On What is Signified, Part I

7/30/2019 On What is Signified, Part I.

1/127

ON WHAT IS SIGNIFIED, PART I.

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

1


2/127

PART I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Signification in the Ante-Predicaments: Categories ch. 1.

II. On what is signified according to the Categories.

III. On things said denominatively.

IV. On signification in relation to substance and accident.

V. On things said either with intertwining or without it.

Supplement:De Ente et Essenti, cap. 3, nn. 24-36.

Supplement: On accidental predicates and the singular in the genus of substance as whatexistsper se.

2


3/127

I. SIGNIFICATION IN THE ANTE-PREDICAMENTS: CATEGORIESCH. 1.

1. Translations.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1 (1a 1-15):

(tr. R. Glen Coughlin)

Those are called equivocal of which the namealone is common but the account of the sub-stance according to the name is different, asboth man and a picture of a man [are called]animal,

for, of these, the name alone is common but theaccount of the substance according to the nameis different.

For should someone give out what it is for eachof these to be animal, he will give out a proper

account of each.

Those are called univocal of which both thename is common and the account of thesubstance according to the name is the same, asboth man and ox [are called] animal.

For each of these is called by the common nameanimal, and the account of the substance is thesame.

For should someone give out an account of

each, what it is for each of these to be animal,he will give out the same account.

Those are called denominative, which, differingfrom something by falling away {by case, byending, }, have their name accordingto its name, as the grammarian from gram-mar, and the brave from bravery.

(tr. unknown)

[1a] Things are named equivocally whose namealone is common but the thought of the sub-stance according to that name is different, as aman and a picture of a man are named animal.

Only the name of these things is common, sincethe thought of the substance according to thatname is different for each.

For if anyone were to say [5] what it is for eachof these to be animals, he would give the proper

account for each.

Things are named univocally whose name iscommon and the thought of the substance ac-cording to that name is the same,

as a man and an ox are called by the commonname animal, and the thought of the [10] sub-stance is the same for both.

For if anyone were to give an account of what it

is for each of these to be animals, he would givethe same account.

Things are named denominatively which have aname according to another name with a [15] dif-ferent ending, as grammarian from gram-mar, and brave from bravery.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1 (1a 1-15):

(tr. E. M. Edghill)

Things are said to be named equivocallywhen, though they have a common name, thedefinition corresponding with the name differsfor each.

Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture canboth lay claim to the name animal;

(tr. H. G. Apostle)

[1a] Things are named equivocally if only thename applied to them is common but the ex-pression of the substance [i.e. the definition]corresponding to that name is different for eachof the things,

as in the case of a man and a picture when eachis called animal.

3


4/127

yet these are equivocally so named, for, thoughthey have a common name, the definitioncorresponding with the name differs for each.

For should any one define in what sense each isan animal, his definition in the one case will beappropriate to that case only.

On the other hand, things are said to be namedunivocally which have both the name and thedefinition answering to the name in common.

A man and an ox are both animal,

and these are univocally so named, inasmuch asnot only the name, but also the definition, is thesame in both cases:

for if a man should state in what sense each isan animal, the statement in the one case wouldbe identical with that in the other.

Things are said to be named derivatively,which derive their name from some other name,but differ from it in termination.

Thus the grammarian derives his name from theword grammar, and the courageous man fromthe word courage.

For only the name is common to these, but theexpression of the substance corresponding tothat [5] name differs for each;

for if one were to state what it is to be ananimal, he would give a different definition foreach of them.

Things are named univocally if both the nameapplied to them is common and the expressionof the substance corresponding to them is thesame for each of the things,

as in the case of animal when applied to a manand to an ox.

For a man and an ox may be called by thecommon [10] name animal, and the expressionof the substance [corresponding to that name] isthe same for both;

for if one were to state for each of them what itis to be an animal, he would give the samedefinition.

Things are derivatively named if they are calledby a name which is borrowed from anothername but which differs from it in ending.

For example, a man may be called grammar-ian, and this name is borrowed [15] fromgrammar; and he may be called brave, andthis name is borrowed from bravery.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1, (1a 1-15) (tr. Richard P. Diamond):

Things are said to be equivocal whose name alone is common, but the definition cor-responding to the name of the substance is different; animal, for example, which is both aman and a drawing [of one]. For only the name of these is common, and the definition corre-sponding to the name of the substance is different.

(a) Forms of translation compared:

Those are called equivocal... (tr. Coughlin)

Things are named equivocally... (tr. unknown)Things are said to be named equivocally.... (tr. Edghill)Things are named equivocally... (tr. Apostle)Things are said to be equivocal... (tr. Diamond)

(b) My trans.: Those (things) are called equivocal.... (see further below)

4


5/127

2. Definition, description, and a division of names into four.

Cf. Porphyry, Commentary on the Categories (In: Porphyry: On Aristotles Categories.Translated by Steven K. Strange, Ithaca, New York, 1992, pp. 38-39):

A.I claim that everything possesses both a name and either a definition (horismos) ora description (hupograph).40 For example, this thing has the name man, and is indicatedby that name, but there also exists a definition of it, for we say that man is a mortal rational

animal capable of receiving intelligence and knowledge. Each thing is indicated not only byits name but also by the account that defines and conveys its essence, as for example whenwe say that sound is the proper sensible of hearing. Since everything has both a name anda defining account, there are four sorts of relations that [38-39]

40 The Neoplatonic version of this distinction is well illustrated by Boethius 166A: a defi-nition (diffinitio) reveals the essence of something according to its genus and differentia,whereas a description (descriptio) merely indicates it by means of a common characteristic(propria quadam proprietate)....

obtain between defining accounts and names. Things either share both the same name

and the same defining account, or the name but not the defining account, or the

account but not [25] the name, or neither the account nor the name. 41 When things sharethe same name but have entirely different accounts, they are called homonyms.1 When theyshare both the account and a name, they are referred to as synonyms, since together with(sun-) the name they also have the same account. When things share the same account butnot the same name, they are called polyonyms, and when they have in common neither [30]a name nor an account, they are called heteronyms. There is a fifth sort of case: whencertain things come to be from other things, participating in a way in both the name and theaccount of the things from whence they come, differing however in grammatical form. Theseare called paronyms.42

41 [note omitted]42 According to Simplicius, who presumably depends for his information on Porphyryslarger commentary, the division of homonyms, synonyms, heteronyms, polyonyms, andparonyms was reported by Boethus to have been due to Speusippus (Simpl. 38,19-24 =Speusippus fr. 34a Lang). Porphyrys text appears to imply, probably correctly, that Aristotleadopted Speusippus division for his own purposes in the Categories....

Cf. Porphyry the Phoenician Isagoge. Translation, Introduction and Notes by Edward W.Warren (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1975, n. 17), p. 30:

...Boethius remarks, Carefully he says describentes, not definientes: for a definition arisesfrom a genus, but a genus cannot have another genus. E.S. p. 180, 20 -22. 2 A descriptio isgiven, not a definitio. A descriptio, as we said in an earlier book, is a kind of sketch of athing based on its qualities and like a characterization from outward appearances . For,

when many qualities unite together so that all of them at the same time are equal to the thingto which they applythis is called a descriptio, unless this collection is composed of agenus or differences. E.S. p. 181, 8-13....

Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on the Categories (Kalbfleisch 29.16-25) (In: Simplicius: OnAristotles Categories 1-4. Translated by Michael Chase. Ithaca, New York, 2003, p. 43):

1 On this choice of terms, see my comments further below.2N.B. E.S. means Boethius second edition of his commentary on Porphyrys work.

5


6/127

He said account (logos) rather than definition (horismos), in order to include the de-scriptive account318 as well, which fits both with the highest genera and with individuals [=infimae species]; these cannot be included by a definition (horismos), since it is notpossible to take either a genus of the highest genera, nor differentiae of individuals [=infimae species].319Descriptions (hupograph), by contrast, which give an account ofthe characteristic property (idiots) of substance,320 extend to these321 as well. This iswhy he did not say the definition[3] (logos) in accordance with the name but the definition[1]

(logos) of substance: since a descriptive definition [1] (logos)325 defines the characteristicproperty of a substance, whereas a definitory (horistikos) one defines both the quiddity322 ofeach thing, and the substance itself. Thus definition [1] (logos) of substance includes boththe descriptive and the definitory definition[1] (logos).323

318tn hupograpikn apodosin.319 The highest genera have no genera above them; if they did they would no longer behighest. Individuals, by contrast, as the most specific species (eid eidiktata), have nodifferentiae; if they did, then the differentia in question, combined with the new species,would give rise to another lower species; cf. Boethius In Cat. 166A; Simplicius below,45,24. But the definitions (horismoi) in the strict Aristotelian sense proceed by genus anddifferentiae (cf. Topics 1.8, 103b14-15), so that in the absence of either of these twoelements, strict definition is impossible.320 cf. BoethiusIn Cat. 166A.321viz. the highest genera and individuals.322to ti n einai, an Aristotelian term of art meaning essence.323 cf. BoethiusIn Cat. 166B1-2. (emphasis added)

Cf. Susanne Bobzien, The Stoics on Fallacies of Equivocation (In: Dorothea Frede &Brad Inwood ed.,Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age,Cambridge, 2005, Stoic Definitions, p. 186):

Section One: Stoic Theories of Definition

The basic evidence for the Stoic theory of definition is given by Diogenes Laertius in an ap-

pendix to his report on the grammatical part of dialectic:According to Antipater in Book One of his On Definitions, a definition is a statement byanalysis expressed commensurably; alternatively, as Chrysippus has it in his On Definitions,it is a rendering of a peculiar characteristic ( idion). A delineation (hupograph) is an accountintroducing the things (pragmata) in outline, or a definition having the effect of a definitionin a simpler fashion.81 (D.L. 7.60,FDS621, SVF2.226)

81 [Greek omitted] ...The translation follows the MSS; Sedleys emendation of the genitive(horou) for the MSS nominative (horos) in the last clause (Long and Sedley 1987: II.194)yields or having the effect of a definition in a simpler fashion than a defi-nition. This implies that there are two kinds of delineation, or two different ways to charac-terise delineations; the received text instead disambiguates two senses of the word deline-ation i.e. roughly between introductory book (sic) and provisional definition.

