus not necessary that the capitalists, their apologists, and all the people who accept the capitalist ideology be aware of the fact that it is the ordinary business of profit-making which determines the national and international capitalist policies.

Neither is it necessary for the capitalist-decision-makers to comprehend all the implications of their activities in the defense of and, therefore, the expansion of their economic and political powers. They know in a general way that whatever lies outside their control endangers their interests and perhaps their existence and they react almost instinctively to any danger to their privileged positions. Because they are the ruling class, they determine the ruling ideology, which suffices to explain their own behavior, as it covers their special class interests and nothing else. They will thus explain all their actions in strictly ideological terms, taking their economic content for granted and as something not debatable. Indeed, they may never make a conscious connection between their political convictions and their underlying economic considerations, and may inadvertently violate the latter in satisfying their ideological notions.

The capitalists are not Marxists, which is to say that they must defend, not criticise, existing social relationships. Defense does not require a proper understanding of the system; it merely demands actions which support the status quo. Marxist rationality, which includes criticism of existing conditions, often assumes that all capitalistic activities are directly determined by its capitalistic rationality, that is, by its immediate need to make profit and to accumulate capital. They will look for directly-observable economic motives behind the political activities of capitalist states, particularly in the international field. When such obvious reasons are not directly discernible, they are somewhat at a loss to account for imperialist aggression. In the case of Indochina, for example, the apparent absence of important economic incentives for American intervention has been a troublesome fact for Marxist war critics. This was seemingly mitigated only by the recent discovery of offshore oil potentials, which are supposed to explain, at least in part, the continued interest of big business in a victorious conclusion of the war. It is clear, however, that the Indochina war was there, and would be there, without this discovery and explanations must be found other than some definite but isolated capitalistic interests.

The apologists of capitalism utilize this situation to demonstrate that it is not the capitalist system as such which leads to imperialism, but some aberration thrust upon it by forces external to itself. They speak of a military-industrial complex, conspiring within the system, to serve its particularistic interests at the expense of society as a whole. In their views, it is one of the institutions of society, not capitalism itself, which is responsible for the war through it usurpation of the decision-making powers of government. Whereas the war far from being waged for profits, current or expected is an enormous expense to the American taxpayers and therefore senseless, it does directly benefit the particular group of war profiteers in control of government. Specific people, not the system, are to blame, for which reason all that is necessary to end the aberration is a change of government and the emasculation of the industrial-military complex.

There is, of course, truth in both these assertions, namely, that imperialism is economically motivated and that it is spearheaded by groups particularly favored by war. But by failing to relate these explanations to the fundamental contradictions of capital production, they fail to do justice to the complexity of the problem of war and imperialism. Neither the production nor the accumulation of capital is a consciously-controlled process on the social level. Each capitalist entity, be it an entrepreneur, corporation, conglomerate, or multinational enterprise, necessarily limits its activities to the enlargement of its capital, without regard to or even the possibility of having regard for. social needs and the course of social development. They are blind to the national and international social consequences of their relentless need to enlarge their capital. The profit motive is their only motive. It is what determines the direction of their expansion. Their enormous weight within society determines social policies and therewith the policies of the government. This implies, however, that government and society itself operate just as blindly with respect to its development as each separate capital entity with regard to its profit needs. They know what they are doing, but not where it will lead them; they cannot comprehend the consequences of their activities.

These consequences may include war and war may be initiated not because of some definite economic expectations, such as possession of specific raw materials, entry into new markets, or the export of capital, but because of past economic policies whose consequences were not foreseeable. This is quite clear, of course, in the case of imperialistic interventions in defense of capitalist property which stands in danger of being expropriated, or has been expropriated, in nations which try to gain, or regain, some measure of independence in economic as well as in political terms. This explains recent interventions such as those in Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the Congo and so forth. It is not clear with respect to the intervention in Indochina, where the United States economic interests were minimal and their possible loss of no consequence to her economy. Yet this intervention, too, was the unforeseen outcome of past economic developments, even though it cannot be related to any immediate and specific economic needs or opportunity on the part of American capitalism.

There is only one way to secure the capitalist market economy and that is through the continuous expansion of capital. It is this expansion which is the secret of its prosperous stages of development, just as lack of expansion results in its periods of depression. Capital development has been an alternation between prosperity and depression, the so-called business-cycle. For American capital, however, the last big depression, that of 1929, did not lead to a new period of prosperity but to an era of relative stagnation and decline, which was overcome only through the transformation of the economy into a war economy, that is, the growth of production not by way of capital accumulation, but through the accumulation of the national debt and production for public consumption such as is required by war and preparation for war. But just like the Great Depression before, the war failed to restore a rate of capital expansion sufficient to assure the full utilization of productive resources and the available labor power. The government saw itself forced to continue its support of the economy by way of deficit-financed public expenditures which, given the nature of the capitalist system, are necessarily non-competitive with private capital and therefore largely arms expenditures. The cold war in the wake of the real war provided the rationale for this type of compensatory production.

To be sure, private capital continued its expansion at home and abroad, but not to the extent which would have allowed a significant curtailment of non-profitable government-induced production. Indeed, in spite of both types of production that is, for the market and for extra-market public consumption full employment and full use of productive resources could not be reached. Despite the great expenditures connected with the war in Indochina, at the end of 1970 America counted six million unemployed and an 80% utilization of her productive resources. War expenditures are, of course, a deduction from the national income and can neither be capitalized nor be consumed in the usual sense of the term. A steady growth of expenditures for war is possible only at the expense of capital accumulation and living standards. It is, therefore, no solution for the problems caused by an insufficient rate of capital expansion; instead it makes a solution harder to achieve. Capitalistically, war makes sense only if it serves as an instrument for bringing about conditions more favorable for a further expansion and extension of capital. Yet at the same time, under prevailing conditions, absence of the war in Indochina would merely increase the number of unemployed and increase the unused part of the productive resources.

