Nova Srbija, novi NATO – Vizija budućnosti za 21. vek

Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za XXI vek

Zbornik tekstova

Beograd, 2011.

transconflict

FORUM ZA ETNIČKE ODNOSEFORUM FOR ETHNIC RELATIONS

“Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za XXI vek”

Izdavači: TransConflict Serbia Forum za etničke odnoseKlub 21

Urednici:Mirjana KosićMilan Karagaća

Prevod: Mirjana Kosić

Lektorisanje i korektura: Ian BancroftVladimir Ninković

Grafički dizajn i prelom:Digital Art Company

Dizajn i štampa: Digital Art Company

Tiraž: 500

ISBN 978-86-914589-0-4

Sadržaj

Uvodne napomene

PredgovorMirjana Kosić ............................................................................................

Uvod Milan Karagaća .........................................................................................

Nova Srbija, novi NATO – vizija budućnosti za XXI vek

Nj. E. Hana HubačkovaNova Srbija, novi NATO – Vizija budućnosti za 21. vek ........................

Ambasador Lawrence RossinNova Srbija, novi NATO – Vizija budućnosti za 21. vek ........................

Julian HarstonNovi Strateški koncept NATO-a i sistem globalne bezbednosti .................

Matthew RhodesNovi Strateški koncept NATO-a: Kontekst i značaj .................................

Aleksandar FatićStrateška dilema Srbije - Između NATO-a i Rusije .................................

Jasminka SimićMisija NATO-a i Evropski bezbednosni i odbrambeni identitet (ESDI): komplementarnost ili takmičenje? ................................

Filip EjdusRepublika Srbija i Zajednička beznednosna i odbrambena politika .......

Mladen NakićNATO nakonLisabona: Zapadni Balkan u Alijanci do 2020. godine .....

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Sanda VučićIskustvo Crne Gore na putu ka evroatlantskim integracijama ................

Nano RužinZapadni Balkan nakon NATO samita u Lisbonu 2010 i usvajanja novog Strateškog koncepta .....................................................

Armin KržalićBosna i Hercegovina i NATO – Značaj novog Strateškog koncepta ........

Miloš ŠolajaBosna i Hercegovina i novi Strateški koncept NATO-a ................................

Arshim ÇelaUticaj novog Strateškog koncepta i Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike na “Bezbednosnu arhitekturu jugoistočne Evrope” .......................................

Milan KaragaćaBudući bezbednosni koncept Srbije ..........................................................

Mihajlo BasaraNovi NATO i nova Srbija: Šta sa neutralnošću? ......................................

Predrag SimićEvroatlantizam i stvaranje “Bezbednosne zajednice” na Balkanu ..........

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Table of Contents

Introductory Remarks

ForewordMirjana Kosić ............................................................................................

Introduction Milan Karagaća .........................................................................................

New Serbia, New NATO: Future Vision for the 21st Century

Hana Hubáčková Contribution to the conference „New Serbia, new NATO – Future Vision for the 21st Century“ ..........................................................

Lawrence RossinNew Serbia, new NATO – Future Vision for the 21st Century ................

Julian HarstonNATO’s new Strategic Concept and the System of Global Security ..........

Matthew RhodesNATO’s New Strategic Concept: Context and Significance ......................

Aleksandar FatićSerbia’s Strategic Dilemma - Between NATO and Russia ........................

Jasminka SimićThe mission of NATO and European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI): complementarity or competition? ..................................

Filip EjdusThe Republic of Serbia and the Common Security and Defence Policy ......................................................................

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Mladen NakićNATO after Lisbon: The Western Balkans in the Alliance by 2020 .............

Sanda VučićExperience of Montenegro on its path to Euro-Atlantic Integrations ......

Nano RužinThe Western Balkans after NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010 and adoption of a new Strategic Concept .................................................

Armin KržalićBosnia and Herzegovina and NATO - the importance of the new Strategic Concept ........................ ....................... .......................

Miloš ŠolajaBosnia and Herzegovina and NATO’s new Strategic Concept .................

Arshim ÇelaThe Impact Of the new Strategic Concept and the European Security and Defence Policy on the “Security architecture of South East-Europe” ...........................................

Milan KaragaćaThe Future Security Concept of Serbia .....................................................

Mihajlo BasaraNew NATO and New Serbia: What to do with neutrality? .....................

Predrag SimićEuroatlanticism and Creation of “Security Community” in the Balkans ......................................................

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Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za XXI vek 7

Predgovor

2010. je bila godina obeležena ponovnim definisanjem i daljim razvijanjem uloge, svrhe i misije NATO-a u svetlu savremenih i budućih bezbednosnih pretnji i izazova. Po prvi put u svojoj istoriji, Alijansa je učinila taj proces otvo-renim i sveobuhvatnim ne samo kroz angažovanje vlada država članica NA-TO-a, već - što je gotovo još važnije – kroz konsultacije sa i uključivanjem različitih aktera širom sveta.

Naglašavajući važnost partnerstava i globalne saradnje, NATO je pokrenuo novu fazu u međunarodnim odnosima, pri čemu su izbrisana mnoga neprija-teljstva i nekadašnje podele, dok je istovremeno otvoren novi prostor za uspo-stavljanje odnosa na osnovu uzajamnog savetovanja i saradnje, koji prevazila-ze postojeće okvire partnerstava. Ova odluka je posebno važna za Srbiju koja - kao članica programa Partnerstvo za mir (PzM) - još uvek nije u potpunosti istražila, niti iskoristila sve potencijale Partnerstva za mir, ali koji bi mogli po-nuditi obilje pogodnosti, posebno za odnedavno profesionalizovane oružane snage Srbije.

Iako se novi Strateški koncept Alijanse nije fokusirao posebno na zapad-ni Balkan, zemlje ovog regiona koje trenutno teže ka punopravnom članstvu (Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija i Crna Gora), dočekale su najavu Alijanse o nastavljanju politike “otvorenih vrata” kao značajnu poruku i znak ohrabrenja.

Dok kolektivna odbrana ostaje suštinski razlog postojanja NATO-a, novi Strateški koncept stavlja naglasak na član 4 Vašingtonskog ugovora, koji defi-niše Alijansu “kao jedinstven i suštinski transatlantski forum za konsultacije o svim pitanjima koja se tiču teritorijalnog integriteta, političke nezavisnosti i bezbednosti svojih članova”, čime je organizacija napravila određeni pomak ka svojoj političkoj dimenziji i nadležnostima.

Svi ovi i mnogi drugi zaključci su analizirani i diskutovani na konferenciji “Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za 21. vek”, koja je održana 3.-4. decembra 2010. Usledivši svega dve nedelje nakon NATO Samita u Lisabonu, ova konferenciji je poslužila kao platforma za kritičko vrednovanje novog Stra-teškog koncepta NATO-a usvojenog nedugo pre toga, i otvorenu diskusiju o budućim kretanjima u oblasti bezbednosti – kako onima sa kojima se suočava NATO, tako i iz perspektive Srbije.

8 New Serbia, New NATO: Future Vision for the 21st Century

Međutim, šest meseci nakon konferencije, mnogo toga se dogodilo na svet-skoj sceni što je na izvestan način testiralo neke od odredbi Koncepta, kao i spremnost Alijanse da odgovori na nove krize i izvore bezbednosnih pretnji. Talas nezadovoljstva i pobune koje su potresle afrički kontinent imali su domi-no efekat, što je kulminiralo građanskim ratom u Libiji. Odluka NATO-a da se uključi u sukob Libiji nije olako, niti brzo donesena. Iako se ovog puta NATO odlučio na intervenciju tek nakon poziva za pomoć od strane američkog pred-sednika - kada je Alijansa preuzela jedinstvenu komandu nad međunarodnim vazdušnim operacijama nad Libijom, u skladu sa Rezolucijama 1970 i 1973 Saveta bezbednosti UN – ovu intervenciju nisu u potpunosti podržale sve ze-mlje saveznice. Turska je izrazila ozbiljne primedbe na angažovanje NATO-a u Libiji, dok je Nemačka odlučila da ne učestvuje u vojnoj operaciji koja, kako je navedeno, “nema nikakve veze sa odbranom Evrope”.

Iako je takav scenarij bilo teško predvideti pre šest meseci, učesnici u našoj konferenciji u decembru su ispravno procenili regionalne i globalne političke tokove, i stavili naglasak na određene izazove i slabosti na koje nije pronađen odgovor. Dok je libijska kriza trenutno veliki test za jedinstvo Alijanse, posebno u pogledu njene buduće svrhe i uloge u globalnoj bezbednosnoj areni, kao i njene političke ekspeditivnosti i moći, nadamo se da će ovaj zbornik tekstova svojim čitaocima obezbediti uvid u specifičnosti savremene bezbednosne arhi-tekture, ali i poslužiti kao polazna tačka za dalju analizu i proširivanje diskusije.

Inače, konferencija je omogućena zahvaljujući podršci Ambasade Češke Republike u Beogradu i Balkanskog fonda za demokratiju, dok se njen ukupan uspeh mora pripisati isključivo našim izuzetnim gostima. Govori i diskusije predstavljeni na konferenciji skupljeni su u ovom zborniku, koji je ugledao svetlost dana zahvaljujući velikodušnoj podršci Fonda za otvoreno društvo; Fond je s pravom procenio važnost i blagovremenost ovakve diskusije u Srbiji, te im ovom prilikom izražavamo najdublju zahvalnost.

Nadamo se da će ovaj zbornik tekstova biti primljen sa velikim interesova-njem, ne samo od strane organizacija civilnog društva, akademske i šire javno-sti u Srbiji, već i da će naći čitaoce u čitavom regionu i šire.

Sve greške ostaju naša odgovornost i za njih se najiskrenije izvinjavamo au-torima.

Mirjana Kosić

Izvršni direktor, TransConflict Serbia


Uvod

NATO se nalazi u stalnom procesu transformacije, a ključne determinante tih promena su da je hladni rat odavno završen, vreme unipolarnosti je tako-đe prošlo, dok je svet danas suočen sa globalnim bezbednosnim izazovima i rizicima.

Krajnji ishod i model tog procesa još uvek su otvoreni, što je potvrđeno Deklaracijom i novim Strateškim konceptom usvojenim na samitu u Lisabonu u novembru 2010. godine. Dosta je verovatno da će se Alijansa od kolektivnog vojnog saveza pod američkim vođstvom, transformisati u globalnu bezbedno-sno-političku organizaciju koja bi imala konstruktivan odnos sa susedima, na-ročito Rusijom, koja bi dugoročno mogla i da pristupi ovoj zajednici. Primarne vojne funkcije bi se sastojale u omogućavanju formiranja ad-hoc koalicija, te bi takva OEBS-izacija bila bi kompatibilna sa Ujedinjenim nacijama jer bi NATO uvažavao odluke Saveta Bezbednosi Ujedinjenih nacija u očuvanju mira.

U kom pravcu će se ova transformacija odvijati zavisi od toga u kojoj meri će jačati unilateralne tendencije američke politike, koliko će evropski uticaj u Sjedinjenim Državama dalje opadati i konačno, od budućnosti Evropske bez-bednosne i odbrambene politike i rešenosti Evrope da snažnije istakne svoju samosvojnost.

Nije ni sasvim isključeno da će akronim NATO-a (Not Activity Talking Only, kako je često prevođeno tokom 90-ih prošlog veka), u budućnosti da dobije novi smisao u četiri S: Sada Skoro Sasvim Staromodan (Now Almost Totally Obsolete), posebno ukoliko se zaista realizuje transformacija Alijanse od kolektivnog vojnog saveza ka otvorenoj bezbednosnoj zajednici sa sasvim drugačijim unutrašnjim odnosima i strukturom.

Na samitu u Lisabonu je promovisana namera da NATO bude fleksibilan, efikasan i isplativ instrument u službi mira. U tom svetlu treba posmatrati i an-gažovanje NATO-a u Libiji, povlačenje Sjedinjenih Država iz vojnih operacija i prepuštanje težišnih aktivnosti Evropskoj Uniji. Vreme će pokazati koliko su namere Sjedinjenih Država iskrene, a koliko test za Evropsku Uniju, te u kojoj meri su u skladu sa tačkom 2. Deklaracije samita u Lisabonu, kojom se gene-ralnom sekretaru NATO-a nalaže da tesno sarađuje sa visokim predstavnikom za spoljnu politiku Evropske Unije upravo s ciljem što efikasnijeg delovanja u sprečavanju kriza.


S druge strane, dinamika eskalacije događanja u arapskom svetu i relativno lako donete odluke o borbenom angažovanju NATO-a bacaju novo svetlo ne samo na nove bezbednosne rizike i izazove, već i odnose na relacijama UN- NATO-EU, kao i na odnose sa Rusijom, Kinom, Indijom i drugim globalnim i regionalnim činiocima.

Srbija je izložena svim globalnim, regionalnim i specifičnim rizicima i iza-zovima koji su nepredvidivi i ne poštuju nikakve granice, te u tim okvirima mora da razmišlja o svojoj bezbednosti.

Bez obzira na aktuelnu vojnu neutralnost, postoji mnogo razloga zbog ko-jih Srbija mora da razmišlja o najoptimalnijem konceptu bezbednosti za bu-dućnost, uključujući i novi sadržaj partnerstava, bezbednosnu konfiguraciju u regionu i projekcije trendova. Svakako je potrebno imati u vidu da je Srbija članica programa Partnerstvo za mir; potpisala je i Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju, u procesu je dobijanja kadidature, a teži ka punopravnom član-stvu u EU, što podrazumeva i potpuno uvažavanje Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike i potpisivanje odgovarajućeg bezbednosnog sporazuma sa EU.

U tom smislu, cilj konferencije je bio da se analizom različitih aspekata i sa što više relevantnih činjenica, barem preliminarno, formulišu osnovni ele-menti vizije koncepta bezbednosti Srbije u savremenom svetu.

Nadamo se da smo u tome uspeli i da ova publikacija to potvrđuje.

Milan KaragaćaPukovnik u penziji, nezavisni politički analitičar


Izlaganje Nj.E. Hane Hubáčkove na koferenciji “Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za 21. vek”1

Mirno i stabilno okruženje u evroatlantskoj regiji danas nije nešto što se sme uzeti zdravo za gotovo - ono je rezultat izvesnog broja ključnih odluka donese-nih od završetka hladnog rata do danas. Kolektivna odbrana i dalje predstavlja suštinu postojanja NATO-a. Ona podrazumeva ne samo potrebu za efikasnim, fleksibilnim i razmestivim vojnim kapacitetima, već i pripremljenost Alijanse za suočavanje sa novim bezbednosnim izazovima. Terorizam, oružje za masovno uništenje, sajber-napadi ili prekidi vitalnih isporuka energije nisu potpuno nove pretnje; međutim, ono što jeste novo su njihova snaga, učestalost i obim poten-cijalne štete koju mogu naneti našim društvima. Strateški koncept potvrđuje da izvor direktnih pretnji za evro-atlantske teritorije može da bude i u veoma uda-ljenim oblastima.Lekcije iz Avganistana ukazuju da za mirovne, kao i operacije stabilizacije, nisu dovoljne samo vojne sposobnosti, već da iste moraju biti pro-praćene ne-vojnim sredstvima kako bi se osigurali dugoročni razvoj i stabiliza-cija. Stoga će NATO morati da izgradi minimum sopstvenih civilnih kapaciteta kako bi bio u stanju da uzajamno deluje i sarađuje sa nizom aktera, bilo da su u pitanju države, druge međunarodne organizacije, kao što su UN ili EU, ili nevla-dine organizacije koje upravljaju složenim krizama.

1 Nj.E. Hana Hubáčková je Ambasador Češke Republike u Srbiji


Najpre, dozvolite mi da u nekoliko reči izrazim zahvalnost organizatorima ove konferencije – organizaciji TransConflict Serbia - za preuzimanje inicijative i omogućavanje ove konferencije. Ovo je još jedan značajan doprinos nevladine organizacije sve većoj zainteresovanosti javnosti za najnovija dešavanja po pi-tanjima bezbednosti i odbrane, i upoznavanju sa politikama formulisanima od strane glavnih međunarodnih aktera i organizacija u sitacijama kada se suočava-ju sa tradicionalnim, ali i sa novim bezbednosnim rizicima i izazovima.

Naše je veliko zadovoljstvo što smo podržali ovu inicijativu ne samo kao NATO kontakt ambasada u Srbiji, već prvenstveno zbog toga što okuplja širok spektar učesnika i pruža priliku za raspravu o važnim pitanjima koja su po-djednako relevantna za Srbiju, kao i za njene partnere.

Osvrćući se na samit NATO-a u Lisabonu koji je održan pre dve nedelje2, važno je imati na umu da mirno i stabilno okruženje u evro-atlantskoj regiji danas nije nešto što se može ili čak sme uzeti zdravo za gotovo. Ono je rezul-tat izvesnog broja ključnih odluka naših država, počevši od završetka hladnog rata naovamo.

Moje zemlja je mogla realno početi da učestvuje u donošenju tih odluka tek kada smo se ostvarili kao nezavisna i suverena država, nakon decenija ko-munizma koji je gušio sposobnost zemlje da se samostalno uključi u tokove međunarodne politike.

Kolektivna odbrana i dalje predstavlja suštinu postojanja NATO-a. Ona po-drazumeva ne samo potrebu za efikasnim, fleksibilnim i razmestivim vojnim kapacitetima, već uključuje i buduću teritorijalnu protivraketnu odbranu.

Takođe, NATO mora biti bolje pripremljen za suočavanje sa novim bezbed-nosnim izazovima. Terorizam, oružje za masovno uništenje, sajber-napadi ili prekidi vitalnih isporuka energije nisu potpuno nove pretnje; međutim, ono što jeste novo su njihova snaga, učestalost i obim potencijalne štete koju mogu naneti našim društvima.

Strateški koncept potvrđuje da izvor direktnih pretnji za evro-atlantske te-ritorije može da bude i u veoma udaljenim oblastima. Prema tome, NATO će nejverovatnije biti više angažovan u udaljenim operacijama za koje će morati

2 Konferencija je održana 3.-4. decembra 2010. godine (prim. prev.)


da bude dobro pripremljen. Lekcije naučene u Avganistanu, gde Češka Repu-blika doprinosi sa više od 600 svojih vojnika i obezbeđuje jedan od Pokrajin-skih timova za rekonstrukciju (Provincial Reconstruction Team) u pokrajini Loghar, ukazuju da za mirovne, kao i operacije stabilizacije, nisu dovoljne samo vojne sposobnosti. Vojne sposobnosti moraju da budu propraćene ne-vojnim sredstvima kako bi se osigurali dugoročni razvoj i stabilizacija. Iako NATO neće biti prva opcija za obavljanje razvojnih zadataka, moraće da izgradi mi-nimum sopstvenih civilnih kapaciteta kako bi bio u stanju da uzajamno deluje i sarađuje sa nizom aktera, bilo da su u pitanju države, druge međunarodne organizacije, kao što su Ujedinjene nacije ili Evropska Unija, ili nevladine or-ganizacije koje su često uključene u upravljanje složenim krizama.

Poslednje, ali ne i manje važno, strateški koncept daje odgovarajući značaj partnerstvima NATO-a sa zemljama koje nisu članice. Mnoge zemlje širom sveta dele isti interes i aktivnosti sa NATO-om u očuvanju međunarodnog mira i stabilnosti. Značajan broj njih daje i najveći doprinos nekim od opera-cija pod vođstvom NATO-a, kao što je ISAF. Strateški koncept stoga predviđa šire i fleksibilnije mogućnosti za partnere u njihovom angažovanju sa NATO-om, te predviđa i njihovo učešće u oblikovanju odluka ove organizacije. Ra-zvijanje konkretnih mehanizama u tom pravcu je zadatak koji će biti kritički razmatran i odobren tokom nastupajućih ministarskih samita.

U tom kontekstu, partnerstvo sa Rusijom ima nezamenljivu ulogu. Rusiju i NATO povezuje veliki broj zajedničkih interesa. Savet NATO-Rusija, na kojem je učestvovao predsednik Medevedev, se tokom samita u Lisabonu osvrnuo na niz mogućnosti za političke konsultacije i praktičnu saradnju. Postoji zajed-nički osećaj da je Savet NATO-Rusija potencijal koji još uvek nije u potpunosti iskorišćen. Mi se nadamo da značajna očekivanja koja su probuđena ovim sa-mitom neće biti izneverena.

U svojoj celosti, novi strateški koncept predstavlja veliki podstrek za da-lju transformaciju NATO-a u moderniji, efikasniji i sposobniji savez, koje će morati da nastavi delovati pod mnogo strožijim budžetskim propisima nego ikada pre.

Mnogo posla je sada pred saveznicima da pretoče ove strateške smernice u konkretne korake i razviju mnoge oblasti u saradnji sa partnerskim zemljama. Ambasador Rossin je juče dao pregled onoga što nas očekuje u narednom pe-riodu i u kojim vremenskim rokovima.


Srbija će za nas biti važan partner u sprovođenju zadataka koje su nam do-delili šefovi naših vlada u Lisabonu. Novo-uspostavljena misija Srbije u sedištu NATO-a postepeno dobija formu kroz nekoliko zaposlenih koji su već prisutni tamo. Uz puno funkcionisanje misije, Srbija će steći sposobnost da zajedno sa 44 partnera učestvuje u svim razmatranjima u okviru programa Partnerstvo za mir koja su relevantna za nju, kao i da otpočne sa iskorištavanjem mogućnosti koje ovaj program pruža. Praktična saradnja je već razvila korene, ali u osnovi još mnogo više toga se nudi. Na osnovu odluke u Lisabonu, dalji razvoj par-tnerstava u fleksibilniji i fokusiraniji aranžman je prioritet koji će kao takav biti od veće koristi i partnerima, kao i NATO-u. Na Srbiji je da odluči dubinu, in-tenzitet i suštinu svojih partnerskih odnosa sa NATO-om. I samo Srbija može da se ograniči, kao što je to slučaj i sa svim ostalim partnerima.

Da zaključimo, dozvolite mi da naglasim svoje uverenje da su dobre odluke zasnovane na čvrstom znanju.

To me vodi natrag do organizatora ove konferencije koji rade upravo ono što je potrebno – stvaraju mogućnosti za razumevanje dinamike i razvoja u jednoj veoma važnoj oblasti. Želela bih da im se još jednom zahvalim.


Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za 21. vek

Ambasador Lawrence Rossin3

U svom današnjem izlaganju, uglavnom ću se baviti sa tri sledeća pitanja: • prvo, najznačajniji zaključci samita NATO-a, održanog u Lisabonu pre

dve nedelje; • potom, razvijanje i – ukoliko to Srbija bude želela – moguće unapređe-

nje odnosa sa NATO-om; • i konačno, angažman NATO-a na Kosovu kroz delovanje KFOR-a.

Samit u Lisabonu i novi strateški koncept NATO-a

Za početak, samit u Lisabonu i novi strateški koncept NATO-a, te naglasak na izgradnji niza globalnih partnerstava.

Nije preterano reći - kao što je naš generalni sekretar Rasmussen izjavio na samom kraju samita - da je Lisabonski samit od istorijskog značaja za NATO. Značajan broj odluka je donet tokom niza sastanaka u kojima su učestvovale prvenstveno same zemlje saveznice; potom saveznice i partneri angažovani u Avganistanu, uključujući Predsednika Karzaija, generalnog sekretara UN-a Ban Ki-Muna i lidere Evropske unije, te na samom kraju, lidere NATO-a za-jedno sa ruskim Predsednikom Medvedevim putem Saveta NATO-Rusija.

Zaokruživši svoja ukupna razmišljanja, šefovi država i vlada NATO-a su usvojili novi strateški koncept Alijanse, zamenivši njime Koncept koji je usvo-jen u Vašingtonu 1999. godine. Kao što naglašavaju konkretne odluke lidera NATO-a na samitu, ovaj strateški koncept predstavlja dokument koji je ve-oma okrenut ka budućnosti i kojim će se rukovoditi delovanje NATO-a. U današnjoj Evropi, čak i regionalni oružani sukob je malo verovatan. Umesto toga, uglavnom se suočavamo sa transnacionalnim pretnjama. Međunarodni terorizam, sajber-napadi i širenje oružja za masovno uništenje su izazovi koji

3 Ambasador Rossin je Zamenik pomoćnika generalnog sekretara NATO-a za operacije


ne poštuju nikakve granice i čije posledice mogu biti globalne u svom obimu. Novi strateški koncept stavlja NATO u poziciju da se pozabavi ovim pitanjima, oslanjajući se istovremeno na naše civilne, kao i vojne snage.

Novi strateški koncept određuje tri glavna prioriteta za aktivnosti NATO-a tokom narednih godina:

• Prvo - da budemo efikasniji ulaganjem u moderne sposobnosti koje zadovoljavaju savremene potrebe. Dok je fokus NATO-a i dalje na os-novnim tradicionalnim vojnim sredstvima, istovremeno se preusmera-vamo ka borbi protiv izazova kao što su terorizam, sajber-napadi i ostali budući bezbednosni izazovi. To, takođe, podrazumeva veći angažman na sveobuhvatnom pristupu dopunjavanjem vojnih instrumenata civil-nim naporima, što me dovodi do drugog prioriteta, a to je -

• Osiguravanje aktivnijeg i dubljeg angažmana šire u svetu. Izazovi sa ko-jima se NATO suočava ne ugrožavaju samo interese NATO-a. Alijansa je već uspostavila važna partnerstva sa državama koje nisu članice NA-TO-a i međunarodnim organizacijama. Širok spekar zemalja koje nisu članice NATO-a podržavaju operacije NATO-a na Kosovu, u Iraku i Avganistanu, dok su sve naše aktivnosti koordinisane sa multinacional-nim naporima u borbi protiv piratstva kod Roga Afrike. I mi sledimo naše struktuirane mehanizme partnerstava - Partnerstva za mir i Evro-atlantskog partnerskog saveta, u kojima učestvuje i Srbija, kao i struk-ture sa državama Mediterana i Persijskog zaliva. Novi strateški koncept daje još veći značaj NATO partnerstvima, što podrazumeva i intenziv-niji angažman sa Rusijom. Predsednik Medvedev i njegove kolege iz NATO-a su u Lisabonu obavili konstruktivne razgovore o Avganista-nu i zajedničkim bezbednosnim pretnjama, kao i saradnji u rešavanju istih. Ovaj akcenat na nova partnerstva bi mogao imati pozitivan efekat na naše odnose sa partnerima kao što je Srbija.

• Treće, strateški koncept nam daje zadatak da unapredimo svoje struk-ture kako bi bile sposobnije da brzo, efikasno i ekonomično odgovore na pretnje.

Novi strateški koncept je osmišljen tako da formuliše aktivnosti NATO-a za celi niz godina. Već u Lisabonu, naši lideri su doneli nekoliko sledećih odluka kako bi se pokrenuli napori unutar tog okvira:


1. Proširiti, kao osnovni element kolektivne odbrane NATO-a, naš trenutni aktivni slojeviti sistem balističkih raketa za odbranu. On je trenutno di-zajniran tako da štiti raspoređene snage NATO-a; no, sada će biti unapre-đen kako bi zaštitio evropsku populaciju i teritorije u sastavu NATO-a.

2. Razviti do kraja marta 2011. godine političke smernice za nastavak transformacije odbrambenih sposobnosti i snaga NATO-a i otpočeti vojnu primenu novog strateškog koncepta.

3. Razviti do juna 2011. godine temeljnu politiku sajber-odbrane za NATO, i Akcioni plan za njeno sprovođenje.

4. Ojačati Sveobuhvatni pristup Akcionog plana NATO-a do aprila 2011. godine, kako bi NATO bio u mogućnosti da bliže sarađuje sa partne-rima koji mogu da deluju sa svojim civilnim snagama u složenim kon-fliktnim situacijama, kao i da bi stvorio sopstvene civilne snage za stabi-lizaciju i rekonstrukciju. To je, pre svega, plod iskustva iz Avganistana, gde je samo vojna pobeda nemoguća.

5. I po pitanju Avganistana, naši lideri i lideri naših partnera u ISAF-u4 su odlučili, zajedno sa predsednikom Karzaijem, da otpočnu sa tranzici-jom ISAF-a ka snagama pod avganistanskom odgovornošću početkom 2011. godine, uz dogovoreni cilj da tranzicija bude realizovana širom zemlje do kraja 2014. godine, kao i da stupe u Trajno partnerstvo, čak i posle završetka borbenih operacija ISAF-a.

Konačno, nešto više o partnerstvima, što možda i jeste deo lisabonskih od-luka koji je neposredno najrelevantniji za Srbiju i za ovu konferenciju. NATO partnerstva obuhvataju evro-atlantsku, ali i širu međunarodnu bezbednost i stabilnost, i jačaju zajedničke vrednosti. Partnerstva daju okvir za politički, bezbednosni i odbrambeni dijalog i regionalnu saradnju i od suštinskog su značaja za uspeh operacija NATO-a. Partnerstva nam omogućavaju uzajamnu razmenu stručnosti, davanje podršku širim reformama, pružanje pomoći par-tnerima u razvoju njihovih sposobnosti i pripremanje zainteresovanih nacija za njihovo članstvo u NATO-u. Osim toga, partnerstva imaju obostranu vred-nost u zajedničkom rešavanju već pomenutih transnacionalnih izazova.

Zbog toga je u Lisabonu dogovoreno da se osnaži rad Partnerstva za mir (PzM) i Evro-atlantskog partnerskog saveta (EAPC) - u kojima je Srbija ak-tivna članica - kao osnovnog okvira za značajan politički dijalog i praktičnu

4 ISAF – International Security Assistance Force (Međunarodne snage za bezbednosnu po-moć)


saradnju. PzM, EAPC i drugi partnerski formati NATO-a su već dosta evolui-rali, ali je dogovoreno da će partnerstva, kao i sam NATO, imati koristi od fo-kusiranog napora za reformom. Identifikovano je nekoliko specifičnih oblasti za takve reforme i o njima će se, tokom priprema za aprilski sastanak ministara spoljnih poslova NATO-a u Berlinu, razgovarati interno, ali i sa partnerima.

Zapadni Balkan i NATO, Partnerstvo Srbija - NATO

Sada ću se, upravo u tom kontekstu jačanja partnerstava NATO-a, osvrnuti na region zapadnog Balkana, i posebno na Srbiju.

Stabilnost i sigurnost na zapadnom Balkanu su od ključnog značaja za evro-atlantsku bezbednost. Većina nacija u regionu su se već pridružile NATO-u, ili su izrazile želju da to učine:

• Albanija, Hrvatska i Slovenija su članice NATO-a; • Bivša Jugoslovenska Republika Makedonija će postati članica čim bude

rešen takozvani “problem imena”; • Crna Gora je u Akcionom planu za članstvo (MAP) i aktivno ga spro-

vodi; • Bosna i Hercegovina je takođe je u okviru Akcionog plana za članstvo

(MAP), čije sprovođenje će početi čim sva nepokretna imovina koja priprada sektoru odbrane, a koja ja identifikovana kao neophodna za buduće odbrambene svrhe, bude zvanično registrovana kao državna imovina Bosne i Hercegovine, koja će se koristiti za potrebe Ministar-stva odbrane ove zemlje;

• I Srbija je članica Partnerstva za mir.

NATO želi da ostvari plodne odnose sa svim zemljama u regionu. Vrata za članstvo ostaju otvorena za sve one koji se pridržavaju zajedničkih vrednosti i posebnih uslova za članstvo u NATO-u, ali je prvenstveno do svake zemlje pojedinačno da odredi kakvi će biti njeni odnosi sa NATO-om.

U konkretnom slučaju Srbije, NATO nastoji da produbi bilateralne odnose. Srbija i NATO su u poslednjih nekoliko godina unapredili nivo saradnje po pitanjima kao što su reforma odbrane i planiranje za vanredne situacije, i veru-


jemo da postoji još mnogo toga što bismo mogli učiniti u našim bilateralnim odnosima, a od čega bismo imali uzajamnu korist.

U praktičnom smislu, saradnja NATO-a i Srbije kroz program Partnerstvo za mir je uglavnom fokusirana na jačanje vojne interoperabilnosti Vojske Srbije sa državama članicama NATO-a, kako bi mogla da učestvuje u međunarodnim operacijama podrške miru. Ta saradnja može omogućiti Srbiji da svojim snaga-ma doprinese operacijama pod vođstvom NATO-a. Ona podjednako unapre-đuje sposobnost Srbije da doprinese i međunarodnim mirovnim operacijama koje predvode Ujedinjene nacije ili Evropska unija. Naravno, NATO pozdravlja angažman srpskih snaga u mirovnim operacijama u bilo kom okviru.

Srbija i NATO su se u aprilu 2009. godine usaglasili oko prvog seta od 19 Partnerskih ciljeva. U maju 2010. godine, taj set ciljeva je znatno proširen. NATO i Srbija su osnovali Grupu za reformu odbrane NATO-Srbija kako bi podržali reformu sistema odbrane i pomogli u sprovođenju Partnerskih ci-ljeva. Grupa za reformu odbrane je sačinjena od šest sektorskih radnih gru-pa, a plenarnim sastancima, koji se održavaju svaka četiri meseca, zajednički predsedavaju Srbija i NATO. Inače, poslednji Plenarni sastanak je održan pre mesec dana ovde u Beogradu5.

Mi u NATO-u smo zadovoljni uspostavljanjem diplomatske misije Srbije pri NATO-u 2010. godine, na čijem je čelu moj prijatelj, ambasador Branko Milinković. Bilo nam je drago kada su u septembru predstavnici oružanih sna-ga Srbije dopunili diplomatsku misiju.

Sve ovo je dosta dobro, i mi bismo mogli predložiti još mnogo toga, no, kao što su lideri NATO-a ponovili više puta - odluka je Srbije da podesi tempo razvijanja ovog odnosa.

• Ako Srbija odluči da njena budućnost leži u daljem produbljivanju par-tnerstva sa NATO-om, naći će spremnog partnera među naših 28 članica.

• Ako ne želi da produbi partnerstvo, to će takođe biti prihvatljivo za NATO, mada bismo bili razočarani gubitkom uzajamnih mogućnosti.

• Ako Srbija odluči da možda želi članstvo u NATO-u, kao i njeni susedi, naći će vrata Akcionog plana za članstvo otvorenima.

5 Početkom novembra 2010. godine (prim. prev.)


• Ako Srbija odluči da ne želi da uđe u NATO, to je takođe u redu, je se od nikoga ne zahteva da postane članicom NATO-a, niti naši dobri odnosi zavise od toga. NATO i nacije u njegovom sastavu imaju veoma blisku i plodnu interakciju sa svim zemljama u Evropi koje iz bilo kog razloga nisu pristupila NATO-u, Partnerstvu za mir, a pogotovo ne operacija-ma. Isto bi trebalo da bude slučaj sa Srbija izvan NATO-a, ukoliko to bude pravac koji odaberete.

Ono što je važno za NATO je da u svakom trenutku - bez obzira u kojem okviru - sa Srbijom održi snažan politički dijalog i dobru praktičnu saradnju s ciljem rešavanje zajedničkih bezbednosnih izazova, koje će biti zasnovana na međusobnom poštovanju.

Misija KFOR-a i njena evolucija

Što se tiče KFOR-a, vojni kontakti između NATO-a i Vojske Srbije su i dalje besprekorni u kontekstu Zajedničke komisije za implementaciju. Dozvolite mi stoga da se sada osvrnem na operaciju NATO-a na Kosovu.

Kao što znate, Rezolucijom 1244 u junu 1999. godine su uspostavljeni pa-rametri za okončanje sukoba i međunarodni angažman na Kosovu. Savet bez-bednosti je bio nadležan za razmeštanje međunarodnog bezbednosnog prisu-stva na Kosovu, dok je Severno-atlantski savet odlučio da će KFOR preuzeti ulogu tog međunarodnog bezbednosnog prisustva. U toj ulozi KFOR deluje od 1999. godine. Rezolucija 1244 definiše zadatke za međunarodno bezbed-nosno prisustvo u stavki 9 svog teksta. Mnogi od tih zadataka su završeni ili su ih preduhitrili događaji na terenu. Osnovni zadaci koji su preostali KFOR-u su održavanje sigurnog i bezbednog okruženja, sprovođenje dužnosti nadgleda-nja granica po potrebi, i obezbeđivanje zaštite i slobode kretanja svojoj misiji, međunarodnom civilnom prisustvu, kao i drugim međunarodnim organiza-cijama.

Tokom jedanaest i po godina, KFOR je ispunio sve svoje zadatke, uz neko-liko pogrešnih koraka. U tom periodu, KFOR-u je pružen adekvatan doprinos od strane NATO-a, kao i zemalja koje nisu članice NATO-a. Misija je redov-no prilagođavana i njen broj je smanjivan kao odgovor na opšte poboljšanje bezbednosnih uslova na samom Kosovu, kao i na nastanak drugih elemenata


na Kosovu koji čine kontekst za aktivnosti KFOR-a. U ocenjivanju delovanja KFOR-a, misija je konstantno dobijala visoke ocene od svih grupa stanovniš-tva na samom Kosovu, kao i regionalnih aktera, uključujući i Srbiju.

Na misiju KFOR-a, koju je definisao Severno-atlantski savet u okviru para-metara Rezolucije 1244, nisu uticala dramatična politička zbivanja tokom niza godina, posebno od kraja 2006. godine. NATO je podržao napore Specijalnog izaslanika UN-a, predsednika Ahtisaari-ja, a kasnije i napore pregovaračke trojke sačinjene od predstavnika Evropske unije–Rusije-Sjedinjenih Država, koja je nastojala da privede kraju napore predsednika Ahtisaari-ja. KFOR je pomagao u očuvanju bezbednosti i stabilnosti na terenu, osiguravajući kon-tinuirani nastavak pregovora. Ova, nepristrasna uloga KFOR-a, nastavljena je bez prekida i kada ja Trojka - nakon proglašenja nezavisnosti Kosova - gene-ralnom sekretaru UN-a prijavila svoju nesposobnost da posreduje u ostvarenje sporazuma o statusu. Do današnjeg dana. KFOR nastavlja da obavlja tu nepri-strasnu ulogu, i tako će i nastaviti.

Važno je shvatiti da su u sastavu NATO-a i države koje priznaju nezavisnost Kosova, kao i one druge koje tu nezavisnost nisu priznale, ali da NATO kao organizacija ne preuzima nikakav stav u vezi sa pravnim statusom Kosova. Kao međuvladina organizacija, NATO ne priznaje države, niti ih ne priznaje, to je isključivo pravo samih nacija. Kao što je naš prethodni generalni sekretar, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, rekao: “NATO se ne bavi priznavanjima.” To znači da NATO i KFOR nisu “statusno neutralni” – već samo nepristrasni u načinima na koje KFOR obavlja svoje zadatke.

Na samitu u Bukureštu u aprilu 2008. godine, NATO se složio da će NATO i KFOR, u okviru operativnih zadataka KFOR-a, nastaviti da rade sa svim ak-terima na Kosovu s ciljem pružanja podrške stabilnosti, demokratiji i multi-etničnosti. Pored toga, najavljeno je da je NATO spreman da odigra ulogu u primeni budućih bezbednosnih aranžmana. U junu 2008. godine, NATO je pristao da pomogne u dostojanstvenom raspuštanju Kosovskog zaštitnog kor-pusa i postavljanju na noge Kosovskih snaga bezbednosti i civilnih struktura za nadzor istih. Prvi zadatak je završen. NATO i KFOR trenutno sprovode drugi i treći zadatak u bliskoj koordinaciji i uz konsultacije sa relevantnim domaćim i međunarodnim institucijama.


Ovakva politika NATO-a ostaje na snazi, i doprinosi održavanju sigurnog i bezbednog okruženja na Kosovu za sve narode koji žive tamo.

KFOR-ovo prisustvo odvraćanja

Nedavno, odnosno u junu 2009. godine, nacije u sastavu NATO-a su odlu-čile da će sprovesti postepeno prilagođavanje snaga KFOR-a do stadija koji se naziva “odvraćajućim prisustvom”. To znači da će, kada to bude prikladno, u skladu sa razvojem događaja i na postepen način, uz periodične procene Se-verno-atlantskog saveta, NATO tokom vremena smanjiti broj snaga KFOR-a s ciljem obezbeđivanja manjih, fleksibilnijih snaga koje će i dalje biti u stanju da u potpunosti obavljaju sve zadatke KFOR-a.

Prva faza u prilagođavanju KFOR-a, takozvana “Kapija 1”, je ostvarena u januaru 2010. godine. KFOR je smanjen na svega nešto više od 10.000 vojnika.

Nakon višemesečnih procena situacije na Kosovu, Severno-atlantski savet je u oktobru odobrio preporuku SACEUR-a6 za pokretanje takozvane “Kapi-je 2” u položaj odvraćanja. Ovaj potez, za čije sprovođenje je potrebno nešto više od 4 meseca, značajno će konsolidovati geografsko razmeštanje KFOR-a, fokusiraće se na oblasti u kojima povremeno dolazi do izbijanja bezbednosnih problema ili gde su rizici evidentni.

Ovaj potez odražava pozitivnu procenu bezbednosne situacije na Kosovu od strane NATO-a tokom kontiunuiranog vremenskog perioda, te pokazuje sve veću sposobnost kosovske policije, uz podršku EULEKS-a i sa KFOR-om - kao trećim pružaocem bezbednosti - da se nosi sa izazovima održavanja javne bezbednosti i reda.

SACEUR, naš generalni sekretar i nacije u sastavu NATO-a su sa ogrom-nim oprezom prišli smanjenju snaga KFOR-a. Posvećenost Alijanse Kosovu i održavanju sigurnog i bezbednog okruženja ostaju čvrsti.

6 Vrhovni komandant savezničkih snaga u Evropi


Zaključak

Dozvolite mi da ovde završim.

Nastojao sam da vam kroz ova opažanja dam jezgrovit pregled istorijskih odluka šefova država i vlada NATO-a na samitu Lisabonu. Te odluke su jedna od tema ove konferencije, ali takođe mogu poslužiti i kao okvir za razmatranje implikacija za dalji razvoj odnosa između NATO-a i Srbije unutar okvira Part-nerstava na čijem unapređenju ćemo raditi posle Lisabonu.

Malo sam se zadržao na zadacima KFOR-a i evoluciji ove misije kako bih preneo vesti o najnovijim dešavanjima, ali i da bih istakao značajnu stvar koja, čini mi se, ovde ponekad nije sasvim jasna - a to je da uloga NATO-a na Kos-ovu služi stabilnosti i bezbednosti svih naroda na Kosovu, a samim tim i celog regiona, nepristrasno i bez pozivanja na pravne ili političke razloge koji su iz-van nadležnosti NATO-a. Dakle, operacija NATO-a na Kosovu ne bi smela da bude prepreka za razvoj našeg partnerstva. U onoj meri u kojoj je neki navode kao prepreku, možda postoji izvesno nerazumevanje onoga što KFOR i NA-TO-a rade ili ne rade na Kosovu, ili zbog čega.

Novi strateški koncept stavlja partnerstva u središte programa NATO-a u

narednim godinama. Alijansa će ove godine delovati u pravcu oblikovanja da-ljeg puta sa partnerima, i sarađivaće sa njima tokom tog procesa. Lisabon nam je dao fleksibilnost da nadogradimo na ono što je već učinjeno kako bismo stvorili partnerstvo koje će najbolje odgovarati potrebama Srbije, kao i našim potrebama. Kao što sam rekao, mi vidimo značajan potencijal u produblji-vanju odnosa sa Srbijom, pod uslovom da je to ono što Srbija, njena Vlada i njen narod žele. Sa pozicije našeg generalnog sekretara Rasmussen-a i nacija NATO-a, Srbija poseduje ogroman potencijal da doprinese stabilnosti i bez-bednosti, ne samo na ovim prostorima, već u celoj evro-atlantskoj regiji, dok i sa njihove strane postoji veliko interesovanje za izgradnju našeg partnerstva.


Novi strateški koncept NATO-a i sistem globalne bezbednosti

Julian Harston7

Živimo u kompleksnom i opasnom okruženju ispunjenom višestrukim pret-njama. Umesto međudržavnih izazova i pitanja, sada smo suočeni sa nedr-žavnim i asimetričnim pretnjama. U prva dva strateška dokumenta NATO-a koja su izrađena nakon hladnog rata, pokušalo se odgovoriti na nove pretnje okruženju koje u tom trenutku nije bilo ugroženo istinskim pretnjama, uz isto-vremeno zalaganje za dalje proširenje Alijanse. Dokumentom iz 1999. godine, koji je napisan tokom vazdušne kampanje NATO-a na Balkanu, uspostavljen je presedan za širenje operacija NATO-a koje prevazilaze definiciju puke sa-moodbrane, kako bi se obrazložile humanitarne intervencije i sprečavanje su-koba. To je sasvim sigurno bila značajna promena u odnosu na dokument iz 1991. godine, kada je misija glasila “Alijansa je čisto defanzivna u svojoj svrsi: nijedno od njenih oružja neće nikada biti korišteno, osim u samoodbrani”. Ono što je nesporno jeste da NATO neće nestati. Međutim, imajući u vidu različite suštinske interese država članica, pitanje je koja značajna pretnja bi mogla objediniti NATO-a u narednoj deceniji kako bi podstakla Alijansu da se upusti u onu vrstu investicija i reformi koje novi strateški koncept predviđa.

7 Autor je bivši Pomoćnik generalnog sekretara Ujedinjenih nacija


Na samom početku bih želeo staviti karte na sto. Kao diplomata koji je dva-deset i pet godina radio za Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, bio sam plaćen da budem po-bornik NATO-a, što sam i radio sa izvesnim entuzijazmom zbog bitnih eleme-nata uzajamne asistencije koji su sastavni deo tog posla. Pa ipak, ja sam oduvek bio Gaullista8. Nikada nisam verovao da bi Sjedinjene Države dovele Njujork ili Vašingtonu u opasnost zbog Londona ili Pariza ... i kakav god mogući scenario da bih zamislio, Sjedinjene Države bi u najboljem slučaju imale svega nekoliko dana, umesto uobičajenih dve do četiri godine, da donesu odluku.9

Ne tako davno, bio sam pomoćnik generalnog sekretara Ujedinjenih na-cija i posmatrao agoniju zemalja osnivačica te organizacije, a koje su, takođe, vodeće članice NATO-a, svaki put kada bi morale da donesu odluku da li da obezbede dodatni legitimitet za operacije koje Savet bezbednosti u određenim situacijama može odobriti, a kada da to ignorišu.

Tokom poslednjih 15 godina, veći deo sam bio u službi na Balkanu, i veliki deo tog vremena sam proveo u Beogradu. Video sam kako je Srbija iz diktatu-re prešla u demokratiju, kao i kako je postala metom NATO bombardovanja tokom tog procesa. To je bila akcija koja je označila početak politike ekspan-zije koja je NATO dovela tamo gde je danas - u Avganistan, i koja je pomerila NATO daleko od principa samoodbrane do principa napada, iako je to zarad opšteg dobra, ili se bar tako kaže.

U ovom tekstu bih najpre želeo da razmotrim neke pretnje globalnoj bez-bednosti, da se osvrnem na novi strateški koncept NATO-a koji je usvojen u Lisabonu u novembru 2010. godine, a potom da napravim određene procene o tome da li taj koncept nudi odgovor na pretnje, te da završim sa nekoliko reči na kraju o tome kako bi Srbija trebala da planira svoje mesto u budućoj bezbednosnoj arhitekturi.

Osvrnimo se na pretnje po globalnu bezbednost.

Da li srljamo ka globalnim neredima? Koje će mesto u budućnosti imati vojne alijanse i njihova politička moć?

8 Gaullism je francuska politička ideologija koja počiva na razmišljanju i delovanju vođe Otpora, a tadašnjeg Predsednika Charles de Gaulle-a. Videti: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ga-ullism (prim. prev.)

9 Opaska na Drugi svetski rat. (prim. prev.)


Živimo u kompleksnom i opasnom okruženju ispunjenom višestrukim pretnjama, koje analitičari bezbednosti nazivaju “punim spektrom pretnji”. Umesto međudržavnih izazova i pitanja na koja smo navikli, sada smo suo-čeni sa nedržavnim pretnjama i izazovima u vidu banditskih država. Suočeni smo sa proliferacijom oružja za masovno uništenje i raketnom tehnologi-jom, kao i ostalim dugoročnim globalnim izazovima koji nam postaju sve poznatiji: globalno zagrevanje, pandemije, nestanak fosilnih goriva. Dodajte tome veoma realnu opasnost sajber-rata protiv vlada i oružanih snaga koje su sve ugroženije, i dobićete jedan od onih raznobojnih koktela sa malim kišobranom, gde su sve lepe boje prepoznatljive, ali vas bez obzira na to vaše piće može ubiti.

Međunarodni terorizam i radikalizovani islam, bez obzira na uzroke, pred-stavljaju Veliki rat, u kojem su domaći teroristi inspirisani celovitom global-nom ideološkom osnovom. Do sada su protiv-terorističke i obaveštajne aktiv-nosti uspele da spreče drugi 9/11, ali koliko još dugo? Mi moramo da budemo uspešni svaki put. Oni moraju da budu uspešni jednom.

Dugoročna budućnost Avganistana je, u najboljem slučaju, neizvesna. Ta-libani stalno vrše pregrupisavanja, premda bi nedostatak jedinstvenosti svrhe među tim grupama možda mogao biti izvestan znak nade. Sve to vreme, po-kušaji NATO-a da zaustavi trgovinu drogom (glavni raison d’être za prisustvo NATO-a u Avganistanu) su bezuspešni. NATO se – onda kada otvoreno raz-matra svoju izlaznu strategiju – čini slabim i podeljenim. Strateški neuspeh u Iraku postaje još očigledniji, i pored dobrih vesti prošlog meseca10 da se trenut-no uspostavlja nekakva vlada.

Regionalni protivnici - Iran, Sirija, Al-kaida, Hezbolah, Hamas - su svi ohrabreni onim što karakterišu neuspehom SAD u Iraku i neuspehom Izraela u Libanu. SAD i Izrael se više ne čine neranjivima, dok će iranski nuklearni i raketni štit koji se sigurno razvija, verovatno u značajnoj meri oblikovati bez-bednosno okruženje u narednih deset godina. Iransku hegemoniju će potpo-moći šiitska milicija u regionu, inspirisana, opremljena, obučena i finansirana od strane Irana. Budite sigurni da Teheran smatra kako je nuklearna energija ključni element za iransku moć i prestiž.

10 Novembar 2010 (prim. prev)


Proliferacija oružja za masovno uništenje je sledeća na dnevnom redu. Ona se trenutno ubrzava i širi. Dvostruki izazov koji predstavljaju Iran i Severna Koreja su u skorije vreme često u vestima zahvaljujući Vikiliksu, no sada postoji mo-gućnost širenja pravog požara. Ne zaboravimo da su i Saudijska Arabija i Egipat najavile nuklearne programe 2006. godine, te da čak i Japan razmatra istupanje iz Sporazuma o sprečavanju širenja oružja za masovno uništenje11 iz 1968. godi-ne, kao odgovor na pretnje Severne Koreje. Imajući u vidu sve propuste kojima je Sporazum ispunjen, koliko nuklearnih država će postojati u 2025. godini? I da nastavim ceremoniju loših vesti, već postoji mreža država opremljenih oružjem za masovno uništenje i pretendirajućih terorističkih organizacija. Biološka i ra-diološka oružja su glavni kratkoročni problem. Bivše sovjetsko nuklearno oružje je i dalje na raspolaganju za prodaju ili krađu. Znamo i za sub-državne ‘puteve’ širenja tehnologija i znanja. Prisetite se A. Q. Khan-a iz Pakistana.

Da li je unipolarni svetski poredak na izdisaju?

Rusija trenutno uživa preporod bogatstva i problema, zajedno sa opasnom samo-percepcijom moći i uticaja, i obnovljenim imperijalnim pretenzijama. Međutim, tu je i njena dugoročna otpornost koja će omogućiti iskorištavanja energetskih resursa kao oružja prinude protiv suseda i konkurenata, dok mi posmatramo kako matica polako klizi nazad u autoritarizam. A šta je sa Ki-nom, koja već jeste ekonomska super-sila, ili Japanom – koji traži status ‘nor-malne odbrambene moći’ kao odgovor na veće izazove lokalnog bezbedno-snog okruženja?

I pre nego što se udaljimo od mojih opažanja pretnji po naše okruženje u kratkom i srednjem periodu, dodajmo tome i klimatske promene koje su dove-le do pražnjenja resursa i demografskog pritiska u zemljama u razvoju.

Globalizacija ugrožava državnost na načine koji su istovremeni i dobri i veoma, veoma opasni. I ne samo zbog toga što se onima, kojima je sve uskra-ćeno, globalizacija može lako prodati kao obnovljeni zapadni imperijalizam i iskoristiti za odgajanje snaga koje mobilišu nezadovoljstvo i bes naroda.

Kakvo olakšanje, stoga, donosi spoznaja da je u svom novom strateškom konceptu NATO identifikovao sve ove pretnje i čini se da nudi barem delimič-na rešenja za veći deo njih.

11 Sporazum o neširenju nuklearnog oružja


Dokument, koji otpočinje izjavom o misiji organizacije tolike dužine da čak i najmanje skeptični među čitaocioma moraju da se zapitaju kuda ih to vodi, hrabar je pokušaj suočavanja sa pretnjama, dok istovremeno samo prividno pokriva pukotine u Alijansi nastale usled veoma različitih percepcija tih pret-nji među njenim članicama, te ignoriše izvor krize kroz koju Alijansa prolazi i zbog koje će u doglednoj budućnosti snositi posledice.

U prva dva strateška dokumenta NATO-a koja su izrađena nakon hladnog rata, odnosno 1991. i 1999. godine, pokušalo se odgovoriti na nove pretnje okruženju koje u tom trenutku nije bilo ugroženo istinskim pretnjama, uz isto-vremeno zalaganje za dalje proširenje Alijanse. Dokumentom iz 1999. godine, koji je napisan tokom vazdušne kampanje NATO-a na Balkanu, uspostavljen je presedan za širenje operacija NATO-a koje prevazilaze definiciju puke sa-moodbrane, kako bi se obrazložile humanitarne intervencije i sprečavanje su-koba. To je uistinu značajna promena u odnosu na dokument iz 1991. godine, kada je misija glasila “Alijansa je čisto defanzivna u svojoj svrsi: nijedno od njenih oružja neće nikada biti korišteno, osim u samoodbrani”.

Poslednjih 10 godina smo svedoci pokretanja najvećeg vojnog angažmana NATO-a u Avganistanu, potom uključivanja u borbi protiv piratstva nedaleko od Roga Afrike i obučavanja bezbednosnih snaga u Iraku. NATO je pred so-bom imao izazov da formuliše novi strateški koncept koji bi zadovoljio svih 28 članica, te da istovremeno upravlja svojim angažmanom u Avganistanu i od-govori na bojazni nekih od svojih članica u vezi sa postepenim približavanjem Rusije. Nije jasno da li je pronađen odgovarajući odgovor na ovaj izazov, i da li se, zapravo, uopšte može naći.

Umesto iscrpnog i iscrpljujućeg osvrta na sadržaj strateškog koncepta od skoro 4.000 reči, samo bih želeo napomenuti da Koncept obuhvata sve - od energetske bezbednosti, do mreža bezbednosti i klimatskih promena. Zadovo-ljen je zahtev centralno-evropskih zemalja da princip samoodbrane i dalje ima središnje mesto, jer se pominje kao prvi u svakom odeljku. No, biće potrebno mnogo više od otpočinjanja svakog pasusa aludiranjem na princip samood-brane NATO-a kako bi se centralno-evropske zemlje dale uveriti da je Alijansa iskrena po ovom pitanju.

I upravo u ovom kontekstu bih želeo da se fokusiram na Rusiju kao kata-lizator uspeha ili neuspeha NATO-a ili čak njegovog samog opstanka. Možda


najupečatljivija od svih ironija je da Rusija i dalje drži ključ za postojanje NA-TO-a, ili možda čak i njegovo srozavanje ka tome da postane mnogo manje bitan elemenat u odbrambenoj arhitekturi Evrope.

Dok države članice NATO-a prave planove za naredne decenije, Rusija agresivno deluje s ciljem ponovnog uspostavljanja nekadašnje moći u zemlji i regionu nakon razadoblja post-sovjetskog dremeža. Rusija danas počinje da pomalo izgleda kao Sovjetski Savez koji je tokom hladnog rata bio glavni mo-tiv postojanja NATO-a. Iako NATO više ne posmatra Rusiju kao svog glavnog protivnika, Rusiji je dato dovoljno vremena da nakon pada Sovjetskog Saveza i haosa 1990-ih godina pregrupiše svoje snage, dok su agresivne i - neki bi rekli – opsesivne odluke NATO-a ka proširenju poslužile kao podsticaj Moskvi, a ja verujem i kao legitimacija za njen preporod.

Dok je NATO više fokusiran na islamski svet, Rusija je vojno intervenisala u Gruziji12 (što je rezultovalo de-facto okupacijom četvrtine zemlje), preselila je svoje vojne baze na jug centralne Azije i Jermenije, objedinila je Belorusiju i Kazahstan13 u ekonomsku uniju i omogućila izbor pro-ruskih snaga u Ukrajini i Kirgistanu14.

Stratfor, američki think-tank, i Madeleine Albright, su podelili NATO u tri grupe na osnovu ovog, ali i ostalih pitanja (sa Rusijom, kao glavnom tačkom sporenja), odnosno: na Sjedinjene Države i njene „atlantske“ saveznice (kao što su Holandija, Danska i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo), suštinsku Evropu (koju predvode Nemačka i Francuska), te centralno-evropske zemlje. Vašington i njegovi najjači NATO saveznici su umorni od Rusije i sumnjičavi su prema njenim namerama, no oni takođe žele da Alijansa stavi naglasak na pitanja kao što su post-konfliktne operacije i terorizam, a ne samo odbrana od Rusije. Zemlje koje čine jezgro Evrope žele da održe dobre odnose sa Rusijom, i da je ne provociraju Alijansom koja je fokusirana na zaustavljanje kontrole Moskve nad njenom sferom uticaja. Zemlje centralne Evrope žele da dobiju uverenje, dok Berlin i Pariz – upravo zbog njihovog odnosa sa Moskvom - ne žele da centralnoj Evropi daju ništa više od simboličnog uveravanja . Osim Rusije, Sje-

12 Videti: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/real_world_order 13 Videti:http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/151436/analysis/20091230_russia_bela-

rus_kazakhstan_customs_deal_and_way_forward_moscow 14 Videti: http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/160817/analysis/20100426_russia_un-

rest_foreign_policy_tool


dinjene Države bi želele da se NATO usmeri na terorističke pretnje, da poveća trošenje za vojne svrhe15 i da pomogne u post-konfliktnim misijama. Suštinska Evropa je posebno izmorena daljim angažmanom NATO-a i želi da NATO potvrdi primat Saveta bezbednosti UN-a u međunarodnim odnosima - kako bi se ograničio unilateralizam Sjedinjenih Država koji odvodi Alijansu u razne “avanture” - i da više stremi ka prevenciji konflikata, nego izgradnji država u post-konfliktnim uslovima. Zemlje centralne Evrope su takođe skeptične po pitanju daljih izvora razonode Sjedinjenih Država.

U trenutku kada ja predsednik Barak Obama preuzeo dužnost izgledalo je da su Vašington i Moskva odustali od svojih agresivnih stavova. Promenom taktike, obe zemlje su se usaglasile da je u to vreme svaka od njih imala veće probleme na koje se trebalo fokusirati, tako da su sva neprijateljstva - barem privremeno - stavljena na čekanje. Takvo shvatanje je, naravno, klimavo, ali i Vašington i Moskva su znali šta se dešava.

Izgleda da sporazum između Moskve i Vašingtona ne uključuje usporava-nje ponovnog jačanja Rusije. Kada su se Sjedinjene Države povukle iz agresiv-ne borbe protiv Rusije, zemlje koje su bile pod zaštitom Vašingtona - centralna Evropa i Gruzija – osetile su se napuštenima i bespomoćnima. Takođe, ove države nisu bile u mogućnosti da se okrenu tradicionalnim evropskim sila-ma, jer su Nemačka i Francuska već odlučile da je bolje da izbalansiraju svoje odnose sa Rusijom nego da budu protiv nje - a posebno ne zbog toga da bi zaštitile centralnu Evropu.

Međutim, postoje znaci koji upućuju da je ovo zbližavanje tanko poput pa-pira. Nasmejana lica na kraju samita u Lisabonu i sporazum o protivraketnoj odbrani koji je navodno ostvaren tom prilikom već su pod velikim pritiskom. Na detalje o učešću Rusije će se morati sačekati do juna 2011. godine, no, izgle-da da bez obzira kakvo da je bilo učešće Moskve, neće joj se dati zajednička kontrola nad balističkim projektilima. Da li je neko zaista poverovao da bi se Rusija vezala u jedno ozbiljno partnerstvo bez prava na veto?

Učestvujući na samitu NATO-a, mnoge države zapadne Evrope su računale da će otopljavanje odnosa između SAD-a i Rusije i dalje biti na snazi, što bi

15 Videti: http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/173818/analysis/20101015_us_and_euro-pe_face_military_spending


im omogućilo da se osećaju prijatnije u pregovorima i sa NATO-om i sa Rusi-jom. Međutim, države centralne Evrope su doživele olakšanje zbog toga što su pukotine u popuštanju počele da se pokazuju, jer će im to omogućiti da budu agresivnije prema Rusiji. Dakle, raspad odnosa između SAD-a i Rusije će do-datno podeliti već podeljenu Alijansu.

Ono što države centralne Evrope smatraju najproblematičnijim je to što je ruski izaslanik u NATO-u, Dmitri Rogozin, novi strateški koncept nazvao „balansiranim“. Srećan Rogozin, znači srećan Kremlj, a to znači da centralna Evropa nije dobila garancije od Sjedinjenih Država i zemalja koje čine jezgro Evrope koje bi na bilo koji način zabrinule Rusiju.

NATO neće nestati. On je ovde kako bi ostao, ako ni zbog čega drugog, onda iz inercije. I dalje će imati korisnu ulogu u borbi protiv piratstva, u reša-vanjima situacija poslije konflikata i kao pečat odobrenja za nekoliko država zapadnog Balkana koje tek treba da se pridruže Zapadu. No, Evropljani već rade na razvijanju alternativnih rešenja, dok se države centralne Evrope uzdaju u bilateralne sporazume sa Sjedinjenim Državama.

Države centralne Evrope imaju poteškoća u pronalaženju druge zapadno-evropske sile, osim Švedske, koja bi bila prijemčiva za njihove brige oko bez-bednosti. Osećaju potrebu da se samostalno suprotstave Rusiji, uz ograničenu podršku. Tu je uvek Nemačka, kojoj bi se države centralne Evrope teoretski mogle obratiti za pomoć. Barem na papiru, Berlin je saveznik i EU i NATO-a. Međutim, ono što je specifično za bojazni centralne Evrope – a što je realnost o kojoj se retko govori u javnosti u centralnoj Evropi - jeste činjenica da se Nemačka izvlači iz institucija hladnog rata. Rusija možda jeste očigledna bez-bednosna pretnja, međutim, sve snažnija uloga Nemačke - i, što je najvažnije, njeni sve topliji odnosi sa Moskvom – je ono što uznemirava Varšavu i ostale centralno-evropske metropole, upravo zbog toga što nije jasno u kom pravcu je Berlin krenuo.

Ostale evropske zemlje će uzajamno formirati sporazume. Skandinavske zemlje, koje su podeljene između članica NATO-a i onih koje to nisu, već su ostvarile vojne sporazume sa baltičkim državama koje Švedska i Finska posma-traju kao svoju sferu uticaja. Francuzi samostalno razvijaju amfibijske sposob-nosti sa Ujedinjenim Kraljevstvom i mediteranskim zemljama, a potpisali su i


sporazum o odbrani sa Ujedinjenim Kraljevstvom kako bi balansirali svoje po-litičke i ekonomske odnose sa Nemačkom. Ovi nezavisni koraci među članica-ma i nečlanicama NATO-a samo su još jedan dokaz da dugogodišnja održivost i egzistencija Alijanse nisu dovoljni da je spase od nerelevantnosti.

Imajući u vidu različite suštinske interese država članica, pitanje je koja zna-čajna pretnja bi mogla objediniti NATO u narednoj deceniji kako bi podstakla Alijansu da se upusti u onu vrstu investicija i reformi koje novi strateški kon-cept predviđa.

NATO će osigurati svoj značaj relevantnog aktera ukoliko se fokusira na evropske snage, i ne dopusti da bude ugrožen nedostatkom kredibilne stra-tegije. Evropski saveznici bi trebali da se fokusiraju na koji način da razviju vojne sposobnosti potrebne za podršku njihovih strategija bezbednosti u okvi-ru projektovanih ograničenja resursa. S obzirom na ograničene kapacitete za ekspedicione operacije (nije moguće rasporediti niti održavati više od 2-3% NATO snaga van Evrope), evropski saveznici bi trebalo da unaprede sopstve-ne sposobnosti u operacijama slabog intenziteta, kao što su rekonstrukcija, sajber-bezbednost, organizovani kriminal i nadzor kretanja unutar svojih granica. Dakle, korišćenjem ograničenih resursa dostupnih za specijalizaciju, Evropa će biti bolje pozicionirana da garantuje svoju bezbednost i da postane sposobniji partner. Takođe, Sjedinjene Države bi izbegle vojnu i stratešku ra-stegnutost, što bi im omogućilo da razmotre nove strateške odnose sa Indijom i drugima koji će bolje odgovoriti na izazove bezbednosnom okruženju 21. veka koje sam opisao ranije.

Sada ću se osvrnuti na to gde sve ovo ostavlja Srbiju.

NATO je u procesu stalnih promena, novi strateški koncept je zakrpao pu-kotine, ali ne daje jasnu sliku o tome gde će NATO biti za pet godina.

Dakle, da li iko razuman ulazi u autobus, ne znajući kuda autobus ide? Uglavnom ...........ne ...........

No, u ovom slučaju, mislim da je odgovor potvrdan.

Znam da Srbija nikada nije bila članica vojnog saveza, razumem emotiv-ne argumente koji počivaju na brutalnosti NATO bombardovanja, znam da je


Vuk Jeremić ponudio alternativu politike tri stuba, iako se ista čini pomalo ne-stvarnom, no ja verujem da Srbija ima luksuz vremena. Držite se Partnerstva za mir (PzM), izvucite maksimalnu korist iz toga, uverite posebno SAD koje i dalje prikazuju Srbiju u liku potencijalne otpadničke države, uverite evropske prijatelje Srbije, i sačekajte da vidite u kom pravcu će se NATO razvijati i da li možda postoji nova bezbednosna arhitektura, koji bi obuhvatila i NATO, a u kojoj bi se Srbija osećala udobnije u srednjoročnom periodu.


