claimed most of the Marine vic-tims. A platoon from Company F,2d Battalion, joined Company C, asdid a provisional unit assembledfrom the 1st Battalion's Headquar-ters and Service Company. Ratherthan taking part in an attempt toregain Vegas, these latest reinforce-ments helped evacuate thoseMarines wounded in the earlierfighting.

Marines wounded in the vicinityof Outpost Vegas followed one oftwo routes to a collection pointbehind the position held byCompany H, 3d Battalion, 5thMarines. From here, casualtieswent either directly to the 3dBattalion aid station or to a campof the Korean Service Corpsenroute to the aid station of the 1stBattalion. The most severelywounded traveled by helicopterdirectly to a hospital ship, Haven(AH 12) or Consolation (AH 15), inInchon Harbor. The othersreceived further treatment from thedivision's medical battalion beforebeing transferred to better-equipped facilities in the rear.

Chinese Diversionary Attacks

On the night of 26 March, theChinese diverted attention fromCarson, Reno, and Vegas by jab-bing at Berlin and East Berlin inthe sector of Lieutenant ColonelRobert J. Oddy's 3d Battalion, 5thMarines. Berlin occupied a round-ed hilltop roughly the same heightas the main line of resistance; a400-yard ridge linked the two.Supplies or reinforcements boundfor Berlin, unlike those destinedfor Vegas or Reno, were screenedby the hill from direct enemyobservation. Taking advantage ofthe concealment, carrying partiesof the Korean Service Corps shut-tled supplies to the entrance to theoutpost. The porters were notallowed to enter the trenches,

however, to avoid confusion thatmight prove advantageous to theenemy.

One reinforced squad fromCompany G held Berlin, andanother East Berlin. Both garrisonsbeat back the Chinese with thehelp of barrages that boxed-in theoutposts and variable-time fire thatrained fragments on the enemy'sroutes of approach. By midnight, asecond squad had reinforced eachof the outposts.

The Chinese also probed theoutposts held by the 1st Marines onthe left of Colonel Walt's regiment.The enemy bombarded four out-posts—Hedy, Bunker Hill, Es-ther,and Dagmar—and tested thedefenses of all of them. Only atCombat Outpost Dagmar did theattackers break through the wire.The 27 Marines defending the out-post held their own against anapproximately equal number ofChinese. Some 300 rounds of mor-tar and artillery fire helped thedefenders, commanded by Second

Lieutenant Benjamin H. Murray ofCompany I, 3d Battalion, to containthe penetration until help arrived.Before midnight on 26 March,Second Lieutenant John J. Peeler,the executive officer of Company I,led a counterattack from the mainline of resistance that regainedcontrol over all of Outpost I)agmar.The clashes at Dagmar and theother outposts—Hedy, Bunker Hill,and Esther—killed perhaps 10

Chinese and wounded 17 at thecost of four Marines killed and 16wounded. A feeble jab at OutpostKate proved an annoyance ratherthan a threat, and Chinese troopsmassing in front of the KoreanMarines did not attack at this time.Marine artillery again demonstratedits importance during the outpostactions on the night of 26-27March. The 11th Marines firedmore than 10,000 105mm and155mm rounds at targets from EastBerlin and Berlin westward toOutpost Hedy. The bombardmentof Vegas and Reno, the outposts

A Marine mans the main trenchline on the forward sloop of Outpost Dagmar.The outpost was the site of a two-squad Chinese diversionary assault with auto-matic weapons and satchel charges that was beaten back with help from Marineson the main line of resistance.

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A317670

A graduate of Stanford University andveteran of the British CommandoProgram, LtCol Alexander D.Cereghino spent most of World War IIin command of the 1st ProvisionalBattalion stationed in NorthernIreland. Following a three-year stintat Headquarters Marine Corps, he wasgiven command of 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, in Korea.

the Chinese had seized, continuedinto the morning of the 27th inpreparation for a more powerfulcounterattack.

Marine Counterattack of

27 March

Preparations for a major coun-terattack went ahead on theground and in the air. At 0345 onthe 27th, Lieutenant ColonelCereghino's 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, an element of the divisionreserve, came under the opera-tional control of Colonel Walt's 5thMarines. Cereghino's unit hadalready moved into an assemblyarea behind the 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, and Company F hadtaken part in as unsuccessfulattempt to break through toOutpost Vegas.

By the time the Marines aban-doned the early attempts to fighttheir way through to Vegas and

Reno, observation planes fromMarine Observation Squadron 6(VMO-6) began flying missions todirect friendly artillery fire againstChinese batteries. Aerial observerscalled down some 60 fire missionsagainst targets that included mor-tars, artillery, and self-propelledguns. During the morning dark-ness, Douglas F3D-2 Skyknightnight fighters conducted radarbombing against Chinese gunnersand troop concentrations. As dawnapproached, the time chosen foran attempt to recapture Vegas andReno, air strikes intensified.Grumman F9F Panther jets ofMarine Fighter Squadron 115(VMF-115) arrived overhead at0650 to help neutralize theChinese defenders of the two cap-tured outposts. A breakdown ofcommunications forced a post-ponement, however; H-Hour forthe assault on Reno and Vegasslipped until 0900, but persistentproblems of coordination causedfurther delay. Airmen took advan-tage of the additional time; withtwo-dozen Marine fighter-bombersjoining Air Force jets in deliveringstrikes.

Marine tanks—which the divi-sion commander, Major GeneralEdwin A. Pollock, had ordered tojoin the rocket battery, mortars,and artillery regiment in support-ing the counterattack—made theircontribution to the preliminaryfires. Company A of the division'stank battalion spotted two groupsof Chinese carrying logs for theconstruction of bunkers on the siteof Outpost Reno. The tank compa-ny wiped out one group with90mm fire, but the other presum-ably reached its destination.

Before the attack finally began,Major General Pollock agreed to achange of plan. Vegas would bethe sole objective; while attackingthere the Marines would neutralizeReno with fire. Smoke shells burst-

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ing on Hills 57A and 90 blindedthe Chinese observers there andmarked the launching of theattack, which got under way short-ly after 1100. Artillery, mortars,tanks, and aircraft hammeredVegas, Reno, and the enemy's fir-ing batteries, including some locat-ed by Marine airmen earlier in theday.

As bombs, shells, and rocketsexploded on Vegas and the othertargets, Company D, 2d Battalion,5th Marines—an element ofColonel Walt's regimental re-serve—advanced from the mainline of resistance. The assault com-pany, commanded by CaptainJohn B. Melvin, launched its attackat 1120 but immediately cameunder fire from Chinese mortarsand artillery. Within an hour, thecompany's first platoon had beenreduced to just nine able-bodiedMarines, but Melvin's survivorsslogged forward through floodedrice paddies and up a rain-soakedslope. Marine casualties andenemy reinforcements slowedCompany D, as the men workedtheir way from one depression orrocky outcropping to another untilthe counterattack stalled some 200yards short of the objective.Chinese fire raked the slope wherethe assault had bogged down, butMarine jet fighters and piston-pow-ered attack planes joined the 11thMarines and the 1st Tank Battalionin trying to silence the hostileweapons.

Shells from Chinese 122mmartillery and 120mm mortarschurned the slopes of Vegas; mak-ing the detonations from 60mmmortar rounds seem like mere fire-crackers. Captain Melvin recalledthat the enemy fire "was so intenseat times that you couldn't moveforward or backward.... You couldonly hope that the next roundwouldn't be on target." Despite thedeadly barrage, a handful of

Marines succeeded in entering theouter trench and making a brieflodgment there.

To sustain the counterattack,two forces set out shortly after1200 from the lines of Company H,3d Battalion, 5th Marines. CaptainFloyd G. Hudson led the way witha provisional unit made up fromthe 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.Captain Herbert M. Lorence com-manded the second, Company F ofthe same battalion. These rein-forcements reached the slopewhere Melvin's Marines wereundergoing their ordeal but couldadvance no farther. As a result,Company F, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines—available from what hadbeen the division reserve—set outat 1530 under Captain Ralph F.Estey to lend its weight to thecounterattack on Outpost Vegas.

Captain Estey's companyreached the fire-swept slope lead-

ing to the enemy-held outpost andrelieved the surviving elements ofMelvin's Company D, 5th Marines,which returned to the main line ofresistance. While 90mm guns fromCaptain Clyde W. Hunter's Com-pany A, 1st Tank Battalion, firedfrom the main line of resistanceagainst a Chinese strongpoint onthe crest of Vegas, Marine aircraftmaintained a smoke screen thatblinded enemy observers. Esteycombined his men with those ofCompany E of the 5th Marines, andformed the equivalent of three pla-toons. After a savage fight lastingabout an hour and a half, thecounterattack succeeded by 2000in overrunning the trenches near-est the Marine main line of resis-tance. The Chinese who held therest of Vegas contained the break-through short of the summit andforced the Marines to fall back tothe base of the hill and dig in. Fire

from supporting weapons in therear, and also from the site ofOutpost Reno, helped the enemyprevail.

Pressure on the Marine footholdcontinued throughout the night. Bymidnight, Captain Estey's men hadbeaten off three attacks and clungfirmly to the position at the base ofVegas. Marine night fighters andattack planes made nine radar-con-trolled strikes between darknesson the 27th and 0115 the nextmorning, dropping some 24 tonsof bombs on enemy positions andsupply lines. The bombardment ofEstey's perimeter gradually abated,as Chinese gunners shifted theirfire from the base of Vegas to themain line of resistance.

