Operation Benton AAR 28 Sep 1967

8/3/2019 Operation Benton AAR 28 Sep 1967

1/48

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBERAD385755

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:Approved for public release, distribution

unlimited

FROM:

Controlling DoD Organization: AssistantChief of Staff for Force Development[Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY30 Sep 1979 per Group-4 document marking;Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED


2/48

L7

L

SECURITYMARKING

The classified or limited status of this repont applies

to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUSTbe marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING TH E NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN TH E MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. TIJE TRANSMISSION OR TH E REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN AN Y MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or otherdata are used fo r an y purpose other than in connection with a defi-nitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Governmentthereby incurs no responsibility, no r any obligation whatsoever; andthe fact that th e Government ma y have formulated, furnished, or in an y

way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is notto be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner l icensingthe holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying an y rightsor permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention thatmay in an y wa y be related thereto.

i -

~ ~


3/48

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED

AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

UNDER DOD DIRECTIW 5200.20 AID

14 0 RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON

ITS USE AND DISCLOSUREI

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENTA

OPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE)

DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED1


4/48

CONFIDENTIAL

DEP., TZ'NT OF THE< ARMYHEADQUARTERS ST BRIGADE IOIST AIRBORNEDIVISION

APO 96347

SEDC 28 September 1967CeA O

SUBJE T: Combat Operations Aftdr Action Report, Operation BENTON (MACV1:CSJ3/32)

TURU: Conmanding General 0Americal DivisionAPO 96374

Commanding General2'- II I Marine Amphibious Force

,jO 6602 >

CeZTO: Commanding GeneralUS Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

ATTN: J343AP O 96222

0

1. (U) Name of Operation:: Operation BENTON

2. (U) Dates of ' 0eration: 130730 August 1967 through 291430 August 1967.

3. (U) Location: QUANr TIN Province.

4. (U) Command Headouarters, 1s t Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

5. (U) Report i g Offcer: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson, ComnandingOcneral, ist Brigade, lOlat Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization:

a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of OperationBENTONwa s as shown below:

Bde Ccntrol D D C1-327 In f 2-.,20 rty (DS)

4 LZ Clearing/Demo Tins, A/326 Engr Dde HC (TFP r fl1 F1 72 Sct Dog Tms, 42 Inf Plat A/326 Engr (-)

IRRP Flat DEC 14 16 72-327 Inf 2 Co CIDG (DS)

4 IZ ClearingDemo Tins, A/326 Engr MP Flat2 Sct Dog Tins, 42 Inf Plat 1/i01 A-n SecCc Mike Force (DS) 20 Cml Det (GS) B

N-B m, 244 Psyops Co (GS)2-502 Inf CA Tm, 41 "A Co (GS)4 LZ Clearig/Dem 7Tins, A/326 Engr 406 RRD (GS)

2 Sct Dog Tins, 42 Inf Plat 181 MI Det (GS)Co Mike Force (DS) TACP (-)

42 In f Plat, So t Dog (-)(GS)D/326 M.ed

b. The task organization of the Brigade was changed three times duringOperation BENTON. On 14 August 1967, A Company, l8 t Battalinn (Airborne), 327thInfantry was placed under operational control of the 2d Battalion (Airborne),327th Infantry. Th e follo:ing day operational control ef A Company wa s terminatedand the company rcturncd to its p-rent unit. On 15 August 1967, the Mike Force

DOWNGRADLDAT 3 YEAR INTERVALSDECLASSIFIED AFThR -2 YhRS

FORA OT AD F;/1 CONFIDENTIAL6,/XO .


5/48

CONFiDENTiAL

AVBD-C 28 September 1967SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U)

Company with the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was detached and attachedto the Ist Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. Th e tw o CIDG Companies in sup-port of the Brigade were released on 3.9 August 1967, and the Long Range Recon-naissance Platoon wa s attached to the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry.

7. (C) Supporting-Forces:

a. 2-320 Art i l l e ry : Employed in a d i rec t support ro le .

h. C Battery. 3-16 Arti l le ry (155 Towed)t Reinforced th e fires of 2dBatta l i fn (Airborne), 320th Art i l l e ry.

c. 14th Aviation Battalion: Provided troop lift and flew combatsupport and resupply mission-s.

(1) 176th Helicopter Assault Company: Employed in direct support ofthe Brigade and provided troop lift and flew combat support and resupply missions.

(2) 161st Helicopter A s s a l t Company: Provided helicopters onmission support basis fo r troop lift, combat support and resupply m is ic - ' - .

(3) 178th Aviation Compary: Provided CH-47 aircraf t on . i ss ionsupport basis for us e in displacing and resupplying ar t i l l e ry units .

d. 9t h Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support fo r psychologicaloperations.

e. 244th Psychological Operations Comparn: Provided one loudspeakerand leaf le t dissemination team in d i rec t support of th e Brigade.

f. 7t h US Ai r Force: Flew 210 t a c t i c a l f ighter missions total ing 372sorties. One hundred and fifty of these sorties were immediate requests whichwere processed through the Ai r Force Tactical Ai r Request Net with an averagereaction time of twenty-five minutes. Ln addition, sixty-four Combat Skyspotsorties, thirteen flareships (AC 47) sorties, and 19 2 transport sorties wereflown in support of th e Brigade. Forward Ai r Controllers flew 103 so r t i e s in

forwarda ir

control, a r t i l l e r y adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions.

g. TIEN P.UOC CIDG Camp: Provided two CIDG Companies in support ofBrigade operations.

h. Company C, 5th SpecPl Forces (PA NANG): Provided two Mike ForceCompanies to operate with tw o battalions of the Brigade.

8. (U) Inte. i e n e : Se e Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Task Force ORE(fN directed the Brigade to conduct operationst, find, fi x and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in andaround Base Area 117.

10 . (C) Concept of Operation: Operation BENTON commenced on 130730 August1967 after completing Operation HOOD RIVE. Th e 2d Battalion (Airborne),

327thInfantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted airmobileassaul ts northwest of CHU LAI into multip le landing zones (IZts) west of GOHR Areaof Operations (AO) an d commenced search and destroy operations to th e east . TheIs t Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry terminated operations in th e ZON FO(Operation HOOD RIVER) on 10 August, conducted airmobile and overland displacementto CHU LkI Base Camp, and on 13 August 1967, assumed the mission of the Brigadeimediate Action Force with an on-order mission to conduct air;aobile assaults

into the 4 R -1. On 15 August 1967, the 1st Battalion (Airhorne), 327th Infantry(minus one company) conducted airmobile assaults into the GCCR AO and commencedsearch and destroy operations within their assigned AO. Artillery 4nd Air ForceTactical Air prepared all LZ's and then shifted to known or suspecte4, eneai lo-cations and routes of egress (Inclosure 2, Operations Schematics).

2

CONFIDENTIAL


6/48

>2 CONFIDENTIALI, ,AVBD-C 28 September 1967SLr3JECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BENTON (U)

11 . (C) Execution:

a. Operation BENTON wa s characterized by nall unit actions with bat-talions an d companies maneuvering freely in reaction to intelligence received andenemy movements. All contacts with large size eneny forces (platoon or larger)were made in the late afternoon or just prior to darkness an d normally lasted in-to the night unti l the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Contactr with largeforces gradually declined &s did the enerts will to stand and fight and degen-erated into contacts with squad size or smaller eneaW forces. The search anddestroy tactics employed by the Brigade consisted of saturation patrolling, dayand night ambushes and small unit. stay behind forces. Artillery fired harassingand interdiction missions each night on knoum or suspected enemy locations. Theterrain over which operations were conducted included dense, jungle coveredmountains, rolling hil ls with t a l l elephant grass and flat, cultivated lowlandswith rice paddies.

b. Operation BENTONwa s initiated immediately upon the comnlcticn ofOperation HOOD RIV from selected pickup zones (pZts) within the VEC-HELAO .Elemnts of the Brigade Tactical Cojuoand Post displaced overland to CHU IAI tocoordinate and control the operation. A Troop, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th

Cavalry remained at CAREITAN Base Camp east of DUC PHO an d secured the Brigacebase and conducted patrols outside the base perimeter. A Company, 326th EngineerBattalion (Airborne)continued to improve the base camp in addition to providingengineer teams to the infantry battalions.

c. Numerous small unit contacts were made throughout the operation as aresult of extensive saturation patrolling. These contacts are liatcd chronologicallyin Inclosure 11 (Small Unit Actions). Sigutificarat enemy contacts during OperationBE N OU areas follows:

(1) 13 August 1967: At 1700 hours near BT210088 Company B, 2dBattalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry was engajeo by an unknown size eneo force.The enemy .employed rockets, rifle grenaies, machine guns and srmll arms fire.Cnmpany B returned tf e fire and called for artillery. As the company attemptedto maneuver, it wa z me t with intense enery fire an d the company consolidated theirposition and requested Air Force C-47 aircraft with miniguns ("Spooky"). Theenemy continued to attack with small arms until 2350 hours. He then employed 60=-nortars, 40mm rocket launcher fire and rifle grenades and two companies attacked

the perimeter. Company B countered with small arms, machine guns, gunships and"Spooky." The fire fight continued until 0155 hours, 14 August 1967, when th eenery broke contact an d withdrew. Sporadic sniper fire continued throughout thenight. Results of the contact were 35 enemy killed (confirmed); 11 AK-47ts, 5SKS) 2 RFD machine guns and several Chicom grenades captured; 5 US killed and 15wounded.

(2) 13 August 1967: The tactical commarnd post and fire base of the2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry at BT173115 was subjected to a mortar

.d renade attack at 2110 hours. Elements at the command post incluced the bat-talion staff, Reconnai-sance Platoon of the Bttal ion and B Battery, 2d Battalion(Airborne), 320th Artillery. The enemy folluwed the mortar attack with a probe ofthe defensive positions employing automatic weapons. Friendly units countered -with 5mall arms, grenades aid "Spooky." The fire fight terminated at 2245 hours.Movement around the perimeter continued throughout the night. Results of the

contact were 1 US killed and 13 wounded; enemy losses could not be assessed.(3) 15 August 1967: Company B, 1s t Battalion (Airborne), 327th In-

fantry made contact at 2OOChotns with an estimtedU1IVA squad at BT2OOO53. Thecompany employed artillery-, gunships and iSpockyl' against the enemy force. Con-tact was broken at 2145 hours. Results of the contact were 10 enemy killed(confirmed) and.I carbine captured. Frienily losses were 2 killed and 5 wo'nded

(4) 16 August 1967: Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327thInfantry became engaged with an unknown size enemy force at 1320 hours nearBT164107. An air strike was called in on the enemy exposing a trench system andbunkers. A second air strike was called in destroying the bunkers and exposingan additional trench system. Results of the action were 10 enemy killed (confirmed)

3

CONFIDENTIAL

L


7/48

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBD-C 28 September 1967SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BDNTON (U)

(5) 18 August 1967: Company A, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th In-fantry while maneuvering through a pass (BT160050) at 1200 hours was fired uponby enemy automatic an d semi-automatic weapons fire. An air strike and ar t i l le rywere employed and the enemy broke contact. The company pursued with 2ight contactunt i l 1640 hours. Again the company wa s fired upon by heavy automatic weaponsfire from BT165055. Air strikesand artillery were again employed as Company A

maneuvered. Heavy fighting continued until 2215 hourb wheii the enemy broke con-tact and withdrew. Enemyr losses were 9 killed (confirmed). Friendly losses were5 killed an d 15 wounded.