Cf. A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. Translations of thePrincipal Sources with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 190-191.

C Diogenes Laertius, 7.60-2

3 Obviously, logos here should also be translated account and not definition.

6


7/127

(1) A definition is, as Antipater says in On definitions book I, a statement of analysis match-ingly expressed, (2) or, as Chrysippus says in his On[190-191]definitions, a representation ofa peculiar characteristic. (3) An outline account is a statement introducing us to things bymeans of a sketch, or which conveys the force of the definition more simply than a definitiondoes....

E Alexander, On Aristotles Topics 42,27-43,2 (SVF2.228, part)

Those [i.e. the Stoics] who say that a definition is a statement of analysis matchingly ex-pressed (meaning by analysis the filling out of the definiendum, and in succinct fashion,and by matchingly that it is neither broader nor narrower) 4would say that the definition isno different from the representation of the peculiar characteristic.

Note by Long & Sedley, op.cit., pp. 193-194.

It must however be admitted that one or two apparent instances of definitions [193-194] whichseem not to be the products of division could in fact be not the definitions in the strict senseat all, but outline accounts. Outline account (hupograph) is an Aristotelian notion inher-ited by both Stoics (C3; 26H) and Epicureans (19 commentary). It is a formula used for thepreliminary marking off of a definiendum, prior to the construction of a true definition. Itclarifies what it is that is under discussion, but may not yet reveal that things nature. This

contrasts with a genuine definition (C2), which presents the (or a) peculiar characteristicof a species. One critic of the Stoics, Alexander (in the sequel to E), argued that a peculiarcharacteristic might itself turn out to be something quite inessential to the nature of thedefiniendum, e.g. that man might be on the Stoic view defined as animal with a sense ofhumour. But there seems no doubt (cf. 32D; 58A 5; 63D, M) that peculiar characteristic(idion) is an expression intended by the Stoics to apply only to features which are not justunique but also essential. Alexander is perhaps unduly influenced by the more flexibleAristotelian use of the term.

Cf. C.H.M. Versteegh, Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking(Leiden: Brill, 1977),pp. 129-130:

3. The type of definition favoured by the theologians is the description ( rasm), about whichvan Ess observes: One was not primarily concerned with the problem to find out the essenceof a thing, but rather how to circumscribe it in the shortest way so that everybody couldeasily grasp what was meant.13 In other words, the aim of the description is to differentiatethe object to be defined from other objects resembling it, by mentioning a characteristic pro-perty it does not share with any other object. In Frbis words: Both (sc. the definition andthe description) share the use of the genus of the thing, and they differ in that the definition

13 van Ess, 1970, 38. [= van Ess, J. The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology, Grunebaum,1970, 21-50]

adds to the genus the substantial differentiae, while the description (adds) the accidentaldifferentiae.14

It is to this type of definition which Za refers when he talks about the differencebetween various definitions of philosophy: in his view, definitions may indeed differ, sincethey are made for different aims.15 It is evident that this type of definition is related to theStoic description (hupograph), which is defined by Chrysippus as showing the charac-teristic properties (h tou idiou apdosis).16

4 On this point, see Simplicius (op.cit., pp. 42-43).

7


8/127

14 Translation Dunlop, 1951, 83 [= Dunlop, D.M. The Existence and Definition ofPhilosophy: From an Arabic text Ascribed to al-Frbi, Iraq, 13, 1951, 76-94]; cf. alsoZas analysis of the definition of man, Id. 46, 7-11.15 [note omitted]16 SVF 2, 226; cf. van Ess, 1970, 37 sqq. and note 90; van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 84; 129. [=van den Bergh, S. Averroes Tahafut al-tahafut. Translated from the Arabic with Introduc-tion and Notes, 1954]

3. On the art of defining: The difference between the quid nominis and the quid rei.

Cf. Michael A. Augros, Excerpt from a letter to Sean Kelsey:

In defining anything, how can we know we have the right definition? Against what do wetest it? Let us recall the definition of definition: speech making known distinctly what a thingis (which is composed of genus and differences, etc.). The thing to be defined, then, must beknown vaguely or indistinctly before it can be defined. Take for example nougat. What isnougat? Its that whitish sweet gook in a Three Musketeers Bar. That is a vague grasp ofwhat nougat is; in fact, since it does not tell us the intrinsic causes and principles of nougat,it does not tell us what the thing is, but merely points out to us what the word refers to. It is adefinition of the name (a quid nominis as opposed to a quid rei). From this we can often

reason to a definition of the thing, as Aristotle reasons to a definition of what the soul is fromwhat the name refers to. In short, there must be something in our experience which made uswonder what something is in the first place, and this something in our experience can be atest or starting point for our proposed definitions.

In his discussion of place in the Physics, Aristotle says something about a good definitionof place that can be extended to many other definitions. A good definition should say whatthe thing is (not just some property of it), and it should manifest the properties of the thing(i.e. make a good middle term in a demonstration), it should resolve the difficulties sur-rounding the thing to be defined, and it should show why anyone had difficulties about it inthe first place.

Cf. Michael A. Augros, Excerpt from another letter to Sean Kelsey:

Knowing is a word used by everyone, and by quid nominis all we mean is what are youtalking about? If no one had any idea what they were talking about, if they meant nothingby the word, it would soon fall from common speech.

Cf. E.D. Buckner, On Connotation:5

Introduction.

The distinction between nominal and real essence originates with Aristotle. In the passagefrom the Posterior Analyticsbelow[= II.7], he argues that we can know the meaning of a

made up name (he gives the example goat stag) that denotes no-thing, without knowingwhat he calls the essential nature of the thing that the name would denote, if there weresuch a thing.

These brief remarks, as with many of his brief remarks, are the starting point of a hugecontroversy and discussion which lasts throughout the Middle Ages, which occupies adefining position in the early modern era (it occupies most of book III of Lockes EssayConcerning Human Understanding), and which is a philosophical issue today....

5 (http://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/connotation/nominaldefinitions.htm [3/14/08])

8
http://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/connotation/nominaldefinitions.htm#aristotle%23aristotlehttp://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/connotation/nominaldefinitions.htm#aristotle%23aristotlehttp://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/connotation/nominaldefinitions.htm#aristotle%23aristotle


9/127

They imply the following distinctions. First, between the meaning of a name such asman, which the medieval logicians called the quid nominis or whatness of the name, andthe underlying nature common to all the things it names, which they called the quid rei orwhatness of the thing. (Early modern philosophers like Locke used the correspondingEnglish terms nominal essence and real essence). The name hobbit, for example, isperfectly meaningful. It has a quid nominis. But we could not know the real nature ofhobbits, even if there were such things (presumably there would be a hobbit geneticstructure, but we cannot tell this from the meaning of the word hobbit). So we cannot knowthe real nature, the quid rei of hobbits. By contrast, the name man denotes real things(men) that have a certain quid rei. The meaning of a name is distinct from the nature thatthing must have in order that the name apply to it.

Second, between nominal and real definition. A nominal definition is the definition ex-plaining what a word means, i.e. which says what the nominal essence is. (The Latin cor-responding to the English term nominal definition is definitio exprimens quid nominis,literally a definition expressing the quid nominis or nominal essence of the term). A realdefinition is one expressing the real nature orquid rei of the thing.

Third, between the meaning or connotation or intension of a name, and the objects that thename applies to or denotes. Connotation is a term introduced by Mill, which closely cor-responds to the idea of nominal essence. (He claimed it was derived from the Latin con-notare, however in Latin logic this term has a slightly different use - see Ockhams dis-cussion of connotative terms). Mill makes it clear that what he calls connotation is what we

would ordinarily call meaning. In the case of connotative names [i.e. common nouns], themeaning, as has so often been observed, is the connotation (System of Logic, I. viii. 1). Thedefinition of a name, in turn, is any proposition that says what its connotation is. 6 Note thatMill, following Locke, makes no distinction between nominal and real essence, or nominaland real definitions.

6N.B. The consideration of connotation versus denotation will be met with in several places below.