During the counterattack onChinese-held Outpost Vegas,Hospitalman Third Class William R.Charette—attached to Company F,2d Battalion, 7th Marines—repeat-

Grumman F9F Panther jets taxi into position for takeoff Squadrons 115 and 311 not only attacked chinese trench-against enemy concentrations. During the Marine counter- es, bunkers, and mortar emplacements, but also bombedattack on Outpost Vegas, Panther jets from Marine Fighter enemy resupply points.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A34672()

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ly risked his life to care for thewounded. While Charette was giv-ing first aid to a Marine, a Chinesegrenade landed next to them.Charette pounced on the grenade;his armored vest saved him fromserious injury, hut the force of theexplosion tore away his helmetand his medical kit. Since he couldnot waste time searching for thekit, he used his clothing to impro-vise bandages. When he was tend-ing to another wounded Marine,whose armored vest had beenblown off by the concussion froman explosion, Charette removedhis own vest and placed it overthe wounded man. Without eithera helmet or an armored vest, hestayed with his platoon through-out the fighting. According to oneof the Marines who fought there,the corpsman "was everyplaceseemingly at the same time, per-forming inexhaustibly." In recog-nition of his bravery and devotionto duty, Charette received theMedal of Honor. Of the corpsmenwhose service in Korea earnedthem the nation's highest awardfor valor, he alone survived towear it.

The Marines counterattackingVegas had seized a strong footholdat the base of the hill where theoutpost stood, but the summit andthe shell-battered complex oftrenches and bunkers remained inChinese hands. Preparations foranother assault up the hill beganat 0335 on 28 March when the105mm and 155mm howitzers ofthe 11th Marines fired the first ofmore than 2,300 rounds directedat Chinese weapons positions andassembly areas, as well as thedefenses of the summit itself.

After half an hour's bombard-ment, the men of Captain Estey'sCompany F, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, who had entered thefight at mid-afternoon the previ-ous day, worked their way to

within grenade range of theChinese before being driven backby fire from small arms and mor-tars. While the companyregrouped, Marine aircraft joinedin battering the enemy. After sun-rise, Marine fliers laid a smokescreen to conceal air strikes fromChinese antiaircraft gunners onHill 67, north of Outpost Carson.During the early morning, Marineaircraft conducted four powerfulstrikes, the first of a series thatlasted throughout the day.

The second infantry assault ofthe morning, launched at 0600,failed to recapture Vegas, endingwhen Captain Estey's Marines tookcover from enemy fire about 375yards south of the crest. After fur-ther air strikes, Estey's Company Fattacked once again and by 1015penetrated to within 15 yards ofthe trenches, where it engaged ina firefight that lasted 22 minutesand deprived the assault of itsmomentum.

When this latest counterattackstalled in front of a machine gunfiring from the base of a rock for-mation, Sergeant Daniel P.

Matthews, a squad leader inCompany F, saw that the weaponhad pinned down a woundedMarine and the corpsman trying tobring him to safety. The sergeantcrawled to the formation, scram-bled onto the rocks, opened firewith his rifle, and charged the gun.Although wounded almost imme-diately, Matthews killed two mem-bers of the gun crew and silencedthe weapon. His bold actionenabled the corpsman to save thewounded Marine, but Matthewsdied of his wounds before mem-bers of his squad could reach him.His heroism earned a posthumousMedal of Honor.

Shortly after the one-manassault by Sergeant Matthews,Captain Lorence's Company E, 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, passed

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through Company F, 2d Battalion,7th Marines. Captain Estey's com-pany, reduced to just 43 able-bod-ied men after a half-dozenattempts to recapture Vegas, fellback to regroup at the base of thehill.

While the relief of Estey's com-pany was taking place, aircraft,mortars, and artillery continued toscourge not only outpost Vegas,but also Chinese supply routes,enemy-held Outpost Reno, nearbyHill 25A, and other high groundfrom which hostile gunners couldfire in support of their comradesdug in on Vegas. Taking advantageof the savage bombardment—dur-ing a 23-minute period, aerialbombs fell at the rate of more thana ton per minute—the 1st Platoonof Captain Lorence's companylaunched its assault at 1301. Ledby Staff Sergeant John J. Williams,who had taken over when SecondLieutenant Edgar R. Franz waswounded, the platoon killed ordrove off the Chinese defendingthe former site of Outpost Vegas.The platoon took only one prison-er, the second the Marines hadcaptured during the day.

As soon as Captain Lorence'sMarines regained the ruins ofOutpost Vegas, the Chinese coun-terattacked, but fire from tanksdug in on the main line of resis-tance and artillery helped breakup the assault. Although theMarines controlled Vegas itself, afew Chinese stubbornly held outat the very summit of the hill. Thework of preparing to meet thenext counterattack went aheadunder the command of MajorBenjamin G. Lee, who had earnedthe Silver Star and Purple Heart asa noncommissioned officer atGuadal-canal during World War II.Although Lee, operations officer ofthe 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, tookcommand, the resupply of Vegasbecame the responsibility of the

al burst of machine gun or sniper fire,attempts to overrun the outpost.

regiment's 3d Battalion. To defendthe newly recaptured outpost, Leeat first could muster only 66Marines, eight of them members ofCompany F, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, who had not fallen backto the base of the hill with theunit's other survivors, and the restfrom Captain Lorence's CompanyE, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.Fortunately, Captain Thomas P.

Connolly's Company E, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, reached thehill with an additional 150 menand prepared to take over fromLorence's Marines and spearhead afinal attack.

Further Action on Outpost Vegas

The Chinese held the initiative,however, and at 1955 on 28 March,as darkness enveloped Vegas, theycounterattacked. The preparatoryfires included the usual artilleryand mortar barrages supplementedby 3.5-inch rockets fired from the

while night witnessed renewed Chinese

Chinese equivalent of theAmerican Bazooka antitank wea-pon. An enemy battalion advancedfrom captured Outpost Reno, butfell back after coming under dead-ly fire from Army and Marineartillery and the 1st MarineDivision's 4.5-inch rocket battery.

Outpost Carson came under fireat about the same time from mor-tars and automatic weapons.Chinese patrols probed theapproaches to the outpost, but thegarrison, supported by weaponson the main line of resistance,drove off the enemy. The attack, ifone was planned, did not takeplace.

At 2130, Major Lee radioed fromVegas to report that a secondChinese assault was imminent, andwithin an hour the enemy struck.Box-me-in fires helped Lee'sMarines cling to their position, butthe Chinese struck again, launch-ing the night's third attack aboutan hour before midnight. At least

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200 Chinese soldiers tried to over-whelm Lee's perimeter hut suc-ceeded only in forcing the Marinesto yield some non-critical ground.While aircraft dropped flares, how-itzer batteries of the 11th Marinesdueled with Chinese gunners, fir-ing more than 6,000 rounds bymidnight. The attack continueduntil 0130 on the morning of 29March, when another savage bom-bardment by the division's artilleryand the fire of Captain Connolly'sCompany E, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, forced the enemy to relaxhis pressure. The bulk of theChinese assault force, totaling twobattalions during the fight, with-drew behind a curtain of fire fromweapons emplaced on Reno.

As Connolly's Company E, 7thMarines, and Lorence's CompanyE, 5th Marines, prepared to elimi-nate the Chinese die-bards stillclinging to the crest of the bill,artillery and 4.5-inch rockets kepton pounding the enemy. Morethan 4,000 rounds neutralizedReno while others tore into theChinese-held portion of Vegas. Afinal Marine assault secured thesummit of Vegas at 0450.

Chinese mortar and artillery firedirected at the Marines continuedafter the recapture of Vegas.Shortly after 0500 a 120mm mortarshell killed both Major Lee andCaptain Walz, the commander ofCompany F, 2c1 Battalion, 5thMarines, who had led the charge atReno Block. Also killed in this flur-ry of shelling was First LieutenantJohn S. Gray, a forward observerfrom the 1st Battalion, 11thMarines.

Major Joseph S. Buntin, theexecutive officer of the 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, which wasresponsible for rebuilding the out-post, now took command.Replacements, including corps-men, arrived that morning, alongwith weapons, tools, construction

lstlvlarDiv 1-listorical Diary Photo supplement, Mar53

Although Vegas was retaken, Marines still had to keep low when moving aroundthe ruined outpost. Daylight hours were relatively quiet with only an occasion-

supplies, and laborers from theKorean Service Corps. By noon,work was underway on trenches,fighting holes, and bunkers,screened as necessary by smokemissions fired by the 11th Marines,but the muddy, shell-churnedearth complicated the efforts of theMarines and the Korean labortroops helping them. As daylightfaded, rain and light snow addedto the discomfort of the men onthe ground and forced the aerialobservers, who had been directingthe maintenance of smoke screensand other artillery missions, toreturn to their airstrips.

The Chinese had not yet aban-doned their designs on Vegas. At1805 on 29 March, they advancedfrom assembly areas in the vicinityof Reno and Hill 153 and hit Vegason both flanks. This attack trig-gered the most violent single bar-rage of the battle for Vegas, asmore than 6,400 shells from fiveartillery battalions, plus tworounds from each launching tube

in the division's 4.5-inch rocketbattery, exploded among theattacking troops. Army 8-inchhowitzers and 4.2-inch mortarsalso helped break up the assault.

After a brief flurry of activity atabout 2045, perhaps an attempt toretrieve men wounded in the earli-er attack, the Chinese mountedanother major effort early in themorning of 30 March, again strik-ing from Reno and Hill 153. Thislatest attempt to isolate OutpostVegas and destroy it also collapsedunder an avalanche of artillery andmortar shells.