Novi strateški koncept NATO-a: kontekst i značaj

Dr Matthew Rhodes16

Usvajanjem novog Strateškog koncepta na samitu u Lisabonu, ojačan je kre-dibilitet Alijanse kao kamena temeljca međunarodne bezbednosti, ali i održivosti evroatlantskog partnerstva i integracija. Međutim, usvajanje novog strateškog koncepta nije bio neminovan zaključak. Saveznici su mogli da odlože napore u izradi Koncepta za kasnije ili da jednostavno objave deklaraciju o relevatnosti prethodne verzije. Umesto toga, ne samo da su se držali ambicioznog radnog plana za izradu Koncepta, koji je utvrđen na samitu u Strazburu/Kelu u proleće 2009. godine, već su to učinili putem širokog inkluzivnog procesa koji je obuhva-tio i doprinos starijih državnika i nevladinih stručnjaka. Konačan proizvod koji je usvojen u Lisabonu krajem 2010. godine je savladao katkad suštinski gorke razlike o nizu ključnih pitanja. U vreme sve većih sumnji, usvajanje novog stra-teškog koncepta je iznova potvrdilo visoku vrednost koju članice pripisuju Alijan-si, kao i njihovu sposobnost i volju da ostvare konsenzus o bezbednosnoj agendi 21. veka. Kao neophodna, čak i ako nedovoljna polazna tačka, novi strateški koncept NATO-a je već obezbedio blagovremeni podsticaj snagama i prestižu evroatlantske zajednice.

16 Autor je Direktor Programa za više studije bezbednosti i profesor nacionalne bezbedno-sti Marshall Centra.


Ono što je najznačajnije u vezi novog strateškog koncepta NATO-a jeste da je dogovor uopšte postignut. Neuspeh da se izradi ozbiljan dokument ili bojazan da se tako nešto čak i pokuša, bi samo dodatno osnažili nedavnu krizu samouverenosti evroatlantske zajednice. Uspeh na samitu u Lisabonu ojačava kredibilitet Alijanse kao kamena temeljca međunarodne bezbednosti, ali i odr-živosti evroatlantskog partnerstva i integracija kao tačaka orjentacije za zemlje ne-članice u Jugoistočnoj Evropi i šire.

Uz nešto drugačiji naglasak na suprotnim stranama okeana, evroatlantska zajednica je izašla iz hladnog rata u velikoj meri ubeđena u dve značajne stva-ri. Prva je da zajednica poseduje dovoljno resursa, tehničke stručnosti, kao i profesionalne sposobnosti da reši gotovo svaki bezbednosni izazov koji bi se mogao pojaviti. Druga je da se liberalno-demokratska kapitalizam, kakav se praktikuje širom ove zajednice, dokazao kao najuspešnija forma društvene organizacije u istoriji, za šta je verovatno posedovao univerzalnu primenjivost. Kao rezultat, bilo je moguće očekivati stalna unapređenja sposobnosti i uslova u zajednici čak i nakon njenog proširenja, jer je sve veći broj zemalja usvajao njene principe.

Sasvim sigurno, stvarna kretanja su u više navrata dovodili u pitanje taj ose-ćaj samo-uverenosti. U početku pomalo zbrkan multilateralizam, kojim je za-jednica odgovorila na nasilje u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i drugim mestima, jedan je od početnih primera. Teroristički napadi u gradovima kao što su Njujork, Madrid, London i Istanbul, kao i prirodne katastrofe poput uragana Katrine, naknadno su istakle prethodno potcenjene domaće slabosti. Zažarene rasprave oko inter-vencije u Iraku (koju je američki ambasador Nikolas Burns nazvao “iskustvom gotove smrti” za NATO), kao i dugotrajne, krvave pobune u toj zemlji i u Avga-nistanu, dodatno su naglasile ograničenja evro-atlantske efikasnosti.

Međutim, više od bilo čega drugoga, globalna finansijska kriza je taj trijumfalni optimizam zamenila sumnjom. Čak i nakon što je zajednica zabeležila kvalifikovani napredak u većini drugih oblasti, iznenada se našla suočenom sa najvećom svetskom ekonomskom krizom od 1930-ih. Kriza do koje je došlo slomom tržišta nekretnina u SAD-u u proleće 2007. godine, dovela je do velikih gubitaka i gotovo potpune paralize finansijskih tržišta do jeseni 2008. godine, dramatičnog skoka nezaposlenosti i budžetskih deficita tokom 2009. godine, te potencijalno fatalnog pritiska na valutu evrozone u 2010. godini.

Kumulativno, ovi efekti su umanjili pažnju i sredstva za međunarodni angažman, te su ubrzali prebacivanje globalne moći na Aziju i druge eko-


nomije u razvoju. Narušili se ugled evroatlantskih država za stručnost i nji-hove tvrdnje o superiornosti liberalne demokratije kao sistema.

Ono što je bilo podjednako zloslutno za postizanje dogovora o novom strateškom konceptu jeste da je tokom ovog perioda evroatlantska saradnja ostala u razočaravajućem, pa čak i stanju pogoršavanja. Značajna lična pop-ularnost novo-izabranog američkog predsednika Barak Obame u Evropi, nije pretočena u veću posvećenost zajedničkom delovanju po pitanjima vi-sokog profila. Uprkos upozorenju američkog Sekretara za odbranu, Bob Ge-jtsa, o “dva nivoa saveza”, evropski saveznici su dočekali Obaminu odluku o utrostručivanju američkih snaga u Avganistanu sa mešavinom relativno skrom-nih, delimično privremenih uvećavanja svojih snaga, i najavama povlačenja. Što se tiče Obame, ubrzo nakon što je izbegao obeležavanje dvadesetodišnjice od pada Berlinskog zida i nakon što se proglasio “prvim američkim predsed-nikom pacifistom”, on je tokom samita Ujedinjenih nacija o klimatskim prom-enama u Kopenhagenu izostavio svoje evropske kolege iz završnih razgovora sa liderima drugih velikih nacija. Što se tiče same finansijske krize, zajedni-ca je ostala podeljena oko relativnog prioriteta koordiniranog stimulansa ili smanjenje duga. Tadašnji češki premijer, Miroslav Topolanek, čija je zemlja u proleće 2009. godine predsedavala EU, svojom čuvenom izjavom je željenu pu-tanju Obamine administracije za podsticaj nazvao “putem u pakao.” Nemački lideri se podelili ovo mišljenje, doduše uz nešto manje živopisan rečnik.

Naspram te pozadine, usvajanje novog, smislenog strateškog koncepta od strane NATO-a nije bio neminovan zaključak. Saveznici su mogli da odlože napore u izradi Koncepta za kasnije ili da jednostavno objave deklaraciju o relevatnosti prethodne verzije. Umesto toga, ne samo da su se držali ambi-cioznog radnog plana za izradu Koncepta, koji je utvrđen na samitu u Straz-buru/Kelu u proleće 2009. godine, već su to učinili putem širokog inkluz-ivnog procesa koji je obuhvatio i doprinos starijih državnika i nevladinih stručnjaka. Konačan proizvod koji je usvojen u Lisabonu krajem 2010. go-dine je savladao katkad suštinski gorke razlike o nizu ključnih pitanja. Njime je dogovoren put napred u Avganistanu, ojačana je spremnost za teritori-jalnu odbranu, kao i za ekspedicione misije, potvrđena je velika uloga Saveza u nuklearnom odvraćanju i raketnoj odbrani, sajber i energetska bezbednost su identifikovane kao potencijalna pitanja vezana za primenu člana 5, na-vedeni su principi odnosa sa Evropskom unijom i Rusijom, i potvrđena je otvorenost za buduće proširenje.


Nije iznenađujuće da u velikoj meri sadržaj novog Koncepta u ovim oblas-tima ne predstavlja radikalno odstupanje od prethodnih izjava Alijanse. Ipak, premostivši neke od značajnih nesuglasica i ponudivši trenutne, autoritativne strateške smernice, ovaj dokument ima veoma važnu funkciju. U vreme sve većih sumnji, usvajanje novog strateškog koncepta je iznova potvrdilo visoku vrednost koju članice pripisuju Alijansi, kao i njihovu sposobnost i volju da ostvare konsenzus o bezbednosnoj agendi 21. veka.

Izazovi implementacije će sigurno ostati prisutni, ne samo u raspodeli sred-stava za predviđene sposobnosti. Paralelna pitanja se odnose na “Lisabonsku agendu” Evropske unije, nakon sporazuma te organizacije o reformama, koji je pukim slučajem potpisan u istom gradu. Ipak, kao neophodna, čak i ako nedovoljna polazna tačka, novi strateški koncept NATO-a je već obezbedio blagovremeni podsticaj snagama i prestižu evroatlantske zajednice.


Srpska strateška dilema između NATO-a i Rusije

Dr Aleksandar Fatić17

Unutrašnja debata i politička napetost u Srbiji u vezi sa članstvom u NATO savezu pokazuje tendenciju „usisavanja“ širih strateških argumenata. Ova de-bata se pre svega vodi u odnosu na normativna i moralna pitanja, dok su šira strateška pitanja ostavljena po strani. Normativna pitanja se odnose na postojeći Ustav Srbije, na probleme u vezi sa odnosom NATO-a i novoproglašenu nezavi-snu državu Kosovo nastalu odvajanjem od Srbije, kao i na rezoluciju Skupštine Srbije o vojnoj neutralnosti, koju veći deo političke javnosti interpretira kao za-branu za članstvo u NATO-u. Moralna pitanja se tiču uloge NATO-a u raspar-čavanju srpske državne teritorije, čiji je najdrastičniji primer odvajanje Kosova i NATO bombardovanje 1999. godine. Sva ova pitanja koja nose emocionalni potencijal, zaobilaze ključno, strateško pitanje o tome da li je u odbrambenom, civilizacijskom, kulturnom i političkom interesu Srbije da postane punopravna članica NATO-a, ili je njen interes suprotstavljen takvom projektu. Ovaj tekst se bavi navedenom strateškom dilemom polazeći od teze da je osnovna strateška prepreka članstvu Srbije u NATO-u nedovoljno jasan odnos između Srbije i Ru-ske Federacije.

17 Autor je Naučni savetnik pri Institutu za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd


Uvod

Osnovni argument ovog teksta je da je suštinski razlog za oklevanje Srbije u pogledu učlanjenja u NATO pritisak koji dolazi iz Moskve, jer je stvaranje monolitnog NATO geostrateškog prostora u Evropi direktno suprotstavljeno objektivnim strateškim interesima Ruske Federacije. Ovaj pritisak ima eko-nomske, energetske i političke dimenzije. On je kulminirao posetom ruskog predsednika Dmitrija Medvedeva Beogradu oktobra 2009. godine i njegovom obraćanju srpskim parlamentarcima, kojom prilikom je potpisan niz bilateral-nih sporazuma. Posle značajnog srpskog oklevanja, 2009. godine je finalizovan sporazum o prodaji monopolističke srpske naftne kompanije NIS Jugopetrol ruskom Gazpromu sa 51% vlasništva, kao jedan od uslova za izgradnju ruskog gasovoda Južni tok kroz Srbiju, sa krakom kroz Republiku Srpsku. Istovreme-no je dogovoreno osnivanje ruske vojne baze „za intervencije u elementarnim nepogodama“ u Nišu (jug Srbije), a pitanje o tome čije trupe će obezbeđivati budući gasovod koji će biti postavljen nadzemno nije otvarano. Istovremeno, ruski ministar za vanredne situacije Sergej Šojgu, koji je kao ključni pregovarač učestvovao u pripremi Medvedevljeve posete, prilikom odlaska iz Beograda je na pitanje o tome da li će u budućoj bazi biti stacionirane samo trupe ruske „unutrašnje vojske“ koja je pod njegovom komandom, ili i regularna ruska ar-mija, odgovorio da „odluku o tome može doneti samo predsednik Medvedev“, ostavljajući time otvorenu mogućnost ruske militarizacije Srbije. Uz sve ove neposredne bilateralne pritiske, Rusija je najpouzdaniji diplomatski saveznik Srbije u sprečavanju donošenja rezolucija u Savetu bezbednosti UN koje bi do-datno konsolidovale nezavisnost Kosova, kao i u onemogućavanju da Kosovo postane punopravni član niza drugih međunarodnih organizacija i foruma. Stoga je srpska zavisnost od Moskve značajna i Beograd nije u stanju da zauz-me odlučan kurs prema NATO-u bez prećutnog odobrenja Kremlja.

Ruska spoljna politika je tokom protekle decenije doživela niz transforma-cija u svom odnosu prema NATO-u, a ta tema je sastavni deo razmatranja ruskih interesa prema Srbiji i njenoj politici u odnosu na NATO. Moskva ima racionalne razloge da se protivi daljem proširivanju NATO-a i zaokruživanju NATO strateškog prostora sve do ruskih granica, ali se u tom stavu prema pro-širivanju suočava sa realnim nedostatkom strateških saveznika. U stvari, mo-glo bi se smatrati da je jedini nevoljni saveznik Rusije u istočnoj Evropi danas


Srbija, koja je ostala izvan NATO-a. Istovremeno, što je ruska politika diplo-matskog i strateškog protivljena širenju NATO-a neuspešnija, verovatnije je da će dolaziti do sve većeg zaoštravanja ruske Odbrambene doktrine i Strateškog koncepta, dva ključna odbrambena dokumenta Ruske Federacije, a samim tim i do sve većeg rasta klasične bezbednosne dileme između Rusije i NATO. Stoga je u interesu globalne bezbednosti da se proširivanje NATO-a zaustavi, radije nego da bezbednosna dilema sa Moskvom eskalira, što to ne znači i da je u strateškom interesu malih zemalja poput Srbije da ostanu izvan NATO.18

Strateška pozicija Rusija vis-à-vis NATO

Svako razmatranje odbrambene strategije Rusije mora poći od njene tradi-cionalne konvencionalne odbrambene doktrine iz posthladnoratovskog vre-mena, koja se zasnivala na dubini strateške teritorije kojom bi se apsorbovao prvi konvencionalni udar neprijatelja. Doktrina potom predviđa kumulativnu mobilizaciju ruskih rezervnih snaga, postepeno zaokruživanje neprijatelja i isterivanje van teritorije Rusije. Ova doktrina je tradicionalno bila primarna u odnosu na paralelnu, nuklearnu doktrinu, koja se sastoji iz principa „pro-širenog zastrašivanja i prvog udara“. Pošto je ruska konvencionalna doktrina sasvim defanzivna, u globalnom je interesu da se ona očuva i da ostane realna opcija ruske odbrane, kako Moskva ne bi morala da pribegava više preventiv-nim, a time i agresivnijim pozicijama u protokolima aktivacije svojih oružanih snaga, jer takvi protokoli istovremeno ugrožavaju susede i povećavaju opa-snost od izbijanja vojnih sukoba.

Proširivanje NATO-a ka ruskim granicama je politika koja direktno uruša-va održivost konvencionalne ruske odbrambene doktrine. Osim toga što Rusi-ja više nije konvencionalno superiorna u naoružanju i broju vojnika u odnosu na NATO - za razliku od perioda hladnog rata - i njena odbrambena geografija se dramatično menja usled proširivanja NATO-a. Osamdesetih godina prošlog veka sovjetska armija je imala gotovo četiri miliona vojnika, 10.000 strateških i 30.000 taktičkih nuklearnih projektila, uz godišnju proizvodnju 3.000 tenko-va, 600 borbenih aviona i 20 ratnih brodova. Današnja ruska vojska ima oko milion vojnika, a budžetska kriza Kremlja direktno potkopava održavanje dra-stično redukovanog nuklearnog arsenala i mornarice.19 Istovremeno, ukoliko

18 Za detaljnija razmatranja videti moj tekst “A Strategy Based on Doubt: Russia Courts Southeast Europe”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 31, no. 3, Decembdr 2010, str. 441–464.

19 Alexei Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from


se proširivanje NATO-a nastavi prijemom Ukrajine i Gruzije, to će značiti da bi Moskovska vojna oblast postala prva linija ruske odbrane, drugim rečima da bi konvencionalna odbrambena doktrina postala potpuno neprimenljiva. Stoga je Moskva prinuđena da razmatra promenu konvencionalne doktrine od defanzivne ka proaktivnoj, a to bi uključivalo trajno stacioniranje većine trupe u blizini granica i aktivacione protokole koji podrazumevaju povećani stepen borbene gotovosti i princip „eksplodiranja prema neprijatelju“ van ruskih gra-nica na prvi nagoveštaj pretnje.

Kada je reč o nuklearnoj doktrini, ona je već pokazala ruski osećaj nesi-gurnosti pred širenjem NATO-a. Iako je sporazum o nuklearnom razoružanju START 2 ratifikovan od strane ruske Dume 14. aprila 2000. godine, kada su se SAD povukle iz Sporazuma o ograničavanju antibalističkih projektila, 13. juna 2002. godine, Rusija se - svega dan kasnije - povukla iz START-a 2. Tek su predsednici Barak Obama i Dmitri Medvedev prevazišli ovu pat poziciju u nu-klearnom razoružanju, potpisujući u Pragu, 8. aprila 2010. godine, sporazum Novi START, koji ograničava broj postavljenih strateških nuklearnih glava na 1.550 i broj strateških lansirnih rampi na 800, u periodu od sedam godina.

Kao što je tokom hladnog rata, kada je NATO bio konvencionalno infe-rioran u odnosu na SSSR, primarna vojna doktrina NATO-a bila nuklearna (Strateški koncept NATO-a je insistirao na „prvoj upotrebi“ nuklearnog oruž-ja), tako je i Ruska Federacija, usled sopstvene konvencionalne inferiornosti u odnosu na NATO, 2000. godine svoju nuklearnu doktrinu pretvorila u primar-nu odbrambenu doktrinu. Sama ta promena je radikalno zaoštrila globalnu bezbednosnu jednačinu. Ruski predsednik, Vladimir Putin, je 21. aprila 2000. godine potpisao novu Vojnu doktrinu Ruske Federacije, koja se od prethodne - usvojene 1997. godine - razlikuje po tome što spušta nivo pretnje potreban za upotrebu nuklearnog oružja. Doktrina iz 1997. godine je predviđala upo-trebu nuklearnog naoružanja u situacijama kada je „ugrožena sama egzisten-cija Ruske Federacije“. Doktrina iz 2000. godine predviđa aktiviranje nukle-arnog arsenala kao odgovora na „konvencionalnu agresiju velikih razmera“, uz garantovanje zaštite ruskog „nuklearnog kišobrana“ ruskim saveznicima.20 Kremlj je tokom prve decenije 21. veka stavio naglasak na raspoređivanje i razvoj taktičkih nuklearnih projektila, dometa ispod 500 kilometara, koji nisu Kosovo and Chechnya, Marshall Centre Papers, no. 2, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, juli 2000, str. 14.

20 Nazavisimaya Gazeta, 22. april 2000.


ograničeni sporazumima o smanjenju strateškog nuklearnog naoružanja i koji su očigledno nuklearno oružje izbora za napad na konvencionalne snage u neposrednom susedstvu. Moskva je uložila značajan napor u razvoj poznatog Iskander balističkog projektila i rad na novom „superborbenom“ avionu kojim bi se ojačale vazdušne snage.21

Međutim, ekonomski napredak i jačanje Rusije tokom 2010. godine omo-gućavaju radikalnu promenu vojne doktrine koju je uveo predsednik Medve-dev. Vojna doktrina koju je potpisao 5. februara iste godine „vraća“ mandat za upotrebu nuklearnog oružja na nivo „pretnje egzistenciji Ruske Federaci-je“, ali uvodi kao prioritet skupu i ambicioznu politiku razvijanja strateških konvencionalnih projektila, poznatih „hiruških bombi“ visoke preciznosti, u otvorenom nadmetanju sa NATO-om, koji već celu deceniju razvija upravo takvo naoružanje kao oružje prvog izbora u intervencijama. Naglasak na stra-teškim projektilima ponovo pokazuje da Rusija primarnu pretnju svojoj bez-bednosti vidi na Zapadu, a ne u svom neposrednom geografskom okruženju.22 Međutim, Rusiji su za primenu nove doktrine neophodni strateški saveznici u Evropi koji bi pomogli da se konvencionalna snaga oružja projektuje što da-lje prema Zapadu. Osim Belorusije, koja se u Vojnoj doktrini iz 2010. godine eksplicitno pominje kao saveznik, Rusija ima samo još jednog potencijalnog saveznika u Evropi, a to je Srbija.

Energetska strategija Rusije prema Srbiji

Osim činjenice da su ruska preduzeća vlasnici obe velike naftne kompani-je u Srbiji, Beopetrola i, odnedavno, Jugopetrola, čime već kontrolišu tržište energenata u ovoj zemlji, ključni aspekt ruske energetske strategije prema Srbi-ji je planirana izgradnja gasovoda Južni tok kroz Srbiju, sa krakom koji se, pre-ko Republike Srpske, odvaja ka Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine (videti mapu).

Projektovano je da Južni tok bude u funkciji 2015. godine, sa godišnjim ka-pacitetom transporta od oko 63 milijarde kubnih metara gasa, što je 35% uku-pnog ruskog izvoza gasa u Evropi. Kada se ima u vidu da evropske zemlje od Rusije uvoze gas koji pokriva između 23 i 40% njihove ukupne potrošnje, jasno je koliki je strateški značaj Južnog toka za Rusiju i za sve zemlje kroz koje bi on

21 Alexei Arbatov, Ibid, str. 28–29.22 Vojna doktrina Ruske Federacije, 5. februar 2010, beleška br. 5.


prolazio. Gasovod treba da prođe ispod Crnog mora do Bugarske, odakle će se račvati na krak preko Grčke do Italije, i na drugi krak koji povezuje Srbiju, Hrvatsku, Sloveniju, Mađarsku i Austriju. U svetlu projekta Južni tok značajno je postojanje nezvaničnog dokumenta ruskog ministarstva spoljnih poslova, pod nazivom „Program za efikasnu upotrebu spoljne politike u dugoročnom razvoju Rusije“, koji su 2010. godine objavili rusko izdanje časopisa Newsweek i hrvatski Jutarnji list. Ovaj dokument navodi plan da se izgradi naftni cevovod pod nazivom „Družba Adria“, dužine 3.200 kilometara, sa kapacitetom od 5 do 15 miliona tona nafte godišnje u toku tri faze postepenog aktiviranja. Naftovod bi počinjao u ruskom gradu Samara i protezao bi se preko Belorusije, Ukrajine, Slovačke i Mađarske do Omiša, na hrvatskom ostrvu Krk.23 Izgradnjom Južnog toka, Družba Adria i NATO zemlje u regionu, kao i Srbija, bile bi uvučene u ruski gasni projekt i stavljene pod rusku gasnu zavisnost.

23 Krešimir Žabec, „Tajni naputak Rusa: Morate biti u projektu Družba Adria“, Jutarnji list, 18. maj 2010.

Copyright Centar za bezbednosne studije (Centre for Security Studies), Beograd


Srpski problemi u vezi sa Rusijom i NATO-om

Srpska politika prema Moskvi je izrazito pragmatična, zasnovana pre svega na konkretnoj potrebi da se zadrži rusko diplomatsko sponzorstvo u vezi sa multilateralnim tretmanom nezavisnosti Kosova. Srbija ima razloga za stra-hovanje da bi se proces cepanja bivše Jugoslavije koji traje već dve decenije mogao nastaviti kroz predstojeću unutrašnju decentralizaciju same Srbije. To se posebno odnosi na sve izraženije ambicije političara u južnom regionu Sandžaka ili Raške, i u severozapadnoj provinciji Vojvodini, da izraze i insti-tucionalizuju svoje posebne identitete kroz državne i paradržavne atribute i politiku. Takva politika je formalno u skladu sa načelima evropskog regiona-lizma, ali je istovremeno prirodno i da izaziva bojazni u Beogradu, koji je bio predmet dugotrajne i uporne državne dezintegracije. Stoga je srpskim vlastima veoma važno da Moskva ostane principijelno suprotstavljena formiranju do-datnih novih država na Balkanu.

Pored konkretne političke zavisnosti, uz koju idu ekonomska i energetska zavisnost (tokom poslednje posete predsednika Medvedeva dogovorena je ru-ska pomoć srpskom budžetu, između ostalih oblika pomoći), Srbija je oslonje-na na Rusiju i u identitetskom smislu. Kolektivni identiteti su u bivšoj Jugosla-viji prošli kroz niz lomova, a veliki deo njih je traumatizovao srpski kolektivni identitet. Danas, posle svih državnih fraktura, Srbija je najmultikulturalnija država na Balkanu, sa značajnim muslimanskim stanovništvom koje je politič-ki aktivno i ima bliske porodične, religijske i političke veze sa bošnjačkom dr-žavnom većinom u susednoj Bosni i Hercegovini. Muslimani traže novu afir-maciju svog identiteta kroz političke projekte u Srbiji, a nosilac tih inicijativa danas je sandžački galvni muftija Muamer Zukorlić, koji je predmet upornih kritika medija u Beogradu. Istovremeno, unutrašnja politička i kulturna po-dela srpske javnosti na takozvane „dve Srbije“, jednu autoritarnu, sklonu oču-vanju države po cenu diktature, koja je, po oceni kritičara, podržavala režim Slobodana Miloševića i njegovu politiku, i druga, demokratska i evropska, ne samo da ne nestaju, nego se produbljuju kroz debatu o eventualnoj promeni Ustava Srbije, o budućnosti Kosova i na kraju, o mogućem učlanjenju Srbije u NATO. Jedan deo konzervativne javnosti sve se više nalazi na antievropskim i anti-NATO pozicijama pozivajući se na patriotizam, dok se drugi deo, blizak aktuelnoj vlasti, plaši da bude suviše eksplicitan u svom pro-NATO stavu kako ne bi bio optužen za nacionalnu izdaju.


Objektivno posmatrano, Srbija nema mnogo izbora u vezi sa eventu-alnim pridruživanjem NATO-u s obzirom na svoju regionalnu situaciju. Albanija, Bugarska, Hrvatska i Slovenija su već članice NATO-a, a Bosna i Makedonija su u procesu pridruživanja. To znači da je Srbija jedini poten-cijalni strateški saveznik Rusije u njenom protivljenju daljem proširivanju NATO-a. Sve zemlje regiona su postavile članstvo u EU kao svoj najvažniji spoljnopolitički prioritet, što je u skladu i sa transatlantskom orjentacijom spoljne politike. Stoga Srbija, zbog specifične unutrašnjopolitičke situaci-je, trenutno „štrči“ iz ostatka regiona, i to pre svega u dimenziji odnosa prema NATO-u. To odstupanje od politike ostalih zemalja je zasnovano na činjenici da je Srbija 1999. godine bila bombardovana od strane NA-TO-a, te da su zemlje članice NATO-a priznale nezavisnost Kosova, tako da se, objektivno, Srbija suočava sa kontradiktornim faktorima za oprede-ljivanje prema NATO-u. S jedne strane, ona ima snažne moralne razloge da ne postane članica, a s druge, strogo strateški posmatrano, ima dilemu između očigledno logičnog stava da zajedno sa svim susedima pristupi NATO-u i svojih posebnih interesa u odnosu na Rusiju. Zbog svega toga, Srbija će morati da odluku o članstvu u NATO-u donosi na više nivoa, uključujući kako dovršavanje unutrašnje političke debate o kolektivnom identitetu i osnovnim smerovima spoljne politike, tako i formulisanje ja-snih strateških zaključaka o tome koji od njenih strateških interesa su važ-niji za njenu budućnost.

Uključenje ostalih zemalja Balkana u NATO se odvija na osnovu une-koliko različitih pretpostavki i normativnih predložaka. Dok su ostale ze-mlje srednje i istočne Evrope tokom hladnog rata bile pod represivnom dominacijom Moskve i u kolektivnom sećanju naroda čuvaju doživljaj Rusije kao okupatora, Srbija je imala nešto drugačiji sistem socijalizma u kome je glavnu represiju sprovodila domaća komunistička oligarhija, dok se Rusija shvatala kao daleki ideal slovenskog bratstva koji nije direktno povezan sa zločinima režima Josipa Broza Tita. Stoga je i danas otklon od Rusije u kulturnom i strateškom smislu, koji je bio osnovni motiv učla-njenja zemalja srednje, a donekle i istočne Evrope, prvo u Partnerstvo za mir, a potom u NATO, u Srbiji nije izražen. Iz tog razloga, politička elita nema dovoljno javne podrške da bude agresivna u vezi sa inicijativama da se takav otklon napravi, a on je neophodan za kristalisanje javne podrške za učlanjenje u NATO.


Srpskoj javnosti bi koristila nezavisna analiza strateških mogućnosti u vezi sa perspektivom članstva u NATO-u. Za Srbiju to pitanje nije jednostavno, jer ono podrazumeva niz vrednosnih i identitetskih enigmi, ali je silina sa kojom se ono postavlja na dnevnopolitičkom planu i jasnoća srpske geopolitičke situ-acije, u potpunom okruženju zemljama članicama NATO-a, neizbežan faktor pritiska da se ta dilema rešava.


Misija NATO-a i Evropski bezbednosni i odbrambeni identitet (ESDI): komplementarnost ili konkurencija?

Dr Jasminka Simić24

Proces transformacije NATO-a pokrenut političkim i geostrateškim prome-nama početkom ‘90-tih godina dvadesetog veka praćen je procesom sazrevanja politike i strategije Evropske unije na polju zajedničke spoljne i bezbednosne po-litike. Napori EU da rukovodi jugoslovenskom krizom u njenoj početnoj fazi i kasnije vojno angažovanje NATO-a u ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini i NATO bom-bardovanje SR Jugoslavije, doveli su do uzajamnog nepoverenja, ali i nesugla-sica u pogledu sposobnosti one druge strane da deluje i upravlja krizama. Ipak, vremenom se pokazalo da ta vrsta uzajamnog nepoverenja u osnovi ima pitanje traženja usklađenosti, jer NATO i EU često imaju dve vizije, ali isti cilj. U tom okviru deluju vojne i misije održavanja mira dve organizacije.

24 Autorka je doktor političkih nauka, novinar-urednik na RTS, Beograd


Uvod

NATO i Evropska unija posmatraju bezbednost u 21. veku u najširem smi-slu reči, odnosno, onako kako je bezbednost shvatio NATO na samitu u Lisa-bonu (19.-20. novembar 2010.), pod tim podrazumevajući - pored zaštite dr-žava članica organizacije i borbe protiv terorizma - i oblast zaštite i reagovanja na sajber kriminal ili upade u kompjuterske sisteme, smatrajući to prioritetom ove organizacije u narednoj dekadi.25 Istovremeno, tako shvaćena globalna bezbednost predmet je delovanja Službe za spoljnopolitičke poslove Evropske unije, koja je počela da radi 1. decembra 2010. godine - na godišnjicu stupanja Ugovora iz Lisabona kojim je i uvedena, od rešavanja sukoba preko pomoći u razvoju ili u slučaju prirodnih katastrofa, pandemija, migracije stanovništva, do energetske bezbednosti. U Evropskoj uniji je zauzet zajednički stav o tome kako da se unaprede odgovori na bezbednosne izazove i pretnje.26 Dakle, bez-bednosne pretnje koje su i NATO i EU percipirale kao glavne u drugoj dekadi 21. veka i za koje je neophodna kombinacija zajedničkih napora i akcija kako bi se poboljšala bezbednost građana, preduzeća i društva u državama članica-ma, su: terorizam (organizovani, prekogranični), sajber kriminal, kao i krize i prirodne nesreće.

25 Afera Wikileaks je najeklatantniji primer pretnji tako shvaćenoj bezbednosti. NATO je osudio objavljivanje američke diplomatske prepiske o razmeštanju američkog taktičkog nuk-learnog oružja u Evropi na sajtu Wikileaks-a i ocenio ga “ilegalnim i opasnim”, jer dokumenta pokazuju da se većina od oko 200 američkih nuklearnih glava, koliko ih je preostalo u Evropi, nalazi u Belgiji, Holandiji, Nemačkoj i Turskoj. Odavno se pretpostavlja da se nuklearno oružje nalazi u ove četiri države, ali su i NATO i vlade tih zemalja do sada odbijale da to potvrde (nuk-learne bombe tipa B-61, najstarije američko nuklearno oružje koje se još uvek nalazi u arsenalu, a napravljeno je 1950-tih godina 20. veka).

26 Evropska komisija donela je set mera koje imaju za cilj da obezbedi bolju zaštitu građana EU od bezbednosnih pretnji među kojima su: a) zajednička agenda za rasturanje kriminalnih i terorističkih mreža, za šta se predlaže brza i efikasna zaplena imovine i profita ostvarenog na ovaj način, upotreba spiskova evropskih putnika i pomoć u borbi protiv korupcije u državama članicama; b) zaštita od sajber-kriminala, tj. podizanje nivoa bezbednosti za privatna i pravna lica u sajber prostoru što bi se ostvarilo uspostavljanjem Evropskog centra za borbu protiv saj-ber-kriminala, mreže timova za brzo reagovanje u informatičkom svetu i uspostavljanje evrop-skog sistema za razmenu informacija i upozoravanje, i c) jačanje spremnosti Unije da se izbori sa kriznim situacijama, što se može postići sprovođenjem “klauzule o solidarnosti”, stvaranjem evropskog kapaciteta za vanredne situacije i uspostavljanjem politike koja će povezivati procene o opasnostima i rizicima sa donošenjem odluka. Videti: The EU Internal Security Strategy, 26. novembar 2010., http://www.parliament.uk


Ovo su novi izazovi novog veka, ali za jasniju viziju bezbednosti u buduć-nosti, potreban je odgovor na pitanje: koliko su u vojno-odbrambenom smislu transatlantske veze bile jednake, odnosno da li su bezbednosni sistem NATO-a i Evropski bezbednosni i odbrambeni identitet (ESDI) komplementarni ili konkurencija jedan drugom i kakav je njihov odnos prema globalnoj i bezbed-nosnoj arhitekturi zapadnog Balkana, regiona kome pripada i Srbija.

Suštinski princip sistema bezbednosti NATO-a utemeljen je u članu 5. Va-šingtonskog ugovora o osnivanju organizacije, po kome je napad na jednu dr-žavu potpisnicu napad na sve, što je i srž sistema kolektivne odbrane (bezbed-nosti). U tradicionalnom vojnom smislu, transatlantska veza bila je nejednaka. Tokom hladnog rata, ona je suštinski bila zasnovana na američkom zaštitnič-kom tipu partnerstva nad zapadno-evropljanima. Po okončanju hladnog rata, evropske članice NATO-a su nastavile da se oslanjaju na vojno prisustvo i an-gažovanje Sjedinjenih Američkih Država (na Balkanu) i u odnosu na njih su zaostajale u procesu vojne modernizacije (rat na Kosovu i Metohiji je pokazao jaz između vojnih kapaciteta SAD-a i kapaciteta zemalja članica EU).

S druge strane, Ugovorom iz Mastrihta (1992) u njegovom tzv. drugom stu-bu, je uvedena Zajednička spoljna i bezbednosna politika EU, radi poboljšanja saradnje u oblasti spoljne politike utvrđivanjem pravila za zajedničko delovan-je zemalja EU, uključujući i formulisanje zajedničke odbrambene politike. Uprkos postojanju u to vreme devetočlane Zapadnoevropske unije (ZEU)27 kao integralnog dela razvoja Unije i njenog vojnog ogranka kome je u zadatak stavljeno razvijanje tešnjih međusobnih institucionalnih odnosa uz mogućnost integracije u Uniju, bavljenje humanitarnim poslovima, kao i preduzimanje mirovnih misija, NATO je ostao stub evropske odbrambene politike. Ovaj deo Ugovora iz Mastrihta predstavlja zametak nove zajedničke evropske odbram-bene politike, uz naglasak da ona mora da bude spojiva sa NATO-om.

27 Briselski ugovor iz 1948. kao prvi korak ka posleratnoj konsolidaciji bezbednosnih pri-lika u zapadnoevropskim zemljama bio je osnivački dokument Zapadnoevropske unije (ZEU). Taj ugovor je izmenjen 1984. godine. Zapadnoevropska unija formalno ne postoji od 2000. go-dine, a nadležnosti su prebačene na EU. Stupanjem na snagu Ugovora iz Lisabona, nadležnosti ZEU prelaze na EU i do jula 2011. ZEU prestaje sa radom. Ipak, tokom čitavog perioda ZEU funkcioniše kao organizacija sa sedištem u Parizu, i u okviru nje se nalazi Institut za bezbed-nosne studije koji organizujuje međunarodne konferencije i seminare i redovno izdaje zbornik radova pod nazivom „Chaillot Papers“ svetski poznatih stručnjaka međunarodnih odnosa i bez-bednosti. Videti: http://www.weu.int/institute


Na ministarskom sastanku NATO-a u Berlinu (1996) dogovoreno je da ZEU nadgleda stvaranje Evropskog bezbednosnog i odbrambenog iden-titeta (ESDI) u okviru strukture NATO-a.28 Evropski bezbednosni i od-brambeni identitet trebalo je da stvori tzv. evropski stub u okviru NATO-a, delimično omogućavajući evropskim zemljama da vojno deluju tamo gde NATO to ne želi, ali i da bi olakšao američko finansijsko opterećenje u održavanju vojnih baza u Evropi, koje tu poseduje od hladnog rata. Spora-zum iz Berlina omogućio je evropskim zemljama da, ukoliko to žele, kroz ZEU koristi aktivu NATO-a. Ovaj sporazum je kasnije izmenjen kako bi dozvolio EU da upravlja takvim misijama, i poznat je kao Sporazum Berlin plus (2002).

Zajednička spoljna i bezbednosna politika EU se lagano izgrađivala i na terenu se intenzivnije angažovala delom i kao posledica transatlantskog neje-dinstva 90-tih godina 20. veka. Dok je iskustvo na Kosovu i Metohiji (1999) vodilo ka pojavljivanju Evropskog bezbednosnog i odbrambenog identiteta, dotle je transatlantski jaz povodom Iraka (2003) intenzivirao angažovanje ev-ropskih članica NATO-a okupljenih u EU na njegovoj daljoj razradi i formi-ranju evropskih vojnih snaga.

Na francusko-britanskom samitu u Sen Malou (4. decembar 1998)29 tra-siran je put Evropskoj bezbednosnoj i vojnoj politici (European Security and Defence Policy - ESDP), uz zahtev da se obezbede sredstva i kapaciteti neophodni za sprovođenje takve politike, što je značilo da je Evropi dat autonomni glas na međunarodnoj sceni i kapacitet da interveniše u službi mira, čime je pokrenut proces formiranja evropskih snaga za brzo reagovan-je. Inače, u vreme održavanja ovog skupa vladala je posebna politička klima

28 Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3. juni 1996. Videti: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm

29 Na sastanku je rečeno da se sve odluke vezane za evropsku bezbednost i odbrambeni identitet (ESDI) ubuduće moraju vezivati za EU, a ne više za ZEU. EU je data mogućnost da preduzima autonomne vojne akcije kada NATO savez u celini nije zainteresovan za angažovanje svojih snaga, tj. “EU mora da ima sposobnost za autonomnu akciju, podržanu kredibilnim voj-nim snagama, sredstvima za odlučivanje o njihovom korišćenju i spremnošću da se to učini u sklopu reakcije na međunarodne krize”, ali da razvoj takvih autonomnih evropskih snaga ne sme da znači dupliranje postojećih snaga NATO-a, dok kolektivna odbrana ostaje i dalje u okviru NATO-a. Videti: Joint Statement by British and French Governments, Franco-British Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 4. decembar 1998.


u Evropi, stvorena zahtevima za internacionalizacijom kosovskog problema, pripremama za međunarodnu konferenciju o Kosovu i Metohiji, te nagove-štajima moguće vojne intervencije NATO-a u slučaju propadanja diplomat-skih napora.

Za EU je, takođe, bilo značajno da je u maju 1999. godine, u vreme inten-zivnog bombardovanja SRJ, na snagu stupio Ugovor iz Amsterdama, pošto je on obuhvatao tzv. zadatke iz Petersberga o preduzimanju akcija humani-tarnog karaktera, održavanja mira, upravljanja krizama, uključujući i uspo-stavljanje mira. Značaj ovog akta je u tome što je Evropska unija trasirala put za svoje kasnije misije održavanja mira, sa kojima je otpočela na prostoru bivše SFRJ.

U junu 1999., Evropski Savet je u Kelnu odlučio da do eventualnog zatva-ranja ZEU inkorporira ulogu ZEU u okvire EU. Havijar Solana je tada imeno-van za Visokog predstavnika za zajedničku spoljnu i bezbednosnu politiku i postavljen je za generalnog sekretara ZEU (uz ovlašćenje da nadležnosti ZEU prebaci na EU), kako bi se ostvario napredak i Zajedničke spoljne i bezbed-nosne politike i Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike. EU je svoj prvi konkretni korak ka jačanju vojnih sposobnosti u skladu sa Evropskom bez-bednosnom i odbrambenom politikom načinila kada su njene države članice potpisale „Helsinške glavne ciljeve“ (1999).

Naime, vojna zavisnost evropskih članica NATO-a od Sjedinjenih država u Bosni i Hercegovini, koja se ponovila tokom bombardovanja NATO-a na Kosovu i Metohiji, (to se vremenski dogodilo između skupa u Sen Malou i samita u Kelnu), duboko je uticala na vlade država članica EU. Na samitu EU u Helsinkiju (decembar 1999.) dogovoreno je da se kroz plan „Helsinški glavni ciljevi“ do 2003. godine oko 60.000 vojnika stavi na raspolaganje (i da se održe bar na jednu godinu) za operacije upravljanja krizama, čime bi bili realizovani Petersburški zadaci postavljeni u Ugovoru iz Amsterdama. EU je tada ista-kla svoju rešenost da „razvije autonomne kapacitete radi donošenja odluka i - tamo gde NATO kao celina nije angažovan - da pokrene i vodi vojne ope-racije kao odgovor na međunarodne krize“... Ovaj proces će izbeći nepotrebno dupliranje i ne implicira stvaranje evropske vojske.30

30 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999. Videti: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm


Na samitu Evropskog Saveta u Santa Marija da Feira (jun 2000) utvrđeni su „modaliteti za razvoj odnosa EU-NATO u četiri oblasti koje pokrivaju bezbed-nosna pitanja, kapacitete, modalitete pristupa EU aktivi NATO-a i utvrđivanje dogovora o stalnim konsultacijama“.31 EU je na samitu u Lakenu (decembar 2001) pokrenula „Evropski akcioni plan sposobnosti“ (European Capabilities Action Plan - ECAP). Međutim, postalo je jasno da „Helsinški glavni ciljevi“ nisu brzo dostižni. U maju 2004. ministri odbrane država članica EU odobrili su „Glavne ciljeve 2010“, time produžujući rok za realizovanje projekata EU.

Okvir za odnos NATO-EU izgrađen je na osnovu dokumenta usvojenog na samitu NATO-a u Vašingtonu (april 1999), na zaključcima Evropskog Saveta na samitu u Nici (decembar 2000) i Severnoatlantskog saveta na samitu u Bri-selu (decembar 2000) o privrženosti jedinstvenom partnerstu dve organizacije u upravljanju krizama,32 kao i Zajedničkom deklaracijom EU-NATO (decem-bar 2002). Naime, uoči samita u Vašingtonu usvojen je dokument NATO-a o “Strateškom konceptu Saveza” u kome se ističe da će razvijanje koncepta evropske bezbednosti i odbrambenog identiteta biti nastavljeno isključivo un-utar NATO-a, a umesto ZEU, sva pitanja vezana za evropsku odbranu NATO će ubuduće rešavati isključivo sa EU-om. Ovaj novi odnos NATO-a prema Evropskom bezbednosnom i odbrambenom identitetu kasnije će prerasti u tzv. sporazum Berlin plus (2002), prema kome EU za operacije koje predvodi može da koristi NATO vojnu aktivu, ukoliko postoji potreba za tim. Ovim sporazumom je omogućeno da NATO podrži operacije upravljanja krizama pod vođstvom EU, a u kojima NATO kao celina nije angažovan.

EU je uspostavila odgovarajuće modalitete uključenja u svoje operacije onih država koje nisu članice EU-e, ali jesu članice NATO-a. U to vreme, pet zemalja je pripadalo ovoj grupi: Bugarska, Rumunija, Island, Norveška i Tur-ska. Na taj način je Zajednička deklaracija NATO-EU o Evropskoj bezbednos-noj i odbrambenoj politici delovala podsticajno u brojnim aspektima.

31 Presidency Conclusion, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000. Vide-ti: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/csm_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-rl.en0.htm

32 Pozitivni rezultat konsultacija i saradnje bilo je regulisanje situacije u južnom delu Srbije (kraj 2000), kada je, uz evroatlantsku pomoć i učešće jugoslovenske strane, uklonjen rizik od ci-vilnog sukoba između albanske i srpske strane, i popravljene bezbednosne prilike u Makedoniji, gde je NATO imao zadatak da obezbedi misiju Evropske unije i posmatračku misiju OEBS-a.


Sporazum Berlin plus

Pregovori između NATO-a i EU doveli su do Zajedničke deklaracije o uspo-stavljanju strateškog partnerstva između dve organizacije u oblasti upravljanja krizama, koja je objavljena 16. decembra 2002.33 Konačni sporazum završen je 11. marta 2003. kao sporazum Berlin plus, i njegov naziv ukazuje da je usledio posle sporazuma sa samita u Berlinu (1996), na kome je zvanično započela saradnja ZEU-NATO. Sporazum Berlin plus ima nekoliko glavnih delova:34

• Pristup Evropske unije kapacitetima NATO-a za planiranje, sposobnih da doprinesu vojnom planiranju za operacije EU;

• Uspostavljanje liste aktive i kapaciteta NATO-a koji bi mogli da se stave na raspolaganje EU za korišćenje u operacijama koje ona predvodi;

• Označavanje opsega evropskih komandnih opcija (European Command Options) za operacije EU, dalje razvijanje uloge zamenika Vrhovnog komandanta savezničkih snaga u Evropi (DSACEUR)35, kako bi u pot-punosti i efikasno preuzele svoje (evropske) odgovornosti;

• Dalje prilagođavanje odbrambenog sistema planiranja NATO-a, kako bi raspoložive snage za operacije koje predvodi EU bile sveobuhvatnije inkorporirane;

• Sporazum NATO-a i EU obuhvata razmenu klasifikovanih informacija pod recipročnim pravilima bezbednosne zaštite;

• Procedure za oslobađanje, nadgledanje, povratak i opoziv aktive i ka-paciteta NATO-a;

• Sporazum NATO-a i EU o konsultacijama u kontekstu operacija uprav-ljanja krizom od strane EU podrazumeva upotrebu aktive i kapaciteta NATO-a.

U praksi, procedura nalaže da se upotreba aktive NATO-a od strane EU mora podvrgnuti načelu „pravo prvog odbijanja“, što znači da NATO prvo

33 Videti: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm 34 Sporazum Berlin plus nije javni dokument i nije ratifikovan od strane nacionalnih par-

lamenata.Videti: http:/www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf

35 Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR), ima značajnu ulogu u spora-zumima određenim kao komandne operacije. Vojno osoblje EU (EUMS, EU Military Staff) osnovalo je ćeliju u okviru Vrhovnog štaba Savezničkih snaga za Evropu (Suprime Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE) čije je sedište u Monsu, kako bi poboljšao pripreme za operacije EU koje zahtevaju aktivu i kapacitete NATO-a, dok je NATO uspostavio stalne kancelarijske veze u okviru Vojnog osoblja EU.


mora da odbije da interveniše u datom slučaju. Odobravanje upotrebe aktive mora da bude jednoglasno među državama članicama NATO-a. Na primer, uzdržanost Turske u pogledu korišćenja aktive NATO-a u operaciji „Kon-kordija“ odložila je njeno angažovanje za više od pet meseci. Strateško par-tnerstvo između NATO-a i EU kroz sporazum Berlin plus veoma brzo je dobilo praktičnu primenu na terenu. EU je vodila dve operacije sa podrškom NATO-a.

Operacija „Konkordija“ u bivšoj jugoslovenskoj republici (BJR) Makedoniji je prva misija zasnovana na sporazumu Berlin plus i prva vojna misija EU koja je realizovana u okviru Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike. U periodu od avgusta 2001. do marta 2003. godine, NATO je osiguravao bez-bednost osoblja EU i OEBS-a, te sprovodio obaveze održavanja mira u BJR Makedoniji. Operaciju NATO-a, „Saveznička harmonija“, koja je završena 31. marta 2003., je preuzela EU pod nazivom operacija „Konkordija“ angažujući oko 300 vojnika s ciljem garantovanja bezbednost, i posmatrače OEBS-a koji su nadgledali sprovođenje Okvirnog sporazuma iz Ohrida. Operacija „Kon-kordija“ je kompletirana 15. decembra 2003. NATO je predvodio strateško, operacionalno i taktičko planiranje operacije. Operativni komandant bio je zamenik Vrhovne savezničke komande u Evropi, sa sedištem u Vrhovnom štabu Savezničkih snaga za Evropu i sa jednom komandnom jedinicom us-postavljenom u regionalnoj komandi NATO-a u Napulju (trenutno zajedničke komandne snage - Joint Force Command, JFC).

Druga misija vođena u skladu sa sporazumom Berlin plus je „EUFOR Al-tea“ u Bosni i Hercegovini, koja je počela 2004. godine. U junu te godine, NATO je odlučio da okonča svoju misiju Stabilizacionih snaga (SFOR), dok se Savet EU 12. jula 2004. složio da pokrene evropsku vojnu operaciju u BiH (EUFOR Althea), kao deo globalne politike u cilju stabilizacije zemlje.36 Prateći odluku NATO-a sa samita u Istanbulu (2004) o završetku NATO misije Snaga za stabi-

36 Joint Action 2004/570/FSP adopted by the Council on 12 July 2004. Videti: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:252:0010:0014:FR:PDE. U BiH je Evropska unija ponudila svoje usluge u preuzimanju misije međunarodnih policijskih snaga (misija SFOR uključuivala je i međunarodne policijske snage). Policijska misija EU osnovana je u januaru 2003. sa ciljem formiranja održivih, profesionalnih i multietničkih policijskih snaga u skladu sa evropskim i međunarodnim standardima. Deluje u skladu sa obavezama koje su deo procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja EU, posebno u oblastima borbe protiv organizovanog kriminala i policijske reforme.


lizaciju (SFOR) do kraja iste godine, EU je započela svoju misiju u BiH sa 7.000 vojnika, sa ciljem da sprovede vojni aspekt Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma i održi bezbednu i sigurnu sredinu. Savet bezbednosti UN-a usvojio je (22. novembar 2004) rezoluciju 1575 kojom se odobrava angažovanje operacije shodno Glavi VII Povelje. Ponovo je zamenik Vrhovne savezničke komande u Evropi imenovan za operativnog komandanta operacije EU. Prema rezolu-ciji 1948 Saveta bezbednosti UN-a, mandat operacije „Althea“ je produžen do kraja 2011. godine (obnavlja se svake godine).

Između dve prethodno pomenute vojne operacije, EU je pokrenula operaciju „Artemis“ u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo (12. juni 2003) koju je autonomno vodila u skladu sa rezolucijom 1484 Saveta bezbednosti UN-a (30. maj 2003) o angažovanju Privremenih hitnih multinacionalnih snaga (Interim Multina-tional Emergency Force) u mestu Bunia sa zadatkom obezbeđivanja aerodro-ma i zašite interno raseljenih lica. Operacija „Artemis“ je bila prva autonomna vojna misija izvan Evrope, značajan kamen temeljac u razvoju Evropske bez-bednosne i odbrambene politike. Ova misija je uspešno stabilizovala situaciju u mestu Bunia i ojačala prisustvo UN-a u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo. I tokom izvršavanja ove misije, NATO je bio redovno informisan o namerama EU, uz puno poštovanje duha i slova dogovora o konsultacijama u slučaju kriza.

Sporazum Berlin plus otvara i nekoliko pitanja u pogledu ovako koncipi-rane strateške saradnje između NATO-a i EU. Samo dve od svih operacija EU se vode u skladu sa sporazumom Berlin plus. Kada EU i NATO sprovode dve istovremene, ali odvojene kopnene ili pomorske operacije, sporazum Berlin plus se ne primenjuje. Sporazum ne obezbeđuje mogućnost kombinovanja civilnih i vojnih instrumenata. Davanje nadležnosti širokog obima Evropskoj uniji - poput ekonomskih, vojnih, političkih i pravnih - stvara mogućnost formiranja civilnih kapaciteta upravljanja krizom i njihovog stavljanja na ra-spolaganje NATO-u, što bi u određenoj formi moglo da proširi sporazum Be-lin plus stvaranjem civilne komponente ovog Sporazuma.

Kada su dve organizacije istovremeno angažovane u jednoj operaciji, podela klasifikovanih informacija može da stvori problem, kao što je bio slučaj tokom bombardovanja SRJ, u Avganistanu, ili na obali Somalije gde su operacije bile komplikovane usled nedostaka zvanične komunikacije. Ovakve operacionalne teškoće često potiču od političkog neslaganja dve organizacije


što ima štetan efekat na terenu (pitanje Kipra ili Turske), a njihovo rešavanje je u pregovorima i kompromisu. Kako bi se obezbedila operativna komplemen-tarnost između NATO-a i EU, neophodno je da se dalje razradi sporazum Berlin plus, koji ne pokriva čitav obim moguće saradnje dve organizacije, ali ima potencijala za to.37

Evropska odbrana

Od 2003. godine zahtevi za akcijama EU su povećani, tako da je EU godiš-nje preuzimala oko 4 misije, kojih je trenutno 14 (npr. misija nadgledanja mira u Gruziji, pomorska operacija u blizini obale Somalije).38 Operacije variraju u pogledu zadataka, koristeći - a ponekad i mešajući - civilne i vojne resurse. EU se oslanja na nacionalne, kao i štabove NATO-a za vojne operacije. Na Kosovu i Metohiji, misija EU (EULEX) je preuzela (decembar 2008.) Civilnu misiju UN-a (UNMIK). Misije EU su se stacionirale i izvan Balkana, tako da u kontekstu razvoja evropske odbrane možemo razmatrati i budućnost NATO-a i njegove misije, na koji način će se dalje redefinisati i preusmeravati na nove oblike delovanje i nove oblasti angažovanja.

Predlog za strukturu evropske odbrane u sedam tačaka su tokom 2003. godine podnele Nemačka, Francuska, Belgija i Luksemburg. Prema tom planu do kraja 2003. godine je trebao da bude formiran pokretljivi multina-cionalni štab za vojne operacije evropskih intervencionih snaga u rešavanju kriza i zavođenju mira, koji bi bio nezavisan od NATO-a. Okosnicu evrop-skih snaga bi činila već postojeća francusko-nemačka brigada, pojačana trupama iz Belgije i Luksemburga. Za razliku od snaga za brzo delovanje koje su dobile podršku zbog svog partnerstva sa snagama NATO-a, plan o evropskoj odbrani je naišao na kritiku SAD-a i Velike Britanije, s obzi-rom da su ove dve zemlje bile aktivno angažovane u Iraku i da im stvaranje evropske odbrane nije išlo u prilog, imajući u vidu postojanje NATO struk-ture. Ovim je produbljen transatlantski jaz nastao povodom angloameričke intervencije u Iraku.

37 Više o tome: Robert Walter, What future for the EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreements?, European Defence and NATO, Towards which developments and complementaire, European files, December-January 2011, br. 21, European Security and Defence Assembly of WEU, Paris, http://www.assembly-weu.eu

38 Izvor: Issues, Quarterly published by the EU Institut for Security Studies, no 27, The Eu-ropean Foreign&Security Policy Institute, Oktobar 2008., Paris, www.iss.europa.eu


Anglo-američka koncepcija, za razliku od francusko-nemačkog predloga, je podrazumevala da se kolektivna odbrana Evrope što više prepusti NATO-u, te da umesto 60.000 pripadnika iz pomenutog predloga, u snagama za brzo re-agovanje sadrži maksimalno 20.000 vojnika. Na samitu EU koji je organizova-la predsedavajuća Grčka (2003.), zvanično je dogovoreno da visoki predstav-nik EU za spoljnu politiku, Havijer Solana, izradi nacrt evropske bezbednosne strategije (European Security Strategy), koja je usvojena iste godine.

Formiranje evropskih vojnih snaga u osnovi predstavlja želju da se dovrši sa stvaranjem evropskog vojnog identiteta. Pomenute snage bi bile embrion buduće evropske vojske. Ukoliko bi se to ostvarilo, Evropa bi mogla da posta-ne jedinstvena konfederalna država kao što su to Sjedinjene Države. Evropska ekonomska integracija počela je da obuhvata i oblast vojne industrije, što je dodatni podsticaj realizovanju jedne takve ideje. Stvaranje ovih snaga nije bilo samo u domenu teorijskog razmatranja i želje većine država članica EU, već i praktična potreba koju je zahtevala situacija na terenu, jer je sa odlaskom ame-ričkih vojnika iz misija na prostoru bivše SFRJ u mirovne misije na Istok (Irak i Avganistan) ostavljen prostor za delovanje evropskih snaga.

Predlog da se formiraju evropske vojne snage posredstvom kojih bi Evro-pa stekla relevantan uticaj u svetu, mnogi - poput Andreja Moravščika - su primili sa kritikom.39 On je smatrao da je to gubljenje vremena i resursa, tek “pusta želja” Evrope, a da je stvarna snaga EU u trgovini i misijama očuvanja mira. Moravščik uzima primer Iraka i njegovu posleratnu obnovu i ponovno uspostavljanje insitucija vlasti. Po njemu, u tom poslu postoji samo jedna, “tiha super sila” - Evropa. Ako Evropa teži jačoj globalnoj ulozi, treba da se fokusira na one komparativne prednosti i da radi ono u čemu je najbolja, a to su trgovina i misije održavanja mira, smatra Moravščik. U prilog ovom stavu je i primer Avganistana, gde su Sjedinjene Države obavile vojnu akciju, nakon čega je usledilo dostavljanje obimne strane pomoći, gde zapadna Evropa isporučuje 70% ukupne strane pomoći i više od 90% za-padne pomoći Avganistanu. Slično je i u Iraku. Robert Hanter ima potpuno negativan stav prema evropskim vojnim snagama, nazivajući ih “imitacijom NATO-a”.40

39 Andrej Moravščik je direktor programa Evropske unije na Univerzitetu u Harvardu. U svom tekstu “Posle svega, svet je bipolaran” piše o lekcijama koje je Evropa izvukla posle rata u Iraku. Newsweek, 5. maj 2003. New York, str. 39.

40 Robert Hanter je viši savetnik u korporaciji RAND u Vašingtonu, D.C. Od 1993-98, bio je


U osnovi stavova koji se protive formiranju evropskih vojnih snaga nalazi se zahtev za racionalnom “podelom rada” između Sjedinjenih Država, sa jed-ne, i evropskih članica NATO-a ,sa druge strane. Sjedinjene Države i EU su dva najkrupnija aktera na međunarodnoj sceni. Ali ukoliko uzmemo u obzir prethodno iznetu “podelu rada” u kriznim regionima ili zemljama, kao i porast ekonomsko-političke uloge Kine i Indije, te ekonomsko-politički oporavak Rusije, sve to ukazuje da se približavamo multilateralizmu oličenom u UN-u.

Budućnost strateškog partnerstva NATO-a i EU

Uprkos nesuglasicama između evroatlantskih partnera u pogledu formira-nja evropske odbrane koja je shvaćena kao konkurencija snagama NATO-a i protivljenju angažovanja u ratu u Iraku, između snaga EU za brzo reagovanje i misije NATO-a je uspostavljen komplementaran i odnos partnerstva. Takav uzajamni odnos čini suštinu transformacije NATO-a i napretka unutar EU u posthladnoratovskom periodu. 41

Ugovorom iz Lisabona (1. decembar 2009.) EU je stekla međunarodno-pravni subjektivitet, ai uvedene su i dve nove ključne funkcije: funkcija pred-sednika Evropskog Saveta (predsednik EU) i funkcija Visokog predstavnika EU za spoljnu politiku i bezbednost (šef evropske diplomatije). U Ugovoru iz Lisabona se kaže da „imajući na umu da politika Unije u skladu sa članom 42. neće prejudicirati specifični karakter bezbednosne i odbrambene politike izvesnih država članica i da će poštovati obaveze izvesnih država članica koje svoju zajedničku odbranu vide ostvarenu u NATO-u i u skladu sa Ugovorom o Severnoatlantskom paktu, biće kompatibilna sa zajedničkom bezbednosnom i odbrambenom politikom uspostavljenom unutar tog okvira“.42 U skladu sa postignutim dogovorom ovo je postao aneks Ugovora o Evropskoj uniji i Ugo-vora o funkcionisanju EU.

američki ambasador u NATO-u. Članak pod nazivom “How deep is Ocean?” (Koliko je dubok Atlantik?) objavljen je u časopisu Newsday, 23. februar 2003. Videti: http//www.rand.org/hot/op-eds/022303.html

41 Videti: Др Нано Ружин, „НАТО во современите мегународни односи“, Фондација „Фридрих Еберт“, канцеларија Скопје, Скопје, 2010., tačke 15 i 16.

42 Treaty on European Union (amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, potpisan 13. decembra 2007), Protocol (No 11) on Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), 9. maj 2008., No C115, str.278. Videti: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexU-riServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0201:0328:EN:PDF


Što se odbrambenih perspektiva tiče, Ugovor iz Lisabona je predvideo da će Evropska bezbednosna i odbrambena politika voditi zajedničkom odbram-benom dogovoru za EU kada o tome jednoglasno odluči Evropski Savet i biće moguć kada sve države članice daju svoj pristanak kroz uobičajene ustavne procedure. Uz to, oblast odbrane na raspolaganju je unapređenje saradnje, stvarajući mogućnost za odbrambene integracije koje isključuju države članice sa neutralnim politikama (ne ispunjavaju kriterijume i izjave iz člana 1. i 2. Protokola o Stalnoj strukturnoj saradnji). Države sa značajnim vojnim kapaci-tetima su predočile formu Stalne strukturne saradnje u odbrani.43

To što je Ugovor iz Lisabona promovisao korake ka izgradnji jače zajed-ničke odbrambene politike EU koja će „tražiti napredniji okvir za zajedničku odbrambenu politiku“ i koja „će voditi ka zajedničkoj odbrani“44, u izvesnim krugovima je ponovo izazvalo strah da bi veća koordinacija EU u pogledu od-brane koja bi mogla da dovede do razvoja njenih vojnih struktura, za posledicu imala dupliranje NATO strukture i slabljenje tranatlantske veze. Ujedinjena i kompaktnija Evropa je čak viđena kao potencijalni američki rival u mnogim političkim oblastima.

Na samitu NATO-a u Lisabonu (19-20 novembar 2010.) usvojen je Novi strateški koncept organizacije, u kome se kaže da „aktivna i efikasna EU dopri-nosi opštoj bezbednosti evroatlantske oblasti. Stoga je EU jedinstven i ključni partner za NATO. Dve organizacije dele većinu članica, a sve države članice obe organizacije dele zajedničke vrednosti. NATO potvrđuje značaj jače i spo-sobnije evropske odbrane“.45 NATO i EU mogu i treba da imaju komplemen-tarnu i uzajamno pojačanu ulogu u održavanju međunarodnog mira i bezbed-nosti kroz unapređenje praktične saradnje u operacijama u čitavom spektru kriza, od koordinacije do uzajamne podrške, kao i širenje političkih konsul-tacija kako bi bila obuhvaćena sva pitanja od zajedničkog interesa, navodi se u ovom dokumentu.

43 Sven Biscop, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the future of ESDP, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, 2010. http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep20.pdf

44 Videti: Treaty of Lisbon, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index-en.htm 45 Paragraf 32. „Strateškog koncepta za odbranu i bezbednost članica Organizacije Sever-

noatlantskog pakta“, usvojen od strane šefova država i vlada u Lisabonu (novembar 2010); Vide-ti: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic.concept.2010-eng.pdf


Činjenica je da NATO i EU nisu samodovoljne institucije, već su potrebne jedna drugoj kako bi upravljale krizama ili održavale mir. EU je uspela da izgradi instrumente delovanja jedne „meke sile“,46 koji su adekvatniji u procesu stabilizovanja situacije i u rukovođenju civilnim misijama, u poređenju sa de-lovanjem SAD-a kao „čvrste sile“, samostalno ili kroz misije NATO-a. Ugovor EU iz Lisabona i Novi strateški koncept NATO-a pokazuju da su bezbednosni i odbrambeni odnosi između dve organizacije razvijeni, te da su sazreli do ste-pena da mogu da idu i dalje od odredaba sporazuma Berlin plus, pribegavajući komplementarnim civilnim i vojnim kapacitetima. Komplementarnost i po-tencijalna sinergija između dve organizacije, koje do sada nisu u potpunosti iskorišćene, sada dobijaju priliku za to.

Rad EU na usavršavanju sopstvenog bezbednosnog i odbrambenog identiteta vrlo je intenzivan, ali još uvek nedovoljan kako bi se moglo konstatovati da EU „gospodari“ evropskim kontinentom, tako što je usavršila sopstvene mogućnosti da predupredi ili reši sve negativne tokove koji mogu dovesti do eventualnog po-vratka sukoba na kontinentu. Uprkos određenim uspesima u evropskoj spoljnoj politici (angažovanje u rešavanju sukoba u Gruziji), EU je u odnosu na svog atlantskog partnera i dalje daleko od toga da postane „jaka“ vojna sila i koheren-tan globalni akter. Pragmatizam će učiniti svoje, a to znači da će prema potrebi evropski partneri nastaviti da se vojno oslanjaju na američkog partnera i NATO strukturu. I danas imamo podele u viđenju buduće uloge NATO-a među evroat-lantskim partnerima (atlantisti, evropejci i centralnoevropske zemlje). Mesto Saveza u sadašnjim transatlantskim odnosima odrediće, najpre, smanjenje značaja Saveza za same Sjedinjene Države, kao što je pokazano tokom operacije u Avganistanu i smanjenje nivoa američkog vojnog učešća u misijama NATO-a; i drugo, porast spremnosti i sposobnosti EU (veličina, intenzitet i otpornost misija EU) da se vojno angažuje u mirovnim misijama i misijama očuvanja mira u inostranstvu, razvijajući istovremeno sopstveni diplomatski profil, što je učinjeno sa Službom za spoljnopolitičke poslove.

U sklopu razmatranja budućeg bezbednosnog sistema u svetu i Evropi ne tre-ba zaboraviti ni predlog ruskog predsednika Dimitrija Medvedeva na skupu sa nemačkim političkim, parlamentarnim i civilnim liderima (5. jun 2008., Berlin, Nemačka) o stvaranju novog sistema bezbednosti u Evropi i potpisivanju pan-evropskog bezbednosnog Pakta. Medvedev je pozvao sve evropske države da

46 Pojam „meke moći“ lansirao je devedesetih godina 21. veka Džozef Naj, profesor na Harvard Univerzitetu i definisao je kao sposobnost uticaja u međunarodnim odnosima kroz kulturne, političke i institucionalne vrednosti.


učestvuju u ovom procesu, „svaka u skladu sa svojim nacionalnim mogućnostima, dok bi svaka ideja o alijansama i grupama država trebalo bi da ostane izvan ovih okvira“. To podrazumeva da NATO i države članice EU ne treba, bar ne zvanično, da koordiniraju svoje stavove u pregovorima, ukoliko proces bude napredo-vao. Taj panevropski bezbednosni Pakt treba da, u duhu Povelje UN, „konačno razjasni ulogu upotrebe sile u evroatlantskoj oblasti“, što implicira da bi za odluke NATO-a bilo potrebno odobrenje izvan Saveza. Ovu rusku ideju o transformaciji postojećeg sistema bezbednosnih institucija i potpisivanju panevropskog Pakta, predsednik Dimitrij Medvedev je ponovio na forumu o Svetskoj politici (8. ok-tobar 2008., Evijan, Francuska). Inače, jaču saradnju EU sa Rusijom podržavaju njene najveće države članice, Francuska, Nemačka i Italija.47

EU je prihvatljivija za zemlje zapadnog Balkana; u Srbiji postoji podrška EU, ali istovremeno i emotivni otklon prema NATO-u (zbog bombardovan-ja SRJ). Zemlje zapadnog Balkana, osim Srbije, prihvatile su Akcioni plan članstva u NATO-u i učestvuju u mirovnim misijama u Avganistanu. Pri-padnici Vojske Srbije, Ministarstco unutrašnjih poslova i medicinsko osoblje koji već učestvuju u mirovnim misijama UN,48 su spremni da učestvuju i u mirovnim misijama EU.49 S obzirom na prožimanje NATO-a i EU kada su u pitanju mirovne misije, kao i tesan zajednički ili sukcesivni rad, to znači da bi u određenom trenutku - iako zvanično ne učestvuje u misijama NATO-a – za Srbiju postojala izvesna tačka dodirivanja sa njima. Učešćem u mirovnim op-eracijama u svetu se povećava i spoljnopolitički kredibilitet države, dok vojnici stiču iskustva na terenu, unapređuju svoje sposobnosti i interoperabilnost.