(6) 18 Augst 19671 Cormencing at 1700 hours, on e platoon of CCompany, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry made contact with a company sizeforce near BT165037. The enemy oraned fire with nine automatic weapons, simul-taneously pinning down the platoor. Results of the in i t ial contact were 2 USkilled and 5 wounded. Th e company employed ai r strikes and ar t i l lery and maneu-vered it s remaining platoons against the enemy. Heavy fighting erupted at 1810hours and continued until 2100 hours. Final results of the action were 6 USkilled, 13 wounded and 1 enemy killed (confirmed).

(7 ) 25 August 1967: At 0900 hours, A Company, 2d Battalion (Air-borne), 502d Infantry engaged an unknown size ene:m force near BT169107 that re-

sultod in 1 US wounded, 1 enemy killed (confirmed) an d 1 enemy individual weaponcaptured. A MEDEVAC helicopter approaching the area to evacuate the w-unded manwas h it by enemy small arms fire and. forced down at 1020 hours. A Company securedthe area, and in the process of doing so, killed 1 enemy near the helicopter.Sporadic action continued throughout the afternoon. Arti l lery aed limited gunshipssupported the company while heavy rains precluded the use of ai r strikes. At1715 hours, the company received 8-10 incoming 82rm mortar rounds and engaged anestimated 20-30 well dug in enemy. Contact wa s broken at 1730 hours. Total resultsfor the days action were 9 enemy killed (confirmed), 5 individual weapons and 1flare pistol captured. Friendly losses were 6 killed and 22 wounded.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission ofconducting operations to find, fix and destroy VC/1VA forces and to neutralizeVC/NVA base camps in an d around Base Area 117.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the ener7 during the operation:303 killed (confirmed); 1 killed (probable); 13 VC captured; 2 NVA captured; 8crew served weapons an d 123 individual wczpons captured! 31 tons of rice, 1.4 tonsof salt and 4 tons of tea either extracted or destroyed; and 7 base camps des-

c. Ficndlv losses resulting from combat operations were: 41 kil led,251 wounded (Medevac\ and 36 wounded (nor); 5 UH-lD aircraft destroyed, 15UH- D and Uti-I. aircraft damaged.

13. (U) Administration Matters:.

a. Personnel and Administration: Inclosure 3.

b. Logistics: Inclosure 4.

c. Civic Action: Inclosure 6.

14. (C) Speclal Eaulment ancl Techniques:

a. Satchel charges were employed against enemy bunkers when artilleryand hand grerndes failed to rout the creny. During a heavy contact againstenemy in well dug in bunkers with ov(r cad cover, a company of the 2d Battalion(Airborne), 502d Infantry employed th x attached engineer team to destroy th eeneny,, and bunkers. Under tnc cover oi pporting mach.fe ,n fire, engineertearm emplaced satchel charges against the bunkers which rtsulted in four enemykilled, tw o weapons captured and the bunkers destroyed.

4

CONFIDENTIAL


8/48

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBD-C 28 September 1967SUBJET: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BENTON(U)

b. CS was effectively used to rout an enemy from bunkers when repeatedair strikes and artillery failed. During a heavy contact with the enemy deployedin dug in bunkers with overhead cover which prevented the friendly force fromadvancing dispite numerous a ir strikes and art i l le ry, non-persistent CS wasdropped from a helicopter and followed by additional air strikes and artillery.Once the air strikes were completed, smoke

grenades were dropped from a helicopterto screen the movement of advancing troops fromt the enemy. The CS and smoke em -ployed permitted the friendly troops to overrun the enemy positions. See In -closure 5 (Chemical).

c. "Daisy Cutters", 1000 pound bombs with a three foot pipe welded tothe fuze, were used extensively to cut landing zones in the jungle forward ofadvancing troops, In several instances, these landing zones were used for resupplyan d medical evacuation.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) Sufficient air to ground radio nets must be available to supplyall maneuver elements (down to and including the rifle company) with a frequencythat will net with the radio mounted in the forward ai r controllerts airplane.Without sufficient frequencies to supply all companies, the battalion command ne tmust then be used which unnecessarily ties up the battalion commander's net.

(2) An immediate debriefing of all pilots (command and contrwlhelicopters, utility helicopters and "slick" helicopters) m t be accomplishedas soon as pilots return from the area of operations to determine and rocessinformation which may be valuable intelligence. In one instance, a helicopterpilot saw the muzzle flashes of a recoilless rifle firing and assumed it to befriendly. Later, in a casual comment, this sighting was mentioned and was de-termined to be the enemy firing at friendly forces.

(3) Whenever possible, if a fire base is to be established on agrassy slope, the grass should be burned off using napalm or white phosporousrockets prior to the fire base being establish. In one instance, a fire wasstarted by an unknown source down the grass slope of an artillery fire base andresulted in extenqive damaged to equipment and the accomplishment of an assignedmission. See Inclosure 10 (Artillery).

(4) Monsoon weather greatly decreases the efficiency and range ofco mnications equipment. Additional radio relay stations must be planned fo r andestablished during the operation to insure continuous ccvmanications.

(5) Plans for and speedy evacuation of downed aircraft must beexecuted as rapidly as possible. Without prompt evacuation, a maneuver unit isrequired to secure the downed aircraft which, in turn, jeopardizes the accomplish-ment of the mission and allows time for the enem to maneuver and attack.

(6) The enemyIs capability to employ indirect fire support shouldalways be assumed. Whenever a unit's location is compromised by resvpply ormedevac helicopteis, the unit should immediately move from the immediate area.Another effective method of guarding against a mortar attack is to displace ashort distance (200-400 meters) after dark.

(7) Defensive targets are a necessity when establishing a positionfor th e night. At the same time if defensive targets are plotted in a pattern,the position can be compromised. Consideration should be given to occasionallyfiring in false defensive targets.

b. Commanders Notes:(.) The enemy encountered during Operation BENTON were well trained

and equipped. He was aggressive and did not hesitate to maneuver against the

5

CONFIDENTIAL

L - .- , *'" - '

.... . :. . ... . .. .- . . .. . . .


9/48

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBD-C 28 September 1967SrJBJL-T: Combst Operations Af t r Action Report. Opervtion BENTON (U)

flanks or rear of advancing troops. He utilized th e terrain to his advantage withexoer t ize and dug in tenaciously. The Brigade maximized th e use of tactical air,artillery and CS to dig him out of hi s defensive positions prior to assaulting.Without th is f i re support , it is l ikely tha t fr iendly casualt ies would have beengreater.

(2) CIDG ar d Mike Force Companies worked with and supported theBrigade. Each company worked directly with a maneuver battalion, thereby enhancingthe capability of the battalion to maneuver and search out an area of operation.

(3) A need exists to have a winci capability organic to each assaulthelicopter company. When operating in dense, jungle covered mountains where land-in g zones ar e d i ff i cu l t to f ind, resupnly to units and evacuation of xnon-criticallywounded personnel be. :e a serious problem. Units must postpone their assignedmission to move to accomplish resupply or evacuation. A winch mounted on a utilityhElicopter would facilitate accomplishing both requirements in a minimum amount oft ime.

(4) Mine3 appeared in increasing numbrs during Operation BETO" andresulted in some casualties. Several mines were booby trapped. Constant alertness,training

andaggressive

leadershipar e th e

keynegating the eneav's

useof

boobytraps.

11 Incls S.H. MATHESON

1 - Intelligence Brigadier General, USA2 - Operations Schematics Commanding3 - Perso-nnel and Adrunistration4 - Logistics5 - Chemical6 - Civil Affairs7 - Ccm-unications8 - Psychc.logical Operations9 - Enginetr

10 - Artill.ry11 - Small Unit Actions

CONFIDENTIAL


10/48

In c lo su re 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation After Action Report,Operation BENT'ON (U)

1. (C) TERRAIN: The area of operation has numerous hil ls andlow mountains surrounded by valleys in the north and rugged mountainsin the central and southern portion. The many t ra i l s and waterwaysafford access throughout the area. It was along th e waterways thatthe majority of contacts were made and ins ta l la t ions discovered. Themain avenues of approach are the SOW BQMJ MIEW (NM - SE), Route 531(E - W) an d Route 533 (E - W).

2. (U) WEATHE: Partly cloudy skies with daily afternoon andearly evening rainshowers and/or thunderstorms was th e dominate weatherpicture during Operation BENTON. Visib i l i ty was generally unrestrictedwith a minimum of a half mile in rainstorms. Winds were generally south-easterly, l igh t and variable a t night. The maximum temperature was 101degrees and the minimum was 78 degrees (F). Relative humidity rangedfrom a high of 98 percent to a low of 43 percent. Weather hampered onefull da y of ai r operations (27 August 1967) but did not severly hamperth e ground operations fo r this period.

3. (C) ANALYSIS:

a. Intelligence Analysis

(1) During Operation BENTON, elements of th e 6th and 7t hCompanies, 22d Battalion, 21st VC Regiment were engaged as was provenby documents captured. The enemy ini t iated two mortar attacks onfr iendly units. Units were sniped a t constantly. Most elements werebroken down to squad size groups, were well trained and maneuvered wellin response to our heavy f i r e . Utilizing thei r excellent kmowledge ofthe t e rra in and cover, especially bunkers, they would inf t iate contactin order to draw the friendlies into an area from which th e VC could em-pluy thei r bunker complexes. The bunkers were constructed with a thickoverhead of logs, very narrow f i r ing ports, well maintained camouftLA&,dand were mutually supporting. (Comment taken from reports by 2d Bat-talion (Airborne), 502d Infantry).

Conclusion: NV A units wi l l in i t ia te action employingheavy vol,,mes of f i re and adroit maneuvering. The enemy prefers to usehi s bunlker complex so that he can infl ic t greater casualties a t less ex-pense. 14VA units wil l vigorously defend and only ret reat as a f ina l re -course to annihilation. Fe w prisoners can be expected af ter contaft.

(2) Discussion: Enemy contacted in areas adjacent to cachesi tes were armed with various type weapons bu t predominatly Chinese Com-munist manufacture. Training areas had small arms ranges with r i lhouet tetargets , mock ups of planes and armored vehicles, and dummy potato masherhand grenades. Forces which guarded these areas ut i l ized all forms of

*guerril la warfare i .e . , booby traps, mines, etc., which were in good work-ing order. (Taken from reports rendered by 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502dInfantry). Cache si tes were well camouflaged and items stored were inlarge quantities.