Sunrise brought clearing skies,enabling Marine AU Corsairs todisrupt Chinese attempts toregroup for further assaults.Throughout the day, Marine air-men attacked troops, fortifications,and firing batteries on Reno andother hills that menaced Vegas. OnVegas, the Marines "were like rab-bits digging in," said CorporalGeorge Demars of Company F, 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, who added

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A365894

For "outstanding services performedin the line of his professional services,"Maj Joseph S. Buntin would laterreceive the Bronze Star Medal fromMajGen Randolph McC. Pate. Theaward was presented in December1953.

that the replacements "jumpedright in," as members of hastilyorganized squads worked together,even though "they didn't knowhalf the people on the fire teams."In the afternoon, Company G, 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, relievedCaptain Connolly's Company E, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, and MajorGeorge E. Kelly, operations officerof the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,replaced Major Buntin.

At about 1100 on the morning of30 March, five Chinese soldiersapproached Outpost Vegas, givingthe impression they intended tosurrender. Instead they threwgrenades and cut loose with sub-machine guns in a suicidal gestureof defiance. Marine infantrymenreturned the fire, killing three ofthe intruders outright. Anotherdied of his wounds, and the sur-vivor was taken prisoner.

During the night, Army search-lights provided illumination forMarine artillery, including the half-track-mounted .50-caliber machineguns of the 1st Provisional

By daybreak on 31 March, the men on Vegas could relax in the partially recon-structed trench works. The five-day siege involving more than 4,000 ground andair Marines was the bloodiest action Marines on the Western Front had yetengaged in.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A170454

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Marines continued to relieve the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A170436

Members of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, take time out after returning from thefierce five-day battle tbr Outpost Vegas to eat chow and take a well-deservebreather. With a touch of sarcasm, they called the disputed crest of Vegas "thehighest damn beachhead in Korea."

Antiaircraft Artillery Battery(Automatic Weapons), which tooka hand in the fighting on theground. Marine aircrews directedby Marine Corps radar made seven

Standing together at I Corps headquarters in early April are,from left, BGen John K. Waters, Chief of Staff I Corps,MajGen Bak Lim Hang, Commanding General, 1st Republicof Korea Division, MajGen M. A. R. West, CommandingGeneral, 1st Commonwealth Division, MajGen Edwin A.Pollock, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, LtGenPaul W Kendall, departing commanding general I Corps,

garrisons at their combat outposts.To prevent the enemy from

exploiting his conquest of OutpostReno, the Marines strengthenedVegas after its recapture, manningit with a company rather than aplatoon. The 1st Marine I)ivisionalso established a new outpost,Elko (named like Reno, Vegas, andCarson for a city in Nevada). Elkostood on Hill 47, southeast ofCarson and 765 yards north of themain line of resistance. During theunsuccessful attempt to breakthrough to the Reno garrison,Chinese troops had used Hill 47 toambush the rescue forces. Marinepossession of the hill improved thesecurity of Carson, Vegas, and themain line of resistance.

Outpost Vegas: Summing Up

The five-day battle that endedwith the recapture and successfuldefense of Outpost Vegas cost the

strikes against Chinese positions onthe night of the 31st, and aircraft,mortars, and artillery continued toharass the enemy on the followingday, as the 5th Marines and 1st

MajGen Bruce C. Clarke, newly appointed commandinggeneral I Corps, MajGen James C. Fry, CommandingGenera4 2d Infantry Division, MajGen Arthur G. Trudeau,Commanding General, 7th US. Infantry Division, and ColPak Ki Sung, Commander, 101st Korean Service Corps.

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC429583

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1st Marine Division 1,015 casualtiesor some 63 percent of those suf-fered by the division, including theKorean Marine regiment, duringthe entire month of March 1953.Chinese losses were estimated tohe 2,221, of whom 536 had beenactually counted. Whatever theexact toll, the Marines had crippledthe 358th Regiment of the Chinesearmy, which faced the task ofrebuilding before it could againtake the offensive.

During the loss and recapture ofVegas, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wingflew 218 missions in support of thecombat outpost line, most of themto help hold positions manned bythe 5th Marines. This total repre-sented some 63 percent of the 346close air support missions flownby the wing during March. Despiterain and snow that sometimesrestricted visibility, Marine aircraftdropped some 426 tons of bombsin support of Marines on theground, provided battlefield illumi-nation, and laid smoke screens. Inaddition, helicopters evacuated thecritically wounded.

Although Marine tanks not onlyfired some 9,000 rounds from themain line of resistance but alsoilluminated some targets usingtheir shuttered searchlights, ar-tillery proved the deadliestweapon in support of the infantry.Between 27 and 31 March, the 11thMarines, the 1st Marine Division'srocket battery, and the Armyartillery and heavy mortar unitsreinforcing their fires, deliveredalmost 105,000 rounds against tar-gets in the vicinity of Vegas,Carson, and Reno. The heaviestartillery action took place duringthe 24 hours ending at 1600, 29March, when four Marine howitzerbattalions fired 33,041 rounds andtwo Army battalions another 2,768.

The recapture of Outpost Vegasand the related fighting earnedcongratulations from the Corn-

mandant of the Marine Corps,General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.,who praised the "stubborn andheroic defense of Vegas, Reno, andCarson Hills coupled with thesuperb offensive spirit which char-acterized the several counterat-tacks." The sustained and deadlyaction earned a respite for the 5thMarines, which on 4 and 5 Aprilmoved into division reserve,replaced by the 7th Marines after68 days on line. Meanwhile, on 28March the Chinese high command,perhaps motivated to some extentby the failure to hold Vegas andcrack the Jamestown Line, advisedArmy General Mark W. Clark, theUnited Nations commander, of itswillingness to discuss an exchangeof sick and wounded prisoners ofwar.

Shuffling Marine Regiments

After the battles for Reno,Carson, and Vegas, the 5th Marineswent into division reserve. Shortlyafterward, on 14 April, ColonelHarvey C. Tschirgi took commandof the regiment, replacing ColonelLewis Walt, who was reassigned tothe division staff. The 7th Marines,under Colonel Glenn C. Funk afterhe took over from Colonel LorenE. Haffner on 27 March, replacedthe 5th Marines on 4-5 April, mov-ing from division reserve to manthe portion of the Jamestown Lineformerly held by Colonel Walt'sregiment. The 1st Marines, com-manded by Colonel Hewitt D.Adams from 1 November 1952until Colonel Wallace M. Nelsontook over on May 1, remained inplace, holding the segment of theline between the 7th Marines andthe Korean Marine regiment. Aftertruce talks resumed at Pan-munjom, the 1st Marines underColonel Adams provided a force of245 men and five armored vehiclesthat stood by to rescue the United

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Nations negotiators if the otherside should spring a trap.

As the division reserve, the 5thMarines assumed responsibility formaintaining the fallback positionsbehind the main line of resistance.One of these, the Kansas Line, hadsuffered severe structural damagefrom torrential rains and the springthaw. Its restoration required thefull-time efforts of the regiment's3d Battalion, which had to cancelits scheduled training. The 2dBattalion, however, participated ina landing exercise at Tokchok-to,an island southwest of Inchon, buthigh winds and rolling seas cutshort the training. While the 5thMarines was in reserve, its staffparticipated—together with staffofficers of the 1st Marines, theCommonwealth Division, and U.S.Army and South Korean forces—ina command post exercise stagedby I Corps.

Meanwhile, the Chinese testedthe 7th Marines. On 9 April, aftermortars and artillery battered theregiment with some 2,000 rounds,the Chinese launched an attack onCarson, followed by a series ofprobes of that outpost and nearbyElko. At 0345 on the morning ofthe 9th, some 300 Chinese,advancing in two waves, hitOutpost Carson. After an hour,some of the assault troops reachedthe trenchline and for another hourexchanged fire at point-blankrange with the defenders. A pla-toon set out at 0530 to reinforceCarson but got no farther thanElko, the newly established out-post some 400 yards southeast ofCarson, before fire from mortarsand small arms stopped the unituntil 90mm tank guns and Marinemortars broke up the ambush.Howitzers and rocket launchersjoined in, battering the approachesto Carson until the Chinese fellback.

To strengthen Carson's defenses,

Little Switch

During December 1952, when the truce talks atPanmunjom seemed to have reached a deadend, General Mark W. Clark—who in May of that

year had replaced another Army officer, GeneralMatthew B. Ridgway, in command of the United Nationsforces—took note of a suggestion by the InternationalLeague of Red Cross Societies that the combatants inKorea exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war. On22 February 1953, Clark formally proposed an immediateexchange, but, as he expected, the Chinese and NorthKoreans did not respond. On 5 March, however, thedeath of Joseph Stalin deprived the Soviet Union of aforceful dictator and the People's Republic of China of astrong ally.

In this time of transition, as Georgei Malenkovemerged from the shadows to become Stalin's successor,at least temporarily, the Chinese leadership began think-ing of Clark's proposal as an anchor to windward in a

Frontline Marines watch a US. Army ambulance convoybringing the first freed United Nations prisoners fromPanmunjom to Freedom Village. Following the long one-

gale of uncertainty. Indeed, if Malenkov or some otherruler proved less supportive than Stalin, the limitedexchange of prisoners might enable China to revive thetruce talks and perhaps bring to an end a long and thusfar inconclusive war. On 28 March, while the fight forVegas and the other outposts still raged, General Clarkreceived not only a formal Chinese acceptance of theproposal to exchange prisoners, hut also an offer toresume serious armistice negotiations at Panmunjom.

On 6 April, representatives of the two sides begantalks at Panmunjom that resulted in an agreement for theexchange, Operation Little Switch, scheduled to begin onthe 20th. To prepare for the transfer, 100 Marines fromthe 1st Engineer Battalion and the 1st Shore l'artyBattalion built the so-called Freedom Village at Munsan-ni, a tent city complete with roads, a helicopter pad, andfacilities for emergency medical treatment, administra-tion, and press coverage.

and-a-half hour trip, each Marine prisoner received amedical check and a new utility cap with us MarineCorps emblem.