War or no war, short of an accelerated rate of private capital expansion, there is only the choice between a deepening depression and the amelioration of conditions through the further extension of non-profitable public expenditures. But whereas the war may eventually yield the preconditions or an American penetration of East Asia, and its present expense be recompensed by future profits, public expenditures for other purposes do not have such effects. Experience shows that war does open up possibilities for further capital expansion. From a consistent capitalistic standpoint a successfully waged war is more rational than a steady drift into economic decline.

Even if the mixed economy has found acceptance as a probably unavoidable modification of the capitalist system, the mix, that is, governmental interventions in the economy, are supposed to be only such as benefit private capital. To keep it that way, interferences in market relations must be limited on the national as well as on the international level. A general expansion of government production internally would spell the certain end of corporate capitalist property relations, just as the extension of a state-determined social system of production within the world economy points toward the contraction of the free-enterprise economies. The necessity of containing the spread of communism, that is, of state-controlled systems, is thus related to the necessity of

restricting governmental interventions in the economy within each private-capitalist nation. With more nations adopting the state-controlled form of capital production and thereby limiting the expansion of private capital, insufficient expansion of the latter calls forth more intensive government interventions in the private-capitalist nations. To halt the trend toward state-capitalism in the market economies requires the containment and possibly the roll-back of the already-established state-capitalist systems. But while at home the capitalists control their governments and thus determine the kind and degree of the latters economic interventions, they can only halt the dreaded transformation abroad either by gaining control of the governments of other nations or by imperialistic military measures.

There is, then, no special reason for Americas intervention in Indochina, apart from her general policy of intervening anywhere in the world in order to prevent political and social changes that would be detrimental to the so-called free world, and particularly to the power which dominates it. Like an octopus, America extends her tentacles into all the underdeveloped countries still under the sway of private-capitalist property relations to assure their continued adherence to the free enterprise principle or, at least, to the old world market relations which make them into appendages of Western capitalism. She tries to rally all pro-capitalist forces into various regional alliances, arms and finances the most reactionary regimes, penetrates governments, and offers aid, all to halt any social movement which might strive for the illusory goal of political and economic self-determination. Because self-determination is not a real possibility, the United States recognizes that attempts to attain it could only result in nations leaving the orbit of Western capitalism to fall into that of the Eastern powers. By fighting self-determination and national liberation, America is simply continuing her war against the Russian and Chinese adversaries. Although no longer a cold war, it is as yet fought only on the periphery of the real power issues involved.

Separately, none of the small nations which experienced American intervention endangered the United Statess hegemony in world affairs to any noticeable extent. If they were hindered in their attempts to rid themselves of foreign domination and of their own collaborating ruling classes, this was because America recognizes that their revolutionary activities are not accidental phenomena, but so many expressions of an as yet weak but world-wide trend to challenge the capitalist monopolies of power and exploitation. They must, therefore, be suppressed wherever they arise and conditions that will prevent their return must be created, quite apart from all immediate profit considerations. In this respect, the present differs from the past in that while imperialist interventions used to serve to create empires within a world system, such interventions today serve the defense of capitalism itself.

At first glance, Americas gains in Asia are quite impressive. She has not only regained the Philippines and destroyed Japans co-prosperity sphere, but found entry into nations that only a few years ago had been monopolized by European powers. With the aid of a reconstructed Japan, now allied to the United States, it seemed relatively easy to keep China out of Southeast Asia and secure this part of the globe for the free world in general and the United States in particular. But the communist enemy was to be found not only in China but to a greater or lesser extent in all the countries of the region, achieving by subversion what could ostensibly no longer be achieved by more direct procedures. Securing Americas newly-won position in Southeast Asia thus required the destruction of native national forces which saw themselves also as communist movements and wished to emulate the Russian and Chinese examples rather than adapt themselves to the ways of Western capitalism.

Like all countries, the emerging states in Southeast Asia were divided by different class interests. Different social groups fought for special aims by way of and within the struggle for national liberation, which was thus at the same time a civil war. Its results would determine whether the liberated nations would have societies keeping them within the fold of Western capitalism. It became necessary to influence the outcome of the civil war by outside intervention. For the United States it was essential that whatever the results of the liberation movements they must not lead to new communist regimes willing to side with the Chinese adversary. Americas politicians rightly surmised that notwithstanding the most exaggerated nationalism, which would tend to oppose a new Chinese domination as it had opposed that of the old colonial powers, China by sheer weight alone would dominate the smaller nations at her boundaries, disguised though this domination would be by ideological camouflage. The surge of nationalism was to be channeled into anti-communism, which meant the upholding or creation of governments and institutions friendly to the United States and Western capitalism.

Political decisions are left to the decision-makers; so long as they are successful they find some kind of general support. Even if the decisions involve war, they will be accepted not only because of the generally-shared ideology, but also because of the practical inability on the part of the population to affect the decision-making process in any way. People will try to make the best of a bad situation which also has its advantages. Certainly, the armaments producers will not object to the extra profits made through war. Neither will the arms production workers object to it, if it provides them with job security and steady incomes, which might be less certain under other circumstances. The military will see the war as a boon to their profession; war is their business and they will encourage business to make war. Because the mixed economy has become a war economy, many new professions have arisen which are tied to war conditions or to preparation for such conditions. A growing government bureaucracy relies for its existence on the perpetuation of the war machinery and of imperialistic activities. Wide-spread interests vested in war and imperialism ally themselves with those specific to the large corporations and their dependency on foreign exploitation.

While for some war and imperialism spell death, then, for many more they constitute a way of life, not as an exceptional situation but as a permanent condition. Their existence is based on a form of cannibalism, which costs the lives of friend and foe alike. Once this state of affairs exists, it tends to reproduce itself and it becomes increasingly difficult to return to the normal state of capitalist production. War itself increases the propensity for war. The American decision-makers, who decided to enter the Indochina conflicts (or for that matter any other) have thus been able to count on the consensus of a large part of the population, a consensus which was by no means purely ideological in nature.