Conclusion: The eneay continues to guard h is basecamps with local forces. Base Area 17 exis ts and holds stores fo r amulti-battalion size force. Local Force units in this area are welltrained in and capable of executing a ll aspects of guerri l la warfare.

(3) Discussion: Numerous gas masks in good condition an dmanufactured ei ther by North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist were foundon enemy dead.

Conclusion: NV A units engaged contained newly i n f i l -trated personnel and the enemy is more prepared to cope with chemicalagents. (Corment: Gas masks do no t seal properly around th e nose andcheek). Two gas masks were deliVered to Brigade Chemioal Officer fo rTechnical Intelligence Analysis.

DOWMJRDED AT THR" YEAR INTERVailSDECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

- D O D DIR 5200.10

C1E

7+...


11/48

11c e 1 ntelligence) to Combat Operations After Action rto-tOperation EEIMAI (U) cont'd

(4) Discussion: ,,capons captured after contacts and incache sitcs were mostly SKS, AK-47 and RPD's of the "new fanily", werenew and in good condition. lortar and recoilless rifle asrmuniticen cap-tured was now and, L-, most cases, still in their original containers.

Conclusion: The enemy in this area is well suppliedwith weapons and amunition. He can be expected to deliver high volmos

offire.

b. Coamunication Scur i ty

(1) During Operation B7ION, a total of 11,708 F%, radio trans-missions and 1,550 telephone tramsmissions ,,?ere nonitored. A total of1,224 ?nan hours were spent in support of Operaticon B MN by persornelassigned to the 406th Radio Research Detachmentts Comrmurication SecuritySection. One violation occured (classified location in the clear) duringO-crati on BENTON.

(2) Recommendat iors

(a) Planning a conversation before placing the call willconsiderably decrease the possibility of coprconise. Forethought isa definite requirement in precluding violations. M-ake the conversat-onbrief and to the point. Long drawn-out conversations are likely to leadto compromise. If the party whom one is talking to starts to revealclas3ified material, stop him as soon as possible to limit the amount ofinfornation revealed. Following these simple precautc is an greatlydecrease the amount of intelligence made available to possible eneay in-tercept.

(b) The radiotelephone is the most insecure means of com-munication in pratIcal use. Only personnel trained in th , use of theradiotelephone should be authorized to use it.

(c) Communications security is not just something thathappens, rather it is a condition that is produced. The better trainedan individual is the less he is l ikely to violate the pr icipals of com-munications security. All personnel who use non-secure mean]s of commun-icaticn should be regularly briefed or in some way reminded of the methodsof keep: g classified information secure. When transmitting messagesof a sensitive or classified nature, the secure net should be utilized.The benefits of a secure net can not be over emphasized nor can its need,as the primary net, for the passing of information between the Brigadeand forward Battalions. All comrvinders should insure thp-t the seuro netbe operative at a ll times as an added measure of corLauniCaticn security.

4. (C) LESSONS LEAR1KD

a, Red Haze: The effect of Red Haze was lessened because fieldewere still being burnt off Ln and around the operational area. The RedHaze coverage and response time to requests wu; not adequate. The leadtime allows little leeway for changing to areas that need to be covered.The readouts are often delayed and tactical reaction is lessened. A

system is rceded to give comrprlete and timily disserination to the requestors.A,9o, adjustment of the area to be covered at this tine can not be givenat the last minute, this factor should be incorporated in the overhaulingof the present system. One solution ma be direct commaunication betweenthe requester and the mission co.wmander, utilizing the requestor's oper-at ions and intelligence net.

b. Aerial Photography: Photographic coverage for Operation VEN-TON was unsatisfactcry an that requests and readouts were not deliveredby the da.ues needed. This precluded use by the tactical e-miandcr in theplanninig. Therefore old photagraphy an d outdatud Combine Intelligence CenterVietnam (CTC.) studies had to be used which supply them wiLn .- i,.Laai

Z

7 2

QOL.E DE T


12/48

C.ONFKTNT6\,inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,Operation BENTON (U) cont'd

information. Often insuff icient lead time is given prior to a move;therefore, the requirements stated fo r requesting coverage could notbe met.

c. Visual Reconnaissance: Only eight visual reconnaissancemissions were flown ou t of a possible sixteen (16) days by one ai rcraft .This was due to f l ight restrictions and maintenance requirements.

d. Interrogation of Prisoners of War

(1) During Operation BENTON, th e Interrogation of Prisonersof 4a r Section, 181 Military Intelligence Detachment, 1s t Brigade, 101stAirborne Division operated two (2) Brigade Collection Points for detaindes.One interrogation team operated at th e Brigade base camp in DU C PHO forinterrogation of detainees brought in by th e Brigade Security Patrols, ATroop, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry an d the United. tates N1avy. "Th e majority of the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section moved for- '-ward to CH U LA I with th e Brigade. Utilizing Task Force OREGON fac i l i t ies ,th e Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section worked ou t of th e Task

K / Force OREGON compound. They interrogated a ll detainees brought to them7 by the 1s t Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. If a detainee was determined

to be a Civil Defendent or a Prisoner of War, the prisoner and a copy of*the interrogation report were turned over directly to Task Force OREGON

authorities for disposition. In the meanwhile, the Brigade S2 wa s notifiedof th e detainee's status and an interrogation rnport was submitted to theBrigade S2. A contingent of th e 9th Army, Republic of Vietnam MilitaryIntelligence Dtachment accompanied th e Interrogation of Prisoners of WarSection to CH U LIA and aided in th e screening of captured documents.

- - (2) The Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section also fur-nished n interrogator to each of the three infantry battalions. Eachinterrogator hal the mission of screening out detainees and interrogatingprisoners for information of an immediate tactical nature in order thatth e capturing unit could react on this exploited intelligence. They alsohad the responsibility of working closely with th e Battalion S2 to screencaptured docuents. Also, the interrogator a t battalion level submitted abrief interrogation progress report that accompanied the detainee back tothe Brigade Ce loction Point at CH U AI. Tha brief progress report was togive the interrogator at brigade level a starting point. In general, at-

tachment of Iaterrogation of Prisoners of War personnel to each battalionseemed to be a compatible arrangement.

(3) A problem that again arose during Operation B'ENTON, asit had in other operations, is th e failure on th e part of th e capturingunits to completely fill ou t the capture tag. The te n instances of thisoccurance were a t a time when there was no Interrogation of Prisonerof W-r Section representative out with the unit to assure comliance withth e directive. This information insures proper interrogation and is anessential element to effective intelligence collection.

(4) Another area of concern is documents handling. When andif possible, documents should accompany the individual from whom they weretaken. This is not only to aid in the interrogation process but also toexpedite return of personal papers if the detainee is determined to bean Innocent Civilian. A3.l too often, if an individual's identity card,birth certificate, land deeds, etc. , are separated from hi s person, hemay never see them again.

e. Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon: LRRP's were utilized tomaintain surveillance on avenues of egress on the peripherj of the areaof operations. crtillery was used to engage groups of enemy observed. Theuse of Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) units as a security andstay behind infiltration conveyance proved to be of l i t t le value. They arenot disciplined well enough to be utilized as clandistine security or asinfiltration modes. 3CONF NTh!

QOF Tq K


13/48

LT "losurM 1 (Iatell igence) to Conabt Operations After . ,ction Report,Operation BENTON (U) cont'd

5. (U) F-0.Y LOSSES: The following losses were sustained by th e

eni,:y during Operation BEE.TONI;

a. Personnel: BiNrT. ;iTH TASK FORCE OREGON TO/I.L IN COUNTRY

KIA (C) 303 1248 450oKIA (P) 1 107 1976POW VC/A 13/2 107 55 0tivil Defen- 12 98dentReturnees 38Detainees 116 1049 48123ody/veapons 4.1:1. 3.5:1 3.5:1RatioEn/Frd kill 9.3:1 9.3;1 8.8:Ratio

b. Weapons; TOTAL-iNDIVIDUeL: 123 CPEWSERVED: 8

Springfiled 1 AK-47 31Carbine 7 & R 5I,-i Rifle 1 Thompson 31-C 4h-14 Rifle 1 Chicom 5k G 2hauser 5 12.7 H1LK 1CAR - 15 1 AK-50 1l. S 36 1 h1D 3Elosin Nagant 13 M-60 NG 1Shot Gun 3 M-79 245 Cal Pistol 1 60rm M rtar 1Flare Pistol 1 57=n RR 1MT 49 2 40mm Rocket Launcher IShL 30 Unknown type 5

c. xm,:.unition:

Small ArT-s 6500 8.Tm Mortar 12257mm RR 44 Homemade Bombs 2Chicoi Rockets 3 .- 72 L\WS 2

75r--n RR 10 CLaymore IRifles Grenade 5 G:enades 1i

d. Food Stuff:

Rice - 31 tonsTe a - tons

e. Installaticns:

Base Carp 7Fortified bunkers - hut cozplexes 7Hospital 1

f. Signal

PRC - lO

g. Ii s ceLlaneous

Conypisition B ('E-losive) 2 cansf.ortar Sites, 82;.,. 2 ca.

1 Inclosuru:TA B - Order of Bttle

4

U Q L J 5 \ lE


14/48

Q O N F LD E N 1 (,LTAB A (Order of Batt le) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat OperationsAfter Action Report, Operation BENTON (0)

i. (C) vc/NVA ORDEROF B4TTLE

a. TVA Units

(1) The la rgest knzrn unit operating within the Tact ica lAreas of Responsibility was th e 21it NV A RegiLent of the 2d NV A Division.The !headquarters and subordinate battalions were bel ieved to bc locatedin th e vicinity of BT 1705.

(2) Th e GK 33 Battalion which provides artillery support forth e 2d NIM/ Division was believed to be located in th e vicinity of BT 1324.

b. VC Main Force Units

(1) The 70th Battalion of the 1st VC Regi-7-nt which was pre-viously carried in QUAJ, MfAI Province wa s believed to be located in thevicinity of BT 2017, conducting operations as an independent Battalion,directly subordinate to the 2d NG Division.

(2) The 70th Corpany of the 409th Sapper Battalion was be-

lieved to be operating independently in the vicinity of BT 2813.

c. VC Lncal Force Units

(1) The 72d Local Force Battalion was believed to be operatirgin the vicinity of BT 2221,.

(2) There were seven Local Force Companies believed to be oper-ating within the vicinity of the Tactical A-rea of Responsibility, or with-in reinforcing distance. Units and locations were as follows:

(a) 74th Local Force Ccizoany - 7T 2807

(b) 706ti Local Force Company - BT 3113

(c) K-51 Local Force Company - BT 1536

(d) K-52 Local Force Corq,any - BT 2220

(e) K-53 Local Force Company - BT 1516

(f) K-54 Local Force Company - BT 1516

(g) X-55 Local Force Company - 1T 2718

d. Base ,-reas: There was one base area reportcd within the areaof operations. Base Area 117 in the vicinity of BT 2307 is considered asafe and secure area in which to train, rest and regroup f(or cobat.