9
http://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/connotation/ockhamconnote.htmhttp://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/connotation/ockhamconnote.htmhttp://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/connotation/ockhamconnote.htmhttp://uk.geocities.com/[email protected]/connotation/ockhamconnote.htm


10/127

4. On homonuma or equivocals.

Cf. Porphyry, Commentary on the Categories (In: Porphyry: On Aristotles Categories.Translated by Steven K. Strange (Ithaca, New York, 1992), pp. 39-40:

Q. Why does he begin with homonyms {= equivocals},7not with synonyms {= univocals},if synonyms {univocals} are things that share both the same name and the same account, andsomething sharing both its account and its name would be a clearer case than something that

has only [39-40] its name in common with something else?A. I claim that Aristotle discusses homonyms {equivocals} first because he holds thatbeing is a homonym {equivocal} and because predications (kategoriai) are homonymously{equivocally} said to be predications of that of which they are predicated.43

Q. Why does he not discuss homonymy {equivocity} before discussing homonyms {equi-vocals}, given that homonymy{equivocity} is a word, whereas homonyms {equivocals}are things, and you claim that he is primarily concerned in this treatise with words, not withthings?44

A. Because what produces homonymy {equivocity} in words is not the character of theexpression itself, but rather things are found to be different and in no way have anything incommon yet acquire one and the same expression as their name.45 Until it is recognised thata word applies to a number of things that do not share the same account, there cannot be

homonymy {equivocity}.43 [Note omitted]44 [Note omitted]45 [Note omitted]

Cf. ibid.:

Q. How then does Aristotle define homonyms {= equivocals}?A. Those things are said to be homonyms {equivocals} that have only their name in

common, and have a different account of the essence corresponding to the name (1a1-2).

5. Onsunonuma or univocals.

Cf. ibid., p. 49.

[Concerning Synonyms {= Univocals}]

A. Those things are called synonyms {univocals} that have the name in common and thesame account of the essence corresponding to the name, as for example are animal.73 For both man and ox are called by the common name animal, and the accountis also the same. For if one is to give the account for each of them, what it is for each to bean animal, one will give the same account.

Q. Explain this definition.

A. He is saying that synonyms {univocals} are things that have their name in common, butnot merely their name, as in the case of homonyms {equivocals}. It is clear that name heremust be taken in its general sense, as applying to all parts of speech, and in common mustbe understood in the way previously explained.74

73 Supplying zoion at 68, 6-7 as Busse suggests, followingCat. 1a8.

7 In order to avoid misunderstanding, here and in what follows I have inserted the more familiar term.

10


11/127

74 At 62, 17-33.

6. Aristotle on homonuma understood as equivocals and sunonuma understood assynonyms.

Cf. Aristotle,Rhet. III, 2 (1404b 361405a 2) (tr. J. H. Freese; rev. B.A.M.):

In regard to names, equivocals8 [homonumiai] are most useful to the sophist, for by their

help he does his damage, and synonyms [sunonumiai] to the poet.By synonyms which are current [kuria] [1405a] I mean, for example, going [preuesthai]and walking [badizein], for these words are both current and synonymous with each other[sunonuma allelois].

7. That sunonuma has one meaning in the Poetics and Rhetoric and another in the Cate-gories.

Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on the Categories (Kalbfleisch 36.13, citing Porphyry) (tr.Richard Janko, but rev. B.A.M. after James Huttons translation of the definition ofsunonuma):

Aristotle in thePoetics9 said that synonyms are names more than one in number [pleio] butwith the same account [logos], like the poluonuma [polyonyms] (of Speusippus), such ascloak [lupion], and wrap [himation], and mantle [pharos].

But there is nothing strange, says Porphyry, in the fact that Aristotle uses both meanings(of synonymy), since the usage is twofold. (there is one usage in the logical works, but)where his concern is entirely with vocal sounds or the multiform nomenclature of each(thing), as in thePoetics and the third book of theRhetoric (cf. ch. 2, 1404b 37 ff.), we needthe other kinds of synonym, which Speusippus called the polyonym.

8. On Aristotles understanding ofsunonuma.

From Simplicius report we may recover Aristotles definition ofsunonuma in thesense proper to poetics and rhetoric: sunonuma [synonyms] are names more than one innumber [pleio] but with the same account [logos], such as cloak [lupion], and wrap[himation], and mantle [pharos]. This sense of the term must be distinguished from themeaning appropriate to logic proper: those (things) are called sunonuma [univocal]whose name is common, as well as the account of the substance corresponding to thename, as man and ox are animal (Cat. 1, 1a 6-9, tr. B.A.M.).

9. On polyonyms, heteronyms, and the other kinds of names.

Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on the Categories (Kalbfleisch 38.1-40.11) (In: Simplicius:

On Aristotles Categories 1-4. Translated by Michael Chase, Ithaca, New York, 2003, pp.53-54):

8 That Aristotle intends homonuma here to be understood as equivocals is proven by Soph. Ref. III, 4, 165b25-27 where the he lists equivocation (= homonumia) as one of the ways an apparent refutation may arisefrom the language (lexis).9 Presumably in the lost second book.

11


12/127

Now, whereas Aristotle has spoken of homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms, he omittedboth heteronyms and polyonyms. Polyonyms were omitted because they do not present anydifference or common feature with regard to realities (pragmata), but only multiple ex-pressions (lexeis) [i.e. they aresynonyms (B.A.M.)], while heteronyms were omitted becausethe present discussion does not carry out a division of expressions which are numericallyinfinite, but of those which signify something generically [15] (kata genos).398 Moreover, ashas been said, Aristotle omitted both of them because they pertain more to rhetorical andpoetical punctiliousness than they do to philosophical speculation.399 Nevertheless, it is aswell to include these [two classes of words] as well into one single division, together withthose that have been taken up.

Now Boethus reports400 that Speusippus adopted a division which included all names. Ofnames, he says, Some are tautonyms, and [20] others are heteronyms. Of tautonyms, someare homonyms, and others are synonyms and here we understand synonyms according tothe usage of the ancients. Of heteronyms, he says, some are heteronyms properly ( idis),others polyonyms, and others paronyms.

An account has already been given of the other types.401 As for polyonyms, they are severaldifferent names for one reality, when [25] their account ( logos) is one and the same, as inaor,xiphos, makhaira, andphasaganon.402 Heteronyms, by contrast, are things which differ[39,1] in names, accounts (logoi), and realities, such as grammar, man, and wood. Theydiffer from each other, then, in so far as polyonyms have in common both the same account(logos) and the same reality, whereas heteronyms differ in both respects.403

With regard to the first,404 polyonyms are convertible (antistrephei) with homonyms {=equivocals}, in [5] so far as in the case of homonyms the name was common, while thedefinition (horos) of each thing was particular (idios). In the case of polyonyms the reverseis true: the reality (pragma) and the definition are common, but the names are different.Heteronyms, for their part, are the opposite of synonyms {univocals}; for while the latterhave something in common in both respects, the former have nothing in common in eitherrespect.405

We must watch closely, in the case of polyonyms, lest we mistakenly consider that thingswhich are not polyonyms are such. It is not [10] the case, for example, that if several namesare predicated of one thing, they are eo ipso already polyonyms. Rather, [such names arepolyonyms] only if, in addition, the same predicate is said of one thing. For instance,partless (ameres) and smallest (elakhiston) are two names, and are said of one reality, e.g.

the letter A or B; and convex and concave are said of a circle, but that of which theyare said is by no means a polyonym. For since the account (logos) of each one [sc. of [15][53-54]

398 cf. Porph.In Cat. 70, 29-30.399 cf. above, 23, 13-19 (opinion of Syrianus).400 On the following passage (Speusippus fr. 32a Lang = fr. 68a Tarn); cf., in addition toTarns commentary ad loc., J. Pepin 1980, with further bibliography 275 n. 1. Again, itseems that Simplicius has his information from Boethus via Porphyrys commentary AdGedalium.401 See above, 22,20-3, 10.402 All of which mean, as reminds us (Anon; Paraphr. 4,5), a two-edged piece

of iron; i.e. a sword. Cf. Porph.In Cat. 69,1ff.403 Porphyry (69,10ff.) gives a rather different account of heteronyms; he uses differentexamples (fire/gold; Socrates/bravery) and leaves the reality (pragma) out of consideration,speaking only of the logos and the name being different.404sc. name and logos.405 cf. the following table:

polyonyms heteronyms homonyms synonyms

12


13/127

logos same different different sameonoma different different same samepragma same different

If the values of a column are different, then the types of words are opposite or con-vertible; here this is true of the couple polyonyms/homonyms, and of the couple heter-onyms/synonyms.

convex and concave] is different, each does not belong to it [sc. the circle] in the same re-spect.406 It is worth noting, however, that even in the case of polyonyms properly so called as when, in the case of man, the same person is called both meropes and brotos each ofthe names is given in accordance with different aspects of mans nature. For instance, man isgiven one [20] name in so far as he is analogical,407 another in accordance with the ethnicdifferences in his dialect, and another according to his mortal condition; 408 and the account(logos) of each of these things is different.