Even so, the United States did not, and has not as yet, declared war against North Vietnam. Allegedly, she still is only defending the endangered self-determination of South Vietnam. The Korean War indicated that, short of risking a new world war, already established communist regimes could not be detached from their protector states, Russia and China. In other respects, however, the situation was still fluid. Apart from North Vietnam, other Southeast Asian nations were either anti-communist, or declared themselves neutralist or non-aligned, meaning that their civil wars, clandestine or open, were still undecided. In the case of Laos, this led to a tripartite arrangement, engineered by the great powers, with neutralist"-, communist"-, and western"-oriented forces dividing the country between them. This too was thought of as a temporary solution which would perhaps be resolved at some future date. Cambodia maintained a precarious independence by catering to both sides of the overshadowing larger power conflict. Only in Thailand, where America had replaced Britain as the major foreign influence was the commitment to the West almost complete. Here the United States States sent more than 30,000 troops and much aid to build this kingdom into a bastion of the free world. (It has become the most important American airbase for the Vietnam war.)

Because of the flexibility of the situation, it seemed essential to the United States to stop any further change in Southeast Asia by assisting all anti-communist forces in that region. This has been a consistent policy, from which none of[ the successive American administrations has deviated. Objecting to the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the American-installed regime of South Vietnam refused to consider the proposed elections, which were to decide the question of unification of South and North Vietnam. To assure the. continued existence of South Vietnam, the United States poured money and soon troops into the country. The resumed civil war in the South found support from North Vietnam, turning the American intervention into a war against both the national liberation forces in the South and the North Vietnamese government. This intervention has often been found unjustified, because it concerned itself with a civil war instead of, as claimed, with the national independence of South Vietnam. However (as was pointed out above) in the context of Indochina no distinction can be made between international war and civil war, because here all wars for national liberation are at the same time civil wars for social change. It was precisely because of the civil-war character of the national liberation movements that the United States entered the fray.

Americas determination to retain influence in Indochina at all costs did check a possible further extension of social transformations such as occurred in North Vietnam and in a part of Laos. As it became evident that neither Russia nor China would actively intervene in the Vietnamese war, the anti-communist forces in Southeast Asia were greatly strengthened and, aided by the United States, began to destroy their own communist"-oriented movements, the most gruesome of these undertakings being that in Indonesia. But while neither Russia nor China was ready to risk war with the United States to drive the latter out of Southeast Asia, they tried to prevent the consolidation of American power in that region by enabling the Vietnamese to carry on the war. The military aid given to the Vietnamese by Russia and China could not lead to the defeat of the Americans, but promised a prolonged war which would deprive the United States of enjoying the spoils of an early victory. The immediate and growing expenses of the war would, instead, loom ever larger in comparison with its possible positive results, which would recede always further to the indeterminate future. By bleeding the people of Indochina America would in increasing measure bleed herself, and perhaps lose confidence in her ability to conclude the war on her own terms.

It seems quite clear that the Americans expected less resistance to their intervention than they actually came to face. They aspired to no more than a repetition of the outcome of the Korean conflict a mutual retreat to previously demarcated frontiers, which meant halting the communist penetration at the Seventeenth Parallel in the case of Vietnam, and at the agreed-upon zones in Laos. As in Korea, in Vietnam too they had no desire to turn the war into a new world war by bringing Russia, China, or both into the conflict. A war of the great powers, possessing atomic weapons, could easily lead to mutual destruction. The fear of such a war has until now set limits to the war in Vietnam. It has prevented a concentrated, all-out American onslaught on North Vietnam to bring the war to a victorious conclusion, since neither Russia nor China, like the United States herself, can be expected to allow any territory already under their control or in their sphere of interests to be lost, without encouraging further encroachments on their power positions. It was for this reason that the Western powers did not intervene on the occasions of the Russian invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and that America now hesitates to attempt the complete destruction of North Vietnam.

Of course, a nations determination to hold on to what it has, or has gained, is not absolute. The overriding fear of a possible atomic war, for instance, kept the United States from re-conquering Cuba. Nations tend to avoid actions which have a very high probability of leading to undesired results. Uncertainty is the rule, however, and it is the presumed job of diplomacy to weigh the pros and cons of any particular policy with regard to long-run national and imperialistic interests. This may incorporate short-run decisions which need not have a direct logical connection with long-run goals. The latter are, of course, illusory, since the dynamics of capitalism imply an ever-changing general situation which escapes political comprehension. The imperialist strategy remains a policy with regard to long-run national and imperialist interests. Since the dynamics of capitalism imply an ever-changing general situation which escapes political comprehension, long-run imperialist strategy put into practice remains a matter of blindly executed activity, in which all diplomatic expectations may come to naught. Actually, the political decision-makers can affect only immediate, short-run goals (which need not have a direct logical connection with the long-run goals). They try to attain a definite and obvious objective. They may reach it or not; if they lose, it will be through the action of an adversary. Until stopped, they will see their course of action as the only rational one and

will try to follow it up to the end. In the case of Indochina, the simple goal was to secure this part of the world for Western capitalism without initiating a new world war. The unexpectedly effective resistance of the adversaries led to a continuous escalation of the war effort and a growing discrepancy between the limited objective and the costs involved in reaching it.

In one sense, to be sure, the American intervention proved successful, in that it not only prevented the unification of South and North Vietnam but also sustained Western influence in Southeast Asia in general. Confidence in the ability to maintain this situation is reflected in new extensive and predominantly private American and Japanese direct investments in oil, timber, and mineral resources in Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, and even South Vietnam. Still, the war goes on, because the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front in the South are not willing to acknowledge defeat and to accept peace on American terms. Short of a successful invasion of the North or an internal collapse of the communists there is no reason to expect a change in this situation, though an apparent loss of offensive power on the part of the North Vietnamese and NLF forces is allowing a reduction in the number of American troops in Vietnam.

There is no reason to doubt that at this juncture the United States would prefer a negotiated peace, which would honor her main objectives, to the continuation of the war, if only to stall the growing unrest at home. Opposition to the war has begun to affect the military situation through an increasing demoralization of the armed forces. The anti-war movement displays a variety of motivations, but has gained its present strength and dangerous possibilities because of deteriorating economic conditions. It is also the long duration of the war, and the lack of any recognizable advantages gained by it, which turn more and more people against it. There existed from the wars beginning a moral opposition, based on pacifist and anti-imperialist ideologies, which has now found more general adherence large enough to induce opportunistic politicians to enter the movement to further their personal aims and to keep it within the framework of existing political institutions. But even though war protests are as yet of a merely verbal nature, with ah occasional firebomb thrown in, they contain the potentiality of more decisive actions in the near future. In any case, the present administration finds itself obliged to placate the anti-war movement, even though it has no more to offer than the demagoguery of promises which it is in no position to keep.