2. (C) ORDER OF W.TTIE FMINGS ,,ID SU4-:LRY IN T9E OPERAT.ONAL .JMA

a. Units Not Contacted:

(1) Elements of the ] th and 33rd Battalions of the 21st Reg-iment, 2d N. Division were not contacted during Operation BENTON, and arecutrrently located in central QUANGTIN Province.

(2) Elements of the GK 33 Artillery Battalion, 2d Ni/A Divisionand the 70th Battalion, 2d Ni/A Division were no t contacted during OperationBFIJTCN, and are currently located in central QIJZ Tl!! Provice.

b. Units with Light Contact:

C1 =


15/48

TA B , (Order of Batt le) to inc losure 1 ( In te l lgence) to Combat Operations4.fter tc t ion Report, Operation BENTON (U) (conttd)

(1) In terrogation by th e 2d Bat tal ion (. irborne), 327thInfan t ry o f l oca l c iv i l ians on 14 August 1967 indicated th e presence ofthe 72d Local Force Battalion in the vic in i ty of BT 154104. Later con-tacts in the area tended to confirm the reporta. On 18 August 1967 aprisoner of war stated t ha t he was fr o tn - QUYET T.MX Bat ta l ion , whichwas located in the vic in i ty of BT 200105. The QUMT TAM Battalion wascarr ied by the enaL,7 as the QUM'1 NA M Provincial Battalion. The enemydoes not recognize QUlNZ- TIN as a Province, so it is possible that theQUYET Ta l Battalion was also known as the 72d Local Force Battalion, dueto the fact that the 72d Battalion was carr ied as the QU.JJl TIN Provincia lBattal ion. The 72d Local Force Br. ta l -on is current ly car r ied in centralQUI TIV Province.

(2) The 70th Company of the 409th Sapper Battal ion was believedto have beon operating within our Tactica l Area of Responsibi l i ty. Thisconclusion is based on th e numerous fo r t i f icat ions , to include t renchsystems, bunkers, tunnels, and an t i - a i r c ra f t posit ions which were en-countered during the opera t ion . The 70th Company of the 409th Sapper Bat-ta l ion is believed to be current ly located in th e vic in i ty of Base Area -17.

(3) Small resistence groups (normally 5 to 10 personnel) whicharm believed to be eleraents o f the l o c a l force l imits operating within th eTactica l .%roa of Responsibility were contacted periodical ly with ins ign i -ficant in te l l igence results .

c. Units Contacted: On 13 August 1967 Company B, 2d Battalion(Airborne) 502d Infantry, received intense mortar fire and autor-aticweapons f i r e at the Tactica l Coimand Pos t located a t BT 210088. Friendlyar t i l l e ry and airstr ikes werm sueioned and th e results of th e engagem.antidentif ied the units as being the 6t h and 7t h Copanies of th e 22d Bat-talion of the 21st Regiment. Documents captured throughout the EE1TONOperation placed the 22d Battal ion in the area. The 22d Bat ta l ion iscurrently believed to be located in the vicinity o f Base Area 117.

3. (C) The fr iendly operations in i t ia ted during Operation BENTON havereduced th e eneny t e combat effectiveness. The eneny base area has beenpenetrated by f r iendly forces reamlting in th e lwos of L@n, zmaterial andsupplies to the ener v . Th e enemy has been forced to s p l i t into arv.iigroups to avoid contact while atterpting to regroup in safer areas to th e

west and scuthwest of t h e i r base area. It was reported that the 21st rVARegiment wa s to be th e spearhead fo r the 2d N a Divis ion 's wet seasoncawoiaign. As a resu l t o f the fr iendly operations in the area this cap-abi l i ty may have been greatly reduced if not eliminated en t i re ly fo r thisy ea r ' s moonsoon scasoi,.

4. (C) ORGOAIZTION, DISPOSITON AN D STRENSTH

UNIT ALSO K-KiN As STRFMTH 00MMANDER LOCATION

21st NVA R e g i e n t Cong Truong 21 1,000 M.J Minh BT 13202d NVA Division Workaite 21

l l th Batta l ion/21st let Batta l ion 250 LA BT 1729MV 250, Dong Hai

22d Battalion/21st 72 Battalion 200 CPT Tiep BT 2008TNVA Dong Hai

33d Battalion/21st Workshop 33 265 CP T Liem BT 1829IUVA Dorig Biun

70th Batta l ior /2d Ph i Doi 2009 350 Cong Base Area 117Truong Son 70

CQHKLDEI>IT K-2


16/48

EN

Th B a (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Coribat OperationsAfter Action Report, Operation BFVTON .(U) (conttd)

UNIT LSO KNOWN AS STRENCTH OMWDER LCATON

70th Company - 409th X-70 CoMPany 90 Duoc Base vrca 217Sapper Battalion 7th Company

70 6 VC Local Force 106th Company 80 Khoa BT 3113Ccmpany

72d VC Local X-72 290 Cao Base Area 117Force Battalion Hai Cong 50

GK 33 Art i l le ry R 33 25 0 Ca n 2T 1324Battalion/2d NV A RQ 330Division

74th VC Local Force X-74 50 Thanh BT 2807Co.-pany, 74th Distr ic t-Force Campaiy

K-51 VC Local 10 7 65 Khoa BT 1536Force Company

K-52 VC Local C-73 150 Unk BT 1017Force Cc-;pany A.13

K-53 VC Local ,.:L 90 Un k BT 3013Furce Company 14th Compary

K-54 VC Local C-73 130 Hong BT 1516Force Conparty A.16

K-55 VC Local Flying Tiger 100 Unk BT 2718Force Company A- 2 1 ; Phi Po

, 21

4

CO-3 .4

,~.-.

A3A


17/48

TAB A (Order of Batt le) to Inclosure I (In te l l igence) to Combat OperationsAfter Action Report, Operation RENTON (U) (cont'd)

2~~ 2nd NV7i

I V14 V16, ;.-

I- I-- J Ye N 1---'~L ~~Z V19m

/7

ll~h Batta l ion/21st NVA Re)iment

11 21

//

A-4

'00NW- - --- ---


18/48

,' oC..CDN F-=E C]>E 'TlA,, ._/ , \ TAB A ( 0 e r f attle) to Inclosure I (Intelligence) to Combat ionfter jiction Report, Operation BENTON (U), (cont 'd )22nd Bat ta l ion /21st Regiment

22 21

/i

33rd Battalion/21st Battalion

33 21

N-

Ul


19/48

TAB A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure I (Intelligence) to Combat OperationsAufter Action Report, Operation BE14TON (U) (cont 'd)

6Y,33 Artillery Battalioz/2nd lYVi Division GK32nd NVA

72nd Local Force Bat t a l i on

AVA \4


20/48

.Order Jf Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations.ftrr .cti; hoport, Operation BENTON (U) (cont'd)

70th

/ I

.!2 4

-' LBN's: PERONALITIER: CO-NGUYEN DUC CONGXO-SR CPT THUAPO-DUidq CODG THANH

DISPOSITION: Th e present probable location of the battalion is ET 2017.

STRENGTH: Personnel: 350

Weapons: 60 , 81, or 82m Mort's57 or 75ram RR'sw3's

Indiv Wpns

/I

X-70 CO 70th Co (.'09th Bn)7t h Co

LBN: P.O. 2.142 PLRSNALITIE',: CO - NGUYEN DUOCF.G.M. XO - 40 LE TABar Hien PO - NGUYIEN MAI

D SPOSITION:Personnel : str 90

Weapons-

(g

A--7

CLN\ 7 T17


21/48

--LB A (Odt srAfter Action Report, Operation BENTON (U) (cont 'd) ra

74th Co

V-20 20th Lapperv-20 u-74706 < 74 Dist Force Co201st co

/7~~po 0 0 0J0f

PERSON,1ITIES: CQ - TH,1- !STRENGTH: XO - TR;il TIEN

Personnel: str 50 PO - FfHU)NGW'eapons: 60mm Mort K-50 Indiv w.ins

Light In K-44 GrenadesF..I 15 1M-14AK-47 B-40

UNIT HISTORY: Bivouac Lrea of camp lo c BT 323110, a l ternate lo c of campwhen in danger is BT 285078. Th e 72nd Bn states company is a sappercompany. Def stated a pl:it from th e V-14 Company was used to organize th e74th Company (sapper company) thL company operates LYk TIN, TIN KY , TIENrHUOC Dis t r ic t s .

K51 K.50 Co1O7th.UnitF-14'A.10D-21F113F .5 . . ....A-IO ]

.15 F i'Thanh BinhThanh Bianhi

PEFYAN,IIT!E8: CO - KHO,'XO - NGUYE1 7r[jN/ PO - ANH VU -

ST"NGTH:Personnel: st r 65

eapons: 81mm Mort .30 Cal VZ iR indiv urpns/ 6CmMort BAR s Stu

/ 57mm RR Heavy W M-I'sB-40 Y1-79 Carbines 30 Cal

TRj]!vTNG AN D T-.CTICS: Low leve l agent reports stated tha t tht. mission ofth is unit is to destroy bridges, escort VC laborers who carry rice, to attackRd teams Ln thei r opera t ional area, to attack refugee camp (,,n-Th.nh).Composi t ion of the Company Ls fol lows: The company ha s 3 in f plats. Eachplat ha s 2 squads of 12 ma n each. The weapons plat . is a recon squadt ha t ha s binoculars.

/

C~bNF-IN~t . -L:

__/ ' 7


22/48

TAB A (Order of Batt le) to Inclosure 1 ( I n t e l l i g n c e ) to Combat Operationx

After Action Report, Operation BENT1ON (U' (contid)

D-22 K.52 CoA.13V.13 Co109th UnitTien PhoucDai 'an

ai LY o 00Tdo *o

57. livTH :Personnel: str 150

Weapons: 60]mm Mort Bhts 5WM-60 MG M-l's Indiv wpns.30 Cal MG K-50M7 9 Grfrn L K-1 4

TIi4,LING hN D T-CTICS: Low levle agent repots indic te th e followingrLissions fo r the unit: attack RD Teams, to attack refugee camp, to shell

CHOI SUNG outpost, to attack bunkers in their area.

The unit wa s composed as follows: It contained three (3) inf platoons

/ad each plat had two squads complsed of 12 me n each. One of these squad.ia s e recon squad ejui;peo with binoculars, t-h, weapons p la t was composed of

-hree squ:cds and each squad wa s composed of 1-22 men each.

V-14.19

14th Co21st Vi]llge Gu r- I?

C-73 uc a. V0 w

D)-23

,LM '-yUnit 113D~i LY

PTK 53V5 3V309K3C9

LB14: 2Co4

STRenGTH:Pcrsonnrl: st r 90

'teapons: 81mr, Mort B 'R scOmm or t indiv Wpn's57mm RR Explosives30 Cal W

TRINING -ND T,,CTICS: Lo w level agent repor ts contain th e following

obJect ivts fo r this un i t : at k US Ar-. ,y Pat ro ls , a tk outpost, ambush US and

FF forces, shell outposts in .. ea, to at k RD Team in area.