Delovanje samostalnih misija EU na i izvan evropskog kontinenta paralelno sa misijama NATO ukazuje na vrednost i potrebu traženja multilateralnog

47 Videti: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, http://www.in.mid.ru/brp4.nsf/2008/06/05/html i http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/10/08/html

48 Pripadnici sistema odbrane trenutno su samostalno angažovani u mirovnim misijama UN u Kongu, Liberiji i Obali Slonovače; u Čadu su zajedno sa pripadnicima norveškog kontin-genta, a na Kipru su u sastavu slovačko-mađarskog kontingenta. Predstoji mirovna misija UN u Libanu zajedno sa španskim kontingentom i na obali Somalijskog mora. Pripadnici Ministar-stva unutrašnjih poslova Srbije su angažovani u mirovnim misijama UN u Liberiji i na Haitiju (gde su posle razornog zemljotresa u januaru 2010. godine pomogli spasavanju povređenih i raščišćavanju ruševina, a početkom 2011. rade na sprečavanju širenja kolere među stanovniš-tvom Haitija).

49 Skupština Narodne Republike Srbije je usvojila odluku o učešću ukupno 134 pripadnika Ministarstva odbrane i Vojske Srbije (98 osoba) i Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova (36) u ovim misijama.


rešenja kriza, tj. drugih alternativa koje su tokom poslednje decenije 20. veka bile marginalizovane ili tek u razvoju. Multilateralni pristup u upravljanju kri-zama olakšava transatlantsku saradnju i omogućava efikasnije suočavanje sa globalnim izazovima. U 21. veku se stvoreni uslovi za reafirmisanje zajedničkih ciljeva uz dijalog i bez nametanja rešenja. Vodeće države članice NATO-a i EU imaju ključna mesta u glavnoj instituciji UN – Savetu bezbednosti - koji treba da bude težište zajedničkog rada i odlučivanja o svetskim bezbednosnim pitanjima. U skladu sa relevantnim rezolucijama Saveta bezbednosti UN i u saradnji sa drugim akterima, uključujući i EU, NATO je preduzeo operacije u Africi.50 Širi kontekst saradnje NATO-a i EU im omogućava da budu pomoćno sredstvo u realizovanju ciljeva i zadataka svetske organizacije, UN, ali i da time pojačaju međusobnu političku i operacionalnu koheziju.

Zaključak

Strateško partnerstvo između NATO-a i EU u upravljanju krizama građeno je kroz pregovore koji su rezultovali sporazumom Berlin plus (period od 16. decembra 2002. do 11. marta 2003.), a koji je veoma brzo dobio praktičnu primenu na terenu – najpre u BJR Makedoniji (2003), a potom i u Bosni i Hercegovini (2004). Tada je EU preuzela misije od NATO-a, koje su bile prve u skladu sa Evropskom bezbednosnom i odbrambenom politikom. Evropske misije na Balkanu su bile predvorje za evropsko angažovanje izvan evropskog kontinenta (npr. u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo), te istovremeno pokazale želju EU da se izgradi i postane globalni politički akter. To je povremeno iza-zivalo osećaj konkurencije kod NATO-a i njegove vodeće države članice, SAD, a želja EU da formira evropsku odbranu je oštro kritikovana, naročito ako se ima u vidu reakcija bivše američke državne sekretarke, Madlen Olbrajt, na for-miranje Evropskih snaga za brzo reagovanje (Sen Malo, 1998), oličena u „tri D“, koja su označila američka očekivanja u pogledu Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike: nema Dupliranja (no Duplication) onoga što je efikasno

50 Slučaj piraterije u Adenskom zalivu i na Rogu Afrike preti da ugrozi međunarodnu hu-manitarnu pomoć u Africi, kao i bezbednost pomorskog trgovinskog puta. Na zahtev general-nog sekretara UN, 2008. godine, NATO je pokrenuo operaciju „Saveznički snabdevač“ (Allied Provider) kako bi se obezbedila pratnja brodu Svetskog programa UN za hranu. Usledila je ope-racija „Saveznički zaštitnik“ (Allied Protector) 2009. godine, a sadašnja pod nazivom „Okeanski štit“ (Ocean Shield) dodatno obučava regionalne zemlje u izgradnji sopstvenih mogućnosti u borbi protiv piraterije.


urađeno u NATO-u, nema razdvajanja (no Decoupling) od SAD-a i NATO-a, nema diskriminacije (no Discrimination) prema državama ne članicama EU, kao što je Turska.

Suština odnosa dve organizacije je u opredeljenju da, iako možda ne izgleda

moguće da sve preduzmu zajedno, imperativ je da obezbede uslove da učine sve za ono što jesu zajednički preduzele. Strateško partnerstvo između ove dve organizacije ukazuje na neophodnost unapređenja globalnog pristupa uprav-ljanja krizama i prihvatanja šireg konteksta za transatlantsko delovanje oličeno u sve prisutnijem multilateralizmu i ulozi UN u svetu. Unapređenje političke i operacionalne kohezije NATO-a i EU tek predstoji u novoj dekadi 21. veka.



Republika Srbija i Zajednička bezbednosna i odbrambena politika51

Filip Ejdus52

Kada je gvozdena zavesa u Evropi pala, gotovo sve bivše istočnoevropske ko-munističke države su najpre zatražile, a zatim i stekle članstvo u EU i NATO-u. Dok se ostatak Evrope tokom devedesetih godina prošlog veka u miru ujedinja-vao, prostor zapadnog Balkana se politički usitnjavao. Čim su oružani sukobi okončani, novonastale države na ovim prostorima su uključivanje u evroatlant-ske bezbednosne tokove prepoznale kao svoj primarni nacionalni interes. Sve do kraja 2007. godine Srbija nije predstavljala izuzetak u tom pogledu. Međutim, u decembru 2007. godine, uoči jednostranog proglašenja nezavisnosti Kosova i Metohije, Narodna skupština je proglasila vojnu neutralnost Republike Srbije. Time je atlantska komponenta bezbednosne integracije Republike Srbije za sada ograničena na članstvo u NATO programu „Partnerstvo za mir“ (PzM). Evrop-ska komponenta bezbednosnih integracija ostala je za Srbiju otvorena, ali još uvek neiskorišćena, mogućnost.

51 Tekst je objavljen kao deo publikacije „Ka Borbenoj grupi Zapadni Balkan – Vizija odbrambene integracije Srbije u EU 2010–2020“, Autori: Filip Ejdus, Marko Savković i Nataša Dragojlović, Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, maj 2010

52 Autor je asistent i doktorant na Fakultetu političkih nauka, Univerziteta u Beogradu.


Evropska komponenta bezbednosnih integracija – neiskorišćena mogućnost?

Nakon jednostranog proglašenja nezavisnosti Kosova i Metohije u febru-aru 2008. godine, Republika Srbija je nastavila svoj put ka EU. On je najpre bio potvrđen potpisivanjem Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju (SSP) u aprilu 2008. godine, a zatim i odmrzavanjem Prelaznog trgovinskog sporazu-ma, kao i liberalizacijom viznog režima u decembru 2009. godine. U prvoj po-lovini 2011. godine očekuje se i dobijanje statusa kandidata za članstvo u EU. Članstvo Srbije u Evropskoj uniji predstavlja ključni spoljnopolitički prioritet Republike Srbije. Aktuelna Vlada je pristupanje EU, pored očuvanja teritori-jalnog integriteta Srbije i regionalne saradnje, postavila kao jedan od tri pri-oriteta spoljne politike. Usklađivanje domaćih zakona i propisa sa evropskim predstavlja u ovoj fazi integracije prioritet reformi i u ostalim oblastima politi-ke. Međutim, za razliku od gotovo svih ostalih država u regionu zapadnog Bal-kana, Republika Srbija do sada, osim reformi u oblasti pravosuđa i unutrašnjih poslova koje su bile preduslov za viznu liberalizaciju, nije učinila značajniji na-por da se uključi u bezbednosne integrativne tokove unutar EU. To se posebno odnosi na Zajedniču bezbednosnu i odbrambenu politiku (ZBOP), što je u ovoj fazi procesa integracije donekle razumljivo. Iako se, formalno gledano, to može odlagati sve do sticanja punopravnog članstva u EU, autori ovog teksta smatraju da je u nacionalnom interesu Republike Srbije da što pre počne da učestvuje u ZBOP.

Da je proaktivno učestvovanje u ZBOP u nacionalnom interesu Republike Srbije, posredno proističe i iz Strategije nacionalne bezbednosti, koju je Na-rodna skupština usvojila u oktobru 2009. godine. U ovom dokumentu, koji je definisao osnovne nacionalne interese u oblasti bezbednosti, navedeno je da „poseban značaj za razvoj i napredak Srbije imaju očuvanje unutrašnje sta-bilnosti, vladavina prava i razvoj demokratije i demokratskih institucija i in-tegracija u Evropsku uniju i druge međunarodne strukture“.53 Takođe, u njoj piše da „svojom spoljnom politikom, unapređivanjem saradnje sa susedima i izgradnjom zajedničkih kapaciteta i mehanizama za rešavanje protivrečnosti, sporova i svih vrsta izazova, rizika i pretnji na regionalnom i globalnom planu, Republika Srbija doprinosi stvaranju mirnog, stabilnog i sigurnog bezbedno-

53 Republika Srbija, Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti, oktobar 2009, str. 13.


snog okruženja“.54 Takođe, Strategija ističe da se „Republika Srbija (se) zalaže za regionalnu saradnju u oblastima zajedničke obuke i angažovanja elemenata sistema bezbednosti u multinacionalnim operacijama, upravljanju krizama i upravljanju granicom”.55 Dalje, u ovom dokumentu navodi se da „kroz proces evropskih integracija, Republika Srbija izražava spremnost da izgrađuje kapa-citete i sposobnosti sistema nacionalne bezbednosti, u skladu sa standardima i obavezama koje proizilaze iz Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike“.56

Nažalost, ostali strateški dokumenti Republike Srbije ovu mogućnost za sada nisu u dovoljnoj meri prepoznali kao važnu. U Nacionalnoj strategiji Srbi-je za pristupanje Srbije i Crne Gore EU, koju je Vlada Republike Srbije usvojila u junu 2005. godine, piše da će „Srbija nastojati da svoju spoljnu politiku vodi što više u skladu sa načelima Zajedničke spoljne i bezbednosne politike EU“.57 Međutim, ovaj dokument nijednom rečju ne pominje Evropsku bezbednosnu i odbrambenu politiku. U Nacionalnom programu za integraciju u EU, koji je Vlada Republike Srbije usvojila 2008. godine, piše da „Republika Srbija kon-tinuirano unapređuje dijalog sa Evropskom unijom i reformiše civilne i vojne kapacitete kako bi, između ostalog, bila spremna da nakon punopravnog član-stva preuzme obaveze koje proizilaze iz Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike i učestvuje u operacijama upravljanja krizama pod vođstvom EU“.58

Međutim, na primeru ostalih država u regionu vidi se da je nepotrebno od-lagati integraciju u ZBOP do punopravnog članstva u EU. U poslednjoj verziji ovog dokumenta iz decembra 2009. godine, u prilogu koje je dalo Ministar-stvo odbrane, kaže se da je „Republika Srbija (je) spremna da učestvovanjem u aktivnostima Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike, učestvovanjem u NATO programu „Partnerstvo za mir“, kao i u okviru regionalnih inicija-tiva, jača sopstvenu bezbednost i da dijalogom i saradnjom doprinosi miru i

54 Ibid, str. 11. 55 Ibid., str. 16.56 Ibid. str. 16. Ovakva strateška opredeljenja potvrđena su i Strategijom odbrane (2009).

Autori ovog teksta smatraju da je ovo opredeljenje potrebno potvrditi i konkretizovati izradom i usvajanjem ostalih strategijsko-doktrinarnih dokumenata, čija je izrada u toku, a usvajanje najavljeno u dokumentu „Nacionalni plan integracija“ do kraja 2010. godine. To su Strategijski pregled odbrane, Doktrina vojske, Dugoročni program razvoja sistema odbrane i Srednjoročni programi i planovi razvoja sistema odbrane.

57 Vlada Republike Srbije, Nacionalna strategija Srbije za pristupanje Srbije i Crne Gore, Beograd, juni 2005, str. 43.

58 Ibid, str. 785.


stabilnosti“.59 Takođe, ističe se spremnost Republike Srbije da, nakon stupanja na snagu SSP, intenzivira dijalog sa EU o pitanjima koja se odnose na bezbed-nost i odbranu.

Uprkos polovičnom deklarativnom zalaganju, donosioci odluka u Repu-blici Srbiji su do sada bili izuzetno pasivni kada je reč o ZBOP. Oni su se do sada, koliko je poznato autorima ovog teksta, samo u nekoliko navrata javno izjasnili o mogućem učestvovanju Srbije u ZBOP. Prvi put je novembra 2008. godine tadašnji načelnik Generalštaba Zdravko Ponoš, nakon susreta sa šefom Vojnog komiteta generalom Anri Bantežeom u Briselu, izneo nekoliko ideja koje su išle u ovom pravcu. Tom prilikom on je izjavio da Srbija treba da razvi-ja saradnju u okviru EBOP, a potencijalno i u borbenim grupama EU kao i da „postoji mogućnost da na vojnom planu uradimo čak i korak dalje u odnosu na neke druge oblasti pridruživanja Evropskoj uniji”, jer je stvorena „moguć-nost da naši oficiri učestvuju u vežbama EU u statusu posmatrača, isto kao i da oficiri iz EU budu pozvani da prisustvuju vežbama Vojske Srbije”.60 Takođe, ministar unutrašnjih poslova Ivica Dačić je, najpre u aprilu a potom i u julu 2009. godine, nagovestio mogućnost učestvovanja srpske policije u operacija-ma EU.61 Mediji se ovom temom u Srbiji nisu mnogo bavili, a njihova pažnja je uglavnom usmerena na odnos Srbije i NATO-a. Osim toga, stručna javnost se, uz nekoliko izuzetaka, nije značajnije bavila problemom integracije Srbije u ZBOP.62 Osim na nekoliko obrazovnih seminara, o ovoj temi se još uvek nije povela šira stručna, odnosno javna rasprava.63 Postavlja se, stoga, pitanje da li

59 Ovaj dokument se periodično revidira, tako da ova formulacija u skoroj budućnosti može opet biti promenjena.

60 Vojska Srbije, „General Ponoš na sastanku vojnog komiteta Evroatlantskog partnerstva”. Videti: http://www.vs.rs/index.php?news_article=219be3cc-0cfb-102c-ad2f-79b934d89d8d

61 RTS, 1. april 2009, „Srpski policajci u misijama EU“, Videti: http://www.rts.rs/page/stori-es/sr/story/9/Srbija/53278/Srpski+policajci+u+misijama++EU.html;

RTS, 2. jul 2009, „Policija spremna za mirovne misije“, Videti: http://www.rts.rs/page/stori-es/sr/story/125/Društvo/71345/Policija+spremna+za+mirovne+misije.html

62 Jedan od prvih koji je predložio proaktivan stav Srbije u ovoj oblasti bio je Srđan Gli-gorijević iz ISAC fonda. Videti: Srđan Gligorijević, „Partnerstvo je moguće”, Evropski forum, novembar - decembar 2006, br. 11–12.

63 Državni službenici Republike Srbije u nekoliko ciklusa učestvovali su u kursevima o EBOP koji se sprovode u saradnji MO Austrije, Nemačke, Mađarske i Evropskog bezbedno-snog i odbrambenog koledža. Videti: ESDP Course open to Western Balkan states, http://www.eu2006.at/en/News/information/2905esvp.html. Takođe, u okviru nevladinog sektora održano je nekoliko kurseva specijalizovanih za EBOP, kao na primer u okviru ISAC fonda ili Škole za evropsku bezbednost Centra za civilno-vojne odnose. Videti: ISAC fond: http://www.isac-fund.


Srbija zaista treba da čeka da postane punopravni član EU kako bi počela da učestvuje najpre u civilnim i vojnim operacijama kriznog menadžmenta EU, a zatim i u njenim borbenim grupama. Iako proaktivan pristup ovoj oblasti nije formalna obaveza države koja još nije postala ni kandidat za članstvo, on bi predstavljao snažan adut diplomatije Republike Srbije u procesu evropske integracije.64 Osim toga, integracija kroz ZBOP može delimično predstavljati kompenzaciju za prilike propuštene privremenim ili trajnim odustajanjem od članstva u NATO-u. Konačno, time bi Srbija pokazala da može da bude kon-struktivan partner, kao i da može da doprinese bezbednosti Evrope. Kao što smo videli, to su već uveliko prepoznale druge države zapadnog Balkana, koje su otpočele integraciju u ZBOP i već učestvuju u misijama EU. Takođe, i u samoj EU postoji pozitivan stav o uključivanju Srbije u ZBOP. O tome svedoči i izjava pomenutog generala Bantaža da bi „Evropska unija (bi) veoma cenila kada bi se Srbija uključila u mirovne operacije EU“.65

Potrebno je napomenuti da EU u ovoj fazi pregovora o učlanjenju Srbije neće insistirati na ZBOP, s obzirom na to da i sama nema izgrađene kriteriju-me i standarde u ovoj oblasti. U prethodnim talasima proširenja, koordinacija reformi sistema odbrane i odbrambena integracija tekla je uglavnom posred-stvom NATO-a. Članstvo bivših komunističkih država u ovom vojnom savezu bilo je dovoljan signal Evropskoj uniji da su ove zemlje obavile neophodne reforme u ovoj oblasti.66 Međutim, Lisabonski ugovor, koji je stupio na snagu 1. decembra 2009. godine, dalekosežno e uticati na sposobnost EU da se nosi sa izazovima 21. veka, posebno u oblasti spoljne i bezbednosne politike. Uko-liko želi da ubrza proces svoje evropske integracije i da nadoknadi izgubljeno

org/lat/esdp.php Videti: CCVO: http://www.ccmr-bg.org/Obrazovanje/3158/Skola+za+evropsku+bez

bednost+%282008-2009 64 U Sporazumu o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju strane se obavezuju da će unapređivati po-

litički dijalog radi većeg približavanja „stavova strana o međunarodnim pitanjima, uključujući u to i pitanja u vezi sa Zajedničkom spoljnom i bezbednosnom politikom“. Međutim, u ovom Sporazumu uopšte se ne spominju približavanja u oblasti ZBOP.

65 „Srbija treba da se uključi u mirovne misije“, intervju sa generalom Anri Bantažeom. Vi-deti: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090619_Politika_Daily-Tereza_Boj-kovic.pdf

66 Izuzetak su, naravno, neutralne države. Kada je Irska ušla u EZ 1973. godine još uvek nije postojala Zajednička spoljna, bezbednosna i odbrambena politika. Austrija, Finska i Švedska ušle su EU 1995. godine. Tada je EU već stvorila Zajedničku spoljnu i bezbednosnu politiku, ali još uvek ne i Evropsku bezbednosnu i odbrambenu politiku. Kipar i Malta, koje su u EU ušle 2004. godine, i dalje imaju prilično ograničenu ulogu u EBOP.


vreme, Srbija nesumnjivo treba da, mnogo pre sticanja punopravnog članstva, otpočne i svoju bezbednosnu integraciju u EU. Jedan od načina da to učini je-ste taj da u periodu između 2010. i 2020. godine zajedno sa ostalim državama zapadnog Balkana razvije borbenu grupu.

Stvaranjem zajedničke borbene grupe države zapadnog Balkana bi učini-le simboličan gest, ne samo istorijskog pomirenja među narodima na ovom prostoru, već i nagoveštaja nove ere u kojoj bi region, od bezbednosnog tere-ta za EU, prerastao u bezbednosni dobitak. Prednosti i izazovi Borbene gru-pe zapadni Balkan Postavlja se pitanje zašto bi države na zapadnom Balkanu osnivale posebnu borbenu grupu kada jednostavno mogu da sarađuju unutar drugih postojećih borbenih grupa i da na taj način izbegnu čitav niz kompliko-vanih političkih, finansijskih i tehničkih izazova. Postoji niz argumenata zbog kojih je usvajanje upravo ovakvog regionalnog pristupa u interesu svih država regiona. Prvo, kulturne i jezičke sličnosti koje postoje na zapadnom Balkanu bi olakšale komunikaciju unutar BGZB. Jezička interoperabilnost je izuzetno važan kohezioni faktor međunarodne vojne integracije. Dakle, kulturna i je-zička bliskost, baš kao što je slučaj u ostalim borbenim grupama EU, mogle bi da budu vezivno tkivo efikasnijeg funkcionisanja i BGZB.

Drugo, učestvovanje u mnogobrojnim regionalnim inicijativama, članstvo u programu „Partnerstvo za mir“ i prihvatanje NATO standarda učiniće ove vojske tehnički i organizaciono interoperabilnim. Iako su njihove doktrine nacionalno obojene, činjenica da je nekoliko vojski zapadnog Balkana izraslo iz bivše JNA, u izvesnoj meri utiče na sličnosti obuka. Pri tom, vojske na zapadnom Balkanu ko-riste slično naoružanje i vojnu opremu, koji su u dobroj meri nasleđeni od JNA.

Stvaranje zajedničke borbene grupe od država zapadnog Balkana zahtevalo bi i funkcionalnu podelu posla, u kojoj bi svaka država pored borbenih eleme-nata razvijala svoje „posebne sposobnosti“. Na primer, Hrvatska bi mogla da doprinese svojim transportnim kapacitetima, Srbija sanitetom i ABHO, BiH svojim timovima za deminiranje, a Makedonija svojim iskustvom specijalne jedinice, koja je angažovana u Iraku. Time bi bili smanjeni troškovi i dodat-no unapređena profesionalizacija oružanih snaga. Međutim, za punu intero-perabilnost nesumnjivo su potrebni zajednička obuka i vojne vežbe. Ovo bi otpočelo najpre učestvovanjem u drugim borbenim grupama EU, a kasnije i učestvovanjem unutar zajedničke BGZB.


Treće, ovakav regionalni pristup doprineo bi razvoju međusobnog povere-nja između nekada zaraćenih strana. Baš kao što je francusko-nemačka bri-gada osnovana 1987. godine predstavljala simbol ujedinjene Evrope, tako bi i BGZB mogla da predstavlja simbol trajnog pomirenja država i naroda za-padnog Balkana integrisanog u EU. Osim toga, ovakav angažman doprineo bi integraciji odbrambene industrije, usaglašavanju zajedničkih programa mo-dernizacije i nabavke naoružanja i vojne opreme. Zajedničko iskustvo u oblasti odbrambene politike pozitivno bi uticalo na jačanje poverenja kako unutar zapadnog Balkana, tako i između zemalja zapadnog Balkana i EU. Multina-cionalna borbena grupa, sastavljena od nekada zaraćenih strana, mogla bi da predstavlja izuzetno snažan simbolični doprinos Zajedničkoj spoljnoj i bez-bednosnoj politici EU. Time bi EU

ojačala svoju poziciju „meke super sile“, koja je u stanju da ratom zahvaćene regione transformiše u bezbednosne zajednice, a „neuspešne države“ u uspeš-ne demokratije.

Svakako je neophodno imati u vidu potencijalne teškoće i izazove formira-nja BGZB. Prvi izazov predstavlja još uvek sveže sećanje na međusobne suko-be do kojih je došlo tokom raspada Jugoslavije devedesetih godina dvadesetog veka. Postavlja se pitanje kako bi nekada sukobljene vojske sarađivale u jed-nom multinacionalnom bataljonu. Međutim, iz evropskog iskustva je poznato da ukoliko dođe do pomirenja na političkom nivou vojske ne predstavljaju prepreku u saradnji. Drugi, naizgled mnogo veći izazov, predstavljaju nerešeni politički problemi i teritorijalni sporovi. Da li je realno očekivati da države, čije odnose opterećuju nerazrešeni politički sporovi, odluče zajedno oforme borbenu grupu? Međutim, kao što je pokazao proces evropske integracije, me-đudržavne probleme je mnogo lakše rešavati u atmosferi saradnje. Odbrambe-nom saradnjom moguće je izgraditi poverenje, a poverenje odstranjuje neizve-snost, umanjuje bezbednosnu dilemu i uklanja revizionističke motive. Vojna integracija država zapadnog Balkana je deo rešenja a ne deo problema.

Treći problem je organizacioni i odnosi se, na prvom mestu, na problem „vodeće države“ (framework nation), odnosno na problem države koja bi bila predvodnik BGZB. Za sada je teško pretpostaviti da bi se lokalne države mo-gle dogovoriti oko toga da neka od dve najveće države u regionu, tj. Srbija ili Hrvatska, bude „vodeća država“. Možda je najbolje da tu ulogu stoga preuzme Bosna i Hercegovina, koja bi u međuvremenu mogla da bude opcija koja je


prihvatljiva za sve. Međutim, ukoliko do dogovora ne bi moglo da dođe, mož-da je moguće pronaći treću vanregionalnu državu koja bi bila prihvatljiva za sve i koja ima relevantno iskustvo učestvovanja u borbenim grupama EU. Dr-žave koje bi bile prihvatljive za ceo region mogle bi da budu Grčka, Rumunija i Austrija. Izazov bi mogli da predstavljaju i unutrašnji politički otpori desno orijentisanih snaga u državama zapadnog Balkana, ali i levo orijentisanih sna-ga, za koje bi u perspektivi angažovanje u operacijama nametanja mira moglo biti neprihvatljivo. Svaka država u ovom multinacionalnom bataljonu oslanja-la bi se na sopstvene posebne sposobnosti. Iako je u ovom trenutku moguće iznositi samo spekulacije, navešćemo neke od posebnih sposobnosti na koje države u regionu mogu da računaju. Bosna i Hercegovina bi mogla da isko-risti svoje dokazano uspešno razvijene snage za deminiranje, dok bi Hrvatska mogla da iskoristi iskustvo svog voda vojne policije, koji se u ovom trenutku nalazi u Avganistanu. Pripadnici makedonskih specijalnih snaga imaju isku-stvo asimetričnog ratovanja u Iraku, te bi u tom pogledu mogli da doprinesu BGZB. Načelni nivo ambicija ukupnog učešća jedinica Vojske Srbije mogao bi da bude jedan pešadijski bataljon, vod vojne policije, vod ABHO, medicinski timovi, laka poljska bolnica, što predstavlja strukturne elemente slične onima koji su već deklarisani kroz učešće Vojske Srbije u NATO Procesu planiranja i revizije (PARP).

Takođe, odlučioci i planeri će tokom implementacije koncepta BG morati, između ostalog, da reše pitanje obuke, odnosno pitanje toga da li će se ona odvijati zajednički ili odvojeno. Primera radi, obuka za HELBROC najpre je realizovana posebno po kontingentima, da bi u kasnijoj fazi realizacije bili iskorišćeni kapaciteti Centra za obuku učesnika u multinacionalnim opera-cijama u mestu Kilkis, u Grčkoj. Takav model bi mogao da bude iskorišćen i u BGZB, a Srbija bi mogla da ponudi kapacitete na Vojnoj akademiji, svoj Centar za mirovne operacije u Beogradu, kao i kapacitete novoizgrađene baze „Jug“ („Cepotina“). Veoma važno je i pitanje taktičkog i strateškog transporta. Kao što smo ranije u tekstu naveli, borbena grupa može da bude razmeštena na udaljenosti do 6.000 km. Ovaj problem je u slučaju HELBROC rešen tako što su oružane snage Grčke ustupile transportne avione Antonov An-14 i Her-kules C-130. Oružane snage država u regionu mogle bi zajednički da pristupe ovom problemu i da udruženim naporima i investicijama, zajedno sa ostalim državama EU, razviju sposobnosti za taktički i strateški transport.


Neformalne pregovore o osnivanju BGZB neophodno je započeti što pre. Teško je reći kako će za par godina izgledati procedure za oblikovanje, trening i sertifikaciju borbenih grupa, s obzirom na činjenicu da se u ovom trenutku odvija proces prilagođavanja procedura za odlučivanje u ZSBP promenama koje je doneo Lisabonski sporazum. Stoga, i za prilagođavanje u ovoj oblasti i za dostizanje standarda važi poznata teza da je Evropska unija za sve zemlje u procesu pristupanja pokretna meta.

U svakom slučaju, do formalnog osnivanja borbene grupe svakako je po-trebno uspešno okončati pregovore u Vojnom komitetu EU, zatim pregovo-re sa partnerima koji učestvuju u stvaranju borbene grupe, a potom odabrati „vodeću državu“ i dovršiti usaglašavanje standarda za oblikovanje, trening i sertifikaciju borbene grupe. U narednom delu teksta iznećemo četvorofaznu mapu puta koja bi do 2020. godine dovela do formiranja BGZB.

Mapa puta uključivanja Republike Srbije u ZBOP 1. Faza pripremanja i posmatranja (2010–2012)

Iz nekoliko razloga upravo je 2010. godina pogodna za otpočinjanje prve faze. Najpre, Lisabonski sporazum je stupio na snagu 1. decembra 2009. go-dine, čime su otvorena vrata za dalje proširenje EU. Odnosi Srbije i EU su unapređeni stupanjem na snagu odluke o viznoj liberalizaciji, 19. decembra 2009. godine, kao i stupanjem na snagu Prelaznog trgovinskog sporazuma, 1. februara 2010. godine. Srbija je 22. decembra 2009. godine podnela i zahtev za dobijanje statusa kandidata, a očekuje se da bi ovaj status mogla dobiti tokom prve polovine 2011. godine. Osim toga, na mesto evropskog komesara za pro-širenje i susedsku politiku je izabran nekadašnji ambasador Češke Republike pri NATO-u i ministar za evropske integracije Štefan File. Češka Republika snažno podržava ulazak Srbije u EU, a i sam komesar File je u nekoliko na-vrata podržao brzu evrointegraciju Srbije.67 I ostale države u regionu mogu u 2010. godini da očekuju ubrzanje evropskih integracija. Tokom 2011. godine, Hrvatska bi mogla da završi pregovore, a Makedonija da ih otpočne. Konačno, svetska ekonomska kriza i evropska monetarna kriza bez sumnje su u pojedi-nim evropskim prestonicama pojačali skepticizam prema daljem proširenju

67 Primera radi, prva delegacija koju je komesar File primio početkom februara 2010. godi-ne bila je delegacija Republike Srbije.


Unije nakon ulaska Hrvatske. Stvaranje BGZB biće najsnažniji adut država u regionu protiv ovakvih negativnih tendencija.

Španija, sa kojom Srbija ima odlične diplomatske odnose, predsedava EU tokom prve polovine 2010. godine. Tokom ovog perioda Srbija je mogla da za-vrši sve pripremne radnje kako bi pripadnici srpskih oružanih snaga mogli da od druge polovine 2010. godine budu poslati kao posmatrači u redove španske borbene grupe, koja će biti na „dežurstvu“ u drugoj polovini 2010. godine.68 Taj proces može biti nastavljen i u drugoj polovini 2011. godine u okviru grčke borbene grupe HELBROC, koja se još naziva i Balkanskom borbenom gru-pom. Grčka i Španija, kao članice EU i NATO-a koje nisu priznale nezavisnost Kosova i Metohije i sa kojima Srbija ima izuzetno dobre diplomatske odnose, mogle bi dugoročno da postanu ključni partneri u integrisanju Srbije u ZBOP.

U fazi pripremanja i posmatranja Republika Srbija treba da usmeri svoje napore u tri pravca. Prvi pravac bio bi institucionalno pripremanje za uče-stvovanje u ZBOP. To najpre podrazumeva sve aktivnosti koje su usmerene na izgradnju i jačanje institucionalnih i ljudskih kapaciteta unutar Ministar-stva odbrane. Posebno je značajno postići punu funkcionalnost organizaci-one јedinice unutar Ministarstva odbrane Republike Srbije koјa radi na po-slovima ZBOP. Ministarstvo odbrane je, uz Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova, Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, Ministarstvo finansija, Ministarstvo eko-nomije i regionalnog razvoja i Kancelarije za evropske integracije, nadležno za sprovođenje aktivnosti Republike Srbije u oblasti evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike (Podgrupa stručne grupe 31). U institucionalnom po-gledu, u ovoj fazi neophodno je stvoriti pretpostavke za horizontalnu sarad-nju ovih institucija. U prilogu koje je Ministarstvo odbrane dalo za NPI piše da je prioritet u institucionalnom smislu za 2010. godinu osnivanje odseka za Evropske integracije i regionalne inicijative, koji će se u okviru sektora za politiku odbrane baviti studijsko- analitičkim i stručno-operativnim poslovi-ma iz oblasti saradnje sa institucijama EU. Dalje, „imajući u vidu definisane misije vojske, Centar za mirovne operacije Združene operativne komande Generalštaba Vojske Srbije je intenzivirao aktivnosti radi pripreme pripad-

68 Španski ministar spoljnih poslova Migel Anhel Moratinos (Miguel Ángel Moratinos ) posetio je 12. decembra Beograd, a dan kasnije srpski ministar odbrane izavio je da Srbija ima nameru da, zajedno sa španskim kontingentom, učestvuje u misiji UN u Libanu, kao i da će vrlo brzo otpočeti pripreme za te aktivnosti. Videti: „Šutanovac o budžetu za Vojsku“, 13. decembar.

http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=12&dd=13&nav_category=11&nav_id=398049


nika Vojske Srbije za učešće u multinacionalnim operacijama“. Uvažavajući relevantnost ovakvog opredeljenja, poželjno je formirati i јezgro nacionalnog elementa EU voјnog osoblja u sastavu Generalštaba. Osim toga, u Ministar-stvu odbrane bilo bi poželjno razviti komunikacionu strategiju za pristupa-nje Srbije Evropskoj uniji u oblasti ZBOP. Takođe, treba intenzivirati proces obrazovanja i osposobljavanja zaposlenih u Ministarstvu odbrane za rad u oblasti ZBOP. Težište ovog procesa treba da bude na njihovoj praktičnoj obu-ci, tj. na praksi u instituciјama EU/ZBOP, ministarstvima i generalštabovima država članica EU. Takođe, potrebno je osposobiti službenike i oficire koji bi, po pristupanju Srbije u EU, bili upućeni u Vojni štab EU. Stoga je u godiš-nji plan školovanja pripadnika MO i VS potrebno uvrstiti i obuku iz oblasti ZBOP, koju organizuje i sprovodi EU kako za države članice, tako i za države kandidate. Poželjno je otpočeti i pripremanje stalnog voјnog predstavnika Republike Srbije pri Voјnom komitetu EU. Dalje, moguće je otpočeti opre-manje, uvežbavanje, pripremu i sertifikaciјu za pripremu snaga Vojske Srbije za učestvovanje u borbenim grupama EU. Paralelno sa ovim, potrebno je da Vojska Srbije dostigne punu usklađenost sa standardima i procedurama NA-TO-a. Konačno, potrebno je započeti uključivanje planiranih aktivnosti Voj-ske Srbije u borbenim grupama EU u Godišnji plan upotrebe Vojske Srbije i drugih snaga odbrane u multinacionalnim operacijama. Ovim će biti stvo-rene pravne i tehničke pretpostavke za učestvovanje Vojske Srbije u vojnim operacijama EU koje se sprovode uz pomoć kapaciteta NATO-a, a u okviru Berlin plus sporazuma.69

Drugi pravac u kome je potrebno usmeriti napore u prvoj fazi bio bi ostvarivanje niza političkih i vojnih oblika saradnje sa EU. To se, pre svega, odnosi na uspostavljanje redovnih konsultacija sa Političko-bezbednosnim komitetom (Political-Security Committee), telom Saveta EU koje upravlja ZBOP. Zatim, moguće je otpočinjanje projekata „bratimljenja“ (twinning), odnosno otpočinjanje postavljanja eksperata iz EU u Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Srbije. Po pravilu, zemlja korisnik bira partnera među zemljama

69 Sa ovim je saglasan i NPI, u kome Ministarstvo odbrane kaže da „u okviru NATO progra-ma Partnerstvo za mir, Republika Srbija postepeno ispunjava preuzete obaveze i razvija saradnju sa ostalim članicama ovog Programa. U 2009. godini usvojen je dokument Procena PARP, koji obuhvata 19 ciljeva partnerstva za Republiku Srbiju. Planirano je da Republika Srbija do 2012. godine pripremi deklarisane snage za angažovanje u operacijama u okviru Partnerstva za mir“. Pošto ovaj dokument (PARP) nije dostupan javnosti, nije moguće proceniti da li su te snage pogodne i za učestvovanje u operacijama kriznog menadžmenta EU ili za učestvovanje u bor-benim grupama.


članicama EU, a ovakvi projekti doprinose ostvarivanju konkretnih operativ-nih rezultata u okviru neke od politika EU (u ovom slučaju ZBOP). Takođe, dobro bi bilo da odabrani pripadnici MO i Vojske Srbije stažiraju u instituci-jama, u kojim mogu posmatrati rad svojih kolega angažovanih na poslovima vezanim za ZBOP, i to kako u državama EU, tako i u državama regiona koje u ovoj politici učestvuju. Osim toga, poželjno bi bilo otpočeti redovne kon-sultativne sastanke ministara odbrane država članica EU i država zapadnog Balkana u sklopu Vojnog komiteta EU (EU Military Committee), kao i ot-početi kontakte sa predstavnicima Vojnog štaba EU (EU Military Staff). To-kom ovog perioda bilo bi poželjno završiti pregovore i potpisati bezbednosni sporazum sa EU, koji će omogućiti razmenu poverljivih podataka između Republike Srbije i EU.70 Konačno, bilo bi korisno da Odbor za odbranu i bezbednost, eventualno i Odbor za spoljne poslove Narodne skupštine Re-publike Srbije, uspostavi kontakt sa Potkomitetom za bezbednost i odbranu Komiteta za spoljne poslove Evropskog parlamenta71, kao i da sa nadležnim parlamentarnim odborima država u regionu otpočne razmenu iskustava iz oblasti ZBOP.72

Time bi na vreme bilo otpočeto izgrađivanje kapaciteta za demokratsku kontrolu učestvovanja Vojske Republike Srbije u operacijama EU. Konačno, domaća odbrambena industrija bi u ovoj fazi već mogla da počne da pronalazi svoje mesto u poslovnim planovima Evropske odbrambene agencije (Europe-

70 O tome govori u svom intervjuu listu „Danas“ državni sekretar Ministarstva odbrane Du-šan Spasojević. „Inicirali smo i zaključenje Sporazuma o bezbednosnim procedurama za razme-nu poverljivih informacija sa Evropskom unijom, što će stvoriti mogućnost da se angažujemo i u misijama EU.“ Videti: http://www.mod.gov.rs/novi.php?action=fullnews&id=1968.

Pored toga, trebalo bi, možda, uporediti zakonska rešenja zemalja iz regiona koja su u vezi sa prisustvom pripadnika stranih oružanih snaga na teritoriji države (npr. zajedničke vežbe, manevri i sl.). To se odnosi na slučaj da je potrebno održati zajedničke vežbe ili obuku. Takođe, razmena poverljivih informacija između zemalja u regionu treba da bude propisana na odogo-varajući način. Naznake o tome pogledati u http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/vesti-dana/Spora-zum-ovojnoj-saradnji-Srbije-i-Hrvatske.sr.html.

71 S tim u vezi, svakako je celishodno slediti praksu drugih članica EU i odrediti predstav-nika nacionalnog parlamenta – NSRS u Evropskom parlamentu, makar i na neredovnoj (ne-formalnoj) osnovi. Videti: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/lang/en/pid/18/cache/offonce

72 Jedan od najefikasnijih vidova međuparlamentarne saradnje u ovoj oblasti, sasvim izve-sno, biće i održavanje interparlamentarne konferencije (na redovnoj osnovi) za razmatranje pitanja iz oblasti ZSBP/ZBOP, koja je predviđena članom 9 Protokola Lisabonskog ugovora o ulozi nacionalnih predstavnika država članica. Očekuje se da će na ove sastanke biti pozivani i predstavnici zemalja kandidata (npr. COSAC).


an Defence Agency). Faza pripremanja i posmatranja bila bi krunisana stav-ljanjem snaga Vojske Srbije na rednu listu operativnih borbenih grupa EU po odluci Političko-bezbednosnog komiteta EU, a na predlog Vojnog štaba EU.

Treći pravac aktivnosti u fazi pripremanja i posmatranja bio bi započi-njanje političkog dijaloga koji bi vodio stvaranju BGZB. Kako bi 2020. godi-ne BGZB bila sertifikovana i stavljena na raspolaganje, o njoj je neophodno otvoriti dijalog već 2010. godine. Kako kaže Terje Haverstad, nekadašnji voj-ni ataše Kraljevine Norveške u Beogradu, „naravno da je sada suviše rano za realizaciju ove vizije. Međutim, ovo ne bi trebalo da spreči donosioce odluka u državama zapadnog Balkana da već sada počnu razgovor o tome kako je moguće ostvariti ovu viziju. Potrebno je mnogo vremena da se uspostavi BGZB zbog velike složenosti, investicija koje su neophodne i političkih pita-nja koja treba rešavati.“73

2. Faza prilagođavanja (2013–2015)

Za otpočinjanje druge faze prilagođavanja i planiranja potrebno je ispuniti dva uslova. Prvi je da Vojska Srbije raspolaže osposobljenim snagama koje su obučene i sertifikovane za angažovanje u borbenim grupama EU. Drugo, po-trebno je postizanje političke saglasnosti sa EU o učestvovanju Srbije u nekoj od borbenih grupa EU.

U ovoj fazi jedinice Vojske Srbije bi se postepeno prilagođavale integrisa-njem u neku od postojećih borbenih grupa EU. Zbog vojne intervencije NA-TO-a protiv SRJ 1999. godine, kao i zbog nerešenog statusa Kosova i Metohije, javno mnjenje u Srbiji postalo je dosta skeptično kada je reč o učestvovanju Vojske Srbije u multinacionalnim operacijama.74 Zbog toga je u fazi prilago-đavanja preporučljivo ograničeno učestvovanje Vojske Srbije u borbenim gru-pama EU. To, pre svega, znači da će u njima učestvovati isključivo službe koje nisu direktno uključene u borbena dejstva.

Takođe, bilo bi poželjno da jedinice Vojske Srbije budu integrisane u borbe-nu grupu EU u u kojoj su države učesnice vojno neutralne (Švedska, Austrija, Finska i Kipar) ili pak države koje nisu priznale nezavisnost Kosova i Metohije (Španija, Slovačka, Grčka, Rumunija). Republika Kipar je jedina država koja

73 Intervju obavljen elektronskim putem 13. 10. 2009. godine.74 Više o tome vidi: Miroslav Hadžić i Milorad Timotić, Javnost i vojska, Centar za civilno-

vojne odnose, Beograd, 2006., str. 42


je vojno nesvrstana i koja nije priznala nezavisnost Kosova i Metohije, tako da svaka vojna saradnja sa ovom državom u okviru Balkanske borbene grupe HELBROC ima dobre šanse da naiđe na odobravanje javnog mnjenja. Bal-kanska borbena grupa biće dežurna tokom prve polovine 2014. godine što je odlična prilika i za učestvovanje srpskog kontigenta. On bi mogao biti jačine do 50 pripadnika iz redova vojne policije, timova za deminiranje, medicinskih timova i, svakako, štabnih oficira.

Tokom ove faze potrebno je intenzivirati i političke pripreme za stvaranje BGZB. Ovo pitanje je, najpre, moguće pokrenuti u bilateralnim kontaktima kako sa ostalim državama regiona, tako i sa državama članicama EU. Kada ideja bude prihvaćena, moguće je sazvati i regionalnu konferenciju na kojoj je neophodno postići multilateralni politički konsenzus o stvaranju BGZB do 2020. godine. Regionalnu konferenciju poželjno je organizovati u saradnji sa Grčkom koja će tokom prve polovine 2014. godine predsedavati EU. Tokom ove konferencije, osim iskazivanja opšte političke volje, bilo bi odlučeno i to koja država će biti kontaktdržava (Point of Contact) za koordinaciju planira-nja i pripremanja borbene grupe, kao i to koja država bi mogla da igra ulogu “vodeće države“. Prema postojećim procedurama, proces formalnog osnivanja borbene grupe započinje na zasedanju Saveta EU za opšte i spoljne poslove (General Affairs and External Relations Council, skr. GAERC). Tada ministri odbrana država učesnica u borbenoj grupi potpisuju pismo u kome izražavaju nameru da u određenom roku Evropskoj uniji ponude svoju borbenu grupu kao potpuno operativnu.

3. Faza unapređenog učestvovanja, planiranja i pripreme (2016–2017)

Tokom ove faze Republika Srbija bi mogla da unapredi svoje učestvovanje u borbenim grupama EU uključivanjem drugih rodova Vojske Srbije, poput pešadije, artiljerije, transportne avijacije i helikopterske jedinice. Jedan od najtežih izazova u fazi unapređenog učestvovanja biće pridobijanje podrške javnosti u Srbiji. To će posebno biti komplikovano ukoliko borbena grupa EU u kojoj Srbija učestvuje bude upotrebljena za sprovođenje neke misije EU. Pro-fesionalizacija Vojske Srbije i dodatne investicije u obuku pripadnika koji će učestvovati u borbenoj grupi EU mogu smanjiti, ali ne mogu u potpunosti isključiti rizik od toga da, ukoliko borbena grupa bude upotrebljena za neku operaciju ZBOP, može biti žrtava među pripadnicima Vojske Srbije. Stoga je,


ukoliko do toga ipak dođe, na vreme potrebno napraviti strategiju komuni-kacije sa javnošću. Osim toga, potrebno je napraviti detaljan plan socijalnog zbrinjavanja žrtava i njihovih porodica. Tokom ove faze potrebno je otpočeti i sa planiranjem stvaranja BGZB.75

U tom cilju poželjno je nastaviti politički dijalog sa budućim državama učesnica. Politički osetljivim temama, kao što su proces donošenja odluka za razmeštanje borbene grupe, pravni mandat i nacionalna ograničenja, potreb-no je posvetiti posebnu pažnju. Ovaj dijalog bio bi krunisan potpisivanjem Memoranduma o razumevanju između budućih država kontributora. Ovi do-kumenti mogu da sadrže principe: donošenja odluka za razmeštanje borbene grupe; konsultacija između država kontributora tokom planiranja i priprema-nja BGZB, kao i nakon sticanja sertifikacije u tzv. stand-by fazi; komandovanja i kontrole tokom operacija u kojima bi bile uključene borbene grupe; uvežba-vanja i obuke; kao i ostala pravna i finansijska pitanja. Pored Memoranduma o razumevanju države kontributori potpisuju i na njima zasnovane Tehnič-ke sporazume kojima se definišu postavljanje osoblja u strukturama borbene grupe, obuka i uvežbavanje, kao i upotreba borbene grupe. Ukoliko pojedina pitanja ostanu nerešena, pored Memoranduma o razumevanju i Tehničkih sporazuma, u ovoj fazi moguće je sklopiti i druge multilateralne, odnosno bi-lateralne sporazume. Koordinaciju ovog procesa vršiće kontakt-država.

4. Faza razvoja inicijalnih operativnih sposobnosti i formiranja Borbene grupe zapadni Balkan (2018–2020)

U ovoj fazi Srbija bi, zajedno sa ostalim državama učesnicama, nastavila pri-premanje BGZB. Najpre je potrebno započeti proces razvijanja paketa BGZB, koji koordinira kontakt-država. Iz ovog procesa treba da proisteknu sastav i sposobnosti paketa borbene grupe, tzv. ORBAT (order of battle), uključujući u to i nacionalna ograničenja. Takođe, neophodno je dogovoriti standardne operativne procedure za funkcionisanje BGZB. Kontakt-država je zadužena i za planiranje osposobljavanja komande snaga BGZB. Osim toga, potrebno je napraviti dobru koordinaciju procesa donošenja odluka o upotrebi BGZB, koji obavljaju države učesnice. Poželjno je da se ovaj proces maksimalno ubrza i harmonizuje kako bi BGZB mogla da poštuje predviđeni rok za brzo raz-

75 Za standardizovan vodič kroz stvaranje borbene grupe pogledati: Council of the Europe-an Union, Military Staff, EU Battlegroup Preparation Guide, Brussels, 8. septembar 2009.


meštanje u periodu od 5 do 10 dana nakon odluke Saveta EU. Neophodno je razviti i obaveštajnu zajednicu BGZB, koja bi se sastajala dva puta godišnje. Bilo bi dobro da na ovim sastancima učestvuju i obaveštajni oficiri drugih bor-benih grupa, po mogućstvu i iz one borbene grupe koja će biti dežurna kada i BGZB, tako i iz borbenih grupa koje će biti dežurne u polugodištu pre dežur-stva BGZB i posle njega.

Za uspešnu sertifikaciju BGZB ključni su obuka i uvežbavanje. Kontakt-država koordinira proces obuke, uvežbavanja i sertifikacije. Oni treba da budu usaglašeni sa NATO procedurama koje su predviđene za Snage za brzo reago-vanje (NRF). Proces obuke sastoji se od četiri nivoa: individualna obuka, obu-ka jedinice, obuka jezgra BG (pešadijskog bataljona) i obuka paketa BGZB. Interoperabilnost i operativna efikasnost postižu se združenim kombinovanim uvežbavanjem. Sertifikacija borbene grupe u nadležnosti je država učesnica, ali se odvija u skladu sa procedurama koje su dogovorene na nivou EU. Vojni komitet Evropske unije je organ koji vrši praćenje procesa evaluacije i sertifi-kacije borbene grupe. Kontakt-država dužna je da, najkasnije mesec dana pre stavljanja u pripravnost, sertifikuje to da paket BGZB odgovara dogovorenim kriterijumima BG. Druge države članice EU mogu, takođe, biti pozvane da posmatraju proces sertifikacije BGZB, što bi bilo izuzetno poželjno s obzirom na to da će BGZB uglavnom ili u potpunosti činiti države koje još uvek nisu članice EU. Ova faza bila bi okončana najpre stavljanjem BGZB u pripravnost (standby) za vreme predsedavanja Finske u prvom polugodištu 2020. godine, a zatim i na rednu listu tokom prve naredne Konferencije za koordinaciju. Time bi države zapadnog Balkana, prilikom ulaska u EU, pokazale ne samo to da mogu individualno da budu one koje obezbeđuju bezbednost, već i mnogo više od toga. Stvaranje BGZB bio bi najbolji dokaz toga da su one prevazišle sukobe iz prošlosti i da su u stanju da integrišu svoje odbrambene kapacitete kako bi zajednički doprinele evropskoj bezbednosti.


NATO nakon Lisabona: zapadni Balkan u Savezu do 2020. godine

Dr Mladen Nakić76

Novi strateški koncept NATO-a, donesen na samitu u Lisabonu krajem 2010., ima za cilj odgovoriti na novi spektar izazova i prijetnji koje će prevladavati u narednih deset godina. Savez je formalno završio svoju post-hladnoratovsku tranziciju i više nije samo klasična obrambena organizacija kako se navodilo u ranijim strateškim dokumentima. Iako članak 5. ostaje glavni stup savezništva, globalni sigurnosni angažman od članica Saveza traži promišljanje „veće slike“ svijeta nego li je to samo euroatlantski prostor država članica. Posebnu važnost u promijenjenim međunarodnim odnosima sve više imaju razna partnerstva kroz koja NATO može legitimno djelovati na sigurnost i stabilnost međunarodnog po-retka. Bez obzira na snagu i moć svojih članica, Savez neće moći igrati samostal-nu ulogu na međunarodnoj političkoj ploči i zato su partnerstva s EU, UN-om, OESS-om, ali i s Rusijom te ostalim regionalnim organizacijama i državama od ključnog značaja. Područje jugoistočne Europe bi u narednih desetak godina tre-balo biti sigurnosno definirano, što znači da bi sve države regije mogle i formalno biti integrirane u euroatlantski politički i sigurnosni prostor.

76 Autor je doktor znanosti iz područja međunarodnih odnosa i nacionalne sigurnosti i izvršni direktor Centra za međunarodne studije iz Zagreba


Savez je kroz šezdeset i jednu godinu postojanja prošao različite faze razvo-ja međunarodnih odnosa – od hladnog rata do pokušaja stvaranja globalnog partnerstva. Posebno je bilo izazovno razdoblje koje je obilježila poljska Soli-darnost i rušenje Berlinskog zida 1989. godine, kao početak pada komunizma u istočnoj Europi, što je prethodilo raspadu SSSR-a i Varšavskog pakta, a što je Putin nazvao „najvećom geopolitičkom katastrofom stoljeća“.

Upravo je nestanak ideološkog i vojnog suparnika s političke scene po-četkom ‘90-tih godina prošlog stoljeća poslužio kritičarima Saveza za jačanje negativnog stava koji je dovodio u pitanje daljnje postojanje Saveza i svrsis-hodnost njegove buduće misije.77 Iako danas Savez u svom članstvu okuplja i većinu najrazvijenijih i najbogatijih demokratskih država svijeta, kontinuirano se suočava s novim izazovima, kako onim u međunarodnim odnosima tako i s vlastitim promišljanjima kako na njih adekvatno odgovoriti.

Rat na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije – početak redefiniranja nove misije NATO-a

Gotovo cijelo jedno desetljeće (1990-1999) trajale su rasprave unutar i izvan Saveza o njegovoj budućnosti. Do 1995. godine kritičari Saveza su dovodili u pitanje samu svrhu daljnjeg opstanka NATO-a, a od sredine 1990-tih rasprava se više odnosila na buduću misiju Saveza. Ratna tragedija na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, etnička čišćenja i genocid pokazala su kako Europa pedeset godina od završetka 2. svjetskog rata nije bila spremna i/ili voljna sama preventivno spriječiti rat na vlastitom teritoriju.

Vojna intervencija Saveza u BiH 1995. označila je početak nove misije NATO-a. Bilo je jasno da rat na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije ne predstavlja direktnu sigurno-snu prijetnju bilo kojoj članici Saveza. Postalo je očigledno kako samo obrambena

77 Teorija ravnoteže snaga polazi od činjenice da savezi prestaju jačati kada njihova svrha postaje zadovoljena. Waltz kao realist smatra da NATO ide polako svome kraju iako to nije pita-nje dana, ali za nekoliko godina bi se to pitanje moglo aktualizirati. Kao razloge navodi činjenicu da je Europa prihvatila američku hegemoniju te time preventivno spriječila povratak ravnoteže snaga. Isto tako, realisti su smatrali da unipolarnost ne može biti dugovječna, jer dominantna država preuzima sve više obaveza i odgovornosti te s vremenom i slabi. S tom tvrdnjom se treba složiti budući da unipolaran poredak dugoročno ne može biti stabilan zato što se ostale države osjećaju nesigurnima. John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled, Cornell University Press, 2002., str. 11,12.


zadaća Saveza nije dovoljna u promijenjenim odnosima koji su uspostavljeni u međunarodnoj zajednici. Bacevich prepoznaje činjenicu da je Clinton pretvorio NATO od defanzivne organizacije u nešto što ponajprije mora politički i vojno dje-lovati prema vani.78 Kolektivna obrana ostala je brand Saveza, međutim definicija kolektivne obrane podrazumijevala je više pasivni instrument kolektivne zaštite, a ne konkretno sredstvo za jačanje kolektivne sigurnosti na europskom kontinentu, ali i šire. Zapravo se radilo o ugrožavanju osnovnih transatlantskih vrijednosti dr-žava članica i njihovih zajedničkih demokratskih tradicija. Zajedničke vrijednosti iz kojih su definirani i načelni zajednički interesi u osnovi su jedina preostala nit koja povezuje države članice Saveza nakon onih ideoloških i vojnih koji su ne-stali s padom komunizma, raspadom SSSR-a i Varšavskog pakta. Kao i u slučaju NATO-ove intervencije u BiH, tako se i u intervenciji na Kosovu 1999. godine primarno radilo o zaštiti demokratskih vrijednosti (individualnih i kolektivnih), a manje o sigurnosnoj ugrozi samih članica Saveza. Zapravo, tu počinje konkretna post-hladnoratovska transformacija Saveza u pravcu zaštite zajedničkih vrijedno-sti, najprije u Europi, a kasnije i izvan transatlantskog prostora.

Washington - Lisabon - Washington

Jedna od smjernica Washingtonskog strateškog koncepta iz 1999. godine bila je jačanje raspoloživih kapaciteta Saveza za nove misije kao odgovora na nove prijetnje zajedničkim interesima i vrijednostima. Pri tome su se u vidu imali regionalni sukobi poput BiH i Kosova. Transnacionalna prijetnja teroriz-mom samo je spomenuta u kontekstu prijetnji oružjem za masovno uništenje. Međutim, terorističkim napadom na Sjedinjene Države 11. septembra 2001., međunarodni terorizam postaje ključno polazište u svim kasnijim smjernica-ma i djelovanjima Saveza, ali i predmet određenih neslaganja u fazi zajednič-kog donošenja odluka. Napad terorista pomoću otetih putničkih zrakoplova na vojne i civilne ciljeve u SAD, otvorio je rasprave oko sustava kolektivne obrane unutar Saveza i njegovog mehanizma brzog odgovora. Opravdano je po prvi puta u povijesti Saveza aktiviran članak 5. Ugovora bez obzira što se nije radilo o klasičnom napadu konvencionalnim snagama na jednu od člani-ca. Međutim, otvorile su se i rasprave o načinu i uvjetima pod kojima se može ili treba pozvati na članak 5. radi kolektivne obrane.

78 Bacevich Andrew, American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Harward University Press, Cambridge, 2002., str.75.


Novi strateški koncept koji je usvojen u Lisabonu reafirmirao je važnost i nepromjenjivost članka 5. kao nositelja kolektivne obrane. Imajući u vidu nekonvencionalne prijetnje ne samo prema državama članicama Saveza već i širem euroatlantskom sigurnosnom okruženju, članak 5. i kolektivna obrana bi se trebali shvaćati u smislu zaštite kolektivne sigurnosti posebno u odnosu na terorističke prijetnje, moguću upotrebu oružja za masovno uništenje, te kemijsko i biološko ratovanje. Korištenje članka 5. izvan terito-rija država članica Saveza u smislu šire (preventivne) kolektivne sigurnosti, posebno treba učiniti proceduralno jasnijim u fazi donošenja odluke i kon-kretnog postupanja kako bi se izbjegla situacija koja je prethodila napadu na Irak 2003. godine.

Pri tome, dva osnovna cilja imaju posebnu važnost – a) sigurnost u Europi i Sjevernoj Americi – što bi trebala biti poveznica sa „starim“ ili tradicionalnim NATO-om pod člankom 5. i b) sigurnost za Europu i Sjevernu Ameriku, ali i za zemlje sa zapadnim vrijednostima koje nisu članice Saveza. To je „novi“ NATO koji promovira zajedničke vrijednosti i pri čemu se posebno naglaša-va važnost članka 4., odnosno potreba za konzultacijama tj. usuglašavanjem stavova unutar Saveza, a nerijetko i s vanjskim partnerima. Za oboje je važna činjenica kako je atlantska ideja temelj suradnje SAD-a i Europe.79

Savez bi narednih godina dodatno trebao pokazati kako je nešto više od klasične obrambene organizacije. Zaštita zapadnih vrijednosti poput slobode, jednakosti, zajedničkog demokratskog nasljeđa, vladavine zakona i sl., pred-stavljati će polazište za izgradnju globalnog partnerstva.

Globalnim partnerstvom u sljedeće desetljeće

EU i NATO stvaraju novo strateško partnerstvo koje neće biti samo u okvi-rima transatlantskog prostora. Ako se riječ partnerstvo shvati u širem smislu osiguranja efikasnog sustava upravljanja krizama onda je glavno pitanje – kako

79 Važnost Atlantske zajednice SAD-a i Europe Brzezinski pokazuje još vidljivijom u nekim pokazateljima. 13% svjetske populacije živi u zemljama NATO-a i/ili Europe, ali oni zajedno čine 63% svjetskog BDP i proizvode 27 trilijuna USD vrijednosti roba u 2005. i 77% ukupne svjetske vojne potrošnje. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance, Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower, Basic Book, New York, 2007., str. 188.


najbolje odgovoriti na te krize? Zato svrha, ali i cilj buduće misije NATO-a nije samo njegova transatlantska povezanost, već prvenstveno volja i riješenost demokratskih zemalja da štite zajedničku sigurnost i demokratsko nasljeđe.

Partnerstvo ima višedimenzionalan karakter i ne bi ga trebalo svesti samo na institucionalnu razinu suradnje koje ostale države imaju sa Savezom. Ako se uzme u obzir pojednostavljeno institucionalno povezivanje može se dobiti pogrešna slika prioriteta, pa čak i važnosti partnerskih veza. Tako bi na prvom mjestu moglo biti partnerstvo sa zemljama kao budućim članicama Saveza u sklopu Partnerstva za mir (PzM) kao priprema za članstvo. U drugi krug par-tnerskih zemalja mogle bi ići zemlje članice PzM koje nemaju aspiracije za članstvom, ali sudjeluju u projektu zbog vlastitih interesa. Zatim, tu je partner-stvo koje Savez želi učvrstiti sa ostalim organizacijama kolektivne sigurnosti poput UN-a i OESS-a. Naposljetku, Savez gradi i sigurnosno partnerstvo sa zemljama izvan transatlantske regije poput Australije, Novog Zelanda, Japana i Južne Koreje ili pak u prostoru Mediterana. Svako od navedenih oblika par-tnerstva ima svoju težinu i teško ih je navesti prema važnosti. Sadašnji oblik partnerstva sa zemljama iz Azije i Oceanije vjerojatno je važniji i konkretniji sa stanovišta borbe protiv terorizma i ostalih sigurnosnih izazova (npr. u Afga-nistanu) od suradnje s aspiranticama za članstvo u okviru PzM (BiH, Crna Gora i Makedonija). Međutim, pojam partnerstva treba promatrati u kontek-stu balansiranja regionalnog pristupa raznim sigurnosnim izazovima. Dok su ti izazovi bili naglašeni u prostoru JIE i Balkanskog poluotoka, važnost je bila na širenju Saveza prema žarištima potencijalnih kriza u Europi (BiH, Kosovo). Trenutno su ti izazovi usredotočeni na prostor Azije (Afganistan, Irak), pa se i partnerski angažman zemalja poput Australije i Novog Zelanda posebno ci-jene.

Neka posebno važna partnerstva koje Savez želi razvijati vezana su za Rusi-ju, ali i odnose s Kinom. Regionalna partnerstva Saveza poput suradnje sa ze-mljama ASEAN-a koji neki vole nazivati „Azijskim NATO-om“, daju dodatnu važnost odnosima na relaciji NATO-Rusija-Kina.

Stvaranje sigurnosne zajednice kako ju je nazvao Karl Deutsch prije šezde-setak godina, nije utopijski cilj, ali vremenski završetak te misije nije lako pred-vidljiv. Stvaranje globalnog partnerstva koje će naglasiti i novi NATO-ov stra-teški koncept samo je jedna važna dionica na tom putu. Stoga i pravni okvir za


upotrebu snaga izvan teritorija članica („out of area operations“) te NATO-ov globalni angažman mora biti kompatibilan s nastavkom izgradnje funkcional-nog odnosa Saveza s UN-om, OESS-om i drugim organizacijama kolektivne sigurnosti čije se aktivnosti temelje na međunarodnom pravu. U narednih de-set godina, Savez bi u suradnji s ostalim međunarodnim ključnim subjektima trebao dati jasan odgovor na sve češće pitanje – treba li NATO postati globalni sigurnosni savez? Takvu ambiciju nije izrazila niti jedna članica Saveza imajući u vidu realnosti međunarodnih odnosa. Isto bi se moglo odnositi i na rješenje da se za globalne izazove i probleme prakticira stvaranje različitih oblika ad hoc „koalicija dobre volje“. Rješenje je u svakom slučaju poželjno tražiti u ko-ordiniranju aktivnosti Saveza s UN-om i ostalim relevantnim organizacijama kolektivne sigurnosti na temeljima međunarodnog prava. Pri tome se članak 51. Povelje UN-a ne bi trebao koristiti kao opravdanje za preventivne napade.

Zapadni Balkan u Savezu do 2020

Prema Artu, NATO je uspio u nakani da postane respektabilna sigurno-sna organizacija s ciljem angažmana u regionalnim misijama nametanja mira i stabilnosti.80 Prostor bivše Jugoslavije poslužio je kao poligon za redefiniranje buduće misije Saveza sredinom ‘90-tih godina prošlog stoljeća. To je prostor gdje je ujedno prvi puta iskušana legitimnost savezničkog angažmana izvan teritorija država članica. Ujedno to je bio prostor gdje je NATO prvi puta vojno djelovao od svog osnivanja, jer tijekom hladnog rata nikada nije došlo do upo-trebe vojnih sredstava u borbenim djelovanjima suprotstavljenih strana uslijed postignute strateške ravnoteže dva bloka.

Iako je situacija u regiji stabilna i nema prijetnje od otvorenih sukoba, du-goročna regionalna sigurnost tek treba biti definirana. Ključan i ohrabrujući čimbenik na tom putu predstavljaju euroatlantski integracijski procesi.

Odličan primjer je suradnja Hrvatske, Albanije i Makedonije u okviru Američko-Jadranske povelje kojima su se pridružile BiH i Crna Gora, dok je

80 Angažman u BiH pokazuje transformaciju NATO-a koji uz svoju političku dimenziju, u prvi plan stavlja sigurnosnu, a tek tada obrambenu što pokazuje i bit njegove promijenjene misije. Anton Grizold, A Reconceptualization of NATO’s Transformation: the Next Round, Šipan Yearbook 2006, Politička kultura, 2006., str. 40.


Srbija u statusu neformalnog promatrača. BiH je jedan od ključeva regional-ne sigurnosti i najsloženije pitanje na koje tek treba dati odgovor. Kao zemlja koja želi postati članica NATO-a, BiH se suočava s vrlo ozbiljnim problemima. Unatoč uvjetovano dobivenom Akcijskom planu za članstvo (MAP), BiH nije uspjela regulirati pitanje vlasništva državnom imovinom, odnosno 69 vojnih nekretnina nije upisano u vlasništvo središnje vlasti, jer je proces blokiran od strane Republike Srpske čime je na godinu dana zamrznut početak Akcijskog plana za članstvo.