What, then? Do polyonyms not exist at all? Rather, those things alone are polyonyms towhich different names apply not with regard to their various natures, but as if with regard tothe same nature, either because different people name them differently with regard to anyrandom aspect, or because different names have been given out [25] with regard to the sameaspect, not etymologically, but in accordance with whatever license the imposer of namesmay have had. This is shown by the fact that names which apply to one reality are often sub-stituted for the names of others, as however (alla mn) was transferred to become a nameof a slave;409 for if we do not follow etymology, we can impose as many names, and of asmany kinds, as we wish.410

It must also be a property of polyonyms that they are called by [30] many names within thesame ethnic group; otherwise hmera and hamera411 will be considered polyonyms. Theyalso do well to note the following fact: whereas in the case of homonyms, homonymydenotes both the homonymous name and the relation (skhesis) itself, in the [40,1] case ofpolyonyms polyonymy denotes only the reality (pragma), but not the name. Moreover,homonyms are at any rate said relative to something else: O homonym of the blessedDardanids412 whereas polyonyms do not have their being in any relation (skhesis).

[5] Why, however, did Archytas omit this instruction about names in his On the UniversalFormulae? The answer is that since the Pythagoreans say that names are by nature and not

by imposition, they reject both homonyms and polyonyms, saying that by nature one name issaid of one reality. It is therefore fitting that they should distinguish homonyms by ancestralor hopeful reference,413 but that [10] they should show that polyonyms, when they aregenuinely words, are not said with reference to one thing, but are given according todifferent etymologies.414 They will also appropriately explain the change in form(paraskhmatismos) that takes place in the case of paronyms by means of the couplings(suzugiai) of realities.415

406 For two predicates to be polyonyms, they must fulfil two conditions: (i) they must be thesame (to auto legetai); and (ii) the subject of which they are predicated must one and thesame (kathhen). Partless, and least fulfil both conditions and are polyonyms, as is that ofwhich they are said (e.g. letters of the alphabet); but since convex and concave are

different (Simplicius says they have a different logos), they do not fulfil condition (ii),either: for convex and concave cannot be predicated of the same circle; rather, they arenames for different circles. At De Caelo 1.4, 270b35f., Aristotle states that convex andconcave lines are (apparently) contrary; yet at Physics 4.13, 222b3-4 he says that theconvex and the concave are in what is in a sense the same circle. Presumably whatAristotle means in the latter passage is that convex and concave are both said of a circlein the abstract and generic sense of the term, although they can never simultaneouslycharacterize the same individualcircle.

13


14/127

407 This appears to be an imperfect recollection of Platos Cratylus 399c, where the wordman (anthrpos) indicates that the other animals do not examine, or consider(analogizetai), or look up at (anathrei) any of the things that they see, but man has no soonerseen that is, oppe than he looks up at and considers (logizetai) that which he has seen.Therefore of all the animals man alone is rightly called man (anthpos), because he looks upat (anathrei) what he has seen (oppe). Thus, while Plato, etymologises anthrpos asderiving from anathrei + oppe, Simplicius has recalled analogizetai from the same passage,and wrongly thinks that analogizomai is connected to the etymology ofanthrpos.408 Simplicius seems to be following here the same school tradition concerning the etym-ological explanation of anthrpos, merops and brotos, as that given by Ammon. In DeInterp. 38,9ff.: man is called merops because he uses a divided-up voice (meristi opi), i.e.different languages; while brotos refers to the fall of his soul into the realm of becomingand the contamination it incurs down here, i.e. to his mortality.409 By Diogenes; cf. above, 27,19f. and n. 294.410 There is thus the implication that we always should follow etymology; indeed, since, forthe Neoplatonists, names had been imposed by an onomatothets/group ofonomatothtai, ifnot divine then at least extremely wise, to make up names arbitrarily that is, without regardto the natural consonance of names and realities would be to fly in the face of nature.411 Respectively, the Epic/Attic and Doric Greek words for day. Simplicius point is thatdialect variations in the form of a word do not constitute instances of polyonymy.412 PindarEncomium to Alexander son of Amyntas, fr. 120-1 Schroeder = Ecloges fr. 2

Puech (Bud) = fr. 126 Tuyrn = fr. 120 Maehler/Snell (Teubner).413homnuma ti progoniki katelpida anaphorai. As we learn from Philoponus (In Cat.22,7ff.) we have hopeful (katelpida) homonymy when a father names his son Plato in thehope he will turn out to be like the Philosopher, while homonyms by ancestral referenceoccur when the child is named after his grandfather, so that the latters memory may bepreserved.414 Since, for the Pythagoreans, one name corresponds to one reality, they had to account forapparent cases of polyonymy. They seem to have done so in at least the following ways: (i)In the case of proper names, polyonymy could be explained by the intentions of parents (seeprevious note); such names were definitely thesei, not phusei. (ii) Some ostensiblepolyonyms, they claimed, were not words at all. (iii) Finally, if two non-proper genuinenames really do designate the same object, the this is not due to arbitrary naming, as in the

case of Diogenes slave; instead, the two apparent polyonyms have two differentetymological derivations.415 The Pythagorean suzugiai are the series of contrasting couples of opposed realities suchas we find in Aristotle Metaphysics 1, 986a22; but how these may be used to explainchanges of linguistic form in paronyms is not clear to me.

Cf. Christos Evangeliou, Aristotles Categories and Porphyry (Leiden: Brill, 1986), pp.49-50.

c. Paronymy

In comparison to o(mw/numa and sunw/numa the case of parw/numa was the leastdiscussed by the ancient commentators. In contrast to the other two there were not variantwritings of Aristotles definitions of them. This is best explained by the fact that in theCategories doctrine the role of paronymous things is not as important as the roles of thesynonymous and homonymous things. Accordingly, the treatment of them can be brief.

To begin with, it seems that derivative names designate paronymous things. With regardto this issue, the examples which Aristotle gives speak for themselves. The grammarianand the courageous are paronymously called from grammar and courage respectively (1a

14


15/127

13-15). However, Porphyry specified three criteria which must be met in any case of genuineparonymy.

(a) Sharing in name (mete/xein tou= o)no/matoj)(b) Sharing in reality (mete/xein tou= pra/gmatoj)(c) Transformation (metasxhmatismo/j) (p. 69, 33-35)144

Unless all three criteria are met, it would not be correct, Porphyry suggests, to speak ofparw/numa. He proceeds to give examples....

144 [note omitted][49-50]

From the text of the Categories it is evident that Aristotle makes use ofparw/numa intwo cases: (a) In his discussion of the category ofpoio\n (quality); and (b) in his discussionof the category ofkei=sqai (position). The relevant passages are as follows:

These, then, that we have mentioned are qualities, while things called paronymously becauseof these or called in some other way from them are qualified. Now in most cases, indeed inpractically all, things are called paronymously, as the pale man from paleness, the gram-marian from grammar, and so on. (10a 27-32)

Again:

Lying, standing, and sitting are particular positions; position is a relative. To-be-lying, to-be-standing, or to-be-sitting are themselves not positions, but they get their names parony-mously from the aforesaid positions. (6b 11-14)

Consequently, Aristotle, needed parw/numa in order to distinguish between qualities(poio/thtej) and things qualified (poia\) in the first case and, in the second case, in order toseparate the category of position (kei=sqai) from the category of relation or relatives (pro/jti).10In this respect, the doctrine of paronymy was useful to Aristotle, though it was not asimportant as the doctrines of homonymy and synonymy were.11

10 Actually, Aristotle is making a distinction between being a position and being named from being in a posi-tion: When one says Socrates is standing, he is denominated standing from being in a certain positionfor to-be-standing differs from to-be-sitting by position.11 It hardly needs to be said that the ways of naming things are equally important for the Categories.

15


16/127

10. Supplement: A review of the doctrine of paronymy.

Cf. D. P. Henry, Why Grammaticus?12

2. PARONYMS IN ANCIENT LOGIC AND GRAMMAR.

The dialogue [sc. of St. Anselm] with which we are concerned takes its customary title fromits incipit, viz: De grammatico..., and from the fact that grammaticusisemployed as a

crucial example. However, as its first sentence also makes clear that this word is used as aninstance of a paronym (nomen denominativum, denominative name, denominative) fromwhich generalisations are permissible5, a more illuminating title would be Dialogue onParonyms.

The last notable use of the term denominative is one which occurs in J. S. MillsSystem of Logic6, and is enlarged on below, the tradition of its use extends back to theancient grammarians and logicians. Priscian7 employs the term to cover any kind ofderivation from a nomen, or name; as nomenisfor the ancient Latinists a wider term thanthe modern noun (it embraces what would nowadays be distinguished as adjectives) a verywide range of types is here in question.

Of course, the notion of derivation must not be taken too seriously here: usually somespecies of word-similarity is in question. The same applies to the cases envisaged by

Aristotle in Chapter 1 of the Categories8

:things are there stated to be named paronymously(or derivatively) which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in ter-mination. Thus the literate derives his name from literacy and the courageous man fromcourage. However, Boethius, when commenting on this passage 9, appears to restricthis account

5. SL 159.3, 161.11.12.6. Bk. I, Ch. II 5.7. Inst. Gramm. Bk. IV. References to this work will henceforward take the form of volume,page and line-numbers of Keils Grammatici Latini,prefaced by a K , e.g.KII 55.6.8. 1a 12-15 (The Oxford translation has been used and amended as required).9. Patr. Latina Vol. 64 Col. 167D. References to this volume will hereunder consist of a B followed by the column-number and letter.