-k-=


23/48

TtB A (Order of Battle) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligonce) to Combat Operationsrf te r Action Report, Operation BUTTON (U) (contid)

C-73 K-54 COk.16 COV-12 K 4CII I UnitDailyNorth TAM KY I I16/ i Co d

LBN: 2002 PERON,.LITIES: CC--HO:G LE

STRENGTH: PjthbON1EL: STR: 130

i.EAPONS: 81nin M1ort 30 Cal MG CK C6orm Mort BRS AK57-in RR Indiv Wpns SMG40mn RKT Launcher AR's 1-l 's

T..j.hING AD TCTICS: Low level agent reports list the following asmdssions of this unit: atk RD ttams in the area, mine rcads atk PF units,shell out posts in their arca, to itI: ,efugee camp, to maintain security inVC ccntrolled areas.

K. 5 CO

A 21A.21 SMt IGTH: PERLONLE.L: 5TR 100C-75Flying Tigcr ,-21PHI POA-21 CO QT Int el Est #5-6775th

16 /a._."

!J


24/48

a*LBAre fBatl) oInclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Cm, rationsAfter Action Reort, Operation BETON (U) (contid)

106th Co 706th Co76th COV-75 CoV-76th CoCI PB- Hunta

eOwo oo

STIJO TH:

Ptrscrrnl: 80

'eapons: 60 m mort .3 0 Cal MG Grenade L aunchers81r. Mort BiJi s Tndiv '/pns57 m RR 1,1-24,s

TRA-11UGC 14D T.GIICS: Unit is supposed to hurass allied units in the area.

.--.

2/K


25/48

z~~~~nr ~ ~ ~ tp-t, &Ge,~c)~ ombnat Oper-ations After Action Repe r. ,Operaitioni FEN1TON (U)

f- -13-

13

C) 0


26/48

2CONFIDENTIAL

(,. e 3 tPe~6n~ie1 auu #~-son ..u t .1ci) to Oaubat p r. t i ons After ActionRepo.t, Operation BENTON (U)

1. (C) UN'IT STREIT.15:

a. Beginning of Operation BENTON:

(1) The Brigade personnel s trengths a t the beginning of OperntionBENTONwere as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE) 4368

Assigned 5095Itesent fo r Duty 4774

Airhead - DUC PH O 3935Base Camp - PHAN RANG 839

Not Present fo r Duty 321

(2) The assigned strength was 116% of the au~mented authorizeds trength . The present fo r duty s trength was 109% of the augmented autho-rized strength.

(3) Of th e nc t present fo r duty s trength ; 54 were in t rans i t , 110

were on TDY/SD status, 145 on leave, 8 in confinemrent, 1 missing and 3 AWOL.

b. Conclusion of Operation BENTON&

(1)The Brigade

personnel s trengths a t the conclusion o f OperationBENTON were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (WO0E) 4368Assigned 4943Present fo r Duty 4573

Airhead - LUC PH 0 3670Base Camv - PHAN RANG 903

Not Present f-r Duty 370

(2) The assigned strength was 113% o f th e augmented authorizedstrength. The present fo r duty s trength was 105% of the eugmented E t h o -rized strength.

(3) Of th e no t present fo r duty strength, 19 were in t rans i t , 14 1were on TDY/SD status, 190 on leave, 8 in confinement, I missing, end 11A;,OL.

c. Replacements received during Operation BENTON were assigned to Bub-ordinate units as follows:

2FF k OFF EM

1-327 1 8 2-320 G 32-327 2 15 Sp t Bn 0 \ 02-502 0 15 Sep Co 0 "1

d. Total repla::,ments received fo r Cperetion BFITON were 4-5.N'.

2. (C) CASUALTIES:

a. Casual t ies fo r Operation BENTON were as follows:

U1I_IT KH A WH A

HH C IRRP 0 21-327 19 632-327 5 652-502 16 10 62-320 0 1A/2-17 Cay 0 0A/326 Engr 1 342 Inf (bcout Dog) 0

TOTAL 41 251

CONFIDENTIAL


27/48

, CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After ActionReport, Operation BENTON (U)

b. Total casualties fo r Operation BENTON were:

KRA 4H}A Mk ~

41 25 1 0

c. Total casualties to date:

KHAWHA MRA

51 4 2822 3

3. (U) PERSONME PROG.ANS:

a. Th e Re d Crose Recreational Unit continued it s visits to th e forwardunits during th e operation.

b. A 'forward Red Cross representative remained ir n integral pert ofthe Brigade forward echelon during Operation BENTON.

4. (U) MESONNL PIANNING:

a. A records check was conducted by AG.

b. During the time of Operation BENTON, the brigade rotated approxi-mtely 140 personnel to CONUb and received 45 replacements.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

U\


28/48

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 4 (Logist ie) to Combat Operations After Action Report, OperationM",TON (U)

i1 (C) Organitation fo r Support

Generall Brigade maneuver e e m n t s "r e supported by a iv.-ward supply poin t established a t CHU LAI by th e Forward Support Element.Brigade elements loca ted a t CAHEh"1'XN base continued to be supnorte-d byth e Forward Supply Element a t C-RUENTAN base.

b. Support flattalitn

(1) The Forward Supply Element rovided a ll o a s s e s ofsupply and services to Brigade elements located CkPENTfN base. The For-ward Supply Element consis ted o f D Company, 326th Medical Pa t ta l io n ;E Compay, 8 01st Maintenance Batta l ion; and C Company, 501st Supply andTransportatin Battalion.

(2) The forward supoly point provided all classes o f supply,laundry .and bath, maintenance and t ransporta t ion services fo r *3rigade e le -monts a t CHU LAI. The forward supply point consisted of D Company, 326thMedical 3atta l ion ( - ) I th e Maintanance Sc t i o n , 801st Maintenance Compan7yand a Supply Section, 801s t Supply and Transportation Company. Elementsof these sect ions collocated with th e next higher suprorting units to fa -cilitate passing of r eq u is i t io n s , jo b orders

and DA 581s.

c. Supporting Forcest

(1) Units Suporting the Forward Supply Element weres

(a) Task Force McDonald

(b) Support Pattalion (HAN RWG)

(2) Units Supoorting th e Forward Supply Poin t were,

(a) 94th Supply and Service lat tal ion

(1) 221st Supply and Service Company

(2) 163d Transportation Company

(b) 80th General Support Group with the 205th AmmunitionPlatC -u:

(C) 18Rth Maiwtanamcu Pwtt--linn

2. (C) Materia ) and (ervices

,. Supply

(1) Class It "Meal, Combat, Individual" formed the bulk ofa ll Class I consumed during the operation. No problem areas were encount-ered other than a shortage of ice due to a mechanical failure of ice mak-ing equipment In the Class I yard. Air shipments of ice from DU C PHOhelped alleviate the problem unti l the ic e roducing equipment was return-ed to an operational status. A to ta l of 84.05 short tons of Class I wa sconsumed by the Brigade to include 29.25 short tons of "A" rations and5h.80 short tons of "C" rations.

(2) Class TI and V:t The bulk of Class II and IV items usedby the 3rigade was drawn through the 9hth Supply and Service nattalion,Task Force OrtEG'.L1Supnort, C:m-md. Problem areas developed due to in-sufficient stockage at the 94th Supply and Service fattalion to meet th eDrigade'a demands. A crit ical shortage of fatigues in small sizes becameevident 6uring the ls ' attalion (Airborne), 327th Inftntry's materialreedinress operations. Medium. sizes were available but due to the factthat 90% of airborne troops require small and extra small sizea, this wasan unsatisfactory solution.

CONFIDENTIAL


29/48

-T CONFIDENTIALiLiriiph nt s of fatiguF's from the Brigadests resoures at DUC PH O .ndPHAN RANG helped to supply the unit. However, many troops returnedto the field without the proper sized fatigaes. Total Class II andTV issued to the Brigade was 22.97 short tons.

(3) Class III- Th e 221st Supply and Serrice Company pro-vided a ll types of Class II I in sufficient quantities to support logi3ticaland tactical operations. Th e Brigade drew a total of 4.O6 short tons and'

no problems were encountered.(4) Class V: The 205th Ammunition Platoon supplied the

Brigade with a ll Class V items. No problems were encountered on Class Vresupply at Brigade level. However, on two ocaasions units did exper-ience delay cn emergency resupply in drawing amunition from the Am-munition Supply Point (ASP) and in movement to the helipad. It is re-commended that units stockpile a small emergency resupply in th-. vlco ityo,^ he resupply pad to facilitate movement to the requesting uwit.

(5) Water: Potable water was available from two waterpoints on CHU LAI post. Although the water points produced sufficientwater, the length of time units had to wait in line made resupply ofunits in the field extremely difficult. This problem was rectified byComany F,, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne) establishing a waterpoint in the vicinity of the forward supply point,

b. Maintenance: Maintenance support was pruvided by the 188thMaintenance Dattalion. No problems were encountered. Th e following joborders were completed:

ITEM JOB ORDERS COMPLETED

Automotive 12Armament 30Instrument 0Signal 92Engineer 9

c. Transportation:

(1) Vehicular: Vehicular support was furnished by the163d Transportation Company by allocating the Brigade ten 2 ton trucksper day. However, due to vehicle deadline, the Brigade seldom receivedal l of it s allocated vehicles. At. the termination of the operation,nrigade headquarters elements and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Ar-tillery headquarters elements motor marched from CIU LA1 to DUC PFO util-izi-g 37 non-organic 21 to n t rucks .

(2) Air: United States Air Force C123, C130, C7A, andArmy C-07 and TUR-1D aircraft provided ai r l i f t support fo r the entireoperation. A daily C123 shuttle between CHU LA I and DU C 7HO was scheduledin direst support of the Brigade. Two airlif ts were conducted at th eclose of the operation on 28 and 29 August 1967 by moving three infantrybattalions and three arti l lery batteries.

(3) Sea: No sea transportation was used during the opor-

ation.

-'d. Other Services:

(1 ) Graves Registration Service was available through the94th Supply ine Scrvic3 Battalion.

(2) Quartermaster laundry and shower service was availableat CH U LAI.

2

CONFIDENTIAL


30/48

CONFIDENTIAL

3. (C) MNedical.

a. Hospita l iza t ion and Evacuation:

(1) Hositalization: All patients requiring Army levelmedical care were admitted to th e 2nd Surgical Hospital. A holdingfaci l i ty collocate(] Aith the 196th Light Infantry Prigade dispensaryiwas maintained to t reat minor wounds an d medical problems.