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National Archives Photo (USMc) I 27-N-A170964

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-480686

Marine Pvt Alberto Pizzaro-Baez talks with MajGenEdwin A. Pollock at Freedom Village following his release.Pet Pizzaro-Baez was among the 15 Marines and threeNavy Coipsmen who had been captured from the 1stMarine Division.

When the exchange began on 20 April, Major GeneralEdwin A. Pollack, the division commander, stood by togreet the Marines among the 149 Americans released

through 26 April when Little Switch ended. The firstMarine welcomed by Major General Pollack, and by theother dignitaries that included General Clark, was PrivateAlberto Pizzaro-Baez of Company H, 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, wounded in the leg and captured at OutpostFrisco in October 1952. During his imprisonment, the legbecame gangrenous and had to be amputated. The menof the 1st Marine Division returned in Operation LittleSwitch totaled 15 Marines and three Navy hospital corps-men. Two of the Marines, Corporal Jimmie E. Lacy andPrivate First Class George F. Hart, and one of the corps-men, Hospitalman Thomas "Doc" Waddill, had beenwounded and captured when the Chinese overranOutpost Reno on the night of 26 March. The Communistforces released 684 sick and wounded captives from 11nations, more than half of them South Koreans, in returnfor 6,670 North Koreans and Chinese. The disparity innumbers may have reflected the desire of the Americansto rid themselves of dedicated and disciplinedCommunists among the prisoners like those who hadseized a prison compound at the island of Koje-clo andbriefly held the commander hostage. Little Switch did notaddress, let alone resolve, the question of the forcedrepatriation of prisoners unwilling to return when a trucefinally went into effect.

Company E, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, moved there from regi-mental reserve, more than makinggood the day's losses of 14 killedand 64 wounded. The Marinescounted 60 Chinese killed in thefighting on the early morning of 9April. Another 160 may have beenkilled or wounded, which wouldhave brought the morning's casual-ties to more than half the Chineseassault force that triggered theaction.

During the first day's fighting onthe ground, Marine aircraft ap-peared overhead after 0715, attack-ing visually or with the help ofground-based Marine radar. Bymid-afternoon, fighter-bombershad dropped more than 67 tons ofbombs on Chinese positions northof Carson. Radar-directed strikestook place after dark, and visualstrikes resumed after daylight on10 April.

As aerial action intensified,activity on the ground slowed. On

the night of the 9th, three Chineseplatoons, possibly searching forthe day's casualties, advanced as

far as the ruins of a bunker just 50yards from Outpost Carson. TheChinese activity attracted fire that

Not eveiy veteran of the 1st Marine Division was a human being. The pack horse"Reckless," shown here with her handler, took her name from the recoilless (orrec-less) rfle, like the one next to her, for which she carried ammunition. Thehorse returned to Camp Pendleton, California, with the division in 1955.

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A171729

559

division by 1953.

definitely killed 15, may havekilled 15 more, and woundedbetween seven and 27. Shortlybefore midnight, some 70 Chineseadvanced from the Ungok hills andattacked Carson, only to lose per-haps 20 additional men to Marinemortars, tank guns, and machineguns. A couple of Chinese squadsprobed Outpost Elko on the nightof the 11th, but for the most part,the enemy now contented himselfwith trying to exploit the renewalof truce talks by showering theJamestown Line with propagandaleaflets warning the Marinesagainst risking their lives because aceasefire was at hand. The Chinesereinforced the printed messagewith loudspeaker broadcasts, andon one occasion they droppedleaflets from an airplane to supple-ment those scattered from specialmortar shells.

Into I Corps Reserve

On 5 May, the Army's 25thInfantry Division, commanded byMajor General Samuel T. Williams,

and its attached Turkish brigadereplaced the 1st Marine Divisionon what had been called theJamestown Line. The practice ofnaming each separate segment ofthe line, like Jamestown, ended on28 April, after which the entire

front, from coast to coast, wasknown collectively as the mainline of resistance. At the sametime, the Eighth U.S. Army inKorea became simply the EighthU.S. Army.

While the bulk of the Marinedivision moved 15 miles eastwardover muddy roads to occupy thethree cantonment areas that com-prised Camp Casey, named inmemory of U.S. Major HughB. Casey, the 11th Marines and thedivision's rocket battery remainedattached to I Corps Artillery, inposition to provide general sup-port and fire counterhattery mis-sions as necessary. The artillerybattalion of the Korean Marinesmoved into position to reinforcethe fires of I Corps Artillery. TheMarine 1st Tank Battalion cameunder the control of the 25thInfantry Division; two companiessupported the Turkish brigade,which had no armor of its own,another was assigned to the Armydivision's 35th Infantry, and thefourth served as a reserve. TheKorean Marine tank company

National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A170606

Marine Cpl Dennis W. Burker, using a Browning automatic rifle, fires at enemypositions in front of Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines'place on the mainline of resistance. Cpl Burker wears one of the 24,000 armored vests issued the

The first contingent of the 3d Turkish Battalion begins the relief of the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines. On 5 May, the U S. Army's 25th Infantiy Division, towhich the Turkish troops were attached, took over.from the 1st Marine Division,which went into corps reserve.

Department of I)cfcnse Photo (USMC) A171351

560

Women Marines

The role of women in the Marine Corps during theKorean War was the result of a checkered series ofevents in the preceding years. When World War II

ended, there were 820 officers and 17,640 enlisted mem-bers of the Marine Corps Women's Reserve. They hadserved to "free a Marine to fight," as the recruiting sloganproclaimed.

In one tumultuous year of peacetime demobilization,the number of women reservists plummeted to a total of298 in August 1946. Simultaneously, there was skepti-cism at the highest levels in Headquarters Marine Corpsas to whether there should be any women reservists onactive duty, or, in fact, any women at all in a peacetimeMarine Corps. With other branches of the Armed Servicesretaining women, the Marine Corps finally agreed to aminimum step, it would enlist former women reservistsin its Reserve and authorize their formation intoVolunteer Training Units (January 1947).

The decisive breakthrough occurred on 12 June 1948with the passage of the Women's Armed ServicesIntegration Act. This led to women in the OrganizedReserve and, for the first time, in the Regular MarineCorps. They were now confirmed as a permanent partof a peacetime Corps, with authorization to seek 100 offi-cers, 10 warrant officers, and 1,000 enlisted women dur-ing the next two years.

To take charge of this rebirth, a superb leader wasessential. There would be endless problems and detailsin organizing this latest expansion, as well as a crucialneed for a firm but diplomatic style at HeadquartersMarine Corps. The right person emerged—Katherine A.Towle. She had been a captain in 1943 and had returnedto a college campus in 1946. General Clifton B. Cates,Commandant of the Marine Corps, asked her to return toactive duty and take charge. On 18 October 1948, shewas sworn in as Director of Women Marines with therank of colonel. It was she who would lead WomenMarines throughout the Korean War. Progress camequickly after that—commissioning of women as regulars,with their title changed from women reservists to WomenMarines.

The year 1949 saw a variety of activities, which,unknowingly, prepared women reservists and WomenMarines for the wartime demands which would erupt thefollowing year. Enlisted training began at Parris Island,South Carolina. Drawing on the Volunteer Training Units,Organized Women's Reserve platoons were activated,with 13 functioning by February 1950. At Quantico aWoman Officer Candidate Course and a Woman OfficerTraining Class were instituted, and 86, later reduced to27, appropriate military occupational specialties were tar-geted as potential for women. By March 1950, there were28 Regular Women Marine officers, 496 regular enlisted,

Marine corps Historical Center Photo Collection

The first post-World War H Women Marines arrived atQuantico, Virginia, in 1950 and were assigned to theAdministrative Section of the Landing Force Develop-ment Center. Although limited to a minute number ofoccupational fields, Women Marines numbered morethan 2, 700 by mid-1953.

18 women reserve officers, and 41 women reserve enlist-ed on active duty.

A bombshell exploded on 25 June 1950 when SouthKorea unexpectedly was invaded. Now the trials andtribulations that Marine women had experienced in thepast years would bear fruit in a time of crisis. With thebrutal strength reductions that had been forced upon itin the preceding years, the Marine Corps suddenly need-ed all the personnel—hopefully trained—that it couldscrape together. And here were the women! Their poten-tial went far beyond those on active duty and out into areservoir of civilians who would soon be joining up.

The Marine Corps immediately called up its 13

women reserve platoons, with 287 enlisted veteransgoing straight to active duty and 298 non-veterans beingsent to Parris Island. This mobilization was characterizedby President Harry S. Truman's 19 July call up of allReserves for active duty, including the Marine Corps'Organized Reserve and Volunteer Reserve.

For women, the Marine Corps had strict standards: anage limit of 18 to 31 (with 20 as the minimum for a reg-ular); single with no dependents; and a high schooldiploma or its equivalent. Within a year, the eagerresponse had brought the total number of women in theCorps to 2,065.

The flow of recruits led to a battalion of women atParris Island and a similar company at Camp Lejeune,North Carolina, and the air base at El Toro, California, byOctober 1950. There they worked five days, spent a half-

561

day on instruction in military subjects, and finished offafter their evening meal with close order drill. It was notsurprising that the vast majority of their assignments wereclerical and administrative, given the culture of the 1940sand 1950s, when many civilians, and not a few Marines,believed that a woman's place was in the home. This alsowas evidenced when family and friends would often tryto dissuade young women from enlisting. And then therewere some Marines who made life difficult for thewomen who did join up.

This narrow limitation of assignments for womenresulted in their being untrained for billets that neededthem, as well as strange anomalies such as a woman pri-vate first class filling a master sergeant's billet.