167

to contexts of the elementary sort which are indicated by Aristotles concrete examples,

and asserts that the (supposed) derivation of the nomen reflects participation in

whatever is named by the cognate abstract noun; e.g. because a given man participates

in the virtue of justice, we denominate him just10. This Platonic-sounding supplementdoes not necessarily have as its consequence that those who make use of the term paronym(or denominative) are committed to holding that we first perceive, e.g. the quality,subsequently note the participant, and finally consider ourselves licensed to use the paronymin respect of that participant. Boethius remarks that the opposite is the case: whites andliterates are cognitively prior (notior) to whiteness and literacy respectively11. In all, heholds, three marks distinguish paronyms: (i) participation in something by the thing

paronymously named, (ii) participation by the paronym in the name of that some-

thing mentioned in (i), i.e. the two names must differ in termination only, and (iii) the

non-identity of the paronym and the name of that in which the thing paronymously

named participates12. When condition (iii) is unfulfilled, says Boethius, equivocationresults.[13] Thus musicanames both a female musician and the art in which she is versed 13.

12 (http://irevues.inist.fr/bitstream/2042/3099/1/04+TEXTE.pdf [3/13/08]).13 Cf. the discussion of Porphyrys position outlined above by Evangeliou.

16


17/127

Leaving aside this third condition, at least three variable factors are apparent here, andthinkers of the Middle Ages were quick to exploit them. The first such variable is the wordparticipation used in respect of things. Now while derivative words may be said toparticipate in the words from which they are derived, or which have the same stem, andthis in a perfectly familiar and intelligible sense, nevertheless the use of participate inrespect of things is far from intelligible. In practice this was later, e.g. at the hands ofAquinas, to be interpreted as any kind of connection implied by the purposive transferenceof words in accordance with human needs and interests. The second variable lies in the rangeof objects in which such participation is envisaged. Boethius examples appear to

10.B168A.11.B240C.12. B168A Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales (ed. Bochenski) 2.22, 3.01.References to of this edition will hereafter be prefaced by PH only.13.B168B-C.

168

confine this range to qualities in which things might be said to participate in common. Butthere seems to be no reason why this range should not be extended to other categories(quantity, state, etc). The most serious question here is, however, still to be faced: what kind

of a thing is a quality, if it really is a thing at all? The third variable is the language used.Thus, suppose participation in qualities is in question: exactly what is to count as a paronymwill then depend upon the extent to which names given to things on account of their qualitieshappen to have, in the language of the period, corresponding abstract names of thosequalities. A simple example of the effect of this third variable can be drawn from Boethiusown text: virtus(excellence, virtue) is the name of a quality to which, it would appear,the Latin of Boethius time had no corresponding paronym, since he tells us that a manhaving virtuswas called sapiens(wise) orprobus(honest14); virtuscould hence not beconsidered by him in connection with paronyms. Yet in medieval Latin the correspondingparonym (virtuosus) exists and is used freely.

In a situation of the kind described, two reactions are possible: one can either recognisethat there are limits to the use of linguistic classifications for the delineation of logical

problems, orone can make artificial additions to the language in an attempt to force it toreflect those problems. Aristotle, on whose text Boethius comments, is quite alive to thedangers of circumscribing a class of cases by reference to the contingent features of non-technical language, and hence takes the first course: he merely uses the notion of paronymyas a rough guide, and concludes by noting that the name borne by a thing in virtue of a givenquality possessed by that thing may or may not be derivative from the name of that quality 15.Boethius, following him, used the general heading qualia for things having qualities,whether paronymously named or no16. The medievals tended to take the second course, andinvented constructions to fit their needs: this is particularly evident in the case of abstractnouns like animalitas, corporeitas, and the like, against which Locke inveighs17,

14.B254B.

15. Categ. l0b 9.16.B253B cf.PH 3.26, 3.27.17. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. III, Ch. 8, 2.

169

although these are no worse than the abstract nouns formed by the addition of ness or -hood to the concrete noun, and used in contemporary philosophical writings in English.However, this possibility of systematic artificial amendment of a language can, unless used

17


18/127

with great caution, give the impression that all cases which are linguistically alike are sus-ceptible of like logical classification. The difference between the cautious and incautiousattitude on this point may be exemplified by the cases of Aquinas and J. S. Mill: both holdexplicitly that white and man are paronymous: in Aquinas terms, ... things are ordin-arily denominated from their forms, as the white from whiteness and man (homo) fromhumanity (humanitas)18 [14], and Mills, Snow, and other objects, receive the name whitebecause they possess the attribute which is called whiteness; Peter, James, and others,receive the name man because they possess the attributes which are considered toconstitute humanity. The attribute, or attributes, may therefore be said to denominate thoseobjects, or to give them a common name19. Now this is part of Mills evidence for thepossibility of treating both man and white as belonging to the class of connotativenames, and so of regarding them as signifying in the same fashion. Aquinas, on the otherhand, was not thus misled, as an inspection of his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics20

makes clear.Boethius description of paronyms not only contains the variables which have been

mentioned, but is also such that any change in the interpretation of one of those variablestends to affect the interpretation of the others: thus it would appear that the meaning ofparonyms such as sweet or white is bound up in some sense with the correspondingqualities (sweetness, whiteness), hence such denominatives were said to signify aquality21. Now given the use ofhumanitasin medieval Latin to mean human nature, andgranted that white signifies the quality whiteness, are we to say also that homo(man)

si-

18. Summa Theologica I, q. 37, art. II, corpus.19. System of Logic, Bk. I, Ch. II, 5.20.Ed. Spiazzi, 285. 295; cf. 87, 259, 281, 289.21. Nihil enim a album n significat quam qualitatem, B194C cf. ARISTOTLE, Categ. 3a 18.

170

gnifies the quality humanitas(humanity, attributes constituting human nature)? Hencearise repercussion (sic) in the range of the second variable: is humanitasa quality in whichmen participatea set of attributes, a form, a nature, or a quiddity? And leaving aside the

vexed question of the ontological status of attributes, one can still ask: if man signifies,say, a quality in this way, does this not exclude the view that man is a substance, as opposedto a quality? In Mintos words: When we say This is a man do we not declare what sort ofa thing he is? Do we not declare his Quality? If Aristotle had gone further along this line, hewould have arrived at the modern point of view 22 that a man is a man in virtue of hispossessing certain attributes, that general names are applied in virtue of their connotation23.Minto goes on to suggest, most significantly, that Aristotle failed to take this further step,which would make man into a quality-signifying word, only because he had not at hisdisposal a separate name in common speech for the common attributes of man24. Boethius,when commenting on the topic of secondary substances, appears to go quite a long way inthe direction suggested by Minto, when he admits that man shows what a substance islike, i.e. shows its qualities26. Indeed, he holds that both man and white signify qualities

in ways sufficiently similar to establish the need for further criteria to distinguish which ofthe two indicates a substance26, e.g. lack of contrary, insusceptibility of degree, and soforth27.

14 In view of the fact that they do not have the same definition, one should not suppose that for St. Thomas,denomination in the case of a name like man means the same thing as it does in the case of accidental predi-cates. Hence it is inaccurate to attribute to the Angelic Doctor the view that saying something like Socratesis a man is an instance of paronymous naming.

18


19/127

22. i.e. that of J. S. Mill, mentioned in the previous paragraph.23. W. MINTO, Logic Inductive and Deductive, London, 1894, p. 117. He is here referringto Aristotles Categ. 3b 10-24, cf.B194B195C.24. Op. cit.,p. 118.25. Qualis substantia sit demonstratur, cum dicitur homo .B194D.26.B195C.27.B195D et seq.

11. Note on the foregoing.

While I shall return to this subject below, here let it suffice to note that in determin-ing the signification of a name like man Aristotle was well aware of the relation of sub-stance to quality: Cf. Categories ch. 5 (3b 21), where the Philosopher states that genusand species determine a quality with respect to substance, for they signify such a sub-stance. Cf. also Soph. Ref., ch. 22 (178b 37178b 10) (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge):Again, there is the proof that there is a third man distinct from Man and from individualmen. But that is a fallacy, for Man, and indeed every general predicate, denotes not an in-dividual substance, but a particular quality.... Also to be noted is that this question has no-thing to do with paronyms or denominatives properly so called, but rather with sub-stantives.

On the whole matter of naming things from accidents, see further below on de-nominative naming, where I give further texts of St. Thomas, as well as the relevant ex-cerpt from Minto and related passages from other authors reviewing the doctrine of certainmedievals and moderns on this subject.

19


20/127

12. Definitions of paronym.

Cf. The Hutchinson Encyclopaedia. Helicon Publishing LTD 2008. s.v paronym:

paronym n.

[a] word having [the] same derivation as another, or formed from [a] foreign word, or having[the] same form as [a] cognate foreign word. paronymic, paronymous, a.