'2) Evacuation. Evacuation of patients from the Brigadearea of opera ions was carr ied out in an effec t ive manner thr,)ugh thesupport provided by the 498th Ai r Ambulance Company. Al l field pickupsinitially went to the 2d Surgical Hospital for sorting. Those patientsno t admitted were provided ambulance transportation to th e 9rigade t sholding faci l i ty.

b. Medical Statistics:

(1) Killed Hostile Action: bl(2) Wounded Hostile -%ction: 251(3) 'n Battle Injury: 30(4) Significant Diseases:

(a) Gastroenter i t is(b) Upper Respira tory Infection h

(c) Neuropsychiatric 3(d) Hepatitis 3(e) Heat Injury Is(f) Dysentary (Amebic) 5(g) Malaria 50(h) Fever of Unknown Origin 43(i) Foot Problems 2(j) Dermatitis 1

c. Logistics. initial deployment with a twenty day leve l ofsupply proved inadequate when fire destroyed the medical supplies oftwo bat ta l ion forward ai d stations. Supply was accomplished to the for-ward supply point f~om the disper. .ary located in th e Brigade t ac t ica lcclaand post area. In further operations, th e span of control wil l bemade more eff ic ient by the employment of bat ta l ion rea r ai d s t a t ion

elements.

I. (C) Conclusions:

a. Th e present concept of logistical suport is valid.

b. A small emergency resupnly of armunition shnuld be stock-piled in the immediate vicini ty of th e resupply helipad.

c. Closer supervision of sized TASO-901 items is required forunits to be properly prepared for s tand-down periods.

3

CONFIDENTIAL


31/48

_.. .~

Inclosure 5 (Ch=, m.l) t-o O o m Oe-.tion,- ftr Action Report, OperationBbNTCIJ Cu)

1. (U) Mission: To conduct chemical and ground a ir assault operations againstWC/NVA forces oper-ting in the arca of cper:.tions and to employ r iot control agentsto harass and demoralize civilians under VC/1VA influe.nce in conjunction with psy-chological operations.

2. (C) Operations:

a. General: Cherical operations conducted during Operation BENTON weresmcke operaticns, M7A3 CS grenade attack, employment of fougasses, and tunnelflushing/denial operati,;ns. All opcrations were conducted by the 20th ChemicalDetachment under the supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officer. Details pertinentto each operation are discussed in the following paragraphs.

b. Smoke Operations/M7A3 Grenade Attack: Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne),502d Infantry on 20 August 1967 requested a combined CS end smoke attack be conductedagainst an estimattd reinforced NVA platoon in bunkers and 2-3 man fighting holeswith overhead cover vicinity BT185123. Th e purpose of this strike wa s to cause th eenemy to evacuate their bunkers making them vulnerable to tactical air and artilleryand/or decrease their ability to place effective fire on Company B as it maneuveredto engage. Five-hundred and four CS and 378 smoke grenades were utilized. A totalof seven passes (4 CS and 3 smoke) were made over the target area in the followingranner: Tactical air, then three CS strikes immediately followed by artillery andtactical a ir again, then three smoke strikes to build a heavy cloud over the object-ive area, and then a f inal CS strike followed by Company B assaulting.

c. Company C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered anextensive tunnel complex on 27 August 1967 vicinity BT163214. The 20th ChemicalDetachment wa s requested to flush any VC/NVA personnel out of the tunnel and seedthe tunnel complex with persistent CS. This was accomplished using 240 pounds ofbulk CS.

d. On 13 A-gust 1967, three fougasse emplacements were employed on th edefensive perimeter of th t Tactical Corrand Post, ls t Battalion (;Lirboie), 327thInfantry.

3. (C) Results: CS grenades formed a heavy concentration of Riot ControlAgent in the target area. Smoke grenades created a dense cloud throughout the

target area. Troops of the supported infantry company reported the enemy fled fromhis fortified positions from which he ha d brought heavy machine gun fire on them fo rtwo days disnite constant ai r and arti l lery strikes. The fougasse was not employedagainst the enemy.

4. (C) Lessons Learnmed- No new lessons were learned relevant to chemicalcombat operations; however, the practicality and effectiveness of employing CSagainst enemy troops in bunkers and cacuflaged positions with overhead cover,causing them to flee and ther.by E pvsing themselves tc art.illery and tactical air,was aa in ru-ven.

CONFIDENTIAL A


32/48

-%vt,

r CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation

BENTON (U)

1. (C) Missiani The Civil Affairs mission was to control and coordinate:

a. Refugee Movementb. Food Extractionc.- Medical Assistance

d. Return of InnocentCivilians

2. (C) Concept of Operations: No mass refugee movement was planned for.Operation BENTON, ' ,he QUANGTIN Province Chief requested that only refugeeswho volunteered to leave the tactical area of onerations be evacuated. EachDistrict headouarters was prepared to accept up to one hundred refugees, withthe excention of HAU DUC District. HAU DUC does not have an American advisor,as a result refugees from this District were evacuated to Province headquartersat TAM lY. If large nu. ers of volunteer refugees were encountered, they wouldbe evacuated directly to Province headquarters. Fuod caches discovered duringthe operation were to be evacuated to Province headquarters. Province officialswould provide laborers to assist in extraction operations. The area of oper-ations was not considered secure enough to execute IEDCAP operations; however,

medical treAtmnt in the field was planned. Innocent civilians would be re-turned to their resn-ctive District headnuarters.

3. (C) Execution: Th e civil affairs mission was executed in four areas:

a. Refugee Movement

DATE UNIT NUl4ER EXTRACTEDTO SORTIES

14 Aug 67 2-502 5 TAM KY 1- UH-ID15 Aug 67 2-502 Ii TAM KY I UH-1D16 Au g 67 1-327 85 LY TIN 1 CIL-717 Au g 67 1-327 20 TAMKY 2 - U-!D17 Pug 6 7 1-327 222 LY TIN 4 - CF-4719 Aug 67 2-502 7 T'M KY I - UH-lD19 Aug 67 1-327 28 T.M KY 2 - UH-ID19 Aug 67 1-327 113 LY TIN 2 - C3-472o Aug 67 2-327 23 TAM KY 2 - UH-lD \20 Au g 67 1-327 2

TAM KY 1 - uH-ID22 Au g 67 1-327 84 TM KY I - CH-4724 Aug 67 1-327 40 TAM KY 3 - UH-ID26 Aug A7 1-327 42 TAM KY 1 - CH-4727 Au g A? 2-327 5 TA, KY 1 - Ur-ID28 Aug -67 1-327 TAIM KY 1 - UH-lD-

SUB-TOT.'J 420 LY TIN 7 - CH-.47

TAM KY 2 - CH-47

_25L- UH-lD

TOTAL 70 1 -4-\

b. Food Extraction- No food caches were extracted during Operation TBENTON due to inaccessible extraction sites coupled with heavy ground fighting.

c. Medical Assistance: Medical treatment was given to twenty-tworfqaees in the area of operations during Operatfon BENTON. Nine animalsreceived veterinary treatment..

d. Innocent Civilians: 19L

.h~TWI:P R R.ETI TD TV SORTI]ES

14 Au g 67 4 DU C il'O 1- UH-lD18 Aug 67 7- : u Im UH--

18 Pu g 67 2 NHI J1- UH-ID21 Aug 67, - 19 T11N I-HUOC 2 - UH-ID23 Aug 67 1 TAM KY I - UH-ID

26 Aug 67 10 TIE, P UOC 1-j-D

TOTFEL 7

CONFIDENTIAL


33/48

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 6 (Civil . ,ffairs) to Ccrbat Operations After Action Report, OperationBETTON (U) -

4. (C) Total Operation BE.NTONStatistics:

a. Refugees Relocated: 701b. Food Extracted: Nonec. Persons 1ledically Treated: 22d. Domestic Animalb Treated: 9e. Innocent Civilians Ruturno: 4)

5. (C) Civil Affairs Analysiv: It was observed that population mcvmentand control presents a major problem to QUAIC TIN Province. Eist ing facilitiesfor recciving and caring for refugtn.s nced % excpansion. It was furthernoted that more govcrnment security forces are ucdcd. This wouldallow Province to capitalize on the impact of tactical operations and begineffective pacificalion measures over a larger area.

3

3:

CONFIDENTIAL

-g


34/48

CONFIDENTIALInclosure 7 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action Report, OperationEE,'TO (U)

1. (U) '-ission: The I s t Forward Area Signal Center Irlatoon, Company P,'Clat Signel Batta l ion and th e Cononunications Platoon, Hesdcuarters and Head-quarters Company, ls t Brigadc, 101st Airborne Division had th e jc in t missionof pro ' iding s ignal support fo r th e Brigade.

2. (C) Operations:

c. General: The lst Forward kles Signal Center Platoon, Company B,501st Signal Batta l ion vnd th e Com unications Pirtocn, HeEdquarters andHeadquarters Company, 1s t B r i p . c , 101st Airborne Division provided signalsupport d r i n g Operation BEITO.

b. F%; Rdln S.ct ion established FM radio commnunications &t CH U LAI

fo r Operaticn BH2NTON. Operations consisted of th e following Brigrde nets:

(1) Brigade CoTznand

(2) Operations and In te l l igence/Secure

(3) mi . ' , t ion/Looistics

(4) Aviation

(5) General Purpose

(6) Artillery

(7) PRdio Wire Integration

In addi t ion, th e Brigade entered th e Task Force ORIGCN Command Net plus moni-toring Ratts l ion Command .ets on order. Com-unicptions between the Area ofOperations and TLC were initially by AJ/PRC-25 at Battalion Tactical CommandPosts boosted by one Brigade automatic retransmission relay site. L.ter, com-

nunictions were directed between T,.C and Bpttalion Tactical Commend Postsutilizing the ANIRC-46. All nets operated by Brigade were operational 24 hoursdaily. At CAROTAN Base th e Base Sicurity Net end Prigade Comrand Net wereoperational 24 hours daily.

o. VHF Section. Organic VTHF equipment wrs no t used. VVY carriersupport we s provided by 36th Signal Bat tal ion, Task Force OREGON. Twelve VhFcircuits were provided to TAC. Of the twelve, four were commnn user endeight were sole user/teletype circuits. In addition, 36th Signal Battalionprovidejd spira l- four cables from, %IF carr ier to TA C Forward Supply Pointlinking cozrrunicptions of T1.C pnd TA C Forward Supply Point with Task ForceGRE,3CX circui ts on a 24 hour bpsis.

d. Switchboard/ . i re Section remained operational a t CAEDTAN Bose,, ith c, wirc team and one switchboard team dispatched to CHU LAI. A stackedSB-86 svtchborrd provided 42 circui ts at CHU LAI. Fourteen miles of :ieldwire UD-1 were installed. Al l wire was installeC underground or overhead.

e. Comiaunicatcns Center remained oper:i t ionol a t CRI&NTAN Base.One ewas sent o i n s t a l l end operate a Ccmraunications Center at CH U LAI.It pro:ided 24 hour secure teletype service to Task Force OREGOJ.

f. LM Rpdio Section remained opera t ional at CARPM.TA14Base. OneVSC-2 wos operational 24 hours da i ly vicini ty TAC Forward Supply Feint. Th enot con,i ted of stations located a t TA G Forward Supily Point, Forwerd SupplyPoint, 5nd Raer Supply Point.