However, one should neither under- nor over-estimate the anti-war movement. While it is true that its existence has forced the government to masquerade its continued and intensified war activities as so many attempts to reach an honorable peace, in its broad majority the opposition to the war directs itself not against the capitalist system, which is necessarily imperialistic, but merely against this particular and apparently unsuccessful war (now viewed as a big mistake that needs being undone). And while it is true that the hitherto-displayed apathy about the war on the part of the working population is apparently giving way to a critical attitude, this does not in itself imply independent working-class actions such as could bring the war to an end. Even among the bourgeoisie, not directly favored by the war, dissatisfaction with its course and its internal consequences is visibly rising. But this amorphous anti-war sentiment, affecting all layers of the population, does not as yet constitute a real threat to the Administrations war policy; especially because the government still commands the unswerving loyalty of perhaps a majority of the population, which would no doubt come to its aid should this become necessary. The developing polarization of pro- and anti-war forces points in the direction of civil strife rather than to the governments capitulation to the opposition.

Meanwhile, the governments demagoguery is taken quite seriously namely, that the war is being wound down by way of Vietnamization in accordance with the Nixon doctrine, which wants to leave the (capitalist) defense of Asia to the Asians. This demagoguery is seemingly substantiated by a partial withdrawal of American troops and the simultaneous increase of the Vietnamese army, as well as by the intensification of the American air war in Laos, Cambodia, North and South Vietnam. Withdrawal has in fact meant, first of all, the extension of the war into Cambodia and Laos to prepare the conditions under which the Asians themselves will be enabled to take care of all communist aggression. It would indeed be an ideal situation to have Asians fight Asians to secure Indochina for capitalist exploitation. But as matters stand, it is more likely that a real American withdrawal would also be the end of Vietnamization and the Nixon doctrine.

The ideal situation is admittedly unrealizable, however, even though an approximation is held to be possible, provided the enemy adapts itself to the American strategy. If it does not, then, of course, the Americans must return in greater numbers to defend their endangered occupation troops. The deterrent strategy of a large naval and air presence will be maintained in any case. Even this strategy assumes the continuation of the present military stalemate, which favors the Americans, since it can be utilized for the systematic destruction of enemy forces within the areas under American control. A resurgence of resistance to the Americans and their Indochinese allies becomes increasingly more problematical, as ever greater masses of the population are driven into controlled refugee centers and as the countryside is laid waste. If Russia and China continue to stay out of the conflict, the aid they provide by itself will not enable North Vietnam and the NLF to win a war of attrition with the United States.

Clearly, the war will go on as long as the North Vietnamese continue to defy the American will. They will be able to do so as long as they receive sufficient aid from either Russia, China, or both. In this sense, the war is still a war between these Eastern powers and the United States, even though only the latter has engaged her military forces due to the weakness of her Indochinese allies, who were no match for the national-revolutionary forces they set out to combat. The rift between Russia and China has not altered this situation, as each of these nations has its own reasons for opposing the American advance in Asia. Whatever national interests and rivalries divide Russia and China, these interests cannot be furthered for either side through an alliance with the United States, which cannot help treating both as implacable enemies because of their socio-economic structures and their own desires to make themselves secure by gaining greater power and more influence within the world economy.

In summing up, it must be said that the Indochina war has to be seen not as an isolated conflict between America and North Vietnam, but as an aspect of an unfolding wider struggle concerning the whole of Asia and the nature of its further development. Beyond that, it is a special case of a general struggle going on in many parts of the world against the imperialist forms of private capital production. Objectively and subjectively, this struggle can as yet take on no other form than that of national liberation, even though this is not a real solution to the social and economic problems that beset the countries subjugated to the double yoke of native and and foreign exploitation. However, this struggle is itself a sign of an ongoing dissolution of the capitalist mode of production and will, in time, find support in class struggles to be waged in the imperialist nations. For it is more than doubtful that capitalism will be able to overcome its deepening structural crisis by way of outward expansion, since it is certain that all attempts in that direction will meet ever more effective resistance. Whatever the outcome of the struggle in Indochina, it will not affect this general situation.

Die Gemischte konomie und ihre Grenzen

(Juni 1971)

Die Gemischte konomie ist das Manuskript eines Vortrages, den Paul Mattick im Juni 1971 whrend eines Berlin-Besuchs gehalten hat.Zuerst abgedruckt in Die Soziale Revolution ist keine Parteisache No. 2 vom November 1971, S. 46-55. Abgedruckt in der Broschre P. Mattick Kapitalistischer Reproduktionsproze und Klassenbewutsein 2 Aufstze, Hamburg, Verlag O, 1973, S. 2-11 Transkription/HTML-Markierung: Thomas Schmidt fr das Marxists Internet Archive.

Die brgerliche Wirtschaftstheorie erhob auf lange Zeit keinen Anspruch auf praktische Anwendbarkeit. Sie sollte nur den sich von ihr unabhngig vollziehenden aktuellen Wirtschaftsproze verstndlich machen und die existierenden gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen rechtfertigen. Um dem praktischen Gesellschaftsleben gerecht zu werden, bildeten sich besondere Gewerbe- und Handelsschulen. Die reine Theorie, ganz unabhngig von ihrem Wahrheitsgehalt, hatte nur ideologische Funktionen zu erfllen. Die ausschlaggebende Theorie um die Jahrhundertwende war die neo-klassische Markttheorie, die sich als Gleichgewichtstheorie verstand und in der sich die Nachfrage dem Angebot automatisch anpate. Ohne darauf weiter einzugehen, sei nur bemerkt, da diese Theorie durch die ihr widersprechenden aktuellen Ereignisse ihren ideologischen Wert verlor.