Colonel Towle, alert as always, wrote a pithy memo-randum to the powers at Headquarters Marine Corps inJanuary 1951. She stated unequivocally that Marine Corpspolicies for women were "unrealistic and short-sighted, aswell as uneconomical." Thus, there was an urgent need,she continued for a "systematic, long-range training[plan]."

As the number of women grew, so did the range oftheir activities. At their assigned bases, they organizedathletic teams and had a variety of off-duty interests.There was also a modest expansion of duties, with somewomen now in billets for motor transport, recruiting,photography, air traffic control, public affairs, and basenewspapers. A few even made it to duty in Italy andGermany.

With the increase in active duty billets, womenreservists with minor-age children were released while, atthe same time, applications for active duty rose.

In January 1952, women reserve platoons werereestablished and by the end of the year totaled 14. Inaddition to basic military subjects, they received individ-ualized training in one of five occupational specialties:administration, supply, classification, disbursing, andcommunications. Besides regular "drill nights" thesewomen reservists had a two-week summer training peri-od.

In spite of these expanded roles for women in theCorps, billets for officers were still limited to 10 occupa-tional specialties in April 1952. Nevertheless, by May,

there were Women Marine companies at Cherry Point,Camp Pendleton, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Norfolk, SanDiego, and Quantico, with Kaneohe Bay added in 1953.

The year 1953 saw the establishment at Camp Lejeuneof a Staff Noncommissioned Officer Leadership Schoolfor women. Military occupational specialties available toofficers were expanded in March. Three more womenreserve platoons had been formed by April.

There was a change of command on 1 May 1953.Colonel Towle had reached the statutory age limit of 55for colonels, and she had to retire. She had been a superbleader, and a Letter of Commendation from theCommandant and an award of a Legion of Merit medalrecognized her achievements.

Her successor as Director of Women Marines wasLieutenant Colonel Julia E. Hamblet. She was a graduateof the first training class for women officers in 1943, andwas only 37 years old when, after a wide variety of activeduty, she was promoted to colonel in her new assign-ment.

When she took office, the Korean War was windingdown. June 1953 saw a total of 160 women officers and2,502 enlisted. Then, on 27 July, the war was over.

As one author summed up these years:

The Korean War era witnessed a brief, temporarysurge of interest in WMs [Women Marines] on theCorps' part, but it did not result in major, long-termchanges in either the women's standing within theCorps or in the duties they were assigned. In thewake of the war their numbers began to decrease,the sense of urgency that surrounded their reduxsubsided, and WM-related issues were shelvedindefinitely. The ambivalence the Corps felt aboutwomen in the ranks never really disappeared, evenwhen the war was on the WMs were sorely need-ed.

Besides these institutional evaluations, there wasanother vital factor to record, the impact that duty in theCorps had on these women. Their later comments werenearly unanimous: "The best years of my life."

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

remained in its former sector,although now under control of ICorps.

The tanks on the main line ofresistance occupied fixed posi-tions, functioning mostly asartillery; they shifted as necessaryto alternate sites to preventChinese gunners from zeroing inon them. The Army division pro-vided armored personnel carriers

to haul food, water, fuel, andammunition to the tanks. The pres-ence of Marine armor at the frontprovided a bonus in addition tofirepower, for when Chineseartillery ripped up telephone wiresleading to the rear, the tank radiosensured reliable communications.

While in reserve, the 1st MarineDivision added depth to the I

Corps positions by standing ready

562

to counterattack after occupyingany of the back-up lines—like theformer Wyoming and Kansas—behind the four divisions manningthe main line of resistance: the25th Infantry Division; theCommonwealth Division; the 1stRepublic of Korea Division; andthe 7th Infantry Division. In addi-tion, the Marines made improve-ments to Camp Casey, repaired the

Department of Defense (USMC) A171330

Marines of Company H, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, set up their tents after mov-ing from the frontlines into corps reserve in the central area of the Casey com-plex. Although the division had been on line for more than 20 months, there wasa reluctance to turn over positions.

back-up positions, especially theformer Kansas Line which hadbeen severely damaged by rainsand the spring thaw, and em-barked on a program of instructionthat emphasized night combat andbegan with the individual andsmall unit. The larger-unit exercis-es included the use of helicoptersin conjunction with a rifle compa-ny, proceeded to regimental land-ing exercises, and culminated in afield exercise. All of this training,which had to be somewhat cur-tailed, was to take place before thedivision returned to the main lineof resistance in early July.

Although the spring weatherthat had damaged the old KansasLine also turned roads to rivers ofmud, the division completed itsmove to Camp Casey andlaunched the programs of trainingand rebuilding. The 5th Marines,the reserve regiment when thedivision moved off line, under-

went a week of training for anamphibious exercise held atYongjong-ni, on the west coastnear Kunsan. Dense fog forcedcancellation of a planned rehearsalthat might have highlighted theimpact of a shallow beach gradientthat grounded landing craft farfrom shore and complicated thelanding of vehicles.

While Colonel Tschirgi's regi-ment was carrying Out this exer-cise, other elements of the divisiontook part in a combined commandpost exercise and firing exercisedesigned to help the division pre-pare for an Eighth Army exercise,then scheduled for the end of Maybut later canceled. The 7thMarines landed at the Yongjong-nitraining area on 5 June, employinga 144-foot pontoon bridge, sup-plied by the Army, to speed themovement of vehicles over theshallow-sloping beach. However,the possible need for amphibious

Members of the 81mm mortar platoon, Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, receive refresher instruction on the parts and nomenclature of the81mm mortar during the eight-week reserve period. Lectures such as this werekept to a minimum with at least 50 percent of the tactical training conducted atnight.

Department of Defense (USMC) A171518

563

A ew Commanding General

O n 1:; Jun 19:;3, lajor neral Randolph Ie allPate t ok command of the 1'it ~Iarine Di\ision.replacing ~ lajor eneral Ed,,'in ,Polla k, \" ho

h cam director of the "Irinc orps Edu ational enter,uantic ,Virginia, nati\'e of :outh Car lina \\ h sp nt

his boyho d in Virginia. General Pate's milital) 'are'rhegan in 191H. the final "ar of World 'X'ar I. \\ hen heenlisted in th' rmy. sen ing long enough to qualif~ forthe \'ictol)' "vledalthough he did not fight in France. ftergraduating from the "irginia \.-'ilitary Institute in .June192 I. he accepted in ::, ptemher of that 'ear a commis­sion as a se 'ond lieutenant in th ~ brine orps Resen'e.Ik 1'1.' 'ei\cd a r ~gular commis... ion in l\la 1922. after­ward carrying out a \'ariet' of assignments in theDomini 'an Republic and hina. as well as at pos\<, in thecontin ~ntal L'nited < tall's and Ilawaii.

During \1 orld '.: ar n. Jeneral Pate sef\ed a... .,upplyofficer on th 'ita 1'1' of th' 1st Marine Division at

uadal anal, wher he was wounded, and held oth r,vamme staff p sition. After Japan' ...urrender, heI ecame Direuor of Re:ene at \Iarine orrs headquar­ter. , sen ed on the 'a\'y' Jeneral Board, and held thea. signm 'nt of hief of ::'raIT. ;\Iarine orr.... <:hoob.

uantico. Virginia. While at ~Iarine orp:. 'hools. heachie\ ed promotion to brigadier general in 1919 andduring d1e following year took 0\ er a., Director. ~Iarin

orp... Educational enter at Quantico.After ,In a~..,ignment "ith the ffice f Joint hiefs of

< taff as the Joint taff's Director ~ r Logistic.... en ralPate r turn I t larine orps headquarters and in

ugu. t 19')2 was promoted to maj r gen ral. while s n,­ing his 'econd t ur dire ting the Marine orp. Resene.In September I' that year, he as. umed command of rhe2d Marine Division at amp Lejeune. 'nh arolina.

ft 'r laking 0\ r the 1st Marin' I ivision in .June 19')3. hcommanded the unit for the r 'mainder or the Koreanfighting, finally llIrning the di\ ision O\er to lajor

eneral Rohen II. Pepp r in \.-Iay 19:;'LL'pon I ~a\'ing Korea. eneral Pate became ...siswnt

,ommandant of the ~Iarine orp... and hief of • taff.advancing to the rank of lieutenant gen ral. n 1.I. nual)' 19'16. he re 'ei\'(;~d a founh star and b 'came

ommandant I' tll Ivlarine orp"', sue eeding GeneralLemuel .• hepherd. Jr. eneral Pale ...ened as

ommandant for four years, during r;vhich the !\Iarine

1'o,IlIlJn;t1 \rlhIH'., PholO ([·... \le> I T-'\-A ,-n.wMajeell Randolph ,lie '. Pale. leji, reliel'e:; MajCell RtILl'i1lA. Pollock in culllll1{lI1d 1?!'lbe lsI .llan'lIe Diz'isioll. 71.1edeparlillg Pollock Il'as />resenled Ibe Dislill!!.lIisbed'erl'ice Medalfor bis "OIlISlm7din!!. slIccess ill Ibe defense

ofCm:oll, I ega" (II/{I Blko."

orps mo\'(.:d away from the tren ·he.... and hunkers andreestabli::.hed it elf as a highly mobile amphibious forccin rcadiness. Foilim ing four years as ommandant, heretired in De 'ember 19:;9 \\ ith the rank of general.

Follo\\ing a hrief dlne.,s, eneral Pate died in 1961.lJ1d was interred \\ ith full milital) honor., in Arlington

ational emeter)', PatL'" milital) c >lIeagues descrihedhim as: "A man of deep ... incerit)' and untiring integrit "\\ ho is thoughtful and con.,id rate of others-a tru ' gen­tleman of the old .,(hool.·'

shipping to repatriate prisoners ofwar in the event of a truce causedthe cancellation of a landing exer­cise scheduled for the 1st Marinesbetween 14 and 23 June.

