OBIGGS II Improvement Project Team - ASQasq.org/wcqi/2008/pdf/boeing-obiggsii-team-presentation-07silver.pdf · OBIGGS II Improvement Project (US Air Force Photo) The C-17 is an amazing

2007 ASQ World Conference for Quality and Improvement

International Team Excellence Award Competition – 30 April, 2007 1

INTRODUCTION

OBIGGS IIImprovement Project Team

OBIGGS IIImprovement Project Team

Good afternoon, my name is Don Snow. I am the lead engineer and system architect of the Boeing C-17 OBIGGS II improvement project.



INTRODUCTION

OBIGGS II Improvement ProjectOBIGGS II Improvement Project

(US Air Force Photo)

The C-17 is an amazing military cargo plane. It carries enormouspayload over long distances, yet can land on short, un-preparedrunways. The C-17 delivers cargo and troops directly to the battlefield, so the fuel tanks are protected by an “OBIGGS”, which stands for On-Board Inert Gas Generating System. The OBIGGS prevents the tanks from exploding if hit by enemy gunfire by injecting inert nitrogen gas into the space above the fuel.



INTRODUCTION



The first 141 C-17s were delivered with an OBIGGS - which we call OBIGGS 1 – that did successfully protect the fuel tanks, but required frequent maintenance. Our presentation tells the story of how our team successfully replaced OBIGGS 1 with a completely new design, called OBIGGS II. OBIGGS is now one of the strongest systems on the C-17, instead of the weakest.



INTRODUCTION

Top Row: Brent Theodore, John Watson, Dan Ehlers

Bottom Row: Rick Morey, Don Snow, Ben Canfield

Top Row: Brent Theodore, John Watson, Dan Ehlers

Bottom Row: Rick Morey, Don Snow, Ben Canfield


The six of us will represent the …



INTRODUCTION


… more than 200 Boeing, 150 supplier, and 50 US Air Force team members, that took this project from concept to reality.



1A.aTypes of Data and Quality Tools Used to

Select the Project and Why they were UsedTypes of Data and Quality Tools Used to

Select the Project and Why they were Used

Mean Manhours To Repair

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3023 49 76 42 14 24 46 41 55 11 45 97 91 13 71 44 61 47 12 57 51 72 63 69 62 64 65 68

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Man

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rs Good

OB

IGG

S 1

Mean Manhours To Repair

0

5

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3023 49 76 42 14 24 46 41 55 11 45 97 91 13 71 44 61 47 12 57 51 72 63 69 62 64 65 68

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S 1

Section 1A.a describes the data and quality tools we used to select the project.

The C-17 is very reliable compared to other military transports. Even so, we continuously look for ways to improve the design and make the airplane more reliable for the men and women who fly and maintain it.

Boeing created a tool to capture the time required to maintain each of the aircraft systems from the Air Force maintenance records. Wehave a process to review the output from that tool every month. A typical example is shown in this chart. The engines were the only system that required more repair time than OBIGGS I. We observed that improving OBIGGS reliability would have more impact on the airplane reliability than almost any other system.



1A.aTypes of Data and Quality Tools Used to

Select the Project and Why they were UsedTypes of Data and Quality Tools Used to

Select the Project and Why they were Used

To track performance of OBIGGS

Reliability EngineerWeekly representation of field activity

Tracking Charts & In-Service Evaluations

Determine Root Causes of individual failures

Reliability & Design Engineers

Analyze each and every piece of data

Step-by-step Detailed Analysis

To Identify Failure Drivers within the system

Reliability, Design Engineers & Suppliers

Ranking of components and failure modes

Pareto Analysis

Boeing C-17’s closed loop system for tracking corrective actions

Reliability EngineerStore data from Air Force for Boeing analysis

FRACAS (Boeing database)

C-17 source of Supplier repair induction data


Collect data on component repairs

GOLD (Boeing database)

Formulate solutionsAll stakeholdersFree flow of ideasBrainstorming

Best source of field failure data

Reliability EngineerCollect maintenance activity of OBIGGS

Air Force Maintenance Data

Why It Was UsedWho Used ItHow It Was UsedMethod / Tool

We have other tools that track the reliability of each subsystem and component on the airplane. These tools will be discussed in more detail in section 2, but the output confirmed the low reliability of the OBIGGS I components.

We knew it wouldn’t be easy to improve the OBIGGS I reliability, because we had already identified the root causes of the most frequent failures and had tried to upgrade those components.



1A.bReasons Why the Project was SelectedReasons Why the Project was Selected

OBIGGS IMPROVEMENT PROJECTION vs. ACTUAL RELIABILIT Y

020406080

100120140160180200220240260280300320340360380400420440460480500520540560580

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-02

MONTH

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Goal

ActualReliability

ImprovementProjection

GOODProjected Improvement

After Incremental Design Change Implementation

SYSTEM OBJECTIVE

Section 1A.b. We discovered we were generally successful in fixing the original root causes of the component failures. Unfortunately, we also found when the parts lasted a little longer, that new failure modes appeared and prevented the breakthrough reliability improvement we had expected.

The OBIGGS II Improvement project was selected to determine whether a different and simpler method of inerting the fuel tanks was feasible, because of the unsuccessful attempt to improve system reliability by improving the OBIGGS I components.



OBIGGS 1 Problems:– High repair costs– High labor hours

– Airplanes not mission capable

OBIGGS 1 Problems:– High repair costs– High labor hours

– Airplanes not mission capable

Customer Ranked OBIGGS 1 Reliability Improvement as No. 1 C-17 Priority

1A.bReasons Why the Project was SelectedReasons Why the Project was Selected

Meanwhile, our stakeholders were dealing with the effects of an unreliable system ...

… The asset managers were spending millions to repair failed OBIGGS 1 parts.

The technicians were constantly troubleshooting and replacing failed components.

The mission planners at headquarters couldn’t schedule missions for C-17s that were unavailable while OBIGGS maintenance was going on.

All of this prompted the Air Force Council that sets funding priorities to rank OBIGGS reliability improvement as the number one priority for future C-17 funding.



• Pilots and maintenance personnel helped quantify low OBIGGS 1 reliability

• Team was expanded to include representatives of the following stakeholders– Pilots– Maintainers– Engineering – Production– Field engineers– Support Systems– Customer Engineering– Supplier Management



1A.cInvolvement of Potential Stakeholders in

Project SelectionInvolvement of Potential Stakeholders in

Project Selection

Section 1A.c. Stakeholders were critically involved in project selection.

Our customer stakeholders helped us quantify the low reliability of OBIGGS I. The measured reliability is not public information, but was used by the team to select the project. The customer also validated the need for the project by ranking OBIGGS reliability improvement as their top priority.

Identifying the stakeholder universe was simple, because all of our customers work for the Air Force and have well-defined roles and responsibilities. We followed a company process to make sure weidentified all affected stakeholders.

The most important way stakeholders were involved in project selection….







Customer Approved and Funded OBIGGS II Improvement Project

1A.cInvolvement of Potential Stakeholders in

Project SelectionInvolvement of Potential Stakeholders in

Project Selection

… was that our project was customer-funded. We knew we had their buy-in, since they deferred other priorities to fund our project.



1B.aAffected Organizational Goals/

Performance Measures and StrategiesAffected Organizational Goals/

Performance Measures and Strategies

Improved ReliabilityImproved Reliability(US Air Force Photo)

Section 1B.a. We established three performance measures at project kick-off.

The first was improved reliability and was determined by our Air Force customer. That metric became our top priority, since it was the reason for their investment.






Improved ReliabilityImproved Reliability Reduced Initialization TimeReduced Initialization Time

(US Air Force Photo) (US Air Force Photo)

The second performance measure was to reduce initialization time, or the time to inert the tanks on start-up. This was also selected by our customer.

Quantified targets for both metrics were established and the projections for each were updated and reported throughout the project.






Improved ReliabilityImproved Reliability Reduced Initialization TimeReduced Initialization Time

Increased RevenueIncreased Revenue


We picked a third performance measure, which was to achieve Excellentaward fee ratings from our customer. The Air Force evaluates each project they fund semi-annually and those ratings determine an incentive payment to Boeing.



Run HealthyBusiness

Leverage to Emerging

Opportunities

Create New Frontiers

TimeTime

Value

Creation

Value

Creation

Our Vision:

People Working Together

to Provide the World’s First

Choice for Global Airlift

and Mobility Solutions

Our Vision:





Profitably

Expand

Markets

� Achieve aggressive, sustainable improvements to safety, quality, schedule and cost

� Strengthen stakeholder relationships

� Relentlessly improve and integrate processes

� Create Agile Logistics Mobility and Systems Solutions

� Create Next Generation Airlift/Support

� Create Network-Centric Capability Integration

� Accelerate Technology Integration

� Aggressively pursue a sustainable competitive advantage

� Capture additional C-17 business (C-17, BC-17X, International)

� Launch C-17A+

� Capture Performance Improvement contracts

� Expand alliances and partnerships

Operational

Efficiency

Customer

Solutions

• Customer• Work Force• Suppliers• Community• Shareholders

Stakeholder

Requirements

& Expectations




Now I’ll cover how those performance measures fit into our company goals and strategies.

These are the company-level objectives for the C-17 program.



Run HealthyBusiness


Opportunities


TimeTime

Value

Creation

Value

Creation

Our Vision:





Our Vision:





Profitably

Expand

Markets










� Launch C-17A+

� Capture Performance Improvement contracts

� Expand alliances and partnerships

Operational

Efficiency

Customer

Solutions


Stakeholder

Requirements

& Expectations




The OBIGGS II project supported all three aspects of the organizational strategy to Run a Healthy Business:

To improve safety, quality, schedule, and cost

To strengthen stakeholder relationships

And to improve and integrate processes



Receive EXELLENT award fee ratings from customer

Strengthen Stakeholder Relationships

Key Performance Measures:• Improve reliability• Reduce initialization time

Improve Satisfaction Index

Improve Mission Capable Rate

Project Strategies:• Enhance customer satisfaction by developing a simpler, more reliable OBIGGS• Develop and implement innovative methods and processes to maximize return on investment

Organizational StrategiesOrganizational Organizational StrategiesStrategies

Organizational Organizational GoalsGoals

Project Project Performance Performance MeasuresMeasures

Relentlessly Improve & Integrate Process

Achieve Aggressive Improvements in safety, quality, schedule, and cost

Capture Incentive Award Fee




Our three performance measures directly support organizational goals which support the three organizational strategies I just highlighted.