Das Ende der traditionellen Theorie wurde als Keynesianische Revolution gefeiert. Dieser Umsturz enthielt jedoch nicht mehr als die einfache Feststellung, da die Gleichgewichtstheorie den Tatsachen widersprach. Unfreiwillige Massenarbeitslosigkeit und eine wachsende Unlust zu neuen Kapitalanlagen wiesen darauf hin, da der Marktmechanismus kein Gleichgewichtsmechanismus war. Um unter den neuen Umstnden ein solches Gleichgewicht zu erreichen, wren bewute staatliche Eingriffe in den Marktmechanismus notwendig. Die Mittel zu diesem Zweck lgen in der staatlichen Geld- und Kreditpolitik. Allerdings war hier die Praxis der Theorie bereits vorausgeeilt. Der Notgehorchend hatten verschiedene Staaten bereits versucht, die Arbeitslosigkeit durch vermehrte ffentliche Ausgaben einzuschrnken. Da dies den bisherigen Auffassungen widersprach, wurde es notwendig, die Theorie den neuen Tatsachen anzupassen.

Die neue, mit Keynes Namen verbundene Theorie und ihre praktische Anwendung wurde zuerst als kurzfristige Notmanahme akzeptiert. Abgesehen von letzten Erklrungen, war die Wirtschaftskrise offensichtlich ein Zustand, der sich aus einer fallenden Investitionsrate ergab. Reichen die privaten Kapitalanlagen nicht zur Vollbeschftigung aus, so mte das Defizit durch erhhte ffentliche Ausgaben ausgeglichen werden, ffentliche Ausgaben werden jedoch von Steuereinnahmen bestimmt, und Steuererhhungen knnen die privaten Investitionen nicht erhhen. Aber grere ffentliche Ausgaben knnen durch Staatsanleihen gedeckt werden. Das Regierungsbudget Einnahmen und Ausgaben braucht sich nicht Jahr fr Jahr zu decken. Staatsschulden, die in Zeiten der Krise gemacht werden, knnten in Jahren der Prosperitt durch vermehrte Staatseinnahmen abgetragen werden. Durch eine langfristige Budgetpolitik wre es mglich, den Zyklus von Krise und Hochkonjunktur zu nivellieren und die Wirtschaft zu stabilisieren.

Darberhinaus htte die staatlich vermittelte Produktionsvermehrung die eigenartige Wirkung der Selbstfinanzierung, so da unter Umstnden das Problem des Budgetausgleiches berhaupt nicht aufzutauchen brauchte. Diese Auffassung fand ihren Ausdruck in dem Begriffe des Multiplikators, d. h. in der Annahme, da jede zustzliche Investition das volkswirtschaftliche Gesamteinkommen weit ber die Summe der Investition hinaus vermehrte. So wrden sich die greren staatlichen Ausgaben durch die von ihnen verursachte Vermehrung des Gesamteinkommens von selbst bezahlen. Es wurde allerdings vergessen, da die zustzlichen staatlichen Ausgaben nicht vom Himmel fallen, sondern zurckzuzahlende Anleihen sind, die nur dann zu einer greren als der ihr eigenen Summe fhren knnen, wenn sie produktiv angelegt werden, d. h. soweit sie ihrem Wert einen Mehrwert zuzufgen imstande sind. Andernfalls tauscht sich der Wert der staatlichen Investitionen nur gegen einen gleichen Wert in anderer Form aus, und vor Multiplikation kann keine Rede sein.

Aber es waren nicht diese oder hnliche theoretische Erwgungen, die zur Ausdehnung der staatlich vermittelten und damit gemischten Produktion fhrten, sondern zuerst der soziale Druck der Arbeitslosigkeit und spter die Anforderungen der Aufrstungs- und Kriegsproduktion. Nur im letzteren Fall verband sich eine fast verschwindende Akkumulationsrate mit Vollbeschftigung. Profite wurden als Staatsverschuldung verbucht und wiesen auf die im gesellschaftlicher Rahmen tatschlich existierende Profitlosigkeit der Kriegsproduktion hin. Die Produktion war im wesentlichen eine Produktion fr den Verbrauch, wenn dieser auch nur destruktiven Zwecken diente. Der Gedanke lag jedoch nahe, da auch in Friedenszeiten Vollbeschftigung erreicht werden knnte durch die Sozialisierung des Verbrauchs, d. h. durch staatlich vermittelte Produktion, unabhngig von den Profitnotwendigkeiten, denen die kapitalistische Produktion unterliegt. Dort, wo das Kapital aufhrte, durch weitere Expansion die Vollbeschftigung zu sichern, mte der Staat mit ffentlichen Ausgaben einspringen, um die Existenz der Massen sicherzustellen.

Der Staat ist jedoch nur in begrenztem Mae Besitzer von Kapital und Produktionsmitteln, und in diesem begrenzten Sinne ohne Einflu auf den Wirtschaftszyklus. Um zur Vollbeschftigung vorzustoen, mu der Staat ber seine eigenen normalen Anforderungen hinaus und mit Mitteln, die nicht ihm, sondern dem privaten Kapital gehren, die Produktion zu erweitern suchen. Um mehr auszugeben, als er einnimmt, mu er sich die Differenz auf dem Kapitalmarkt erstehen. Der Staat kauft von den Kapitalisten Produkte mit dem Geld, das er sich von ihnen gegen einen bestimmten Zinssatz geliehen hat. Da stets neu geborgt werden kann, ist nur die Verzinsung der Anleihen zu bercksichtigen, also nur ein kleiner Bruchteil der Staatsschuld, der durch Steuern gedeckt werden kann.