Marine aircraft participated inthe training program conducted

while the division formed the ICorps reserve. Fighter-bomberscovered the landing exercises, forexample, and helicopters of HMR­161 landed at Camp Casey for apractice redeployment of two sec­tions of 4.5-inch rocket launchers

564

from the division's rocket battelY,along with infantry from the 5thMarines.

The principal mission of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing, although ittook part in the training program,remained the support of United

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A169791While the division was in corps reserve in May and June, the main line of resistance, as it had in March when the1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery supported units manning the Marines were fighting to hold Reno, Vegas, and Carson.

Nations ground forces by day andby night. The crews of Marinenight fighters, Grumman F7FTigercats and Douglas F3D Sky-knights, learned to take deadlyadvantage of beams from search-lights along the main line of resis-tance that illuminated terrain fea-tures held by the Chinese, bathingin light those on the near slopeand creating an artificial horizonfor air strikes against those on theshadowed slope farther fromUnited Nations lines. Artillery, fir-ing time-on-target or variable-timeconcentrations, blanketed knownChinese antiaircraft batteries with-in 2,500 yards of a target. At first,this kind of bombardment, usual-ly lasting about three minutes,

effectively silenced the hostilegunners, hut with repetition thetechnique declined in effective-ness, serving to alert the Chinesethat an air strike was imminent.Besides providing close air sup-port for the ground forces, Marinenight fighters escorted Air ForceB-29s on missions against NorthKorea and flew long-range inter-diction.

On the Main Line of Resistance

While infantry, service, andsome support elements of the 1stMarine Division repaired the posi-tions that added depth to the I

Corps front and underwent train-ing to the rear, the Chinese exert-

565

ed renewed pressure on the por-tion of the main line of resistancethat the Marines had formerlyheld. The enemy struck first at theoutposts now held by the Turkishbrigade—Berlin and East Berlin,Carson, Elko, and Vegas. Shortlybefore 0200 on 15 May, advancingbehind deadly mortar and artilleryfire, one Chinese battalionattacked Berlin and East Berlin,while another hit the Carson-Elko-Vegas complex. The Turks heldtheir ground, thanks in part toaccurate fire from Marine tanks onthe main line of resistance, whichmay have inflicted 300 casualties,and from the 11th Marines and therocket battery, which fired some5,500 105mm and 155mm how-

Events at Panmunjom

The fighting along the combat outpost line, whichcaused the commanding general of I Corps to shiftthe 1st Marines into position for a possible coun-

terattack, coincided with resolution of the lingering issueof forced repatriation. By the end of May 1953, theUnited States was insisting that there be no forced repa-triation, as had happened in Europe after World War IIwhen American troops handed over refugees and pris-oners of war to Soviet authorities, the representatives ofa wartime ally. The alliance that defeated Hitler'sGermany soon collapsed, and the Soviet Union emergedas America's principal antagonist in a Cold War that burstinto flame in Korea. China and the Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea, at first indifferent to the issue, hadcome to insist on forced repatriation upon realizing howmany of their captured soldiers might prefer to remain inSouth Korea.

In short, both sides faced possible embarrassment.American acceptance of involuntary repatriation wouldseem a repetition of the transfers of both captives andcivilians to Soviet control in the aftermath of World War

After a high wind blew down the tents in August 1952,the Communist built a more substantial wooden struc-ture for the armistice meetings atPanmunjom. The white

566

II. Widespread refusals to return to China or North Koreawould shatter the image of a Communist paradise andlend substance to Western propaganda.

On 25 May, Lieutenant General William K. Harrison ofthe Army, the senior American delegate at thePanmunjom negotiations, persuaded the Communist sideto agree to a closed session. The absence of press cov-erage, Harrison believed, would prevent posturingdesigned to influence world opinion and instead focusthe attention of the delegates on progress toward a set-tlement. At this meeting, Harrison declared that therecould be no forced repatriation and then offered com-promises to make this principle palatable to the Chineseand North Koreans.

The United Nations forces would neither force cap-tured Communist troops to return to their homeland norsimply release them. Harrison proposed instead that sol-diers who refused repatriation be turned over, as theCommunist delegates desired, to a Neutral NationsRepatriation Committee with representatives of five so-called neutral states—Switzerland and Sweden, with ide-

tent on the left is the Communist delegates' tenl while thetwo dark ones on the right are the United Nations dele-gates' tent and press tent.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-482368

ological ties to the West; Poland and Czechoslovakia,Soviet satellites at the time; and India, which followed anoften erratic political course determined largely by itsown self-interest. To minimize friction among the neutralnations—Poland and Czechoslovakia against Swedenand Switzerland—Indian troops would assume custodyof all newly released prisoners seeking asylum.

The Communist side, troubled by the prospect ofmass defections, insisted on an opportunity to persuadeits soldiers who refused repatriation to change theirminds and return. The United Nations, however, fearedthat persuasion would give way to coercion, and, as aresult, Harrison's compromise specifically forbade thethreat or use of force and limited the time allotted for re-indoctrination to 90 days. Those prisoners who persisted

in refusing repatriation would then be turned over to thecontrol of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Communist negotiators demanded certainchanges. They called for an additional 30 days for re-education and the elimination of the United NationsGeneral Assembly from the repatriation process, sincethe international organization, as a belligerent, could notserve as a disinterested guardian of the rights of Chineseor North Korean prisoners. On 4 June, however, theCommunist parties accepted the principle of voluntaryrepatriation, although without formally endorsing it, inreturn for the additional 30 days of persuasion and thesubstitution of India's Red Cross organization for theGeneral Assembly as custodian of those prisoners whorefused to return to their homelands.

witzer shells and 4.5-inch rocketsduring four hours of fighting. Inaddition, the 1st Marine AircraftWing flew 21 strikes againstChinese positions threatening theTurkish troops.

Neither the successful Turkishresistance nor the continuing talksat Panmunjom—where negotiatorswere addressing both the issue ofrepatriation and South Korean con-cerns that a truce could place theircountry at a fatal disadvantage—dissuaded the Chinese from inten-sifying their offensive. On 25 May,despite signs of real progress in thetruce talks, Chinese gunnersresumed pounding the Turkishbrigade, and three days later, theenemy launched a series of attacksalong much of the combat outpostline held by I Corps. At 1800 on 28May, the enemy's 120th Divisionlaunched simultaneous attacksagainst Combat Outpost 2, to theeast of the Panmunjom Corridor,on Carson, Elko, and Reno, Berlinand East Berlin, and against theHook and its two outposts, Ronsonand Warsaw, these last three heldby the British 1st CommonwealthDivision.

The major thrusts by the Chinesedivision sent a battalion, advancingbehind a mortar and artillery bar-rage, against Outposts Carson andElko, while another battalion took

advantage of a smoke screen tostorm Vegas, and a third menacedBerlin and East Berlin. At the sametime, still other Chinese troopsattacked Combat Outpost 2, on theleft of the 25th Infantry Division'ssector, and the Hook, along withOutposts Ronson and Warsaw, onthe right of the I Corps line.

The 11th Marines, commandedby Colonel James E. Mills—whohad taken over from Colonel HarryN. Shea on 22 February 1953—fired some 9,500 rounds during thenight of 28 May, and Marine air-craft flew eight strikes againstChinese artillery positions. TheMarine division's 4.5-inch rocketbattery, now firing from the vicini-ty of the Hook, supported theCommonwealth Division. Marinetanks, dug-in along the main lineof resistance, provided deadly firefrom prepared positions, especiallyin the sector of the Turkishbrigade.

The deluge of shells and rocketsfrom Marine weapons helped the35th Infantry Regiment holdCombat Outpost 2 and theCommonwealth Division to main-tain its grip on the Hook, Warsaw,and Ronson. The Chinese, howev-er, succeeded in capturing Carson,although Turkish troops clungstubbornly to Elko and Vegas. Thethreat to Berlin and East Berlin

567

abated swiftly, suggesting that theenemy launched the probe todivert attention from the adjacentCarson-Elko-Vegas complex.

Marine air, artillery, and armorcontinued to support I Corps as thefighting entered a second day.Attack planes and fighter-bombershit Chinese troops, artillery posi-tions, and supply points by dayand night. Additional tanks movedinto prepared positions on themain line of resistance until 33 ofthem supported the Turkishbrigade. After Chinese counterbat-tety fire silenced six Turkish how-itzers, the 2d Battalion, 11thMarines, took over the direct-firemission. By dusk on 29 May, thetotal rounds fired by Marine how-itzers and rocket launchers indefense of the outposts exceeded40,000.

This intense fire, and the tenaci-ty of the Turkish soldiers who suf-fered 150 killed and 245 wounded,could not save the Carson-Elko-Vegas complex. By mid-day,Lieutenant General Bruce C.

Clarke, the corps commander, andGeneral Williams, in command ofthe 25th Infantry Division, decidedto withdraw from these outposts atleast temporarily. Carson had fallento the Chinese on the previousday, and fewer than 40 survivorscontinued to resist on Vegas. Since

Elko could not survive if theenemy held both Vegas andCarson, the Turkish troops with-drew to the main line of resistance.By the time the withdrawal tookplace, the attacking Chinese hadlost perhaps 3,000 men butshowed no signs of breaking offthe action.