Makedonija je zadovoljila sve kriterije za članstvo u Savezu prije sastanka na vrhu u Bukureštu 2008. godine, ali nije pozvana u članstvo na sastanku na vrhu u Strasbourgu-Kehlu uslijed problema s imenom koje osporava Grčka. Grčki veto na makedonsko članstvo u Savezu nema jasnu perspektivu rješava-nja čime to postaje važno makedonsko unutarnje političko pitanje.

Crna Gora je dobila MAP krajem 2009. godine, ali se suočava s problemom nedovoljne potpore javnosti unatoč provođenja komunikacijske strategije. Dodatan problem je podijeljenost relevantnih političkih stranaka oko defini-ranja strateškog nacionalnog interesa odnosno ne postoji politički konsenzus po tom pitanju. Sa statusom kandidata za članstvo u EU, Crna Gora otvara jasne perspektive nastavka euroatlantskih integracija.

Srbija je u Skupštini proglasila „vojnu neutralnost“, članica je Partnerstva za mir i nedavno je otvorila ured u sjedištu NATO-a. Iako nitko od političara (osim Liberalno demokratske partije) ne govori glasno o budućem članstvu Srbije u NATO-u, tema se sve više nameće u društvu. Trenutno oko 25% gra-đana podupiru članstvo Srbije u Savezu, a veliki dio javnosti je još uvijek opte-rećen negativnim emocijama prema NATO-u. S obzirom na iskustva iz 1999. godine to je odličan rezultat. Treba podsjetiti da je tek nešto malo veća potpora bila u Hrvatskoj na početku sustavnog informiranja građana o prednostima hrvatskog članstva u NATO-u. Tako da uz primjerenu komunikacijsku strate-giju realno se može očekivati da građani Srbije počnu svoju budućnost proma-traju kroz vlastite interese - sigurnosne, gospodarske političke, a manje kroz emocije.


Što zemlje regije mogu očekivati nakon Lisabona?

Iako politika „otvorenih vrata“ nije visoko pozicionirana na dnevnom redu Saveza i u nacrtu novog strateškog koncepta, ona se uvijek naglašava kao kon-tinuitet. Članak 10. Ugovora ostaje aktualan u omogućavanju daljnjeg širenja Saveza. S druge strane, nameće se objektivno pitanje granica širenja Saveza. Iako je to posebno osjetljivo pitanje za prostor Azije, odnosno bivšeg SSSR-a, regija jugoistočne Europe ima svoje osjetljive geostrateške elemente u odno-su na širenje Saveza. Unatoč ruskom negativnom stavu prema crnogorskom približavanju članstvu u NATO-u i pokušaja zadržavanja neutralnog statusa Srbije, stvari u regiji polako, ali sigurno kreću u pravcu integriranja cijelog prostora u transatlantski sigurnosni sustav. Cijela regija bi mogla do 2020. go-dine biti sigurnosno definirana kroz članstva regionalnih zemalja u NATO-u i većine u EU. U tom kontekstu, širenje NATO-a u regiji znači nastavak politič-ko-sigurnosnog projekta stabilizacije Europe.

Modernizacija NATO-a i regije

NATO će ostati glavni jamac euroatlantske sigurnosti. Novo desetljeće neće biti pošteđeno već poznatih prijetnji poput terorističkih napada, kori-štenja subverzivnih sredstava za masovna uništenja, nuklearne proliferacije i sl. NATO ne bi trebao imati ambiciju postati svjetski sudac i izvršitelj vlastitih presuda. Međutim, različiti su aspekti sigurnosnih prijetnji koje ugrožavaju države članice Saveza i njene stanovnike. Pozornost bi se trebala usmjeriti s kolektivne sigurnosti pod kojom se primarno misli na sigurnost institucija, na individualnu sigurnost samih građana odnosno stanovništva.

U tim nastojanjima ostaje i nadalje veliki prostor za preventivno djelova-nje koje je nerijetko nedovoljno zastupljeno u sagledavanju svih uzroka nave-denih prijetnji. Intervencija bi uvijek trebala ostati (zadnje) sredstvo ukoliko preventivne mjere ne poluče željeni rezultat. Preventivna mjera može biti i proturaketna obrana ako se shvaća u kontekstu daljnjeg smanjenja nuklearnih kapaciteta.

Važan će biti i kontinuitet načela konsenzusa u donošenju odluka kao jam-stva manje utjecajnih članica da se čuje i njihov glas.


Nastavak razvijanja partnerskih veza s Rusijom i poželjno otpočinjanje in-stitucionalnih odnosa s Kinom predstavljaju izazov za NATO, ali i za navedene zemlje. Problem u rješavanju situacije u Afganistanu predstavlja zajedničko polazište za jačanje partnerskog angažmana s obzirom da tu sve strane ima-ju naglašene gospodarske i sigurnosne interese. Širenje članstva Saveza biti će aktualno i u narednih deset godina. Vjerojatnije je da će ono biti realnije na ju-goistoku Europe (Crna Gora, Makedonija, Kosovo, BiH i Srbija) nego li ispred „dvorišta“ Rusije (Ukrajina, Gruzija).

Ranije politike velikih sila nisu bile najsretnije za narode naše regije. Bush I nije želio uvući Sjedinjene Države u rat vezan za raspad bivše Ju-goslavije. Isto se dogodilo i kasnije u svezi BiH i Kosova želeći to prepu-stiti Europi, iako je znao da ona to nije spremna niti sposobna. Clinton, s druge strane, ipak Balkan prepoznaje ne samo kao vrlo važan regionalni interes za SAD, već i za sigurnost šire regije (Makedonija, Grčka, Turska, Albanija).81

Nakon dvadeset godina obilježenih ratovima i tragedijama, prostor Bal-kanskog poluotoka je na dobrom putu institucionalnog „vraćanja“ u Europu. Jugoistočna Europa u narednih pet do deset godina mora dobiti jasnu sliku političke i sigurnosne europske pripadnosti. To podrazumijeva rješavanje ne-koliko otvorenih regionalnih izazova. BiH mora osigurati vlastitu funkcional-nost na ravnopravnim osnovama, kako građana tako i konstitutivnih naroda. U suprotnom, države NATO-a očekuje ozbiljan posao.

Makedonija i Grčka moraju konačno riješiti problem oko imena, jer je svi-ma u interesu nastavak odnosno završetak makedonskih euro-integracijskih procesa.

Priština kroz predstojeće razgovore s Beogradom treba završiti proces me-đunarodnog priznanja vlastite nezavisnosti i krenuti u ozbiljne reformske iza-zove koji tek predstoje.

81 Nuechterlein s pravom postavlja osjetljivo pitanje upotrebe američke vojne moći pa na-vodi i slučaj BiH gdje ne bi trebao biti vitalan američki interes. Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Recommitted, The University Press of Kentucky, 2001., str. 239. Međutim, slučaj s BiH jest bilo, uz ono humanitarno, i pitanje funkcioniranja svjetskog poretka kao i stabilnosti Europe što predstavlja deklarirani američki vitalan interes. To se može odnositi i na slučaj Kosova.


Srbija napokon mora izručiti Mladića i Hadžića, regulirati odnose s Koso-vom i nastaviti s reformama ako želi dobiti status kandidata za članstvo u EU do kraja 2011. godine.

Zaključak

Savezu je trebala nova strategija za novo vrijeme. To svakako ne bi trebao biti samo komad papira već održiva strategija za narednih deset godina djelo-vanja Saveza kao važnog međunarodnog čimbenika. Koncept bi trebao kom-binirati ranije odrednice o kolektivnoj obrani kao glavnoj svrsi Saveza, ali i naglasiti sve potrebne elemente za učinkovito i legitimno djelovanje u opera-cijama izvan teritorija država članica. Članak 4. bi trebao dobiti jaču važnost, jer su konzultacije direktno povezane sa postizanjem nužnog konsenzusa kao načela odlučivanja unutar Saveza.

Svijet se drastično promijenio od kraja hladnog rata, te se s tom činjenicom mijenjao i NATO, ali je njegova osnovna misija ostala nepromijenjena – od održavanja mira i stabilnosti do odgovora na nove sigurnosne prijetnje poput informatičkog kriminala, energetske sigurnosti i piratstva.

Države članice Saveza su svjesne da NATO ima ograničene kapacitete. Važ-no je postaviti prioritete, definirati glavne izazove i realno procijeniti raspolo-žive resurse. Pri tome je partnerstvo s ostalim međunarodnim subjektima od ključnog interesa kako za promicanje multilateralne suradnje tako i za kvali-tetno podizanje razine međunarodne sigurnosti.


Dosadašnja iskustva Crne Gore na putu ka evroatlantskim integracijama

Sanda Vučić82

U ovom tekstu posebna pažnja je posvećena dosadašnjim iskustvima Crne Gore na njenom putu ka evroatlantskim integracijama, dok je posebno akcen-tovan razvoj podrške javnog mnjenja za članstvo Crne gore u NATO-u u peri-odu od sticanja njene nezavisnosti do danas. U drugom dijelu teksta se navode preporuke za dalju i efikasniju implementaciju komunikacione strategije u cilju kvalitetnijeg informisanja javnosti o ovom Savezu, kao i argumenti koji se naj-češće navode za i protiv punopravnog članstva Crne Gore u NATO-u. Poruka teksta jeste da je u svijetu savremenih izazova, rizika i prijetnji neophodno ra-zumjeti da nijedna država nije u mogućnosti da sama upravlja bezbjednosnim izazovima 21. vijeka; stoga je potrebno ojačati kapacitete za zajednički rad, kako na regionalnom tako i na globalnom nivou i biti dio jednog sistema bezbjednosti koji može djelovati povratno u interesu svih.

82 Autorka je portparol Evro-atlantskog kluba Crne Gore


Obnovom svoje državnosti 2006. godine, Crna Gora se jasno opredijelila da krene putem evroatlantskih integracija koje predstavljaju jednu od prioritetnih aktivnosti Vlade Crne Gore. U skladu sa tim, Crna Gora je preuzela niz oba-veza usmjerenih ka reformi cjelokupnog sistema bezbjednosti. Četiri godine nakon referenduma nije teško zaključiti da je Crna Gora ostala vjerna svom cilju ulaska u NATO i EU, o čemu svjedoči izuzetna saradnja sa svim zapadnim državama, kao i reforme sprovedene u sistemu bezbjednosti, koje nekadaš-nji socijalistički sistem transformišu u sistem koji će biti komplementaran sa NATO standardima koji se primjenjuju u svim državama članicama Alijanse, kao i državama koje pretenduju da to postanu. Jedino takva Crna Gora, kao dio sigurne i bezbjedne Alijanse, može biti garant bezbjednosti budućim gene-racijama u zemlji i faktor stabilnosti u regionu.

Crna Gora je na svom putu ka punopravnom članstvu u NATO ispunila većinu kriterijuma. Međutim, statistički podaci pokazuju da je stepen in-formisanosti građana Crne Gore o tome šta evroatlantske integracije pred-stavljaju i šta je NATO, izuzetno nizak. Prema istraživanjima koja je sproveo CEDEM u julu 2010. godine, 32% stanovništva se izjasnilo da bi na refe-rendumu o članstvu Crne Gore zaokružilo DA; 40.1% protiv, dok je 28% njih bilo neopredjeljeno. Razloga je svakako više, ali dva najbitnija su velika neinformisanost građana o današnjoj ulozi i značaju NATO saveza, kao i bombardovanje SR Jugoslavije 1999. godine, u čijem sastavu je tada bila i Crna Gora.

S ciljem informisanja građana o procesu evroatlantskih integracija, Vlada Crne Gore je oformila Komunikacioni tim koji radi na implementaciji Ko-munikacione strategije o evroatlantskim integracijama. Međutim, dosadašnja implementacija Komunikacione strategije nije se odvijala u željenom pravcu. Prekretnica u njenoj implementaciji je bila konferencija: „Dijalog o NATO-u - Zajednički napori na podizanju javne svijesti u Crnoj Gori“, koju je organizo-vao Evro-atlantski klub Crne Gore, a u kojoj su učestvovali predstavnici kako vladajućih, tako i opozicionih partija.

Zaključci do kojih se došlo zajedničkim radom na konferenciji su sljedeći:• Vlada ne smije imati monopol nad procesom evroatlantskih integracija;• Uključivanje političara, tj. Parlamentaraca, mora biti na mnogo većem

nivou nego što je trenutno slučaj. Potrebno je uključiti sve partije u taj proces i predstaviti ga kao državni, a ne kao projekat Vlade ili određe-nog pojedinca;


• Cilj Komunikacione strategije mora biti edukacija građana, odnosno direktna komunikacija sa građanima jer komunikacija je dijalog a ne propaganda;

• Ciljne grupe se moraju jasno definisati i u njih treba uključiti i medije kao izuzetno bitnog partnera u ovom procesu;

• Cilj mora biti jasno definisan! Potrebno je stvoriti tim eksperata koji će biti na raspolaganju medijima i građanima;

• Poruke moraju da budu jasne, precizne i razumljive običnim građani-ma;

• Kako bi te poruke bile efikasno prenesene običnim građanima, potreb-no je koristiti sva raspoloživa sredstva. Jedna od preporuka je da mno-go šira i intenzivnija upotreba Interneta, a ne samo zvaničnih site-ova Vlade i Komunikacionog tima;

• Poruke koje su jasne i na koje treba staviti akcenat su sljedeće: osigu-rana bezbjednost, zaštita teritorijalnog integriteta (očuvanje državnih granica), ekonomska perspektiva (veći stepen povjerenja u državu, i samim time u investicije stranih ulagača), pripadnost eliti i druš-tvu najmoćnijih demokratskih država svijeta, jednako pravo glasa, i profesionalizacija vojske, što znači da će ratovati samo profesionalno obučeni vojnici;

• Vlada treba da nastavi sa aktivnim promovisanjem ovih ideja, ali je po-trebno da u taj proces uvede osobe i institucije sa kredibilitetom van političke sfere (npr. ekonomiste, analitičare, akademike, stručnjake iz raznih oblasti, javne ličnosti - sportiste, glumce, pjevače, kao i obične građane).

• Takođe, veoma je bitno shvatiti da samo postojanje akcionog plana za implementaciju Komunikacione strategije nije dovoljno. Ono što je mnogo važnije jeste kako će se taj akcioni plan implementirati, te ko će vršiti njegovu implementaciju.

Pored nedovoljnog stepena informisanosti građana i bombardovanja 1999. godine, jedan od argumenata koji se često navodi jeste percepcija NATO-a kao prvenstveno vojne alijanse. Takođe se koristi i argument da bi Crna Gora, kao članica NATO-a, slala svoje vojnike u Irak i Afganistan zarad ciljeva Amerike, Velike Britanije ili neke druge velike sile, a ne zbog sopstvenih interesa. Zatim, finansijski aspekt, pri čemu se navodi da je članstvo u NATO-u mnogo skuplje nego što se to građanima predstavlja, itd.


Međutim, NATO je prvenstveno političko-vojni savez i kao najrazvijeniji sistem kolektivne bezbjednosti čini nezamjenljiv oslonac svojim članicama. Princip donošenja odluka konsenzusom se primjenjuje u okviru čitavog save-za, što znači da su sve zemlje članice uključene u postupak donošenja odluka. Primjer za to je Makedonija, koja je ispunila sve kriterijume predviđene za pu-nopravno članstvo u ovoj Alijansi, ali čije pristupanje istoj blokira Grčka. Tek kada ove dvije države riješe spor oko imena Makedonije na bilateralnoj osnovi, Makedonija će biti primljena u članstvo. Iz ovog primjera je jasno da glas samo jedne zemlje može da utiče na donošenje ili nedonošenje odluka u Alijansi.

U skladu sa tim, članstvo u NATO-u bi Crnoj Gori omogućilo da ravno-pravno sa svim članicama Alijanse donosi odluke koje su od važnosti za ko-lektivnu bezbjednost. Članstvo u Alijansi, ne samo Crne Gore, već i ostalih zemalja u regionu je od prioritetnog značaja za stabilnost regiona. Posmatrano sa ekonomskog aspekta, ulaskom u NATO Crna Gora bi „otvorila vrata“ stra-nim ulagačima, i što je najbitnije, smanjila bi troškove koje bi imala ukoliko ostane izvan Saveza.

Nepostojanje jasnih neprijatelja u vojnom smislu kao i novi vidovi prijetnji su motivisali Crnu Goru da svoju odbranu organizuje kroz saradnje sa partne-rima koji dijele iste vrijednosti. Stoga, Vojska Crne Gore učestvuje u mirovnim misijama u Avganistanu, Liberiji i Somaliji, što potvrđuje da je Crna Gora za vrlo kratak period uspjela da profesionalizuje i osposobi svoju vojsku u skladu sa NATO standardima. To, ujedno, predstavlja i korak bliže članstvu u Alijansi. U ovom trenutku se u mađarskoj bazi ‘Panonija’ u mjestu Pol-e Khomri u Av-ganistanu nalazi drugi vojni kontingent Vojske Crne Gore, dok su pripadnici trećeg kontingenta upućeni na obuku u Mađarsku.

U sigurnosnom okruženju koje je podložno neprestanim promjenama, i NATO neprestano razmatra svoje prioritete, zadatke i strukturu. S tim ciljem je razvijen i novi Strateški koncept koji Alijansi omogućava da se odupre bu-dućim bezbjednosnim izazovima. Ovakav NATO odgovara Crnoj Gori, koja svojim skromnim političkim, a prije svega vojnim kapacitetima, mora da pro-nađe odgovarajući način da zadovolji svoj bezbjednosni aspekt i zahtjeve. Pri-stupanje NATO-u predstavlja garant spoljne bezbjednosti i dobru osnovu za jačanje diplomatskog uticaja zemlje kroz članstvo u „klubu odabranih“. Ako tome dodamo i način donošenja odluka u Savezu, onda je sve jasno. To nada-lje podrazumjeva i kompatibilnost sa procesom evropeizacije, modernizacije i demokratizacije Crne Gore, u kojoj tranzicija traje predugo bez obzira na to što su putevi pristupanja EU i NATO-u različiti i po dužini, i po suštini. Crna


Gora, vođena sopstvenim državnim interesom, omogućava sebi da jednim po-tezom izvede višestruki efekat, odnosno da izvuče višestranu korist.

Neophodno je razumjeti da nijedna država u svijetu nije u mogućnosti da sama upravlja bezbjednosnim izazovima 21. vijeka, te je stoga potrebno ojačati kapacitete za zajednički rad, kako na regionalnom tako i na globalnom nivou. Članstvo u NATO-u bi Crnoj Gori omogućilo pravo glasa u svim forumima odlučivanja Alijanse, te bi unaprijedilo i sposobnost Crne Gore da doprinese nacionalnoj i regionalnoj bezbjednosti. Imajući u vidu težinu izbora u raspo-djeli budžeta, logično je da nacije mogu imati koristi tako što će teret odbrane podijeliti sa ostalim pouzdanim partnerima. NATO obezbjeđuje uspostavljeni mehanizam za zajedničko koordinisanje partnerskih zemalja razvijanjem svo-jih snaga i specijalizovanih kapaciteta za optimalno korišćenje resursa.

Obzirom da je značaj evroatlantskih integracija prepoznala i većina opozi-cionih političkih partija Crne Gore (tačnije, sve izuzev jedne), kao i na to da je Rusija promijenila stav prema članstvu Crne Gore u NATO-u, nama ostaje da se u narednom periodu posvetimo kvalitetnom i preciznom informisanju građana o tome šta je NATO, šta NATO nudi i šta bi Crna Gora dobila, a šta izgubila, punopravnim članstvom u Alijansi, kako bi - kada dođe vrijeme za to - na referendumu ili u Skupštini donijeli ispravnu odluku o tome da li će Crna Gora biti članica Alijanse.

Potrebno je shvatiti da je ulazak u NATO dugotrajan proces u kome se ništa ne dešava preko noći. Takođe je potrebno shvatiti da sam NATO ne želi Crnu Goru, niti bilo koju drugu državu, koja u potpunosti ne ispunjava uslove za članstvo i u kojoj ne postoji većinska volja građana za ispunjavanje obaveza prema Alijansi. Neophodno je nastaviti sa reformama i završiti započeti posao - ne zbog samog NATO-a, niti zbog bilo koga, već prvenstveno zbog nas samih i budućnosti naše zemlje.

Kada je riječ o Srbiji i njenom putu ka evroatlantskim integracijama, stav Evro-atlantskog kluba je da neutralnost Srbije, u ovom trenutku, nije rješenje. Naime, Srbija je isuviše bitna, i mogu slobodno reći „lokomotiva“ cijele regije, tako da cjelokupna priča o evroatlantskim integracijama neće imati smisla uko-liko Srbija ostane izvan Alijanse. Balkanske države, u sastavu NATO-a, predstav-ljaju garant stabilnosti i bezbjednosti u cijelom regionu.

Stoga je u interesu Srbije da započne proces pristupanja NATO-u, jer sve pri-jetnje koju su identifikovane u novom Strateškom konceptu ne zaobilaze ni Srbi-ju. Sagledavajući sve pozitivne i negativne aspekte članstva, potrebno je istaći kao najbitniji očuvanje suvereniteta Srbije i njenog teritorijalnog integriteta.


Zapadni Balkan posle Samita NATO-a u Lisabonu 2010 i usvajanja novog Strateškog koncepta

Prof. dr Nano Ružin83

Novi strateški koncept, usvojen na lisabonskom samitu u jesen 2010. godine, označio je novu epohu u bezbednosnom domenu Evrope i sveta jer je to prvi strateški koncept koji se suočio sa novim izazovima današnjice i identifikovao nove bezbednosne pretnje svetu. Koje su karakteristike NSK? Šta ovaj dokument znači za NATO, za Evropu, za partnere kao što su Rusija, Ukrajina ili Gruzija? Novi Strateški koncept se ne bavi isključivo sa državama zapadnog Balkana, ali određeni elementi ovog dokumenta, kao što su unapređenje partnerskih odnosa, princip ‘otvorenih vrata’, zajednički odbrambeni štit ili ostale savremene bezbed-nosne pretnje koje predstavljaju realnu opasnost za sve države kontinenta, imaju izvesne implikacije i po bezbednosni status država zapadnog Balkana. U tom kontekstu se postavlja pitanje budućeg statusa država iz regiona. Grčka, Mađar-ska, Slovenija, Rumunija, Bugarska, Hrvatska i Albanija su već postale članice Alijanse, Makedonija od 1999. ima kandidatski MAP status, Crna Gora je dobi-la taj status na poslednjem Samitu, BiH mora da ispuni dodatne uslove kako bi dobila MAP status, dok je Srbija jedina zemlja u regionu koja nema pro-atlanske ambicije.

83 Autor je Dekan na Fakuletu političkih nauka, Univerziteta FON u Skoplju, kao i bivši Ambasador Republike Makedonije u NATO-u u periodu od 2001.-2008. godine


Pretnje, rizici i izazovi 21. veka

Pretnje, rizici i izazovi sa kojima se Alijansa suočava danas precizno su de-finisani i veoma se razlikuju u odnosu na njihov sadržaj iz vremena hladnoga rata. Više se ne smatra da bi teritorije i populacije država članica Alijanse mogle da budu cilj klasičnih, konvencionalnih vojnih pretnji širih razmera. Nasuprot tome, pretnje koje sada ugrožavaju globalnu bezbednost su daleko brojnije i, između ostalih, uključuju i političku nestabilnost, etničke i verske rivalitete, rat za pristup prirodnim resursima i bogatstvima, proliferaciju oruž-ja za masovno uništenje, bankrot-države, genocid, velike migracione talase, organizovani kriminal, sajber-napade i terorizam.

Svi ti izazovi globalnoj bezbednosti iziskuju nalaženje odgovora od strane Alijanse putem novih vidova operacija s ciljem zaustavljanja sve većeg broja pretnji. Upravo stoga su saveznici rešeni da nastave sa transformacijom svojih odbrambenih strategija. Dosadašnja iskustva i naučene lekcije pokazuju da su za uspešno vođenje sadašnjih i budućih operacija neophodne elastične i inte-roperativne snage koje su dobro pripremljene, savremeno obučene i upotre-bljive na većim geografskim distancama.

U funkciji ovih ciljeva koje pronalazimo u dokumentu Comprehensive Poli-tical Guidance, na novembarskom samitu Alijanse u Lisabonu je usvojen novi strateški koncept (New Strategic Concept), kojim će se NATO rukovoditi u suočavanju sa bezbednosnim rizicima u sledećoj deceniji. U okviru ovog do-kumenta, NATO-krati su se fokusirali na četiri teme: odnos između NATO-a i EU, nove mirovne misije, odnos između Rusije i NATO-a, i NATO i globalna partnerstva. Međutim, ono što je tokom poslednjih nekoliko godina prouzro-kovalo najveću debatu je pitanje antiraketnog štita.

Antiraketni sistem, čija je osnovna svrha zaštita građana i teritorija zemalja članica Alijanse, zauzima značajno mesto u novom strateškom konceptu Ali-janse. Po rečima Generalnog sekretara NATO-a, Andersa Fogh Rasmussena, antiraketni sistem je jedan “od centralnih elemenata naše odbrane”. 84

Sličan optimizam i zadovoljstvo ostvarenim konsenzusom u Lisabonu je izrazio i američki Predsednik Barak Obama. “SAD i naši saveznici u NATO-u danas su postigli suštinski progres. Srećan sam što mogu da objavim da smo se

84 Konferencija za štampu održana 21. novembra 2010. godine


po prvi put dogovorili da razvijemo jedan antiraketni sistem koji je dovoljno moćan da pokrije evropsku teritoriju NATO-a i SAD”.

Epiteti poput istorijski i senzacionalan samit, nisu dobijeni samo zahvaljuju-ći konsenzusu o raketnom sistemu, već i zbog učešća Rusije na najvišem nivou. Uostalom kao i na prethodnim samitima. a kao što je akcentirano na jubilar-nom Samitu u Strazburu/Kilu 2009. godine, Alijansa se izjasnila “za jačanje dijaloga sa Moskvom u okviru Saveta NATO-Rusija”, osnovanog 2002. godine na sastanku Alijanse u Rimu, kada je usvojena Deklaracija iz Rima. Na Samitu u Lisabonu 2010. godine, bilo je primetno značajno otopljavanje odnosa iz-među Rusije i NATO-a. Za takav pozitivan razvoj odnosa veliku zaslugu ima Predsednik Obama koji je odstupio od realizacije projekta antiraketnog štita u Evropi, tačnije u Poljskoj, i izgradnje velikog radara u Češkoj Republici. U istom kontekstu je i pitanje proširenja Alijanse u pravcu Gruzije i Ukrajine, od-nosno dobijanje statusa za članstvo (Membership Action Plan - MAP), što nije bilo na dnevnom redu Samita u Lisabonu. Ujedno je i dogovor START između Rusije i SAD-a u vezi smanjivanja bojevih nuklearnih glava ušao u završnu fazu, dok istovremeno Rusija i NATO dele i neke zajedničke brige kao što su rat protiv terorizma i borba protiv proliferacije nuklearnog oružja (Iran).

Novi strateški koncept evocira deo pomenutih elementa. Prema ovom do-kumentu, NATO će “zatražiti od Rusije i ostalih partnera da sarađuju u reali-zaciji antiraketnog sistema.” Ujedno, Barak Obama je dobio značajnu podršku od strane evropskih saveznika u pogledu brze ratifikacije rusko-američkog do-govora o nuklearnom razoružanju START koji je potpisan u aprilu 2010. godi-ne, ali koji je tek u decembru 2010. odobren od strane republikanskih senatora.

Novi START jača Alijansu i celokupnu evropsku bezbednost, ističu NATO-krati. Stoga ne iznenađuje izraženo žaljenje Generalnog sekretara Rasmussena “zbog odlaganja ratifikacije dogovora START od strane Kongresa”. Inače, novi START predviđa smanjenje bojevih glava za 30% od strane dveju super-sila.

Celokupna arhitektura novog strateškog koncepta počiva na ambicijama da se stvori jedan sigurniji i predvidljiviji svet. To je, uostalom, treća osovina isto-rijski značajnog lisabonskog Samita NATO-a. Novi strateški koncept bi morao da doprinese “globalizaciji odbrambenih kapaciteta Alijanse”. S ciljem realiza-cije opisanih ambicija u vremenu velikih ekonomskih i finansijskih promena,


kao imperativ za pojačanom saradnjom se nameće bolje korišćenje izvora ne-zavisno od reduciranih budžeta članica NATO-a.

Avganistanizacija

Drugi radni dan Samita prošao je u znaku afirmacije nove strategije za izlaz Alijanse iz Avganistana, čiji je vodeći lajt-motiv transfer bezbednosti u korist vojno-policijskih snaga Avganistana do 2014. godine. Predviđeno je da se ovaj proces odvija u nekoliko faza, te je u skladu sa time predviđeno da 37, od ukupno 238 regiona, pređu pod kontrolu avganistanskih snaga do kraja 2010. godine. Pravci delovanja Alijanse su jasni, i kako je istakao generalni sekretar Rasmussen, podrazumevaju “napredak i priprema avganistanizacije Avgani-stana, prema principu korak po korak - region po region”. U tom kontekstu će biti sprovedeno i postepeno povlačenje snaga ISAF-a85. Francuska i Kanada su odlučile da povuku svoje snage iz mirnijih u manje stabilne regione, dok je britanski premijer David Cameron najavio da će svi britanski vojnici iz Avga-nistana biti povučeni do 2015. godine. Istovremeno su i Holandija, kao i veći-na ostalih država partnera, među kojima je i Republika Makedonija, najavile povlačenje. Alijansa je tom prilikom najavila najmanje 35% od svojih efektiva i postojećih struktura u skladu sa Deklaracijom iz Lisabona. S druge strane, planirano je da vojska Avganistana dostigne broj od 300.000 ljudi. Konačno, dobra vest je što će i Rusija da uzme učešće u rešavanju avganstanske krize korišćenjem velikih transportnih helikoptera.

Novi strateški koncept Alijanse

Od usvajanja poslednjeg strateškog koncepta u aprilu 1999. godine, u vreme žestoke vazdušne kampanje NATO-a protiv Srbije, došlo je do značajne prome-ne brojnih parametara i subjekata: osnove transatlantske bezbednosne strukture su evoluirale, povećan je broj članica NATO-a, gotovo sve američke snage su po-vučene iz Evrope i preusmerene ka srednjem Istoku i Aziji, dok je uporedo sa tim procesima afirmisana i Evropska bezbednosna i odbrambena politika (European Security and Defence Policy - ESDP). EU se nametnula kao novi strateški akter, dok se na Samitu u Bukureštu 2008. godine i Francuska vratila u integrisanu voj-

85 ISAF – International Security Assistance Force


nu komandu i celovito pristupila Alijansi. Nakon terorističkih napada na New York 11. septembra 2001. godine, Alijansa je aktivirala član 5 Vašingtonskog sporazuma i angažovala se u antiterorističkom ratu u Avganistanu. Istovremeno je otpočela sveobuhvatnu transformaciju i reforme sopstvenih vojnih struktura, stvaranjem Savezničke komande za transformaciju i Sila za reakciju NATO-a, dok je partnerstvo u NATO-u doživelo novi uspon i nove kvalitete.

Tokom Samita u Strazburu/Kilu86, upućen je poziv za izradu novog stra-teškog koncepta. Donošenje ovog dokumenta je realizovano u tri faze: reflek-tivna, konsultativna i završna, dok je na čelu ekspertskog tima bila Madeleine Albright, državna sekretarka iz perioda Klintonove vlade.

Novi strateški koncept potvrđuje angažovanje članica Alijanse u suočavanju sa novim izovima i pretnjama, u upravljanju krizama i stabilizovanju post-konfliktnih situacija, a u bliskoj saradnji sa Ujedinjenim nacijama i EU. Novi strateški koncept je usmeren ka jednom svetu bez nuklearnog oružja, uz isti-canje generalnog sekretara NATO-a Rassmussena da “sve dok postoju nukle-arno oružje u svetu, NATO će ostati nuklearna Alijansa”.

Među 6 osnovnih programskih ciljeva Alijanse koji su izneseni u uvodnom delu dokumenta, politika “otvorenih vrata” ostaje važeća za sve evropske demokratije koje su zainteresovane za članstvo u NATO-u. U delu koji se odnosi na najznačaj-nije zadatke i ciljeve Alijanse, novi strateški koncept ističe oko tridesetak tačaka, u čijoj realizaciji bi učestvovao NATO. Osnovni cilj NATO-a ostaje očuvanje slobode i bezbednosti njenih članica putem upotrebe političkih i vojnih sredstava.

U četvrtoj tački novog strateškog koncepta, Alijansa se fokusira na tri fun-damentalna zadatka u očuvanju bezbednosti svog stanovništva i teritorija:

a) kolektivna odbrana, što znači da bi u slučaju agresije na bilo koju od svojih članica, Alijansa aktivirala član 5 Vašingtonskog dogovora i interve-nisala u odbrani svoje članice;

b) upravljanje krizom znači da je Alijansa jedina sila koja raspolaže moć-nim političkim i vojnim sposobnostima pomoću kojih bi mogla da utiče na tok i smirivanje krize - pre, tokom i nakon konflikta;

86 Samit je održan 03. aprila 2009


c) kooperativna bezbednost, što znači da će se Alijansa aktivno angažovati u jačanju međunarodne bezbednosti, prihvaćajući i nudeći kooperativno partnerstvo sa određenim zemljama i međunarodnim organizacijama, u kontroli naoružanja, neproliferacije i razoružavanja.

Alijansa i dalje ostaje jedinstveni forum za transatlanske konsultacije za sva pitanja koje se odnose na bezbednost. U odnosu na bezbednosnu oko-linu, izdvojeno je devet značajnih tačaka među kojima su naročito značaj-ne sledeće: iako je opasnost od konvencionalnih napada na države članice otklonjena, klasično oružje se ne sme zanemarivati; proliferacija nuklear-nog oružja, kao i drugih oružja za masovno uništenje, predstavljaju ozbilj-nu pretnju za stabilnost i prosperitet u svetu; terorizam predstavlja direktnu pretnju za bezbednost građana NATO-a i šire; opasnost raste ukoliko tero-rističke ćelije uspeju da se snabdeju nuklearnim oružjem; svaki konflikt koji je u granicama ili van granica teritorije NATO-a predstavlja pretnju miru i stabilnosti za Alijansu; u porastu su i sajber-napadi, opasnosti za transnaci-onalne transportnu infrastrukturu, komunikacije, kao i vitalne energetske arterije koje moraju da budu zaštićene i obezbeđene kako bi se izbegle eko-nomske i ekološke katastrofe većeg obima; razne tehnološke inovacije kao što su lasersko oružje, elektronski rat i tehnologije koje onemogućavaju pri-stup određenom prostoru mogu da predstavljaju ozbiljnu pretnju za global-ni mir. Istovremeno, klimatske promene, sanitarni rizici, nedostatak vode, ugrožavaju bezbednost i okolinu.

U domenu odbrane - u slučaju agresije - Alijansa će zaštititi teritorije i po-pulaciju svojih država članica aktiviranjem člana 5 Vašingtonskog ugovora, što nikako ne znači da Alijansa smatra bilo koju državu za neprijatelja. Vrhovnu garanciju bezbednosti saveznika pružaju strateške nuklearne sile Alijanse, a to su: SAD, Velika Britanija i Francuska, koje u najvećoj meri doprinose globalnoj anti-nuklearnoj odbrani NATO-a. S tim ciljem novi strateški koncept ističe da će “Alijansa zadržati nuklearne i konvencionalne snage koje i dalje moraju da budu mobilne, robusne i reaktivne, kako bi uspešno odgovorile imperativima člana 5. Ujedno novi strateški koncept ističe da je mir nedeljiv i da Alijansa tra-ži aktivnu saradnju sa Rusijom i ostalim partnerima.” Alijansa će istovremeno nastaviti da se suočava i sa ostalim vidovima pretnji, kao što su proliferacija hemijsko-biološkog oružja, sajber-napadi, međunarodni terorizam, itd.


U odnosu na upravljanje krizom, novi strateški koncept ističe da svi konflik-ti van granica NATO-a mogu da predstavljaju direktnu pretnju za teritoriju i stanovništvo članica Alijanse. Iskustva sa Balkana i iz Avganistana su pokazala da je globalni pristup sačinjen od političkih, civilnih i vojnih elemenata neop-hodan za uspešno upravljanje krizom. Svakako, najefikasniji način upravljanja krizom je “njeno izbegavanje”, i upravo stoga Alijansa sprovodi stalne analize i procene međunarodnih događaja, te moguće načine upravljanja istima. Čak i u slučajevima kada dođe do smirivanja situacije, međunarodna zajednica je primorana da nastavi sa svojom podrškom u uspostavljanju mira u post-kon-fliktnom periodu.

Pitanja kontrole naoružanja, razoružavanje i neproliferacije nuklearnog oružja ostaju suštinski ciljevi Alijanse. I pored velikog uspeha u smanjenju broja bojevih glava u Evropi, neophodno je nastaviti sa stvaranjem uslova za dalju redukciju naoružanja. U ovom kontekstu je veoma značajna uloga Rusi-je, koja bi trebala da demonstrira veću transparentnost u vezi sa nuklearnim oružjem sa kratkim dometom kojim raspolaže. Inače, saradnja Rusije i NATO-a je od strateškog značaja jer doprinosi stvaranju zajedničkog prostora mira, stabilnosti i sigurnosti (tačka 33, str.9, NSC).

Program Partnerstvo za mir doprinosi jačanju međunarodne bezbednosti, odbrani vrednosti i operacijama Alijanse, dok istovremeno služi i kao svojevr-sna priprema država-aspiranata za njihovo članstvo u NATO-u. Evroatlantski partnerski Savet i program Partnerstvo za mir se nalaze u centru koncepcije jedne slobodne, celovite i Evrope mira. Zato se novi strateški koncept zalaže za razvoj prijateljskih odnosa i saradnju sa državama Mediterana u cilju što većeg intenziteta Mediteranskog dijaloga. Novi strateški koncept nastoji da unapredi proces konsultacija i vojnu saradnju sa Ukrajinom i Gruzijom, uzimajući u obzir i evroatlanske aspiracije ove dve države. Ujedno, novi strateški koncept nastoji da olakša proces evroatlanskih integracija zemalja zapadnog Balkana i da obezbedi trajni mir, garantuje demokratske vrednosti, te omogući regional-nu saradnju i dobrosusedske odnose.

NATO je jedini primer u istoriji koji predstavlja jednu Alijansu koja se zala-že za veću efikasnost i sposobnost, dok njena sposobnost zavisi od finansijskih, vojnih i ljudskih resursa u vršenju svojih misija. Samo takva Alijansa će biti u stanju da se suoči sa bezbednosnim pretnjama 21. veka.


Zapadni Balkan posle lisabonskog samita Alijanse – novembar 2010. godine

Kakvo je značenje novog strateškog koncepta za Balkan? Iako se dokument na bavi posebno balkanskim regionom, ipak sadrži reference na lekcije nau-čene na Balkanu i u Avganistanu, dok se u tački 35 sugeriše olakšanje proce-sa evroatlanskih integracija zapadnog Balkana s ciljem obezbeđivanja mira i razvoja tog regiona. Uz ovu sugestiju, značajno je da novi strateški koncept potvrđuje nastavak politike “otvorenih vrata” za prijem novih članica Evrope, u skladu sa članom 10. Vašingtonskog ugovora.

Geopolitički prostor Balkana u širem značenju obuhvata države bivše jugo-slovenske Federacije, Mađarsku, Rumuniju, Bugarsku, Grčku, Tursku i Alba-niju. U nešto užem značenju, geopolitički prostor Balkana obuhvata sve države bivše SFRJ, bez Slovenije, uz Albaniju.

Što se tiče velike balkanske grupe, Grčka i Turska su već dugogodišnje članice Alijanse, Mađarska je zajedno sa Poljskom i Češkom Republikom (Višegradska grupa) pristupila Alijansi u prvom krugu proširenja (1997-1999); Slovenija, Ru-munija i Bugarska su dobile poziv za članstvo posle terorističkih napada protiv SAD-a na samitu u Pragu 2002. godine (tzv. big-bang) u okviru neformalne gru-pe “Vilnus”, dok su Albanija i Hrvatska dobile pozive za članstvo na samitu u Bu-kureštu u okviru Jadranske grupe, što nije bio slučaj i sa trećim članom ove grupe, Republikom Makedonijom.87 Ostale države zapadnog Balkana, osim Srbije, su pokazale želju za članstvom u Alijansi. Crna Gora je dobila kandidatski status (MAP), BiH očekuje isti status, čije je dobijanje zaustavljeno usled nerešenih imo-vinsko-pravnih odnosa nekretnina i vojne imovine do rešenja ovog problema. Srbija se izjasnila za neutralnu poziciju, dok se Kosovo jos uvek suočava sa pro-cesom međunarodnog priznavanja, naročito od strane onih članica NATO-a koje još uvek nisu priznale njegovu nezavisnost. (Španija, Slovačka, Rumunija i Grčka)

Republika Makedonija između evroatlanskih aspiracija i skepticizma

Najduže se u ‘čekaonici’ Alijanse zadržala Republika Makedonija, koja je svoj partnerski status dobila 1995. godine - čitavih 6 godina pre Hrvatske. To-

87 Za detaljniju analizu, Nano Ružin: “NATO vo sovremenite megjunarodni odno-si”, Skopje, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010


kom 1999. godine, Makedonija je dobila kandidatski status (MAP), a danas je u procesu pripreme svog jedanaestog Godišnjeg akcionog plana za članstvo.

Republika Makedonija je na putu ka evroatlanskim integracijama bila najpo-slušniji učenik od svih država članica zapadnog Balkana: intenzivirala je proces reformi; usvojila je Ohridski okvirni dogovor i time promenila svoj Ustav; progla-sila je opštu amnestiju za borce UCK iz 2001. godine; sprovela je snažnu decen-tralizaciju, dvojezičnost i univerzitetsko obrazovanje na albanskom jeziku, što je rezultovalo stvaranjem multietničkog društva koje je primer modela demokratije za balkanske narode, ali i koje je teško prihvatljivo za balkanski mentalitet.

Međutim, posle veta Grčke na napredovanje Republike Makedonije ka pu-nopravnom članstvu u Alijansi tokom samita u Bukureštu 2008. godine, što je zvanično obrazloženo “lošim (dobro)susedskim odnosima”, a nezvanično zbog spora oko imena države, Makedonija nije dobila poziv za otpočinjanje razgovora o pristupanju. Ovaj konsenzualni stav Alijanse je među političkim elitama Republike Makedonije izazvao veliko razočarenje, NATO-skepticizam i prezasićenost temom članstva u NATO-u. To je, takođe, uticalo i na uspo-ravanje reformi i smanjenje ambicija ka realizaciji evroatlanskih integracija; došlo je do smanjenja vojnog budžeta sa prethodnih 2.3–2.6% na 1.38% BNP; izigravanja demokratskih procesa; partizaciju administracije, povećanu kon-trolu nad medijima; ugrožavanja političkog dijaloga; intenziviranja populizma i još snažnijeg zaokreta ka antici u potrazi za nekim drugim i značajnijim iden-titetom; monumentalizacije istorijskih ličnosti i opadanja pro-evroatlanskog raspoloženja.

Na primer, prema poslednjim istraživanjima javnog mnjenja konstatovano je da je i pored opadanja podrške javnosti, trenutna podrška ipak dovoljna za ispunjavanje uslova za dobijanje poziva za članstvo. Međutim, kada se postavi pitanje izbora između imena ili članstva u NATO-u i EU, gotovo 70% građana su za zadržavanje imena po ceni da se ne postane članicom NATO-a i EU. S obzirom da sinergija između kandidature za članstvo u NATO-u i EU zavisi od konsenzusa ovih institucija koje podržavaju grčku poziciju blokiranja Ma-kedonije ka članstvu u obe organizacije, problem sa imenom je postao glavna kočnica procesu integracija Republike Makedonije u EU i NATO. Imajući u vidu da je u ovom trenutku raspoloženje obeju strana jasno određeno i ne-promenjivo (Republika Makedonija insistira na dvojnoj formuli – odnosno, da Grčka može da koristi bilo koji naziv za Republiku Makedoniju, a ostale


države prema afinitetu, dok Grčka insistira na geografskoj odrednici, odnosno Severna, Gornja ili Vardarska Makedonija, uz izmenu naziva i ostalih elementa kao što su jezik, pismo, pasoši, itd). Sve prognoze u vezi brzog rešavanja ovog semantičkog problema su veoma skeptične, čime se šanse Republike Make-donije za dobijanje članstva u EU i NATO-u svode na apsolutni minimum. Ceo ovaj bagaž bi mogao da dovede Republiku Makedoniju do nove političke i među-etničke krize, te verovatno otrežnjavanja svih onih koji trenutno koče put Republike Makedonije prema EU i NATO-u.

Republika Srbija, vojna neutralnost ili nešto treće ?

Strateška opredeljenja Republike Srbije su sasvim različita u odnosu na NATO. Posle pada Miloševićevog režima i vazdušne intervencije NATO-a 1999. godine, pitanje odnosa Srbije prema Alijansi postepeno je počelo da se aktuelizuje. Kako je jačao proces demokratizacije, tako je i debata o NATO-u u Srbiji postajala sve aktuelnija. Sa aspekta spoljnih gledišta, na osnovu vođenih debata i zvaničnih pozicija vlasti moguće je konstatovati tri nivoa razmišljanja o odnosu Srbije prema Alijansi, a to su: a) pozicija odbijanja b) pozicija neu-tralnosti i c) pro-atlanska pozicija.

a) Pozicija odbijanja mogućeg članstva u NATO-u se zasniva na najma-nje tri razloga: prvi razlog proizilazi iz vremena vladavine Miloševića kada je Alijansa 1995. godine bombardovala srpske pozicije u BiH, što je imalo dalekosežne posledice na tok i ishod rata u Krajini i u Bosni, a potom i veli-ka vazdušna kampanja iz 1999. godine (Milosrdni anđeo ili Merciful Angel), čime je po prvi put u svojoj istoriji Alijansa prekršila pravilo o neintervenciji van zone NATO-a. Posle ovih intervencija, Srbija je pretrpela velike ljudske, finansijske, ekonomske i ostale gubitke, a ujedno je izgubila i teritoriju - po-krajinu Kosovo i Metohiju. Razumljivo je da svaka pomisao o potencijalnom članstvu u NATO-u nije prihvatljiva za šire srpsko javno mnjenje, niti za veći deo političke elite.

Drugi razlog odbijanja je ‘proces Kosovo’ i post-kosovski period oko kojeg se sukobljavaju dve suprotstavljene koncepcije. Jednu koncepciju, koja je rezul-tirala proglašenjem nezavisnosti Republike Kosovo, je zastupala međunarodna zajednica podržana od strane NATO-a . Kao glavni argument je iskorišteno to što Albanci predstavljaju ogromnu većinu u odnosu na srpsku manjinu, a za-


tim neizvesnost, te finansijska i ostala zavisnost Kosova koja je pretila eskalaci-jom i širenjem krize po principu spojenih sudova u celom regionu. Druga kon-cepcija koju zastupa Srbija je ona prema kojoj je Kosovo sastavni deo srpske teritorije i srpskog suvereniteta čije otcepljenje je suprotno međunarodnom pravu, i čiju nezavisnost neće priznati niti jedna srpska vlada. Tokom ‘procesa Kosovo’ i u vreme post-kriznog perioda, ostale članice Alijanse, izuzev četiri države, su priznale nezavisnost Kosova. Razumljivo je da je Alijansa koja je oduzela teritoriju jednoj državi ipso facto nepoželjna za partnera.

Treći razlog odbijanja je povezan sa bilateralnim odnosima Srbije sa Rusi-jom. Iako Rusija nije bila u stanju da spreči vazdušnu intervenciju protiv Srbije, te je povukla svoje mirovne snage sa Kosova, ipak je ostala je značajan saveznik Srbije i nije priznala nezavisnost Kosova. Rusija se suprotstavlja širenju NA-TO-a ka njenim granicama, čak i kada se radi o Srbiji koja je geografski udalje-nija od Rumunije, Poljske i Baltičkih zemalja. Ruska diplomatija je u najmanje dva navrata dala do znanja Beogradu da se suprostavlja eventualnom članstvu Srbije u NATO-u. Najpre je ruski Ambasador u Beogradu, Aleksandar Konu-zin, izjavio “ukoliko Srbija reši da uđe u NATO, Rusija će i formalno priznati nezavisnost Kosova, jer ta vojna organizacija ne smatra Kosovo za sastavni deo teritorije Srbije.” U isto vreme, i Ambasador Rusije u NATO-u, Dmitri Rogo-zin, je u istom stilu dopunio svog kolegu iz Beograda rečima “ne mogu Rusi biti veći Srbi od Srba.”

b) Pozicija vojne neutralnosti kao spoljno-politička opcija Srbije je rezul-tat tri prethodno izložena razloga anti-NATO raspoloženja Srbije. Narodna Skupštine Srbije je 26. decembra 2007. godine usvoijila Rezoluciju o zaštiti suvereniteta i teritorijalnog integriteta i ustavnog poretka Srbije, kojom se Sr-bija proglasila za vojno neutralnu državu. Šta takva strategija znači za Srbiju? Prema mišljenju Generala Zdravka Ponoša, “vojno neutralne države nemaju saveznike i zato takva neutralnost može da košta jer suočena sa vojnim pret-njama, neutralna država treba sama da se suprotstavi”. Drugi autori se pozi-vaju na zaključke Haške konferencije iz 1907. godine i ističu značaj principa aktivne neutralnosti. U ovom kontekstu neki autori smatraju da Srbija može da unapredi svoje aktivnosti u okviru programa Partnerstvo za mir (PzM), kao što to čine Austrija, Švajcarska, Finska, Švedska i Irska, ali koji ne vodi neizo-stavno ka članstvu u Alijansi ili aktivnom vođenju rata protiv terorizma i bez primene sile. Srbija bi ujedno mogla da se promoviše i kao faktor neutralnosti


na Balkanu, čime bi delovanje Srbije kao neutralne države bilo ograničeno na krizni menadžment, post-konfliktnu rekonstrukciju, humanitarne i ne-vojne intervencije.

Međutim, neki autori poput Milana Pajevića smatraju da je ideja o ne-utralnosti Srbije “zastarela opcija, jer stvarna i puna neutralnost ne postoji u današnjem svetu i to definitivno nije realno i održivo rešenje za Srbiju na duže staze.”

c) Pro-atlansku poziciju za članstvo u NATO zastupa nekoliko savremenih analitičara, dok su među političkim strankama najjasniji zagovarači pro-atlan-ske strategije s ciljem punopravnog članstva u NATO-u Liberalno-demokrat-ska partija (LDP), G17+ i Srpski pokret obnove (SPO), nezavisno od činjenice što dve trećine javnosti Srbije ne podržavaju pro-atlansku opciju.

U zvaničnom osvrtu LDP-a, ističe se pet razloga zbog kojih je potrebno da Republika Srbija postane članicom Alijanse: politički, bezbednosni, ekonomski, razlozi vezani za politički imidž i značaj Republike Srbije, i neodrživost koncep-ta vojne neutralnosti. U odnosu na bezbednosne aspekte, ističe se činjenica da bi pristupanjem kolektivnoj bezbednosti sistema Alijanse, Srbija osigurala svoju bezbednost i odbranu i dobila najmoćnije države za saveznike. Uostalom, Repu-blika Srbija nije u stanju da sama garantuje sopstvenu bezbednost; što se politič-kih razloga tiče, LDP smatra da se samim činom prihvaćanja kandidatskog statu-sa, država obavezuje na veću transparentnost, demokratiju i stabilnost institucija.

Sredinom juna 2010. godine, predstavnici G17+ i SPO su se zauzeli za uki-danje odluke o uspostavljanju vojne neutralnosti Republike Srbije i za prihva-ćanje pro-atlanske pozicije s ciljem članstva u NATO-u. Sa svoje strane, srpska diplomatija je i pored unapređenja bilateralnih odnosa sa NATO-om koje se odvija na nivou ambasada, jasno dala do znanja preko Ministra spoljnih poslo-va, g-dina Vuka Jeremića, da “Beograd nema nameru da preuzme bilo kakve korake koji vode ka vezivanju sa NATO-om ili bilo kojim drugim vojnim sa-vezom .... politika vojne neutralnosti Srbije neće se menjati.” U prilog ove teze ide i konstatacija da “članstvo u NATO-u nije uslov za članstvo u EU”, iako je u dosadašnjih tri kruga proširenja Alijanse posle 1989. godine to bio uobičajeni put ka članstvu u EU.


Atlantske perspektive ostalih država zapadnog Balakana su heterogene i kreću se između onih država za koje je samo pitanje vremena kada će da ispu-ne obaveze iz Akcionog plana za članstvo kako bi na sledećem samitu Alijanse dobile poziv za početak pristupnih prgovora (Crna Gora); zatim države koje u očekivanju Akcionog plana za članstvo moraju da razreše određene unutrašnje probleme (Bosna i Hercegovina); odnosno, da dobiju međunarodno priznanje od strane svih članica Alijanse kako bi dobile partnerski status (Kosovo).

Vizije i prepreke

Nema nimalo sumnje da je spoljno-politička orijentacija država zapadnog Balkana pro-evropska i - sa izuzetkom Republike Srbije - pro-atlantska. Izme-đu političkih ambicija i želje političkih elita s jedne strane, te realnosti i raspo-loženja javnosti balkanskih naroda s druge strane, nameće se više prepreka i poteškoća koje blokiraju ili usporavaju put ka članstvu u EU i NATO-u. U tom kontekstu, napravićemo malu komparativnu analizu između Srbije i Makedo-nije u pogledu članstva u NATO-u.

Obe države su proizašle iz bivše jugoslovenske Federacije koja je kao lider nesvrstane politike (1960-1980) bila veliki protivnik blokovske politike i član-stva u vojno-političkim paktovima (Varšavski ugovor i NATO pakt) u periodu hladnoga rata. Stoga su se političke elite koje su početkom 1990-ih došle na vlast u Srbiji i Makedoniji u odsustvu kredibilne spoljno-političke orijentacije okrenule ka Titovoj strategiji. U Republici Makedoniji, Predsednik Gligorov je u prvoj polovini 1990-ih afirmisao strategiju ekvidistance, koja predstavlja vrstu neutralne politike, dok se Milošević zbog vazdušne intervencije NATO-a u BiH 1995. godine zadržao na nesvrstanoj spoljnoj politici.

Republika Makedonija se kasnija pridružila opštem trendu pro-atlanske orijentacije ostalih post-komunističkih država pristupanjem programu Par-tnerstvo za mir (1995) i približavanjem kandidatskom statusu prihvaćanjem izrade Akcionog plana za članstvo 1999. godine.

Sa druge strane, vazdušna kampanja protiv Srbije i ‘proces Kosovo’ su utica-li na anti-natovsko raspoloženje stanovništva Srbije (oko 70% se suprotstavlja članstvu u NATO-u). Nasuprot tome, uloga NATO-a u upravljanju kriznim si-tuacijama u Republici Makedoniji 2001. godine, kao i želja za većim stepenom bezbednosti putem članstva u Alijansi, povećali su evroatlantsko raspoloženje


građana Makedonije na 85-90%. Međutim, nasuprot aspiracijama i ambicija-ma, diplomatski neuspeh u Bukureštu 2008. godine je smanjio popularnost Alijanse. I pored značajnog pro-atlanskog raspoloženja koji iznosi oko 70%, kada bi građani morali da biraju između članstva u NATO-u (ili EU) i pro-mene imena, 20% se nije izjasnilo, dok je gotovo 70% ispitanih građana za za-državanje imena i neulazak u NATO i EU. S druge strane, ovaj procenat je još veći među etničkim Makedoncima, dok nasuprot njima više od 95% etničkih Albanaca daje prednost daje članstvu u NATO-u umesto imenu.

Po pitanju statusa u Alijansi, obe države imaju svoje misije na nivou amba-sadora, odnosno Šefova misija; obe poseduju članstvo u programu Partnerstvo za mir, dok je Republika Makedonija dobila i Akcioni plan za članstvo. Repu-blika Srbija, kao i Republika Makedonija, su pristupile društvenim reformama (tržišna privreda, višepartijski sistem, liberalna demokratija), kao i reforma-ma svojih vojski (veća transparentnost u usvajanju i trošenju vojnog budžeta, civilna kontrola vojske, profesionalizacija vojske). Srbija je praktično krenula istim putem kao i Republika Makedonija u reformama i reduciranju vojske, koja se u prošlosti odlikovala sovjetskim organizacionim modelom. Reforme vojske su vršene u sinergiji sa stručnjacima NATO-a, u čemu je veliku ulogu odigrao program Partnerstvo za mir.

Ako bismo pokušali da rezimiramo uporedni odnos Srbije i Makedonije, došli bismo do nekih paradoksalnih konstatacija.

Naime, Srbija koja je bila cilj vazdušne kampanje i izgubila deo svoje teritorije usled te kampanje (Kosovo), nije zainteresirana za članstvo u Alijansi nezavisno od toga što je pristupila intenzivnim reformama u sektoru odbrane, i to upravo u saradnji sa NATO-om. Republika Srbija nije zainteresovana za kandidatski sta-tus, nije MAP država, ali ukoliko odluči da dobije MAP status i postane članica NATO-a, uspeće na relativno lakši način u odnosu na Makedoniju. Nasuprot tome, Republika Makedonija koja je već 11 godina (od 1999) aspirant za član-stvo u Alijansi, te koja je posle krize iz 2001. godine usvojila Ohridski okvirni dogovor, promenila svoj Ustav i politički sistem, pristupila decentralizaciji, pro-porcionalnoj zastupljenosti ostalih etničkih zajednica u administraciji, i uspešno ispunila reforme predviđene Akcionim planom za članstvo, pretvorila se od ‘ko-risnika’ bezbednosti u ‘izvoznika’ bezbednosti slanjem 4% svojih oružanih sila u mirovne misije Alijanse. Međutim, čak i uz ogromno pro-atlansko raspoloženje populacije, Republika Makedonija ne može da dobije poziv za članstvo i uđe u NATO-klub ukoliko ne promeni svoje ustavno ime.


Bosna i Hercegovina i NATO – značaj novog Strateškog koncepta iz Lisabona

Doc. Dr Armin Kržalić88

Bosna i Hercegovina je pristupanje Europskoj uniji i NATO-u postavila kao

ciljeve svoje vanjske politike. Reforme u oblasti odbrane koje je Bosna i Herce-govina preduzela u 2004. godini, označene su kao važni koraci na putu ka eu-roatlantskim integracijama. Provedba reforme odbrane je započeta stupanjem na snagu novog Zakona o odbrani BiH i Zakona o službi u Oružanim snagama BiH, ali je prvi značajniji datum bio 1. januar 2006. godine kada su institucije odbrane BiH preuzele entitetska Ministarstva odbrane i vojne komande, te počele primjenjivati novi jedinstveni budžet za odbranu. Sve ove reformske aktivnosti rezultirale su članstvom BiH u Partnerstvu za mir i Akcionom planu za član-stvo (MAP). U pogledu budućnosti i novog strateškog koncepta, najvažnije je da je NATO zadržao politiku ‘otvorenih vrata’, što znači da BiH može postati punopravna članica kada ispuni sve demokratske kriterije. U cilju ispunjavanja uslova ka punom članstvu u Europskoj uniji i NATO-u, neophodno je ostvariti dodatni napor da se deklarativni stavovi političara, iznešeni u njihovim politič-kim deklaracijama, pretoče u konkretna ostvarenja koja će građanima donijeti blagodeti članstva.

88 Autor je doktorirao na Fakultetu za kriminalistiku, kriminologiju i sigurnosne studije, Univerziteta u Sarajevu. Autor je knjige Privatna sigurnost, kao i velikog broja istraživanja na temu sigurnosti i sigurnosnih pojava, posebno onih koje se tiču ljudske sigurnosti. Zaposlen je Centru za sigurnosne studije BiH kao Direktor projekta.


Uvod

Posmatrajući sigurnost Bosne i Hercegovine (dalje u tekstu, BiH), može se reći da je ona nerazdvojno povezana sa sigurnošću i perspektivama neposred-nog okruženja, regije, Europe i međunarodne zajednice u cjelini. Zbog toga se integracija u okviru regionalnih, europskih i euroatlantskih kolektivnih sigur-nosnih struktura za BiH smatra prioritetnim područjem djelovanja. Ono što je pozitivno, a što se u dosadašnjim aktivnostima pokazalo kao dobro, jeste činje-nica da BiH razumije i prihvaća koncept vojne sigurnosti kao kamen temeljac dugoročne vojne strategije.

Definisanjem prioriteta na vanjsko-političkom planu u dokumentu Predsjedništva BiH iz 2003. godine, BiH je pristupanje Evropskoj uniji i NATO-u postavila kao ciljeve svoje vanjske politike. Zastoj koji se u po-sljednje vrijeme uočava na euroatlanskom putu BiH, ostavlja dilemu da li su te odrednice vanjske politike još uvijek validne. Kakav je značaj i utjecaj Novog strateškog koncepta NATO-a, usvojenog 19. i 20. novembra 2010. godine u Lisabonu, na odrednice ovakve politike BiH, vidjet ćemo u na-stavku teksta.

1. Put Bosne i Hercegovine u NATO

Historijske činjenice pokazuju da je članstvo u NATO-u glavna prekretnica za države koje žele članstvo u Europskoj uniji. Tako gotovo sve države u re-gionu žele članstvo u NATO-u i EU. Hrvatska i Albanija su članice NATO-a, Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija i Crna Gora su članice Akcionog plana za članstvo (MAP), te teže ka članstvu i u NATO-u i EU, dok je Srbija u programu Partnerstvo za mir (PzM), i želi članstvo u EU.

Kada je u pitanju put BiH ka NATO-u, odnosno postepena transformacija odbrambenog sektora u BiH, može se reći da je on najvećim dijelom trasiran i izgrađen pod pokroviteljstvom NATO-a i OSCE-a. Taj proces se kretao od razoružavanja, demobilizacije i reintegracije pripadnika vojski unutar BiH, do izgradnje mjera povjerenja i promovisanja demokratskih principa u sektoru sigurnosti. Broj pripadnika do tada zaraćenih strana, koji je tokom rata bio oko


400.000, do sredine 1996. godine je smanjen na blizu 150.000,89 te je smanjen na prihvatljivih 30.000 u toku 2001/2002 godine.

Bitno je napomenuti da su vojne strukture isprva funkcionisale kao tri za-sebne strukture u okviru Hrvatskog vijeća odbrane, Vojske Republike Srpske i Armije BiH, a potom su se Hrvatsko vijeće odbrane i Armija BiH ujedinile u Vojsku Federacije BiH. Entitetska nadležnost nad vojnim strukturama za-držana je sve do značajnijih reformi u ovom sektoru poduzetih tokom 2003. godine.

Postepeni napredak u odnosu na vojna pitanja, koji se odvijao pod pokro-viteljstvom NATO-a i OSCE-a, doveo je i do promjena u političkom dijalogu vezanom za budući odbrambeni sistem BiH. Političke odluke koje su slijedile iskazale su jasno opredjeljenje političkih krugova za pristupanje kolektivnim odbrambenim sistemima.

U julu 2001. godine, Predsjedništvo BiH je donijelo zaključak i uputilo ga generalnom sekretaru NATO-a, kojim se izražava spremnost Bosne i Herce-govine da prihvati obaveze i prava u porodici ravnopravnih euroatlantskih na-roda, te da sudjeluje i aktivno doprinosi kolektivnoj sigurnosti. Predsjedništvo BiH je takođe jasno izrazilo opredjeljenje za uključenje BiH u evropske i euro-atlantske integracije i program Partnerstvo za mir, kao i za provedbu potrebnih reformi odbrambenog sistema i reorganizacije oružanih snaga.90

Neadekvatan postojeći sistem odbrane nije mogao odgovoriti iskazanim političkim ciljevima, pa je postalo jasno da će morati pretrpjeti određene iz-mjene. Na ovu disproporciju političkog određenja i prakse, treba dodati i visi-nu budžeta koju su trošile vojne strukture, a koja nije bila u skladu sa ekonom-skim mogućnostima zemlje.

Uprkos deklarisanim političkim ciljevima političkih partija, nije bilo mogu-će postići faktički dogovor od strane unutrašnjih političkih elita, te je došlo do intervencije visokog predstavnika za BiH. Kao prigoda toj neophodnoj inter-venciji iskorištena je afera ‘Orao’ u oktobru 2002. godine, kada je ustanovljeno da je ova vojna kompanija iz Republike Srpske prodavala naoružanje Iraku,

89 Bonn International Center for Conversion (2003), “Turning Soldiers into a work force, Demobilisation and reintegration in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brief 26 , str.9.

90 Džemal Najetović (2007), “Geopolitički položaj BiH u euroatlantskim integracijama Za-padnog Balkana”, DES, Sarajevo, str.195.


koji je u to vrijeme bio pod sankcijama UN-a, odnosno pod embargom za prodaju naoružanja.

Koristeći ovlaštenja koja su mu data Dejtonskim mirovnim ugovorom, vi-soki predstavnik je ustrajao u zahtjevu da se obezbjedi komanda i kontrola nad vojnim sektorom od strane državnih institucija. U tu svrhu, svojom odlukom je formirao Komisiju za reformu odbrane koja je ponudila preporuke za una-prjeđenje sektora odbrane.

Legitimitet za rad Komisije za reformu odbrane nalazio se u četiri odredbe Ustava BiH, a jedna od njih - odnosno član II stav 5 - predviđa da će država preuzeti odgovornosti neophodne za očuvanje suvereniteta, teritorijalnog in-tegriteta, političke nezavisnosti i međunarodnog subjektiviteta Bosne i Herce-govine i da dodatne institucije mogu biti uspostavljene prema potrebi za vrše-nje ovih nadležnosti.91

Tim ovlaštenjima su stvorene zakonske pretpostavke za donošenje novog

Zakona o odbrani BiH, koji je predložila Komisija, kao i predložene aman-dmane na ustave entiteta, zakone o odbrani i Zakon o Vojsci Republike Srp-ske. Pored ovih prijedloga zakona, Komisija je predložila i novi Zakon o Voj-sci Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine i zakonodavni okvir za novo ministarstvo odbrane na državnom nivou. Ovaj okvir uključuje i amandmane na Zakon o Vijeću ministara BiH i Zakon o ministarstvima i prijedlog Odluke Predsjed-ništva BiH o prijenosu nadležnosti sa Stalnog komiteta za vojna pitanja na novo Ministarstvo odbrane.

Možda najznačajniji prijedlozi Komisije su se odnosili na uspostavu vrhov-ne komande od strane države po pitanjima odbrane. Usvojena je jedinstvena odbrambena struktura BiH, sa izvodljivom podjelom odgovornosti između institucija države i entiteta. Po njoj je Predsjedništvo BiH kolektivno djelovalo u obavljanju komande i kontrole Oružanih snaga BiH u miru, tokom kriznih situacija i u ratu.

Odredbama Zakona formirano je Ministarstvo odbrane na državnom ni-vou. Ministar je postao punopravan član Vijeća ministara BiH sa pravom glasa i imenovan je kao i svi ostali državni ministri. Ministar je djelovao u lancu ko-

91 Ustav BiH


mandovanja za vojne operacije, poznatom kao operativni lanac komandova-nja, te u lancu komandovanja za popunu, obuku i opremanje oružanih snaga, poznatom kao administrativni lanac komandovanja.