Der Staat ist natrlich keine ber der Gesellschaft stehende Institution, sondern der Staat der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft. Als solcher kann er nur dem Kapital zusagende Anordnungen treffen. Die von ihm vermittelte zustzliche Produktion kann grundstzlich nicht mit der Produktion fr den Markt konkurrieren, obwohl auch hier Ausnahmen die Regel besttigen. Soweit jedoch die staatliche Produktion auf dem Markt konkurriert, unterliegt sie den allgemeinen Gesetzen der Konkurrenz, die den Staat als Unternehmer genau so betreffen wie den privaten Unternehmer. Die staatlich vermittelte Produktion der gemischten Wirtschaft handelt von der Produktion, die aus dem Marktbereich herausfllt, die nicht in die allgemeine durchschnittliche Profitrate eingeht und die keine auf dem Markt zu realisierenden Gewinne aufweist. Wrde die staatliche mit der privaten Produktion in stets wachsendem Mae konkurrieren, so Wrde das private Kapital der staatlichen Konkurrenz bald unterliegen und die Wirtschaft zu einer staatskapitalistischen Wirtschaft werden.

Die gemischte Wirtschaft setzt voraus, da ihr staatlicher Sektor nur den kleineren Teil der Gesamtwirtschaft bildet. Andernfalls knnte der unprofitable staatliche Sektor nicht von dem profitablen privaten Sektor getragen werden. Da der staatliche Sektor keinen Profit bringt, kann er auch keinen Zins abwerfen. Die Kosten des unprofitablen Sektors drcken sich in der Staatsverschuldung und ihrer Verzinsung aus, die aus den Steuern des profitablen Sektors beglichen werden. Mit der Ausdehnung des staatlichen Sektors wchst die Besteuerung des Kapitals und vermindert dementsprechend die zu seiner eigenen Expansion notwendigen Profite. Mit dem Wachsen der Gesamtproduktion durch die Erweiterung des staatlichen Sektors fllt die schon unzureichende Akkumulationsrate noch mehr und erschwert damit einen neuen Aufschwung des privaten Kapitals, der zu einer relativen Einschrnkung des staatlichen Sektors fhren knnte. Soll das Prinzip der Vollbeschftigung unter allen Umstnden gewahrt werden, so drngt die stagnierende Akkumulationsrate zur Erweiterung des staatlichen Sektors. Das Prinzip der Vollbeschftigung steht im Widerspruch zu den Notwendigkeiten der Akkumulation. Um dieser Notwendigkeit nachzukommen, mu die unprofitable staatliche Produktion in bestimmten Grenzen gehalten werden.

Diese Begrenzung derausgleichenden staatlichen Wirtschaftseingriffe vermindert deren Wirksamkeit im Laufe ihrer fortgesetzten Anwendung. Die Akkumulation des Kapitals hat die unbestrittene Tendenz, die Profitrate zu vermindern ein Proze, der sich durch ein beschleunigtes Akkumulationstempo latent halten lt. Die relative Stagnation des Kapitals, die die staatlichen Eingriffe erzwang, vermindert die Profitrate trotz und wegen der mit diesen Eingriffen verbundenen steigenden Produktion. Gemessen an der Gesamtproduktion drckt sich die fallende Profitrate als abnehmende Akkumulationsrate des privaten Kapitals aus. Wird die dadurch entstehende Arbeitslosigkeit immer wieder durch staatlich vermittelte Produktion aufgesogen, so wird es stets schwieriger, die notwendigen Profite zu Zweckender Akkumulation zu erzielen. Die fallende Akkumulationsrate bestimmt damit das mgliche Ausma der kompensierenden staatlich bestimmten Produktion. Sie kann nicht zu dem Punkt gebracht werden, der eine fortgesetzte kapitalistische Akkumulation ausschlsse. Da sich durch staatliche Wirtschaftseingriffe nichts an der Dynamik der kapitalistischen Akkumulation ndern lt, setzt die ihr immanente Tendenz der fallenden Profitrate auch die Grenzen der unprofitablen staatlichen Produktion. Sie kann nur vorbergehende Wirkung haben und verliert diese Wirkung in zunehmendem Mae durch ihre Ausdehnung.

Im allgemeinen unterscheidet die brgerliche konomie nicht zwischen profitabler und unprofitabler Produktion. In ihren Augen dient alle Produktion dem Verbrauch gleich welcher Art. Jede Produktion und Dienstleistung vergrert das wirtschaftliche Gesamteinkommen, das sich den privaten und ffentlichen Betrgen und Bedrfnissen nach entsprechend verteilt. In Wirklichkeit ist die kapitalistische Produktion die Produktion von Kapital. Sie ist nur insofern produktiv, als sie das gegebene Kapital vermehrt. Der kapitalistische Profit realisiert sich damit als Akkumulation des Kapitals. Ohne Akkumulation gibt es zwar Produktion, aber keine kapitalistische. Ohne Akkumulation wrde die Produktion tatschlich nur dem Konsum dienen, wie unterschiedlich dieser sich auch darstellen sollte. Was konsumiert wird, kann nicht akkumuliert werden, so da die Grsse der Akkumulation von dem nicht verbrauchten Teil des gesellschaftlichen Produkts bestimmt wird. Man kann also die Akkumulation nicht durch die Vergrerung des Verbrauchs frdern, obwohl bei schneller Akkumulation der Verbrauch nicht nur zunimmt, sondern auch zunehmen mu. Die Akkumulation hngt von der Rentabilitt des gegebenen Kapitals ab. Wird ein wachsender Teil dieses Kapitals unrentabel angewandt, so fllt die Profitmasse des Gesamtkapitals und damit die durchschnittliche Profitrate. Das Verhltnis zwischen rentabler und unrentabler, zwischen privater und ffentlicher Produktion beeinflut die Akkumulationsrate und damit den Aufstieg oder Niedergang des kapitalistischen Systems.