. ".rjntnnance Section remained operational a t CARENTA Base.

One mintenaicc teen wrz sent to CHU LA I to provide maintenance support fo rthe B'igade.

31CONFIDENTIAL

,,,_..


35/48

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosurc 8 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operations Aftei Action Report,

Operation BENTON (U)

1. (U) Missions: To assist th e ground comaander in the accomplishment ofhis tactical mission by insuing instructi,.ns to the popultion an d by decreasingthe combat effectiveness of VC and NUA units by explo it ing th e psychologicalvulnerabilities of th e VC and NVA.

2. (U) General: During Operation BENTON 3,510,000 leaflets were distr ibutedand seventeen hours of loudspfaker broadcasts were made. The themen uti l ized w r e :

a. Population control

b. VC/NVA Der.'oralizaticn

c. Chieu Ho i

d. National Safe Conduct Passes

3. (U) Special Projects: During th e course of Operation BEN'TON, th e BrigadeTC CP cur iucted an overland displacement from CH U Ll to DUC PHO. During th econduct - th e road movement, a prerecorded tape was played explaining th e bennefitsw i c h accurc to th e Vietnamese people by vir tu re of th e GVNI aving reopened Highway1.

4. (C) Results : During the month of August 1967, 54 Hoi Chanh turned them-selves over to government control in QU _ MG TIN Province as opposed to no Hai Chanhtsfo r th e month of July.

5. (C) Conclusions: The resu l t s achieved in Operation BMITON indica te thatBrigade combat operat ions have a marked effect on th e number of Hoi Chanh ra l ly ingto G-:1 agencies.

CONFIDENTIAL


36/48


37/48

CONFIDENTIAL/

Inclosu-me 10 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, OperationBENTON (U)

1. (C) Mission: The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery stipported the

ls t rigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery C, 3 Battalion (Towed),16th Artillery wa s placed underi operational control (CPCON) if 2n dBattalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery and provided reinforcing fires,

2. (C) Suamary- of Operations:

a. In the conduct of Operation BENTON, the same technique; of artilleryemployment that have proven successful in the past were employed. Al-though the radar was not employed in the area of operations, it was moved

from DUC PHObaac to CHU LAI base on 16 August 1967 and was placed OPCONto th e 3d Battalion, 82 d Artillery for a period of seven days. The radar

section also furnished a team of three personnel to assist the 3d Bat-talion, 82 d Artillery section and to instruct them in registration, sur-vey an d detection techniques employed by the lst Brigade CountermortarRadar Section.

b. Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery wa s placed OPCON to th e 2dBattalion (Airborne), 320th Arti l lery by Task Force OREGON on 11 August1967. This battery was given the mission of reinforcing the 2d Battalion

(Airborne), 320th Artillery. When Battery B, 2d Battalion (Airborne),

320th Artillery became non-operational because of damaged equipment re-

sulting from a fire on 13 August 1967, Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16thArtillery, assumed th e mission of Battery B until reconstitirtion was com-p lo to on 16 August 1967.

c. An additional forward observer requirement was imposed on the 2dBattalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery, with th e attchment of two Mike

Force companies to the Brigade. This requirement exceeded the organic

capabi l i ty of th e ba t t a l i on ; o w v er, a dd i t i ona l forward observer pa-t ieswere formed and provided to th e two companies by using personnel from

orga nic sections and battalion headqurters. Moreover, an additional

liaison section wap formed and collocated with Battery C, 3d Battalion,16th Arti l lery. T~ic se c t i on ' s mission was to coordinate a i r c r a f t con tro l

-aid rtillery fire at th e TIEN PHUOC airfield anO also to effect coor-

dination with th e a Jacent Special Forces camp and the Marine Artillery

(105imv Howitzer Battery) located within the compound. Dluring th e first

three days of the operation an ARVN I05mm Howitzer Battery was locatedat

th e canp and th e l i a i so n section was responsib le fo r th e coordinat ion of

all fires affecting the air traffic control pattern at TIENPHUOC.

d. During th e initial phase of th e ope ra t i o n , communication problems u,:'e

encounterod because o f th e dis tances between ba t t a l i on opera t ions a t CHU

LA I an d th e fire direction centers of Battery A : 'nd Battery B. This pro-

blem was solved by collocating an automatic rotransmissionl station with

fattery C.

e. On th e afternoon of 13 August 1967 a grass fire ignited by an unsoownsource burned over the firing position of Battcry B and the tactical com-

mend post of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. Exploding ammu-

nition forced evacuation of th e position and precluded movement of howit-

zers and ecirtent. The unit wa s under enemy mortar and small arms fire

throughout the night . On th e afternoon of 14 A4gust 1967 all personnel

I__ '3 CONFIDENTIAL


38/48

CONFIDENTIAL

and howitzers were extracted by CH-47 and taken to CEO L&I. Althoughthere wore no major casualties as a result of the fire, nine personnelwere evacuatred fo r wounds received from enemy f i re . Emergency requisi-tions were submitted for essential items of equipment and on 15 August1967 four operational howitzers, less section equipment, were issued tdthe = i t . Fire direction equipment, tentage and section equipment wereprovided from battalion resources, and minimum essential communicationsequipment was obtained by the Brigade Signal Officer. Two howitzers re-claimed from the fire were test fired and found to be servicohblo. Th ebattery with six operational howitzers was inserted into the operationalarea on 16 August 1967. Excellent cooperation and rapid action on thepart of all personnel in the supply chain resulted in the minimum down-

time for this unit.

3. (0) Execution:

a. A/2-320 displacements:

(1) On 150730 Aug, A Btry displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 175078.Unit closed 1500 hours. Priority of fires to 1-327 Infantry.

(2) On 290830 Aug, A Btry displaced by air (CH-47) to BT 552055.Unit closed 1100 hours. Further displaced by ai r (C-130) to CARE3TANBase Camp vicinity BS 84063715. Unit closed 1600 hours and startodpreparation for future operation.

b. B/2-320 displbcmonts:

(I) On 130730 Aug, B Btry displaced by air to BT 173114. Unit closed1200 hours. Priority of fires to 2-327 Infantry.

(2) On 141330 Avg, B Btry was extracted duo to fire at the batteryposition. Unit closebd CH U LAI Base Camp area at 1620 hours.

(3) On 161000 Aug, B try displaced by a ir to BT 125109. Unitclosed 1145 hours. Priority of f ires to 2-327 Infantry.

(4) On 280800 Aug, B Btry displaced by air to BT 552055. Unitclosed 1430 hours; Farther displaced by a ir to CAF.UTAN Base Campvicinity BT 84063700. Unit closed 1835 hours. Unit started preparationfor future operation.

c. C/2-320 displacements:

(1) On 131230 Aug, 0 Btry displaced by ai r to UT 23851409. Unitclosed 1700 hours. Priority of f ires to 2-502 Infantry.

(2) Or 291000 Aug, C Btry displaced by air to UT 552055. Unitclosed 1400 hours. Fur4ther displaced by a ir to CAENTAN Base Campvicinity US 84063715. Pait closed 120 hours. Started-preparation forfuture operations.

d. TAC 2-320 disp-ajomonts:

(1) On 100930 A-o,, TAG displaced overland to Ciu LA- Base Campvicinity 575028. Unit, closed 1130 hours. ission to support OperationBMIPTON.

(2) On 291300 AuM, TAC commencecd displacing overland to DUO PHO.Unable to make river .rossing at BS 695636, it returned to QUANGNGAI

Airfield vicinity BS 604721. Closed 1820 hours.(3) On 301000 Aug, TAC displaced overland to CARERTANBase Camp at

BS 84o63711. Unit closed 1530 hours.

CONFIDENTIAL


39/48

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Radar Section 2-320 displacements:

(I) On 160800 Aug, Radar displaced by air to BT 515041. Unit closed0915 hours. Became OPCON to 3-82 Artillery, with the mission of provid-ing coimtermortar defense to the CHU LAI Airbase complex during theperiod that the 3-82 radar wa s inoporational.

(2) On 220900 Aug, Radar terminated OPCON to 3-82 Artillery. Dis-pl-cod by air to BS 870331. Unit closed and operational 221030 hours.Mission defense of CARENTANBase Camp.

4. (U) Resilts:a. 4 VC KB A (C)b. 2 VC KBA (P)

5. (U) Recap of 11issions Fired:

a. Number of missions fired:(1) 105: 553(2) 155: 376

b. Total rounds oxponded:(1) 105: 8792(2) 155: 4819

6. (U) Administrative Matters: N/A

7. (U) Special Equipmont and Techniques: The '418 Field Artil ory Data Com-puter was issued to the battalion, basis of issue being one per firing

unit and one to battalion FDC. Issue was made at the coapletion of afive dy course conducted by a New Equipment Training Team. The com-'putors wrro programmed by the battalion technician and will be issuedprior to the next operation. Each unit has two trained operator per-sonnel and two personnel in the battalion communications section worequalified as maintenance technicians.

8. (U) Commander's Analysis: Attempts to fight the fire which ravaged theB Battery firing position on 13 August 1967 wore severely hampered by theextrcmely tall. (8-10 fot) vegetation on the landing zone. Therefore,the practice was later initiated during Operation BENTON, of intention-ally starting firns during the artillery and air preparations with whitephosphorus and/or napalz, particularly when the landing zone was coveredwith ta l l grasseu. This practice has considerably reduced the hazardsassociated with fire during subsequent operations. Additionally, thisprocedure assists in detonating nny bnnby trapped ordnanco placed onth e lr nding 7tro, IV thn. ncn'o.

CONFIDENTIAL


40/48

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure ll (Small Unit Actions) to Combat Operations After Action Report,Operation BEt1TON (U)

The following is a chronological list of all smal l units actions and in te l l -igence reported during Operation BENTON. The list does not include significantsmall unit contacts described in the basic Combat Operations After Action Report.

1. 13 August 1967:

a. 131000 Au g 67: Command an d Control helicopter of the Brigade Comman-de r was h it two times by enemy small arms f i re near BT132074 resulting in 1 WHA(minor).

b. 131400 Aug 67: Cormnand and Control helicopter of th e Brigade Comnan -de r near BT173115 was h it two t imes by enen s t a l l arms fire resu l t ing in minordan.ages to th e helicopter.