Cf. Robert Lawerence Trask,A Dictionary of Phonetics and Phonology (Routledge, 1996),s.v. paronym:

Any word derived from a second word or from the same root; a derivative or a cognate.

Cf. Wikipedia, s.v. paronym:

A paronym orparonyme in linguistics may refer to two different things:

A word that is related to another word and derives from the same root, e.g. a cognateword;

Words which are almost homonyms, but have slight differences in spelling or pro-nunciation and have different meanings.

13. On paronymy in the Tractatus Coislinianus.15

Cf. Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy. With an Adaptation of the Poeticsand a Translation of the Tractatus Coislinianus(New York, 1922), p. 225:

Laughter arises (I) from the diction [= expression] (II) from the things [= content].

(I) From the diction, through the use of

(A) Homonyms(B) Synonyms(C) Garrulity(D) Paronyms,

(?1) addition and(?2) clipping

(E) Diminutives(F) Perversion

(1) by the voice(2) toward the better

(G) Grammar and syntax

Cf.Ibid., The Tractatus Illustrated, pp. 233-234:

15 See also the relevant discussion in Richard Janko, Aristotle on Comedy: Toward a Reconstruction ofPoetics II (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1984), pp. 175-178, a passage I excerpt below. In agreement withCooper and Janko, I believe the Tractatus, garbled though it is, preserves in outline certains parts of the lostsecond book of thePoetics on comedy, although it requires much argument to make this thesis persuasive.

20


21/127

(I) Paronyms. They are formed (1) by adding to a word, and (2) by taking something awayfrom it. [Or the sense may be that they are formed by first dropping some part of a word andthen adding something to what remains. A paronym is, so to speak, a name lying at theside of another. In each case, two words are concerned, one of them being derived from

the other, generally by a change of termination. The relation may be a true one accordingto scientific principles. Or it may be a fancied one according to popular notions of etym-ology as in the time of Aristophanes, before the advent of strict linguistic science. Or itmay be a pretended one based upon an assumed principle. Thus Hermippus (frg. 4, Kock1.225-6) derives the rolling year (e)niauto/j), which contains all within itself, from e)nau=t%. Similar derivatives are common in everyday speech while a language is in the ma-king. In comedy they are extempore formations, or else formations otherwise rare in thelanguage. In a given instance it may be difficult to say whether the word is a coinage of thepoet, or a term, not previously recorded, from common usuage. If the reading great oneyersis authentic, a paronym formed by addition is found in Gadshills I am joined with no foot-land-rakers, no long-staff sixpenny strikers, none of these mad mustachio-purple-hued-malt-worms, but with nobility and tranquility, burgomasters and great oneyers (I Henry IV2.1.76-9). So also (from au=to/j, by droppingj and adding -tatoj) au=to/tatoj in Plutus 83:Are you really he? I am. Himself? His own selfs self. Here, too, perhaps, belongskunto/tatoj the most shameless (most doglike) of all (see above, pp. 29, 150). 16 In acomic compound epithet, if we take the first element as a base, the whole may be regarded asa paronym derived from it. Those of Gadshill (as long-staff sixpenny strikers and mad

mustachio-purple [233-234] -hued-malt-worms) he formed by addition....But the device, strictly considered, seems to involve a stem of some word in regular usage:

the customary termination of the word may be dropped, and then something may be added.]

14. Onparonuma in sum:

Paronyms are things which have a name according to another name, but with a dif-ference in ending. Hence, to say that things are said to be called something from parony-my means from naming one thing after another thing. A paronym, then, is the name bywhich one thing is named after anotherthat is, it is the appellation one thing has when itis appellated after another, but differing from it in ending, as when Socrates is named

grammarian after grammar, which is the grammatical knowledge he has: the namegrammarian is that by which he is named or appellated after grammar.

But, as we have seen, in rhetoric and poetic there is a related meaning of paronymythat is not the same as denominative naming, as in the language employed by comedy thereare names by which a thing is named after another thing, but with a difference in ending, asby an addition, a subtraction or shortening, by use of a diminutive, or from an alteration ofthe word, as one may see from Richard Jankos version of the Tractatus, excerpted below.

15. Definitions of synonyms, homonyms, and paronyms.

SUNONUMA (SYNONYMS). (1) Synonyms [sunonuma] are names more thanone in number [pleio], but with the same account [logos], such as cloak [lupion], andwrap [himation], and mantle [pharos];17 (2) sometimes synonym signifies a

16 Cf. p. 150: We may close the section with the interesting gloss, not found in ourPoetics, of the Anti-Atticist: kunto/twn. )Aristote/lhj peri\ poihtikh=j: to\ de\ pa/ntwn kunto/taton. I translated: (21) Mostdog-like [= shameless], Aristotle, On the Art of Poetry: the most shameless of all.3 (Cf. Coopers note3: Anti-Atticista in Bekker,Anecdota Graeca I. 101. 32; Aristotle frg. 77, Rose, p. 81.)17 Cf. Simplicius on Aristotles Categories 36.13 Kalbfleisch, drawing on Porphyry: o( )Aristote/lehj e)n t%= Peri\ Poihtikh=j sunw/numa ei)=pen ei)=nai w(=n plei/w me\n ta\ o)no/mata lo/goj de\

21


22/127

plurality of names with a unity of account and of the thing signified, which Speusippuscalledpolyonyms, and which at the present time among the Latins are calledsynonyms, likeParis and Alexander, which were names of the son of Priam;18 (3) synonyms arethings which agree in account, but differ in the names;19 (4) synonyms are nameswhich signify one thing according to one account;20 (5) for synonyms are names whichsignify exactly [omnino] the same thing.21

HOMONUMA (HOMONYMS). (1) Homonyms (homonuma) are names more

than one in number which are the same (or similar sounding), but with differing accounts,such as pear, pair, and pare (B.A.M., after Aristotle via Simplicius and Porphyry); (2)sometimes homonym signifies a unity of names with a plurality of account and of thething signified (B.A.M., after Ferrariensis); (3) homonyms are things which agree inname, but differ in account ;22 (4) homonyms are names which signify more than onething according to more than one account (B.A.M., after St. Thomas Aquinas); (5)homonyms are similar sounding names which signify different things (B.A.M., after St.Thomas Aquinas).

PARONUMA (PARONYMS). (1) Paronyms are names by which a thing has anappellation after another thing, but with a difference in ending;23 or again (2) [a] paronym

is, so to speak, a name lying at the side of another. In each case, two words are concerned,one of them being derived from the other, generally by a change of termination. (LaneCooper, op.cit.); according to Richard Jankos composite text of the Tractatus Cois-linianus, paronymy comes about in four ways: (a) by addition, when something extraneousis attached to the current name, e.g. [**]; and (b) by shortening, e.g. Im called Midas thescrounge, instead of scrounger; (c) from a diminutive, e.g. Socratididdles, Euripi-dipides, instead of Socrates, Euripides; (d) from an alteration, e.g. the worstest ofall.24

16. Some dictionary definitions.

Cf. Liddell Scott Greek English Lexicon:

o( au)to/j, oi(=a dh/ e)sti ta\ polouw/numa, to/ te lw/pion kai\ i(ma/tion kai\ fa/roj.Aristotle in thePoetics said that synonyms are when there are several words with the same meaning, like (Speusippus)polyonyms indeed, such as cloak, wrap and mantle. (tr. Richard Janko, rev. B.A.M. after JamesHutton in his edition of thePoetics)18Aliquando enim significatpluralitatem nominum, cum unitate rationis et rei significatae; quae Speusippus,

polynyma vocabat; quae et nunc etiam a latinis dicuntur synonyma, ut Paris et Alexander quae fueruntnomina filii Priami. (Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), Comm. in Lib. Quat. Contra Gentes, cap. 35, tr.B.A.M.)19

Illa (synonyma) vero sunt, quae conveniunt in ratione et differunt nominibus. (Ferrariensis, ibid.)20 Cf.In I Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 3, c.: non tamen significant unam secundum unam rationem; et ideo nonsunt synonyma. nonetheless they do not signify one thing according to one account, and so they are notsynonyms. (tr. B.A.M.)21synonyma enim nomina dicuntur, quae omnino idem significant. For names are called synonyms whichsignify exactly the same thing. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 4, obj. 1, tr. B.A.M.)22Ista (homonyma) enim sunt quae conveniunt in ratione in nomine et differunt in ratione (Ferrariensis,ibid.).23 B.A.M., after Aristotle, Cat. 1, 1a 14, in the light of the Philosophers definition of homonyms.24 See my separate discussion.

22


23/127

sunw/nu m-oj, on , having the same name as, c.gen., h( . . sunw/numoj th=j e)/ndonou)/shj e)/gxeluj Antiph.217.1 , cf. E.Hel.495; o( j. th=? po/lei [potamo/j ] Plb.9.27.5.