Die Vermehrung der unrentablen auf Kosten der rentablen Produktion, wie notwendig auch immer, bleibt, kapitalistisch gesehen, stets widersinnig. Wenn zu diesem Mittel gegriffen wurde, so aus Furcht vor den sozialen Konsequenzen einer weitgehenden anhaltenden Depression mit Massenarbeitslosigkeit. Da sich die kapitalistische Akkumulation durch ihre inneren Widersprche von selbst verlangsamte und damit die Krise auslste, knnte man entweder das Ende der Krise abwarten oder durch staatliche Eingriffe die Produktion ohne Rcksicht auf Rentabilitt vergrern. Man beschnitt damit nicht die gegebene Akkumulationsfhigkeit des Kapitals, da diese ja bereits ihre vorlufige Grenze erreicht hatte. Aber man konnte damit auch nicht die Akkumulationsfhigkeit des Kapitals verbessern, da staatliche Eingriffe die Rentabilitt des privaten Kapitals nicht zu vergrern vermgen. Man beschnitt damit allerdings die Wirkungskraft des Krisenmechanismus als Voraussetzung einer neuen Konjunktur. In der Vergangenheit erwirkten die kapitalzerstrenden Krisen strukturelle Vernderungen des Kapitals mit Bezug auf seine Konzentration und seine Ausbeutungsrate, die dann zu einer neuen Prosperitt berleiteten. Aber unter den Krisenbedingungen des 20. Jahrhunderts schienen die mit diesem Proze verbundenen sozialen Kosten nicht lnger tragbar.

Die Verminderung der kapitalistischen Akkumulationsrate durch unzulngliche Rentabilitt erscheint den Kapitalisten als Verminderung der Nachfrage, die zu Produktionseinschrnkungen zwingt. Produktionsmittel und Arbeitskrfte liegen zum Teil brach. Kapital, das der Akkumulation dienen sollte, findet keine profitablen Anlagen, woraus sich die sogenannte Liquidittsvorliebe erklrt. Der Mangel an Profit erscheint als ein berflu an Waren und Kapital. Unter diesen Bedingungen fllt die staatliche Defizitfinanzierung ffentlicher Ausgaben leichter. Das Geld, das nicht kapitalistisch angelegt werden kann, findet seinen Abnehmer und seine Verzinsung durch den Staat. Der Staat vermehrt damit die wirtschaftliche Ttigkeit. Das kann bis zur Vollbeschftigung und zur vollen Ausnutzung der Produktionsmittel fhren. Die Produktion verluft wie unter den Umstnden einer Marktkonjunktur. Aber der Schein trgt.

Die Marktkonjunktur war gezeichnet durch eine Rentabilitt und deren Realisierung, die ihren Niederschlag in der Akkumulation fand. Die durch den Staat knstlich erzeugte Konjunktur vermehrt die Produktion in gleichem Ausma ohne eine ihr entsprechende Frderung der Akkumulation. Ein Teil des Kapitals wird unproduktiv angewandt. Trotzdem befriedigt dieser Zustand zunchst die Ansprche aller gesellschaftlichen Schichten. Die Arbeiter haben Beschftigung, die Kapitalisten machen Profite, und die Zwischenschichten nehmen an den Einkommen von beiden teil. Es ist dem Finanzier gleichgltig, an wen er sein Geld verleiht, wie es den Arbeitern und den Kapitalisten gleichgltig ist, fr wen oder was sie produzieren. Die Einkommen steigen im allgemeinen, und es ist unverstndlich, warum man nicht schon frher die Krisen auf diese Weise beseitigte. Jedenfalls scheint die Lsung des Krisenproblems nun gefunden zu sein.

Aber was spielt sich hier wirklich ab? Der Ausgangspunkt der ganzen Geschichte sind die vermehrten ffentlichen Ausgaben. Das kann auf zwei Wegen erreicht werden. Der Staat kann Geld borgen oder Geld drucken. Im letzteren Fall ergibt sich eine rapide Inflation, die das in Geldform existierende Kapital zerstrt. Die Vernichtung von Kapital kann die Krisensituation noch verschrfen und zum Ausgangspunkt einer galoppierenden Inflation machen, die unter Umstnden der Gesellschaft gefhrlicher sein kann als die Deflation, die sie zu bekmpfen versucht. Es ist besser, das brachliegende Geld zu borgen. Es lag brach, weil es keine profitable Anlagemglichkeit fand. Damit lag auch ein Teil der Produktion still. Mit der unproduktiven Anwendung des flssigen Kapitals verbindet sich nun die unrentable Ausdehnung der Produktion. Diese Produktion wird durch staatliche Schuldscheine gedeckt. Die Kufer der letzteren sind zwar ihr Geld los, haben aber dafr die Garantie der Regierung, da die Schuldscheine als Wertpapiere wieder in Geld verwandelt werden knnen. Das Geld selbst fliet den Produzenten zu, welche die Staatsauftrge ausfhren, und findet durch diese allgemeinere Verbreitung.

Die Staatsauftrge beziehen sich auf Endprodukte, fr die es im allgemeinen keinen Markt gibt. Allerdings bentigen diese Endprodukte zahlreiche Zwischenprodukte Produktionsmittel, Rohstoffe, Arbeitskrfte die als Kosten in die Endprodukte eingehen. Die Wirtschaft belebt sich so in der ganzen Produktions- und Zirkulationssphre, obwohl die Endprodukte aus dem Markt herausfallen. Sie finden ihren Gegenwert in der Staatsverschuldung. Der Staat kann jedoch den ihm zugestandenen Kredit nur in Geld und Kapital zurckverwandeln durch entsprechende grere Steuereinnahmen oder durch neue Anleihen, d. h. durch verzgerte Besteuerung. Was hier geschehen ist, ist, da ein Teil der Produktion fr den Verbrauch und nicht fr Profit arbeitet. Trotzdem ist die ganze Produktion profitabel, ohne da ein Transfer der Profite von dem profitablen in den unprofitablen Sektor der Produktion ersichtlich wrde. Obwohl dies tatschlich der Fall ist, wird der Vorgang durch den Geldschleier, der ber allen kapitalistischen Transaktionen liegt, verdeckt. Da die Schulden des Staates als Geld auftreten und dafr gehalten werden, erscheinen die Staatsausgaben als so viele Einnahmen der von ihnen begnstigten Institutionen und Personen. Ausgaben knnen so als Einnahmen gebucht werden, solange dem Staat Kredit gewhrt wird. Die nicht vorhandenen Profite erscheinen als Profite in Form der Staatsverschuldung, die sich als Geldquivalent ausgibt. Die jetzigen Profite sind damit allerdings an entsprechende Abzge von knftigen Profiten gebunden, insofern als diese zur Abtragung der Staatsschuld verwendet werden. Es sind vorweggenommene Profite, deren aktueller Gegenwert erst noch in der ungewissen Zukunft aufgebracht werden mu.