Improved ReliabilityImproved Reliability

1B.bTypes of Impact the Project Will Have on

Each Goal/Performance MeasureTypes of Impact the Project Will Have on

Each Goal/Performance Measure

• Reduce repair cost• Reduce maintenance labor• Improve mission capable rate



For 1B.b, the project would have the following types of impact:

Improving the OBIGGS reliability would reduce repair cost, reduce maintenance labor, and improve aircraft mission capable rate.




1B.b

Reduced Initialization TimeReduced Initialization Time• Improve aircraft availability• Improve aircraft availability

Types of Impact the Project Will Have on Each Goal/Performance Measure





Reducing the fuel tank initialization time would make the airplane more available for the customer




1B.b

Reduced Initialization TimeReduced Initialization Time

Increased RevenueIncreased Revenue• Excellent performance

captures potential incentive award fee

• Customer confidence for future projects

• Excellent performance captures potential incentive award fee

• Customer confidence for future projects



• Improve aircraft availability• Improve aircraft availability• Reduce repair cost• Reduce maintenance labor• Improve mission capable rate



Managing the project to meet the performance, schedule, and costtargets would result in greater incentive award fees to Boeing. The potential award fees were large, since they were a percentage of total project cost.




1B.cDegree of Impact on Each Goal/Performance

Measure and How DeterminedDegree of Impact on Each Goal/Performance

Measure and How Determined

• Projected 1100% increase• Determined by system

reliability analysis




Section 1B.c. We estimated the degree of impact to each of the three performance measures:

To determine the reliability improvement, we performed a system reliability analysis that conservatively projected OBIGGS II parts would last 11 times longer than OBIGGS I.




1B.c





Degree of Impact on Each Goal/Performance Measure and How Determined


Reduced Initialization TimeReduced Initialization Time• Projected to initialize five times

faster • Determined by detailed component

analysis and test

• Projected to initialize five times faster

• Determined by detailed component analysis and test


To project the OBIGGS II initialization time, we tested prototype hardwarein a temperature chamber and created computer simulations of the nitrogen distribution in the fuel tanks. The increased capacity of OBIGGS II allows it to initialize the fuel tanks at least five times faster than OBIGGS I.




1B.c

Reduced Initialization TimeReduced Initialization Time• Projected to initialize five times

faster • Determined by detailed component

analysis and test

• Projected to initialize five times faster

• Determined by detailed component analysis and test





Increased RevenueIncreased Revenue• Projected to capture 90% of

available project incentive award fee

• Determined by best performance on prior large-scale integration projects

• Projected to capture 90% of available project incentive award fee

• Determined by best performance on prior large-scale integration projects




Our goal to achieve EXCELLENT ratings from the Air Force customer would qualify us to receive greater than 90 percent of the available award fee. This goal would be a stretch for a project of this complexity, but we had studied the lessons learned from past projects and were confident we could do it.



• Internal stakeholders identified via project management process at kick-off meeting

• External customer stakeholders identified by Boeing Field Services and USAF engineering customers

• External supplier stakeholders identified through competitive bid process

• Internal stakeholders identified via project management process at kick-off meeting

• External customer stakeholders identified by Boeing Field Services and USAF engineering customers

• External supplier stakeholders identified through competitive bid process

1C.aAffected Internal and External

Stakeholders and How they were IdentifiedAffected Internal and External

Stakeholders and How they were Identified

Suppliers

Customer Engineering

Maintainers

Pilots

External

Flight Test

Field Services

Training

Support Systems

Supplier Management

Production

Engineering

Internal

Stakeholders How Affected Stakeholders were IdentifiedHow Affected Stakeholders were Identified

For section 1C.a, I’ll discuss the affected stakeholders.

The internal stakeholders were self-identified per our Boeing project management process at a project kick-off meeting.

Our Boeing field services organization and the customer engineershelped identify specific representatives of each customer group who could help us. We arranged a visit to Air Force headquarters to brief our project and ensure we had representation from all affected customer groups.

Boeing supplier management helped identify and select the externalsuppliers who would participate on the project team through the formal Boeing competitive bid process.



• Project plans were briefed to internal stakeholders and they estimated the technical and cost impact

• Boeing developed specifications in coordination with potential suppliers, then requested formal proposals. Suppliers then determined their impact and Boeing selected the most favorable proposals.

• Customer stakeholders were invited to design reviews and technical meetings

• Team traveled to eight Air Force Bases to explain system impacts





1C.bTypes of Impact on Stakeholders and How

These were DeterminedTypes of Impact on Stakeholders and How

These were Determined

Design and deliver new system componentsSuppliers

Monitor project performance/verify specification complianceCustomer Engineering

Use new maintenance proceduresMaintainers

Understand display changes and reduced initialization timePilots

External

Install instrumentation and verify new system performanceFlight Test

Prepare to assist USAF maintenanceField Services

Create new training courseTraining

Create tech manuals and provision sparesSupport Systems

Procure 1400 new partsSupplier Management

Plan, install, and test new system componentsProduction

Create 750 new drawings for system and support equipmentEngineering

Internal

Types of ImpactStakeholders How Types of Stakeholder Impact were DeterminedHow Types of Stakeholder Impact were Determined

1C.b. The different types of stakeholder impact are shown here.

The internal stakeholder impacts were determined by the stakeholders themselves as part of our formal change process.

Supplier stakeholder impacts were determined during the bid process.

Our team determined the customer impacts and got concurrence we had adequately assessed them at the recurring technical meetings. We also traveled to eight different Air Force bases to explain system impact and ensure we had customer stakeholder support.











1C.c

HighSuppliers

ModerateCustomer Engineering

HighMaintainers

LowPilots

External

HighFlight Test

ModerateField Services

LowTraining

HighSupport Systems

HighSupplier Management

HighProduction

HighEngineering

Internal

Degree of ImpactStakeholders How Degree of Stakeholder Impact was DeterminedHow Degree of Stakeholder Impact was Determined

Degree of Potential Impact on Stakeholders and How These were Determined

Degree of Potential Impact on Stakeholders and How These were Determined

For section 1C.c, the degree of stakeholder impact is shown in the table.

We determined the degree of stakeholder impact in the same way we determined the type of impact. I’ve repeated that information on this slide.

We didn’t expect much stakeholder resistance, beyond the normal resistance to change, because none of the stakeholders were negatively impacted

That completes the story about how and why the project was selected.

Now I’ll introduce John Watson, who will discuss the Current Situation Analysis when we started the project.



2

Current SituationAnalysis

Current SituationAnalysis

ASQ 2007ASQ 2007

Thank You Don,

I’m the Lead Reliability Engineer for the C-17.

I’ll describe the methods, tools and analysis we used to determine the root causes of the OBIGGS 1 problems.



2A.aMethods and Tools Used to Identify

Possible Root CausesMethods and Tools Used to Identify

Possible Root Causes











Pareto Analysis













For section 2A.a, we used a number of methods and tools to determine the possible root causes.
















Pareto Analysis













Our main tool was the Air Force database that contains the C-17 maintenance records. This was the best source of data available for identifying OBIGGS 1 component failures, because the records were generated by the pilots & maintenance crew at the time of failure.
















Pareto Analysis













Next, our Boeing Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) was used to correct, sort, analyze, and store the data from the Air Force records. This tool follows our company procedure for a closed loop corrective action system.
















Pareto Analysis













Using another tool called GOLD, we tracked each component returned to the supplier for repair.
















Pareto Analysis













We also used several tracking charts and In-Service evaluations to monitor the performance of OBIGGS as we implemented fixes to the system’s components.









Determine Root Causesof individual failures







Pareto Analysis













We used a detailed step-by-step approach for analyzing each failure which occurred on the system. This degree of analysis is standard for every maintenance action that takes place on the C-17.
















Pareto Analysis













Performing Pareto Analyses of all of the failures helped us focus our efforts on the driving components for maximum benefit.
















Pareto Analysis













And finally, we used Brainstorming methods with our stakeholders and subject matter experts to help identify root causes.



LOCATION / T/O TIME ACTUAL COUNTED QUESTIONNAIRE TURNED IN OBIGGS OBIGGS SUCCESSFUL SYSTEM RESETS FAULT PILOT ( P) SQUAWK or FROM MAINT. FAILEDDATE AIRCRAFT DESTINATION SORTIE (ZULU) FLT HRS FLT HRS LOG # OPS MAINT USED LEFT RIGHT TOTAL # RESETS LEFT RIGHT # FAULT LIST (FL) CODE JCN P or FL ACTIONS WUC COMMENTS

10-Nov-98 90-0532 WSAP-FJDG 1 0947 4.6 4.6 None 1 111-Nov-98 90-0532 FJDG-WSAP 1 2110 4.9 4.9 9 Y N 1 Y Y 1 0 0 012-Nov-98 90-0532 WSAP-RJTY 1 0437 6.5 6.5 10 ? Y Y 1 Y Y 1 0 0 0 1 OBGULLAG-R 3171006 FL 0 dosen't count

2 OBGXSET2-R 3171007 FL 0 49SC0C/A states ops checked good (this was re-opened as JCN 3192431)

3 OBGDXFVLV 3171008 FL 1 49TA0signed off as duplicate discrepancy to JCN 3171009, but Maint actually found cannon plug disconnected

4 OBGSXFVLV 3171009 FL 1 49LM0C/A states ops checked good (Neer says this was re-opened). G0-81 also shows a JCN 3171010 for same fault .