Entiteti su i dalje davali značajan doprinos odbrani BiH. Oni su nastavili sa obavljanjem administrativnih funkcija u popuni, obuci i opremanju Vojske Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine i Vojske Republike Srpske. Svaki od entiteta je imao ministarstvo odbrane na čelu sa ministrom, koji su za svoj rad sada bili odgovorni državnom ministru odbrane.

Značajnije nadležnosti date su državnoj parlamentarnoj skupštini a bile su

bazirane na principima demokratske civilne kontrole nad oružanim snagama, transparentnosti u planiranju i izradi budžeta za odbranu, kao i potrebom za fiskalnim ograničenjima za odbranu koja trebaju ustanoviti politički organi na demokratski način. Ključna od predloženih reformi u sferi demokratske kontrole je i uspostava nove Zajedničke komisije za odbranu i sigurnost Parla-mentarne skupštine Bosne i Hercegovine.�

Reforme u oblasti odbrane koje je BiH preduzela u 2004. godini, označene su kao važni koraci na putu ka euroatlanskim integracijama. Političko rukovod-stvo i javnost u BiH su sa pravom očekivali da će za ostvarene značajne rezul-tate međunarodna zajednica odlučiti da za ove napore nagradi BiH pozivom za članstvo u Partnerstvu za mir. Na žalost, očekivanja se nisu ispunila, i na Samitu NATO-a, održanom juna 2004. godine u Istanbulu, pozdravljen je napredak ali su šefovi zemalja i vlada članica Sjeverno-atlanskog vijeća ponovno apelirali na BiH da ostvari dodatni napredak prema uspostavi jedne vojne sile. Naglašeno je da BiH treba da preduzme sistemske reforme koje će joj omogućiti da u pot-punosti sarađuje sa Haškim tribunalom, te da brže počne jačati državni nivo komande i kontrole time što će nadležnost entitetskih ministarstava odbrane i komandi prenijeti na odgovarajuće državne odbrambene institucije.

Sve ovo je utjecalo na potrebu da visoki predstavnik ponovno reaguje, u po-litičkom okruženju koje nije blagonaklono gledalo na daljnje reforme u ovom sistemu. Posebno su glasne kritike dolazile iz Republike Srpske, čije rukovod-stvo nije bilo voljno da prenosi dalje nadležnosti na državni nivo, posebno u uslovima kada se nisu ispunila njihova obećanja da će prethodnim reformama ostvariti članstvo u Partnerstvu za mir.

Ipak, koristeći se podrškom Upravnog odbora Vijeća za implementaciju mira u BiH, visoki predstavnik je u decembru 2004. godine donio odluku o


produženju mandata Komisiji za odbrambenu reformu.92 Preporuke nove, sta-re Komisije za reformu odbrane, bile su bazirane na dvije osnovne promje-ne: stvaranju jedne odbrambene strukture i jedne vojne sile u BiH pod punom funkcionalnom državnom komandom i kontrolom, i reorganizaciji Oružanih snaga BiH kako bi se ispunili kriteriji državnih nastojanja u pogledu vanjske, odbrambene i sigurnosne politike, a posebno kolektivne odbrane i sigurnosti.

Da bi jasnije dočarali sliku ostvarenih reformi pod mandatom Komisije za reformu odbrane tokom 2005. godine, predočićemo neke od najvažnijih rezul-tata do kojih se došlo tokom jednogodišnjeg pregovaranja.

U oblasti komande i kontrole uspostavljen je jedan lanac komandovanja. On polazi od Predsjedništva BiH, koje odlučuje konsenzusom, preko ministra odbrane, načelnika Zajedničkog štaba, komandanta Operativne komande i ko-mandanta Komande za podršku, a preko njih do njima podređenih elemenata. Ministarstvo odbrane, zajedno sa Zajedničkim štabom je nadležno za politike i planove. Operativna komanda, Komanda za podršku i njima podređeni ele-menti su nadležni za provođenje planova i politika koje donose Ministarstvo odbrane i Zajednički štab, u skladu sa zakonima i propisima. Parlamentarna skupština BiH zadržava svoju nadležnost za parlamentarni nadzor nad institu-cijama odbrane u skladu sa Zakonom o odbrani iz 2003. godine.�

Izmjene u regrutnom i rezervnom sastavu odnose se na to da su nove Oru-žane snage BiH sastavljene isključivo od profesionalnih lica. Regrutni sastav je ukinut sa 1. januarom 2006. godine, kao i obaveza regruta u slučaju mobiliza-cije (40 godina u RS i 60 godina u Federaciji). Evidencije o regrutnom sastavu i druga dokumentacija o vojnoj službi, koje su se nalazile u općinskim uredima entitetskih Ministarstava odbrane, prebačene su na civilne općinske organe vlasti, kako bi svi dokazi o obuci i zvanična dokumentacija koju bi mogli po-traživati građani bili na raspolaganju. Pasivna rezerva od 60.000 pripadnika (40.000 u Federaciji i 20.000 u RS), ukinuta je također 1. januara 2006. godine, a nova aktivna rezerva će se formirati u narednih nekoliko godina i njena veli-čina će biti 50% od brojnosti aktivnog sastava.

Uspostavljen je sistem pukova Oružanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine (OSBiH), kao jedne vojne sile kompatibilne sa NATO-om. Postoje tri pješadij-ska puka, od kojih je svaki odgovoran za očuvanje i njegovanje vojnog nasli-

92 Pogledati http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=33874


jeđa i identiteta jedinica od kojih potiču, tj. komponenti ARBiH i HVO bivše Vojske Federacije i bivše VRS. Ostali, manji rodovi OSBiH, poput inženjerije, veze i artiljerije, organizirani su u pojedinačne pukove i u njihovom sastavu su jedinice dodijeljene trima brigadama kao podrška.

Veličina aktivnog sastava OSBiH je smanjena ukidanjem onih pozicija na kojima su radila lica trenutno angažirana na poslovima obuke i upravljanja regrutnim sastavom i pasivnom rezervom. Veličina OSBiH je oko 10.000 pro-fesionalnih lica. OSBiH se sastoje od tri manevarske brigade, jedne brigade za taktičku podršku i jedne avijacijske brigade, a sve su pod kontrolom Opera-tivne komande. Svaka od tri manevarske brigade se sastoji od tri pješadijska bataljona, po jedan iz svakog od tri nova pješadijska puka. Svaka manevarska brigada ima svoje rodove podrške, poput artiljerije, inženjerije, veze, itd.

OSBiH pripadaju BiH i odražavaju sastav BiH kao države tri konstitutivna naroda i ostalih. Tri konstitutivna naroda su jednako zastupljena na svim vi-sokim nivoima na kojima se donose odluke, počevši od Predsjedništva, pa do Operativne komande i Komande za podršku. Ministar odbrane, načelnik Za-jedničkog štaba, komandant Operativne komande i komandant Komande za podršku svaki imaju po dva zamjenika, čije su odgovornosti definirane zako-nom. On i njegovi zamjenici ne mogu biti iz reda istog konstitutivnog naroda. Predsjedništvo BiH je odgovorno za utvrđivanje nivoa nacionalne zastuplje-nosti u OSBiH, uzimajući u obzir ustav, zakone, posljednji popis stanovništva, operativnu gotovost, popunu, moral i koheziju OSBiH.

Funkcije koje su obavljala entitetska ministarstva odbrane i vojne komande

preuzelo je Ministarstvo odbrane BiH, odnosno Zajednički štab BiH, ili su preba-čene na nove odjele za ljudstvo, logistiku i obuku i doktrinu Komande za podrš-ku. Entitetska ministarstva odbrane i vojne komande su ukinuta 1. januara 2006. godine. Od tog datuma, uspostavljen je jedinstveni budžet za odbranu na nivou države. Troškovi za odbranu su smanjeni za 55% u odnosu na 2002. godinu.

Provedba je započeta stupanjem na snagu novog Zakona o odbrani BiH i Zakona o službi u Oružanim snagama BiH,� ali je prvi značajniji datum bio 1. januar 2006. godine kada su institucije odbrane BiH preuzela entitetska mi-nistarstva odbrane i vojne komande, te počele primjenjivati novi jedinstveni budžet za odbranu.


Sve ove aktivnosti, kao i niz drugih koje su bosanskohercegovačke vlasti uradile, doprinijele su da je BiH, zajedno sa Srbijom i Crnom Gorom na Sa-mitu NATO-a u Rigi 29. novembra 2006. godine dobila poziv za članstvo u programu Partnerstvo za mir (PzM), a 14. decembra 2006. godine potpisom na Okvirni dokument u Briselu, BiH je i formalno pristupila ovom programu.�

Uprkos ovim ostvarenjima u odbrambenom sektoru, mišljenja pojedinih

autora je da reforma odbrane nije u potpunosti ispunila očekivanja, posebno u odnosu na OSCE Pravila ponašanja o političko-vojnim aspektima sigurnosti. Tako neki od njih ističu da su donešeni zakoni u stvari kopije starih komuni-stičkih zakona bivše Jugoslavije o odbrani i oružanim snagama, te da su nji-hove odredbe često nekompatibilne sa osnovnim principima ljudskih prava, principima slobode i međunarodnim humanitarnim pravom.�

Ipak, uprkos ovim kritikama BiH je ulaskom u Partnerstvo za mir uspjela da ostvari jedan od svojih vanjsko-političkih ciljeva. Sektor odbrane se može posmatrati kao najnapredniji društveni sektor u kojem je sačinjen prvi insti-tucionalni iskorak, koji se ogleda u formalnom uključivanju BiH u zvanične euroatlantske strukture.

Članstvo BiH u PzM otvorilo je novo poglavlje u reformi odbrane, koje se sada ogleda u povećanoj saradnji sa međunarodnim snagama i ispunjavanju obaveza koje sa sobom nosi članstvo u PzM. Još jedan od dokaza napretka BiH u reformi odbrane, ogleda se u preuzimanju svih nadležnosti od EUFOR-a, odnosno dobijanje nadležnosti Oružanih snaga BiH u pogledu deminiranja, kontrole vojnog kretanja i kretanja naoružanja i opreme, inspekcije vojnih skladišta i sličnih vojnih poslova.

U okviru PzM, BiH je u toku prve godine svog učešća u ovom NATO pro-gramu uspjela realizovati sve zacrtane ciljeve. Tako je tokom 2007. godine sa-činjen Prezentacijski dokument BiH za PzM, potpisan sigurnosni sporazum sa NATO-om, kao i PzM sporazum o statusu stranih vojnih snaga, te dostavljen upitnik o Procesu planiranja i revizije.

Saradnja koja se odnosila na Individualni partnerski program realizovana je u 17 oblasti saradnje sa 42 događaja, dok je u 2008. godini taj broj povećan na 155 događaja u 23 oblasti saradnje. I u 2009. godini je nastavljeno sa sličnim tempom saradnje koji je u određenoj mjeri redefinisan u odnosu na planirano


usljed utjecaja svjetske recesijske krize kojom je bilo pogođeno i Ministarstvo odbrane.

Usljed takvog opredjeljenja unutar sektora odbrane, NATO je dodatno osnažio put BiH ka punopravnom članstvu uspostavom Individualnog akci-onog plana saradnje (IPAP), koji se često naziva partnerstvo prve klase. Kao daljnji poticaj uloženim naporima BiH u sektoru odbrane, na Samitu u Buku-reštu aprila 2008. godine NATO je saradnju sa BiH podigao na viši nivo - nivo Intenziviranog dijaloga.

Naredni korak prije punopravnog članstva u NATO-u se odnosi na pristu-panje Akcionom planu članstva (MAP), koji predstavlja završni korak u re-formskim procesima i zahtjeva od države sveobuhvatne promjene, ne samo u sektoru odbrane već i ostalim društvenim segmentima. Bosna i Hercegovina je podnijela aplikaciju za članstvo u MAP-u krajem 2009. godine, no zvaničnici NATO-a nisu pozitivno odogovorili na istu. Na njihovu odluku vjerovatno je uticalo neispunjavanje obaveza BiH vezanih za realizaciju sporazuma za kori-štenje i upravljanje pokretnom i nepokretnom imovinom, što uz kašnjenje od-luke o načinu rješavanja viška naoružanja i municije, predstavlja uzrok zastoja reformi i osnovni preduslov njenog nastavka.

Ovakva situacija nagnala je političare u BiH da učine dodatne napore na ispunjavanju obaveza vezanih za prijem u MAP. Shodno tome, te nakon neko-liko posjeta visokih zvaničnika međunarodne zajednice, Predsjedništvo BiH je donijelo odluku o uništavanju dijela viška municije, te na svojoj 44. sjednici, održanoj 14. aprila 2010. godine, dalo saglasnost za angažovanje pješadijske jedinice OSBiH za osiguranje u misiji ISAF-a u Afganistanu.93

Iskazani stav političkog vrha BiH prema međunarodnim obavezama na promovisanju mira i sigurnosti u svijetu, veoma je pozitivno primljen od stra-ne članica NATO-a. Nakon toga i - mora se priznati - izraženog lobiranja di-plomatskih predstavnika Republike Turske uoči neformalnog sastanka mini-stara odbrane NATO-a u Talinu, Estonija, ministri odbrane su konstatovali da je BiH načinila značajan progres u reformi od dana podnošenja aplikacije za MAP. Tako su, na sastanku u Talinu, 22. aprila 2010. godine, odlučili da BiH pozovu u MAP, te ovlastili Sjeverno-atlansko vijeće (NAC) da prihvati prvi

93 Za više detalja, pogledati http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/zaklj/sjed/1/?cid=14601,2,1


Godišnji nacionalni program BiH kada BiH riješi pitanje nepokretne vojne imovine.94

Ovakav uslovni prijem BiH u MAP svakako je značajan za daljnji re-formski put BiH u odbrambenom sektoru, ali ponovno otvara prostor za unutrašnje političke nesporazume. Tako je srpski član Predsjedništva BiH, Nebojša Radmanović, već komentarisao da NATO ovakvim uslovljavanjem vrši dodatni pritisak na Republiku Srpsku.95 Naime, uslov NATO-a vezan za nepokretnu vojnu imovinu, doslovno kaže da se identifikovana imovina koja će služiti za buduće potrebe odbrambenih struktura mora registrovati kao državna imovina BiH, kojom će se služiti Ministarstvo odbrane. Dosadašnji stav predstavnika iz Republike Srpske, bio je da se imovina registruje kao vlasništvo entiteta na kojemu se nalazi vojna imovina, te da se ista ustupi na korištenje Ministarstvu odbrane BiH. Za nadati se da će se u dogledno vrijeme postići potreban politički dogovor koji će omogućiti punopravno članstvo BiH u MAP-u.

Sagledavajući ovaj proces možemo uočiti da je BiH napravila ogroman iskorak u reformi svojih odbrambenih struktura. Od pukog primaoca među-narodne vojne pomoći, dostigla je nivo u kojem njene oružane snage svojim učešćem u mirovnim misijama daju doprinos izgradnji mira i sigurnosti u svijetu. Očigledno je da je reforma, koja je vođena pod budnom paskom me-đunarodne zajednice, dala pozitivne rezultate i odbrambeni sektor nastavlja reformski put ka unaprijeđenju svoje interoperabilnosti sa NATO snagama.

2. Novi strateški koncept NATO-a

Kao prvo, potrebno je istaći da je NATO usvojio svoj značajan dokument na samitu u Lisabonu 19. i 20. novembra 2010. godine. Na izradi ovog dokumenta radili su mnogobrojni eksperti u ovoj oblasti, a istim je predsjedavala bivša državna sekretarka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Madeleine Albright. Sam dokument, Novi strateški koncept NATO-a, daje smjernice za naredni period djelovanja.

94 Za više detalja, pogledati http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_62811.htm?selectedLocale=en

95 Za više detalja, pogledati http://www.vijesti.ba/politika/10060-Radmanovic-Uvjet-pri-jenosu-imovine---novi-pritisak-Srpsku.html


Globalno posmatrajući, kolektivna odbrana ostaje osnovni instrument sa-radnje i u narednih deset godina, dok su uz terorizam i oružje za masovno uništavanje, dodate i neke nove prijetnje poput piratstva, cyber napada, raket-nih napada i dr. Takođe, ono što je bitno napomenuti jeste ostvareni dogovor o razmještanju protivraketnog štita sa Rusijom, kao i dogovor o unapređenju saradnje, odnosno dogovor da se NATO i Rusija više neće uzajamno posma-trati kao neprijatelji.

NATO će i ubuduće nastaviti politiku ‘otvorenih vrata’, omogućavajući da u njegovo članstvo uđu sve zemlje koje ispune kriterije i žele biti članicama, rekao je Rasmussen. Možemo reći da je ova izjava glavnog sekretara NATO-a ohrabrila one snage u BiH koje rade na ostvarenju punopravnog članstva BiH u NATO-u. Zašto smo izdvojili baš ovu rečenicu?

U prvom redu, smatramo izuzetno značajnom odluku NATO-a da zadrži

politiku ‘otvorenih vrata’, što znači da BiH može postati punopravnom člani-com kada ispuni sve demokratske kriterije. Drugi bitan aspekt je da je potvrđeno opredjeljenje članica NATO-a da BiH pristupi MAP-u kada ispuni uslov koji je vezan za rješavanje pitanja uknjižbe vojne imovine koju koriste Ministarstvo odbrane i Oružane snage BiH. Pored spomenutog, smatramo bitnim i pomak saradnje NATO-a sa Rusijom. Oni će pozitivno utjecati na stavove kako građana Srbije tako i građana iz Republike Srpske po pitanju članstva u NATO. Može se reći i da se srpski ministar odbrane Šutanovac, kao jedan od malobrojnih zva-ničnika vlasti u Srbiji, u svom intervjuu od 1. decembra 2010. godine pozitivno opredjelio prema pristupanju Srbije NATO-u i teškom sprovođenju neutralnosti za koju se Srbija opredjelila. Svakao da stavovi Srbije imaju značajnog utjecaja na građane iz Republike Srpske, pa je ovo možda način da se prevaziđu povremene trzavice u BiH vezane za pristupanje BiH NATO-u, odnosno nagovještaji raspi-sivanja referenduma u Republici Srpskoj povodom članstva u NATO-u.

Uz ovo, strateški koncept će u BiH vjerovatno imati i značajnog utjecaja na formulisanje dokumenta Odbrambenog pregleda BiH do 2020. godine koji se trenutno nalazi u fazi izrade u Ministarstvu odbrane.

Kada je u pitanju Europska odbrambena politike, može se reći da ona nije dovoljno promovisana u BiH, kao ni u drugim zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, pa je stoga i odnos institucija prema ovoj oblasti dosta inertan. Europska od-


brambena politika nije ni uvrštena u dosadašnje pregovore između EU i BiH, te je taj domen saradnje na marginama ostalih politika.

Ono što može biti interesantno je to da su u BiH zastupljeni elementi vanj-ske politike kroz djelovanje vojne misije EUFOR (misija broji oko 1.400 vojni-ka i produžen joj je mandat do kraja 2011. godine), policijske misije EUPM i Ureda specijalnog predstavnika EU. S obzirom na prisustvo ovih snaga, insti-tucije BiH sarađuju sa njima i postepeno dostižu standarde. EUFOR je zapo-čeo sa sprovođenjem treninga za naše vojnike, a u EUPM dosta pomaže našim policijskim snagama u dostizanju najboljih praksi u policijskim poslovima i saradnji sa pravosudnim organima.

Umjesto zaključka

Politika “otvorenih vrata” u narednih deset godina koju zagovara novi stra-teški koncept NATO-a, pruža jedinstvenu šansu za BiH da ostvari svoje ciljeve na vanjsko-političkom i sigurnosnom planu. Ono što je neophodno učiniti je ostvariti dodatni napor da se deklarativni stavovi političara, izneseni u njiho-vim političkim izjavama, pretoče u konkretna ostvarenja koja će građanima donijeti blagodeti članstva u NATO-u i EU.

Analizirajući političko djelovanje pozicije na vlasti, stiče se dojam da je kom-plikovani društveni sistem BiH počeo da se koristi kao ograničavajući faktor na putu integrisanja BiH u euroatlanske strukture. Sve češće posezanje za mehaniz-mom entitetskog glasanja u Parlamentarnoj skupštini BiH i zahtjevi za većim ovlastima entitetskih parlamenata, znatno su usporili euroatlantski put BiH.

Takva dešavanja na političkoj sceni dovela su u određeni ćorsokak i međunarodnu zajednicu, koja je ohrabrena napretkom u reformama koje je BiH ostvarila u periodu od 2000. do 2005. godine, donijela odluku da smanji svoje uplitanje u politički život BiH. Tako je u junu 2006. godine, Vijeće za implementaciju mira (Peace Implementation Council, PIC) čak najavilo i svoj plan o zatvaranju Kancelarije visokog predstavnika (Office of High Represen-tative OHR) u roku od jedne godine, a samim tim i o ukidanju Bonskih ovlasti.

Ipak, preuzimanje pune odgovornosti domaćih vlasti za svoju budućnost, odnosno budućnost građana BiH, nije pošlo u očekivanom smjeru i prema procjenama međunarodne zajednice. BiH jeste prešla iz faze implementacije


mira u fazu euroatlantskih integracija, no kako se pokazalo, to nije bilo dovolj-no za uspostavu funkcionalne i održive državne zajednice.

Vidjeli smo da je cjelokupna reforma sigurnosnog sektora u BiH provedena uz snažnu podršku međunarodne zajednice. Činjenica je da se nijedna refor-ma ne bi mogla dovršiti bez intervencije međunarodnih zvaničnika, prven-stveno visokog predstavnika u BiH, na jedan ili drugi način. Ono što je ostalo nedovršeno i što predstavlja izazov na daljnu izgradnju sigurnosnog sistema je nedovoljno snažno promovisanje ustavnih reformi, odnosno neuvrštavanje ostvarenih reformi u ustavni aranžman.

Ovakav status provedenih reformi, koje još nisu formalno pravno-ustavna kategorija ili su, kao u slučaju reforme policije, pregovori odgođeni do po-stizanja političkog kompromisa o novom teritorijalnom ustavnom ustrojstvu, ostavlja prostor za ugrožavanje dostignutog stepena reformi.

Stoga je još uvijek prilično smjelo ustvrditi da sve etničke strukture u BiH imaju jedinstven i iskren odnos prema unutrašnjoj i vanjskoj politici, odnosno da su istinski opredjeljeni ka izgradnji moderne demokratske države. Vanjski faktor, predstavljen u formi prisutnosti međunarodne zajednice u političkom životu BiH, zasigurno održava onu minimalnu društvenu koherentnost po pi-tanjima strateške orjentacije, odnosno vanjskih, odbrambenih i sigurnosnih prioriteta.

Također, ne treba izgubiti iz vida ni trenutnu političku situaciju koja bi se mogla reflektovati na moguća opredjeljenja i dileme u budućnosti. Kao što je poznato Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata (SNSD), najjača politička partija u Republici Srpskoj, kontinuirano zagovara demilitarizaciju BiH i u posljednje vrijeme podriva napore koje je BiH ostvarila na reformi odbram-benog sistema. Na jedan ovakav pristup vjerovatno značajnog utjecaja ima odluka političke elite u Srbiji da proglasi vojnu neutralnost i ne razmatra kao političku opciju priključenje NATO-u, već samo EU. Ovom stavu, koji još uvijek nije zvanično iznešen u institucijama na državnom nivou, poste-peno se priklanjaju i ostale političke partije u Republici Srpskoj, ali je takvo mišljenje sve više zastupljeno u medijskim istupima političara. Svakako da ovakva stajališta kako u Srbiji, tako i u Republici Srpskoj, zahtjevaju znatno veću pozornost predstavnika međunarodne zajednice i ozbiljnije razmatranje


stavova koji u mnogome mogu biti veoma važni za integrisanje regiona u eu-roatlantske strukture.

Ovakvo razmimoilaženje u stavovima po pitanju članstva u NATO-u, koje je prisutno u Federaciji BiH i Republici Srpskoj, može predstavljati kamen spoticanja daljem putu ka punopravnom članstu.

Utjecaj politike susjednih zemalja na BiH mogao bi ovo pitanje dodat-

no zakomplikovati, ako se ovakva tendencija nastavi u narednom periodu. Opredjeljenje za protežiranje vojnih aktivnosti EU i usporavanje napretka prema integraciji u NATO moglo bi otvoriti unutrašnji politički front, na koji međunarodna zajednica zasigurno ne bi blagonaklono gledala.

Sličan scenario već je primjenjen u proteklim godinama u odnosu na proračun odbrambenih snaga. Iako sve političke partije deklarativno pružaju podršku priključenju NATO-u, budžetskim vojnim ograničenjima taj put je znatno otežavan. Odobreni odbrambeni proračuni dovoljni su samo za opera-tivno funkcionisnaje odbrambenih struktura, a tek neznatnim dijelom zado-voljavaju potrebe za modernizacijom opreme i postizanje interoperabilnosti sa NATO snagama.

Odustajanje od pristupanja NATO-u, pod krinkom ispunjavanja europ-skih uslova za priključenje EU, moglo bi postati tema na političkom obzorju u narednom periodu. Taj čin bi za BiH zasigurno bio višestruko negativan sa stajališta međunarodne zajednice. U sam proces reforme odbrambenog sek-tora uloženo je mnogo finansijskih resursa i napora međunarodnih aktera, pa bi ovakvo političko skretanje sa dogovorenog kursa poslalo veoma negativnu poruku o kredibilitetu naše zemlje. Posebno bi takva odluka bila negativno primljena od strane SAD-a i nekih većih članica NATO-a, poput Velike Bri-tanije ili Turske, koje su i najviše investirale u reformu ovog sektora.


Bosna i Hercegovina i novi Strateški koncept NATO-a

Dr Miloš Šolaja96

Bosna i Hercegovina je, poput ostalih post-socijalističkih zemalja jugoistočne Evrope, svoj tranzicioni put vezala za priključenje evropskim i evroatlantskim in-tegracijama. S tim ciljem je postignut unutrašnji politički konsenzus i sproveden niz reformi koje su pred BiH postavili NATO i EU. Sprovedena je reforma sistema odbrane koja je završena uspostavljanjem jedinstvene odbrambene strukture i vojske. Kroz niz promjena, BiH je takođe oslobođena viznog režima za putovanje u zemlje Šengena. Ono što otežava put BiH prema bezbjednosnim i ekonomskim integracijama jeste nedostatak unutrašnje suverenosti i funkcionalnog ustavnog i političkog sistema, kao i opšta unutrašnja nestabilnost. Iako je načelno jasno da BiH neće dovršiti integracione procese ukoliko odgovornost sa međunarodnih institucija ne bude prenesena na unutrašnje institucije, odgovarajući koncepti još uvijek ne postoje. Zbog nepostojanja unutrašnjeg konsenzusa oko suštinskih pi-tanja i jasnog koncepta tranzicije sa međunarodnih organizacija na unutrašnje institucije, BiH je na vratima Akcionog plana za članstvo (MAP), jer je članstvo uslovljeno određenim odlukama čije je usvajanje još daleko. U međuvremenu, pojavile su se nove bezbjednosne inicijative i intenzivnija uloga Rusije i Turske u regionu.

96 Autor je Direktor Centra za međunarodne odnose Banja Luka


Petnaest godina nakon potpisivanja Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma, po-litički status i unutrašnja organizacija Bosne i Hercegovine (BiH) izazivaju brojne političke nedoumice. Većina subjekata političkih procesa još ima dile-me u pogledu baznog koncepta BiH kako u pogledu njenog unutrašnjeg ure-đenja, tako i u pogledu međunarodnih odnosa koje ona sama treba da gradi. Neizvjesnosti i nedoumice prisutni su u procesima evroatlantskih i evropskih integracija i pored političke saglasnosti gotovo svih institucija i aktera politič-kog života o kretanju BiH u ovom pravcu. „Konstitutivni elementi BiH - dva entiteta i tri naroda“ ne slažu se oko elementarnih osnova ustavnog uređenja i političkog sistema. Koncepti aktera političkih procesa u pogledu unutrašnjeg uređenja BiH razlikuju se od centralističkih do separatističkih. To u znatnoj mjeri usporava razvoj unutrašnjih procesa i uspostavljanje unutrašnji stabil-nog i sigurnog institucionalnog okvira kao nužnog uslova za izgradnju vri-jednosnog okvira i dostizanje standarda neophodnih za prihvatanje članstva BiH u bezbjednosnim i ekonomskim asocijacijama. Deklarativna orijentacija i isprazna retorika u pogledu integracionih procesa nisu više dovoljni kao poka-zatelj održavanja BiH u tim procesima.

Blokada formiranja institucija u procesu primjene rezultata izbora u BiH, održanih početkom oktobra 2010., pokazuje potpunu konceptualnu konfuzi-ju političkog sistema, u suštini postavljenom na tri nacionalna konstituenta, koji nastoje da institucionalne pozicije i političku moć ostvare u veoma kom-pleksnom korišćenju ustavnog i izbornog legaliteta i političkog legitimiteta određenog nacionalnom pripadnošću i interesima. U međuvremenu, posebno u okviru predizborne kampanje u Republici Srpskoj porasli su evroatlantski skepticizam i anti-NATO retorika. Takvi retrogradni stavovi nameću pitanja kako će se pomiriti novi politički pristup i insitutcionalno-pravni okvir koji je BiH postavila na putu ka evroatlatnskim integracijama i NATO-u.

Pozivnica za Akcioni plan za članstvo (Membership Action Plan – MAP) upućena je Bosni i Hercegovini na ministarskom sastanku zemalja članica NATO-a u Tallinnu (Estonija) 24. aprila 2010. Ta pozivnica je, međutim, us-lovljena neophodnim dogovorom i sporazumom između entiteta o korišćenju određenog broja „perspektivnih“ lokacija i objekata, važnih za funkcioniran-je Vojske BiH. Ta uslovljenost je postavila dilemu: da li je BiH zaista postala članica MAP ili će to postati kada ispuni dati uslov. Političari i predstavnici institucija koje su čvrsto opredijeljene za članstvo u NATO-u tvrde da je BiH


dio programa MAP, a oni koji prema NATO-u pokazaju uzdržanost tvrde su-protno. Zbog toga je dilema da li je BiH članica MAP ili nije i dalje prisutna.

Uslovna pozivnica BiH za pristupanje jedan je od posljednjih koraka za-okruživanja evropskog prostora kao jedinstvenog bezbjednosnog prostora u čijim okvirima NATO predstavlja jedinstveni sistem bezbjednosti Evrope u kojem je „bezbjednosna zajednica“ (community security) rezultat kvalitativne transformacije od individualne ka kolektivnoj bezbjednosti. Put post-hladno-ratovske izgradnje jedinstvenog bezbjednosnog sistema do procesa pridruži-vanja BiH evroatlantskim integracijama obilježavaju dva paralelna procesa: postsocijalistička tranzicija u istočnoevropskim zemljama i geopolitičke pro-mjene, ratovi i konflikti na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije koja više nije bila „simbol razlika u komunističkom svijetu”, niti je bila potrebna kao “buffer (ili tampon) zona”, te je u zapadnim političkim doktrinama jednostavno svrstana u zemlje (jugo)istočne Europe.97

U vrijeme ratova na Balkanu tokom posljednje decenije 20. vijeka, NATO se pojavio s konceptom širenja. Učešće Alijanse u ratu u BiH predstavljalo je pro-mjenu principa kolektivne odbrane „out of area” po kojem NATO nije trebalo da dejstvuje izvan svog područja. Od saradnje s misijama Ujedinjenih nacija 1992. do bombardovanja položaja Vojske Republike Srpske 1995. godine, Sje-vernoatlantski savez je prešao put od pomoći u humanitarnim operacijama do otvorenih napadnih oružanih dejstava. To su mnogi protumačili kao kršenje člana 5. Ugovora o osnivanju Alijanse, koji je osnova njenog odbrambenog jedinstva, ali i „izlazak izvan svog područja (teritorije)”, čime je naznačena još jedna nova karakteristika NATO-a koja će se pokazati u budućnosti: pored izgradnje evropskog sistema bezbjednosti, postali su jasni i njegovi globalni ciljevi. To se pokazalo kroz ključnu ulogu NATO-a u primjeni Dejtonskog mi-rovnog sporazuma i uspostavljanja mira u BiH. Od 20. decembra 1995. do da-nas, NATO je odigrao ključnu ulogu u ostvarivanju unutrašnje stabilnosti BiH. Pozicioniranje Alijanse na Balkanu odigralo je jednu od najznačajnijih uloga u strateškom prepozicioniranju globalnih odnosa. „Sjedinjene Države nisu po-smatrale interese prema Balkanu na isti način kao i evropski saveznici, pa su angažovale političke potencijale i vojnu moć 1995. godine kada su procijenile da razlike u pogledu BiH mogu da dovedu u pitanje opstanak NATO-a”.98 Za

97 Susan Woodward: Tragedija Balkana, Filip Višnjić, Beograd, str. 108.98 Kori Schake: „NATO and the Balkans Challenge: An American Perspective“, str. 351. u

„The Strategic Triangle“, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stepehen F. Szabo and


SAD je bilo važno da njihove trupe učestvuju u mirovnoj operaciji, jer su time zadržavale primat u evropskoj bezbjednosti, te je „nametanje mira na Balkanu za njih tek drugorazredna motivacija”.99

Ratovi na jugoistoku Evrope u vrijeme izgradnje novih međunarodnih post-hladnoratovskih odnosa unijeli su novi pogled na realizaciju strateš-kog koncepta NATO-a i uspostavljanja kolektivnog bezbjednosnog sistema Evrope. Vojno-strateški koncept je promijenjen u pravcu vojnih intervencija „izvan područja”, zbog kojih je NATO kao vojni savez dobio mogućnost pre-uzimanja mandata za uspostavljanje i održavanje mira koji je do tada pripa-dao isključivo oružanim snagama UN-a. Ostvarujući koncept širenja, NATO je morao da osmisli kada i kako će bivšim socijalističkim državama dodijeliti status člana.

Akcioni plan za članstvo (MAP) predviđa intenzivni individualni dijalog NATO-a i zemalja-kandidata usmjeren na kreiranje programa pomoći tim državama. Princip saradnje jeste projekat svake države ponaosob, kojii sama usvaja i realizuje svake godine. Godišnji nacionalni program se odnosi na pet oblasti: politiku i ekonomiju, odbranu i vojsku, obezbjeđenje finansijskih sred-stava, bezbjednosna i pravna pitanja, koja se ažuriraju godišnje. Ti izvještaji su osnova za diskusiju između Sjeverno-atlantskog savjeta i zemlje-kandida-ta. „Akcioni plan za članstvo nije puko ispunjavanje uslova koji se očekuju od potencijalne zemlje-članice, kao što ni učešće u MAP-u nije garancija za buduće članstvo. Odluke da se zemlje aspirantice pozovu da počnu pristupne pregovore, donose konsenzusom zemlje članice NATO-a, za svaku zemlju pojedinačno”.100 Države „prvog kruga” koje su primljene u MAP 2004. godine, su provele u Akcionom planu četiri godine, Albanija osam, Hrvatska sedam, Makedonija deset godina i još nije postala članica Alijanse.

Bosna i Hercegovina, kao zemlja koja je proživjela težak unutrašnji ratni sukob i koja je još uvijek pod neposrednom paskom međunarodne zajednice, prošla je težak put do uslovnog članstva u MAP. Transformacija odbrambenog sistema je počela uvođenjem Komisije za reformu odbrane (Defense Reform Commission). Reforma odbrambenog sistema se smatra možda i najuspješ-nijom reformom u BiH. Od 419.000 pripadnika dvije vojske, danas je u BiH Samuel F. Wells Jr. str. 351 - 369.

99 Ibid, str. 351.100 NATO Priručnik, Brisel 2006., str. 197.


uspostavljen jedinstven sistem odbrane i jedna vojska uključujući i promjene neophodne za članstvo u programu Partnerstvu za mir i nastavak evroatlat-nskih integracija. U nekoliko faza je smanjen broj vojnika, uspostavljeno je jedinstveno Ministarstvo odbrane, organizovana jedna vojska u BiH, objedi-njen odbrambeni budžet. Uspostavljeni su institucionalni mehanizmi demo-kratske kontrole nad odbrambenim sektorom, transparentost u planiranju i budžetiranju, te je stvorena osnova za učešće predstavnika BiH u mirovnim operacijama. U samopolaznom dokumentu Komisije sa reformu odbrane, na-slovljenom „Put u Partnerstvo za mir”, Komisija je predložila da „dugoročan cilj BiH bude članstvo u NATO-u”, te predlaže preporuke za učlanjenje u Planu djelovanja za članstvo (MAP).101 Stav o ulasku u NATO je ušao i u Zakon o odbrani BiH, gdje se članom 84. izričito obavezuju „Parlamentarna skupština, Savjet ministara Bosne i Hercegovine, Predsjedništvo, te svi subjekti odbrane, u okviru vlastite ustavne i zakonske nadležnosti, da sprovedu potrebne aktiv-nosti za prijem Bosne i Hercegovine u članstvo NATO-a“.102 Usvajanjem Zako-na dovršen je institucionalni okvir reforme odbrane i postavljena orijentacija za članstvo u NATO-u. Reforma odbrane u BiH počela je sa strahom odbi-janja u Republici Srpskoj, iako je bilo jasno da je uspostavljanje jedinstvenog sistema odbrane u BiH, bilo uslov za ulazak zemlje u evroatlantske strukture i približavanja NATO-u i Evropskoj uniji. Politička potvrda takvog stava došla je kroz izjavu predsjednika 12 parlamentarnih stranaka u BiH od 18. februara 2004., „u želji da se ubrza provođenje reformi u BiH, da se na vrijeme ispune svi uslovi za uspješno zaključivanje SAA, kojim se otvaraju putevi za prijem u EU, kao i neophodni uslovi za prijem u PfP, a kasnije i u NATO“.103 Politička vo-lja u BiH za pristupanje evroatlantskim integracijama s krajnjim ciljem ulaska u NATO je zaokružena Deklaracijom o strateškim opredjeljenjima Republike Srpske u sistemu odbrane Bosne i Hercegovine104 i Zaključkom Narodne skup-štine Republike Srpske.105 BiH je od tada krenula punim kapacitetom u pravcu

101 Vidjeti: http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/Partnerstvo-za-mir-sr.pdf

102 Vidjeti: http://www.oscebih.org/documents/8286-eng.pdf103 Parlamentarna skupština BiH, Predstavnički dom, broj 01-50-180/04. od 18.

februara 2004.104 Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, broj 63. od 4. jula 2005. str. 2-5. Deklaracija se od-

nosi na demilitarizaciju kao krajnji cilj, dok se članstvo u NATO-u tretira indirektno, ali se ne odbija navodeći da bi BiH kao „član Partnerstva za mir, političkog krila NATO saveza i Evrop-ske unije bila ravnopravan partner, stabilan subjekat i primjer izgradnje demokratskog društva nakon tragičnog ratnog sukoba“.

105 Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, broj 82. od 8. septembra 2005. str. 1-2. „Narodna


evroatlantskih integracija što je, primjereno ranijim iskustvima istočne Evrope, postavljeno kao nužna faza u procesu pridruživanja Evropskoj uniji. NATO je u institucijama BiH prihvaćen kao nesumnjivi zajednički oblik evropske bezbjed-nosti izgrađen nakon hladnog rata. Bezbjednost BiH je u tom pogledu imala paradigmatsku vrijednost uspješnog conflict resolution-a u etnički diverzifiko-vanim društvima nakon otvorenih unutrašnjih oružanih sukoba.

Uspješno sprovedena reforma odbrane predstavljala je osnovu za poziv za članstvo u Partnerstvu za mir (PzM). Članstvo u PzM za BiH je imalo veliko značenje za unutrašnju bezbjednost i jedinstvo zemlje, ali isto tako i za njene međunarodne odnose u kojima bi kao država s nestabilnim unutrašnjim od-nosima trebala da participira na ravnopravnim odnosima. Evroatlantske inte-gracije se time postavljaju kao izuzetno značajno unutrašnjo-političko pitanje. Članstvo u Partnerstvu za mir ne iscrpljuje sve potencijale za evroatlantske integracije. „Suština PzM-a jeste partnerstvo oblikovano između zemlje-par-tnera i NATO-a, skrojeno prema individualnim potrebama i zajedno spro-vedeno prema individualnim potrebama na nivou i ritmom koje vlada svake zemlje-učesnika sama odabere“.106 Nakon samita u Washingtonu „pokrenute su značajne inicijative za povećanjem operativne dimenzije PzM, za učešćem zemalja-partnera u donošenju odluka i planiranju.“107 PzM je proširen čitavim nizom odnosa koji se odnose na interoperabilnost partnera i NATO-a osnaži-vanjem zajedničkog rada na partnerskim zadacima. BiH je, zajedno sa Srbijom i Crnom Gorom, pozvana da pristupi programu Partnerstvo za mir na samitu NATO-a u Rigi (Letonija) krajem novembra 2006. Partnerski ugovor je potpi-san u decembru iste godine.

Iako su Crna Gora i BiH neposredno nakon toga izrazile političku volju za pristupanje MAP, sporost u sprovođenju političkih i ekonomskih reformi nije dozvoljavala tako brzo donošenje odluke za uključivanje obe države u Akci-oni plan za članstvo. Da bi zadržala aktivan odnos prema NATO integraci-jama, Alijansa je primijenila formulu s početka procesa proširenja nazvanu „Intenzivirani dijalog.“ To je trebalo da znači da se komunikacija nastavlja i pojačava, ali da se nastavlja i monitoring, i to ne samo u okvirima obaveza de-

skupština Republike Srpske zahtijeva od Predsjednišva Bosne i Hercegovine da kod zvaničnih institucija NATO saveza tekuću reformu Oružanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine verifikuje kao konačnu fazu strukturne reforme, koja će omogućiti uključenje oružanih snaga BiH u NATO savez“.

106 NATO Priručnik, Brisel 2006. str. 205.107 Ibid, str. 207.


finisanim Partnerstvom za mir, već u okvirima onih procesa koji su definisani Akcionim planom za članstvo.

Program MAP ima mnogo šire dimenzije nego što bi se moglo zaključiti na prvi pogled gdje izgleda da za cilj ima isključivo evroatlantske integracije. Polazeći od činjenice da u integracije ne ulaze ni vojske ni sami odbrambeni sistemi, već države u svim svojim aspektima i društveno-ekonomskim okru-ženjem, MAP se postavlja kao ključni unutrašnji proces društvenih promjena koje vode pridruživanju NATO-u „kao ključnom političkom akteru na Bal-kanu čije je širenje imperativ“. Cilj koji ova strategija podrazumijeva je razvoj bezbjednosnih kapaciteta u uslovima demokratske građanske kontrole u sva-koj balkanskoj državi i eventualna transformacija jedinstvene uloge NATO-a u pojedinačnim oblastima, do razvoja bezbjednosnih snaga..“108 Za međuna-rodnu zajednicu to postavlja tri prioriteta: uspostavljanje procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja, i Akcioni plan za članstvo NATO-a kao bazni putokaz evolucije u regionu i odgovarajuću racionalizaciju prisustva u skladu sa međunarodnim zahtjevima i prioritetima; drugo, kampanje međunarodne zajednice, prven-stveno u BiH i na Kosovu, za eliminisanje političko-kriminalne organizaci-je kao najveće prijetnje unutrašnjoj i regionalnoj stabilnosti; rekonstrukcija međunarodnog prisustva u cilju eliminisanja nezavisnog vođenja političkih procesa od strane ad hoc struktura, posebnu u BiH i na Kosovu, i transfer odgovornosti na stalne evropske ili lokalne institucije.109 Zbog svega toga, me-đunarodna zajednica je definisala pristup po kojem se njeno intenzivno prisu-stvo uspostavlja oko procesa pridruživanja Evropskoj uniji i Akcionog plana za članstvo. U vrijeme definisanja procesa stabilizacije na Balkanu, koncept kolektivne bezbjednosti koji je NATO razvio kao evropski sistem bezbjedno-sti je odnio prevagu nad dogovornim konceptom koji se razvija u okvirima Evropske unije ili univerzalnim konceptom razvijenim u okvirima Organiza-cije za evropsku bezbjednost i saradnju (OSCE) ili globalne bezbjednosti, kao koncepta Ujedinjenih nacija.

Predsjedništvo BiH donijelo je juna 2009. godine odluku o aplikaciji za član-stvo u MAP koju je član predsjedništva Željko Komšić predao 2. oktobra 2009. „Saveznici su se složili da se Bosna i Hercegovina pridruži MAP čim se uoči

108 „The Balkans“, Report of an Independent task Force Sponsored by the Council od Forei-gn Relations –Centre for Preventive Acton, Council on Foreign Relations ,2002., str. 29.

109 Ibid, str. 29.


progres u reformama“110. Stabilnost BiH i dalje zavisi od prisustva međunarod-nih subjekata: Kancelarije visokog predstavnika (OHR), Misije NATO-a, EU-FOR-a, OSCE-a. Proces članstva u MAP koji treba da bude dovršen članstvom u NATO-u u Bosni i Hercegovini još nije formalno osporen, ali je u brojnim javnim istupima pojedinih političkih predstavnika u Republici Srpskoj dove-den u pitanje kroz dilemu da li BiH treba da postane članica NATO-a, kao i da je za takvu odluku potrebno tražiti referendumsku potvrdu stanovnika RS. „Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS) saopštila je danas da odluku o eventual-nom ulasku u NATO mogu doneti jedino građani Republike Srpske (RS) na referendumu.“111 Insistiranje na referendumu za ulazak u NATO pokrenuto od strane desnog političkog krila u Republici Srpskoj može da se potraži u izjavi generalnog sekretara NATO-a Jaap de Hoop Shefera novembra 2010. da BiH mora da sprovede ustavne promjene kao put za ulazak u evroatlantske integra-cije. Takav stav je u Republici Srpskoj protumačen kao pokušaj uslovljavanja promjene unutrašnje strukture, zbog čega su reagovale sve političke struje u Republici Srpskoj, iz čega je konsenzualno proistekao zaključak da RS neće prihvatiti promjenu postojeće unutrašnje kompozicije u BiH koja podrazumi-jeva entitetsku teritorijalno-političku podjelu i promjenu dejtonskih ustavnih aranžmana kako bi ostvarila punu integraciju u evroatlantske integracije kao krajnji cilj.

Potencijalno članstvo u NATO-u ima veliku podršku u javnom mnjenju Federacije BiH (FBiH), ali veoma malu u Republici Srpskoj. Dok u FBiH 88% ispitanika potpuno, a tek 9% donekle, podržava pristupanje BiH NATO-u, u Republici Srpskoj svega 30% podržava, a čak 64% se apsolutno protivi pridru-živanju NATO-u.112 Ovakav stav javnog mnjenja u Republici Srpskoj koriste opozicione političke snage u Republici Srpskoj kako bi postavile pitanje budu-ćeg članstva BiH u NATO-u i vezali ga za eventualni ulazak Srbije u Alijansu. Pored niske podrške javnosti u RS, čiji se uzrok nalazi u nedavnoj prošlosti i ratovima na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, a posebno oružanim akcijama NA-TO-a protiv Republike Srpske i Jugoslavije, na promjenu političke orijentacije uticalo je i sve češće i snažnije zagovaranje novog evropskog bezbjednosnog

110 Vidjeti: http://www.skupstina.me/cms/site_data/novo/informacija%20o%20prije-mu%20u%20MAP.pdf

111 Vidjeti: http://www.24sata.info/vijesti/politika/25831-Srpska-demokratska-stranka-smije-biti-zrtva-kratkorocnih-interesa-SNSD-.html

112 Ipsos: Javno mnjenje u BiH, 2010. pripremljeno za National Democratic Institute, april 2010., str. 14.


sistema koje dolazi iz Rusije. Insistiranje na referendumu za ulazak u NATO bilo je jedan od uzroka donošenja novog zakona o referendumu i građanskom izjašnjavanju u Republici Srpskoj koji je pitanje pridruživanja evroatlantskim integracijama izuzeo iz kruga referendumskih pitanja, dok je jak anti-evroa-tlantski naboj i dalje ostao.

Bez obzira na kritike koje dolaze iz Banja Luke i pokušaj da se ta pitanje prevedu na teren opštegrađanskog izjašnjavanja, niko nije doveo u sumnju aplikaciju BiH za MAP. S obzirom na činjenicu da se MAP smatra praktično prvim korakom prema NATO-u, može se zaključiti da će se sve strane dugo-ročno orijentisati upravo prema njemu kao krajnjem cilju. Na tom putu, poli-tička elita u Republici Srpskoj će morati da se suoči s pitanjem javne podrške članstvu u NATO-u koja je jedan od uslova koji se odnosi na demokratsku podršku članstvu u Allijansi, a koju procjenjuje Savjet Alijanse. Sve političke elite u BiH moraće da se suoče s tri bitna procesa ukoliko žele da ispune uslove postavljene na tom putu:

1. Pitanje realizacije i evaluacije godišnjih planova u pet oblasti predvi-đenih MAP, što je potpuno u skladu s obavezama iz Sporazuma o sta-bilizaciji i pridruživanju. Ispunjavanjem obaveza iz MAP ne stiču se samo uslovi za pozivnicu u članstvo u NATO-u, već je to i svojevrsna transformacija koja svaku državu-aspiranta po standardima znatno pri-bližava ispunjavanju zahtjeva potrebnih za pristupanje Evropskoj uniji;

2. Pitanje reformi političkog sistema i društvenih reformi uopšte, bez ko-jih je nemoguće očekivati zatvaranje Kancelarije visokog predstavnika, odlazak međunarodnih snaga za održavanje mira i preuzimanje odgo-vornosti od strane domaćih institucija i njihovih predstavnika i samo-stalno funkcionisanje političkog sistema.

3. Rješavanje pitanja 69 perspektivnih vojnih lokacija kao uslov postavljen od strane Savjeta NATO-a113, što se dovodi u vezu i sa ukupnim rješa-vanjem problema državne imovine.114 Sam problem i različiti pristupi

113 “MAP za Bosnu je usvojen, ali uz jasne uslove potrebne za primjenu”, rekao je portpa-rol Apaturai na konferenciji za novinare u četvrtak poslije sastanka ministara spoljnih poslova NATO-a u Talinu u Estoniji, prenio je Reuters. Vidjeti: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/47282/BiH-primljena-u-Akcioni-plan-za-clanstvo-NATOa-/print

114 Komunike Savjeta za implementaciju mira: „Cilj jedan - prihvatljivo rješenje podjele imovine između države i drugih nivoa Vlasti: vrijeme je da politički lideri nastave sa napretkom koji je postignut u drugim oblastima i preuzmu vođstvo i postignu dogovor o ovom pitanju ko-


njegovom rješavanju u pogledu državne imovine zadiru u samu suštinu BiH kao političke zajednice, i već sada je jasno da će široka diskusija o ključnim problemima BiH uključivati i pitanje državne imovine kao dio ukupne javne diskusije u vezi sa predstojećim ustavnim promjenama kao osnove društvenog konsenzusa koji bi zemlji omogućio dugoročnu stabilnost.

Bosna i Hercegovina je „uslovno“ pozvana u MAP, što de facto ne pred-stavlja članstvo, već je vješto politički postavljena barijera na kojoj domaći politički subjekti treba da pokažu političku volju i spremnost, kao i kulturu konsenzusa posebno kada su u pitanju „perspektivne vojne lokacije“. Dogovor na tom polju treba pokazati da li će evroatlantske integracije biti zadržane kao bazno političko opredjeljenje, kao i da li će se taj proces koristiti za rješavanje političkih ciljeva pojedinih političkih subjekata. Spremnost za konsenzus u vezi MAP će služiti kao putokaz, kao i za konsenzus u vezi ustavnih promjena kao osnovni preduslov za preuzimanje odgovornosti za situaciju u BiH. Kako je izgledalo u trenutku odluke o pozivu u MAP, BiH je čekala oktobarske izbo-re i novo odlaganje rješenja, barem sudeći prema riječima ministra inostranih poslova Svena Alkalaja: „Bila su jasna tri uslova - uništavanje eksplozivnih ma-terijala i uništavanje pokretne vojne imovine, određivanje kontingenta vojnika BiH koji se upućuju u misiju ISAF, znači u Avganistan, i ovaj treći - da se 69 perspektivnih lokacija uknjiže na Ministarstvo odbrane. Prethodni uslov je da prvi ciklus počne onda kada se tih 69 lokacija uknjiži.“115

Spremnost za napredak u rješavanju pitanja državne imovine i vojnih pita-nja govori i o spremnosti političkih elita da vode BiH u evroatlantske i evrop-ske integracije. Reforma odbrambenog sistema jeste potreban, ali ne i dovoljan uslov, jer u integracije ulaze države u cjelini sa svim institucijama i kapaci-tetima u skladu s političkim i drugim uslovima. Ukoliko nema unutrašnjeg društvenog konsenzusa, teško je očekivati brze reforme i društvene promjene u tom pravcu.

Novi strateški koncept NATO-a usvojen na samitu NATO-a u Lisabonu (Portugalija) 2010. godine, zatekao je BiH upetljanu u dva važna procesa.

jim bi se omogućilo državi da vrši svoje ustavne obaveze“. Vidjeti: www.ohr.int/print?content_id=41879

115 Vidjeti: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/47282/BiH-primljena-u-Akcioni-plan-za-clanstvo-NATOa-/print


Prvi je redefinicija globalnih bezbjednosnih izazova, pri čemu BiH ne može da se prepozna kao važan usmjerivač međunarodnih događaja, što je u izvje-snoj mjeri bila tokom devedesetih godina prošlog vijeka; drugi je potreba za unutrašnjom samodefinicijom državnog okvira uspostavljenog pregovorima u Dejtonu 1995. godine i unutrašnjim promjenama koje treba da odrede i nove odnose međunarodne zajednice prema BiH. Evropska unija je 2010. godine počela primjenu Lisabonskog sporazuma kao svojevrsnog ustavnog rješenja, što je nametnulo i potrebu (re)definisanja zajedničke spoljne politike Evropske unije kao sistematski nedovoljno izgrađenog političkog principa i političkog mehanizma. U naporima da se i politički i institucionalno uspostave meha-nizmi definisanja i vođenja spoljne politike EU, BiH ima važno mjesto i kao poligon za isprobavanje ‘policy’ pristupa, ali i kao mogućnost za ostvarivnje početnog uspjeha kao što se već desilo početkom 90-tih godina kada je EU transformisana na politikama Evropske ekonomske zajednice.

Od uspostavljanja mira 1995. godine, međunarodna zajednica je pokušala s nekoliko različitih koncepata u postratnoj „izgradnji države“ (state-building) u BiH koji su se zasnivali na direktivnom učešću i neograničenim izvršnim ovla-šćenjima Kancelarije visokog predstavnika (OHR). Globalni plan, kao i eko-nomska kriza 2008. godine, su usporili kako unutrašnje procese u BiH, tako i one koji je približavaju evroatlantskim i evropskim integracijama. Složena kompozicija zemlje omogućava naglašene uloge nacije i nacionalnog mišljenja u definisanju politika institucija političkog sistema i partija kao reprezentativ-nih predstavnika nacionalnih zajednica. Kriza globalnih institucija i retrograd-ni unutrašnji procesi u BiH pojačavaju težnje pojedinih političkih elita i parti-ja za autoritarnim političkim i ekonomskim rješenjima koja i u nacionalnom javnom mnjenju imaju veliku podršku. Tako usmjereni društveno-ekonomski procesi udaljavaju BiH od bezbjednosnih i ekonomskih integracija, i uprkos deklarativno postavljenim ciljevima i politikama pokazuju da nisu okrenute ka vizijama budućnosti zemlje već više ka populističkoj realizaciji održavanja na vlasti. Unutarnacionalna diskusija o političkim, ekonomskim i socijalnim problemima BiH se predstavlja kao nacionalna izdaja, dok se rasprava među političkim predstavnicima nacionalnih zajednica isključivo svodi na pitanje formiranja institucija i vlasti, a ne na programsko-razvojne koncepte.

Novi strateški koncept NATO-a, nove inicijative za kolektivnu bezbjednost od strane Rusije, pojačavanje prisustva nekih država na Balkanu poput Tur-


ske, redefinisanje spoljne i bezbjednosne politike EU, redefinisanje koncepata evropske bezbjednosti, kao i Organizacije za evropsku bezbjednost i saradnju, svi polaze od neophodnosti rješavanja kriznih žarišta u Evropi. Upravo je ju-goistok Evrope područje koje predstavlja najveći izvor bezbjednosnih izazova. Nestabilnost na južnom Balkanu (južna Srbija, Makedonija, Crna Gora i Al-banija), se pojačava i pretvara u otvorene bezbjednosne izazove, posebno kroz sve otvorenije isticanje albanskog nacionalnog pitanja i pitanja autonomije Sandžaka koju zagovara bošnjačka nacionalna manjina. Otvorene probleme na Balkanu izazivaju ekonomska i finansijska kriza u Grčkoj, kritike za korupciju u Bugarskoj i Rumuniji, odnosi Srbije prema nepriznatom Kosovu, korupcio-naške afere u Hrvatskoj i, nadasve, regionalna mreža kriminala. Pred BiH se postavljaju kompleksni zahtjevi za ostvarivanjem stabilnosti i bezbjednosti kao neophodnog uslova daljeg napretka ka evroatlantskim i evropskim integracija-ma. Da bi u tome uspjela, BiH mora da se opredjeli za uspostavljanje političke stabilnosti, kako bi iz te pozicije mogla da krene u realizaciju ekonomskog i socijalnog razvoja. Primarni koraci u tom pravcu su postizanje unutrašnjeg konsenzusa nacionalnih i političkih predstavnika BiH bez direktivne uloge međunarodne zajednice, odnosno postizanje kompromisa oko mnogih pita-nja, te baznog unutrašnjeg konsenzusa oko nekoliko elementarnih političkih pitanja. Hronološki se kao primarna obaveza postavlja dogovor oko popisa stanovništva planiranog u 2011. godini koji je već izazvao brojne polemike i zaglavio se u neuspješnom dogovaranju. Drugi, još važniji proces, jeste proces ustavnih promjena Dejtonskog, „oktroisanog“, ustava kao proizvoda međuna-rodnih pregovora, i uspostavljanje konsekventnog političkog sistema na osno-vama društvenog konsenzusa. S obzirom na činjenicu da ni u evroatlantske in-tegracije ni u Evropsku uniju ne ulaze samo vlade ili ministarstva, već društva u cjelini organizovana u državne institucije i odgovarajuće odnose, pred BiH se nalaze elementarni procesi uspostavljanja političkog sistema i institucija sposobnih da iznesu unutrašnje promjene i da sprovedu procese koji bi BiH poveli ka evroatlantskim i evropskim integracijama.


Uticaj novog Strateškog koncepta i Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike na “Bezbednosnu

arhitekturu jugo-istočne Evrope”

Dr Arshim Çela116

Dokumenti koji se odnose na stratešku politiku u pogledu bezbednosti, odbra-ne i vojske jedan su od pokazatelja na koji način sektor bezbednosti ima za cilj da u budućnosti koordinira svoje aktivnosti. Prema Ustavu Republike Albanije, Parlament je najviše zakonodavno telo iz koga ostale institucije crpe legitimi-tet. Dakle, dužnosti i funkcije Parlamenta mogu biti ojačane s ciljem efikasnog nadzora nad civilnom kontrolom vojske i bezbednosnih struktura, te kako bi se obezbedila bolja koordinacija i korišćenje finansijskih sredstava. Okončavši fazu “članstva u NATO-u”, Albanija bi sada trebalo da pređe na novu fazu razvoja svoje odbrambene strategije. U skladu sa novim strateškim konceptom Alijanse, Albanija mora da preispita svoje finansijske i ljudske kapacitete, kao i da analizi-ra obaveza koje proizilaze iz učešća u međunarodnim misijama NATO-a. Shod-no tome, Albanija će morati da mnogo preciznije proceni stvarne, prepoznate, verodostojne rizike i pretnje, s obzirom da su same države predmet bezbednosnih institucija i aktivnosti. Pregled glavnih doktrina odbrane i bezbednosti je potre-ban, ne zbog obaveza koje proizilaze iz članstva u NATO-u, već i zbog geopolitič-kih promena u regionu. Srbija se trenutno približava članstvu u EU, što je, u tom kontekstu, veoma značajna činjenica.

116 Autor je pukovnik u penziji, trenutno zaposlen u Institutu za demokratiju i medijaciju, Tirana, Albanija.


Uvod

Veoma sam počastvovan što imam priliku da izlažem na ovoj, dobro orga-nizovanoj konferenciji, na kojoj preovladava duh razumevanja i demokratske rasprave. Svi učesnici, iz moje zemlje, kao i susednih zemalja, izražavaju istu zabrinutost i dele istu viziju u pogledu uticaja novog strateškog koncepta NA-TO-a na naše prostore.

Posmatran u celini, čini se da novi strateški koncept nije ni po čemu proble-matičan za zemlje regiona, bez obzira da li su članice NATO-a ili samo partne-ri, i izgleda kao da se prioriteti novog viđenja budućih bezbednosnih pretnji i rizika prvenstveno odnose na interese velikih evropskih i svetskih aktera.

U svakom slučaju, zemlje jugoistočne Evrope ne mogu tek da bace pogled na ovaj dokument iz Lisabona – najpre zbog toga što ovaj dokument takođe navodi i date obaveze zemalja regije, i drugo, zato što smo se ovde okupili kako bismo razmenili ideje i mišljenja u vezi zajedničkih izazova, kako sadašnjih, tako i onih budućih.

Sa zvanične tačke gledišta, Republika Albanija je jasno izrazila svoju po-ruku na samitu u Lisabonu, i kao članica NATO-a, njene obaveze proizilaze iz ovog i drugih pravnih dokumenata kojima se regulišu aktivnosti Alijanse. Ono što ću danas reći ovde je uglavnom slobodna i otvorena vizija civilnog društva, odnosno Instituta za demokratiju i medijaciju iz Tirane. Naš Institut je - pre, tokom i nakon usvajanja novog strateškog koncepta NATO-a - pre-duzeo nekoliko inicijativa vezanih za sâmo razumevanje pitanja koja se tiču bezbednosti i odbrane, kao i potrebe za strukturisanjem i restrukturisanjem bezbednosnih institucija na osnovu dobro osmišljenih dokumenata. Zbog naše istorije u okviru odnosa sa NATO-om i drugim zemljama, ali i zbog složenosti pozicije jedne male zemlje, Albanija je u većini slučajeva usvojila klišeizirane dokumente umesto da je sama formulisala jednostavna, realna i opipljiva pitanja.

Prema tome, mislim da će moja zemlja morati da mnogo preciznije proceni stvarne, priznate i verodostojne rizike i pretnje, s obzirom da su same države predmet bezbednosnih institucija i aktivnosti.


Isto se može konstatovati i za predviđanje budućih rizika i planiranja. Sve to će nam pomoći da jasno definišemo svoje odgovornosti za pojedi-načne oblasti delovanja, na taj način garantujući uravnoteženu raspodelu. Usvajanje globalnih slogana o realnim rizicima i pretnjama u javnoj sferi će Vladi i državnim akterima otežati da kroz preterano ambiciozne anga-žmane, koji često prevazilaze naše stvarne kapacitete, prikupljaju političke poene.

Interna koherentnost i stabilnost strateškog okvira

Niz dokumenata koji sačinjavaju stratešku politiku u pogledu bezbednosti, odbrane i vojske su, između ostalog, i jedan od pokazatelja na koji način sektor bezbednosti namerava da u budućnosti koordiniše svoje aktivnosti. Imajući u vidu činjenicu da je Albanija, po svome Ustavu, parlamentarna republika, zadaci i odgovornosti Parlamenta Albanije u oblasti bezbednosti i odbrane se ogledaju u demokratskom nadzoru i odgovornosti. S druge stra-ne, uzimajući u obzir hijerarhijsku strukturu bezbednosnih institucija, Vlada je dužna da primeni strateški okvir doktrina kroz relevantna ministarsta i agencije117.

Treba reći da je podela zadataka i uloga između zakonodavne i izvršne vlasti u oblasti bezbednosti i odbrane već konsolidovana kroz niz zakona i praktič-nu primenu. Prema Ustavu Republike Albanije, Parlament je najviše zakono-davno telo iz koga sve druge institucije crpe svoj legitimitet. Dakle, u slučaju Albanije, dužnosti i funkcija Parlamenta mogu biti ojačani kako se osigurali efikasan nadzor i profesionalna kontrola nad civilnom kontrolom vojske i bez-bednosnih struktura, ali i da bi se garantovala bolja koordinacija i upotreba finansijskih sredstava u korist nacionalne bezbednosti.

U tom kontekstu, Parlamentarni odbor za bezbednost bi mogao da proširi svoju stručnu savetodavnu mrežu, ne samo zapošljavanjem profesionalaca, već i kroz saradnju sa nezavisnim ekspertima, kada su u pitanju bezbednost i odbrana ili strateški doktrinarni okvir. Iako se činilo da su posle 2000. i 2004. godine - kada su usvojene strategije bezbednosti - značajna kontrola i operativno vođstvo dati Parlamentu proširivanjem ovlašćenja Odbora za bez-

117 Zakon br. 8417, 21. oktobar 1998, za usvajanje Ustava Republike Albanije (Službeni glasnik, br. 28, 1998, str. 1073)


bednost i unutrašnje poslove, događaji u selu Gërdec 2008. godine, koje je postalo važan simbol bezbednosti i strateških pitanja u Albaniji, pokazali su da je Vlada dobila kontrolu i još više ovlašćenja i nad osnovnim bezbedno-snim institucijama.

Takav pristup je izazvao određenu zabrinutost među albanskim bezbedno-snim partnerima na Zapadu, što se odrazilo u nacrtu zakona o izvesnim pro-menama u vezi sa odgovornostima albanske obaveštajne službe.118

S druge strane, uprkos činjenici da sadašnji zakon jasno definiše savetodav-nu ulogu Nacionalnog saveta za bezbednost koji sarađuje direktno sa pred-sednikom Republike, postojanje Među-ministarskog odbora za bezbednosna pitanja kao savetodavnog tela bliskog premijeru, stvara “skriveno institucijsko rivalstvo”, umesto da omogući bolju koordinaciju aktivnosti između institucija državne bezbednosti.

Iz tog razloga, sveukupna koordinacija i saradnja bezbednosnih institucija u obezbeđivanju sveobuhvatnog strateškog doktrinarnog okvira ostaje jedan od primarnih zadataka države. Priprema ovih strateških dokumenata treba da prođe kroz stručne procene izazova, rizika i pretnji (IRP), koji treba da osi-guraju što značajniji angažman institucija i aktera koji učestvuju u njihovoj praktičnoj primeni.

Ukoliko bi tokom procesa pripreme i sprovođenja ovih strategija, učešće eksperata iz različitih institucionalnih aktera bilo veće, to bi bilo znak kohe-rentne politike. Evidentno je da postoji određeni stepen ispravnosti u struktu-rama demokratskog nadzora snaga bezbednosti i odbrane (uglavnom u parla-mentarnim i vladinim strukturama), kao i određeno učešće civilnog društva u izradi i implementaciji tih strategija. Međutim, to učešće tek treba da se po-boljša, i o tome ću reći nešto više dalje u tekstu.

Ustav jasno definiše uloge i osnovne bezbednosne koncepte države. Oni se zasnivaju na miru, dobrosusedskim odnosima i aktivnom učešću u kolektiv-nim odbrambenim strukturama. Dakle, ovi pojmovi su utrli put opštim prin-cipima koji podržavaju strateški doktrinarni okvir.