Wie schon erwhnt; haben die brgerlichen konomen die Gewohnheit, profitable wie unprofitable Produktion in einen Topf zu werfen. Damit erscheint die wachsende Produktion auch als zunehmende Rentabilitt des Kapitals. Das wachsende Sozialprodukt, nicht die Akkumulation des Kapitals, findet ihr Interesse und versperrt ihnen die Einsicht in die Dynamik der gemischten Wirtschaft. Die Defizitfinanzierung ffentlicher Ausgaben wird als Instrument der Stabilisierung begriffen, das, in Verbindung mit einer ausgleichenden Geld- und Steuerpolitik, die Wirtschaft reguliert. In der Tat haben diese Manahmen groen Erfolg gehabt, wie aus der Wirtschaftsentwicklung nach dem 2. Weltkrieg ersichtlich ist. Allerdings war der groe Produktionsaufstieg in den kapitalistisch entwickelten Lndern nicht nur den staatlichen Eingriffen zu danken, sondern auch der Selbstentfaltung des Kapitals. Jedoch war die letztere nicht ausreichend, um die staatlich vermittelte Produktion zurckzuschrauben, die, wenn auch unterschiedlich, in allen Lndern um sich griff. Dennoch war die enorme Kapitalzerstrung des 2. Weltkrieges ohne Zweifel die Basis der neuen Konjunktur. Die Rentabilitt wuchs weiterhin durch die sich whrend und nach dem Krieg ausbreitende Verwissenschaftlichung der Technik, die die Arbeitsproduktivitt weiterhin frderte. Die Mittel, die in frheren Krisenzeiten zu einem neuen Aufstieg fhrten, erprobten sich auch nach der Weltkriegskrise als wirkungsvoll.

Obwohl die strukturellen Vernderungen des Kapitals und die damit verbundene Verbesserung der Rentabilitt den neuen Aufschwung ermglichten, blieb es doch notwendig, die unprofitable Produktion fortzusetzen, um den Zustand annhernder Vollbeschftigung zu erhalten. Solange jedoch eine gewisse Parallele zwischen den wachsenden ffentlichen und privaten Sektoren bestehen bleibt und die Staatsschuld nicht schneller als das Gesamteinkommen zunimmt, reproduzieren sich nur die diesbezglichen Verhltnisse. Aber jede Periode der Akkumulation trgt ihr Krisenelement in sich durch die ihr eigene tendenziell fallende Profitrate. Wurde der Aufstieg durch Vernderungen der Kapitalstruktur ausgelst, so werden die mit der Akkumulation verbundenen weiteren strukturellen Vernderungen des Kapitals zur Ursache eines neu eintretenden Mangels an Rentabilitt, der die weitere Akkumulation behindert oder ausschliet. War schon die aktuelle Akkumulation nicht imstande, das Ma der notwendigen unprofitablen zustzlichen Produktion herabzusetzen, so wird eine neu einsetzende Kapitalstagnation zu einer weiteren Ausdehnung der staatlich vermittelten Produktion fhren, soll der sonst drohenden Massenarbeitslosigkeit begegnet werden.

Es ist die von der brgerlichen konomie unbercksichtigte Dynamik der kapitalistischen Akkumulation, die mit der Krisenerklrung auch die unvermeidliche Ausbreitung der profitlosen Produktion erklrt, wenn auch nur als politische Reaktion auf eine die Gesellschaft gefhrdende Krisensituation. Und obwohl die Tendenz der fallenden Profitrate nicht geleugnet wird, hat sie in den Augen der brgerlichen konomie doch eine ganz andere Bedeutung, als ihr in Wirklichkeit zukommt. In der fhrenden Keynesischen Theorie z. B. findet die fallende Profitrate ihre Ursache in der verminderten Nachfrage nach Kapital als Ausdruck der zunehmenden Bedrfnissttigung. So kann man sich einen Kapitalismus vorstellen, der zu akkumulieren aufhrt und trotzdem die Bedrfnisse befriedigt, wenn auch nicht unmittelbar in der Gegenwart, so doch in der unbestimmten Zukunft. Damit kann man sich auch einbilden, da die Produktion fr den Bedarf trotz fallender Akkumulationsrate dauernd zunehmen kann, wenn dieser Bedarf auch nichts mit dem Konsum im herkmmlichen Sinne zu tun hat.

Wenn auch die zunehmende Staatsschuld keine unmittelbaren Sorgen verursacht, so bleibt ihre Verzinsung doch an eine weitere Besteuerung gebunden. Diese Zinsen knnen nur von der Profit machenden Produktion beglichen werden, womit sich der gesellschaftliche Gesamtprofit auf beide, die produktive und die unproduktive Produktion, zu verteilen hat und damit fr jedes einzelne Kapital den Profit vermindert. Diese Profitverminderung wird durch Preiserhhungen ausgeglichen, durch die sich das zirkulierende Geld entwertet. Die gemischte Wirtschaft ist so eine inflationistische Wirtschaft. Damit ist nicht gesagt, da die Verzinsung der Staatsschuld, die ja nur einen Bruchteil des Staatshaushaltes ausmacht, fr die Inflation verantwortlich ist. Sie ist es nur zusammen mit der wachsenden Besteuerung, die sich auch unabhngig von der Defizitfinanzierung vollzieht. Es sind die Gesamtausgaben des Staates, nicht nur der geborgte Teil, die zu einem schnelleren Wachstum tendieren als die profitable Produktion.

Was weggesteuert wird, kann nicht akkumuliert werden. Aber die Rentabilitt mu sich trotzdem in der Akkumulation realisieren. Die Profite mssen deshalb auf einem Niveau gehalten werden, das die weitere Expansion ermglicht. Was in den Steuern verloren geht, mu auf dem Markt zurckgewonnen werden. Allerdings wird Profit nicht auf dem Markt gemacht, sondern in der Produktion. Nichtsdestoweniger vollzieht sich seine Realisierung auf dem Markt. Bei einer gegebenen Arbeitsproduktivitt ergibt sich eine bestimmte Profi