RJTY-PHIK 2 2250 7.3 7.3 None 1 113-Nov-98 90-0532 PHIK-KDMA 1 0810 6.0 6.0 None 1 1

KDMA-KCHS 2 1610 3.5 3.5 None 1 114-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS-no flts

15-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS-no flts 1OBIGGS Bottle Pressure Xmitter set 2R Faults on Ctrlr & MCD 3192431 Maint. 2

49LY049LQ0

T/S System on 15th, on 16th R2 Controller (s/n 0056 out; 0068 in), ops ck bad, found pins 1A & 1B in TB 3932TB082 required reseating, then ops checked good. Controller should come back from shop as RTOK. This is probable how AF reopened JCN 3171009. Contr

WEEK 1 TOTAL 32.8 32.8 90-0532 MTBMc = 8.20 6.0 6.0 90-053 2 OMS = 100.00 4.016-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS Bravo Alrt17-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS Bravo Alrt18-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS Bravo Alrt19-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS-no flts

20-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS-KDOV 1 2325 1.3 1.3 27 Y N 1 Y Y 1 0 0 0

No squawks or faults. (G0-81 detailed flight hours (F8038 Y option) shows flights to KNBC and back for 4.7 hrs which belong to 97-0042, there were removed.)

KDOV-ETAR 2 0355/21st 7.6 7.6 27 Y N 1 Y Y 1 0 0 0 second sortie included on same questionnaire as first (#27)

21-Nov-98 90-0532 ETAR-KWRI 1 1605 9.5 9.5 28 Y Y ? 1 Y Y 1 0 0 0 1OBIGGS Bleed Reg Vlv - R on Controller. Sys didn't fail. 3261001 FL 1 49LD0

write-up on discrepancy line as if pilot wrote it up, and fault code "OBGBRVLV-R" checked. Don't think pilot would look at controller.

KWRI-KCHS 2 0450/22nd 1.7 1.7 28 Y Y ? 1 Y Y 1 0 0 0 2 OBGBRVLV-? 3261002 FL 0 49LD0Job closed as "cleared cnt/rtn to serv. Ops ck good" on day 326, but this ties with above squawk (JCN 3261001)

3

#3 Eng OBIGGS Bleed Pressure Regulator Fitting needs to be reemed out 3322843 Maint 0 49LD0 ties with above squawk (JCN 3261001)

22-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS-KCOF 1 2105 1.0 1.0 NONE 1 1WEEK 2 TOTAL 21.1 21.1 90-0532 MTBMc = 21.10 5.0 5.0 90-05 32 OMS = 100.00 1.0

23-Nov-98 90-0532 KCOF-TAPA 1 1745 2.9 2.9 40 ? Y N 1 Y N 1 0 0 0Questionnaire states that right side only operated for 2.3 hrs. No squawks or faults recorded. Also, questionnaire shows 3.3 Flt hrs.

TAPA-FHAW 2 0005/24th 7.3 7.3 NONE 1 124-Nov-98 90-0532 FHAW-no flts25-Nov-98 90-0532 FHAW-TAPA 1 0230 7.8 7.8 NONE 1 1

TAPA-KCOF 2 1245 3.6 3.6 NONE 1 1KCOF-KCHS 3 1750 1.0 1.0 NONE 1 1

26-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS-no flts27-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS-no flts28-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS-no flts29-Nov-98 90-0532 KCHS-no flts

WEEK 3 TOTAL 22.6 22.6 90-0532 MTBMc = #DIV/0! 5.0 5.0 90- 0532 OMS = 100.00 0.0









49LY049LQ0









3
















49LY049LQ0









3








Maintenance Data

2A.bTeam Analysis of Data to Identify

Possible Root CausesTeam Analysis of Data to Identify


Detailed Step-by-step analysisDetailed Step-by-step analysis

• What failed

• When it failed

• Where in the world it failed

• On which aircraft

• Under what conditions

• What failed

• When it failed

• Where in the world it failed

• On which aircraft

• Under what conditions

• How was aircraft repaired

• How long did it take to repair the aircraft

• How long was the aircraft out of service

• What parts were turned in for repair

• How the suppliers fixed the part

• How was aircraft repaired

• How long did it take to repair the aircraft

• How long was the aircraft out of service

• What parts were turned in for repair

• How the suppliers fixed the part

Match up the pieces of data withMatch up the pieces of data with

For section 2A.b, we analyzed all of the data we had collected using our various tools. We identified all of the components in the system which failed and were removed.

We studied what, when and where they failed, on which aircraft and what parts were turned in for repairs.

Our research revealed not only were the system’s components failing far too often, but also the time to initialize the system took way too long and added unnecessary stress on other systems.

By performing this analysis, we identified the maintenance burden imposed by the OBIGGS 1. While the specific numbers cannot be released publicly, I can tell you the system’s drain on maintenance, both in time and money, was significant.



OBIGGS COMPONENT REMOVALS

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

SYSTEM COMPONENTS

NU

MB

ER

OF

RE

MO

VA

LS79.3%

Pareto Analysis




4 main problem components were focus of initial improvement attempts4 main problem components were focus of initial improvement attempts

The results of the Pareto analysis showed 4 components of the system accounted for almost 80% of the removals. However there were many other components which significantly contributed to the system’s problem.



Brainstorming– Inherent design weakness– Maintenance malpractice– Poor quality– Inadequate troubleshooting

manuals and procedures

OBIGGS COMPONENT REMOVALS

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

SYSTEM COMPONENTS

NU

MB

ER

OF

RE

MO

VA

LS

79.3%

Pareto Analysis









49LY049LQ0









3
















49LY049LQ0









3
















49LY049LQ0









3








Maintenance Data




The brainstorming exercises established a list of possible root causes:

• Like which components had inherent design weaknesses

• Where maintenance malpractices were occurring in which an easy-to-remove component was constantly replaced to correct a problem, which just masked the real problem.

• Some of the components would fail again shortly after being repaired.

• And some of the trouble shooting procedures were lacking.



2A.cStakeholder Involvement in

Identifying Root CausesStakeholder Involvement in

Identifying Root Causes

Concurred with analysisEvaluated dataEngineers

Recorded maintenanceRepaired aircraft system

Maintainers

Reported system failuresOperated OBIGGS 1Pilots

Provide Field Reports & spares quantities

Collected & provided data

Support Systems

Identified Root Causes of component failures

Performed detailed failure analysis

Design Engineers

Oversight & ConcurrenceParticipation in Reliability Evaluation

Air Force Customers

Performed main portion of analysis and reported findings

Collected & analyzed data

Reliability & Maintainability Engineer

RolesInvolvementStakeholder

Turning to section 2A.c, we involved some of our stakeholders in identifying the root causes by having them participate in the analysis.

Our Engineering Groups, both Reliability and Design, conducted most of the analysis to determine the possible root causes.

Our Support Systems groups assisted by collecting detailed data, writing Field Reports, and reporting spares consumption.

And …



US Air Force Customer participated in OBIGGS 1 evaluations and analysis

2A.cStakeholder Involvement in

Identifying Root CausesStakeholder Involvement in

Identifying Root Causes


… our Air Force customers were involved by participating in multiple reliability evaluations with the upgraded OBIGGS 1 components installed.

Pilots reported failures, maintenance personnel recorded their repairs, and engineers helped evaluate the data and concurred with our findings.



2B.aMethods and Tools Used to Identify

Final Root CausesMethods and Tools Used to Identify

Final Root Causes



Tracking Charts








Pareto Analysis













Section 2B.a. The methods and tools used to identify the final root cause included all those mentioned earlier, plus:

We gathered more detailed data so we could perform more Pareto Analyses.





Final Root Causes

To get the real story of what was going on

Reliability, Design & Field Engineers

Collect actual experiences

Customer (field user) Interviews

To track performance of OBIGGSReliability EngineerWeekly representation of field activity

Tracking Charts


Reliability & Design EngineersAnalyze each and every piece of data





Pareto Analysis





Reliability & Design EngineersCollect data on component repairs



Best source of field failure dataReliability EngineerCollect maintenance activity of OBIGGS



We added interviews with the Air Force Pilots and Maintainers to fully understand what was really happening with the system. This verified that we were on the right track.





Final Root Causes

Supplement FRACAS with more detail

Suppliers, Boeing Reliability & Design

Collect & Analyze repair records

Supplier repair databases






Tracking Charts







Pareto Analysis











We supplemented the repair data by contacting the suppliers directly to obtain detailed information about the specific cause of each failure.





Final Root Causes

Supplement FRACAS with more detail

Suppliers, Boeing Reliability & Design

Collect & Analyze repair records

Supplier repair databases





Search for final Root Cause


Detailed study of all failure modes

Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA)


Tracking Charts







Pareto Analysis











And we used a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis during the search for a final root cause to identify failure modes which had not yet occurred.



Team Analysis

2B.bTeam Analysis of Data to Select the

Final Root CausesTeam Analysis of Data to Select the

Final Root Causes

Section 2B.b. Our team of stakeholders, which now included our suppliers, analyzed all of the detailed data to determine the final root causes. We started with our list of possible root causes and then dove deeper into our data.



Suppliers’ analysis of removed parts



Final Root Causes

Our suppliers performed detailed analysis of what failed on each of their returned components and formulated ideas for solutions.

They, in turn, involved their sub-tier suppliers for even more detailed analysis of how piece parts were failing and had them conduct further testing.



Expanded Pareto analysis

OBIGGS COMPRESSOR FAILURE MODES

02468

101214161820222426283032343638404244464850525456586062646668

C o m po ne nts f a ilure



Final Root Causes

Pareto results for just one of the driving components shows multiple issues

Pareto results for just one of the driving components shows multiple issues

With this added detail, we expanded our Pareto analysis down into problems within the individual components.

The Pareto results shown here represent just one of the top 4 driving components, and illustrate the complexity of the system. You can see the multiple ways this single component was failing.

Each of the other components had a similar list of issues.



Plotted performance of the system showed less than desired results from changes made



Final Root Causes


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ActualReliabilityImprovementProjection

GOOD

Projected Improvement After Design Change Implementation

SYSTEM OBJECTIVE

Our tracking tools continued to show even after implementing multiple component design changes, we were not achieving the system-level reliability improvement we expected.

We also realized that since the system was so inherently complex, the reliability goal we were shooting for would always be perceived as too low and the Air Force would be unhappy with it’s performance.



Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA)



Final Root Causes

Identified many failure modes for the OBIGGS 1 componentsIdentified many failure modes for the OBIGGS 1 components

We conducted a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of the entire OBIGGS 1 using the results of our detailed analysis reviews. We concluded from this analysis that there were far too many failure modes.