II. in the Logic of Arist. sunw/numa are things having the same name and the samenature and definition, Cat.1a6, cf. Top.123a28, 148a24, Thphr.HP9.11.5; e)/sti tija)diki/a para\ th\n o(/lhn a)/llh e)n me/rei, sunw/numoj, o(/tio( o(rismo\j e)n tw=? au)tw=? ge/nei Arist.EN1130a33 ; ta\ polla\ tw=n j.toi=j ei)/desi the many particulars which have the same name as the forms, i.e.things denoted by the same univocal or unambiguous word, e.g. man and ox, bothcalled zw=?on in the same sense of zw=?on, opp. o(mw/numa (v.o(mw/numoj IV), Id.Metaph.987b10. Adv. -mwj Id.Cat.3a34 , Plb.3.33.11, Phld.Rh.1.148 S.

2. of pairs of the form A: non-A, opp. e(terw/numa (q. v.), Procl. in Prm.p.955 S.

III. in Rhet. ta\ j. aresynonyms, words having different forms but the same sense, asporeu/esqai and badi/zein, Arist.Rh.1405a1; to\ j. tou= ne/fouj, i.e. nefe/lh,A.D.Synt. 199.27.

o(mw/nu m-oj , (o)/nwma) having the same name, Il., etc.

Cf. Robert J. Shubinski, Glossary of Poetic Terms, s.v. Homonym, s.v. Synonym:25

HOMONYM

One of two or more words which are identical in pronunciation and spelling, but different inmeaning, as the noun bearand the verb bear.

Although often called homonyms in popular usage (indeed, in some dictionaries as well),homophones are words which are identical in pronunciation but different in meaning orderivation or spelling, as rite, write, right, and wright, orrain and reign.

Heteronyms are words which are identical in spelling but different in meaning andpronunciation, assow, to scatter seed, andsow, a female hog.

Homographs are words which are identical in spelling but different in meaning andderivation or pronunciation, aspine, to yearn for, andpine, a tree, or the bow of a ship and abow and arrow.

SYNONYM

One of two or more words that have the same or nearly identical meanings.

17. On homonymy and synonymy.

Cf. PHIL 410: Classical Philosophy (Spring 2005) Instructor: Robin Smith

([email protected]). Predication, Homonymy, and the Categories:26

Homonymy and Synonymy

25 Glossary of Poetic Terms from BOBS BYWAY. Compiled, edited and cross-referenced by Robert G.Shubinski. Copyright 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002. [email protected] (http://aristotle.tamu.edu/~rasmith/Courses/Ancient/predication.html [3/9/08])

23
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


24/127

A good place to begin is with the very beginning of the Categories, in which Aristotle makesa distinction between homonymous and synonymous things. Though these terms look justlike English words, its a good idea to pretend that youve never seen them before: thoseEnglish words are just close enough to Aristotles in meaning to be seriously confusing.Here are Aristotles definitions:

A and B are homonymous = A and B are both called F, but with different definitions of FA and B are synonymous = A and B are both called F and with the same definition of F

Homonymous things, not words. The first point to notice is that these define relationshipsof things, not of words.27 In English, homonymy and synonymy are relationships betweenwords. Two words are homonyms if they soundalike but have differentspellings, or at leastdifferent meanings, and two words are synonymous if they have different sounds (or at leastspellings) but the same meaning. From a modern philosophical viewpoint, this at once raisesquestions about whether it is words or occurrences of words that are homonymous or syn-onymous and what the identity conditions are for words. Those issues do not really arise forAristotles distinction, however, since for him it is things, not words, which are homo-nymous or synonymous. Homonymous really means like-named, and synonymousmeans named together. Things are homonymous, in Aristotles sense, if the same wordapplies to them both but not in virtue of the same definition, and things are synonymous ifthe same word applies to them in virtue of a single definition.

Aristotle gives as an example a human being and picture. The Greek word zion (usuallytranslated animal) applies to these both, but with different definitions: it applies to a humanbeing because a human being is a certain kind of living entity, whereas it applies to a picturebecause the Greeks used this same term of drawings or illustrations (rather like our use ofthe word figure).28 For an English example, a fingernail and a roofing nail are both callednails, and a fingernail file and a computer file are both called files, but in each case withdifferent definitions.

Intracategorial and Cross-Categorial Predication

Since the categories are fundamentally different kinds of thing, nothing in one category canbe the same as anything in another category. This much may seem obvious. However, whatis not obvious, and what is equally important for Aristotle, is that when A and B belong tothe same category, A can express what B is. For instance, Socrates, human, and animal areall substances, and it is true to predicate animal of human and human of Socrates. Aristotledescribes these predications assaying what the subject is. The relationship between predicateand subject in a true same-category predication has certain properties.

Same-category predication is synonymous. That is, if A and B are in the same categoryand A is predicated of B, then the definition of A will also be predicated of B. This is pre-cisely Aristotles definition of synonymy: both A and its definition are true of B as well asA, so A and B are synonymous.

27 Compare Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.4, a text to be cited more fully below):In the ante-predicaments there are really two main uses of the word substance.One is in Chapter 1, where theGreek says that univocal things have both a name in common...and the logos tes ousias....28 Cf. H. L Cookes note to his Loeb translation: Z%=/on had two meanings, a living creature and the repre-sentation of a living creature. (We have no corresponding ambiguous noun, although we use the word,living of real living things and for certain artworks that are true to life). I myself employ the wordfigure below.

24


25/127

Same-category predication is transitive: if A is predicated of B and B is predicated of C,then A is predicated of C. For instance, if animal is predicated of man, and man is predicatedof Socrates, then animal is predicated (synonymously) of Socrates.

In a case such as this, Aristotle describes the predicate assaying what the subject is.

Contrasted with these are cross-categorial predications, with subjects and predicates fromdifferent categories. In Socrates is pale, for instance, the subject is a substance and the pre-dicate is a quality. Since the definition of a quality cannot apply to a substance, this predica-tion cannot be synonymous: from the fact that Socrates is pale, it does not follow (and in-deed it cannot be true) that the definition of pale applies to Socrates. Similarly, cross-cate-gorial predications are not transitive. Thus, though Socrates is pale and pale is a color, itdoes not follow that Socrates is a color. From the standpoint of modern (post-Fregean) logic,this contrast seems to make little sense. A Fregean analysis of Socrates is pale decomposesit into a proper name, Socrates, and an incomplete expression is pale which becomes astatement when an appropriate number of arguments is supplied (in this case, one). Themeaning of Socrates is that which it names, Socrates. The meaning of is pale is the classof objects to which it applies.29 The sentence is true if and only if the object named bySocrates is a member of the class named by is pale. Exactly the same form of analysisapplies to Socrates is a man: it is true if and only if the object designated by Socrates is amember of the class of objects satisfying ___is a man.

Aristotle approaches this matter differently. He regards pale as designating, not the class ofpale things, but paleness. That is to say, paleness is a name of paleness in the same waythat Socrates is a name of Socrates. The difference between Socrates and paleness (andtherefore between Socrates and paleness) is a categorial one: Socrates is a substance,whereas paleness is a quality. Now, Aristotle notes that we do not say Socrates is palenessbut Socrates is pale. He calls this a matter ofparonomy, naming after: pale things arenamed pale because they are named after paleness.30 Since paleness and Socrates arecategorially different, Socrates cannot be paleness. He can, however, have paleness, that is,paleness can be present in him as a subject. When that is the case, then Socrates is paron-ymously called pale after paleness.

29 While there is a class of objects which are pale, this is notwhat the name means. Rather, when used in asentence such as Socrates is pale, it supposes or stands for this accident existing in him. In sum, one mustdistinguish what names stand for from what they signify, although the latter includes the former.30 N.B. Just as pale things are named pale after paleness, so human things are named human afterhumanity, an essential, not an accidental, predication, for which sort of denomination, see further below.

25


26/127

18. The treatment of these matters in the Categories and the Topics.

Cf. Isaac Husik, The Categories of Aristotle [In: Philosophical Essays, Ancient,Mediaeval, and Modern - Edited by Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss, Oxford, Blackwell,1952, pp. 96-112, pp. 97-103.] (Greek citations omitted):31

(...) When we pass over to matters of doctrine, it is surprising how many points ofcontact there are between the two works [Categories and Topics]. I shall follow the

Categories and point out the parallels in the Topics.

The homonyms, which are given a definition and an illustration in the beginning of

the Categories, have a whole chapter devoted to them in the Topics, the fifteenth of the

first book, where they are also called pollachos legomena [= things said in many

ways]. Of particular significance is 107a 18-20, for in 20 we seem to have a direct

allusion to the definition in the Categories. We must see, Aristotle says, if the generadesignated by the given name are different and not subordinate to one another, (...) (which istherefore a homonym), for the definition of these genera as connected by the name isdifferent (...). The greater space given to homonyms in the Topics is not due so much to adevelopment in doctrine as to the necessities of the subject. The object of the Topics is apurely practical one, to provide the disputant with ready arguments properly pigeon-holed,

and a single general definition of homonyms is not adapted to such use. We must needs gofarther and show in what different special ways homonyms can be detected. The Categorieshave more the appearance of materials gathered in the shape of preliminary definitions ofnecessary concepts.

Synonyms are referred to in the Topics 109b 7, 123a 27, 127b 5, 148a 24, and 162b 37.

Of these, the first is the most important, since it states that the genera are predicated

synonymously of their species; for the latter admit both the name and the definition of

the former (...), assuming it as established that this condition constitutes synonymity.