118 Za dodatne informacije, proverite albansku štampu u periodu od februara do aprila 2010


Međutim, postojeći zakoni i dalje treba da pruže više informacija o proce-su izrade i usvajanja različitih strateških dokumenata. Na taj način bi bilo mo-guće uključiti i stručnjake i predstavnike nevladinih organizacija, pri čemu celi taj proces ne bi bio isključivo u diskreciji institucija državne bezbednosti - odnosno, time bi bio ojačan legitimitet ovog procesa i dobijena neophodna podrška.

Rezultati analize rizika

Dokumenti strategija nacionalne bezbednosti i odbrane bi trebalo da kon-statuju da je osnovni koncept bezbednosne strategije uglavnom usmeren na “poštovanje vladavine prava” i “integracijski pristup”.119 Nacionalna bezbednost i vojne strategije, kao i dokumenti odbrambene politike, definisali su izazove, pretnje i rizike sledeći ‘top-down’ pristup, što znači da relevantne bezbednosne institucije nisu bile prijemčive za sveobuhvatniji pristup (npr. putem prethod-nih ispitavanja percepcije javnosti o pretnjama i rizicima). Kao rezultat toga, izazovi, pretnje i rizici su u ovim dokumentima rangirani na tri nivoa: lokal-nom, regionalnom i globalnom, bez jasnih prioriteta i diferencijacije.120 Stoga, u slučaju Nacionalne strategije bezbednosti, kao prioritetni su praćeni kriteri-jumi koji se odnose na lokalni nivo, umesto sveobuhvatnog pristupa kojim bi se pokušalo nadograditi na detaljniju klasifikaciju ovih.

Bezbednosne strategije i doktrinarni okvir na lokalnom nivou, identifikuju četiri kategorije pretnji i rizika za Albaniju: organizovani kriminal, terorizam, prirodne katastrofe i probleme vezani za tranziciju. U slučaju organizovanog kriminala, ovaj pojam se odnosi na različite oblike nelegalne trgovine, prven-stveno drogom, ljudima, konvencionalnim naoružanjem, itd. U slučaju Alba-nije, poseban akcenat je stavljen na unutrašnju bezbednost, ilegalne migracije (npr. problem albanskih emigranata u drugim zemljama) ili nekontrolisano naseljavanje stanovništva u samoj zemlji.

119 Pogledati Zakon br. 9322, 25. novembar 2004., “O odobravanju Nacionalne strategije bezbednosti Republike Albanije” (Službeni glasnik, br. 98, 2004, str. 6697) i Zakon br. 9858, 27. decembar 2007., „Usvajanje Vojne strategije Republike Albanije” (Službeni glasnik, br. 184, 2007, str. 5802).

120 Za analitički pregled dokumenta Nacionalne strategije bezbednosti i opaženih pretnji, pogledajte: Sotiraq Hroni, Gjen.Let, Pellumb Qazimi: View from Albania-Study on assessment og regional security and Challenges in the Western Balkans, Istvam Gyarmati i Darko Stančić (eds.), DCAF (Ženevski centar za demokratsku kontrolu oružanih snaga), 2007, str.57.


Međutim, ono što se može naći u Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti su ne-jasni i nedovoljno razrađeni pojmovi koji se smatraju terminima za označava-nje rizika, kao što su “dezinformisanje javnog mnjenja” ili “nedovoljan razvoj obrazovanja, nauke i kulture”. S obzirom na pretnje i izazove za regionalnu bezbednost, važno je napomenuti da su Nacionalna strategija bezbednosti i vojska bili pod uticajem istorijskog nasleđa i geostrateškog značaja zemlje kao ključnih faktora u određivanju bezbednosnog okruženja. U tom kontekstu, nacionalni dokumenat bezbednosti jasno definiše da „destabilizacija regiona kroz oživljavanje želje za ostvarenjem preuveličanih nacionalističkih projekata i razvoja trans-nacionalnih etničkih sukoba, predstavlja opasnost za bezbed-nost Republike Albanije“.121

S druge strane, oba dokumenta zvanično potvrđuju ubeđenje kreatora poli-tike da susedi nisu glavna pretnja bezbednosti u regionu, već da su pretnje pre internog porekla, kao što su politička nestabilnost, slaba ekonomija i organizo-vani kriminal. U slučaju Albanije, takozvano “albansko nacionalno pitanje” je postavljeno kao jedan od prioriteta među strateškim bezbednosnim ciljevima i predloženo je da se „albansko nacionalno pitanje ostvari kroz evropske i evro-atlantske integracije“. Dakle, čini se da je Albanija više fokusirana na pitanja evropeizacije izbegavanjem bilo kakvog nacionalističkog pristupa i traženjem rešenja za “albansko pitanje” u okviru svog članstva u NATO-u i budućeg član-stva u EU.

U međuvremenu, u prvom istraživanju u vezi sa bezbednosnim pretnjama i NATO integracijama koje je sproveo Institut za demokratiju i medijaciju u aprilu-maju 2007. godine, od ispitanika se tražilo da rangiraju pretnje na skali rizika od 1 do 6 (najveći broj označava najveći rizik). Pretnje su rangirali sle-dećim redosledom: korupcija (4.6), siromaštvo i ekonomska stagnacija (4.4), neuspeh demokratskih reformi (3.64)122. Ova četiri elementa se smatraju još opasnijim za nacionalnu bezbednost od spoljnih faktora, kao što su terorizam, regionalni sukobi, i tako dalje.

121 Kastriot Islami (bivši Ministar spoljnih poslova Albanije 2003-2005), Nacionalna bez-bednost u kontekstu regionalnih rizika i pretnji (izveštaj sa međunarodne konferencije): “On the development of the national security strategy”, Tirana 21. septembar 2007, u organizaciji Instituta za demokratiju i medijaciju i Ženevskog centra za demokratsku kontrolu oružanih snaga (DCAF)

122 Besnik Baka, Albanija: Bezbednosne pretnje i percepcije (ÇËSHTJE TË SIGURISË), Tromesečni žurnal br. 11, Institut za demokratiju i medijaciju, Tirana, 2009, str. 74-90.


Na ovaj način, jasno definisanje izazova, rizika i pretnji na nacionalnom, regionalnom i globalnom nivou ostaje nedovršeno, posebno u okviru doku-menata nacionalne strategije bezbednosti. Samo “mapiranje rizika i pretnji”, zasnovano na jasnim kriterijumima, može da pomogne u određivanju najvišeg holističkog koncepta strategija nacionalne bezbednost i odbrane. Diferenci-jacija i prioritizacija izazova, rizika i pretnji trebali bi biti nužno povezani sa drugim aspektima, a ne tradicionalnim bezbednosnim konceptima, kao što su državni suverenitet, teritorijalni integritet, itd. Pridržavajući se tih koncepata, strategija nacionalne bezbednosti je izgubila mogućnost da bude osmišljena u okviru ljudske bezbednosti.

Sa stanovišta klasifikacije izazova, rizika i pretnji, oba dokumenta nacional-ne bezbednosti jednostavno slede red geografske raspodele rizika (globalni, regionalni ili lokalni nivo), međutim, svakome od njih nedostaje definicija skale i intenziteta izazova, rizika i pretnji u kratkom, u srednjem i dugom roku.

S obzirom da se nalaze u istom regionu i da se suočavaju sa gotovo istim pretnjama, zemlje jugoistočne Evrope, ili, kako se često nazivaju - zemlje za-padnog Balkana - verovatno nemaju različite vizije u pogledu uticaja novog strateškog koncepta NATO-a. Kao što je pokazano tokom ove konferencije, uprkos različitih političkih odnosa između zemalja regiona sa NATO-om, zajednička i očigledna briga za region su mir, sigurno i stabilno okruženje. Mišljenja eksperata iz civilnog društva, istraživačkih institucija iz Srbije, Crne Gore, Bosne i Hercegovine, Republike Srpske (kao dela Bosne i Hercegovine), uglavnom su usaglašena oko toga da su bezbednosna pitanja istovremeno na-cionalna, kao i regionalna pitanja.

Strategije naspram strategijskog pregleda odbrane

Za glavne političke i institucionalne aktere u Albaniji, periodični pregled osnovnih bezbednost dokumenata Republike Albanije, poznat kao “Nacio-nalna strategija bezbednosti”, je potreban i zakonski obavezan. Ovaj pregled postavlja dosta pitanja uglavnom zbog dinamike u bezbednosnom okruženju, bilo na lokalnom, regionalnom ili globalnom nivou. Strateški dokumenti Al-banije nisu promenjeni od 2007. godine, dok je češći pregled vojne strategije (2002, 2005 i 2007) ubrzan samo zbog budućeg članstva u NATO-u.


Poslednji pregled dokumenta strategije odbrane je sproveden skoro dve go-dine pre nego što je Albanija postala punopravna članica NATO-a (3. april 2009). Ovaj dokument ostaje na snazi i još uvek nije predmet bilo kakvih raz-matranja, s obzirom da se odnosi na strategiju Ministarstva odbrane za peri-od od 2007 do 2013. godine. Taj dokument je postao važan za predvođenje oružanih snaga u njihovim naporima da ispune ciljeve predviđene u okvoru strateške doktrine. To je kasnije omogućilo da na samitu u Bukureštu, 3. aprila 2008. godine, Albaniji budu upućen poziv za članstvo u NATO-u.

Po završetku “faze članstva u NATO-u”, te uzimajući u obzir da je Albanija postala punopravna članica Alijanse, sada bi trebalo preći na novu fazu razvoja odbrambene strategije. U skladu sa novim strateškim konceptom, od Albanije se zahteva da preispita svoje finansijske i ljudske kapacitete, kao i da analizira obaveze koje proizilaze iz učešća u međunarodnim misijama NATO-a.

Albanija uvažava i deli mišljenje da je pregled dokumenata koji se odnose na odbranu i bezbednost proces diktiran ne samo obavezama koje proizilaze iz članstva u NATO-u, već i geopolitičkim promenama u regionu. Srbija se trenutno približava članstvu u EU, što je, u tom kontekstu, veoma značajna činjenica.


“Budući bezbednosni koncept Srbije“

Milan Karagaća123

Svedoci smo svakodnevnih sporenja da li je za Srbiju bolje članstvo u NATO-u ili vojna neutralnost. Po tom pitanju se delimo na patriote i izdajnike, evroen-tuzijaste i evroskeptike, pa čak i NATO plaćenike, i one druge. Međutim, sve to je više u funkciji dnevnopolitičkih interesa, nego ozbiljnog formulisanja vizije i koncepta bezbednosti Srbije. Bezbednost se isključivo ili pretežno svodi na vojsku i odbranu, pri čemu se zanemaruju ostali, izuzetno važni segmenti bezbednosti. Odnos Srbije prema NATO-u je prevashodno spoljno-političko pitanje i zato se mora posmatrati u celokupnom kontekstu spoljne politike, jer je to pitanje drža-ve, a ne samo vojske. To i jesu neki od ključnih uzroka odsustva ozbiljnih raspra-va o budućem bezbednosnom konceptu Srbije. Bez ozbiljne rasprave koja ništa a priori ne prihvata niti odbacuje, nema ni optimalnih ni državno-odgovornih rešenja. U svakom slučaju, Srbija ne može da vodi politiku duplih koloseka kada su u pitanju Zajednička bezbednosna i odbrambena politika EU i NATO, naru-čito uzevši u obzir njihovu kompatibilnost.

123 Autor je penzionisani pukovnik, član Foruma za međunarodne odnose Evropskog pokreta u Srbiji


Srbija u traženju bezbednosnog koncepta za

budućnost – opcije i fikcije

Rasprava o budućem bezbednosnom konceptu ne može i ne sme biti sve-dena na kviz pitalice da li volimo NATO ili ne, da li želimo članstvo u toj orga-nizaciji ili ne, da li će to doneti nekoliko izbornih poena ili ne, već da li NATO jeste i može li biti okvir za najoptimalniji bezbednosni koncept Srbije. U Srbiji još uvek preovladava uprošćen pristup po kome se bezbednost isključivo ili pretežno svodi na vojsku i odbranu, pri čemu se zanemaruju izuzetno važni segmenti bezbednosti države i građana, kao što su energetska, ekološka, infor-matička, socijalna, ekonomska i ljudska bezbednost, kao i sigurnost građana od svih oblika ugrožavanja. To podrazumeva sistem umrežene bezbednosti na državnom nivou uz aktivno učešće svih vladinih i nevladinih aktera, a ne samo vojske i policije.

Kada je formulisana i u Skupštini usvojena deklaracija kojom se Srbija opre-deljuje za vojnu neutralnost, niko nije tražio da se o tome građani izjasne na referendumu. Sada zagovornici vojne neutralnosti insistiraju na referendumu po pitanju članstva u NATO-u. Međutim, kao što je ministar Šutanovac rekao, „da je Ataturk organizovao referendum, nikada ne bi sproveo reforme“, ili „da je Vuk Karadžić išao na referendum o pravopisu, mi danas ne bismo imali moderno pismo“. Dakle, politička elita je izabrana, preuzela je odgovornost, i stoga mora imati dovoljno hrabrosti da donese odluke koje se nekome i neće svideti.

Srbija je izložena najvećem broju globalnih i svim regionalnim rizicima, pretnjama i izazovima, kao i nekim specifičnim sa kojim se mnoge druge ze-mlje ne suočavaju. Kao balkanska, centralnoervropska, podunavska i evropska država, Srbija najveći broj svojih strateških ciljeva i vitalnih nacionalnih in-teresa, uključujući i njene legitimne interese na Kosovu, ostvaruje u realnom okruženju u kome EU i NATO determinišu politički, ekonomski i bezbedno-sni okvir. To mora biti polazna osnova za svako ozbiljno i državno odgovorno razmatranje interesa Srbije u odnosima sa EU i NATO-om.

Savremeni izazovi, rizici i pretnje zahtevaju da taj koncept bude pouzdan, dugoročan, siguran, efikasan, interoperabilan, ali i racionalan i ekonomski optimalan. Ciljevi kojima se stalno mora težiti je bezbednija Srbija u jednom


boljem regionu, bezbedniji region u jednoj boljoj Evropi i bezbednija Evropa u jednom boljem svetu, upravo kako je formulisano Evropskom bezbednosnom strategijom.

Upravo stoga, Srbija mora da vrlo pažljivo i odgovorno formuliše viziju svo-je bezbednosti za 21. vek i da dođe do strateškog koncepta kao dugoročnog i održivog projekta državne i nacionalne bezbednosti. Kao mala zemlja, Srbija može da bira između nekoliko poznatih strateških opcija:

1. neutralnosti ili nesvrstanog angažmana;2. bezbednosnog partnerstva i inicijativa; 3. kolektivne bezbednosti u okviru OUN; 4. kooperativne bezbednosti u okviru OEBS-a; 5. ad-hoc saveza; 6. solidarnosti u okviru EU; i 7. kolektivne odbrane i partnerstva u okviru NATO-a.

Kako doći do najboljeg koncepta? Tako što ćemo se njime ozbiljno pozaba-viti. Mogli bismo poći od proste kvantifikacije i komparacije efikasnosti svake opcije u odnosu na svaki savremeni izazov.

Vojna neutralnost je, za sada, zvanična opcija. Svi relevantni činioci geostra-teškog položaja Srbije svrstavaju je u red malih zemalja u svetu, sa svim bezbed-nosnim dodatnim rizicima koji proizilaze iz takvog statusa. Ona je izložena naj-većem broju globalnih rizika, a nekima i više od mnogih drugih zemalja.

Odluka za opciju vojne neutralnosti najpre podrazumeva da država odluči da li je sprema i sposobna da se sama suprotstavi pretnjama, ili će pak ima-ti saveznike. Neutralnost podrazumeva da država nema vojnih saveznika, što znači da mora da ima adekvatnu sopstvenu vojsku koja će po brojnosti i opre-mljenosti moći da odgovori izazovima, i koja će biti argument za uvažavanje takvog statusa od strane drugih. Da bi zemlja bila neutralna, ona mora da vodi neutralnu spoljnu politiku koja je međunarodno prihvaćena kao takva. Srbija nikako ne može da se pozove na istoriju neutralne spoljne politike. Ne može se reći da je Srbija izbegavala učešće u vojnim konfliktima, niti je racionalno očekivati da bi bila neutralna u nekim budućim vojnim sukobima u kojima bi njeni interesi bili ugroženi.


Neutralnost Srbije nije međunarodno priznata, ni prećutno ni izričito, niti je realno očekivati da će se to dogoditi. S druge strane, nisu ispunjene ključne pretpostavke vojne neutralnosti, kao što su:

• povoljan odnos subjekata međunarodnih odnosa prema proklamova-noj neutralnosti;

• odgovarajući geostrateški položaj zemlje;• stabilna unutrašnja bezbednosna situacija; • sposobnost razvijanja autonomnih odbrambenih kapaciteta;• razvijena i stabilna ekonomija;• visok BDP;• izjava države da se opredeljuje za taj status;• prihvatanje, priznavanje i garantovanje takvog statusa od strane trećih

država;• poseban ili specifičan istorijski kontekst ubedljivih razloga.

To samo po sebi dovoljno govori da je vojna neutralnost samo fikcija, a nikako ozbiljna opcija.

Opravdavanje zalaganja za vojnu neutralnost time da je srpski narod najveći stradalnik u Evropi u 20. veku, te da je Srbija najpogodnija veza između Ev-rope, Azije, Bliskog Istoka i Sredozemlja i da se nalazi na osetljivom području jugo-istočne Evrope, gde se prepliću raznovrsni strategijski interesi, zapravo su najjači argumenti protiv vojne neutralnosti, pogotovo ako ne želimo da nam se ta stradanja ponove.

Ako se uporedimo sa nekim od neutralnih evropskih zemalja, tek tada dol-azimo do argumenata koji ne idu u prilog neutralnosti, jer bi građani Srbije morali mnogo više da plaćaju, dok im pri tome bezbednost ne bi bila potpuno zagarantovana. Austrija ima vojni budžet od 2.263 milijarde dolara, što je 278 dolara po stanovniku ili 57.148 dolara po vojniku; Finska raspolaže sa 2.758 milijardi, odnosno 527 dolara po stanovniku ili 94.13 po vojniku. Iste, 2007. godine, Srbija je imala budžet od 578 miliona, što podrazumeva izdvajanje od 80 dolara po stanovniku ili 12.500 po vojniku godišnje. Pri tome, Austrija je imala 336 milijardi dolara BDP, Finska 213, a Srbija tek 54 milijarde.

Iz svega ovoga je jasno da je za Srbiju toliko izdvajanje za potrebe odbrane preskupo. Ako bi se posmatralo sa pozicije Austrije, izdvajanje za odbranu bi


za nas bilo 4,2 %, sve dok ne dostignemo BDP Austrije. S obzirom da je položaj Srbije u bezbednosnom pogledu mnogo složeniji u odnosu na bilo koju od navedenih zemalja, to bi značilo da bi neutralna Srbija morala posedovati bro-jnije i opremljenije oružane snage. Pri tome treba uzeti u obzir da bi se odmah na početku morala izdvojiti ogromna suma kako bi se dostigao sadašnji stepen opremljenosti oružanih snaga jedne Austrije.

Fizionomija savremenih pretnji, rizika, izazova i mogućnosti da im se u uslovima okruženosti članicama NATO-a i EU uspešno parira jasno poka-zuje da je za Srbiju vojna neutralnost neadekvatna, neefikasna i ekonomski iscrpljujuća opcija. Spekulisanje da bi Srbija teoretski mogla da uđe u EU, a ostane van NATO-a, kao što su to učinile zemlje poput Irske, Austrije, Finske, Švedske, Malte i Kipra, te da je članstvo u EU solidna garancija bezbednosti jer EU ima autonomnu zajedničku bezbednosnu i odbrambenu politiku, je u osnovi na mestu, ali samo ako zanemarimo činjenicu da Srbija niti u geografs-kom, ni u bilo kom drugom smislu nije ni Austrija ni Finska.

Savezništvo sa nekom drugom zemljom ili grupom zemalja pretpostavlja spremnost te zemlje ili te grupe zemalja da preuzmu obavezu da doprinose bezbednosti Srbije. Pod uslovom da se Rusija i NATO nađu u konfrontaciji, što trenutno nije u izgledu, vojno savezništvo sa Rusijom bi vodilo značajnom povećanju rizika upravo po bezbednost Srbije i njenih građana jer bi umanjilo saradnju sa Severno-atlantskim savezom koji je okružuje.

Promenljivo savezništvo očito nije prihvatljivo niti podnošljivo za male zemlje, jer takav “luksuz’ mogu priuštiti samo velike i regionalne sile.

Bezbednosno partnerstvo i inicijative se podrazumevaju prvenstveno u regionu, ali oni sami po sebi nisu dovoljni, kao ni isključivo oslanjanje na kolektivnu bezbednost u okviru OUN-a ili kooperativnu bezbednost u okviru OEBS-a.

Kolektivna odbrana i partnerstvo u okviru NATO-a je opcija koja svakako zaslužuje posebnu pažnju. Naime, zbog sopstvene bezbednosti, interesovanje Sr-bije za NATO je mnogo veće nego obrnuto, dok interes Alijanse za unapređenje odnosa sa Srbijom proizilazi iz činjenice da je ona realni i nezaobilazan činilac na Balkanu, te je utoliko bolje ako Srbija bude deo rešenja a ne problema.


Istorijsko nasleđe, nedovoljno poznavanje NATO-a, kao i stranačke i medi-jske manipulacije, tri su ključne odrednice našeg odnosa prema NATO-u i pre-preke su za ozbiljnije rasprave. Rezultat toga je i pogrešan celokupan pristup tom pitanju, tretiranjem ovog, prvenstveno spoljno-političkog pitanja, kao da je pitanje unutrašnje politike, gde emotivno dominira nad racionalnim, i koje se posmatra više kao vrednosno nego bezbednosno pitanje. Ozbiljan pristup zahteva da se razmotri šta je zapravo NATO, na koji način se do sada trans-formisao i u kom pravcu ide, u kakvim smo danas odnosima i kakva je njihova percepcija budućnosti.

Po okončanju hladnog rata, NATO se našao u procesu transformacije čiji je krajnji rezultat još uvek otvoren. Verovatno je da će se od kolektivnog vojnog saveza pod američkim vođstvom transformisati u bezbednosnu zajednicu demokratskih država koja će multilateralno povezivati njihove vojne kapac-itete. Bila bi to bezbednosno-politička organizacija, čije bi se primarne vojne funkcije sastojale u omogućavanju formiranja ad-hoc koalicija, dok bi prema susedima imala konstruktivan odnos, posebno Rusiji koja bi u dugoročnoj perspektivi mogla da pristupi ovoj zajednici ili bi s njom ostvarila vrlo bliske odnose. Takva ‘OEBS-izacija’ NATO-a bi bila kompatibilna sa UN-om, jer bi NATO uvažavao odluke Saveta bezbednosti UN-a u očuvanju mira.

U kojem pravcu će se odvijati transformacija najpre zavisi od toga koliko će jačati unilateralne tendencije američke politike, koliko će evropski uticaj u SAD-u nastaviti sa slabljenjem i konačno, od budućnosti Evropske bezbed-nosne i odbrambene politike i rešenosti Evrope da snažnije istakne svoju sa-mosvojnost.

Nije sasvim isključeno da će skraćenica NATO-a (Not Activity Talking Only, kako su je često prevodili do 90-ih godina prošlog veka) u budućnosti dobiti novi smisao u četiri S: Sada Skoro Sasvim Staromodan (Now Almost Totally Obsolete). NATO je prošao dug proces promena i transformacije, da-nas nije ono što je bio pre 10 godina, niti će za 10 godina će biti ono što je danas, jer se nalazi u procesu transformacije od kolektivnog vojnog saveza ka otvorenoj bezbednosnoj zajednici. Shodno tome, vreme je da i Srbija shvati da ni ona sama nije ono što je bila pre 10 godina, a da će za 10 godina biti drugačija, i nadamo se, mnogo bolja nego danas.


Razmatranjima odnosa Srbije i NATO-a, prvenstveno iz dnevnopolitičkih razloga, dominiraju emocije, a ne argumenti, što je sa stanovišta nacionalnog i državnog interesa neodgovorno posezanje za podelama za i protiv, na pa-triote i nepatriote, one kojima je do „nacionalnog dostojanstva i identiteta“ i one koji ne razumeju „dušu našeg naroda“. Imajući u vidu nesrećnu hipoteku prošlosti, svaka kvalifikacija krivice osim obostrane bila bi neodgovorna i ne vodi konstruktivnoj raspravi, iako je nesporno da je NATO bombardovao Srbiju.

Da je to mnogo više unutrašnjepolitička manipulacija političara govori činjenica da smo odmah posle peto-oktobarskih promena, znači samo dve godine nakon bombardovanja, uspešno sarađivali sa NATO-om u sprečava-nju sukoba i rešavanju krize na jugu Srbije, a u martu 2003. godine u zaustav-ljanju pogroma i nasilja nad Srbima na Kosovu. Uporedo sa tim, počeli smo sondiranje, izražavanje namere i traženje podrške za što skoriji napredak ka evroatlantskim integracijama i NATO-u. Dakle, u kratkom periodu pređen je put od konfrontacije do dijaloga, dok je svega 3 godine nakon bombardo-vanja, krajem aprila 2002. godine, Vrhovni savet odbrane kojim je predseda-vao dr. Vojislav Koštunica, uputio Saveznoj vladi preporuku o pokretanju procesa pristupanja programu Partnerstvo za mir (PzM). Imali smo ekspan-ziju saradnje sa zemljama NATO-a i samom Alijansom, insistirali smo da što pre budemo primljeni u PzM sa vizijom da idemo ka punopravnom članstvu u NATO-u, kako bismo se u jednom trenutku prisetili da su nas oni, ipak, bombardovali.

Do kraja 2003. godine smo normalizovali odnose sa NATO-om i sa više od 20 država potpisali sporazume o bilateralnoj saradnji. Do polovine 2004. godi-ne, oko 800 vojnih i civilnih lica iz sistema odbrane je bilo obuhvaćeno raznim programima školovanja, kurseva, serminara, konferencija i drugih aktivnosti u inostranstvu, a preko 200 oficira su stekli znanje stranih jezika (engleskog, nemačkog, francuskog, italijanskog, grčkog) u skladu sa NATO standardima. Troškove, u iznosu od preko 2 miliona eura, snosile su najvećim delom zemlje članice NATO-a, ali i neke druge zemlje među kojima i Švajcarska.

Intenzivna saradnja na svim poljima rezultirala je i prijemom Srbije u PzM bez pominjanja Mladića kao preduslov, što je do tada bila nepremostiva pre-preka. Interesantno je istaći da su pojedinci koji se sada najviše protive nor-


malizaciji odnosa sa NATO-om tokom perioda, od 2001. do 2007. godine bili na vodećim funkcijama u tadašnjoj Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji, odnosno Srbiji.

Koliko je dosledno ako se svaki razgovor o NATO-u odbija argumentom da nas je NATO bombardovao, no kad je u pitanju PzM ili članstvo EU, gde su iste te zemlje, onda nam to ne smeta? Naravno, nije moguće jednostavno zabo-raviti na prošlost i činjenice, međutim, stalno insistiranje na tome i korišćenje tog argumenta za političke kampanje je beskorisno i nikuda ne vodi. Bilo bi mudrije ugledati se na pragmatizam drugih zemalja, pa i same Srbije. Srbija je već 1951. godine normalizovala odnose sa Nemačkom – zemljom koja je 1945. godine bila sravnjena sa zemljom od strane američke i britanske avijacije, a koja je već 1955. godine postala članicom Alijanse, u kojoj su upravo SAD i Velika Britanija bile vodeće sile. Zar nam zajedničko rešavanje krize na jugu Srbije 2001. godine nije najbolji primer uspešne saradnje Srbije sa NATO-om u sprečavanju sukoba na prostoru Preševske doline, ili u martu 2003.godine, kada je NATO zaustavio pogrom i nasilje nad Srbima na Kosovu?

Upravo ta iskustva bi trebala biti najbolji dokaz pozitivnih strana članstva u NATO-u, jer da je Srbija u to vreme bila članica PzM ili NATO-a, do bombar-dovanja ne bi došlo jer bismo bili u položaju da takvu mogućnost isključimo kao faktor pritiska u pregovorima. To treba da se ima u vidu kad se razmišlja o budućnosti, jer je bolje biti onaj koji razgovara nego neko o kome se razgovara - jednom rečju, uvek je bolje biti subjekat nego objekat.

Zapravo, tokom neuspešnih pregovora oko rešavanja pitanja Kosova, već 2007. godine nastupa period sve glasnije konfrontacije sa NATO-om i EU. Neke stranke, političari, javne ličnosti i mediji odjednom ponovo ističu da nas je NATO bombardovao; medijski se oživljavaju sećanja na 1999. godinu uz na-pomenu “da nam NATO otima Kosovo, da je tamo okupirao deo naše suverene teritorije, da sprovodi Ahtisatijev plan i pravi NATO državu na našoj terito-riji“, dok evroatlantske integracije postaju nepoželjan pojam i čak se iz ranijih dokumenata brišu. Sve to se koristi za izgovor protiv članstva u NATO-u, dok se zapravo radi i o odnosu prema EU.

Nešto ubedljivije je obrazloženje da je Srbija od 2000. godine bila uklju-čena u politički proces u pravcu integracija u NATO ali da je, nakon prizna-


vanja nezavisnosti Kosova od strane velikog broja članica NATO-a, koje su potom učestvovale i u formiranju kosovskih bezbednosnih snaga, nastupila nova politička realnost. Premda i dalje ostaje činjenica da nisu sve države čla-nice NATO priznale nezavisnost Kosova, i nameće se pitanje zbog čega nam ne smeta članstvo u EU ako su sve, izuzev njenih pet članica priznale, priznale to isto nezavisno Kosovo.

Da je u pitanju unutrašnje-političko i stranačko nadmudrivanje koje narod

vodi u svojevrsnu trilemu, pokazuje i činjenica da smo od opredeljenosti za evroatlantske integracije evoluirali ka vojnoj neutralnosti, doneli skupštinsku deklaraciju, a onda se u “Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti” neutralnost i ne pominje.

Dakle, novembra 2004. godine je usvojena “Strategija odbrane Srbije i Crne Gore”, gde je kao cilj proklamovan ulazak u program Partnerstvo za mir i NATO, dok u „Strategijskom pregledu odbrane“, koji je usvojen 7. juna 2006. godine na Kolegijumu ministra odbrane, stoji: “Vitalni bezbednosni i odbram-beni interesi su: odbrana Republike Srbije, saradnja i pristupanje evroatlant-skim integracijama, Evropskoj uniji i drugim međunarodnim organizacijama i institucijama, izgradnja poverenja, bezbednosti i stabilnosti u regionu i spro-vođenje Rezolucije 1244 Saveta bezbednosti UN o Kosovu i Metohiji“.

„Osnovu politike odbrane Republike Srbije čini njena evroatlantska spolj-nopolitička orijentacija, i opredeljenje da se aktivno uključi u proces saradnje i zajedničkog delovanja sa drugim državama i subjektima međunarodnih od-nosa, na izgradnji globalne, regionalne i nacionalne bezbednosti“ i „razvijanje i unapređivanje partnerskih odnosa sa sistemom kolektivne bezbednosti, su-sednim i drugim državama.“

U Deklaraciji Narodne skupštine od 26. decembra 2007. godine, se navodi “Zbog celokupne uloge NATO pakta, od protivpravnog bombardovanja Srbije 1999. godine bez odluke Saveta bezbednosti do Aneksa 11 odbačenog Ahtisa-rijevog plana, u kome se određuje da je NATO konačni organ vlasti u nezavi-snom Kosovu, Narodna skupština Republike Srbije donosi odluku o proglaša-vanju vojne neutralnosti Republike Srbije u odnosu na postojeće vojne saveze do eventualnog raspisivanja referenduma na kojem bi se donela konačna od-luka o tom.”


Zatim, u “Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti”, koja je usvojena krajem 2009. godine, neutralnost se ne pominje već se kaže da “politika odbrane afirmiše sistem kooperativne bezbednosti, integracija u evropske i druge međunarodne bezbednosne strukture i učešće u NATO programu Partnerstvo za mir”, i “dostizanje interoperabilnosti sa sistemima odbrane tih država”, te da će “izgrađivati kapacitete i sposobnosti sistema nacionalne bezbednosti u skladu sa standardima i obavezama koje proizilaze iz Evropske bezbednosne i od-brambene politike“.

Odnosi Srbije i NATO-a su prošli kroz nekoliko faza, počevši od međusobnog uvažavanja, konfrontacije i neprijateljstva, preko dijaloga i nor-malizacije odnosa, do kooperacije. Trenutno su odnosi prilično ambivalentni jer kao članica PzM, Srbija zvanično nastoji da unapredi saradnju do stepena dobijanja statusa kandidata, dok se s druge strane odvija izuzetno snažna an-ti-NATO kampanja koja počiva na percepciji NATO-a u hladnoratovskom mentalnom sklopu i, naravno, oživljava medijski podgrejanu uvređenost zbog bombardovanja srpskih položaja u BiH i agresije na Srbiju 1999. godine. Po-tencira se da zbog toga „narod ima psihološku barijeru i odbojnost prema ulasku u NATO-u“, iako jedno vreme to nije bilo slučaj, čak i onda kada su sećanja bila mnogo svežija.

NATO kao opcija nije nužno sudbina, ali jeste realnost Srbije. NATO je okruženje koje bitno utiče na njen celokupni bezbednosno-politički i međunarodni položaj, bez obzira na odsustvo Srbije kada se o tim pitanjima razgovara. Odgovoran pristup prema budućnosti podrazumeva odgovor na ključno pitanje da li bi i na koji način naša bezbednost bila čvršće zagaran-tovana, po koju ekonomsku i, eventualno, političku cenu, odnosno, koje su prednosti, a koje moguće negativne posledice svake opcije, uključujući i part-nerstvo sa NATO-om, kao i ulazak u Savez. U tom smislu, već sada je moguće odgovoriti na nekoliko dilema.

• Ulaskom Srbije u Savez, njena bezbednost se povećava samim time što isključuje neprijateljstvo sa NATO-om, a naročito zbog toga što bi ušla u sistem kolektivne odbrane i postala deo moćne partnerske političko-bezbednosne organizacije, ravnopravan partner sa njenim članicama i našim susedima.

• Odluke donete u NATO-u utiču na globalnu, evropsku, regionalnu, kao i bezbednost Srbije, bez obzira da li je Srbija članica Alijanse ili ne.


Međutim, ako bi Srbija bila članica, NATO ne bi mogao da donosi od-luke koje, posredno ili neposredno, imaju negativne posledice po bez-bednost Srbije, jer se odluke donose jednoglasno.

• Ulaskom u Alijansu, Srbija bi ojačala svoj međunarodni položaj jer bi poluge njene spoljne i bezbednosne politike bile jače, te bi bila privlačnija za strana ulaganja, što bi omogućilo brži ekonomski razvoj.

• Otvara se i mogućnost ne samo za modernizaciju i konverziju vojne industrije, već i za proizvodnju i prodaju robe široke potrošnje tržištu koje obuhvata preko 900 miliona stanovnika, a čiji je vojska veliki potrošač. Modernizacija i opremanje sopsvenih oružanih snaga je eko-nomski podnošljivije od neutralnosti koja je daleko skuplja, a pruža manje sigurnosti.

• Ako Srbija ostane izvan NATO-a, sve navedene prednosti otpadaju jer bi bila okružena članicama Saveza, i u svakom pogledu bi bila u inferi-ornom položaju, jer su sredstva Srbije za očuvanje bezbednosti daleko ograničenija od sredstava koja bi imala kao deo Saveza.

• S obzirom da se Kosovo uvek koristi kao emotivni izgovor, treba post-aviti pitanje na koji način će Srbija biti sigurnija i lakše rešavati i pi-tanje Kosova, efikasnije ga „odbraniti i vratiti pod puni suverenitet Srbije“, ako smo zbog neutralnosti u zategnutim, a ne normalnim i prijateljskim odnosima sa okruženjem. Zapravo, potrebno je postaviti pitanje koliko je štetno da svoje zalaganje za neutralnost dokazujemo neprijateljstvom prema NATO-u, dok su istovremeno snage KFOR-a i EULEX-a na Kosovu.

• Bojazan da bi Rusija postala neprijatelj Srbije je neosnovana jer Rusija nije u neprijateljskim odnosima sa NATO-om, niti sa pojedinačnim zemljama članicama. Najnovije približavanje Rusije NATO-u će uticati i na pozitivniju percepciju NATO kod nas.

• Neosnovane su takođe i tvrdnje da bi Srbija ulaskom u NATO nanela štetu strateškim interesima Rusije i time dovela u pitanje političke (KiM) i ekonomske (snabdevanje energijom) interese koji zavise od podrške Ru-sije. Veoma je diskutabilno da li Rusija smatra Srbiju toliko strateški zna-čajnom. Rusija isporučuje energente članicama NATO-a, a što se Kosova tiče, ono će se svakako rešavati i uz rusku podršku dijalogu.

• Već sada je deplasirano pitanje da li bi ulaskom u NATO Srbija indirekt-no priznala legitimitet vojne intervencije protiv SRJ 1999. godine, i svim odlukama o konačnom statusu Kosova koje se kose sa njenim interesima.


• Opasnost da će Srbija biti izložena većim rizicima i novim transnacio-nalnim i asimetričnim pretnjama, kao što su međunarodni terorizam i islamski fundamentalizam, takođe je samo jedan od izgovora. Opa-snosti postoje i inače, a Srbija nema aspiracije ni da u okviru NATO-a šalje svoje intervencionističke kontingente bilo gde. Kako stvari stoje, ni NATO to više neće činiti u istoj formi jer je svima jasno da se mir ne donosi ratom već njegovim sprečavanjem.

Iako se na prvi pogled vidi da je NATO najpouzdaniji koncept, a neutral-nost samo fikcija i politička floskula, ipak ne znači da treba srljati u NATO i opstruisati konstruktivnu raspravu, već da svaku opciju treba svestrano raz-motriti i ništa unapred ne odbacivati.

Odbacivanje NATO-a pozivanjem na patriotizam nije niša drugo do ma-skiranje otpora prema evropskom putu modernizaciji Srbije. S druge strane, nekritičko zalaganje nekih nevladinih organizacija za ulazak Srbije u NATO, koje pri tome bezrezervno opravdavaju bombardovanje SRJ, predstavlja zapra-vo najbolju anti-NATO kampanju.

Uporedo sa otvaranjem dijaloga sa Kosovom i deblokiranjem procesa pri-druživanja EU, čini se da se stvaraju uslovi da se konačno i bez ostrašćenosti započne ozbiljna i argumentovana rasprava o odnosima Srbije sa NATO-om. Da smo u NATO-u, verovatno bi i format pregovora oko Kosova bio drugačiji. Da smo od početka 1990-ih bili u NATO-u, verovatno nam se ne bi desilo ono što se desilo; da smo tada ušli u NATO, ne bi bilo razloga da NATO na tako brutalan način ulazi kod nas.

Patriotizam se ne dokazuje suštim ponavljanjem kako nas je NATO bom-bardovao, već iznalaženjem okvira i koncepta koji će Srbiji i njenim građanima omogućiti najbezbedniji i najsigurniji život, pa makar to bio i savez sa NATO-om. Pri tome, odnosi NATO-Rusija i trend njihovog razvoja nas uopšte ne sputavaju da izaberemo NATO kao opciju. Štaviše. S druge strane, ako po-državamo sve naše susede da postanu članice NATO-a, kao što je izjavio naš predsednik u Crnoj Gori, zašto ne bi smo podržali i sebe na tom putu? Ako je interes Srbije iznad svega, onda to mora biti i merilo za izbor najboljeg koncep-ta koji osigurava ostvarenje tih interesa.


Novi NATO i nova Srbija: šta sa neutralnošću?

Dr Mihajlo Basara124

Tokom 2000-ih postalo je jasnije da Srbija nema kritičnu masu za reforme. Velike nade koje je pobudio 5. oktobar pokazale su se kao trenutni kompromis o prevratu i istopile su se u ideološkom regradiranju i neiscrpnim stranačkim borbama za vlast. Da put Srbije bude teži, ovim unutrašnjim negativnim ten-dencijama pridružuje se NATO svojom podrškom nezavisnom Kosovu i time učvršćuje antinatovsko raspoloženje u Srbiji, te otežava reformski put Srbije ka EU. Davanjem podrške nezavisnosti Kosova, broj bezbednosnih rizika u regionu sa državnim, etničkim i verskim korenima je povećan, a srpska reakcija Rezolu-cijom o neutralnosti više odražava nemoć, nego racionalno zasnovano strateško opredeljenje. Uprkos ovim negativnim trendovima, izvesnu nadu pruža činje-nica da u istom periodu evropska orijentacija postaje nepovratno većinska. To, takođe, upućuje na zaključak da političke elite i stranke razumeju da su bezbed-nosna i razvojna strategija oduvek bile u istom paketu. Stoga je jedina razumna opcija jedan bezbednosni kišobran sa susedima i zemljama sa kojima je nivo ekonomske razmene najobimniji i sa kojima Srbija deli ste vrednosti.

124 Autor je Pukovnik u penziji


Dve negativne evolucije

Od 5. oktobra 2000. godine - kada su probuđene nade građana Srbije u samu mogućnost promene i prosperitetniju budućnost - do danas, promenio se svet, i regionalno okruženje, pa i sama Srbija. Posle duboke ekonomske kri-ze koja se zametnula u centru savremenog demokratskog sveta, demokratija je, kao uzoran društveni i državni model, izgubila na nekadašnjem ugledu. Region nije postao bezbedniji u posleratnom vremenu, a bezbednosne pretnje i rizici postali su i brojniji i ozbiljniji. Rešenja koja su prekinula ratove (Dejton-ski i Kumanovski sporazumi) nisu na srpskoj strani (ni na drugim stranama) donela smirivanje, niti posleratnu mobilnost i preorijentaciju na mirnodopsku izgradnju zemlje. Samoproglašena deklaracija o nezavisnom Kosovu za Srbiju je „nova” tema na kojoj gubi dah u priključivanju evropskim demokratijama. Konačno, Srbija nema konsenzus ni po jednom strateški važnom pitanju svoga razvoja, a ostala su otvorena pitanja nacionalnog i državnog konstituisanja. Takav razvoj događaja zapravo je negativna evolucija jednog procesa koji je 5. oktobra 2000. započeo velikim nadama.

NATO je od 2000. godine takođe imao negativnu evoluciju, imajući u vidu „11.septembar” i akcije u Iraku i Avganistanu.125 Pokušaji da se prema potrebi pretvara iz vojne u političku organizaciju (i obrnuto, čak da se samodefiniše kao političko-vojna organizacija) nisu dali rezultate. Njegova nespretnost za kompleksne civilno-vojne zadatke nervira političare, a vojna nemoć, uprkos tehnološkoj superiornosti, nervira i političare i vojnike i vojnu industriju. Broj poginulih civila i vojnika u Iraku i Avganistanu, broj poginulih vojnika NA-TO-a i koalicionih snaga, nevidljivi rezultati u traganju za međunarodnom mrežom terorizma i kompromitovanje nehumanim odnosom prema zarobl-jenicima, dovoljni su građanima zapadnih zemalja (koji su bili propagandno pripremljeni kako bi podržali ove akcije NATO-a, kao i bombardovanje Ju-goslavije) da se, posle trijumfalizma zbog pobede u hladnom ratu, ozbiljnije zapitaju o funkcionalnosti NATO-a. Stručnjaci su to pitanje postavili odmah nakon pada Berlinskog zida, ali to nikad nije dovoljno niti za prst na čelu po-litičara.

Pogled na NATO iz Srbije, kao i svi ostali aspekti globalizacije i tranzicionih reformi, pati od višestrukih i često nepomirljivih perspektiva i interpretacija.

125 Videti: Transatlantic Trends Key findings 2010; (2010_English_Key.pdf); str.15 i 16.


Najistaknutije interpretacije izdiferencirale su tzv. dve Srbije. „Prva” Srbija je pobedila NATO u nepravednom ratu do koga je došlo bez srpske odgovorno-sti, a „druga” Srbija svu odgovornost za bombardovanje Srbije vidi u srpskoj politici, koja je, takođe potpuno, odgovorna za krah Jugoslavije i njen ratni raspad. Količina emocija koja ispunjava njihovu argumentaciju neprimerena je političkom polju i političkim sredstvima, a pogotovo analitičkom pristupu. Po tome, dve Srbije liče jedna na drugu, stvarajući samoopravdavajuće kohe-rentne doktrine (ideološko nasleđe socijalizma) o srpskoj istoriji i budućnosti. Po jednima su Srbi večni heroji, čiji patriotizam nikad nije dolazio u pitan-je (iako je baš raspad pokazao suprotno), drugi imaju „teoriju” o neupitnoj srpskoj ratnoj krivici i večnoj nesposobnosti Srba da se modernizuju. Nosioci ovakvih ideologija, razume se, imaju (racionalnu) korist za svoju političku po-ziciju. Oni, naime, politički i egzistencijalno dobro žive od takve argumenta-cije. Socijalna psihologija uči da se u masama emocije lako pobuđuju, a teško i sporo gase. Budući da je Srbija posleratna i poražena zemlja, politički pro-cesi u njoj su podjednako intenzivno ispunjeni emotivnim sadržajima kao i početkom ratnog raspada samoupravne Jugoslavije. Koristeći se time, politi-čke stranke i dalje, kao i tada, svojim populističkim (najčešće ekstremnim i iracionalnim) nastupom pokušavaju da se dokopaju vlasti nauštrb racionalne politike i logičke političke argumentacije. Tokom prve decenije 21. veka, po-stalo je jasnije da Srbija nema kritičnu masu za reforme. Peti oktobar je bio samo anti-miloševićevski prevrat. Upravo to i jeste najgori rezultat pokušaja da se Srbija reformiše. Domete i sudbinu postoktobarske Srbije, kao što reče Hana Arent za sudbinu revolucija126, odredio je režim kojem su „revoluciona-ri” Petog oktobra pripremili kraj. Srbija je, kao što se i predviđalo, nakon što je NATO zaveo mir, nastavila „rat”, sada sama sa sobom. Nije prošao ni jedan ceo dan od petog do šestog oktobra 2000. godine, a novi vlastodršci (tada je veliki deo građana verovao da se radi o novoj demokratski orijentisanoj eliti) su se vratili svojim ideologijama. Manjinski pokušaji da se odgovori obećanji-ma i preuzetim obavezama (prema Haškom tribunalu) rezultirali su ubistvom vodećeg reformiste Zorana Đinđića. Taj unutrašnji sukob, pored različitog vi-đenja raspada Jugoslavije i srpskog puta integrisanja u savremene ekonomske i političke tokove, dobio je i nove teme. Otvoreni su komunistički tabui, revalo-rizuje se i revidira istorija - ponovo ne kao konsenzus o potrebi revalorizacije, već kao novi razdor. Kako su elite beskompromisno istrajavale na crno-beloj

126 „Ništa ne izgleda razumljivije nego da vrstu i put revolucija određuje režim kome su pripremile kraj”, Hana Arent, O revoluciji, , “Filip Višnjić”, Beograd 1991., str.136.


Srbiji, a stvarnost išla svojim tokom, zaglavljene elite svojim interpretacijama više ne korespondiraju sa njom. Da put Srbije bude teži, ovim unutrašnjim negativnim tendencijama pridružuje se NATO svojom podrškom nezavisnom Kosovu (Deklaracija o nezavisnosti, najavljena decembra 2007. doneta je 17. februara 2008. godine) i time učvršćuje antinatovsko raspoloženje u Srbiji, a samim time i reformski put Srbije ka EU.

Tek, za javnost iznenađujući, prelom Srpske radikalne stranke (SRS), na proevropsko krilo (javno obelodanjeno nakon Nikolićeve izjave da će radi-kali u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srbije127 glasati za usvajanje Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju Evropskoj uniji128 septembra 2008.) i ostatak SRS, ukazao je na unutarstranačke procene da je izborna baza spremnija na reforme (racionalnija) od političkih elita. Odlomio se povelik antievropski lednik i upao u maticu koja plovi ka EU i time povratio nadu od oktobra 2000. godine.

Doprinos NATO-a anti-NATO raspoloženju građana Srbije

Regionalna bezbednost narušena je jednostranim proglašenjem neza-visnog Kosova, pod okriljem SAD, NATO-a i EU. To je danas glavni razlog što Srbija ne može da mobiliše svoju javnost da prihvati priključivanje NA-TO-u. Naime, nije više reč o tome da se ubedi opozicija toj ideji i da se pre-usmeri nasleđeni duh, već da se istovremeno kada NATO, kao izvor agre-sije, podržava teritorijalno cepanje Srbije, od nje očekuje da priđe vojnom savezu koji je to stanje proizveo. Kome je bila porebna brzina priznavanja nezavisnog Kosova, zašto je pokrenuta politika „standardi pre statusa“ (kao da se nije znalo da je neostvariva), a od koje se potom odustalo? Tim pre što bi Srbija bila zadovoljena formalnom suverenošću i otvorenim putem ka EU. To bi i za Kosovo bio brži i manje zahtevan put ka istom cilju. U okolnostima kada dobici od priključenja EU postanu uočljiviji, jedan novi referendum o nezavisnosti Kosova verovatno bi bio prihvatljiv za Srbiju. U isto vreme, pretpostavka da, ukoliko bi Balkan bezbednosno bio prepušten sam sebi, bez nadzora NATO-a ili EU, verovatnoća nove ratne politike bal-kanskih zemalja je realna i predvidiva. Podrškom nezavisnom Kosovu ta pretpostavka je dobila na snazi.

127 Videti: 128 Videti: http://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sporazum_o_stabilizaciji_i_pridru%C5%BEivanju


Pogledajmo najčešće razvijane ideje o razlozima za podršku nezavisnom Kosovu:

• vojno instaliranje na Kosovu (uključujući bazu Bondstil) čime se pouz-dano čuvaju interesi SAD na Balkanu,

• promena geopolitičke ravnoteže na Balkanu, jačanjem državnosti al-banskog faktora i uverenost da se time parira srpsko-ruskoj dominaciji,

• ekonomski interesi u materijalnim i ljudskim resursima (rezerve uglja i jeftine radne snage),

• regrutni rezervat za potrebe intervencija na svetskim ratištima,• kontrola budućih puteva nafte i gasa iz regiona Zakavkazja i Srednjeg

istoka, • zaštita ljudskih prava Albanaca koji ne mogu nastaviti zajednički život

sa Srbima u Srbiji, • kredibilitet NATO-a.

Ma šta od ovoga ili sve zajedno, bilo blisko istini, podrška jednostranom proglašenju nezavisnosti Kosova ostavlja nerešenim mnogo bezbednosnih pro-blema, te stvara i nove. U periodu Miloševićeve vlasti preuveličavan je značaj geopolitičkog položaja Srbije i njena geopolitička uloga. Objašnjenje za ponaša-nje zapada svodilo se na osudu imperijalizma pobednika hladnog rata i njihov pohod na istok. Verovalo se da je na tom putu, Srbija sa svojim geopolitičkim položajem, etničkim granicama i ujedinjavajućim ciljevima bila glavna smetnja, te je drobljenje srpske etničke teritorije i stvaranje malih država sa međusobnim tenzijama bilo najbolje sredstvo za kontrolu ovog geopolitičkog prostora. Pobor-nicima tih teza, davanje nezavisnosti Kosovu daju priliku da ponovo progovore.

Guranjem nezavisnosti Kosova, broj bezbednosnih rizika u regionu sa držav-nim, etničkim i verskim korenima je povećan. Susedi Srbije su naterani da od-lučuju protivno sopstvenim bezbednosnim interesima u regionu. Ispod ledenog brega intenzivirani su otvoreni ili latentni albansko-srpski, albansko-makedon-ski, albansko-crnogorski albansko-grčki, srpsko-makedonski, srpko-crnogor-ski, srpsko-hrvatski, srpsko-bošnjački, grčko-makedonski bezbednosni rizici. Gledajući unapred, teško je očekivati da demografski rast Albanaca može biti brzo sputan ekonomskim i demokratskim razvojem albanske manjine u Srbiji, Makedoniji, Crnoj Gori, Albaniji, Grčkoj, što ujedno znači i sporo napredovanje u oblasti bezbednosti u regionu. Bolno nasleđe održava tenzije preživljenih trau-ma u odnosima Srbije sa Bosnom i Hercegovinom i Hrvatskom.


Prekomponovanje granica i primena nasilnog multikulturalizma je isku-stvo srpskog naroda i, takođe, put u nesigurnost. Počelo je sa odbacivanjem saživota sa Srbijom u Jugoslaviji (multikulturalizam se tada nije ni pominjao). U nastavku događaja, dvostruki standardi jednostavno nisu mogli da se izbe-gnu u etničkoj šarolikosti svih novih država. Podržana je neodrživost multi-kulturne Jugoslavije, dok se insistira na multikulturalnoj Bosni i Hercegovini; odbacuje se multikulturna Srbija i konačno podržava multikulturalno Kosovo.

Sve navedene pretnje praćene su „modernim“ pretnjama koje najviše zagor-čavaju život građanima Srbije, pa i građanima svih drugih zemalja u delu sveta o kojem govorimo. Tu mislim na terorizam, organizovani kriminal, ekološke opasnosti, nekontrolisano korišćenje i širenje nuklearnog, hemijskog i bio-loškog oružja, industrijske akcidente, trgovinu ljudima i ljudskim organima, institucionalne slabosti. Time je suma pretnji uvećana u odnosu na stanje i proces u kojem bi teritorijalna celokupnost Srbije ostala nedirnuta.129

Šta sa neutralnošću?

U Narodnoj skupštini su 26. oktobra 2009. usvojene Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti, Strategija odbrane i zakoni o vojno-obaveštajnoj i vojno-bezbed-nosnoj agenciji, o radnoj i materijalnoj obavezi, o civilnoj službi, o upotrebi Vojske u multinacionalnim operacijama van granica Srbije. U skupštinskoj

129 „’Za većinu ljudi danas, osećaj nesigurnosti proističe većim delom od njihovih dnevnih briga, nego od straha od kataklizmične svetske katastrofe’ (UNDP 1994, str. 22). Pitanja koja i u Srbiji izazivaju zabrinutost građanki i građana vezana su za sigurnost za-poslenja, zarade, zdravstvenu zaštitu, zdravu životnu sredinu, koja je slobodna i bezbedna od nasilja i kriminala. UN defniše šest klastera pretnji o kojima svet mora da povede računa danas i u decenijama koje su ispred nas (Ujedinjene nacije 2004): ekonomske i društvene pretnje, uključujući siromaštvo, zarazne bolesti i degradaciju životne sredine; međudržavne konfikte; unutrašnje konfikte, uključujući građanske ratove; nuklearno, radiološko, hemijsko i biološko oružje; terorizam i transnacionalni organizovani kriminal. Prema istraživanju iz 2005. godi-ne, iako građani Srbije ne smatraju da im organizovani kriminal predstavlja ličnu pretnju, procenju da organizovani kriminal predstavlja pretnju celom društvu, dok 74% građana obu-hvaćenih istraživanjem smatra da Srbija ne može postati prosperitetna bez rešavanja problema organizovanog kriminala i korupcije (SMMRI 2005). Uspešnost borbe protiv organizovanog kriminala zavisiće od usaglašene regionalne saradnje, budući da grupe za organizovani krimi-nal, baš kao i snažne multinacionalne korporacije, u potpunosti usvajaju prednosti ekonomske liberalizacije i otvorenih granica. Usvajanje UN konvencije protiv transnacionalnog organizo-vanog kriminala, globalnog instrumenta u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala, predstavlja istorijski iskorak u borbi protiv ove pretnje.“ Iz Izveštaja o humanom razvoju u Srbiji 2008., str.156. (Serbia_NHDR-2008-Src.pdf)


raspravi je mnogo puta spomenuta Rezolucija Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije od 26. decembra 2007. godine o vojnoj neutralnosti, ali se termin neu-tralnost nije pojavio ni u jednoj rečenici Strategije nacionalne bezbednosti, niti bilo kog drugog akta koji je usvojen. Opoziciono tumačenje se čulo na sa-moj Skupštini: vladajuća većina namerava da zemlju prevede u NATO, radeći „kako im se kaže“ iz EU i NATO-a.

U Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti, u odeljku Osnovna opredeljenja politike nacionalne bezbednosti, u drugom stavu se kaže: „Republika Srbija se zalaže za poštovanje međunarodnog prava, jačanje uloge OUN, OEBS i EU (u ovom nizu nema NATO-a kao u drugim, npr. crnogorskoj Strategiji – M.B.) i za stvaranje mehanizama za očuvanje bezbednosti u svetu, uz ravnopravno uvažavanje in-teresa svih država, naroda i etničkih grupa. Shodno tome, ne smatra, unapred, nijednu državu ili savez neprijateljskim.“. U nastavku istog odeljka stoji da je Sr-bija odlučna da nikad ne prizna samoproklamovano Kosovo, da će svoju spol-jnju i bezbednosnu politiku u najvećoj meri usklađivati sa delovanjem EU, da će kapacitete i sposobnosti sistema nacionalne bezbednosti razvijati u skladu sa standardima i obavezama koji proizlaze iz Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambe-ne politike, da članstvom u programu Partnerstvu za mir (PzM) pruža doprinos demokratizaciji i bezbednosti regiona i „naglašava svoje uverenje“ da je aktivna saradnja svih zemalja regiona sa državama članicama NATO-a i PzM put ka miru i stabilizaciji. Dalje se, kao spoljnopolitički element nacionalne bezbednosti, ubr-zavanje procesa pristupanja EU određuje kao strateški prioritet. Važno je uočiti da se u taj kontekst stavlja uzajamno prijateljstvo i strateško partnerstvo u oblas-ti energetike sa Rusijom, a potom sledi ocena važnosti obnavljanja tradicije do-brih odnosa sa SAD, nastavak produbljivanja dobrih odnosa sa Kinom, Indijom i Brazilom, te zemljama pokreta nesvrstanih i regiona. Konačno, u delu Politika odbrane decidno stoji da se „Politikom odbrane afirmiše koncept kooperativne bezbednosti“. Srbija će svojom politikom doprinositi zaštiti nacionalnih interesa, očuvanju mira, „uz unapređivanje odnosa sa odgovarajućim institucijama siste-ma kolektivne bezbednosti u susednim i drugim državama.“ Termin neutralnost nije pomenut, ali se čini da je pojam barem u Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti, dobro razrađen. Prethodna vlada je uticala na pojavu i donošenje Rezolucije o neutralnosti, a ova ju je politički provela i eksploatiše je.

Koliko se zna, ideja o neutralnosti javno je potekla iz Demokratske stranke Srbije (DSS) koja je donela Deklaraciju o vojnoj neutralnosti Srbije 18. oktobra


2007. godine.130 Dva meseca kasnije, Narodna skupšina Republike Srbije do-nela je „Rezoluciju o zaštiti suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i ustavnog poretka Republike Srbije“, kojom se proglašava „vojna neutralnost Republike Srbije u odnosu na postojeće vojne saveze do eventualnog raspisivanja referen-duma na kome bi se donela konačna odluka o tom pitanju“. Sredinom februara 2008., Kosovo je jednostrano proglasilo nezavisnost. Javnost, podeljena kao i uvek, prepustila se crno-belim interpretacijama. Da li je to realan koncept ili relikt nesvrstanog sentimenta i njegova zloupotreba od najvećih kritičara komunističkog nasleđa; da li ima samo unutrašnju upotrebnu vrednost (Re-zolucija je doneta dva meseca pre samoproglašenja); neutralnost ukazuje na vrednosnu ambivalentnost; kakve su sličnosti i razlike sa drugim evropskim neutralnim zemljama; između kojih opcija neutralnost počiva; ko je uvažava bez međunarodnog sporazuma; kako ćemo uticati na pitanje KiM okruženi zemljama NATO-a; može li se ući u EU, a da prethodno zemlja nije ušla u NATO (što je bio slučaj sa svim zemljama u tranziciji koje su danas u NATO--u); neutralnost nije ekonomski isplativa, jer će zemlja biti ignorisana od stra-nih investitora131; reforma sektora bezbednosti će stagnirati ili će biti potpuno zaustavljena; standardizacija i profesionalizacija Vojske neće se moći nastaviti, itd. To su sve legitimna pitanja, međutim ima još mnogo pitanja koja nisu do-voljno ili čak uopšte potencirana.

Na primer, sa stanovišta ideoloških orijentira, kako to da jedna desna par-tija iz Srbije (ne samo jedna, ali DSS kao inicijator) u trenutno većinski desnoj Evropi odbacuje NATO; šta znači neutralnost Srbije u kontekstu jednovre-menih reformi EU, NATO-a, odnosa Rusija–EU, Rusija-NATO; šta znači neu-tralnost Srbije u kontekstu priznanja Abhazije i Južne Osetije od strane Rusije, te istovremeno podrška Rusije da KiM ostane sastavni deo Srbije (konsekvence se protežu do „male Jugoslavije“ i Republike Srpske); šta predstavlja evrop-ski koncept bezbednosti i može li ga EU uopšte zasnovati; konačno, čemu služi srpski nevladin sektor u kojem postoji ogromno prazno polje realnosti između ekstremnih pozicija NVO....Neka od ovih pitanja bila su tema rasprave u podeljenoj Skupštini i podeljenoj javnosti od pojave Rezolucije, a na neka je moguće odgovoriti već pažljivim čitanjem same Rezolucije.

130 Videti: http://www.dss.org.rs/ 131 U Zborniku Centra za civilno-vojne odnose „Ekonomija i bezednost“ (Beograd, 2009),

T. Karaulac u tekstu „Rizik zemlje, strane incesticije i NATO“ pokazuje da je veoma teško tvrditi da sam ulazak u NATO pozitivno korelira sa SDI, pogotovo u zemljama koje su izvršile reforme i jednovremeno sa ulaskom u EU ušle i u NATO.


Rezolucija je doneta kao politička reakcija na nagoveštaje o samoprokla-movanju nezavisnosti Kosova. Srbija je svesna da je vojna reakcija okončana 1999. godine, iako je ona legitimni deo arsenala države u slučaju ugrožavanja njenog teritorijalnog integriteta. Tom rezolucijom Srbija je proklamovala da je vojno neutralna u odnosu na postojeće vojne saveze, čime je rekla da privre-meno („do eventualnog referenduma“) ne želi da pristupi NATO-u.132 Ovom formulacijom sam donosilac pokazuje da ne veruje da je to nešto trajno, čvrsto i samorazumljivo. U Rezoluciji najviše ima nemoći, a najmanje racionalno za-snovanog strateškog opredeljivanja. Istinska dilema i istinski problem Srbije od 1991. godine i jeste da se izbori sa konfliktnim nasleđem i iracionalnim odlukama. Nasleđe je za Srbiju bilo srž svakog novog odlučivanja ili novog spoticanja.133 Rezolucija je u tom smuslu samo ishod niza događaja u kojem je najistaknutiji iracionalni izbor bila odluka da se uđe u rat sa NATO-om. Nakon toga, sledbenici su se borili sa novim negativnim nasleđem. Sledom tih činjenica, februara 2008. godine nije se desilo ništa neobično. Srbiji je izbor bio sužen, a možda je tačnije da ga nije ni bilo. Srbija je odbila da prihvati ne-zavisno Kosovo, bori se za diplomatsko i pravno rešenje, a politički nastavlja saradnju sa svim zemljama članicama NATO i ostalima u svetu, posebno on-ima koje su podržale njenu teritorijalnu celovitost. Nije bilo reči o povlačenju iz Partnerstva za mir, što je mehanizam NATO-a, uz ocenu da je za sada PzM adekvatna mera saradnje sa NATO-om.

Treba reći i da odnosi bivših protivnika u hladnom ratu takođe nisu bez tragova nasleđa, pri čemu je teško razlučiti interese od senki iracionalnog re-zonovanja. Da li je istočna Evropa i dalje pod zaštitom i da li joj je zaštita potrebna; da li njeni građani imaju realan osećaj pretnje od Rusije ili se on svesno indukuje iz političke sfere; da li Rusija ima, te da li pokazuje dovoljno promenjen profil i prodemokratski lik, kojim može da ukloni strepnje i sećanja na stare pretnje među svojim zapadnim susedima; da li je za vrednosno „po-

132 Iako se paralele sa neutralnim evropskim zemljama povlače na štetu srpske neutral-nosti, reklo bi se da je i njena pojava proizvod jednog bezbednosnoga stanja (postkonflikta, potencijalnog konflikta, kao i u drugim slučajevima) u kojem se Srbija našla, razume se, ne bez svojih zasluga.

133 Posle pada Berlinskog zida srpska podrška samoupravnoj ju-zajednici naroda ukazuje da je i komunizam bolji od nacionalnog cepanja, pogotovo samoupravni, zbog čega je srpski nacionalni korpus više od drugih držao do Jugoslavije. Ideja da se, uprkos moćnom pobedniku HR, ratnim sredstvima stvore nove srpske granice bila je iracionalna. Posle ove odluke, koja se može „pravdati“ navalom istorije u aktuelnu politiku, sve kasnije su uglavnom delo i greh poli-tičkih elita, sa malo iracionalnog, a mnogo osveštenog vlastoljubnog interesa.


mirenje“ i približavanje dobro poistovećivati nacizam i komunizam? S druge strane, prestankom hladnog rata je bilo reči o tome da se NATO neće širiti na istok. I Rusima je potrebno više poverenja. Zaustavljanje širenja NATO-a na is-tok može biti test poverenja koji bi najpre pozdravila Rusija, odnosno dobitak bi se poentirao u evropsko-ruskim odnosima. To bi bio pravi kraj hladnog rata. Jednom rečju, nasleđe opterećuje sve aktere. U javnosti Srbije često se ne uočava da i srpska i evropska i, da je uslovno nazovemo, zapadna strana, imaju nasleđena predubeđenja, koja, u spletu sa interesima, održavaju nera-zumevanje i nepoverenje.

Iz ovih napomena sledi pitanje da li je vojna neutralnost realna i održiva, da li je opcija ili fikcija? Da li ubrzava ili usporava (stagnira) demokratizaciju srpskog društva? Nema decidnog odgovora. Ima ih mnogo u kondicionalu „ako...onda“. To može biti praktična politika i ona to sada i jeste. Finska neutralnost mogla bi joj biti dobar uzor. Dakle, ukoliko Srbija nastavi svoju društvenu reformu sa ciljem da postane deo EU i pri tome pokaže kredibilan demokratski potencijal, EU će za nju imati otvorena vrata. Danas je Srbija okružena susedima koji već jesu u NATO-u ili će uskoro biti. Uz to, razvojna orijentacija zemalja u tranziciji ka EU po pravilu se ostvarivala preko ulaska u NATO. Globalna integracija odvija se preko nacionalnih granica i isto vredi i za Rusiju. Konflikti između nekadašnjih hladnoratovskih neprijatelja mogu se širiti i rasti, mada logika globalne međuzavisnosti, kao i sama tranzicija Rusije ka demokratskom društvu, načelno to ne predviđa. Naime, sukobi između demokratski uređenih društava manje su verovatni. Ako sukob bude rastao, politika neutralnosti teško će biti moguća, ali teško je verovati da bi EU ušla u oštrije bezbednosne konflikte sa Rusijom zarad interesa i politike SAD prema Rusiji. Tome se Evropa opirala i u hladnom ratu. EU više nije potrebna zaštita kao u hladnom ratu, uprkos pokušajima da se takva situacija stvori i predstavi politikom antiraketnog štita. Ekonomski život EU i Rusije približava njihova strateška gledišta i otežava izglede da između Evrope i Rusije ponovo dođe do uspostavjanja jaza. Zemlje bivšeg istočnog bloka sporije uočavaju ove promene budući da pate od nasleđenog straha i razumljive krhkosti pravne države i demokratskog poretka. Srbija je tradicionalni prijatelj Rusije (više kulturni i politički, nego ekonomski), nema ukorenjen strah od ruskog imperijal-izma i ima iskustvo ravnopravnosti sa Rusijom. Stoga, u kontekstu ulaska Srbije u EU i njenih odnosa sa Rusijom, uvek će izgledati da su Srbija i Rusija u bližim odnosima nego Srbija i zemlje EU. Nivo ekonomske razmene je uvek realniji parametar da se proceni odnos sa jednom i drugom stranom.