Final Root Cause :

The original design was inherently too complex and time consuming to fix to desired levels

2B.cIdentification of Root Causes and How the

Team Validated the Final Root CauseIdentification of Root Causes and How the

Team Validated the Final Root Cause

For section 2B.c, the final root cause was identified.

The entire OBIGGS 1 was inherently too complex to fix.

And even if we could fix the reliability problem, we could not reduce the time it took to initialize the system due to it’s design methodology.

We saw an improvement opportunity: completely redesign the system.



Actual performance tracking validated that Incremental improvements would not result in

acceptable performance

2B.cIdentification of Root Causes and How the

Team Validated the Final Root CauseIdentification of Root Causes and How the

Team Validated the Final Root Cause


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ActualReliabilityImprovementProjection

GOOD

Projected Improvement After Design Change Implementation

SYSTEM OBJECTIVE

Since the Air Force was an active participant on our team, they saw we were not obtaining the desired reliability improvements after numerous design changes. They now understood the operational burdens inherent to the design and concurred with our findings. The customer willingness to fund our project was evidence of their validation that we had determined the correct root cause.

This concludes my portion. Now, I’d like to introduce Brent Theodorewho will present our Solution Development.



3

Solution DevelopmentSolution Development

ASQ 2007ASQ 2007

I was the Systems Engineer on the OBIGGS II project. My part of the story is to describe how we developed the solution.



Low NEA

pressure into

compressor

NEA inlet filter

blockedTubing

leak or blocka

ge between ASM

and compressor

Low NEA

pressure

out of ASM

ASM check valve

failureASM shutoff valve diaphr

agm disbo

nd

Low air

pressure

out of OBIG

GS heat

exchanger

ASM filter

plugged

ASM press

ure regula

tor regula

tes low

ASM shutoff valve

fails closed

(cont. on page 3)

Fault Tree Analysis

Possible Solutions

3A.aMethods and Tools Used to Develop

Possible SolutionsMethods and Tools Used to Develop

Possible Solutions

Brainstorming

Benchmark Suppliers

Section 3A.a. One method we used to identify lessons learned from OBIGGS I was fault tree analysis.

We used Brainstorming throughout the process.

To stimulate the brainstorming, we traced the OBIGGS 1 design back to the original requirements. In some cases, we found those requirements were based on overly conservative assumptions. We also considered technology that was immature during the initial design, but was now proven.

We also visited multiple suppliers during the early phase to gain input on our preliminary concepts. We found out what contributions they could make, what we could do at the system level to simplify their design and lower risk.

Using these methods, we successfully consolidated the ideas for improvement into four different concepts that could be more reliable than OBIGGS I. The consensus of the team verified the four solutions were viable.



Performance

3A.bTeam Analysis of Data to Develop

Possible SolutionsTeam Analysis of Data to Develop

Possible Solutions

For section 3A.b, the team analyzed the four possible solutions and defined the architecture and required performance for each. This effort resulted in a set of components for each solution that would be used in further detailed analysis.

We also created analytical tools to determine how much nitrogen would be needed to inert the tanks for each architecture.





Possible Solutions

Performance

Sizing

Component size and weight were analyzed to meet baseline performance for each option.

Then, component data was totaled for each system to use in comparing the options.



Performance

Sizing

Reliability



Possible Solutions

We analyzed the reliability of each component by combining supplier data with our aircraft operation experience.

Then, we computed a system-level reliability for each solution.



Performance

Sizing

Reliability Cost



Possible Solutions

Component costs were computed in the same way and then totaled for each solution.

With solid estimates of the performance, sizing, reliability, and cost, we were ready to rate how well each option satisfied the selection criteriareceived from the customer.



Design Requirements 5 3 1 1. Supports tank volume of 5110 cu ft Supports > 5110 Supports < 5110 2. Maintain tank and vent system inert through all mission profiles

Tanks and vent inert through all profiles

Tanks inert through all profiles, vents most

Tanks and vents inert through most profiles

3. Total engine flow within limits < 12 % > 12 % 4. Initialization time < 40 min. t < 30 min. 30 min.≤ t < 180 min. 180 min. ≤ t 5. Mean-Time Between Maintenance, corrective

MTBMc > 100 hrs 52.5 hrs ≤ MTBMc ≤ 100 hrs MTBMc < 52.5 hrs

6. Life Cycle Costs LCC ≤ 90% of current 90% of current < LCC < current LCC ≥ Current 7. No increase in pilot workload Decrease in workload Same workload Slight increase in workload 10. Qualified components Qualified Partially qualified Not qualified 11. Fuel tank pressures Meets pressure settings Doesn't meet pressure settings 12. Single ASM failure does not limit mission capability

All missions possible 95% of missions still possible 90% of missions still possible

13. Detect individual LRU failures LRUs identified and isolated by BIT

Failures identified, but fault tree required for isolation

Periodic ops checks and isolation required

14. Capable of inert 2000 fpm descent with any single failure

2000 fpm possible with all single failure types

2000 fpm possible with all except 2 failure types

2000 fpm possible with all except > 2 failure types

15. No two failures cause critical structural failure or prevent recovery

No critical double failures

Critical double failures exist

16. No Real Hazard I>11 All RHIs < 8 8 ≤ RHIs < 11 Some RHIs ≥ 11 17. Current cockpit philosophy Integrated Pseudo Integrated Not integrated 18. Capability of retrofit Easy retrofit Hard to retrofit Can't retrofit 20. General design practices Design standards

followed in all areas Design standards followed in

most areas Design standards followed in

some areas 21. Production Cost Savings CS > $300K $150K < CS ≤ $300K CS ≤ $150K

Note: Sensitive data blocked out

3A.cCriteria the Team Decided to Use in

Selecting the Final SolutionCriteria the Team Decided to Use in

Selecting the Final Solution

Section 3A.c shows the design criteria used to evaluate each of the possible solutions. We surveyed the customers to ensure we had captured and ranked the critical system level requirements.

A Quality Functional Deployment (QFD) analysis then defined the relationship between each design criteria and those system requirements. Then, the design criteria was weighted to correlate with the system requirement weighting factors provided by the customer.

The highest weighting was applied to criteria 4 and 5 for reliability and initialization time to support our company strategy to Run A Healthy Business.



Assembled Stakeholder Team

Possible Solutions

Final Solution

3B.aMethods and Tools Used by the Team to

Select the Final SolutionsMethods and Tools Used by the Team to

Select the Final Solutions

Presented Analysis

Performed Trade Study

Design Requirements 5 3 1 1. Supports tank volume of 5110 cu ft Supports > 5110 Supports < 5110 2. Maintain tank and vent system inert through all mission profiles

Tanks and vent inert through all profiles

Tanks inert through all profiles, vents most

Tanks and vents inert through most profiles

3. Total engine flow within limits < 12 % > 12 % 4. Initialization time < 40 min. t < 30 min. 30 min.≤ t < 180 min. 180 min. ≤ t 5. Mean-Time Between Maintenance, corrective

MTBMc > 100 hrs 52.5 hrs ≤ MTBMc ≤ 100 hrs MTBMc < 52.5 hrs

6. Life Cycle Costs LCC ≤ 90% of current 90% of current < LCC < current LCC ≥ Current 7. No increase in pilot workload Decrease in workload Same workload Slight increase in workload 10. Qualified components Qualified Partially qualified Not qualified 11. Fuel tank pressures Meets pressure settings Doesn't meet pressure settings 12. Single ASM failure does not limit mission capability

All missions possible 95% of missions still possible 90% of missions still possible

13. Detect individual LRU failures LRUs identified and isolated by BIT

Failures identified, but fault tree required for isolation

Periodic ops checks and isolation required

14. Capable of inert 2000 fpm descent with any single failure

2000 fpm possible with all single failure types

2000 fpm possible with all except 2 failure types

2000 fpm possible with all except > 2 failure types

15. No two failures cause critical structural failure or prevent recovery

No critical double failures

Critical double failures exist

16. No Real Hazard I>11 All RHIs < 8 8 ≤ RHIs < 11 Some RHIs ≥ 11 17. Current cockpit philosophy Integrated Pseudo Integrated Not integrated 18. Capability of retrofit Easy retrofit Hard to retrofit Can't retrofit 20. General design practices Design standards

followed in all areas Design standards followed in

most areas Design standards followed in

some areas 21. Production Cost Savings CS > $300K $150K < CS ≤ $300K CS ≤ $150K

Performance

Sizing

Reliability Cost

Performance

Sizing

Reliability Cost

Section 3B.a. We conducted an extensive trade study to select the final solution following our standard Boeing Systems Engineering practice for optimizing a balanced trade-off of requirements among variousengineering design alternatives.

First, we expanded our team to include representatives of all of the stakeholders.

We presented a description of each possible solution and the projected performance, sizing, reliability, and cost of each to the expanded team. This review gave an opportunity for the different stakeholders to suggest new ideas for consideration.

Finally, the stakeholder team scored each option in the trade study before selecting the final solution.



FINALSOLUTION


Final SolutionTeam Analysis of Data to Select the

Final Solution

Determine Options

Option 1

Option 2

Option 3

Option 4

Determine Options

Option 1

Option 2

Option 3

Option 4

Establish CriteriaEstablish Criteria

Identify ConstraintsIdentify Constraints

System RequirementsSystem Requirements

WeightingWeighting

Score OptionsScore Options

Compare ScoresCompare Scores

In Section 3B.b the four design options and QFD analysis developed

previously were then combined in our detailed trade study analysis.

The QFD defined the weighting factors for the different design criteria

that correlated with the customer weighted system requirements. This step ensured higher priority was given to the designs that best met the

customer needs.

The team then scored each possible solution against each of the

different design criteria. After the scoring was complete, we

compared the results to ensure they were objective and consistent. Then the weighting factors were applied and the results were totaled.

The option with the highest score became our final solution.