In the meantime, General Clarkehad ordered the 1st Marines to pre-pare for a possible counterattack.The regiment's infantry battalionsand antitank and heavy mortarcompanies moved into positionjust south of the refurbisheddefenses of the old Kansas Line. Inaddition, the 1st Marine Division'sreconnaissance company cameunder control of the 25th InfantryDivision, replacing a company ofthat division's 14th Infantry inreserve along the east bank of theIrnjin River.

The projected counterattacknever occurred. Torrential rains on30 May frustrated any ambitionsthe enemy may have had for tryingto crack the main line of resistance.

Moreover, a truce agreement thatseemed on the verge of acceptancedissuaded the United NationsCommand from making the obvi-ously costly effort to recaptureCarson, Vegas, and Elko.

The Truce in Jeopardy

After the bitter fighting on theoutpost line at the end of May, alull ensued on the I Corps front.The Chinese, however, did notabandon their attempt to improvetheir military position before atruce should go into effect andlunged instead at the South KoreanII Corps, opposite the enemy-heldtown of Kumsong, attacking on 10June and in six days of fightingforcing the defenders to pull backsome 4,000 yards. A second blowdrove the South Korean 20thDivision back from the northernrim of the Punchbowl. By the timethe fighting died down after 18June, the South Koreans had suf-fered some 7,300 casualties, per-haps 600 more than the Chinese

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attackers. The enemy, moreover,had pushed the South Koreansback as far as 4,000 yards on seg-ments of the frontlines totalingabout 15,000 yards in width. Theoffensive of mid-June proved themost successful Chinese thrustsince April and May 1951 when theenemy penetrated as deeply as 30miles at some points along theUnited Nations line.

Even as the negotiators atPanmunjom were resolving theoutstanding issues concerning therepatriation of prisoners, SyngmanRhee, the president of the Repub-lic of Korea, became increasinglyconcerned about the impact of aceasefire on the survival of hisnation. His dream of one Koreaunified under the government atSeoul was rapidly vanishing. Hehad little direct leverage on theChinese government; his onlyhope—a slim one, indeed—wassomehow to prod his war-wearyAmerican ally into turning its backon the Panmunjom negotiationsand exerting renewed pressure onthe battlefield. To achieve thisunlikely end, President Rheethreatened to pull South Koreanforces out of the United NationsCommand. The threat, howeverunrealistic, brought a formalAmerican offer to build up theSouth Korean armed forces andrestore the nation's shattered econ-omy, provided that the Seoul gov-ernment accepted the settlementthat was taking shape. Despite hisweak bargaining position, theSouth Korean president ignoredthe offer and demanded theremoval of Chinese forces from theKorean peninsula, along with aformal military alliance with theUnited States, the recently offeredprogram of military and economicaid, and the stationing of Americanair and naval forces in SouthKorea.

When progress continued

National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A172204

On 29 May, Col Wallace M. Nelson's 1st Marines move up on foot in full gear toset up a hasty blocking position on the Kansas Line in case of a breakthrough byCommunist forces during their attack on 25th Infantry Division outposts.

The Offshore Islands

American Marines continued to provide essentialhelp in defending the islands off the east andwest coasts of the Korean peninsula that were

garrisoned by their South Korean counterparts. The twodefensive organizations, formerly the East Coast andWest Coast Island Defense Commands, were redesignat-ed task units effective 1 January 1953. The 2d KoreanMarine Corps Regiment furnished the troops thatmanned these outposts under the direction of U.S.Marines.

Two battalions of South Korean Marines manned theWest Coast Island Defense Task Unit, while the U.S.Marine Corps contributed some 17 officers and 100enlisted men. The western task unit manned outposts onsix islands in close proximity to the 38th Parallel, whichhad separated prewar South Korea from the CommunistNorth. These islands, from north to south, were Sok-to,Cho-do, Paengyong-do, Taechong-do, Yongpyong-do,and Tokchok-to. An earlier attempt to occupy tiny Ho-dohad ended in failure when the Chinese overwhelmed thegarrison. The six surviving outposts served as bases forartillery, intelligence collection, the direction of guerrillaoperations in North Korea, and training. At some of the

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-480993

Two members of the 1st Air and Naval Gunfire LiaisonCompany spot and correct gunfire laid down againstCommunist troops by the Dutch frigate Johann Mauritsvan Nassau.

outposts, the South Koreans used their old-model radiosto call down fire from artillery or naval guns against hos-tile batteries on the mainland. American Marines direct-ed all this activity, although the language barrier ham-pered their role in training.

Late in 1952, Communist artillery batteries on thepeninsula opened fire more frequently against UnitedNations warships as well as the western island outposts.For counterbattery missions from Cho-do, two 90mmguns supporting a force of South Korean guerrillas wereshifted there from the island of Kanghwa-do at themouth of the Han River. Enemy light aircraft contributedto the increased pressure on the islands, conducting nui-sance raids against Cho-do, bombed as recently asOctober 1952, Sok-to, and Paengyong-do.

Besides using the two artillery pieces available at Cho-do, the guerrillas provided valuable information onenemy activity. The South Koreans reported an increas-ing number of Chinese junks offshore and identifiedmajor military units on the peninsula itself. As the threatof an assault against one or more of the western islandsintensified, counterbattery fire from the outposts keptpace, only diminishing when the threat ebbed.

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From time to time, American or British pilots, low onfuel or flying damaged aircraft, landed on the beach atPaengyong-do. Unfortunately, obtaining the needed fuelor aircraft parts proved difficult because of tangled andunresponsive lines of supply. Logistics difficulties alsoposed a threat to the large number of refugees that hadfound asylum during 1952 on the islands protected bythe western task unit. As winter approached, concernmounted that they could not be fed by air or sea andwould not survive the cold, but two supply-laden tanklanding ships arrived before the seasonal storms beganand eased the crisis.

By the spring of 1953, improving prospects for aceasefire generally along the 38th Parallel raised doubtsabout the future control of two west-coast islands, Cho-do and Sok-to, which lay north of the demarcation line.Colonel Harry N. Shea, the task unit commander and hissuccessor, Colonel Alexander B. Swenceski, carried outOperation Pandora, a plan for the evacuation of bothislands. Artillery on Sok-to and Cho-do—each of whichnow had its own pair of 90mm guns—pounded enemybatteries along the coast, and warships joined in, includ-ing the battleship New Jersey (BB 62) with its 16-inchguns. Despite the avalanche of American firepower, theenemy stuck to his guns, firing some 1,800 rounds inJune alone. By the end of June, Operation Pandorabegan the successful withdrawal first of the guerrillas andtheir families and then of the two island garrisons.

Whereas only two of the islands manned by the west-ern task unit were located north of the 38th Parallel, themost important of those garrisoned by the East CoastIsland Defense Unit—Tae-do, So-do, Sin-do, Mod-do,Ung-do, Hwangto-do, and Yo-do—lay just off the NorthKorean port of Wonsan, more than 100 miles north of thedemarcation between the two Koreas. The unit also boreresponsibility for two other potentially vulnerable out-posts: Yang-do, off the town of Songjin, 150 miles north-east of Wonsan; and Nan-do, near the North Koreantown of Kojo, some 40 miles south of Wonsan. A total of1,270 South Korean Marines, 35 U.S. Marines, and 15American sailors manned the defense unit. The individ-ual garrisons varied from 300 at Yo-do, the largest of theisland outposts and the site of unit headquarters and anairstrip, to the compact naval-gunfire spotting teams onthe smallest of the islets off Wonsan.

Like the western islands, those off the east coast—especially the ones nearest Wonsan—endured frequentshelling from batteries on the peninsula. BecauseWonsan had been a major port, the ability of the UnitedNations forces to blockade it served as an affront to theChinese and North Koreans, as well as a disruption oftheir coastal supply line. Besides hammering the offshoreoutposts, hostile gunners fired upon United Nations war-ships, as they had off the opposite coast. At Wonsan,however, the enemy employed a more efficient fire-con-

trol technique than in the west. When United Nationsgun crews on the eastern islands, or warships nearby,fired counterbattery missions against an enemy weapon,it fell silent and other artillery pieces took over the firemission.

When winter gripped the east coast islands, tempera-tures dropped to 10 degrees below zero, Fahrenheit, andhigh winds disrupted the movement of supply ships. TheYo-do garrison, for example, survived on canned rationsfor a week, and for several days the defenders ofHwangto-do drank water from melted snow. When theweather improved, so did the determination of Chineseartillerymen, who fired more than 1,050 rounds againstthe island outposts in April 1953 and twice that numberagainst blockading warships. In addition, United Nationssailors sighted 37 floating magnetic mines that month,although the devices caused no damage. This was thegreatest number of sightings in any month since the pre-vious summer, when mines sank the tug Sarsi (AT 111)off Hungnam and damaged the destroyer Barton (DD722) off Wonsan.

As pressure mounted against the islands near Wonsan,Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, increased the size of its con-tingents at these outposts by some 40 percent, addingnine Marine officers and 44 enlisted Marines and sailors.A new unit commander arrived in the spring of 1953.After a year in charge, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D.Heinl, Jr., entrusted the organization to LieutenantColonel Hoyt U. Bookhart, Jr.

Scarcely had this change of command taken place,when preparations began for a withdrawal from the east-ern islands after the signing of an armistice. On 11 June,the unit began retrenching by removing South Koreanvillagers, along with guerrillas and their families, fromYang-do, the farthest north and least defensible of theoutposts, and withdrawing noncombatants from Yo-do,the site of the unit headquarters. Withdrawal of the othereast coast outposts awaited the signing of the armistice.