Ukratko, ukoliko se zaustavi hladnoratovski stil širenja NATO-a (antiraket-ni štit je test, kaže Lavrov) može se očekivati bolje razumevanje evropskog bez-bednosnog prostora u kojem je Rusija jedna od evropskih država. Ako budu prevladavali aktuelni bezbednosni problemi i bezbednosno nasleđe (evropsko i srpsko), vojna neutralnost će postajati relikt, ali ako se jaz bude produbljivao (između Srbije i Evrope, Rusije i Evrope...) onda bi vojna neutralnost mogla dobijati sadržaj političke opcije.

Bezbednosna i razvojna strategija su u jednom paketu

Ovde se, međutim, postavlja pitanje brzine ulaska Srbije u EU u svetlu nje-nog bezbednosnog koncepta. Srbija je izgubila mnogo vremena i konačno ire-verzibilna (?) odluka o priključenju EU je važan rubikon. Da li ga je Srbija definitivno prešla objavom Srpske napredne stranke da je postala proevropska partija, ili je i to još jedna stranačka igra, za sada ne možemo znati. Pod priti-skom dugogodišnjih uslovljavanja i utiskivanja krivice, tvrdnje da je alternati-va ulasku u EU obnova ratova, društvena anarhija i pretnje da će organizovani kriminal i korupcija zavladati institucijama i onemogućiti bilo kakav reform-ski put padaju u senku. Talasi svetske ekonomske krize i uvid da je njen koren u pohlepi finansijskog kapitala koji davi veliki broj, posebno malih zemalja, kolebaju ionako teško dostignutu proevropsku većinu. U tom kontekstu, vojna neutralnost (možda je tačnije reći neodlučnost) usporava proces priključenja EU. Najveća olakšica koju Srbija može danas da dobije od EU jeste razmevanje za situaciju u kojoj se našla i odvezivanje procesa priključenja EU od srpskog stava prema Kosovu i ulasku u NATO. I opet, u nadi da srpske elite nedvosmi-sleno povedu zemlju u pravcu evroatlanskih integracija.

Zašto evroatlantskih? Načelno, jedan bezbednosni kišobran sa susedima i zemljama sa kojima je nivo ekonomske razmene i ekonomskog života najobi-mniji (60% sa EU) jedini je razuman put da se osigura stabilnost i razvoj. Stoga je dobro što se i u Srbiji većinski shvata da bez evropske orijentacije nije mo-guće opstati u političkom životu. Bezbednosna i razvojna strategija su oduvek bili u istom paketu.

Koliko god srpsko iskustvo sa zapadom u proteklih 20 godina bilo kom-pleksno, Srbija (i Rusija) razvija iste evropske društvene vrednosti.134 U članu 1

134 “Poštovanje ljudskog dostojanstva, sloboda, demokratija, vladavina prava, poštova-


Ustava Srbije se kaže:„Republika Srbija je država srpskog naroda i svih građana koji u njoj žive, zasnovana na vladavini prava i socijalnoj pravdi, načelima građanske demokratije, ljudskim i manjinskim pravima i slobodama i pri-padnosti evropskim principima i vrednostima.” A u članu 2 nedavno usvoje-nog Strateškog koncepta za odbranu i bezbednost članova Severnoatlantskog saveza usvojenog novembra 2010. u Lisabonu stoji: “Zemlje članice NATO čine jedinstvenu zajednicu vrednosti privrženu principima individualne slo-bode, demokratije, ljudskih prava i vladavine zakona“. Član 38 upućuje na isto: „Naš savez uspeva kao izvor nade jer počiva na zajedničkim vrednostima in-dividualne slobode, demokratije, ljudskih prava i vladavine zakona, kao i zbog naše zajedničke osnovne i trajne svrhe zaštite slobode i bezbednosti njegovih članica. Ove vrednosti i ciljevi su univerzalni i trajni, a mi smo odlučni da ih branimo kroz jedinstvo, solidarnost, snagu i odlučnost.“

Bez evropskih standarda koji su instrument dostizanja tih vrednosti, taj put

je nemoguć. Izolacija je takođe nemoguća. Kad bi je neka politička opcija i izabrala (mada to više nije moguće u Srbiji), brzo bi bila modifikovana ili čak srušena. Ta dublja logika nalaže da se povežu strategija razvoja društva i forma zaštite te strategije.135 Tako bi država svojim racionalnim odlukama smanjila prostor za Montgomerije i Konuzine, a građani bi postali svesniji vrednosti sopstvenog izbora.

nje ljudskih i manjinskih prava, pluralizam, tolerancija, pravda, solidarnost, nediskriminacija, jednakost među polovima„ su vrednosti koje navodi Ustav EU (kasnije zamenjen Lisabonskim ugovorom). FABUS, Novi Sad, 2005. str. 28.

135 NATO i EU pokrivaju, odnosno štite iste vrednosti različitim sredstvima. Njih verovat-no ne bi bilo moguće razviti, niti zaštititi kroz istoriju hladnog rata bez NATO-a. Francuska je mogla da izađe iz vojne komponente NATO-a, ali ne i iz političke, jer ne može da napusti svoju razvojnu društvenu strategiju.


Evroatlantizam i stvaranje „bezbednosne zajednice“ na Balkanu

Prof. dr Predrag Simić136

Građanski rat u Jugoslaviji devedesetih godina 20. veka bio je prva ozbiljna kriza u Evropi posle hladnog rata. Ova kriza je u SAD i EZ/EU „otvorila prvu ozbiljnu debatu o spoljnoj politici i međunarodnim odnosima posle hlad-nog rata“137 i uticala na evoluciju glavnih institucija evropske i evroatlantske bezbednosti, pre svega, Zajedničke evropske spoljne i odbrambene politike (CFSP) i Severnoatlantskog saveza (NATO).138 I dok su rani posrednički poku-šaji EZ/EU na prostoru bivše SFRJ doneli polovične rezultate, NATO je prve ratne operacije u istoriji ove organizacije izveo 1995. i 1999. godine upravo na Balkanu. Pritisak EU i NATO zaustavio je građanski rat u Jugoslaviji ali je ovaj prostor je ostao potencijalno krizno žarište zbog nasleđa rata, otvorenih etničkih i graničnih problema i međusobnog nepoverenja država-naslednica biše Jugoslavije.

Jedna od posledica raspada i rata na prostoru bivše SFRJ bila je fragmen-tacija regiona i stvaranje novih država koje su ostale opterećene posledicama rata i raspada nekadašnje zajedničke države. Na zaostajanje balkanskih zema-lja uticalo je i nasleđe hladnoratovske podele Balkana koji je prethodnih pola veka bio podeljen između članica NATO-a, Varšavskog pakta, nesvrstanih i samoizolovanih zemalja. Zbog toga se o Balkanu pre može govoriti kao o ge-ografskom pojmu nego kao o regionu povezanom ekonomskim, socijalnim, političkim i drugim vezama.139 Čak ni opredeljenje svih ovih zemalja da uđu

136 Autor je Profesor Fakulteta političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu.137 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Nedrickson, America and Bosnia, National Interest, Fall

1993, str. 14.138 „Dinamične promene u regionu Balkana tokom devedesetih godina dale su podlogu

i razvoju u Evropi i načinu na koji danas izučavamo međunarodne pojave“, Emilian Kawalski, Extending the Euroepan Security Community – Constructing the Peace in the Balkans, Tauris Academic Studies, London and New York 2007, str. 3.

139 Šire o tome videti u: Predrag Simić, Do the Balkans Exists?, u: Dimitriou Triantaphilou (ed.), The Southern Balkans, Perspectives from the Region, Chaillot Papers, No. 46, ISS, Paris


u EU i većine za ulazak u NATO (izuzev Srbije) automatski ne znači i spre-mnost na obnovu međusobnih veza i izgradnju regionalnih institucija. Štaviše, evropsko opredeljenje jugoslovenskih republika početkom devedestih bilo je pokretano željom za „begom s Balkana“ i priključenjem razvijenom delu Evro-pe naglašavajući međusobne razlike i neprijateljstvo.

To su bili neki od razloga zbog kojih su glavne inicijative ka obnovi re-gionalne saradnje na Balkanu došle spolja. Za EU i NATO su fragmentacija i krize u regionu postale prepreka na putu njegove integracije u evropsku i evroatlantsku integraciju. Rani pokušaji obnove regionalnih veza („Rojamon-ska inicijativa“, SECI i sl.) dali su ograničene rezultate. EU je, stoga, posle Dej-tonskog mirovnog sporazuma za Bosnu i Hercegovinu počela sistematske na-pore u ovom pravcu u okviru tzv. regionalnog pristupa zemljama Zapadnog Balkana.140 Ovi napori Unije dobili su pun zamah tek posle vojne intervencije NATO-a protiv tadašnje SR Jugoslavije 1999. godine kada je na samitu EU u Kelnu osnovan Pakt stabilnosti u Jugoistočnoj Evropi. Na evropskim samiti-ma u Zagrebu (2000) i Solunu (2003) zauzet je stav da sve zemlje Zapadnog Balkana mogu biti primljene u EU ukoliko ispune potrebne uslove. Perspek-tiva članstva i zahtevi Unije u pogledu regionalne sradnje doprineli su obnovi međusobnih veza i relativno brzom razvoju regionalnih veza počev od sarad-nje u oblasti infrastrukture, borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala, uklanjanju tarifnih i netarifnih barijera i razvoju privredne saradnje do vojne saradnje, najčešće u okvirima programa Partnerstvo za mir.

Zapadni Balkan je danas okružen članicama EU i NATO-a i na političkoj karti Evrope jedno je od retkih područja koja nisu u potpunosti uključena u evropsku i evroatlantsku integraciju. Uprkos prestanku oružanih sukoba, ovo područje i danas opterećuju mnogobrojni problemi zbog kojih je verovatno-ća njihove skore integracije u EU (izuzev Hrvatske) malo verovatna. Pored nasleđa rata i nedovršene tranzicije njihovih privrednih i političkih sistema ove zemlje i dalje opterećuju etničke napetosti, nerešeni teritorijalni sporo-vi, migratorni problemi, nerazvijena infrastruktura, korupcija i organizovani kriminal i dr. Poseban problem su područja koja su dalje pod međunarodnim protektoratom. Opredeljenje svih ovih zemalja za ulazak u EU i, u većini sluča-jeva, u NATO ipak otvara mogućnost izgradnje nove bezbednosne arhitekture 2001, str. 17-36.

140 Bivše jugoslovenske republike osim Slovenije (koja je 2004. godine primljena u EU) i Albanija.


regiona ne samo Zapadnog Balkana nego i Balkana u celini. Pored nastavka i produbljivanja ekonomske integracije regiona često se ističe potreba stvaranja tzv. bezbednosne zajednice na Balkanu kao okvira za rešavanje međudržavnih sporova i integracije u EU i NATO.

Bezbednosne zajednice

Koncept bezbednosne zajednice uveo je krajem pedesetih godina XX veka američki profesor Karl Dojč u svojoj knjizi „Politička zajednica i severnoa-tlantsko područje“.141 U najkraćem, bezbednosnim zajednicama označavaju se regioni ili grupe zemalja koje su se dobrovoljno odrekle prava da međusobne sporove rešavaju silom i u kojima je mogućnost izbijanja nasilja, odnosno, rata minimalna ili nemoguća. Prema Karlu Dojču, „bezbednosnu zajednicu“ čini „grupa ljudi koji su integrisani“. On integraciju označava kao „stvaranje ,ose-ćaja zajednice‘ na određenoj teritoriji kao i institucija i prakse dovoljno snaž-nih i rasprostranjenih da ,dugoročno‘ izgrade uverljiva očekivanja ,miroljubive promene‘ njenog stanovništva“.142

Pod „osećajem zajednice“ Dojč podrazumeva „uverenje pojedinaca u grupi da su postigli sporazum barem o jednom pitanju: da se zajednički društve-ni problemi moraju i mogu rešiti procesom ,miroljubive promene‘“.143 Takva promena podrazumeva rešavanje društvenih problema putem institucionali-zovanih procedura i bez pribegavanja fizičkoj sili velikih razmera. „Bezbed-nosna zajednica je, stoga, ona zajednica u kojoj postoje realne garancije da se članovi zajednice neće fizički obračunavati nego da će svoje sporove rešiti na neki drugi način. Ukoliko bi čitav svet bio integrisan u bezbednosnu zajednicu ratovi bi bili automatski isključeni“144, zaključuje ovaj autor.

Karl Dojč je u svojoj knjizi identifikovao dve vrste bezbednosnih zajedni-ca. Prve su tzv. amalgamirane zajednice, u kojima se dve ili više nezavisnih jedinica spajaju u jednu zajedničku i širu jedinicu u kojoj nastaje neka vrsta zajedničke vlasti posle spajanja. Primer ove vrste su Sjedinjene Države a, mogli bi dodati, i bivša Jugoslavija koja bi se, prema definiciji ovog autora, mogla

141 Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Or-ganization in the Light of Historical Experience, Greenwood Press Publishers, New York 1957.

142 Ibid, str. 5.143 Ibid144 Ibid


označiti kao neuspela bezbednosna zajednica pošto je nestala u građanskom ratu. Druga vrsta su tzv. pluralističke bezbednosne zajednice u kojima manje jedinice zadržavaju pravnu nezavisnost i posebne vlade. Dojč je takvu zajedni-cu video u Severnoj Americi između SAD i Kanade. Pluralističke bezbednosne zajednice su češće, a kao primeri ove vrste danas bi se mogli navesti evroatlant-sko područje koje obuhvata NATO, Evropska unija u Evropi, ASEAN u Aziji ili Mercosur u Južnoj Americi.

Iako je teorija Karla Dojča nastala još krajem pedesetih godina svoj pun uti-caj dobila je tek posle hladnog rata kada su njegove ideje razradili socijalni kon-struktivisti Emanuel Adler i Majkl Barnet u knjizi „Bezbednosne zajednice“.145 Prema Adlerovom i Barnetovom shvatanju, bezbednosne zajednice, kao i sve druge vrste ljudskih zajednica, odlikuju tri osobine. Prvo, članovi zajednice dele zajednički identitet, vrednosti i značenja. Drugo, pripadnici zajednice održavaju višestruke i neposredne odnose. Treće, zajednicama je svojevrsan reciprocitet zasnovan na dugoročnim interesima članova zajednice, pa čak i na altruizmu: „dugoročni interes nastaje iz poznavanja onoga s kim ste u interak-ciji dok se altruizam može protumačiti kao osećaj dužnosti i odgovornosti“.146

Adler i Barnet navode da se bezbednosne zajednice postepeno grade: na-stajuća zajednica odgovara osnovnim potrebama miroljubive promene dok zrelu bezbednosnu zajednicu odlikuju mehanizmi kolektivne bezbednosti ali i supranacionalni i transacionalni elementi. Za razliku od Dojča, Adler i Barnet razlikuju čvrsto i labavo integrisane zajednice. Na tragu ovih razmišljanja neki drugi autori govore o međudržavnim bezbednosnim zajednicama (među ko-jima rat nije moguć) i sveobuhvatnim bezbednosnim zajednicama (u kojima čak ni građanski rat nije moguć). Komunikacija i transakcije među državama vode onome što Emanuel Adler naziva „socijalizacijom“ i izgradnjom novog zajedničkog identiteta na kome počiva solidarnost članova bezbednosne zajed-nice. Prema Adleru, to znači da „nacionalni političari moraju prihvatiti nova značenja i interpretacije stvarnosti onako kako se stvaraju u intelektualnim, birokratskim i političkim krugovima zbog čega moraju menjati svoje interese, sposobnost i/ili spremnost da razmotre nove pravce delovanja.“147

145 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998.

146 Ibid, str. 31.147 Emanuel Adler, Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of Internatio-

nal Relations and Their Progress, in Adler and Crawford, eds., Progress in Postwar International


Uloga međunarodnih organizacija na Balkanu

U teoriji socijalnog konstuktivizma jedna od najvažnijih ideja je „socija-lizacija“ kroz koju individualni akteri svaraju identitete i ideje koji upravljaju njihovim ponašanjem. Ova ideja, u međuvremenu, prihvaćena je i u konstruk-tivističkoj teoriji međunarodnih odnosa148 koja međunarodne institucije vidi kao socijalne institucije oko kojih se grade identiteti, ideje i očekivanja njiho-vih članova. Prema američkim autorima Džonu Ikenberiju i Čarlsu Kupča-nu, socijalizacija u međunarodnim odnosima se javlja najčešće posle ratova i drugih velikih kriza, u uslovima velikih socijalnih i političkih poremećaja i kada su domaće institucije spremnije da prihvate uticaje spolja.149 Primer ove vrste je posleratna Evropa koja je prihvatila Maršalov plan, stvaranje Severno-atlantskog pakta i ideje o prvim evropskim zajednicama iako je čitavo njeno dotadašnje nasleđe upućivalo u drugom pravcu. Kao rezultat takvog procesa „socijalizacije“ nastala je savremena Evropa okupljena u Evropskoj uniji i Se-vernoatlantskom savezu.

Iako se, prema konstruktivističkim shvatanjima, međunarodne organi-zacije i institucije javljaju kao rezultat ovog procesa, one mogu biti i nje-govi pokretači. Mnogi anglosaksonski autori danas potvrdu za to vide u promenama u srednjoj i istočnoj Evropi posle hladnog rata gde su njihovi pokretači bili EU, NATO ili OEBS.150 Sledeći ovu logiku, neki autori smatra-ju da bi EU i NATO sličnu ulogu mogli odigrati i u stvaranju bezbednosne zajednice i na Balkanu.151 Prema takvom viđenju, za to su potrebne sledeće tri pretpostavke. Prvo, to bi bilo stvaranje prethodnih uslova, odnosno, či-

Relations, str. 52. 148 Videti, na primer: Nicholas G. Onuf, Constructivism: A User’s Manual, u: V. Kubalkova,

N. Onuf, and P. Kowert (Eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY 1998, str. 58-78.

149 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, Inter-national Organization, Vol. 44/1990, str. 283-315.

150 U raspravama o ulozi međunarodnih institucija realisti, međutim, osporavaju njihov značaj u iniciranju promena u državama koje smanjuju rizik upotrebe oružane sile. Videti, na primer: John J. Mersheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions; International Secu-rity, Winter 1994/95, str. 5-49.

151 Na primer: E. Kavalski, navedeni rad, Suzette Grillot et al., Developing Securty Commu-nity in the Western Balkans: The Role of EU and NATO, Paper prepared for the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference May 17-19, 2007, Montréal, QC, Canada, Srđan Vučetić, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution, Southeast European Politics, October 2001, str. 109-134.


nilaca koji mogu podstaći regionalne aktere da se počnu približavati jedni drugima kao što su tehnološki napredak, demografske, ekonomske i pro-mene u životnoj sredini, spoljašnja pretnja i izmenjene predstave o „soci-jalnoj stvarnosti“. Na drugom mestu su strukturni i proceduralni činioci koji vode razvoju bezbednosne zajednice kao što su faktori moći i znanje. Faktori moći mogu biti i spoljašnji (u ovom slučaju EU i NATO) i unutrašnji (u vidu novih političkih elita).

Znanje se odnosi na nove ideje kakve su liberalna demokratija, građansko društvo, vladavina prava, ljudska prava, koji podstiču stvaranje poverenja i osećaja zajedništva među regionalnim akterima. Od njih se očekuje da intenzi-viraju različite oblike međusobne komunikacije i razmene, počev od privred-ne do socijalne, bezbednosne i političke. Treća pretpostavka je kontinuirano delovanje međunarodnog faktora u pravcu stvaranja bezbednosne zajednice. Njegova uloga je da „promovišu zajedničke definicije bezbednosti, odgova-rajuće unutrašnje i spoljno delovanje i regionalne granice, socijalno učenje koje podstiče političke aktere da vide jedni druge kao dostojne poverenja. To upućuje ljude da se identifikuju sa onima s kojima su ranije bili na suprotnim stranama.“152

Posmatrano iz konstruktivističkog ugla, savremeni Balkan se naizgled ukla-pa u ovakav model: region je prošao kroz deceniju nasilnih konflikata u koji-ma je nestala ranija zajednička država, države-naslednice i njihova društva su opterećena postkonfliktnim traumama, njihove ekonomije su fragmentirane a njihove političke elite međusobno suprotstavljene. Određene pretpostavke za proces rekoncilijacije i stvaranja bezbednosne zajednice u regionu, međutim, postoje: tome u prilog se ističe da su dve vojne intervencije NATO-a (1995. i 1999.) zaustavile oružane sukobe, da su političku scenu napustili njihovi glavni protagonisti i da su sva ova društva krenula putem tranzicije pridržavajući se, manje-više, istih načela i vrednosti liberalnog kapitalizma.

Pored Slovenije koja je jedina bivša jugoslovenska republika koja je primlje-na u članstvo EU i članica je NATO-a, 2009. godine u NATO su primljene i Hrvatska i Albanija dok su Makedonija, Crna Gora i Bosna i Hercegovina obuhvaćene Akcionim planom za članstvo u NATO-u (MAP). Izuzetak je, do-

152 Adler and Barnett, A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, u: Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, str. 45.


nekle, Srbija koja je proglasila neutralnost ali je član programa NATO-a „Par-tnerstvo za mir“, pridruženi član Parlamentarne skpštine NATO-a i veoma ak-tivna u vojnoj saradnji sa susedima. Sve zemlje Zapadnog Balkana su sklopile Sporazume o saradnji i pridruživanju sa EU, a neke su počele i pregovore o članstvu. Najdalje je odmakla Hrvatska koja privodi kraju pregovore u ulasku u Uniju.

Unija je sredinom devedesetih godina 20. veka, posle potpisivanja Dejton-skog mirovnog sporazuma za BiH, usvojila politiku prema Balkanu koja je bila deo njene šire politike prema srednjoj i istočnoj Evropi posle pada Berlinskog zida. Za razliku od prve i druge generacije „Evropa ugovora“ ovim zemljama je postavljen zahtev za stabilizacijom kao preduslovom pridruživanja Uniji. Politika „stabilizacije i pridruživanja“ ima dva glavna instrumenta: regionalni pristup i politiku uslovljavanja. Regionalni pristup zemljama tzv. Zapadnog Balkana ima za cilj izgradnju regionalne ekonomske i bezbednosne zajednice dok uslovljavanje znači da je ovim zemljama otvorena mogućnost da postanu članice vodećih zapadnih institucija, EU i NATO-a. Uslov za to je proces „soci-jalizacije“ koji bi ih učinio kompatibilnim sa vrednostima, ciljevima i praksom na kojima počivaju evropska i evroatlanska zajednica. Stav da je poboljšanje odnosa i razvoj regionalne saradnje na Zapadnom Balkanu preduslov uspešne integracije ovih zemalja u EU postao je zvanična politika EU u odnosima sa svima njima: „Regionalna saradnja je takođe i specifičan zahtev u okviru spo-razuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju koji se već primenjuje u BJR Makedoniji i Hrvatskoj ... regionalna saradnja je stoga ugaoni kamen politike EU na Za-padnom Balkanu“.153

Sa svoje strane, politika NATO-a u regionu oslanja se na njegove mirovne misije od kojih su dve završene (u BiH i Makedoniji) dok je nastavljena misija na Kosovu i Metohiji (KFOR), prijem zemalja regiona u članstvo ove organiza-cije i aktivnosti kroz program „Partnerstvo za mir“. Na ovim temeljima 2005. godine je potpisana Jadranska povelja kojom je osnovana Jadanska grupa koja je okupila Hrvatsku, Albaniju i Makedoniju kao neku vrstu regionalnog saveza u okviru NATO-a. Ovakva politika je posle 2000. godine dala određene rezul-tate: broj regionalnih inicijativa, organizacija i projekata je povećan, ekonom-ski i polički odnosi među državama Zapadnog Balkana su vidno napredovali

153 Videti o tome: The Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans: A Policy Priority for the European Union, European Commission, Brussels 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/nf5703249enc_web_en.pdf.


(naročito između tri nekada vodeće jugoslovenske republike: Srbije, Hrvatske i Slovenije) i otklonjene su mnoge prepreke slobodnoj cirkulaciji ljudi i roba u regionu.

Valja, ipak, primetiti da je razvoj regionalne saradnje rezultat odnosa svake pojedinačne zemlje sa Evropskom unijom i NATO-om. Štaviše, čak i neki oz-biljni teritorijalni sporovi koji su zapretili da naruše novostvorenu ravnotežu u regionu (na primer. spor oko Piranskog zaliva između Slovenije i Hrvatske) rešeni su direktnom diplomatskom intervencijom vodećih članica NATO-a i EU. Verovatno najveći napredak u pravcu izgradnje bezbednosne zajednice na Zapadnom Balkanu zabeležen je između Srbije i Hrvatske tokom poslednjih nekoliko godina. U seriji visoko simboličnih manifestacija rekoncilijacije i iz-gradnje regionalne saradnje, predsednici dve zemlje nagovestili su mogućnost stvaranja regionalne zajednice na ovom prostoru koja bi bila kompatibilna sa EU i NATO-om. Napredak u odnosima između Srbije, Hrvatske i Slovenije nije, međutim, praćen odgovarajućim napretkom kada su u pitanju Kosovo i Metohija, Bosna Hercegovina i neka druga područja Zapadnog Balkana gde je stanje ostalo nepromenjeno ili je čak pogoršano.

Tokom poslednje decenje došlo je i do suštinske promene u obliku prisustva i ulozi NATO-a na Zapadnom Balkanu. Posle oružanih intervencija 1995. i 1999. godine, NATO je preuzeo misije očuvanja mira u Bosni i Hercegovini (IFOR, kasnije SFOR) i na Kosovu i Metohiji (KFOR). Mirovna misija u BiH predstavljala je nesumnjiv uspeh pošto posle potpisvanja Dejtonskog sporazu-ma i rasporeda snaga NATO-a u ovoj bišoj jugoslovenskoj republici nije zabe-ležen ni jedan oružani sukob niti je bilo žrtava borbenih operacija. Ova misija napustila je BiH 2004. godine posle čega su je zamenile ograničene snage EU. Misija NATO-a na KiM naišla je na daleko komplikovaniju situaciju u kojoj je bilo više oružanih napada na srpsko stanovništvo, uključujući i napade i etnič-ko čišćenje širokih razmera u martu 2004. godine koje su snage KFOR-a tek uz velike napore i značajan broj žrtava stavile pod kontrolu. Međutim, u ovom slučaju samo robusno vojno prisustvo NATO-a je sprečilo nastavak oružanih sukoba s kraja devedesetih godina i nastavak etničkog čišćenja.

Do preokreta u odnosima između Srbije i NATO-a došlo je u aprilu 2001. godine kada je izbila pobuna Albanaca u Preševskoj dolini. Iako je u prvom trenutku izgledalo da će se ponoviti scenario srpsko-albanskog sukoba iz 1998-1999. godine, predstavnici novih vlasti u Beogradu (Nebojša Čović i Goran Svilanović) su stupili u kontakt sa tadašnjim generalnim sekretarom NATO-a Džordžom Robertsonom posle čega su srpske snage bezbednosti i


snage KFOR-a (tj. NATO-a) zajednički zaustavile delovnje albanskih para-vojnih snaga, tzv. Oslobodilačke armije Preševa, Bujanovca i Medveđe. Kao rezultat ove saradnje ukinuta je tzv. kopnena zona bezbednosti iz kojih su delovale snage OVPBM dok su srpske snage od KFOR-a preuzele kontrolu administravne granice sa KiM. Iako je ova epizoda obnovila poverenje izme-đu Srbije i NATO-a, do narednog koraka u međusobnom približavanju došlo je tek 2007. godine kada je Srbija zatražila i dobila prijem u program NATO-a „Partnerstvo za mir“.

„Preokret u odnosima između NATO i Srbije i Crne Gore je verovatno naj-spektakularniji događaj u oblasti bezbednosti koji se dogodio u bivšoj Jugo-slaviji posle sukoba na Kosovu 1999. godine“, primetio je ekspert NATO-a, Robert Seri.154 Pristupanje svih zemalja Zapadnog Balkana u Partnerstvo za mir kao i prijem Hrvatske i Albanije u NATO učvrstili su položaj ove organi-zacije na Balkanu koja je dobila dugoročni uticaj na razvoj sektora bezbednosti u svim zemljama regiona, uključujući obim i strukturu nacionalnih oružanih snaga, njihovu interoperabilnost, zajedničke vojne vežbe i sl.

Snažan spoljni pritisak u pravcu razvoja regionalne saradnje na Balkanu naveo je pojedine analitičare da postave motive ovih napora. Međunarodni posrednici u krizama pored opšteg interesa da doprinesu njihovom rešava-nju često imaju i posebno, javne ili prikrivene interese. Za neke od analitičara politike Unije i NATO-a na Balkanu njihovi motivi se, između ostalog, kriju i u želji da unaprede vlastitu legitimnost. Tako, na primer, Filip Borinski sma-tra da NATO koristi mogućnost da svojim delovanjem na Balkanu postigne „dvostruko širenje“, tj. da istovremeno ostvari „širenje i geografskom smislu i u smislu širenja svoje uloge koje bi, uspešno ostvareno, doprinelo prestižu ove organizacije.155 Na sličan način se tumači i uloga EU: „samo stabilizacijom Balkana EU može učiniti svoju Zajedničku spoljnu i bezbednosnu politiku (CFSP) uverljivijom i predstaviti se kao značajan geopolitički činilac“.156

Analiza efekata nastojanja EU i NATO-a da podstaknu regionalnu saradnju na Balkanu tokom poslednje decenije govori da, pored postignutih rezultata, ona ima i neke neočekivane posledice. Uprkos želji svih zemalja Zapadnog Balkana da postanu članovi Unije, ona autonomski ne utiče na poboljšanje

154 Robert Serry, NATO’s Balkan Odyssey, NATO Review, 2003. Navedeno prema http://www.nato.int/docu/ review/2003/issue4/english/art3.html.

155 Philip Borinski, NATO Towards the Double Enlargement: The Case of the Balkans, Revue d’intégration européene, 24/2002, str. 113-136.

156 Milada Anna Vachudova, Strategies for European Integration and Democratization in the Balkans, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 4/2004, str. 92-105.


njihovih međusobnih odnosa.157 Slično devedesetim, svaka od ovih zemalja zainteresovana je za vlastiti ulazak u Uniju čak i ukoliko to ne povećava izglede suseda da postignu to isto. Pojedini istraživači procenjuju čak da „napori po-jedinih zemalja da ubrzaju proces svoje integracije u EU dovode do slabljenja regionalne saradnje“.158

Štaviše, članstvo u Uniji ponekad se koristi i kao sredstvo da se blokadom prijema suseda reše neki teritorijalni i drugi sporovi sa njima. Prijem jedne podeljene države, Kipra, u Evropsku uniju pre nego što je rešen spor između grčke i turske etničke zajednice na ostrvu u EU je protumačen kao snažno upozorenje da se nešto slično ne sme ponoviti u slučaju Zapadnog Balkana. EU i SAD su, poučeni ovim iskustvom, energično reagovali u graničnom spo-ru između Slovenije (članice EU) i Hrvatske (kandidata za prijem) koji je, ba-rem privremeno, skinut s dnevnog reda ali je spor između druge članice, Grč-ke, i Makedonije oko imena ove bivše jugoslovenske republike i dalje razlog blokade odnosa između EU i NATO-a, s jedne, i ove države, s druge strane. Suprotno očekivanjima, ovi podaci govore da regionalna saradnja inicirana spolja ne mora voditi unapređenju poverenja među zemljama regiona a time ni izgledima za stvaranje trajne „bezbednosne zajednice“ u regionu.

Ovi problemi su još vidljiviji kada je reč o uticaju NATO-a na Balkanu koje je, na primer, u Srbiji suočeno sa snažnim otporima zbog uloge ove organizacije tokom građanskog rata u Jugoslaviji i, naročito, vojnih intervencija protiv Repu-blike Srpske 1995. i Srbije 1999. godine. Za veliki deo srpskog javnog mnjenja, NATO je i dalje protivnik i organizacija koja je počinila ratne zločine protiv Srba (bombardovanje RTS, uništenje putničkog voza u Grdeličkoj klisuri, bombardo-vanje mosta u Vladičinom Hanu, upotreba kasetne municije u Nišu, projektila s osiromašenim uranijumom i sl.). Iako je negativni stav prema NATO-u posled-njih godina donekle ublažen zbog uloge KFOR-a na Kosovu i Metohiji (naročito marta 2004. godine), podrška negativnim stavovima prema njegovoj ulozi na Balkanu dolazi i iz zemalja koje se snažno protive njegovom širenju (Rusija i deo arapskih zemalja). S druge strane, za neke druge bivše jugoslovenske republike i Albance na Kosovu i Metohiji članstvo u NATO-u je garancija njihove nezavi-snosti i bezbednosti od pretnje koja se i dalje vidi prvenstveno u Srbiji.

157 South East European Barometer je 2007. godine sproveo ispitivanje javnog mnjenja u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana o odnosu njihovih građana prema izgledima suseda da uđu u EU koje je pokazalo veliki stepen nezainteresovanosti za ovo pitanje. South-East Europe Barometer, Public Opinion Compared in 7 Countries.

158 East-West Parliamentary Practice Project (EWPPP), Legislatures and Citizens: stren-gthening democratic institutions and civil society in the Western Balkans, http://www.ewppp.org/programmes/western_balkans.php.


Zaključak

Nastojanje da se napredak zemalja regiona u odnosima sa Evropskom uni-jom i NATO-om uslovi normalizacijom odnosa među zemljama Zapadnog Balkana i razvojem regionalne privredne, političke i saradnje u oblasti bezbed-nosti donelo je određene rezultate. Nesumnjivi napredak je ostvaren u obnovi privrednih odnosa i slobodnog protoka roba između zemalja Zapadnog Balka-na, naročito u okvirima Centralnoevropske zone slobodne trgovine (CEFTA). Slovenija i Hrvatska danas su među najvećim investitorima u Srbiji i drugim bivšim jugoslovenskim republikama, ali je njihovo tržište i dalje relativno za-tvoreno za investitore sa Zapadnog Balkna. Postignut je i znatan napredak sa-radnje organa unutrašnjih poslova i pravosudnih organa u borbi protiv orga-nizovanog kriminala kao i u nekim drugim oblastima.

Deset godina posle završetka oružanih sukoba u bivšoj Jugoslaviji odnosi između ovih zemalja su stabilni iako ne i u potpunosti normalizovani. Najveći problem stvaranju ove regionalne zajednice ostaje problem Kosova i Metohije čiji je status i dalje otvoren i koji je ne samo nezaobilazni problem na putu ulaska Srbije u EU, nego i stabilnosti čitavog Južnog dela Balkana. S druge strane, Bosna i Hercegovina je i šesnaest godina posle Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma pre mehanički spoj tri naroda koji u njoj žive nego zajednica koja ima izvesnu perspektivu. Čak i odnosi između dve najveće bivše jugoslovenske republike, Srbije i Hrvatske, koji su tokom poslednje decenije zabeležili veliki napredak, ostaju opterećeni nasleđem građanskog rata u bivšoj SFRJ. Potvrdu za to su pružila zbivanja u Hrvatskoj posle osude hrvatskih generala u Me-đunarodnom tribunalu za ratne zločine u bivšoj Jugoslaviji koja su dovela do talasa protesta širom ove zemlje i izvesnog zahlađenja između Zagreba i Beo-grada. Problem povratka izbeglica i interno raseljenih lica još uvek nije rešen na područjima koja su devedesetih godina bila zahvaćena ratom.

Vladajuće elite i javno mnjenje ostaju podeljeni u odnosu prema nedav-noj prošlosti i uzrocima i posledicama građanskog rata u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Između ostalog, o tome govori činjenica da se interpretacije novije istorije na Zapadnom Balkanu i dalje suštinski razlikuju i da je, na primer, i danas malo verovatno pisanje zajedničkih udžbenika istorije. Novija ispitivanja javnog mnjenja govore da i dalje postoji visok stepen etničke distance izme-đu stanovnika bivših jugoslovenskih republika. Nacionalni identiteti ostaju čvrsto ukorenjeni u negativnim stereotipima o „drugom“, „orijentalnom“ i „zapadnom kulturnom nasleđu“ a susedi se i dalje doživljavaju kao „istorij-


ski protivnici“, a ne kao partneri u stvaranju novog evropskog i regionalnog identiteta. Zahvaljujući pritisku spolja, društva Zapadnog Balkana su pri-hvatila ideju modernizacije koja se uglavnom identifikuje s „evropeizacijom“, tj. ulaskom u evropsku i evroatlantsku integraciju, ali i dalje postoji snažan otpor stvaranju zajedničkog regionalnog identiteta s jugoslovenskim ili bal-kanskim predznakom.

Ova pojava nije, međutim, nepoznata ni u zemljama Evropske unije. U Španiji, Katalonci i Baskijci svoj lokalni pa čak i evropski identitet po pravilu stavljaju ispred pripadnosti Španiji. U Belgiji, Flamanci i Valonci svoj identitet stavljaju ispred pripadnosti Belgiji. U Velikoj Britaniji, škotski, velški ili irski identitet ima prednost u odnosu na britanski identitet. Čak i u Francuskoj, kolevci građanskog nacionalnog identiteta prema kome pripadnici jedne dr-žave sebe identifikuju s njom nije retko da, na primer, stanovnici Bretanje svoj bretonski i evropski identitet stavljaju iznad pripadnosti francuskoj naciji. U takvoj optici susedi se doživljavaju kao protivnici ili ono što se u anglosakson-skoj antropologiji označava kao „konstitutivni drugi“ (constitutive other) koji se doživljava kao pretnja koja vodi nacionalnoj homogenizaciji. Iskustvo dva svetska rata i posleratni razvoj evropskog identiteta u velikoj meri je amortizo-vao, ali ne i uklonio etničke razlike.

Tri oružana sukoba za manje od jednog veka (1870-1871, 1914-1918. i 1939-1945) između velikih evropskih naroda, Francuza i Nemaca, tokom poslednjih pedeset godina su doveli do stvaranja evropskih zajednica i kolektivnog evrop-skog identiteta i novog viđenja zajedničke istorije u kome se ovi sukobi tumače kao „evropski građanski ratovi“ dok su iz oba jezika nestali pežorativni opisi druge nacije.159 Taj proces je, međutim, trajao veoma dugo i bio je pod snažnim uticajem zajedničkih institucija stvorenih posle Drugog svetskog rata kao što su, na primer, zajednički institut za pisanje udžbenika istorije (Internazionale schulbuch Insitut u Braunšvajgu) ili zajedničkih medijskih organizacija (fran-cusko-nemački TV kanal „Arte“). Na Zapadnom Balkanu, slični pokušaji kao što je bilo stvaranje zajedničkih „komisija za istinu i pomirenje“ nisu dali re-zultate iako je u oblasti medija i umetničkog stvaralaštva primetno izvesno pri-bližavanje. naročito u trouglu Srbija-Hrvatska-Bosna i Hercegovina i, u znatno manjoj meri, između Srba i Albanaca.

159 To je, na primer, prisutno u novijoj istoriografiji i zajedničkom francusko-nemačkom udžbeniku istorije (Histoire/Geschichte, L‘Europe et le monde depuis 1945, Klett & Nathan, Pa-ris Studgart 2007) kao i umetničkim delima koja se finansiraju iz fondova unije ako šti je film „Sretan Božić“ koji je bio evropski kandidat za nagradu Oskar 2007. godine. Valja, međutim, napomenuti da danas u Nemačkoj ima sve manje onih koji uče francuski jezik i obratno.


Ukratko, EU i NATO su tokom poslednje decenije uložili veliki napor da bi zaustavili spiralu građanskog rata u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i pokrenuli preces rekon-cilijacije, regionalne saradnje i stvaranja novih oblika zajedništva na Zapad-nom Balkanu. Oslonjeni na zajedničku želju svih društava iz regiona da uđu u evropsku i evroatlantsku integraciju i tako „pobegnu sa Balkana“ i izmaknu logici „balkanizacije“ ovi napori su doneli određene rezulate, pre svega u po-gledu razvoja evropskog identiteta balkanskih naroda. Rezultati su, međutim, uglavnom izostali kada je u pitanju razvoj regionalnog identiteta koji je i dalje pod snažnim uticajem negativnih stereotipa, nasleđa rata i logike „balkaniza-cije“. Štaviše, problemi Unije i, naročito, svetska ekonomska kriza koja je snaž-no pogodila balkanske zemlje poslednjih godina su oslabili uticaj EU i NATO na Zapadnom Balkanu i doveli do znatnog pada raspoloženja ovih društava za članstvo u njima.

Ispitivanja javnog mnjenja upozoravaju da je procenat podrške ulasku u EU u Srbiji najniži u poslednjih deset godina, dok je u Hrvatskoj posle osude Go-tovine i Markača pala na svega 42%. Procenat podrške članstvu ovih zemalja u NATO-u je na mnogo nižem nivou, čak i u zemljama koje su obuhvaćene MAP-om (Membership Action Plan) kakva je Crna Gora. Uz to, uticaj EU i, naročito, NATO-a na Zapadnom Balkanu se poslednjih godina suočava i sa konkurencijom novih regionalnih aktera među kojima se neki snažno suprot-stavljaju širenju evroatlantske integracije na Balkanu.


New Serbia, New NATO: Future Vision for the 21st Century

Collection of texts

Belgrade, 2011.

transconflict

FORUM ZA ETNIČKE ODNOSEFORUM FOR ETHNIC RELATIONS


Forward

2010 was a year marked by the redefinition of NATO’s role, mission and purpose in light of contemporary and emerging security threats and challeng-es. For the first time in its history, the Alliance made this process open and inclusive; not only by engaging the governments of NATO member states, but – almost more importantly – by consulting and engaging a variety of actors around the globe.

By emphasising the importance of partnerships and substantial global ex-changes, NATO has initiated a new phase in international relations, whereby many of the former animosities and divisions have been erased; whilst new venues have been opened for relationships based upon consultation and co-operation, beyond the existing partnership frameworks. This provision is es-pecially relevant for Serbia which – as a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme – has still not fully explored nor utilised all the potential of the PfP, but which could yield a plethora of benefits for, in particular, Serbia’s newly-professionalised armed forces.

Though the new Strategic Concept did not focus on the Western Balkans, the continuation of NATO’s ‘open door’ policy was received with great reassur-ance by all countries in the region currently striving for full membership, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, respectively.

Whilst collective defence remains the main rationale for NATO’s existence, the new Strategic Concept places an important emphasis on Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, which defines the Alliance “as the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters affecting the territorial in-tegrity, political independence and security of its members”; thus shifting the organisation more towards its political dimension and competencies.

All these – and many other conclusions – were analysed and discussed at the conference, “New Serbia, new NATO – Future Vision for the 21st Century”, which took place on 3rd- 4th December 2010. Coming only a few weeks after NATO’s Summit in Lisbon, the conference provided an important platform for


a critical evaluation of NATO’s New Strategic Concept and open discussion about future security developments – both those facing NATO, as well as from Serbia’s own perspective.

Six months on from the conference, many things have occurred on the global scene which have already tested some of the Concept’s provisions and the Alliance’s responsiveness to new crises and sources of security threats. The wave of discontent and rebellion that shook the African continent has had a domino effect, culminating in the civil war in Libya. NATO’s decision to en-gage in the Libyan conflict was neither easy nor too rushed. Though NATO stepped in only after calls for assistance on the part of the U.S. President – taking sole command of international air operations over Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 – the intervention has not been fully supported by all allies. Turkey expressed its strong objections to NATO’s engagement in Libya, whilst Germany decided not to participate militarily in an operation which, as stated, “has nothing to do with the defence of Europe”.

Though such a scenario could hardly have been predicted six months ago, the participants in our December conference rightly estimated such regional and global political developments, and shed light on the challenges and short-comings which remain to be addressed. Whilst the Libyan crisis is currently a big test for the Alliance’s unity – particularly in terms of its future purpose and role in the global security arena, as well as its political expedience and power – our hope is that this publication will not only provide its readers with an in-sight into the particularities of the contemporary global security architecture, but will also serve as a starting point for further analysis and a broadening of discussion.

This conference was made possible owing to the support of the Czech Embassy in Belgrade and the Balkan Trust for Democracy, whilst its overall success is to be solely attributed to the exceptional list of guest speakers. The speeches and talks presented at the conference have been gathered here in this publication, which saw the light of day thanks to the kind support of the Fund for Open Society, who rightly estimated the importance and time-liness of such a discussion in Serbia, and to whom we express our deepest gratitude.


We hope that this publication will be received with great interest, not only by civil society, think-tanks, academia and the general public in Serbia, but also by readers throughout the entire region and further afield.

All errors remain our responsibility, and for those we apologise to the au-thors.

Mirjana Kosić

Executive Director, TransConflict Serbia


Introduction

NATO is an organization that is in a constant process of transformation. Its key tenets are that the Cold War ended a long time ago, the time of unipolarity is also long gone, and the world of today is faced with contemporary global security risks and challenges.

The ultimate outcome of this process remains open, as was confirmed by the Declaration and the new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. It is likely that NATO will be transformed from a collective military alliance under American leadership, into a global security-political organization which would develop constructive relationships with its neigh-bours, particularly Russia, which in the longer-term perspective could also become a member of this community. The primary military function of the Alliance would consist of allowing the formation of ad-hoc coalitions. Such an OSCE-isation of NATO would be compatible with the UN, since NATO would respect the UN Security Council’s decisions on the preservation and mainte-nance of peace.

In which direction this transformation will be undertaken depends on how much stronger the unilateralist tendencies of U.S policy will become, and how much weaker European influence on the U.S. will continue to be. Finally, it will depend on the future of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and Europe’s commitment to more prominently emphasise its own ownership over it.

It’s not to be entirely disregarded, however, that the acronym NATO (No Activity Talking Only, as it was frequently referred to in the nineties) could in the future acquire an entirely new meaning - Now Almost Totally Obsolete; especially if the transformation of the Alliance from a collective military al-liance to an open security community materialises fully, with very different internal relationships and structures. The NATO summit in Lisbon promoted NATO’s intention to be a more flexible, efficient and cost-effective instrument in the service of peace.


NATO’s engagement in Libya, the withdrawal of the U.S. from military op-erations and the decision to leave key activities to the European Union should all be viewed in this light. Time will tell to what extent the U.S.’s intentions are sincere and to what extent are they test for the EU, as well as to how do they comply with Item 2 of the Lisbon Declaration, which demands that the NATO Secretary General work closely with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in order to secure more efficient action in crises prevention.

On the other hand, the dynamics of the escalation of events in the Arab world and the relative ease of the decision on NATO’s military engagement sheds new light not only on the new security risks and challenges, but also on relations between the UN, NATO and the EU, as well as relations with Russia, China, India and other global and regional factors.

Serbia is exposed to all global, regional and specific risks and challenges that are unpredictable and do not respect any borders, and within that frame-work it has to think about its own security.

Regardless of Serbia’s proclaimed military neutrality, it makes a lot of sense for Serbia to consider the most optimal security concept for the future, which will also include the new content of partnerships, security constellations in the region and the projections of future trends. Certainly, one must have in mind that Serbia is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme; it signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement, therefore, it is in the process of obtaining EU candidate status and is striving towards full EU membership, which also assumes full respect of the European Security and Defence Policy, and the signing of relevant security agreements with the EU.

In line with that, the aim of the conference was to analyse different aspects, and to include all relevant facts, in order to at least preliminarily formulate the basic elements of Serbia’s vision of its security concept in the contemporary world.

We hope that we succeeded in that and that this publication is a testimony of this.

Milan KaragaćaRetired Colonel and Independent Political Analyst


Contribution of H.E. Ambassador Hana Hubáčková to the conference „New Serbia, new NATO – Future Vision for

the 21st Century“160

A peaceful and stable environment in the Euro-Atlantic area is not something that should be taken for granted - it is the result of a number of crucial decisions made since the end of the Cold War up until the present day. Collective defence still remains the essence of NATO’s existence, implying not only the need for ef-ficient, flexible and deployable military capabilities, but also NATO’s better pre-paredness to face new security challenges. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruc-tion, cyber attacks or the interruption of vital deliveries of energy are not entirely new; what is new, however, is their strength, frequency and the scope of potential damage they can cause to our societies. The new Strategic Concept recognises that a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic territories can originate in very distant places. Lessons learned in Afghanistan indicate that for peace and stabilisation opera-tions to be successful, military capabilities have to be accompanied by substantial non-military means to ensure long-term development and stabilisation. Accord-ingly, NATO will need to build a minimum of its own civil capabilities to be able to interact with a number of actors; be it states, other international organisa-tions, such as the UN or EU, or NGOs involved in managing complex crises.

160 H.E. Hana Hubáčková is the Ambassador of the Czech Republic in Serbia


First, let me say a few words of appreciation to the organisers of this confer-ence – TransConflict Serbia – for having taken the initiative and making this conference happen. It is yet another valuable contribution by a non-govern-mental organisation to a growing public interest in the most recent security- and defence-related developments, and in getting to know the policies formu-lated by the main international actors and organisations, when faced both with traditional and emerging security risks and challenges.

We are pleased to have supported this initiative not only as the current NATO contact point Embassy in Serbia, but primarily because it gathers a broad spectrum of participants and provides an opportunity for debating im-portant issues that are clearly relevant to Serbia, as well as to its partners.

Looking back at the NATO summit in Lisbon two weeks ago161, it is impor-tant to note that today’s peaceful and stable environment in the Euro-Atlantic area is not something that might or even should be taken for granted. It is the result of a number of crucial decisions made by our states, starting from the time when the Cold War ended.

My own country could in real terms start participating in those decisions only after we emerged as an independent and sovereign state, after decades of communism that plagued the country’s ability to independently engage in international policy making.

Collective defence continues to be the essence of NATO’s existence. It im-plies not only the need for efficient, flexible and deployable military capabili-ties, but also includes the future territorial missile defence.

NATO must also be better prepared to face new security challenges. Ter-rorism, weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks or interruptions to vi-tal deliveries of energy are not entirely new; what is new, however, is their strength, frequency and the scope of potential damage they can cause to our societies.

The Strategic Concept recognises that a direct threat to the Euro-Atlantic ter-ritories can originate in very distant places. Consequently, NATO is more likely

161 The conference was held on 3-4 December 2010, two weeks after the Lisbon Summit.


to be engaged in distant operations and it has to be prepared for them. Lessons learned in Afghanistan, where the Czech Republic contributes more than 600 troops and provides one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) - in the province of Loghar - indicate that for peace and stabilisation operations, mili-tary capabilities cannot stand alone. They have to be accompanied by substantial non-military means to ensure long-term development and stabilisation. Even though NATO will not be the first option to perform development tasks, it will need to build a minimum of its own civil capabilities to be able to interact with a number of actors; be it states, other international organisations, such as the UN or EU, or NGOs typically involved in managing complex crises.

Last but not least, the Strategic Concept adheres an appropriate prominence to NATO’s partnerships with non-member states. A lot of countries worldwide share the same interests and work with NATO to maintain international peace and stability. A number of them are major contributors to NATO-led opera-tions, such as ISAF. The Strategic Concept therefore envisages wider and more flexible possibilities for partners to get engaged with NATO, and also foresees their involvement in the organisation’s decision shaping. To develop concrete mechanisms in this regard is a task to be reviewed and approved by the forth-coming ministerial meetings.

In this context, partnership with Russia plays an irreplaceable role. Russia and NATO are joined by many shared interests. The NATO-Russia Council Summit in Lisbon, with the participation of President Medvedev, addressed a number of opportunities for political consultations and practical cooperation. It is a shared feeling that the potential of the NATO-Russia Council has not been fully exploited yet. We hope that the considerable expectations the sum-mit raised will not be disappointed.

In its entirety, the new Strategic Concept represents a huge impetus for fur-ther transformations of NATO into a more modern, efficient and capable al-liance, operating under much stricter budgetary regulations than ever before.

A lot of work is ahead of the allies now to translate these strategic guide-lines into concrete steps, and many areas will be developed in cooperation with partner countries. Ambassador Rossin gave yesterday an overview of what is ahead of us in the period to come and what the time-lines are.


Serbia will be an important partner for us in pursuing the taskings we were given by our heads of states in Lisbon. Its newly established mission in NATO HQ is gradually taking shape, with some people already working there. With its full functioning, Serbia will acquire the capacity to participate together with 44 partners in all Partnership for Peace (PfP) deliberations relevant to her, and to start exploiting the opportunities the PfP framework offers. Practical cooperation has already taken some roots, but there is fundamentally more on offer. Based on the decision in Lisbon, Partnership will be further developed as a matter of priority into a more flexible and focused arrangement, bringing additional benefits to both partners as well as NATO. It is up to Serbia to de-cide the depth, intensity and substance of its partnership relations with NATO. And, it is only Serbia that can limit itself, as it is the case for all other partners.

To conclude, let me underscore my belief that good decisions are based on good knowledge.

That leads me back to the organisers of this conference who are doing what is needed – providing opportunities to understand the dynamism and devel-opment in one, yet very important area. I would like to thank them once again.


Contribution of H.E. Ambassador Lawrence Rossin to the conference

“New Serbia, new NATO – Future Vision for the 21st Century”162

NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which has replaced the Concept adopted in Washington in 1999, is a very forward-looking charter for NATO’s work. In Europe today, regional armed conflict is very unlikely; however, we are now faced with transnational threats, such as international terrorism, cyber-attacks and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which respect no borders and the consequences of which can be global in scope. The new Strategic Concept positions NATO to address these, drawing on both our civil and our military strengths. The new Strategic Concept gives NATO three main priorities for work over the next years – first, to make itself more effective by investing in modern capabilities to meet modern needs; second, to ensure that it engages more actively and deeply with the wider world and, third, it tasks NATO to streamline our structures to make them better able to respond to threats quickly, effectively and economically.

In my presentation today, I am going to touch mainly on three matters:

• first, highlights from NATO’s Lisbon Summit two weeks ago; • then, the development and – should Serbia want it – the possible way

forward in Serbia’s relationship with NATO; • and finally, NATO’s engagement in Kosovo through KFOR.

162 Ambassador Rossin is NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations


The Lisbon Summit and the New Strategic Concept

First, the Lisbon Summit, NATO’s new Strategic Concept and NATO’s stress on building a range of global partnerships.

It is not an exaggeration to say, as did our Secretary General Rasmussen at its end, that the Lisbon Summit was historic for NATO. A number of key deci-sions were taken in a series of meetings that included, firstly, Allies themselves; then, Allies and partners engaged in Afghanistan including President Karzai, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and European Union leaders; and finally, NATO’s leaders along with Russian President Medvedev in the NATO-Russia Council.

Framing their entire deliberation, NATO’s heads of state and government first adopted a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. This document replaces the Concept adopted in Washington in 1999. As the concrete further decisions taken by NATO’s leaders at the Summit underscore, it is a very forward-look-ing charter for NATO’s work. In Europe today, even regional armed conflict is very unlikely. Rather, we all face mainly transnational threats. International terrorism, cyber-attacks and WMD proliferation are challenges which respect no borders and the consequences of which can be global in scope. The new Strategic Concept positions NATO to address these, drawing on both our civil and our military strengths.

The new Strategic Concept gives NATO three main priorities for our work over the next years:

• First - To make ourselves more effective by investing in modern capa-bilities to meet modern needs. While NATO is maintaining a focus on the traditional essential military assets, we are also re-orienting our-selves towards combating challenges like terrorism, cyber-attacks and other future security challenges. This also means greater engagement on a comprehensive approach complementing military instruments with civilian efforts, which brings me to the second priority, which is --

• To ensure we engage more actively and deeply with the wider world. The challenges NATO faces do not threaten only NATO’s interests. Al-


ready, the Alliance has forged important partnerships with non-NATO countries and international organizations. NATO’s operations in Koso-vo, Iraq and Afghanistan are supported by a wide range of non-NATO countries. We work in close coordination with multinational counter-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa. And we pursue our structured partnership mechanisms – the Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, in which Serbia participates, as well as struc-tures with Mediterranean and Persian Gulf states. The new Strategic Concept gives more weight to NATO’s partnerships. This also means greater engagement with Russia. President Medvedev and his NATO counterparts had constructive discussions in Lisbon on Afghanistan and shared security threats, as well cooperation in addressing them. This new partnership emphasis can have positive implications for our relationships with partners like Serbia.

• Third, the Strategic Concept tasks us to streamline our structures to make them better able to respond to threats quickly, effectively and eco-nomically.

The new Strategic Concept is designed to frame NATO’s activities for years. Already at Lisbon, our leaders made several decisions to launch efforts within that framework:

1. To expand, as a core element of NATO’s collective defence task, our current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system. It is currently designed to protect NATO-deployed forces; now it will be en-hanced to protect NATO’s European populations and territory as well.

2. To develop by March political guidance for continuing transformation of NATO’s defence capabilities and forces, and military implementation of the new Strategic Concept.

3. To develop by June a substantial cyber-defence policy for NATO, and an Action Plan for its implementation.

4. To strengthen NATO’s Comprehensive Approach Action Plan by April, so that NATO can work more closely with partners who can deliver civilian effect in complex conflict situations, as well as to create NATO’s own civil-


ian stabilization and reconstruction capability. That is primarily the fruit of experience in Afghanistan, where military victory alone is impossible.

5. And on Afghanistan, our leaders and those of our ISAF partners de-cided, along with President Karzai, to commence transition from ISAF to Afghan lead responsibility, in early 2011, with an agreed target for transition to be underway country-wide by the end of 2014; as well as to enter into an Enduring Partnership even beyond the end of ISAF combat operations.

Finally, on Partnerships, perhaps the element of the Lisbon decisions most immediately relevant to Serbia and to this conference. NATO’s partnerships enhance Euro-Atlantic and wider international security and stability and re-inforce shared values. They provide frameworks for political, security and de-fence dialogue and regional cooperation and are essential to the success of NATO’s operations. Through them, we can share expertise, support broader reform, assist our partners in developing their own capabilities, and prepare interested nations for membership in NATO. They are of mutual value in ad-dressing together the transnational challenges already mentioned.

Therefore at Lisbon it was agreed to strengthen the work of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), of both of which Serbia is an active member, as the essential framework for substan-tive political dialogue and practical cooperation. PfP, EAPC and NATO’s other Partnership formats have evolved a lot but it was agreed that they, like NATO itself, would benefit from a focused reform effort. Several specific areas for such reform were identified and will be discussed internally and with NATO’s part-ners in the lead-up to the April meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin.

Western Balkans and NATO; NATO-Serbia Partnership

Now, in that context of strengthening NATO’s Partnerships, I will turn to the Western Balkans region, and Serbia, specifically.

Stability and security in the Western Balkans are crucial to Euro-Atlantic security. Most nations in the region have already joined NATO, or have ex-pressed a desire to do so:


• Albania, Croatia and Slovenia are NATO members; • the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be a member as soon

as the so-called “name issue” is resolved; • Montenegro is in the Membership Action Plan framework and actively

implementing it;• Bosnia and Herzegovina also is in the MAP framework and its imple-

mentation will begin as soon as all immovable defence properties iden-tified as necessary for future defence purposes have been officially reg-istered as the state property of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for use by the country’s Ministry of Defence;

• And Serbia is a member of the Partnership for Peace.

NATO wants to have fruitful relations with every nation in this region. The door to membership remains open to all who adhere to the shared values and specific requirements of NATO membership, but it is up to each country in the first instance to determine what its relations with NATO will be.

In the specific case of Serbia, NATO seeks to deepen our bilateral relation-ship. Serbia and NATO have increased cooperation on issues like defence re-form and civil emergency planning in recent years, and we believe there is more we can do in our bilateral relationship that will benefit both of us.

Practically, NATO’s cooperation with Serbia in the Partnership for Peace has mostly focused on the enhancement of military interoperability of the Serbian Armed Forces with NATO member states, to be able to participate in international peace support operations. That cooperation can enable Serbia to contribute to NATO-led operations. It equally enhances Serbia’s capacity to contribute to inter-national peacekeeping led by the United Nations or European Union. Of course, NATO welcomes Serbian peacekeeping engagement in any framework.

The first set of 19 Partnership Goals and planning targets were agreed be-tween Serbia and NATO in April 2009. In May this year that set of Goals was significantly expanded. NATO and Serbia established the NATO-Serbia De-fence Reform Group to support defence reform and assist in implementation of Partnership Goals. This Defence Reform Group has six sectoral working groups. Plenary meetings are co-chaired by Serbia and NATO and take place every four months - the last Plenary was held a month ago here in Belgrade.


We at NATO are pleased that Serbia established a diplomatic mission to NATO this year, headed by my friend Ambassador Branko Milinković. We were glad when a Serbian Armed Forces representation was added to the dip-lomatic mission in September.

All these things are good, and we could suggest more. But NATO’s leaders have said it often: it is up to Serbia to set the pace of developing this relation-ship.

• If Serbia decides its future lies in ever-deepening Partnership with NATO, it will find a ready partner in our 28 nations.

• If it does not want to deepen the Partnership, that will be OK with NATO too, although we would be disappointed at lost mutual oppor-tunities.

• If Serbia decides it might want NATO membership like its neighbours, it will find the Membership Action Plan door open.

• If Serbia decides it prefers not to enter NATO, that is fine too – nobody is ever required to become a NATO member, and good relations do not depend on that. NATO and its nations have very close and fruitful interaction with all the countries in Europe that have not joined NATO for whatever reasons, in the PfP and not least in operations. The same should be the case with a Serbia outside NATO, if that is the course you choose.

What is important for NATO will be to maintain at all times with Serbia, regardless of the framework, a strong political dialogue and good practical co-operation to address common security challenges, based on mutual respect.

KFOR’S Mission and Evolution As to KFOR, military contacts between NATO and the Serbian Armed

Forces continue impeccably in the context of the Joint Implementation Com-mission. Let me turn now to NATO’s operation in Kosovo.

As you know, Resolution 1244 in June 1999 established the parameters for the end to the conflict in Kosovo and for international engagement there. The Security Council directed the deployment in Kosovo of an international secu-rity presence. The North Atlantic Council decided that KFOR would assume


the role of that international security presence. KFOR has acted in that role since 1999. Resolution 1244 set out tasks for the international security pres-ence in its paragraph 9. Of those, many have been completed or overtaken by events. The main tasks that remain for KFOR are to maintain a safe and secure environment, conduct border monitoring duties as required, and ensure the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations.

For eleven and a half years, KFOR has fulfilled all its tasks, with few mis-steps. It has been adequately resourced by NATO and non-NATO contributing nations throughout. It has frequently adapted and downsized in response to generally improving security conditions in Kosovo itself, as well as the evolu-tion of other elements of the situation in Kosovo that provide the context for KFOR’s activities. Reflecting on KFOR’s good performance, it has consistently received high marks from all population groups in Kosovo itself and from re-gional actors including Serbia.

KFOR’s mission as determined by the North Atlantic Council within the parameters of Resolution 1244 has been unchanged by dramatic political de-velopments over the years, in particular since late 2006. NATO supported the efforts of the UN Special Envoy, President Ahtisaari, and subsequently those of the European Union-Russian-US troika of negotiators that sought to fin-ish President Ahtisaari’s work. KFOR helped maintain safety and stability on the ground, ensuring that the negotiations could proceed without disruption. This KFOR role, performed impartially, continued uninterrupted when the troika reported to the UN Secretary General its inability to broker an agree-ment on Kosovo’s status, followed by the declaration of Kosovo’s indepen-dence. KFOR continues to this day to perform that impartial role, and it will continue to do so.

It is important to understand that NATO has member states that recognize Kosovo’s independence and others that do not, but that NATO as an Organiza-tion takes no view at all on Kosovo’s juridical status. As an inter-governmental organization, NATO does not recognize states, nor not recognize them; that is a prerogative of nations. As our previous Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer said, “NATO is not in the recognition business.” That means NATO and KFOR are not “status-neutral” – just impartial in the way KFOR performs its tasks.


At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO agreed that NATO and KFOR would, within KFOR’s operational tasks, continue to work with all actors in Kosovo to support stability, democracy and multi-ethnicity. Additionally, it was announced that NATO stood ready to play its part in the implementation of future security ar-rangements. In June 2008, NATO agreed to assist in the dissolution with dignity of the Kosovo Protection Corps and the standing-up of the Kosovo Security Force and the civilian structure to oversee the KSF. The first task was completed. The second and third tasks are now implemented by NATO and KFOR in close coordination and consultation with the relevant local and international institutions.

These NATO policies remain in force, and contribute to maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo for all people.

KFOR Deterrent Presence and Unfixing

More recently, in June 2009 NATO’s nations decided to adjust KFOR’s force posture gradually, to what is called a “deterrent presence”. What that means is that, when appropriate, according to the evolution of events and in a phased manner with periodic North Atlantic Council revalidations, NATO is reduc-ing the number of KFOR forces over time to a smaller, more flexible force – one that remains fully able to perform all KFOR tasks.

The first stage in KFOR’s adaptation, the so-called “Gate 1”, was attained in January 2010. KFOR reduced to just over 10,000 troops.

After gauging the situation in Kosovo for several months, the North At-lantic Council in October approved SACEUR’s163 recommendation to move to the so-called “Gate 2” of the move to Deterrent Posture. This move, to be accomplished over approximately 4 months, will significantly consolidate the deployment of KFOR geographically, to focus on areas where security prob-lems sometimes flare up or where risks are evident.

This move reflects NATO’s positive assessment of the security situation in Kosovo over a sustained period of time, as well as of the demonstrated growing capability of the Kosovo Police, backed by EULEX and with KFOR as the third security provider, to deal with challenges to public safety and order.

163 Supreme Allied Commander for Europe


SACEUR, our Secretary General and NATO’s nations all approach this downsizing of KFOR with an abundance of caution. The Alliance’s commit-ment to Kosovo and to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment re-mains firm.

Conclusion

Let me now conclude.

I have sought in these remarks to give you a succinct overview of the his-toric decisions taken by NATO’s heads of state and government at the Lisbon Summit. These both speak to one theme of this conference and also can frame consideration of the implications for the development of the NATO-Serbia re-lationship within the Partnerships framework we will be working to enhance post-Lisbon.

I have dwelt a bit on KFOR’s tasks and its evolution both to convey the latest developments and to underscore a point I think is sometimes not clear here. That is that NATO’s role in Kosovo serves stability and security for all people in Kosovo, and therefore for the entire region, impartially and without reference to juridical or political considerations outside NATO’s remit. There-fore, NATO’s operation in Kosovo should be no impediment to developing our partnership. To the extent it is cited by some as a roadblock, there may be misunderstanding of what KFOR and NATO do, and do not do, in Kosovo, or why.