SuppliersSuppliers

MaintainersMaintainers

BusinessOperationsBusiness

Operations

ProductionProduction

LogisticsSupport

LogisticsSupport

EngineeringEngineering

Air ForceAir Force

OperatorsOperators

3B.cInvolvement of Stakeholders in the

Selection of the Final SolutionInvolvement of Stakeholders in the

Selection of the Final Solution

SuppliersSuppliers



Operations


LogisticsSupport

LogisticsSupport


Air ForceEngineering


Flight CrewsFlight Crews

TRADESTUDYTRADESTUDY

3B.c. All stakeholders evaluated each option against the criteria and reached consensus on a score.



SuppliersSuppliers



Operations


LogisticsSupport

LogisticsSupport


Air ForceAir Force

OperatorsOperators





SuppliersSuppliersBusiness

OperationsBusiness

Operations


LogisticsSupport

LogisticsSupport






Customer engineers and pilots had provided the requirements that were inputs to the trade study and could clarify them during the scoring process.



SuppliersSuppliers



Operations


LogisticsSupport

LogisticsSupport


Air ForceAir Force

OperatorsOperators




SuppliersSuppliers



Operations


LogisticsSupport

LogisticsSupport






Boeing stakeholders used their expertise to estimate the performance of the options.



SuppliersSuppliers



Operations


LogisticsSupport

LogisticsSupport


Air ForceAir Force

OperatorsOperators




SuppliersSuppliers



Operations


LogisticsSupport

LogisticsSupport





FinalSolution

TRADE STUDYTRADE STUDY

Each member participated in the trade study that led to the final solution.



Final Solution – Complete System Redesign

• Continuous flow

• Permeable membrane air separation

• Boost compressor for rapid descents

• Bleed air supply from environmental control system

• Open architecture control

• No fuel scrubbing

Final Solution – Complete System Redesign

• Continuous flow

• Permeable membrane air separation

• Boost compressor for rapid descents

• Bleed air supply from environmental control system

• Open architecture control

• No fuel scrubbing

BLEED AIR INLET

OBIGGS HEAT EXCHANGER

ECS PACK

COMPRESSOR

RAM AIR SCOOP

REAR SPAR

ASM SUPPLY

OVERBOARD EXHAUST

TANK 2 PENETRATION

VENTSWEEP

AIR CROSSOVER

ASM

O2 OUT

AIR MANIFOLD

NEA MANIFOLD

BILGE CRAWLER

AIR FILTER

NEA SUPPLY

O2 SENSOR

NEA TO TANK1

NEA SUPPLY HIGH POINT

NEA VENT AND SWEEP VALVES

ER TANK

OBIGGS 2 SYSTEM

LEFT HAND SIDE

FWD

BLEED AIR INLET

OBIGGS HEAT EXCHANGER

ECS PACK

COMPRESSOR

RAM AIR SCOOP

REAR SPAR

ASM SUPPLY

OVERBOARD EXHAUST

TANK 2 PENETRATION

VENTSWEEP

AIR CROSSOVER

ASM

O2 OUT

AIR MANIFOLD

NEA MANIFOLD

BILGE CRAWLER

AIR FILTER

NEA SUPPLY

O2 SENSOR

NEA TO TANK1

NEA SUPPLY HIGH POINT

NEA VENT AND SWEEP VALVES

ER TANK

OBIGGS 2 SYSTEM

LEFT HAND SIDE

FWD

3C.aFinal Solution and How the Team

Validated the Final SolutionFinal Solution and How the Team

Validated the Final Solution

Now for section 3C.a, the final solution was to completely re-design the OBIGGS with the characteristics listed on this slide. This solution offered the largest potential return on investment, even though the development cost was high.



0

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ER Tank Aft %O2 ER Tank Fwd %O2 Vent %O2

%O2 Threshold Altitude

3C.a

COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ANALYSIS

0

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form

ance

OBIGGS IOption 1Option 2

Option 3Option 4

Cost As An Independent VariableCost As An Independent Variable System Performance ModelingSystem Performance Modeling

System Lab TestSystem Lab Test

Final Solution and How the Team Validated the Final Solution

Final Solution and How the Team Validated the Final Solution

After completing the trade study, a Cost-As-An-Independent-Variableanalysis was performed to validate the selected solution.

Additional validation efforts included detailed system performance modeling and the assembly of an entire system for laboratory testing.



Reduce Initialization Time by a factor of 5

1100% Increase in system reliability

Reduce weight by 475 lbs to allow for increased cargo

capability

OBIGGS II vs. OBIGGS I RELIABILITY DEMO RESULTS

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GOOD

7,376% IMPROVEMENT

REALIZED

OBIGGS 1 ACTUAL MEAN TIME BETWEEN REMOVAL

OBIGGS II PROJECTED MEAN TIME BETWEEN REMOVALOBIGGS II A

CTUAL MEAN TIME BETWEEN REMOVAL

Tangible Benefits

20% system and 3:1 life cycle cost savings

3C.bTangible and Intangible Benefits Expected

by Implementing the Team’s SolutionTangible and Intangible Benefits Expected

by Implementing the Team’s Solution



Some of the tangible benefits we expected to realize for section 3C.b were:

• Significantly improved reliability and reduced initialization time to make the airplane more available to fly equipment to the front lines,

• Reduced system weight to increase cargo capability,

• And, reduced production and logistics costs



Industry Leader

Customer Satisfaction

PASS THROUGH DATAMAINTENANCE MODE

DISPLAY

OBIGGS II SYSTEM CONTROL/IMPACTS

WACS BUS

WCCW BUS

CONTROLLER

WCCW BUS

CONTROLLER

CIPM BUS

CONTROLLER

CIPM BUS

CONTROLLER

ECSECSAPDMCAPDMCMFDCLFCP

NEW BLEED MANIFOLD

OBIGGS II CONTROL FUNCTIONS

BLEED CONTROLTEMP CONTROL

MISSION STATUSTIME TO INERTMAX DESCENTNON-AVIONICS FAULT DATA

ENGINE BLEEDSTATUS

RIU (NEW BOX)

MISSION BUS

SENSOR AND VALVEPOSITION INPUTS

VALVE RELAYDRIVE OUTPUTS

NO S/W OR H/W CHANGE REQ.

EECEEC

8/26/03

MMP

MODIFY SWITCHES H/W CHANGE ONLY

GRUMODIFY SWITCHES H/W CHANGE ONLY

Intangible Benefits

Open System Architecture

3C.bTangible and Intangible Benefits Expected

by Implementing the Team’s SolutionTangible and Intangible Benefits Expected

by Implementing the Team’s Solution

Intangible benefits we expected were:

• to improve customer satisfaction

• to be the industry leader in inerting system design, and

• to incorporate an open architecture design that would reduce the cost of future improvements.

All benefits aligned with our organizational strategies.



PART NUMBER WUC NOMENCLATURE QPA

Op/Fh Hr

Ratio

PDR MTBRPREDICTION

(Shipset - Flt Hrs)

HST-CDR MTBR

PREDICTION(Shipset - Flt Hrs)

SYSTEM CDR MTBR


17B2N9017-1 49WA0 Valve, OBIGGS Shutoff 2 3.00 6,250 7,000 7,00017B2N9014-1 49WB0 Compressor Assy, Boost, OBIGGS 2 0.05 20,000 20,0001003812-1 49WBC Compressor, Boost, OBIGGS 2 0.1 132,1811003813-1 49WBE Heat Exchanger, Boost Compressor 2 0.1 408,272various 49WBG Ducting, Boost Compressor Assy 6 0.1 728,6241003815-1 49WBA Valve, Pressure Regulator - Boost Compresor

Assy2 1.30 8,250 8,850 8,850

2341872-1-1 49WE0 Heat Exchanger, OBIGGS 2 1.30 89,012 40,000 32,1543291628-1-1 49WF0 Valve, Bypass, OBIGGS Heat Exchanger 2 1.30 16,000 16,000 12,789

17B2N9020-1 49WJ0 Filter Assembly, OBIGGS 2 1.30 - 21,728 21,72817B2N9017-501 49WL0 Valve, OBIGGS Crossfeed 1 1.30 42,000 42,000 42,000various 49WP0 Ducting (upstream of ASMs) 54 1.30 - 80,000 73,14817B2N9017-503 49WM0 Valve, Shutoff, ASM 8 1.30 3,875 13,125 13,12517B2N9015-1 49WN0 Module, Air Separation 8 1.30 1,313 1,875 1,95417B2N9021-1 49XB0 Sensor, Oxygen 2 3.00 12,500 12,500 12,50017B2N9017-505 49XF0 Valve, Low Flow 2 1.30 15,500 18,000 13,73917B2N9017-507 49XG0 Valve, Vent Supply, Fuel Tank 2 1.30 21,000 18,000 13,73917B2N9017-507 49XH0 Valve, Sweep, Fuel Tank 2 1.30 21,000 18,000 13,73917B1U1019-1 49YA0 Remote Interface Unit (RIU), OBIGGS 1 3.00 9,000 9,000 9,091

OBIGGS II SYSTEM TOTAL 556 693 761

PTP-111 THRESHOLD 500 OBJECTIVE 600


Op/Fh Hr

Ratio

PDR MTBRPREDICTION

(Shipset - Flt Hrs)

HST-CDR MTBR


SYSTEM CDR MTBR



Assy2 1.30 8,250 8,850 8,850





Final Reliability Analysis Computational Fluid

Dynamics Analysis

3C.cHow the Team Used Data to Justify

Implementation of the Team’s SolutionHow the Team Used Data to Justify

Implementation of the Team’s Solution

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3C.c. The team used data from various analyses to justify the selection of OBIGGS II.

Final reliability analysis used detailed inputs from actual supplier experience to predict the reliability for each component.

The Computational Fluid Dynamic analysis proved the oxygen in the tanks would be evenly distributed and our initialization time goal would be met.