2. 14 August 1967:

a. 14 0815 Aug 67: TA C CP/2-327 In f vicini ty BT173115 received sniperf ire resu l t ing in 1 WH A (medevac).

b. 140900 Aug 67: C/2-502 In f vic ini ty BT231133 engaged snipers in ahut resulting in 1 VC KI A (C) and 3 detainees.

c. 140925 Au g 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT221137 engaged 2 enemy (1 withweapon) resulting in 1 VC KI A (C).

d. 141015 Aug 67: Comnand an d Control hel icopter /2-502 In f vic in i tyBT212113 engaged 1 enemy wearing a khaki uniform resu l t ing in 1 VC KIA (C).

e. 141100 Aug 67: Command and Control helicopter of th e Brigade DeputyComanding Off icer was h it by one small arm round resu l t ing in 1 WH A (medevac) andminor damafe to the helicopter.

f. 141104 Aug 67: A/2-502 Inf v ic ini ty BT201.120 engaged 2 enemy resul t -in g in 1 VC KIA (C), 1 AK-47 and 1 carbine ca. -ured.

g. 141140 Aug 67: Rcn/2-327 Inf v ic ini ty BT174114 found 2 IVA resu l t ingin 2 77,L KIA (C) and 1 mosin-nagent rifle captured.

h. 141320 Aug 67: A/2-327 In f vicini ty BT135113 engaged an estimatedeneq." squad resulting in I VC KI (C) ar l 1 individual weapon captured.

i. 141330 Au g 67: B/2-502 Inf v ic ini ty BT208090 found 1 VC kil led byar t i l l e ry.

j. 141530 Au g 67: A/2-502 In f vicinity BT201117 engaged 1 enemy carry-in g a weapon resulting in 1 VC KJA (C) and 1 carbine captured.

k. 141634 Aug 67: C/2-502 In f vicini ty BT221139 received automaticweapon fire resulting in 1 WqA (medevac).

1. 141835 Aug 67: C/2-502 In f vicinity BT220133 engaged 4 enemy withrucksacks resulting in 4 VC KI 1 (Co

3. 15 August 1967:

a. 150909 Au g 67: A/2-502 In f vicinity DT'204111 received sniper andautomatic weapons f ire resulting in 1 KHA and 1 WH A (mcdevac).

b. 151200 Aug 67: B/1-327 inf vicinity BT206047 apprehended 33 detainees.

c. 151500 Aug 67: C/2-502 In f vicini ty BT216137 received sniper firefrom gwveral different directicns resulting in 1 VC KI A (C).

C=

t COHFWOENItA[


41/48

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 11 (Small Unit Actions) to Combat Oper-t ions After Action Report,Operation BENTON (U)

d. 151635 Aug 67 : A/2-502 In f vicini ty BT271 received automaticweapons fire resulting in I VC YIA (C) and 150 home made grenades captured. Asearch of 2 huts foiund mate r ia l to make 100 more grenades and 10 rucksacks.

e. 15102 Aug 67: A/1-327 In f vicini ty BT165077 found and extrac ted3 tons of r ice .

f. 151802 Au g 67: Rcm/1-327 oIf v ic in i ty BT165076 found 4 tons of te aand 1 to n of r i ce . The r ice was destroyed and th e tta extracted.

g. 151830 Aug 67: C/2-502 In f vicini ty BT219136 engaged 2 enemy withrucksacks resulting in 2 VC KIA (C) and 1 Chicom grende captured.

4, !6 August 1967:

a. 160730 Aug.67: A/2-502 Ir.f vic in i ty BT206110 engaged 1 VC r e su l t ingin 1 VC KIh (C) and 1 AK-47 captured.

b; 160740 Aug 67: C/2-327 In f vicini ty BT154104 engaged an e s t i m t e d15 VC in fo r t i f i ed posit ions . The

company employed a ir s t r ikes , ar t i l lery andgunships resulting in 1 WH A (medevac), 5 VC KIA (C) and 1 shotgun, I mauser and 1Chicom grenade captured.

c. 160830 Aug 67: C/2-502 In f vicinity B7218130 found and destroyed 1ton of rice.

d. 160840 Aug 67: Rcn/l-327 In f vicini ty BT166073 apprehended 2 deta in-ees.

d. 161000 Aug 67: A/2-327 In f vicini ty BT194140 received sniper fireresulting in 1 WHA (medevac).

f. 161135 Aug 67" C/2-502 In f v ic in i ty BT228123 engaged 1 VC resu l t ingin I VC KIA (C) and 1 grenade captured.

g. 161225 Aug 67: x/2-327 In f vicini ty BT192142 received sn iper fireresulting in 1 WiA (medevac).

h. 161315 Aug 67; C/2-327 In f v ic in i ty BT159108 engaged 1 VC resu l t ingin 1 VC KIA (C ) ;r d 1 AK-47 captured.

i. 161425 Au g 67. Rcn/1-327 In f v ic in i ty BT170072 engaged 6 VC resu l t -ing in 1 WINA (minor), 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 SK S captured.

1. 161430 Aug 67: 0/2-502 In f v ic in i ty BT233121 engaged sn iper r e su l t -ing in 2 VC KIA (C).

k. 161445 Aug 67 : A/2-327 In f vicini ty BT183144 engaged 2 VC r e su l t ingin 2 VC KIA (C).

1. 161323 Aug67. C/2-502 In f v ic in i ty BT230117 found and destroyed700 pounds of rice.

m. 161325 Aug 67: 176th Aviation gunship vicinity BT164103 receivedfire resul t ing in 1 WIIA (medevac).

n. 161350 iug 67: A/2-17 Cav vicini ty BS857358 engaged 3 VC r e su l t ingin 1 VC KLA (C) and 1 grenade captured.

o. 16160 Au g 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT166103 engaged an estimatedequad size enemy force resu l t ing in 7 VC KIM, (C) a-in 1 small anm weapon captured.

p. 161645 Au g 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT232120 received sniper fireresulting in 1 WH A (medevac).

CONFIDENTIAL


42/48

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 11 (Small Unit Actions) to Combat Operations After Actinn Report,Operation PFYON (J)

q. 161700 Aug 67t B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT195047 engaged 3 VC resultingin 2 VC KLI, (c).

r; 161730 Aug 67: A/2-,02 Inf vicinity BT206111 found a weapons cachein a hut and cave containing 39 small arms weapons, 5 crc .- served woapons, 2 82mmmortar sights, 3 82mm mortar rounds and assorted samll arms ammunition. All wereextracted.

s. 161932 Aug 67:. Mike Force/1-327 In f vicinity BT133068 received sniperf i re resulting in 1 WHA (minor).

t. 162030 Aug 67; A/1-327 In f vicinity BT171071 apprehended 1 male ofmilitary age resulting in 1 detainee.

u. 162040 Aug 67: C/2-502 In f vicinity BT229125 engaFed 1 VC resul t ingin 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 clip of M-1 ammunition captured.

v. 162250 Aug 67: A/2-327 In f vicinit T192144 received 6 incoming

60mm mortar rounds resulting in I KHA an d 9 WIHk(6 medevac and 3 minor).

5. 17 August 1967:

a. 170001 Aug 67: C/2-327 In f vicinity DT150106 observed 12 82mm mortarsrounds being fired on old defensive positions the company had occupied the previousnight.

b. 170i45 Aug 67: A/2-17 Cay vicinity BS871362 apprehended 7 detaineesunloading a junk. A swift boat took the junk in tow.

c. 170830 Aug 67: A/1-327 In f vicinity BT170072 apprehended 2 detainees.

d. 170900 Aug 67: B/2-502 inf vicinity BT196097 found a hospitalcomplex, 10 tons of rice and I ton of salt. All were destroyed.

e. 170930 Aug 67: Rcn/1-327 Inf vicinity BT170088 engaged I VC resultingin 1 VC KI A Co.

f. 170950 Aug 67: A/1-327 In f vicinity NT165065 engaged an unknown

size VC force resulting in 1 US KHA, 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 SKS captured.g. 171000 Aug 67: C/2-502 In f vicinity BT231120 angaged 2 snipers with

TAC Air resulting in 2 VC KIA (C).

h. 171158 Aug 67 : Rcn/l-327 Inr vicinity BT1788 unkaged 2 enemywearing khaki uniforms resulting in 2 INVAKIA (C) and 1 AK-47 captured.

i. 171215 Aug 67: Util i ty aircraft (176th A n Co)/2-327 In f vicinityBT192145 received 2 small arms hits resulting in 1 US VrHA (mdevac) and minordamage to the aircraft.

J. 171230 Aug 67: C/2-502 In f viidn ty BT231120 received snipor fireresulting in 1 US WHA (melevac).

k. 171340 Aug 61 : A/2-502 In. vicinity DT202101 engaged 2 VC resulting

in 1 VC KIA (C) and 1 AK-47 captured,

1. 171LOO Aug 67: A/2-502 In f vicin-'ty 17212.O1 found and destroyed .nammunition cache consisting of 100 82=. mortar rounds, 24 60nmm mortar rounds, 381mm mortar rounds, 47 75m recoilless rifle rounds, 3 unidentified chicom rocketrounds, and largc a:cunts of mdscellaneous small arms ar.unitione One 14-1, 1 mosin-nagent anl 3 SKS webre captured.

m. 171435 Au g 67: Rcr/2-327 lnf vicinitv PT126116 had 3 US Vih (medova-)when 1 inJividual step;ped nn a landmine.

CONFIDENTIAL


43/48

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosv,'e 1i (Small Unit Actions) to Combat Operations After Action Report,Operation PENTON (U)

n. 171500 Au g 67: A/2-502 In f v ic in i ty BT202101 found a medical supplycache consi sting o f 9 bundles o f gauze, 30C b o t t l e s of pen ic i l l in , 2 bundles ofsyringes and nurerous acissors, tweezers and other instrumenhs. All items wereextracted.

o. 171526 Aug 67: A/2-327 In f v ic in i ty BT1781l engaged 3 enemy r e su l t -in g 1 US WHA (minor) and 1 VC KI A (C).

p. 171535 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT161109 engaged 1 enemy result-in g 1 detainee.

q. 171609 Aug 67: c/2-327 Inf vicinity BT164103 engaged 2 enerm result-.ng in 2 VC KIA (C).

r. 171650 Aug 67: C/2-327 Inf vicinity BT157104 found 1 enemy bodyfprrox imate ly 1 da y old.

s. 171800 Aug 67: B/1-327 Inf vicinity BT196066 found a weapons cachein a hu t consis t ing of 2 MAT 49 submachine guns, 1 BAR, 1 carbine, 19 82mm mortarrounds, 2 chicom rocket rounds, 2 home rade bombs, 2 cans of Composition "B" andsmall arms ammunition.

t. 171910 Aug 67: Rcn/l-327 Inf vicinity BT157074 apprehended 9detainees.

u. 171945 Aug 67: C/2-327 In f vic in i ty BT164103 apprehended 1 VC wh oattempted to escape resulting in 1 VC KIA (C).

v. 172100 Au g 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT221119 apprehended 1 detaineQ.

6. 18 August 1967:

a. 180730 Aug 67: A/1-327 inf vicinity BT164056 engaged 1 VC resultingin 1 VC KIA (C).

b. 180815 Aug 67: C/2-502 Inf vicinity BT248123 engaged an estimatedenemy squad resulting in 1 WHA (medevac).

c. 180845 Aug 67: C/2-327 I