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toward a truce that he considereddisastrous, President Rhee soughtto disrupt the negotiations. On 18June, he ordered the release ofsome 27,000 Communist prisonerswho had refused repatriation, hop-ing to undo what the negotiatorshad accomplished in resolving theissue of repatriation. His gambitfailed. The People's Republic ofChina launched additional limitedattacks, perhaps in retaliation, butthe government in Peiping hadgrown too weary of the long andbloody war to mount an all-outoffensive. Similarly, the UnitedStates remained determined to endthe Korean fighting, regardless ofRhee's objections. As an Americanspecial diplomatic mission madeclear, South Korea could expect nomore than a security treaty withthe United States and a combina-tion of military and economic aidthat would include the presence ofAmerican troops.

On 24 June, six days afterPresident Rhee tried to sabotagethe truce negotiations, Chinesetroops attacked the sector held bythe South Korean II Corps, focus-ing on the South Korean 9thDivision, which blunted the thrustafter the loss of an outpost. On thefollowing day, the enemy hit theSouth Korean 1st Division, to theright of the CommonwealthDivision dug in at the easternboundary of the sector held byGeneral Clarke's I Corps. Despitefierce resistance, the Chinese over-whelmed three outposts mannedby the South Korean 1st Division.Efforts to regain the lost groundhalted on the 29th when GeneralClarke ended a series of gallant butunsuccessful counterattacks, re-peating the decision made amonth earlier during the fightingfor Outposts Carson and Vegaselsewhere on the I Corps front thatthe cost in lives would be prohibi-tive.

As it had during the battles oflate May, 1st Marine Division's the4.5-inch rocket battery deployedeastward at the end of June to sup-port the hard-pressed SouthKoreans dug in to the right of theI Corps line. The battery shiftedabout 20 miles closer to the actionand fired some 25 missions thathelped prevent a Chinese break-through. So grave was the threaton the right that General Clarkealerted the 7th Marines to stand byto reinforce the South Korean 1stDivision, even though Eighth Armypolicy forbade American unitsfrom serving under South Koreancommand. The crisis abated, how-ever, and the alert of the Marineregiment was canceled within 24hours. The 1st Regimental CombatTeam (less one battalion) of theKorean Marine Corps took overfrom the 7th Marines and relievedbloodied elements of the SouthKorean 1st Division.

Marine aviation took part in thefighting during June. Between the

14th and the 17th, when theChinese made their greatest gainssince 1951, American aircraft flew8,359 sorties, 1,156 of them byMarines. The air war again intensi-fied when the Chinese renewedtheir attacks. On the last day ofJune, for example, Marine airmenflew 301 sorties, which included 28percent of the day's close air sup-port and 24 percent of the inter-diction missions.

Marines Return to the Bunkers

The abandonment of the leastdefensible of the offshore outpoststook place as President Rhee wasattempting to wrest stronger guar-antees of future aid from hisAmerican ally, and time wasapproaching for the return of the1st Marine Division to the front-line. The release of some 27,000captured North Korean or Chineseprisoners of war, who sought toremain in the Republic of Korea,and escape attempts by still others,

A .50-caliber machine gun covers the field of fire across the Han River on theKimpo Peninsula. Marines firing the weapon were members of the 1stAmphibian Tractor Battalion, which manned bunkers overlooking the river, andin mid-June had to deploy Company A to Ascom City to maintain order amongthe Chinese and North Korean prisoners.

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A170806

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had an impact on the Marines in ICorps reserve. The 1st AmphibianTractor Battalion, for example, hadto deploy one company to a pris-oner of war compound at AscomCity to maintain order after escapeattempts there.

By releasing the prisoners ofwar, the South Korean presidentcaused a temporary suspension ofthe truce negotiations and per-suaded the United States to agreeformally to a mutual defensearrangement that maintainedAmerican forces in South Koreaand provided economic and mili-tary aid. Since both the People'sRepublic of China and the UnitedStates were ready to end the fight-ing, the talks resumed atPanmunjom, where the delega-tions tried to obtain whateveradvantage they could, althoughwithout sabotaging prospects for aceasefire.

During the latter part of June,the 1st Marine Division completedits training and prepared to resumebunker warfare. The major ele-ments that had been in reservereturned to the segment of themain line of resistance that thedivision formerly held, relievingthe Army's 25th Infantry Division.By dawn 7 July, the 7th Marinestook over on the right of the divi-sion's line and the 5th Marines onthe left, while the 1st Marinesformed the division reserve, pro-tecting the bridges across the ImjinRiver and the Marine radar used todirect air strikes.

The tactical situation hadchanged for the worse since theMarines last occupied this sector.Chinese troops now controlled thethree outposts—Carson, Vegas,and Elko—that blocked the bestapproach to Combat OutpostsBerlin and East Berlin, now beingtaken over by the 7th Marines. AsGeneral Pate, the division's com-mander, immediately realized:

"The loss of Outpost Ve-gas.. placed Berlin and East Berlinin very precarious positions andnegated their being supported byground fire except from the MLR."

The Chinese tried to take advan-tage of any confusion resultingfrom the relief of the Army divi-sion by General Pate's Marines. Onthe evening of 7 July, Chinesemortars opened fire uponOutposts Berlin and East Berlinand the nearby portion of the mainline of resistance, the area thatLieutenant Colonel AlexanderCereghino's 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, was taking over fromTurkish soldiers attached to the25th Infantry Division. By mid-night, assault troops from theChinese 40 7th Regiment, 136thDivision, advanced from the vicin-ity of Hill 190, a frequently usedstaging area, then moved along theridgeline broken by Carson, Reno,and Vegas—all of them now inenemy hands—and pounced onBerlin and East Berlin.

At Berlin, Turkish soldiersstayed in place for a time after theMarines arrived, and a patrol dis-patched from Lieutenant ColonelCereghino's battalion to set up anambush got no farther than theoutpost when the enemy struck.The remaining Turks and thenewly arrived patrol reinforced theMarines manning Berlin. Higherheadquarters soon lost contactwith both Berlin and the otherembattled outpost.

Because Berlin and East Berlinlay no more than 325 yards fromthe main line of resistance, theircapture could provide the enemywith a springboard for an attackdesigned to shatter the maindefenses. As a result, Cereghinoorganized a provisional platoonfrom members of his battalionheadquarters and sent the unit toreinforce the main line of resis-tance. Elements of Companies H

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and I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,came under Cereghino's opera-tional control and prepared tocounterattack if the enemy shouldbreak through.

Meanwhile, the mixed force ofMarines and Turkish soldiers suc-ceeded in clinging to OutpostBerlin. The Marines at East Berlinsuccumbed, however, to an over-whelming force that surged up asteep slope and seized the maintrench despite stubborn resistancefrom the outpost itself and accu-rate fire from the main line ofresistance and beyond. Supportingmachine guns, mortars, andartillery—deadly though theywere—could not save East Berlin.

A squad from Company F, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, unsuccess-fully counterattacked Outpost EastBerlin at 0415 on 8 July, dispens-ing with the usual artillery barragein the hope of achieving surprise.A second force of Marines fromCompany F moved out at about0440 to reinforce the squadalready committed to attackingEast Berlin. Chinese artillerycaught the reinforcements in theopen and wounded 15 Marines,but the attempted counterattackcontinued for another hour untilthe men of Company F receivedorders to fall back so the 11thMarines could fire a time-on-targetconcentration against the enemy-held outpost.

The Chinese who overran EastBerlin had advanced by way ofReno and Vegas, where additionalforces were now gathering toexploit this early success. The 1st4.5-inch Rocket Battery hammeredthe assembly areas and also theChinese attacking Berlin and con-solidating their hold on EastBerlin. Artillerymen of the 2dBattalion, 11th Marines, fired atime-on-target concentration thatshattered an enemy company as itwas organizing on captured

Outpost Vegas to continue theattack. I)uring the early morning'sfighting, all four battalions of the11th Marines took part in the firing,along with the seven U.S. Armyand Turkish artillery battalions stillin the area until the relief of the25th Infantry Division was com-pleted. These weapons matchedtheir Chinese counterparts almostround for round, and Army andMarine Corps tanks joined therocket battery and artillery battal-ions in battering the Chinese.

Despite the savage fighting thaterupted at Outposts Berlin andEast Berlin on the night of 7-8 July,the Marines succeeded in takingover from the 25th InfantryDivision and its Turkish compo-nent. The 5th Marines and 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, effected asmooth transition, but Lieutenant

Colonel Cereghino's 2d Battalion,7th Marines, had to fight at Berlinand East Berlin. Not until 0630 didCereghino obtain confirmation thatEast Berlin had fallen, and shortlyafterward he learned that Berlin,some 300 yards west of the cap-tured outpost, still survived. Hepromptly reinforced Berlin insofaras its compact size permitted, dis-patching 18 additional Marines androughly doubling the number ofthe outpost's American andTurkish defenders.

To recapture East Berlin wouldrequire a strong force of infantrysupported by intense fire frommortars, tanks, and artillery. At1000, taking advantage of anartillery and mortar barrage totalingperhaps 1,600 rounds, a reinforcedplatoon from Company G, 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, and another

from that battalion's Company H—both companies now underCereghino's operational control—launched the counterattack. Theplatoon from Company H led theway but encountered an accurateChinese mortar barrage thatpinned the Marines against thebarbed wire protecting the mainline of resistance and in 15 minutesreduced the force to about 20 menable to fight.

The platoon from Company Gadvanced through the battered unitand pressed home the counterat-tack. Shells fired by tanks andartillery exploded immediately infront of the infantrymen, enablingthe assault force to reach the maintrench on East Berlin and usegrenades and small arms fire tokill, capture, or drive off theChinese. At 1233, the platoon from

Pilots 0/Marine Fighter Squadron 311, from left, Capt John over their upcoming combat mission step by step. Each mustA. Ritchie, Capt Lenhrew E. Lovett lstLt Marvin E. Day, go know exactly what to do.

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National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A346707