Op/Fh Hr

Ratio

PDR MTBRPREDICTION

(Shipset - Flt Hrs)

HST-CDR MTBR


SYSTEM CDR MTBR



Assy2 1.30 8,250 8,850 8,850






Op/Fh Hr

Ratio

PDR MTBRPREDICTION

(Shipset - Flt Hrs)

HST-CDR MTBR


SYSTEM CDR MTBR



Assy2 1.30 8,250 8,850 8,850





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Tank 1 %O2 Tank 2 Fwd %O2 Tank 2 Aft %O2

ER Tank Aft %O2 ER Tank Fwd %O2 Vent %O2

%O2 Threshold Altitude

OBIGGS Mission Analysis Program

Final Reliability Analysis

Weight Analysis

Computational Fluid Dynamics Analysis

Life Cycle Cost Analysis

3C.cHow the Team Used Data to Justify

Implementation of the Team’s SolutionHow the Team Used Data to Justify

Implementation of the Team’s Solution

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The weight analysis was a summation of the added components and structural changes less the weight of equipment removed.

The Life Cycle Cost Analysis showed the total cost benefit over time.

The OBIGGS Mission analysis Program was a computer tool developed to simulate the performance of the entire OBIGGS. This simulation confirmed the tanks would remain inert through 28 different mission profiles.

In all cases, the results confirmed the earlier estimates used during the trade study.

Now I’d like to introduce Rick Morey who will present project implementation and results.



4

ProjectImplementation and Results

ProjectImplementation and Results

ASQ 2007ASQ 2007

Hello, I was the OBIGGS II project manager and will talk about the project implementation and results.



Communication

Teamwork

4A.aTypes of Internal and External Stakeholder

Involvement in ImplementationTypes of Internal and External Stakeholder

Involvement in Implementation

• System Requirements Review

• System Design Review

• Preliminary Design Reviews (Supplier and Customer)

• Critical Design Reviews (Supplier and Customer)

FORMAL DESIGN REVIEWS

• Assembly Simulations

• Prototype Fit Checks on Aircraft

• Document Quality Inspections

DESIGN FOR MANUFACTURING AND ASSEMBLY

• Proactive Issue Resolution

• First Article Inspections

PRODUCTION SUPPORT

• Combined Validation/Verification Component Reviews

• Flight Test

• In Service Evaluation

VALIDATION / VERIFICATION

For section 4A.a, we had 4 general types of internal and external stakeholder involvement on our project.

Formal Design Reviews were conducted to present the design requirements, concepts and status to all stakeholders.

The project team worked closely with manufacturing personnel to ensure a seamless implementation into the production line.

Engineers, co-located with manufacturing personnel, supported production during the first article assembly. Issues were documented and status was provided daily.

All stakeholders were involved in the validation and verification of the final product.



Created point-of-use carts to transport selected parts

Lean initiatives coordination meetings with Production

Cluttered production work space

Installed instrumentation in production

Customer feedback during flight test planning

Flight test airplane out of service too long

Assembly simulation and created protective covers

Feedback from production stakeholder on team

Production concern about part damage on installation

Generated 2D inspection sheets from 3D models

QA feedback at first article inspection

Resistance to Model Based Definition from QA

Fit checks, dedicated engineering support


Production schedule impact from learning curve

Established agreed-to lead times for parts


Production schedule impact from late parts

Negotiated compromise during weekly supplier coordination meetings

Interface Key Characteristic reviews

Supplier not willing to control interfaces to requested tolerances

Detailed estimates, competitive pricing & life cycle cost analysis

Customer feedback during negotiations

Customer reluctance to fund project due to high cost

How AddressedHow IdentifiedType

4A.bHow Various Types of Resistance Were

Identified and AddressedHow Various Types of Resistance Were

Identified and Addressed

Section 4A.b. Various types of resistance identified during implementation are shown in this table. These issues were identified through coordination with stakeholder representatives. Each issue was identified as an action item and worked by the team until the affected stakeholder concern was addressed.



4A.bHow Various Types of Resistance Were

Identified and AddressedHow Various Types of Resistance Were

Identified and Addressed

Created point-of-use carts to transport selected parts

Lean initiatives coordination meetings with Production

Cluttered production work space

Installed instrumentation in production

Customer feedback during flight test planning

Flight test airplane out of service too long

Assembly simulation and created protective covers


Production concern about part damage on installation

Generated 2D inspection sheets from 3D models

QA feedback at first article inspection

Resistance to Model Based Definition from QA

Fit checks, dedicated engineering support


Production schedule impact from learning curve

Established agreed-to lead times for parts


Production schedule impact from late parts

Negotiated compromise during weekly supplier coordination meetings

Interface Key Characteristic reviews

Supplier not willing to control interfaces to requested tolerances

Detailed estimates, competitive pricing & life cycle cost analysis

Customer feedback during negotiations

Customer reluctance to fund project due to high cost

How AddressedHow IdentifiedType

As an example, our Air Force customer was concerned the flight testairplane would be out of service too long. This concern was expressed during an early design review and assigned as an action item. The team coordinated with production to install the flight test instrumentation during aircraft assembly, instead of after delivery. This plan reduced the flight test schedule by 6 weeks and resolved the customer concern.



4A.cHow Stakeholder Buy-in Was EnsuredHow Stakeholder Buy-in Was Ensured

Strong participation in developing design solutions. Commitment to schedule needs.

Strong support for project. Teamwork in decisions addressing challenges, regular communication.

Enthusiastic participation at bases during reviews, mockup installation, follow-up communication

Affirmation during base visits

Outstanding management of installation of instrumentation in production. Close coordination with engineering when developing test plans.

Initiative in learning the system prior to first delivery

Early development of plan, communication with project team and customer

Enthusiastic participation in design reviews. Early coordination of validation impacts with customer.

Strong participation. Provided part-by-part status weekly. Aggressive resolution of issues.

Requests for manufacturing features on designs. Strong participation in mockup trial installations. Positive feedback during first installations.

Dedicated support to the project. Commitment to plan evident during regular status reviews.

Validated By:

Frequent communication, design reviews,– they were team members

Suppliers

Involvement in project selection. Frequent, regular communication. Full system lab test.


Design reviews at bases prior to implementation. Participation in mockup installation.

Maintainers

Dramatic potential improvement of inerting system

Pilots

Full time interaction with design team, from development through test flights

Flight Test

Early visibility from design reviews. Aided planning of future customer support

Field Services

Early coordination with engineering aided course development

Training

Development of own performance metrics and reporting progress to stakeholders

Support Systems

Early close coordination with engineering, participation in drawing release reviews

Supplier Management

Early involvement for development of installation plans. Collocated engineers on first assembly. Full scale mockups of large parts.

Production

Developing own implementation plans. Reported progress to them regularly.

Engineering

Plan to Ensure Buy-in:Stakeholders

Section 4A.c. All stakeholders were involved early in the project. They determined their impacts and gave input to help shape certain decisions. They also developed their own implementation plans and performancemetrics and reported status regularly.

This table lists the different ways we ensured we had stakeholder buy-in.













Requests for manufacturing features on designs. Strong participation in mockup trial installations.Positive feedback during first installations.


Validated By:


Suppliers

Involvement in project selection. Frequent, regular communication. Full system lab test.



Maintainers


Pilots


Flight Test


Field Services


Training


Support Systems


Supplier Management


Production


Engineering


As an example, we ensured buy-in by production mechanics and maintainers by creating full scale mock-ups of large parts to demonstrate their installation.




Stakeholder participation in design development

The mockups were installed on a trial basis during the design phase by the mechanics who would do the work in the future. They enthusiastically participated in this opportunity to validate the design at an early stage and gave their feedback and buy-in.













Requests for manufacturing features on designs. Strong participation in mockup trial installations. Positive feedback during first installations.


Validated By:


Suppliers

Involvement in project selection. Frequent, regular communication. Full System lab test.



Maintainers


Pilots


Flight Test


Field Services


Training


Support Systems


Supplier Management


Production


Engineering


Another example that helped ensure customer buy-in was the assembly of an entire functioning system …




Validation of system performance provided confidence in design

… in a lab to simulate operational performance during all phases of flight.

The test proved the system would meet requirements. This reduced risk for the customer. Any needed adjustments could have been made before a large percentage of the project budget was spent. This test inspired customer confidence and validated their investment



Project Task Plan

Team Plan

Integrated Master Schedule

Integrated Master Plan

4B.aPlan Developed by the Team to

Implement its SolutionPlan Developed by the Team to

Implement its Solution

Risk Mitigation PlansRisk Mitigation PlansStakeholdersStakeholders

Types of ImpactTypes of ImpactStakeholders

PilotsMaintainersCustomer EngineeringSuppliers


InternalInternalEngineeringProductionSupplier ManagementSupport SystemsTrainingField ServicesFlight Test

EngineeringProductionSupplier ManagementSupport SystemsTrainingField ServicesFlight Test

ExternalExternal

StakeholdersStakeholders



InternalInternalEngineeringProductionSupplier ManagementSupport SystemsTrainingField ServicesFlight Test

EngineeringProductionSupplier ManagementSupport SystemsTrainingField ServicesFlight Test

ExternalExternal

Create 750 new drawings for system and support equi pment

Plan, install, and test new system components

Procure 1400 new parts

Create tech manuals and provision spares

Create new training course

Prepare to assist USAF maintenance

Install instrumentation and verify new system perfo rmance

Understand display changes and reduced initializati on time

Use new maintenance procedures

Monitor project performance/verify specification co mpliance

Design and deliver new system components

Create 750 new drawings for system and support equi pment

Plan, install, and test new system components

Procure 1400 new parts

Create tech manuals and provision spares

Create new training course

Prepare to assist USAF maintenance

Install instrumentation and verify new system perfo rmance

Understand display changes and reduced initializati on time

Use new maintenance procedures

Monitor project performance/verify specification co mpliance

Design and deliver new system components

4B.a. A contractual document called a Project Task Plan (PTP) was developed by all of the stakeholders and approved by the Air Force customer.

The PTP included a technical overview of the project, describing aircraft system, structural and avionics changes, and a high-level team plan.

The team plan identified key project milestones with target completion dates. Entry and exit criteria were identified for each milestone.

The plan was further developed in the Integrated Master Schedule and the Integrated Master Plan.

Mitigation plans were developed and implemented for each risk identified during the project life cycle.



4B.bProcedure, System or Other Changes Made to

Implement the Solution and Sustain the ResultsProcedure, System or Other Changes Made to

Implement the Solution and Sustain the Results

Reliability continues to be monitored following evaluation format. Issues are quickly identified and addressed.