This is neither more nor less than a silent reference to the definition in the Categories

(1a 6) [When things have the name in common and the definition of being which

corresponds to the name is the same, they are called synonymous].

Moreover we have almost the very words of the Topics in another place in the Categories,

3b 2, [And the primary substances admit the definition of the species and of the genera, andthe species admits that of the genus; for everything said of what is predicated will be said ofthe subject also.] 148a 24 also gives the same definition of synonyms merely in passing.Aristotle is dealing with the definition, and makes a statement that if the opponent makes useof one definition for homonyms it cannot be a correct definition, for it is synonyms and nothomonyms that have one definition connoted by the name (...). He speaks of the definition asalready known. (...).

Paronyms also are made use of in the Topics, 109b 3-12, in a way which shows the

definition in the Categories is not purely grammatical, as it may seem at first sight, but

has a logical significance quite as important as that of the former two. Paronymous

predication is predication per accidens, as contrasted with synonymous, which may be

per se (cf. also Trendelenburg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, p.27 et seq. and 30). Here

also paronyms are not defined. It is assumed that the reader knows what they are. (...)Categories 3, p. 1b 10-15 expresses very much the same thought as Topics IV, 1, p. 121a20-6. The former states that whatever is true of the species is true of the individuals underthe species (...), the latter that to whatever the species applies the genus does also (...). Theyboth involve the logical hierarchy of genus, species and individual, and the two principlesare: (1) The genus applies not only to the species but also to the individual; (2) to theindividual belongs not only the species but also the genus. What is especially important to

31 (http://www.formalontology.it/aristotle-categories.htm [3/24/08])

26


27/127

notice is that, in the Topics, the principle is stated as already known and is applied to theparticular case, thus assuming the existence of another treatise where these principles arestated and proved for the first time.

The treatment of the difference develops gradually in the Topics in the following pas-

sages: 107b 19 sq., 144b 12 sq., and 153b 6. The first of these is word for word the same

with the statement in the Categories, 1b 16 sq., and they were both quoted above.

Moreover the way in which the passage in the Topics is introduced, (...) makes it a directreference to the Categories. Aristotles doctrine concerning the difference so far is that ofdifferent genera which are not subordinated one to the other: the differences are different inspecies. In the second passage quoted above, 144b 12, Aristotle corrects this view by addingthat the differences in the given case need not be different unless the different genera cannotbe put under a common higher genus. In the third passage, 153b 6, Aristotle adds some morequalifications which make it clear that in the preceding statements the word etron, in thephrase etron ghenon, must be understood as including contrary genera ( enanta). For therethe case is different. If the contrary genera belong to higher contrary genera, their differencesmay be all the same.

The preceding examination seems to show very clearly that the Topicsbuild upon the basislaid down in the Categories and carry the structure higher and broader. It would be a veryabsurd alternative to suppose that a later writer, making use of the Topics, found nothing elseon the subject of logical difference than the first passage, which he copied verbatim in his

treatise, where, besides, it has no particular reason for existence. As a thought tentativelysuggested, with the view of further elaboration and insertion as a proper link in a chain, thepassage in the Categories assumes a different meaning, and its lack of connection with thepreceding and following ceases to cause us serious difficulty.

If the view of the Categories taken here is justified by the preceding arguments and bywhat is still to come, it might even be a legitimate procedure to make use of the Topics indetermining a disputed reading in the Categories. And we have one at hand in the passagequoted above on the difference.

19. On the categories in relation to signification.

Cf. Aristotle, Topics, I. 9 (103b 27-39) (In:Aristotle. Topics Books I and VIII. TranslatedWith a Commentary by Robin Smith, Oxford University Press, 1997):

It is clear at once that an signifying the what-it-is will sometimes signify asubstance, sometimes a quantity, sometimes a quality, and sometimes one of the other cate-gories. For, supposing the example under consideration is a man, if it says that the exampleis a human or an animal, then it says what it is and signifies a substance. On the other hand,supposing the example under consideration is a white color, if it says that the subject is awhite or a color, then it says what it is and signifies a quality. Similarly, supposing that theexample under consideration is a foot-long length, if it says that the example is a foot-longlength, then it says what it is and signifies a quantity. And likewise with the other . For any of these, both in the case in which the same thing is said about itself and in

the case in which its genus is said about it, signifies what it is. But when it is said aboutanother , then it does not signify what it is, but how much or what sort or one ofthe other categories.

Cf. John Marmysz, Is Heidegger Telling the Truth? Notes:32

32 (http://users.aol.com/geinster/Heid.html [3/9/08])

27


28/127

In the Categories, Aristotle undertook an examination of language which he claimedwould be useful for an inquiry into the question of being. According to Aristotle, things maybe called by equivocal, univocal, or derivative names. If things are named univocally,then the definition of the things so named is the same. If things are named equivocally, thenthose things have differing definitions but the same name. If things are derivatively named,then those things derive their names from a common source, yet find their ultimate, specificdefinitions in differing places.

20. On homonuma andsunonuma.

Those are called homonuma (= equivocals) whose name alone is common, butthe account of the substance corresponding to the name is different: e.g. the bark of thedog and the bark of the tree: both the sound made by the dog and the covering of the treeare called bark, which is the same name; hence they are said to have the same name orare homonymous. Those are called sunonuma (= univocal) whose name and whose ac-count of the substance corresponding to the name are both the same. In sum, homonumaare things having the same name,sunonuma, things having the same meaning.

homonuma: having the same name and the same account of the substance corres-

ponding to the name of the thing sunonuma: having the same name and the account of the substance correspondingto the name of the thing differing

In sum:

things can either have the same name or not if they have the same name then either the account of the substance corresponding

to the name of the thing is the same or not

21. Note on the definitions ofCategories Chapter 1.

As a glance at the Greek, as well as the foregoing commentaries, makes clear, inlaying down the three ways in which things are named, Aristotle says that they or those(things) are called something, and then gives the name variously translated as homo-nyms or equivocals (or synonyms or univocals, etc.)which name, being singular,should not be translated as a plural, nor as an adverb (= equivocally, etc.)nor does hesay that they are named this or that, nor that they are said to be x or y. Hence all suchtranslations are inaccurate.

28


29/127

II. ON WHAT IS SIGNIFIED ACCORDING TO THE CATEGORIES.

1. On three ways in which things are said.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1, 1a 1-15 (tr. B.A.M.; Lat. Boethius):

Those (things) are called equivocal whose name alone is common, but the account of thesubstance corresponding to the name is different, as man and picture are zion.33 For of these

only the name is common, but the account of the substance corresponding to the name is dif-ferent. For if one were to assign what it is for either of these to be to zi, he would give theaccount proper to each.34

But they are called univocal whose name is common, as well as the account of thesubstance corresponding to the name, as man and ox are animal. For each of these is calledby the common name animal, and the account of the substance is the same. For if one wereto give the account of each, what it is for each of these to be animals, he would give thesame account.35

But they are called denominative which, with a different ending [or case, or fall,ptosei], have an appellation [prosegorian] from something corresponding to the name, asgrammarian from grammar, and brave from bravery.36

The subjects being determined about, which are certain things:

(1) things whose name alone is common, but the account of the substance correspond-ing to the name is different, as man and picture are zion

(2) things whose name is common, as well as the account of the substance correspond-ing to the name, as man and ox are animal

(3) things which have an appellation from something corresponding to a name butdiffer only by endingthat is, the designation each has (or derives) from itssource-name differs solely in case or fall, as grammarian from grammar, andbrave from bravery

Hence, things may either have a name in common or not, or they may either by namedfrom another name or not. But, as we learn from the Peri Hermeneias, names are vocalsounds, the significations of which are pragmata. Now although the latter word does notoccur here, it is nevertheless implied: for if one were to ask, What is it that are calledequivocal or univocal or denominative?, the answer would be, certain things whichare signified by agreed upon vocal sounds. Hence, in one way, what we might call thething of a name (res nominis) is seen to be the signification of a vocal sound.

33 In Greek,zion signifies both animal and figure or image, as in a painting (cf. LSJ, s.v. zw=?on); anEnglish equivalent to Aristotles example would be, as a famous person and a triangle are figures, theaccount of what it is to be a figure for each of these being different although the name is the same.34

Aequivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, utanimal homo et quod pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae

ratio diversae. Si quis enim assignat quid sit utrumque eorum, quo sint animalia, propriam assignabitutrique rationem. Note that substance here means the what it is and not the this something of a name.35 Univoca vero dicuntur quorum nomen commune est, et secundum nomen eadem ratio substantiae, utanimal homo atque bos, communi enim nomine utraque animalia nuncapuntur, et est substantiae ratio

eadem. Si quis enim assignet utriusque rationem quid utrumque sit, quo sint animalia, eamdem assignabit

rationem.36Denominativa vero dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo, solo differentia casu, secundum nomen habentappellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus, et a fortitudine fortis.

29


30/127

2. The way in which the foregoing definitions are to be understood.

In support of our reading of the text, let us take our example of the name figure:When we say things like The President is a (public) figure and A triangle is a figure,both man and geometrical object are called something, namely, figure. Now in both caseswe observe t

Documents

On What is Signified, Part I