Customer concurrence that plan would verify effectiveness of design change

Reliability Evaluation Plan– Evaluation of OBIGGS

before and after project to assess technical effectiveness

Used by all departments as first ship progressed through the assembly line. Action items quickly resulted in permanent producibility improvements.

Valuable communication tool for daily meeting with production while first ship was assembled

Production Tag-Up Data Base– Spreadsheet on project

server to status production issues. Contained links to artifacts.

Directives followed throughout project and adopted for OBIGGS II retrofit project

Stakeholders affected concurred that each directive would ensure desired results

Project Program Directives– Documented approaches to

technical and project management subjects

Procedure has been adopted by other projects

Source for drawing status statistics and drawing quality metric

Project Drawing Report– Online spreadsheet with real

time status


Resulted in drawing quality metric 33% better than any previous large project

Drawing Quality Inspection– All drawings were reviewed

by stakeholders before release

Evidence of SustainmentHow EvaluatedProcedure/System Change

Section 4B.b. Several effective procedure and system changes were developed to implement OBIGGS II. They were sustained throughout the project and some have been adopted by other projects.






Reliability continues to be monitored following evaluation format. Issues are quickly identified and addressed.

Customer concurrence that plan would verify effectiveness of design change

Reliability Evaluation Plan– Evaluation of OBIGGS

before and after project to assess technical effectiveness

Used by all departments as first ship progressed through the assembly line. Action items quickly resulted in permanent producibility improvements.

Valuable communication tool for daily meeting with production while first ship was assembled

Production Tag-Up Data Base– Spreadsheet on project

server to status production issues. Contained links to artifacts.

Directives followed throughout project and adopted for OBIGGS II retrofit project

Stakeholders affected concurred that each directive would ensure desired results

Project Program Directives– Documented approaches to

technical and project management subjects


Source for drawing status statistics and drawing quality metric

Project Drawing Report– Online spreadsheet with real

time status


Resulted in drawing quality metric 33% better than any previous large project

Drawing Quality Inspection– All drawings were reviewed

by stakeholders before release

Evidence of SustainmentHow EvaluatedProcedure/System Change

One example was the creation of project program directives. They defined strategies to be followed during the project for various subjects, like drawing requirements or communication management.






Program Directives Were Developed for OBIGGS II

Each directive was developed by the affected stakeholders to ensure that it would meet the desired results. The directives were followed throughout the project and have been adopted for the OBIGGS II retrofit projects as well.



OBIGGS II-Aircraft Systems IPT

TIM #3 May 27, 20045

Boeing Proprietary, Confidential and/or Trade Secre tCopyright © 2003 The Boeing Company. Unpublished Wo rk - All Rights Reserved. Third Party Disclosure Re quires Boeing’s Written Approval and if to Foreign Persons, Written Export Authorization

WARNING: Export Controlled - This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C. Sec 2751, et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, Title 50, U.S.C., App 2401 et seq. Violators of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Disseminate in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.

Drawing Status

Propulsion & Environmental Control Systems COR Burn down

0

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Dra

win

gs

COR Burndown Plan 318 318 318 317 317 311 299 282 237 185 134 90 63 16 12 10 10 0 0 0

COR Burndown at CDR 259 259 259 258 258 252 240 223 178 117 87 76 60 16 12 10 10 0 0 0

Delta From CDR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 33 11 3 0 0 0 0 0 0

COR Burndown Actual 318 318 318 317 317 316 296 279 227 179 133

Burndown Variance to Plan 0 0 0 0 0 -5 8 0 7 -4 -5

Planned COR Count 0 0 0 1 0 6 12 17 45 52 51 44 27 47 4 2 0 10 0 0

Actual COR Count 0 0 0 1 0 1 20 17 52 48 46

Jul-03

Aug-03

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Data Current as of 19 May, 2004

Established drawing completion status to monitor on-time release

OBIGGS II

4B.cCreation and Installation of a System for

Measuring and Sustaining ResultsCreation and Installation of a System for

Measuring and Sustaining Results

4B.c. The OBIGGS II teams used both existing and new systems tomeasure and sustain the project results. Project specific reports and metrics were developed to measure such parameters as:

• Engineering Drawing Creation

• Technical Manual Creation

• And, Part Procurement



First team to utilize a combined schedule and performance tool (IPAS)

EVMS performance input weekly





Performance and schedule were integrated into one common tool. It was updated weekly by the stakeholders. This data was used to generate performance metrics to manage the project and to report results to executive leadership and the customer.

Project tasks that were not progressing to the plan were easily identified for corrective action.



System reliability was demonstrated during the project and continues to be monitored

OBIGGS II RELIABILITY EVALUATIONMEAN TIME BETWEEN REMOVAL (MTBR) TRACKING

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

17-A

pr-0

6

24-A

pr-0

6

1-M

ay-0

6

8-M

ay-0

6

15-M

ay-0

6

22-M

ay-0

6

29-M

ay-0

6

5-Ju

n-06

12-J

un-0

6

19-J

un-0

6

26-J

un-0

6

3-Ju

l-06

10-J

ul-0

6

17-J

ul-0

6

24-J

ul-0

6

31-J

ul-0

6

7-A

ug-0

6

14-A

ug-0

6

WEEK STARTING

FLI

GH

T H

OU

RS

(F

lt H

rs)

Projected Cum Demo Flt Hrs

Actual Cum Demo Flt Hrs

MTBR Threshold

Actual OBIGGS II MTBR

Projected Flt Hrs

GOOD

MTBR THRESHOLD




After several ships were delivered with OBIGGS II, a new reliability evaluation was conducted to verify that reliability targets were met. The team reviewed the actual reliability data for the in-service airplanes weekly.

Even though the team completed the reliability verification requirement when the evaluation ended, we have continued to monitor the system reliability. Through this monitoring, one potential issue has been identified, and a solution has been developed.



Reduced Initialization Time by a factor of 11 vs. 5

20% system and 3:1 life cycle cost savings as predicted

Achieved 7400% Increase in system reliability vs. 1100%

Reduced weight by 517 lbs. vs. 475 lbs. allowing for

increased cargo capability

Tangible Benefits

4C.a

OBIGGS II vs. OBIGGS I RELIABILITY DEMO RESULTS

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

WEEKS

HO

UR

S

GOOD

7,376% IMPROVEMENT

REALIZED

OBIGGS 1 ACTUAL MEAN TIME BETWEEN REMOVAL

OBIGGS II PROJECTED MEAN TIME BETWEEN REMOVALOBIGGS II A

CTUAL MEAN TIME BETWEEN REMOVAL

Types of Tangible and Intangible Results That Were Realized

Types of Tangible and Intangible Results That Were Realized



Section 4C.a shows the tangible results we achieved during the project. They greatly exceeded our expectations.

The measured system reliability for OBIGGS II is 74 times better than for OBIGGS I. The initialization time was reduced by a factor of 11. The cost and weight savings were as good or better than predicted.



Industry Leader

Customer Satisfaction

PASS THROUGH DATAMAINTENANCE MODE

DISPLAY

OBIGGS II SYSTEM CONTROL/IMPACTS

WACS BUS

WCCW BUS

CONTROLLER

WCCW BUS

CONTROLLER

CIPM BUS

CONTROLLER

CIPM BUS

CONTROLLER

ECSECSAPDMCAPDMCMFDCLFCP

NEW BLEED MANIFOLD

OBIGGS II CONTROL FUNCTIONS

BLEED CONTROLTEMP CONTROL

MISSION STATUSTIME TO INERTMAX DESCENTNON-AVIONICS FAULT DATA

ENGINE BLEEDSTATUS

RIU (NEW BOX)

MISSION BUS

SENSOR AND VALVEPOSITION INPUTS VALVE RELAY

DRIVE OUTPUTS

NO S/W OR H/W CHANGE REQ.

EECEEC

8/26/03

MMP

MODIFY SWITCHES H/W CHANGE ONLY

GRUMODIFY SWITCHES H/W CHANGE ONLY

Intangible Benefits

Open System Architecture

4C.aTypes of Tangible and Intangible Results

That Were RealizedTypes of Tangible and Intangible Results

That Were Realized

(U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Samantha Willner)(U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Samantha Willner)

We achieved the intangible benefits we expected. Our customer is delighted with the performance of OBIGGS II and the open architecture design. Our team has been recognized as an industry leader and recruited to assist in other inerting system development projects within Boeing.



Run HealthyBusiness


Opportunities


TimeTime

Value

Creation

Value

Creation

Our Vision:People Working Together

to Provide the World’s First Choice for Global Airlift and Mobility Solutions

Our Vision:People Working Together

to Provide the World’s First Choice for Global Airlift and Mobility Solutions

Profitably Expand Markets










� Launch C-17A+� Capture Performance

Improvement contracts� Expand alliances and

partnerships


StakeholderRequirements& Expectations

Improved Reliability• Improved by a factor of 74

Reduced Initialization Time• Improved by a factor of 11

Increased Revenue• Captured excellent rating for every award

fee period throughout the project

Design Engineering

Material and Process Engineering

Production

Planning

Quality Assurance

Electrical Bonding Cognizant Engineer

Develop Preliminary Design

Identify Cr itical Inspection Items In The System, Present And Obtain Concurrence At PDR And CDR

Add Firs t Artic le Inspection Requirements To The Drawings Per TA-PD-233

Add First Article Inspection Requirements To AOs And AAOsPer TA-PD-233

Complete Installation And Notify Necessary Stakeholders Per AOs And AAO s

Inspect Des ignated Inspection Points Per TA-PD-233

Document The Results Of The Inspection

Engineering Correct?

Instal lation Correct?

Revise Drawings

Yes

No

No

Yes

Correct Installation

A

A

A

End

Proposed First Article Inspection Process For New Projects

Process Improvements

• Four different processes

4C.bHow Results Link with Organization Goals,

Performance Measures and StrategiesHow Results Link with Organization Goals,




Section 4C.b. The project’s results directly supported the C17 20-Year Strategy as planned.

We achieved aggressive financial improvement by reducing logistic and production costs and earning excellent ratings during all award fee periods.

Stakeholder relationships were strengthened with the reduced initialization time and improved reliability.

The process for drawing stakeholder review was improved. All drawings were reviewed by production, support systems, supplier management, and other engineering disciplines before release. As a result, our drawing quality metric was 33% better than any previous large project.



External Stakeholders

Boeing E

xec Leadership

CustE

xec Leadership

Supplier

Managem

ent

Production

Engineering

Flight T

est

Field

Services

Training

Support

System

s

Maintainers

Pilots

Custom

er E

ngineering

Suppliers

Bi-MonthlyInternal Project Reviews

Bi-MonthlyVideo Conference Reviews

Various early in project

Design Reviews

After Flight TestFlight Test Report

After EvaluationReliability Evaluation Report

Internal Stakeholders

FrequencyCommunication Vehicle

Bi-MonthlyTechnical Interchange Meetings

WeeklyStatus Meeting

WeeklyAction Item call with customer

DailyProject Team Stand-Up Meeting

4C.cHow Results Were Shared with

StakeholdersHow Results Were Shared with

Stakeholders

For section 4C.c, the team communicated results with the stakeholders regularly, following our program directive for Communication Management. This table shows the different ways they were communicated to the stakeholder groups.



Documented that system met reliability during evaluation. Customer concurred that key project milestone closure criteria was met.

Documented that tests verified the system met its performance requirements. Resulted in release of OBIGGS II capability in fleet.

Highly attended. Provided key Boeing and supplier design information. AI’s documented. Worked and statused at follow-up meetings.

Communication of project technical, schedule and cost status with internal stakeholders. AI’s created to address issues.

Key project management information exchange with Boeing and customer leadership. Project health led to excellent award fee ratings.

High interest for all TIMs, in Long Beach and at bases. Fosteredinternal-external teamwork. New relationships continue thru today.

Fostered collaborative environment. All production drawings released by baseline date. No parts late to assembly start dates.

Technical and project issues documented as action items. Status was provided and closed with concurrence from stakeholders.

High participation. Interaction of engineering and internal stakeholder leads ensured required attention to action items.

MedInternal Project Reviews

HighVideo Conference Reviews

HighDesign Reviews

MedFlight Test Report

MedReliability Evaluation Report

Effectiveness IndicationEffectivenessCommunication Vehicle

HighTechnical Interchange Meetings

HighStatus Meeting

HighAction Item call with customer

HighProject Team Stand-Up Meeting



Stakeholders

This communication was very effective. It established an environment that fostered teamwork among all stakeholders.



Documented that system met reliability during evaluation. Customer concurred that key project milestone closure criteria was met.

Documented that tests verified the system met its performance requirements. Resulted in release of OBIGGS II capability in fleet.

Highly attended. Provided key Boeing and supplier design information. AI’s documented. Worked and statused at follow-up meetings.

Communication of project technical, schedule and cost status with internal stakeholders. AI’s created to address issues.

Key project management information exchange with Boeing and customer leadership. Project health led to excellent award fee ratings.

High interest for all TIMs, in Long Beach and at ba ses. Fosteredinternal-external teamwork. New relationships conti nue thru today.

Fostered collaborative environment. All production drawings released by baseline date. No parts late to assembly start dates.

Technical and project issues documented as action items. Status was provided and closed with concurrence from stakeholders.

High participation. Interaction of engineering and internal stakeholder leads ensured required attention to action items.

MedInternal Project Reviews

HighVideo Conference Reviews

HighDesign Reviews

MedFlight Test Report

MedReliability Evaluation Report

Effectiveness IndicationEffectivenessCommunication Vehicle

HighTechnical Interchange Meetings

HighStatus Meeting

HighAction Item call with customer

HighProject Team Stand-Up Meeting



Stakeholders

For example, when delivery of the first ship was imminent, meetings were held with maintainers to communicate the latest results. They enthusiastically participated and asked insightful questions. These meetings established contacts between the project team and the end users that continue today. This has contributed to efficient maintenance of the system in the field.

Now, Ben Canfield will be our concluding speaker.



5

Team ManagementTeam Management

ASQ 2007ASQ 2007

Good afternoon, I’m representing Program Management and will cover how the team managed the project.

This was the largest design change for the C-17, so team selection and management were key to its success.



Identified functional impacts within each department

– Work Breakdown Structure created

– Detailed Statement of Work created

5AHow the Team Members were Selected and Involved Throughout the Project

How the Team Members were Selected and Involved Throughout the Project

For section 5A we will review how impacts to the functional engineering groups were determined, selection of key representatives, and how we maintained the high level of performance through ownership.

With the PTP in hand, a detailed Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) was created to cover the entire scope, schedule and budget for the project. Statements of work were created for all tasks to identify which functional groups were impacted and to what degree.

The WBS inputs were traced back to the PTP to help each group manage their effort. This trace was also used by project management to ensure all tasks supported the C-17 master schedule.



Representatives identified within each organization

Internal customers

Air Force customer

Suppliers



Representatives were selected from various organizations that would cover all major functional groups. Production, tooling, release, and suppliers, all had individual points of contact.

Air Force customers also played a role in meeting the project milestones with various contract and report approvals.



Involvement was maintained by establishing ownership from each team member and matching skills with needs

Supplier partnerships

Control account responsibility

Agreed to team plans



Team members were committed to working towards one goal, not individual agendas. Suppliers were not just contracted to build a spec part; rather, they signed on as partners to play a role in developing the system that would benefit all stakeholders. The control accounts were managed by the team members who were responsible for the work itself, instead of by someone who didn’t have ownership of the task.



Supplier contract adherence Supplier Management

USAF logistics supportSupport Systems

System assemblyProduction

Requirements maintenanceSystems Engineering

Develop and integrate schedules

Schedules

Maintain control accountsBusiness Operations

Conduct lab and flight testsTest

Structural analysis and designAirframe

Aircraft integrationAvionics

OBIGGS designAircraft Systems

ResponsibilityOrganization



Organizations identified individuals to oversee their departmentresponsibility throughout the project. The team members were selected with management concurrence as experts in their respective fields. They were assigned to the project full time and provided all the resources to meet the project goals and performance.



Team Co-located Facilities Dedicated Personnel

Executive Leadership

OBIGGS IIDIRECTOR

Engineering ProductionSupplier

ManagementSupport Systems

TrainingField

ServicesFlightTest

5BHow the Team was Prepared to Work Together in Addressing the Project

How the Team was Prepared to Work Together in Addressing the Project

Now I’ll address section 5B on how we prepared the team to work together.

C-17 executives created a separate organization to perform as a single unit without competing priorities. The new Integrated Product Team was led by a director who reported to executive leadership.New facilities were constructed to house up to 80 full time staff. The facilities had state of the art computer equipment and conferencing amenities to support the staff.

Core functional organizations provided dedicated staff to work in a collaborative environment. The co-location of the staff encouraged teamwork and provided the freedom from every day interruptions that would have occurred while working within their functional departments.



Tool use for root cause analysisAccelerated Improvement Workshops

Address barriers as a teamEmployee Involvement

Schedule adherenceIntegrated Performance and Scheduling

Performance and Cost controlEarned Value Management

Eliminate 2-D drawingsModel Based Definition

Requirements definitionSystem Engineering Workshop

BenefitTraining Class



Project leadership provided training to the team members to enhance the system development. Various classes were attended by the team throughout the project life cycle.

The training focused on areas to assist the team in several disciplines and improved individual skill sets.



ATTENDEESOCCURRENCEREVIEW

Boeing and customer executive leadership

Bi-Monthly video conference

Program review

Boeing executive leadershipBi-monthlyInternal project review

Customer, Project managementBi-monthly

in personTechnical Interchange

Internal StakeholdersWeeklyProgram review

Customer, Project managementWeeklyAction item review

Internal – Supplier Management, Systems Engineering, Project Management

DailyProject Team Stand-Up



Open communication was emphasized and key to project success!

The team set-up a communication plan to ensure both internal and external stakeholders were informed of the project status and results at all times.

Open communication was emphasized and a key to the project success.



5CHow the Team Managed its Performance

to Ensure it was Effective as a TeamHow the Team Managed its Performance

to Ensure it was Effective as a Team

INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS MONITORED WEEKLY FOR COST AND

SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS MONITORED WEEKLY FOR COST AND

SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE

SUCCESSFUL PROJECT PERFORMANCE RESULTS FROM EFFECTIVE TEAM

MANAGEMENT AND ACTION TO RESOLVE ISSUES EARLY

SUCCESSFUL PROJECT PERFORMANCE RESULTS FROM EFFECTIVE TEAM

MANAGEMENT AND ACTION TO RESOLVE ISSUES EARLY


For 5C, we established and monitored project metrics to manage performance and to ensure we were effective as a team. By delegating responsibility for reporting progress to the team members themselves, they were continuously aware of the team’s performance to plan. As a result, the team met all cost, schedule, and performance targets. For example, our drawing quality metric was 33% better than any previous large project. The total cost of the project came in 0.5% under budget.






The team identified 66 risks during the project life cycle. Each risk was assessed for technical, cost and schedule impacts. The team analyzed and developed a mitigation plan and owner for each risk and monitored the risks until closure.

The status of the design, estimates of the project performance measures, risks, and cost performance were reported on a regular basis per the communication plan.



Team unity was in place




OwnershipOwnershipCommitmentCommitment

CommunicationCommunication

CommonGoal

CommonGoal

Team member communication, commitment, and ownership fostered the common goal to deliver an OBIGGS to the customer that would meet orexceed the required performance measures. The result was a spirit of unity and teamwork that enabled the team to set new benchmarks for project success.



Mission Accomplished!

Thank You!Thank You!Conclusion


Our customer is extremely pleased with the results and rated theOBIGGS II project as EXCELLENT in every semi-annual award fee period for all four years, and are making plans to retrofit the 141 OBIGGS 1 aircraft .

Each member is proud to have been part of the OBIGGS II improvement team. Thank you for the opportunity to share our story.

Documents

OBIGGS II Improvement Project Team - ASQasq.org/wcqi/2008/pdf/boeing-obiggsii-team-presentation-07silver.pdf · OBIGGS II Improvement Project (US Air Force Photo) The C-17 is an amazing