The new Strategic Concept places partnerships at the centre of NATO’s pro-

gram for the coming years. The Alliance will be working this year to shape the way forward with Partners, and working with them as we do that. Lisbon has given us the flexibility to build on what is already being done to create a part-nership which will best suit Serbia’s needs as well as our own. As I have said, we see significant potential for deepening NATO’s relationship with Serbia, provided that is what Serbia, its government and its people desire. From the perspective both of our Secretary-General Rasmussen and of the NATO na-tions, Serbia has great potential to be a contributor to stability and security, not just in this region but in the entire Euro-Atlantic area, and there is great interest in their part in building our partnership.


NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the System of Global Security

Julian Harston164

The world we inhabit today is a complex and dangerous multifaceted threat

environment. Instead of inter-state challenges, we now have non-state and asym-metric threats. NATO’s first two Strategic Concepts of the post-Cold War era attempted to handle a new threat environment that lacked any real threats, whilst simultaneously pushing for enlargement. The 1999 document, written during NATO’s air campaign in the Balkans, set the precedent for the expansion of NATO operations beyond mere self-defence, to account for humanitarian in-terventions and conflict prevention. That was certainly a change from the 1991 mission statement that, “the Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence.” What is indisputable is that NATO is here to stay. However, given the inherently divergent core interests of its member states, the question is what underlying threat will unify NATO in the decade ahead to galvanize the Alliance into making the investments and reforms that the Strategic Concept stipulates.

164 Assistant Secretary General (rtd) United Nations


First of all I should put some cards on the table. As a diplomat working for the United Kingdom for twenty five years, I was a paid NATO supporter, which I did with some enthusiasm because of the essential elements of mutual assistance involved. I was however, always a Gaullist165. I never believed that the United States would place New York or Washington in jeopardy for London or Par-is……and whatever scenario I could imagine would only give the U.S. at most a couple of days to make up their minds, rather than the usual two to four years.

I have more recently served as an Assistant Secretary General in the United Nations, and watched the agonizing of founder members of that organization, also leading members of NATO, choosing when to secure the added legitimacy for their operations that the Security Council can provide, and when to ignore it.

I have served much of the last 15 years in the Balkans, and much of that in Belgrade. I have watched Serbia move from dictatorship to democracy, and watched as it became the target for NATO bombs in the process. This was ac-tion that marked the beginning of a policy of expansion that has taken NATO where it is today - in Afghanistan. And moved NATO away from self-defence to offence, albeit for the greater good…………….or so the story goes.

In this paper, I would first like to look at the present threats to global secu-rity, take a look at the new NATO strategic concept as delivered at Lisbon in November 2010, and then make some judgements about whether that concept is appropriate to the threat, and a few words at the end on how Serbia should be planning for its place in the security architecture of the future.

Let us look at the threats to global security. Are we racing toward global disorder? What place will there be for military alliances and their political power in

the future?

We are living in a complex and dangerous multifaceted threat environment. There is what security analysts call a ‘full threat spectrum’. Instead of the inter-state challenges to which we have become used, we now have non-state threats, as well as rogue state challenges. We are faced with the proliferation of weap-ons of mass destruction and missile technology, and the other longer term

165 Gaullism is a French political ideology based on the thought and action of Resistance leader then president Charles de Gaulle. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaullism


global challenges with which we are now becoming so familiar: global warm-ing, pandemics and the disappearance of fossil fuels. Add to that the very real threat of cyber-warfare against governments and armed forces which are more and more vulnerable, and you have one of those multi-coloured cocktails, with a little umbrella, where the pretty colours stay identifiable, but the drink is a killer nonetheless.

International terrorism and a radicalised Islam, whatever the causes, is a Big War, with home grown terrorists inspired by a broad global ideological base. So far counter terrorism and intelligence activities have prevented an-other 9/11, but for how long? We have to be successful every time. They have to be successful once.

The long term future of Afghanistan is, at best, uncertain. The Taliban is regrouping, but the lack of unity of purpose in those groups is perhaps a hope-ful sign. All the while, the attempts to stem the drugs trade (a main raison d’être for the NATO presence in Afghanistan) is failing. NATO - when openly discussing its exit strategy - seems weak and divided. The strategic failure in Iraq is becoming more apparent, despite the good news of the last month that a government of sorts is now being put in place.

Regional adversaries Iran, Syria, Al Quaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas are all em-boldened by what they characterize as U.S. failure in Iraq and Israeli failure in Lebanon. The U.S. and Israel no longer appear invulnerable, and the Iranian nuclear and missile shield which is for certain being developed, is likely to shape the security environment significantly over the next ten years. Iranian hegemony will be aided by Iranian inspired, equipped, trained and funded Shia militias in the region. Make no mistake, Tehran believes that nuclear power is a key element for Iranian power and prestige.

The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is next on the agenda. It is accelerating and broadening. The twin challenges of Iran and North Korea have been much in the news recently thanks to WikiLeaks, but there is now the possibility of wildfire proliferation. Let us not forget that Saudi Arabia and Egypt both announced nuclear programmes in 2006, and that even Japan has considered a break-out from the 1968 NPT166 in response to perceived threats

166 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons


from North Korea. Given the loopholes available in NPT, how many nuclear states will there be in 2025? And to continue the liturgy of bad news, there is already a nexus of WMD equipped states and aspirant terrorist organizations. Biological and radiological weapons are a major short term concern. Ex-Soviet loose nukes are still out there available for sale or theft. We know of sub-state ‘railroads’ for spreading technology and know-how. Think of Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan.

Is the uni-polar world order at an end?

Russia is enjoying a resurgence of wealth and problems along with a danger-ous self-perception of power and influence, and renewed imperial pretensions. But there is long-term resilience there which will enable energy resources to be used as a coercive weapon against neighbours and competitors as we watch the motherland slip back into authoritarianism. And what of China, already an economic super power, and Japan - as it seeks ‘normal defence power’ status in response to an increasingly challenging local security environment.

And before we leave my perception of the short to medium term threat environment, let us just add climate change, leading to resource depletion and demographic pressures in developing states.

Globalisation is eroding statehood, in ways which are both good and very very dangerous. Not least because it is easily sold to the deprived as renewed Western imperialism and used to breed forces which mobilize popular anger.

What a relief then to realize that in its new Strategic Concept NATO has identified all these threats and would seem to offer at least a partial solution to most of them.

The document, which starts with a Mission statement of such length that even the least sceptical readers must wonder where they are being led, is a brave attempt at facing the identified threats whilst papering over the cracks in the Alliance brought about by very different perceptions of those threats among its members, whilst all the while ignoring the resource crisis that the Alliance is going through and will suffer for the foreseeable future.

NATO’s first two Strategic Concepts of the post-Cold War era, written in 1991 and 1999, attempted to handle a new threat environment that lacked any true threats, while pushing for enlargement. The 1999 document, writ-


ten during NATO’s air war in the Balkans, set the precedent for the expansion of NATO operations beyond mere self-defence, to account for humanitarian interventions and conflict prevention. What a change from the 1991 mission statement that, “The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weap-ons will ever be used except in self-defence.”

The last 10 years have seen NATO launch its largest military engagement in Afghanistan, engage in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa and train security forces in Iraq. The challenge for NATO was to formulate a Strategic Concept that satisfies all 28 members while navigating the engage-ment in Afghanistan and addressing fears among some members about Rus-sian encroachment. It is unclear that this challenge has been, or in fact ever can be, met.

Rather than an exhaustive and exhausting look at the nearly 4,000-word Strategic Concept, I would only note that the concept covers everything from energy security to network security to climate change. The Central European requirement for reassurances that self-defence is still central is fulfilled, be-cause it is mentioned first in every section. But it will take more than starting each paragraph by hinting at NATO’s self-defence to assure the Central Euro-peans that the Alliance is sincere about the issue.

And it is this context that I would like to concentrate on Russia as the cata-lyst for NATO’s success or failure, or even of its continued existence. It is per-haps the most striking of ironies that Russia still holds the most vital key to NATO’s existence, or perhaps even its descent into being a far less essential element in Europe’s defence architecture.

As NATO member states plan for the next decade, Russia is working ag-gressively to restore its former power at home and in the region after its post-Soviet slumber. Russia today is starting to look a bit like the Soviet Union that was NATO’s raison d’etre during the Cold War. While NATO took its eye off Russia as its main adversary, Russia was allowed time to regroup after the fall of the Soviet Union and chaos of the 1990s, while NATO’s aggressive, and - some would say - obsessive moves toward enlargement gave Moscow the impetus, and I believe the legitimization for resurgence.

While NATO focused more on the Islamic world, Russia militarily inter-vened in Georgia167 (resulting in a de-facto occupation of a quarter of the coun-try), moved military bases into southern Central Asia and Armenia, united

167 See: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/real_world_order


Belarus and Kazakhstan168 into an economic union and facilitated the election of pro-Russian forces in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan169.

Stratfor, the U.S. based think-tank, and Madeleine Albright, break NATO into three groups on this and other issues (with Russia as the main point of contention): the United States and its “Atlanticist” allies (such as the Nether-lands, Denmark and the United Kingdom), core Europe (led by Germany and France), and the Central Europeans. Washington and its strongest NATO allies are wary of Russia and suspicious of its intentions, but they also want the Al-liance’s emphasis to include issues like post-conflict operations and terrorism, not just defence against Russia. Core Europe wants to maintain its good rela-tions with Russia and not provoke it with an alliance that is concentrating on rolling back Moscow’s control of its sphere of influence. Central Europe wants to be reassured, but Berlin and Paris do not want to give Central Europe any-thing but token reassurances due to their relationship with Moscow. Beyond Russia, the United States wants NATO to concentrate on the terrorist threat, increase its military spending170 and help in post-conflict missions. The Core Europeans are particularly wary of any further engagements and want NATO to both reaffirm the UN Security Council primacy in international affairs — so as to limit U.S. unilateralism taking the Alliance on various “adventures” — and to look more to conflict prevention, rather than post-conflict nation-building. The Central Europeans are also sceptical of further U.S. distractions.

Washington and Moscow seemed to step back from their aggressive stances when President Barack Obama took office. Shifting tactics, both countries brokered an understanding that each had larger issues to focus on at the time, so the growing hostilities would be put on hold — at least temporarily. Such an understanding is naturally shaky, but both Washington and Moscow knew this going in.

The understanding between Moscow and Washington does not seem to have included a slowdown of Russia’s resurgence. When the United States pulled back from aggressively countering Russia, the countries Washington was protecting — the Central Europeans and Georgia —felt abandoned and defenceless. These states also were unable to turn to the traditional powers in Europe: Germany and France

168 See:http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/151436/analysis/20091230_russia_belarus_kazakhstan_customs_deal_and_way_forward_moscow

169 See:http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/160817/analysis/20100426_russia_unrest_foreign_policy_tool

170 See:http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/173818/analysis/20101015_us_and_eu-rope_face_military_spending


had already decided it was better to balance their relations with Russia than stand up against it — especially to protect the Central Europeans.

But there are signs that the rapprochement is paper thin. The smiling faces at the end of the Lisbon summit and understandings apparently reached there on missile defence are already coming under strain. The details of Russian par-ticipation will have to wait until June 2011 to be hashed out, but it seems that whatever Moscow’s participation is, it will not be given joint control over the BMD171. Did anyone really believe that Russia would tie itself into a serious partnership without a power of veto?

But going into the NATO summit, many Western Europeans were count-ing on the U.S.-Russian détente to still be in effect, allowing them to be more comfortable in negotiations with both NATO members and with Russia. How-ever, the Central European states are relieved that the cracks in the détente are starting to show, as it will allow them to be more aggressive toward Russia. So in essence, the disintegration of U.S. - Russian relations will divide the already-fracturing NATO even further.

What is most troubling for the Central Europeans is that the Russian Envoy to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, called the Strategic Concept “balanced.” A happy Rogozin means a happy Kremlin, and that means the Central Europeans did not receive guarantees from the United States and Core Europe that in any way concern Russia.

NATO will not disappear. It is here to stay, if for no other reason than iner-tia. It will still have a useful role to play in anti-piracy missions, post-conflict clean-ups and as a seal of approval for the few Western Balkan states which have yet to join the West. But the Europeans are already developing alterna-tives. The Central Europeans are looking at bilateral agreements with the United States.

Central Europeans are having difficulty finding another Western European power, outside of Sweden, with an ear for their security concerns. They feel they need to counter Russia on their own, with limited backup. There is always Germany, which Central Europeans should theoretically be able to turn to for support. At least on paper, Berlin is an EU and NATO ally. However, specific to the Central European fears — and a reality that is rarely spoken publicly in Central Europe — is the fact that Germany is becoming unhinged from the Cold War-era institutions. Russia may be the obvious security threat, but it is

171 Ballistic Missile Defence


Germany’s evolving role — and, crucially, its warming relations with Moscow — that troubles Warsaw and other Central European capitals, most precisely because it is unclear which way Berlin is heading.

Other European countries will form agreements among themselves. The Scandinavian countries, which are divided between NATO and non-NATO states, are already making military agreements with the Bal-tic States, which Sweden and Finland see as their own sphere of influ-ence. The French are developing amphibious capabilities with the United Kingdom and Mediterranean countries on their own and have signed a defensive agreement with the United Kingdom to balance their po-litical and economic relationship with Germany. This independent move-ment among NATO and non-NATO states is just more evidence that the Alliance’s continued existence alone may not save it from irrelevancy. Given the inherently divergent core interests of its member states, the question is what underlying threat will unify NATO in the decade ahead to galvanize the Alliance into making the sort of investments and reforms that the Strategic Concept stipulates.

NATO will ensure it will remain relevant if it focuses on Europe’s strengths instead of being undermined by its lack of a credible strategy. European allies should focus on how to develop the military capabilities needed to support their security strategies within projected resource constraints. Considering their limited capacity for expeditionary operations (not more than 2 - 3% of NATO forces can be deployed and sustained outside Europe), European al-lies should instead enhance their capabilities in low-intensity operations such as reconstruction, cyber-security, organized crime and policing of movement within their borders. Hence, by using the finite resources available on role spe-cialization, Europe would be better positioned to guarantee its security and be-come a more capable partner. Likewise, the United States would avoid military and strategic over-extension, thereby permitting it to consider new strategic relationships, with India and others, that will better address the 21st century security environment which I described earlier.

………………and now, with apologies for taking up even more of your time, a very quick look at where all this leaves Serbia.


NATO is in flux, the new Strategic concept papers over the cracks, but does little to give a really clear picture of where NATO will be in five years.

So, does anyone sensible climb onto a bus, not knowing where it is going?Normally..........no.But in this case, I think the answer is yes.

I know that Serbia has never been a member of a military alliance, I know the emotional arguments based on the brutality of the NATO bombing, I know that Vuk Jeremić appears to offer a three-pillar alternative, albeit a somewhat fanciful one, but on balance I believe that Serbia has the luxury of time. Stick with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, get the most out of it, reassure the U.S. in particular which continues to cast Serbia in the guise of a potential rogue state, reassure European friends of Serbia, and wait to see how NATO develops and whether there is perhaps a new security architecture, which will include NATO, where Serbia will feel more comfortable in the medium term.


NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Context and Significance

Dr Matthew Rhodes172

Having adopted the new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon summit, the Alli-ance’s credibility as a cornerstone of international security, as well as the viability of Euro-Atlantic partnership and integration, has been reinforced. However, its adoption was no foregone conclusion. Allies could have delayed drafting efforts or simply released a declaration of the previous version’s continuing relevance. Instead, they not only stuck to the ambitious timetable set at the Strasbourg/Kehl summit in spring 2009, but did so through a broadly-inclusive process that incorporated input from elder statesmen and non-government experts. At a time of rising doubt, its adoption reaffirmed the high value members ascribe to the Alliance as well as their ability and will to achieve consensus on a twenty-first century security agenda. As a necessary - if insufficient starting point - NATO’s Strategic Concept has already provided a timely boost to the vigour and prestige of the Euro-Atlantic community.

172 Author is the director of the Program in Advanced Security Studies and professor of national security studies at the Marshall Center.


The most important fact about NATO’s new Strategic Concept is that agree-ment was reached at all. Failure to produce a serious document or fear to even try would have reinforced the Euro-Atlantic community’s recent crisis of con-fidence. Success at the Lisbon summit reinforces the Alliance’s credibility as a cornerstone of international security as well as the viability of Euro-Atlantic partnership and integration as points of orientation for non-member states in South-east Europe and beyond.

With slightly different emphasis on opposite sides of the ocean, the Euro-Atlantic community emerged from the Cold War largely convinced of two sig-nificant points. The first was that the community possessed sufficient resources, technical expertise, and professional competence to solve virtually any security challenge likely to emerge. The second was that liberal democratic capitalism as practiced across the community had proven itself history’s most successful form of social organization. It probably possessed universal validity. As a result, steadily improving opportunities and conditions could be expected within the commu-nity even as it enlarged, and more and more countries adopted its principles.

To be sure, actual developments repeatedly called this sense of assurance into question. The initially fumbling, messy multilateralism of the commu-nity’s response to violence in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere presented an early example. Terrorist attacks in cities such as New York, Madrid, Lon-don, and Istanbul, as well as natural disasters such Hurricane Katrina, later exposed previously underestimated domestic vulnerabilities. Heated disputes over intervention in Iraq (termed by the U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Burns a “near-death experience” for NATO) as well as protracted, bloody insurgen-cies in both that country and Afghanistan further highlighted limits to Euro-Atlantic effectiveness.

However, more than anything else the global financial crisis replaced trium-phant optimism with doubt. Even as the community registered qualified prog-ress in most of the other areas, it suddenly founded itself confronted with the world’s deepest economic downturn since the 1930s. Triggered by the bursting of the U.S. real estate bubble in spring 2007, the crisis produced severe losses and near-paralysis in financial markets by fall 2008, dramatic surges in unem-ployment and budget deficits through 2009, and potentially fatal stress on the Eurozone currency union by 2010.


Cumulatively, those effects have diminished attention and resources for inter-national engagement and accelerated the perceived shift of global power to Asia and other emerging economies. They have undermined Euro-Atlantic states’ repu-tation for competence and claims for liberal democracy’s superiority as a system.

Equally inauspicious for agreement on a new Strategic Concept, through this period Euro-Atlantic cooperation remained in a disappointing, even de-teriorating state. New U.S. President Barack Obama’s considerable personal popularity in Europe failed to translate into greater commitment to common action on high-profile issues. Despite U.S. Secretary of Defence Bob Gates’s warnings of a “two-tier alliance,” European allies met Obama’s tripling of U.S. forces in Afghanistan with a mix of comparatively modest, partly temporary increases and announcements of withdrawal. For Obama’s part, shortly after skipping twentieth-anniversary commemorations of the fall of the Berlin Wall and declaring himself America’s “first Pacific President,” he left out European counterparts from final talks with leaders of other major nations at the United Nations’ climate change summit in Copenhagen. Regarding the financial crisis itself, the community remained divided over the relative priority of coordinat-ed stimulus or debt reduction. Then-Czech Prime Minister Miroslav Topola-nek, whose country held the EU’s rotating presidency in spring 2009, famously called the Obama administration’s preferred path of stimulus ”the road to hell.” In less colourful terms, German leaders shared this sentiment as well.

Against that backdrop, NATO’s adoption of a meaningful new Strategic Concept was no foregone conclusion. Allies could have further delayed drafting efforts or simply released a declaration of the previous version’s continuing relevance. Instead, they not only stuck to the ambitious timeta-ble for a Concept set at the Strasbourg/Kehl summit in spring 2009 but did so via a broadly-inclusive process that incorporated input from elder states-men and non-government experts. The final product adopted at Lisbon in late 2010 overcame sometimes bitter substantive differences on a range of key issues. It agreed a way ahead in Afghanistan, reinforced preparedness for both territorial defence and expeditionary missions, affirmed alliance-wide roles for nuclear deterrence and missile defence, identified cyber and energy security as potential Article 5 issues, outlined principles for rela-tions with the European Union and Russia, and reaffirmed openness to future enlargement.


Not surprisingly, much of the Concept’s language in these areas did not present radical departures from previous Alliance statements. Nonethe-less, by bridging some significant areas of disagreement and offering current, authoritative strategic guidance it performed an important function. At a time of rising doubt, its adoption reaffirmed the high value members ascribe to the Alliance as well as their ability and will to achieve consensus on a twenty-first century security agenda.

Challenges of implementation certainly remain, not least in marshalling resources for envisioned capabilities. Parallel issues apply to the European Union’s own “Lisbon Agenda,” after that organization’s reform treaty coinci-dentally signed in the same city. Nonetheless, as a necessary if insufficient starting point, NATO’s Concept has already provided a timely boost to the vigour and prestige of the Euro-Atlantic community.


Serbia’s Strategic Dilemma – Between NATO and Russia

Dr Aleksandar Fatić173

Internal debate and political tensions in Serbia regarding its membership in NATO has demonstrated a tendency to “absorb” broader strategic arguments. This de-bate is primarily taking place in relation to normative and moral issues, while broader strategic issues – which are crucial for the answer to the question of a plausible membership in NATO – are left aside. Normative issues are primarily related to the existing Constitution of Serbia, i.e., the issue of the relationship be-tween NATO and the newly-proclaimed independent state of Kosovo, as a result of secession from Serbia, and the Resolution of the Serbian National Assembly on military neutrality, which majority of the political public has interpreted as a ban on accession to NATO. Moral questions are concerned with NATO’s role in dismemberment of Serbian state territory - the most dramatic example of which was the secession of Kosovo and NATO bombing in 1999. All these issues, which carry certain emotional potential, actually bypass one crucial strategic question as to whether it is in the civilizational, cultural, political and defence related in-terests of Serbia to join NATO, or is it in its interest to oppose such a project. This text deals with the above stated strategic dilemma, starting from the assumption that the main obstacle to Serbian strategic membership in NATO is an insuffi-ciently clear relationship between Serbia and the Russian Federation.

173 Author is a Senior Scientific Researcher, Institute for International Politics and Econo-mics, Belgrade


Introduction

The main argument of this paper is that the fundamental reason for Ser-bia’s reluctance concerning NATO membership is the pressure coming from Moscow, given that the creation of a monolithic NATO geo-strategic space in Europe directly opposes the strategic interests of the Russian Federation. This pressure has economic, energy and political dimensions. It culminated with the visit of Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, to Belgrade in October 2009 and his address to Serbian parliamentarians, when a number of bilateral agreements were signed. In 2009, after considerable reluctance on the part of Serbia, an agreement on the sale of the Serbian oil monopoly, NIS Jugopetrol, to Russia’s Gazprom was finalised; with a 51% stake, as a condition for the con-struction of Russia’s South Stream pipeline through Serbia, with a branch in the Republika Srpska. At the same time, it was agreed that a Russian military base for “intervention in natural disasters and emergency coordination” was to be opened in Niš, southern Serbia. The question of whose troops would secure the future pipeline, which will be placed above ground, was not addressed on that occasion. At the same time, Russia’s Emergency Situations Minister, Ser-gei Shoigu, who was a key negotiator in the preparations for Medvedev’s visit, when asked about whether only the troops of Russia’s “inner army” – which is under his command – will in the future be stationed there, or the regular Russian army, responded that “such a decision can only be made by President Medvedev”; thus leaving open the possibility of Russia’s militarization of Ser-bia. With all these direct bilateral pressures, Russia is the most reliable dip-lomatic ally of Serbia in preventing the adoption of the resolution in the UN Security Council that would further consolidate the independence of Kosovo, as well as in preventing Kosovo from becoming a full member of a number of international organizations and forums. Therefore, Serbia’s dependence on Moscow is quite significant and Belgrade is not able to take a decisive course towards NATO without the tacit approval of the Kremlin.

Over the past decade, Russian foreign policy has undergone a series of trans-formations in its relations with NATO, and this topic is an integral part of con-siderations about Russian interests towards Serbia and its politics in relation to NATO. Moscow has rational reasons for opposing NATO’s further expansion and “rounding-up’ of NATO’s strategic space all the way to the Russian border. However, in their attitude towards expansion, they face a real lack of strategic


allies. In fact, it can be assumed that the only reluctant ally of Russia in eastern Europe today is Serbia, which has remained outside NATO. At the same time, the more unsuccessful the Russian policy of diplomatic and strategic opposi-tion to further NATO expansion will be, the more likely it is that increasing tension between the Russian defence doctrine and the Strategic Concept will arise – two key defence documents of the Russian Federation – and thus an increasing growth in the classic security dilemma between Russia and NATO. It is therefore in the interest of global security to halt the expansion of NATO rather than to have an escalation of the security dilemma with Moscow. How-ever, that still does not mean that it is in the strategic interest of small countries like Serbia to remain outside NATO.174

Russia’s strategic position vis-à-vis NATO

Any consideration of Russia’s defence strategy has to start with its tradi-tional conventional defence doctrine in the post-Cold War period, which was based on the depth of strategic territory which could absorb the first conven-tional strike of the enemy. The doctrine then provides for cumulative mobiliza-tion of Russian reserve forces, a gradual rounding of the enemy and expulsion out of Russian territory. This doctrine was traditionally primary to the parallel, nuclear doctrine, which consists of the principle of “extended intimidation and first strike.” Given that the conventional Russian doctrine is quite defensive, it is in the global interest to preserve it as a realistic option of Russian defence, so that Moscow would not have to resort to more preventive – and hence more aggressive – positions in protocols of activation of its armed forces, as these protocols simultaneously threaten its neighbours and increase the danger of military conflict.

The expansion of NATO towards Russia’s borders is a policy that directly undermines the sustainability of the conventional Russian defence doctrine. Apart from the fact that Russia is no longer conventionally superior in terms of weapons and number of soldiers in relation to NATO, unlike during the Cold War, its defence geography has also dramatically changed due to NATO’s ex-pansion. In the 1980s, the Soviet Army had nearly four million troops, 10,000 strategic and 30,000 tactical nuclear missiles, with an annual production of

174 For further details, see my text “A Strategy Based on Doubt: Russia Courts Southeast Europe”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 31, no. 3, December 2010, pp. 441–464.


3,000 tanks, 600 combat aircraft and 20 warships. Today’s Russian army has around one million soldiers, whilst a budget crisis in the Kremlin has directly undermined the maintenance of a drastically reduced nuclear arsenal and na-vy.175 At the same time, if NATO’s expansion continues with the accession of Ukraine and Georgia, it would mean that the Moscow military district would be the first Russian line of defence or, in other words, its conventional defence doctrine would become completely inapplicable. Therefore, Moscow is forced to consider changing its conventional doctrine from defensive to pro-active, which would include permanently stationing a major part of its troops near the border and activating protocols that include an increased level of combat readiness and the principle of “explosion towards the enemy”, out of Russia’s borders, at the first hint of threat.

In terms of nuclear doctrine, Russia has already demonstrated its sense of insecurity in light of NATO’s expansion. Although the agreement on nuclear disarmament, START 2, was ratified by the Russian Duma on 14th April 2000, when the U.S. withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on 13th June 2002, Russia withdrew from START 2 only a day later. It was only presidents Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev, respectively, who overcame this stale-mate in nuclear disarmament by signing a new START treaty in Prague on 8th April 2010, which limits the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 and the number of strategic launch vehicles to 800, within a period of seven years.

As during the Cold War – when NATO was conventionally inferior to the Soviet Union – NATO’s primary military doctrine was nuclear (NATO’s Strategic Concept insisted on the “first resort to” nuclear weapons), so the Russian Federation, due to its conventional inferiority in relation to NATO, transformed its nuclear doctrine into its primary defence doctrine in 2000. That very transformation radically intensified the global security equation. On 21st April 2000, President Vladimir Putin signed a new military doctrine for the Russian Federation, which differs from the previous one adopted in 1997 in that it lowers the level of threat necessary to use nuclear weapons. The doctrine from 1997 predicted the use of nuclear weapons in situations where “the very existence of the Russian Federation was threatened.” The

175 Alexei Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya, Marshall Centre Papers, no. 2, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, July 2000, p. 14.


2000 Doctrine, however, predicts the activation of the nuclear arsenal in response to a “conventional large-scale aggression”, while guaranteeing the protection of Russia’s “nuclear umbrella” to Russian allies.176 During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Kremlin put an emphasis on the de-ployment and development of tactical nuclear projects (of a range below 500 kilometres) that are not limited by any agreements on reducing strate-gic nuclear weapons, and which are obviously nuclear weapons of choice for an attack on conventional forces in the immediate neighbourhood. Moscow invested significant effort in the development of a renowned Iskander bal-listic missile and the new “super-combat” aircraft that would strengthen its air forces.177

In 2010, however, economic growth and the strengthening of Russia allowed for a radical change of military doctrine introduced by President Medvedev. The military doctrine, which he signed on 5th February of the same year, “re-turns” a mandate to the use of nuclear weapons at the level of “threat to the existence of the Russian Federation”, but introduces as a priority an expensive and ambitious policy of developing strategic conventional missiles – known as “surgical bombing” of high precision – in open competition with NATO, which already for a decade has been developing exactly such weapons as a weapon of first choice in interventions. The emphasis on strategic missiles demonstrates that Russia sees the West, and not just its geographical encircle-ment, as a primary threat to its security.178 However, in order to apply a new doctrine, Russia needs strategic allies in Europe which would help to project the conventional weapons as far to the West as possible. Except for Belarus, which was explicitly mentioned as an ally in the 2010 military doctrine, Russia has only one potential ally in Europe, and that is Serbia.

Russia’s Energy Strategy towards Serbia

Apart from the fact that Russian companies own both major oil companies in Serbia, Beopetrol and, since recently, Jugopetrol, through which they con-trol the country’s energy market, a key aspect of Russia’s energy strategy to-wards Serbia is the planned construction of the South Stream pipeline through

176 Nazavisimaya Gazeta, 22 April 2000177 Alexei Arbatov, Ibid, pp. 28–29.178 Vojna doktrina Ruske Federacije, 5 February 2010, note No. 5.


Serbia, with a branch that, via the Republika Srpska, goes towards the Federa-tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see map).

It has been scheduled that South Stream will start functioning in 2015, with an annual transportation capacity of about 63 billion cubic meters of gas; which is 35% of total Russian gas exports to Europe. Bearing in mind the fact that European countries import gas from Russia which covers between 23% and 40% of their total consumption, it is clear how strategically important South Stream is to Russia and all the countries it passes through. The pipeline has to pass under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, from where it will bifurcate; with one branch to Italy via Greece, and the other connecting Serbia, Croatia, Slove-nia, Hungary and Austria. In light of the South Stream project, it is important to note the existence of an unofficial document of the Russian Ministry of For-eign Affairs, entitled “Programme for the efficient use of foreign policy in the long-term development of Russia”, that was published in 2010 by the Russian edition of Newsweek magazine and Croatia’s Jutarnji List. This document out-lines a plan to build a 3,200 km long oil pipeline called “Družba Adria”, with an annual capacity of 5 to 15 million tons of oil, during three stages of gradual ac-


tivation. The pipeline would start from the Russian city of Samara and stretch to Belarus, the Ukraine, Slovakia and Hungary to Omiš, on the Croatian isle of Krk.179 By constructing the South Stream and “Družba Adria”, both NATO member states in the region and Serbia would be drawn into the Russian gas project and thus under Russian gas dependence.

Serbian problems associated with Russia and NATO

Serbia’s policy towards Moscow is highly pragmatic, primarily based on the particular need to maintain Russia’s diplomatic sponsorship in relation to the multilateral treatment of Kosovo’s independence. Serbia has reason to fear that the process of fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia, which has been going on for two decades, could continue through the impending internal decentral-ization of Serbia itself. This is especially pertinent for the increasingly more prominent ambitions of politicians in the southern region of Sandžak and Raška, and in the north-western province of Vojvodina, to express and institu-tionalise their distinct identities through their statal and parastatal attributes and policies. Such a policy is formally in-line with the principles of European regionalism, yet it is also natural that it causes fear in Belgrade, which was the subject of lengthy and persistent state disintegration. Therefore, it is very im-portant for the Serbian authorities that Moscow remains opposed, in principle, to the formation of additional new states in the Balkans.

In addition to this specific political dependence, accompanied with eco-nomic and energy dependence (during the last visit of President Medvedev, Russian assistance to the Serbian budget, amongst other forms of assistance, was agreed), Serbia also relies on Russia in terms of its identity. Collective identities in the former Yugoslavia went through a series of fractures, and a large part of them traumatised the Serbian collective identity. Today, after all the governmental fractures, Serbia is the most multicultural of all the Balkan countries, with a significant Muslim population that is politically active and which has close family, religious and political ties with the Bosniak major-ity in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina. Muslims seek a new affirmation of their identity through political projects in Serbia, and the carrier of these initiatives today is the mufti of Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, who has been the

179 Krešimir Žabec, „Tajni naputak Rusa: Morate biti u projektu Družba Adria“, Jutarnji list, 18 May 2010


subject of persistent criticism by the Belgrade media. At the same time, inter-nal political and cultural division of the Serbian public into the so-called “two Serbias” - one authoritarian, prone to preservation of the state even at the cost of dictatorship, and which, in the opinion of its critics, used to back the regime of Slobodan Milošević and his politics, and the second, democratic and Euro-pean, which is not only not disappearing, but rather deepening the debate on possible changes to the Serbian Constitution, Kosovo’s future and, finally, on Serbia’s possible membership in NATO. One part of the conservative public finds itself increasingly embracing anti-European and anti-NATO positions, calling for patriotism; whilst the second part, close to the current government, is afraid to be too explicit in its pro-NATO stance in order not to be accused of treason.

Objectively speaking, Serbia does not have much choice regarding possible accession to NATO given its regional circumstances. Albania, Bulgaria, Croa-tia and Slovenia are already members of NATO, while Bosnia and Macedonia are in the process of accession. That means that Serbia is the only potential strategic ally of Russia in its opposition to further NATO expansion. All coun-tries of the region set EU membership as their foreign policy priority, which is also consistent with the transatlantic orientation of foreign policy. Therefore, due to its specific internal political situation, Serbia is somewhat “sticking out” from the rest of the region and primarily so in the dimension of its relation-ship with NATO. This departure from the politics of other countries is based on the fact that Serbia experienced the bombing by NATO in 1999, and that NATO member states recognized the independence of Kosovo; therefore, ob-jectively, Serbia is faced with contradictory factors for deciding its position on NATO. On the one hand, Serbia has strong moral reasons not to become a member; while on the other hand, from a strictly strategic perspective, Serbia has a dilemma between an obvious logical premise to join NATO together with all its neighbours and its special interests in relation to Russia. Because of all this, Serbia will have to make its decision on membership in NATO on sev-eral levels, also including the completion of an internal political debate about collective identity and the basic directions of its foreign policy, as well as the formulation of clear strategic conclusions about which of its strategic interests are more important for the future.

The inclusion of other Balkan countries into NATO is taking place on the basis of several different assumptions and normative templates. While other


countries of Central and Eastern Europe were under the oppressive domina-tion of Moscow during the Cold War, and still keep the memory of Russia as the occupier in the collective memory of their people, Serbia had a slightly different socialist system, whereby the major repression was conducted by a domestic Communist oligarchy, while Russia was understood as a distant ideal of Slav brotherhood that was not directly connected with the crimes of the regime of Josip Broz Tito. Therefore, a deviation from Russia in cultural and strategic contexts, which was the main motive for the countries of Central and partly of Eastern Europe to join first the Partnership for Peace (PfP) pro-gramme, and later NATO, is not very pronounced in Serbia. Thus, the political elite does not have sufficient public support to be more assertive in those ini-tiatives to make such a shift, which is essential for crystallising public support for NATO membership.

The Serbian public would benefit from an independent analysis of the strategic options in relation to its prospects of NATO membership. For Serbia, this issue is not simple because it involves a series of value and identity-related enigmas. However, the vehemence with which it is placed on the daily political field and the clarity of Serbia’s geopolitical situation – completely surrounded by NATO allies – is an unavoidable factor of pressure to have this dilemma resolved.


The mission of NATO and European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI): complementarity or competition?

Dr Jasminka Simić180

The transformational process of NATO, prompted by political and geo-strate-gic changes in the early 1990s, has been followed by a process of maturing policies and strategies of the European Union in the field of common foreign and security policy. EU efforts to manage the Yugoslav crisis in its early stages, and subsequent NATO military engagement in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, led to mutual distrust and disagreement about the ability of the other parties to operate and manage crises. However, time has proved that this kind of mutual mistrust is basically a question of seeking for compatibility, since NATO and the EU often have two visions, but the same goal. It is in this framework that the respective military and peacekeeping missions of these two organizations operate.

180 Jasminka Simić, PhD in political science, Editor Journalist at the Radio Television of Serbia RTS, Belgrade


Introduction

NATO and the European Union view the security of the twenty-first centu-ry in its broadest sense, as was confirmed by NATO at the Lisbon Summit (19-20th November 2010), which – in addition to the protection of NATO member states and the fight against terrorism – also assumed protection and response to cyber-crime or intrusions into computer systems, considering it a priority in the coming decade.181 At the same time, global security, thus understood, is a subject of operation of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, which began its work on December 1st 2010, i.e. on the anniversary of the Treaty of Lisbon by which it was originally introduced. The Council’s activities range from conflict-reso-lution through development assistance or in the event of natural disasters, to pandemics, population migrations and energy security. The EU has taken a common position on how to improve its response to security challenges and threats.182 Therefore, security threats perceived as major threats in the second decade of the twenty-first century both by NATO and the EU, and which re-quire a combination of joint efforts and actions in order to enhance the se-curity of citizens, enterprises and society in general in their member states

181 Wikileaks is the most striking example of threats to security thus conceived. NATO condemned leaking of information which included the correspondence between American di-plomats on deployment of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe on Wikileaks site, descri-bing it as “illegal and dangerous”. Documents show that the major part of around 200 American nuclear war-heads, which have remained in Europe, are located in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Turkey. It has been assumed for a long time that nuclear weapons was in these four countries, yet both NATO and governments of these countries, respectively, have all until now refused to confirm that information (nuclear bombs B-61, the oldest American nuclear weapons which is still in the armory, though it was made in 1950s).

182 The European Commission issued a set of measures that aim at better protection of EU citizens from security threats such as: a) a common agenda for dispersal of criminal and terro-rist networks, for which it proposed a rapid and effective seizure of assets and profits generated in this way, the use of European lists of passengers and assistance in fight against corruption in the Member States, b) protection against cyber-crime, i.e. raising the level of security for private and legal entities in cyber-space that would be achieved by establishing the European Centre for fight against cyber-crime, networks of teams for rapid response in the IT world and by establis-hing an European system for the exchange of information and warning, and, c) strengthening the Union’s readiness to cope with crisis situations, which can be achieved by implementation of “solidarity clause”, by creating a European capacity for emergency situations and establishing policies that will link the assessment of hazards and risks to decision-making. See: The EU’s Internal Security Strategy, 26 November 2010, http://www.parliament.uk


are: terrorism (organized, cross-border) and cyber-crime, as well as crises and natural disasters.

These are all new challenges for the new century, but in order to have a clearer vision of security in the future, we need an answer to the following questions - to what extent have transatlantic links been equal in military and defence terms, i.e. whether the security system of NATO and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) are complementary or competing, and what is their relationship to the global security architecture and that of the Western Balkans, which also includes Serbia?

The key principle of NATO’s security system is based on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the organisation’s founding document, according to which an attack on one signatory country is considered as an attack on all; which itself is the core of the collective defence (security) system. In the traditional military sense, the transatlantic link has been uneven. During the Cold War, it was essentially based on American protection of partnerships over Western Europe. After the end of the Cold War, NATO’s European members continued to rely on the military presence and engagement of the United States (in the Balkans) and, due to that, they were falling behind in the process of military modernization (the war in Kosovo demonstrated a large gap between the mili-tary capabilities of the US and those of EU member states).

On the other hand, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) in its, so-called, second pillar, introduces the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to boost cooperation in the area of foreign policy, primarily by establishing rules for joint action by EU member states, and by including the formulation of a common defence policy. Despite the existence of a then nine-membered West-ern European Union (hereinafter, WEU)183 as an integral part of the Union’s development and its military branch – tasked with developing closer institu-

183 Brussels Agreement of 1948, as the first step towards post-war consolidation of secu-rity in west European countries was the founding document of the Western European Union (WEU). That Agreement was amended in 1984. The Western European Union is formally non-existent since 2000, with its authorities transferred onto the EU. With entry into force of the Lisbon Agreement, competencies of the WEU are transferred onto the EU and by July 2011, the WEU terminated its functioning. However, during all that time, the organisation with the seat in Paris has been functioning, and within it, the Institute for Security Studies, which organi-ses conferences and seminars, and regularly publishes Publication entitled „Chaillot Papers“, of world renowned experts in international defence and security. See: http://www.weu.int/institute


tional relations, with an option of integrating into the Union and dealing with humanitarian affairs and undertaking peacekeeping missions – NATO still re-mained the central pillar of European defence policy. This part of the Treaty of Maastricht was the embryo of a common European defence policy, with an emphasis that it must be compatible with NATO.

At the ministerial meeting of NATO in Berlin (1996), it was agreed that the WEU would oversee the creation of the European Security and Defence Iden-tity (ESDI) within NATO structures.184 ESDI was to create a, so-called, Euro-pean pillar within NATO, partly allowing European countries to act militarily where NATO does not want to do so, but also to ease the financial burden on the U.S. in maintaining its military bases in Europe, which have been there since the Cold War. The agreement from Berlin enabled European countries to – through the WEU – use NATO assets, should they wish. This agreement was later amended to allow the EU to also manage such missions, and is known as the Berlin-Plus Agreement (2002).

The Common Foreign and Security Policy, which went through a gradual development, was more intensively engaged in the field; in part as a conse-quence of transatlantic disunity in the 1990s. While the experience in Kosovo and Metohija (1999) led to the emergence of the ESDI, the transatlantic gap on the issue of Iraq (2003) intensified the engagement of European members of NATO, gathered around the further development and establishment of Euro-pean military forces.

At the Franco-British summit in Saint Malo (December 4th 1998)185, the road to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was laid, with a requirement to provide resources and capacities necessary to implement

184 Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996. See: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm

185 It was stated at the meeting that all decisions related to the European security and de-fence identity will in the future have to be linked to the EU, rather than the WEU. The EU was given the opportunity to take autonomous military actions when NATO, in its entirety, is not interested in engagement of its troops, i.e. „the EU has to possess the capacity for autonomous action, supported by credible military forces, decision-making means on their use and readiness to do so within response to international crises“, but also that development of such autonomous European forces must not lead to duplication of existing forces of NATO, while collective defen-ce remains within NATO framework. See: Joint Statement by British and French Governments, Franco-British Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 4 December, 1998


such policies. This meant that Europe was given an autonomous voice on the international stage and the capacity to intervene in the service of peace, whereby the process of forming the European Rapid Reaction Force was launched. At the time of this meeting, a particular political climate was pres-ent in Europe, created by demands for internationalising the Kosovo prob-lem, the preparations for an international conference on Kosovo and Meto-hija, and suggestions of a possible military intervention by NATO in case all diplomatic efforts fail.

For the EU itself, it was significant that in May 1999 – during the intense bombing of Yugoslavia – the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, given that it included the, so-called, Petersberg tasks, which consisted of actions of a humanitarian nature, peace-keeping, crisis management, as well as peace-making. The importance of this act is that the EU thus paved the way for its subsequent peace-keeping missions, which first started in the former Yugo-slavia.

In June 1999, the European Council decided in Cologne to incorporate the role of the WEU within the EU, until its final closure. It was then that Javier Solana was appointed the High Representative for Common Foreign and Se-curity Policy (CFSP) and the WEU Secretary-General (with the authority to transfer the WEU jurisdiction onto the EU), in order to assist the progress of both, i.e. the CFSP and ESDP. The EU made its first concrete step towards strengthening its military capabilities in accordance with the ESDP when its member states signed the “Helsinki Headline Goal” (1999).

Namely, military dependence of NATO’s European members on the U.S. in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was again demonstrated during the NATO bombing in Kosovo and Metohija (on a time-scale, it happened between the meeting in Saint Malo and the Cologne summit), deeply influenced the gov-ernments of EU member states. At the EU summit in Helsinki (December 1999), it was agreed that – through the plan of the “Helsinki Headline Goal” - about 60,000 troops were to be made available (for at least one year) for crisis management operations by 2003, whereby the St. Petersburg tasks set in the Treaty of Amsterdam would be realised. The EU then underlined its de-termination “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military oper-


ations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.”186

At the summit of the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000), “modalities for developing EU-NATO relations were identified in four areas covering security issues, capability goals, the modalities for the EU access to NATO assets, and the definition of permanent consultation arrangements”.187 The EU also launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) at the summit in Laeken (December 2001). However, it became clear that the “Hel-sinki Headline Goal” was not easily attainable. In May 2004, Defence Ministers of the EU member states approved the “Headline Goal 2010”, thus extending the deadline for realization of the EU projects.

The framework for NATO-EU relationship was built on the basis of the doc-ument adopted at the NATO summit in Washington (April 1999), at the mar-gins of the European Council summit in Nice (December 2000) and the North Atlantic Council summit in Brussels (December 2000) on commitment to a single partnership of the two organizations in crisis management,188 and by the Joint EU-NATO Declaration (December 2002). In fact, the document “Stra-tegic Concept of the Alliance” was adopted ahead of the Washington summit, emphasising that the development of the concept of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) will be continued exclusively within NATO, while all issues related to European Defence will be dealt with between NATO and the EU only, rather than with the WEU. This new relationship between NATO and the ESDI will later turn into a, so-called, Berlin-Plus Agreement (2002), under which the EU-led operations are able to use NATO military assets, if there is a need for that. This agreement allows for NATO’s support to crisis management operations led by the EU in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.

The EU has established adequate modalities to also involve in EU-led op-erations those countries that are members of NATO, but not of the EU. At

186 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999. See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm

187 Presidency Conclusion, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000. See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/csm_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-rl.en0.htm

188 Positive result of consultations and cooperation was normalisation of situation in the south of Serbia (end of 2000), when, with the Euro-Atlantic assistance and participation of the Yugoslav side, a risk of civilian conflict between Albanian and Serbian sides was thus eliminated, and security situation in Macedonia improved, whereby NATO was tasked to provide for the EU mission and the monitoring mission of the OSCE.


the time, five countries belonged to this group: Bulgaria, Romania, Iceland, Norway and Turkey. Therefore, the joint NATO-EU Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy had a stimulating effect in a number of aspects.

Berlin-Plus Agreement

Negotiations between NATO and the EU led to the Joint Declaration on the establishment of a strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management, published on December 16th 2002.189 The final agreement was completed on March 11th 2003 as the Berlin-Plus agreement, and its very name indicates that it ensued from the one adopted at the summit in Berlin (1996), when official cooperation between NATO and the WEU was initiated.

The Berlin-Plus agreement consists of several main parts:190 • EU’s access to NATO planning capabilities, that can contribute to mili-

tary planning for EU-led operations; • Creating a list of NATO assets and capabilities that could be made avail-

able to the EU for use in EU-led operations; • Marking the range of European Command Options for EU operations

and further development of the role of Deputy Supreme Allied Com-mander in Europe (DSACEUR)191, in order to fully and effectively take over their (European) responsibilities;

• Further adjustment of NATO’s defence planning system in order to more comprehensively incorporate forces available for EU-led opera-tions;

• The agreement of NATO and the EU includes the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules;

• Procedures for the release, monitoring, recall and return of NATO as-sets and capacities;

189 See: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm 190 Berlin-Plus Agreement is not a public document and it was not ratified by national

parliaments. See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf

191 Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR), has an important role in agree-ments defined as command operations. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) established a cell within the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE), with the seat in Mons, in order to improve preparations for the EU operations which require NATO’s assets and capabilities, while NATO established permanent liaison through offices within the EU Military Staff.


• NATO-EU agreement on consultations in the context of crisis manage-ment operations led by the EU involving the use of NATO assets and capabilities.

In practice, the procedure requires that the use of NATO assets by the EU be submitted to a principle of “right of first refusal”, which means that NATO must first refuse to intervene in a given situation. Approving the use of assets must be unanimous among NATO member states. For example, reserve on the part of Turkey regarding the use of NATO assets in operation “Concordia” postponed its engagement for more than five months.

Strategic partnership between NATO and the EU through the Berlin-Plus agreement very soon received practical application in the field. The EU con-ducted two operations with NATO’ support.

Operation “Concordia” in the FYRoM192 was the first mission based on the Berlin-Plus agreement and the first EU military mission implemented under the ESDP. In the period from August 2001 until March 2003, NATO safe-guarded the security of the EU and the OSCE staff and implemented its obli-gation to maintain peace in the FYRoM. NATO’s operation, “Allied Harmony”, was completed on March 21st 2003 and handed over to the EU as Operation “Concordia”, by hiring about 300 troops to protect the OSCE observers who monitored the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Opera-tion “Concordia” was completed by December 15th 2003. NATO led the strate-gic, operational and tactical planning of that operation. The operational com-mander was the Deputy Supreme Allied Command in Europe (DSACEUR), headquartered at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, and with a control unit established in the regional command of NATO in Naples (cur-rently Joint Force Command, JFC).

The second mission conducted under the Berlin-Plus agreement was “EU-FOR Althea”, which started in 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In June of the same year, NATO decided to end its mission of Stabilisation Forces (SFOR), while the EU Council, on July 12th 2004, agreed to launch a European military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), as a part of a global

192 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia


policy with the objective of stabilising the country.193 Following a decision from the NATO Summit in Istanbul (2004) on completion of the mission of NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) by the end of the same year, the EU started its mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 7,000 troops, with the objective of implementing the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and maintaining a safe and secure environment. The UN Se-curity Council adopted (November 22nd 2004) resolution 1575, which autho-rises the operation under Chapter VII of the Charter. Again, the Deputy Su-preme Allied Command in Europe was appointed the operational commander of the EU operation. According to resolution 1948 of the UN Security Council, the mandate of Operation “Althea” was extended until the end of 2011 (it is renewed annually).

Between the two previously mentioned military operations, the EU launched operation “Artemis” in the Democratic Republic of Congo (June 12th 2003), which was led independently in accordance with resolution 1484 of the UN Security Council (30 May 2003) on the engagement of an Interim Emer-gency Multinational Force (IMEF) in the area of Bunia (in the northeast of DR Congo) with the task of securing the airport and protecting internally dis-placed persons. Operation “Artemis” was the first autonomous military mis-sion outside Europe, and a significant milestone in the development of the ESDP. This mission successfully stabilized the situation in the Bunia area and strengthened the UN presence in the DR Congo. While performing this mis-sion, NATO was regularly informed about the intentions of the EU, with full respect for the spirit and letter of the Agreement on consultations in the event of crisis.

The Berlin-Plus agreement opens up several issues with respect to the con-ceived strategic cooperation between NATO and the EU. Only two of all EU operations has been led in accordance with the Berlin-Plus agreement. When

193 Joint Action 2004/570/FSP adopted by the Council on 12 July 2004. See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:252:0010:0014:FR:PDE. In BiH, th EU offered its service in assuming the mission of the international police forces (SFOR mission also included international police forces). The EU Police Mission (EUPM) was established in January 2003, with the aim of installing sustainable, professional and multi-ethnic police forces in line with European and international standards. It is functioning in accordance with obligations that are part of the Stabilisation and Accession Process, notably in the fight against organised crime and police reform.


the EU and NATO conduct two simultaneous, yet separate land or maritime operations, the Berlin-Plus agreement does not apply. The agreement does not provide the possibility of combining civilian and military instruments. Vesting the EU with a broad scale of competences, such as economic, military, politi-cal and legal, creates the possibility of forming civilian crisis management ca-pacities and making them available to NATO, which – in some ways – could extend the Berlin-Plus agreement by creating a civilian component.

When the two organizations are simultaneously engaged in a single opera-tion, sharing classified information may create a problem, as was the case dur-ing the bombing of Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, or on the coast of Somalia, where operations were complicated due to an absence of official communica-tion. These operational difficulties often stem from political disagreements of the two organizations, which has a detrimental effect on the ground (the issue of Cyprus and Turkey), and their solution is to be found in negotiations and compromise. In order to ensure operational complementarity between NATO and the EU, it is necessary to further develop the Berlin-Plus agreement, which does not cover the entire scope of possible cooperation between the two orga-nizations, but has the potential to do so.194

European Defence

Since 2003, requirements for EU actions have increased, so the EU started taking over about four missions a year. Currently, it has 14 mis-sions (e.g. peace-monitoring mission in Georgia, naval operations off the coast of Somalia).195 These operations vary in terms of tasks; they use and sometimes mix civilian and military resources. The EU relies on national and NATO headquarters for military operations. In Kosovo and Metohija, the EU mission (EULEX) took over from (December 2008) the civilian UN mission (UNMIK). EU missions are also based outside the Balkans, so in the context of the further development of European defence, we can also consider the future of NATO and its missions, how it will be redefined and

194 See: Robert Walter, What future for the EU-NATO Berlin-Plus agreements?, European Defence and NATO, Towards which developments and complementarity, European files, De-cember-January 2011, No. 21, European Security and Defence Assembly of WEU, Paris, See: http://www.assembly-weu.eu

195 Source: Issues, Quarterly published by the EU Institute for Security Studies, no 27, The European Foreign&Security Policy Institute, October, 2008, Paris, See: www.iss.europa.eu


in which way it will redirect itself to new forms of action and new areas of engagement.

In 2003, Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg submitted their re-spective proposals for a structure of European defence, laid out in seven points. According to that plan, mobile multinational headquarters for military opera-tions of European interventionist forces in dealing with crises and peace-mak-ing were to be formed by the end of 2003, and would be independent of NATO. The backbone of European power would be the already existing French-Ger-man brigade, reinforced by troops from Belgium and Luxembourg. Contrary to the rapid reaction forces that received support for their designated partner-ship with NATO forces, the plan for European defence was met with criticism on the part of the U.S. and the United Kingdom, given that these two countries were actively engaged in Iraq and the potential creation of European defence would not work in their favour, considering the existence of NATO structures. This has deepened the transatlantic gap created on the occasion of the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq.

The Anglo-American concept, as opposed to the Franco-German proposal, meant that the collective defence of Europe was to be handed over to NATO, to as great extent as possible, and that instead of 60,000 troops from the afore-mentioned proposal, the rapid-reaction would consist of a maximum of 20,000 soldiers. At the EU summit organized by Greece – which held the EU Presi-dency in 2003 – it was officially agreed that the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, would draft a European Security Strategy (ESS), which was adopted that very same year.

Basically, the formation of European military forces is a desire for the final creation of a European military identity. The said forces would be the embryo of a future European army. Should that happen, Europe could be-come a single confederate state, like the United States. European econom-ic integration also began to include the field of military industry, which was an additional impetus to realization of such an idea. Creation of these forces was not only in the domain of theoretical considerations and the desire of most EU member states, but also the practical need required by the situation on the ground, since – with the departure of the U.S. troops from the mission in the former Yugoslavia to peace-keeping mission in


the East (Iraq and Afghanistan) – a space was left for operations of Euro-pean powers.

A proposal for the formation of European military forces by which Eu-rope would gain significant influence in the world, was received with criti-cism by many, like Andrew Moravscik.196 He thought that it was a waste of time and resources, nothing more than European “wishful thinking”, and that the real force of the EU is in trade and its peace-keeping missions. Moravscik takes the example of Iraq, i.e. its post-war reconstruction and re-establishment of government institutions. According to him, in that kind of business, there is only one “quiet superpower” - Europe. If Europe seeks a stronger global role, it should focus on those advantages and do what it is best at, i.e. trade and peace-keeping missions. In support of this position is the example of Afghanistan, where the United States conducted the military action, which was followed by extensive foreign aid, with Western Europe supplying 70% of total foreign aid and more than 90% of Western aid for Afghanistan. It is similar in Iraq. Robert Hunter has a completely nega-tive attitude towards European armed forces, calling them an “imitation of NATO”.197

In the core of these attitudes that are opposed to the formation of Euro-pean military forces is a demand for a rational “division of lobar” between the U.S., on one side, and the European members of NATO, on the other. The U.S. and the EU are the two greatest actors in the international arena. But if we take into account the previously outlined “division of labour” in crisis regions or countries, as well as the increase of the economic and po-litical roles of China and India, and the economic and political recovery of Russia, this all indicates that we are approaching multilateralism embodied in the UN.

196 Andrew Moravcsik is the Director of the EU programme at the University of Harvard. In his text „The World is Bipolar After All“, he writes about lessons Europe learned after the war in Iraq, Newsweek, 5 May 2003, New York, p. 39

197 Robert Hunter is Senior Adviser in RAND Corporation in Washington D.C. Between 1993-98, he was the U.S. Ambassador to NATO. Article entitled „How deep is Ocean?“, pu-blished in Newsday magazine, 23 February 2003, See: http://www.rand.org/hot/op-eds/022303.html


Future Strategic Partnership between NATO and the EU

Despite disagreements between the Euro-Atlantic partners regarding the establishment of European defence, perceived as a competitor to NATO forces, and opposition to engagement in the Iraq war, a complementary partnership was established between the EU rapid-reaction force and NATO. This mutual relationship has been the essence of NATO’s transformation and progress at-tained within the EU in the post Cold War period.198

With the Lisbon Treaty (December 1st 2009), the EU acquired its inter-national legal personality and introduced two new key functions: that of the President of the European Council (EU President) and the EU High Rep-resentative for Foreign and Security Policy (Head of European diplomacy). The Treaty of Lisbon states that, “bearing in mind that the policy of the Union in accordance with Article 42 shall not prejudice the specific char-acter of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in NATO, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compat-ible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.”199 In accordance with the agreement, this has become an annex to the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.

When it concerns the defence perspective, the Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that the ESDP will lead toward a joint EU defence agreement, once the Eu-ropean Council makes an unanimous decision. This agreement will only be possible when all member states give their consent through their usual con-stitutional procedures. Additionally, the area of defence can be used for pro-moting co-operation, creating the possibility for defence integration which ex-cludes member states with neutral policies (they do not fulfill the criteria and statements given in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on Permanent Structured

198 For further information, see: Dr Nano Ružin, „НАТО во современите мегународни односи“, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Skopje, 2010, points 15 and 16

199 Treaty on European Union (amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, signed 13 December 2007), Protocol (No 11) on Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), 9.V 2008., No. C115, p. 278. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0201:0328:EN:PDF


Cooperation). States with significant military capabilities presented a form of permanent structural cooperation in defence.200

The fact that the Treaty of Lisbon promoted steps toward the creation of a stronger EU Common Security and Defence Policy that shall “seek a more advanced framework for a common defence policy” and “will lead toward the common defence”201, has in some circles sparked fears that greater coordina-tion of the EU in terms of defence could lead to the development of its military structure, consequently resulting in the duplication of NATO structures and a weakening of transatlantic ties. Even a more unified and compact Europe is seen as a potential U.S. rival in many political areas.

At the NATO summit in Lisbon (November 19-20th 2010), NATO’s new Strategic Concept was adopted, stating that “an active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore, the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more ca-pable European defence.”202 NATO and the EU can and should have a com-plementary and mutually enhanced role in maintaining international peace and security through the promotion of practical cooperation in operations in the broad spectrum of crises, from coordination and mutual support, to the expansion of political consultations to include all issues of common interest, stated this document.

It is a fact that NATO and the EU are not self-sufficient institutions, but that they need each other to manage crises and maintain peace. The EU managed to develop instruments of action of “soft power”203 that are more adequate in the process of stabilizing the situation and managing civilian missions, com-pared to the “hard power” actions of the United States, alone or through NATO

200 Sven Biscop, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the future of ESDP, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, 2010 See: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/pape-regm/ep20.pdf

201 See: Treaty of Lisbon, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index-en.htm 202 Paragraph 32. of the „Strategic Concept for Defence and Security of members of the

North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation“, adopted by the Heads of States and Governments in Li-sbon (November 2010) See: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic.concept.2010-eng.pdf

203 Concept of „soft power“ was launched in 1990s by Joseph Nye, professor at the Harvard University, who defined it as the ability of exerting the influence in the international relations through cultural, political and institutional values.


missions. The Treaty of Lisbon and NATO’s new Strategic Concept demon-strate that security and defence relations between the two organizations have developed and matured to the extent that they can go beyond provisions of the Berlin-Plus agreement, resorting to complementary civilian and military capabilities. This complementarity and potential synergy between the two or-ganizations, which has not been fully exploited so far, now has a chance to be realised.

The engagement of the EU in improving its own security and defence iden-tity is very intense, yet still insufficient to be able to conclude that the EU has a “mastery” over the continent by having improved its ability to prevent or solve all negative trends that may lead to a possible return to conflict. Despite certain success in European foreign policy (engagement in conflict resolution in Georgia), in comparison with its Atlantic partners, the EU is still far from being a “strong” military force and a coherent global actor. Pragmatism will have its effect, which means that European partners will continue to rely on the U.S. military partnership and NATO. Even today, we have a divided vi-sion of NATO’s future role among Euro-Atlantic partners (Atlanticists, Euro-peans and Central European countries). The position of the Alliance in current transatlantic relations will first determine reducing the Alliance’s importance for the U.S., as demonstrated during the operations in Afghanistan, and reduc-ing the level of U.S. military participation in NATO missions; second, it will increase the readiness and ability of the EU (size, intensity and resistance of EU missions) to militarily engage in peace operations and peace-keeping mis-sions abroad, all the while developing its own diplomatic profile, which is done with the Foreign Affairs Council.

Within considerations of the future security system in the world and Eu-rope, one should not forget the proposal of Russian president, Dmitry Med-vedev (at a meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic leaders on June 5th 2008, Berlin, Germany) to create a new security system in Europe and to sign a pan-European Security Pact, by which he called on all European countries to take part in this process; “each in line with its national capabili-ties, while any idea of alliances and groups of states should remain beyond this framework”. This means that NATO and the EU member states should not, at least officially, coordinate their positions in negotiations, should the pro-cess continue. The pan-European security pact should, in the spirit of the UN


Charter, “finally clarify the role and the use of force in the Euro-Atlantic area”, which implies that for any NATO’s decision to be made, an approval should be sought outside the Alliance. President Dmitry Medvedev reiterated this Rus-sian idea of transformation of the current system of security institutions and the signing of a pan-European Pact at the World Political Forum (October 8th 2008, Evian, France). Otherwise, stronger cooperation between the EU and Russia is supported by most member states, particularly France, Germany and Italy.204

For the Western Balkans, the EU is more acceptable. In Serbia there is sup-port for the EU, but also an emotional bias towards NATO (the bombings). All Western Balkan countries, apart from Serbia, have adopted a Membership Action Plan and are taking part in peace-keeping missions in Afghanistan. Members of the Serbian Army, police and medical personnel, who are already taking part in UN peace-keeping missions, are also willing to participate in EU peace-keeping missions.205 Given the intertwining of NATO and the EU when it comes to peace-keeping, and tight joint or successive operations, it would mean that even though Serbia would not be officially taking part in NATO missions, there would be some point where these would intersect. Participa-tion in peace-keeping operations in the world also increases the state’s foreign policy credibility, while soldiers have the opportunity to gain experience in the field and improve their capabilities and interoperability.

The activities of independent EU missions on and beyond the European continent, in parallel with NATO missions, point to the value and need for seeking multilateral solutions to crises, i.e. other alternatives that have been marginalized or developed in the last decades of the twentieth century. A multilateral approach to crisis management facilitates transatlantic coopera-

204 See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, http://www.in.mid.ru/brp4.nsf/2008/06/05/html i http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/10/08/html

205 Representatives of the defence system are currently self-engaged in the UN peace missi-ons in Congo, Liberia and the Ivory Coast; they are in Chad together with representatives of the Norwegian contingent, while on Cyprus they are part of Slovakian-Hungarian contingent. UN peace mission in Lebanon, together with Spanish contingent, and on the coast of Somalia, are next due. Representatives of the Ministry of Interior are engaged in UN peace missions in Libe-ria and Haiti (where, after the catastrophic earthquake in January 2010, they assisted in saving the injured people and clearing of demolished sites, and from the beginning of 2011 they have been engaged in prevention of cholera epidemics among local population).


tion and enables more effective ways of coping with global challenges. In the twenty-first century, the necessary conditions for reaffirming common goals through dialogue and without imposing solutions were created. Leading mem-bers of NATO and the EU have crucial places in the main institution of the United Nations Security Council, which should be the focus of joint efforts and decisions on global security issues. In-line with relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and in cooperation with other stakeholders, including the EU, NATO took over operations in Africa.206 A comprehensive context of cooperation between NATO and the EU allows them to serve as an aid in realizing the goals and tasks of the United Nations, thereby strengthening their mutual political and operational cohesion.

Conclusion

Strategic partnerships in crisis management between NATO and the EU was built through negotiations that resulted in the Berlin-Plus Agreement (Decem-ber 16th 2002 – March 11th 2003). Very soon, this partnership received practical application in FYRoM (2003) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004). It was then that the EU took over NATO missions, which were the first operations under the ESDP. European missions in the Balkans served as a lobby for European commit-ment outside the European continent (e.g. in the Democratic Republic of Congo), at the same time indicating a desire of the EU to become a global political actor. That has occasionally caused a sense of competition with NATO and its leading member, the United States, while the wish of the EU to establish European defence received a particularly harsh criticism - especially if one has in mind the reaction of the former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to the formation of the Eu-ropean Rapid Reaction Force (Saint-Malo, 1998), embodied in “three Ds”, which marked the American expectations regarding the ESDP: no Duplication of what has already been done effectively by NATO, no Decoupling of the U.S. and NATO and no Discrimination to states that are not members of the EU, such as Turkey.

206 Piracy in the Aden Gulf and off the Horn of Africa threaten to jeopardise international humanitarian aid in Africa, as well as the security of the maritime trade routes. At the request of the UN Secretary General in 2008, NATO launched the operation „Allied Provider“, in oder to escort the ship of the UN World Food Programme. After that, operation „Allied Protector“ followed in 2009, while the current operation „Ocean Shield“ additionally trains regional coun-tries in capacity-building efforts in their fight against piracy.


The essence of the relations between the two organizations is in their com-mitment that – although it may not seem possible to jointly undertake all ac-tivities – it is imperative to provide conditions to perform all those tasks they have undertaken jointly. Strategic partnership between the two organizations indicates the necessity of improving a global approach to crisis management and acceptance of a broader context of transatlantic activity, embodied in ever more present multilateralism and the role of the UN in the world. Improving the political and operational cohesion of NATO and the EU lies ahead in the next decade of the twenty-first century.


The Republic of Serbia and the Common Security and Defence Policy207

Filip Ejdus208

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, almost all former communist East European states first of all sought, and later gained, membership of the EU and NATO. While the rest of Europe was becoming more unified during the 1990s, the West-ern Balkans was undergoing a process of political division. As soon as armed con-flict was over, the new states in this region recognised inclusion in Euro-Atlantic security systems as their primary national interest. Until the end of 2007, Serbia was no exception to this. However, in December of that year, shortly before the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, the Serbian parliament de-clared Serbia to be a militarily neutral state. This meant that the Atlantic com-ponent of Serbia’s security integration was limited to membership of the NATO programme Partnership for Peace (PfP). The European component of security integration remained open to Serbia, although it is still an unused possibility.

207 This article was published as a chapter of book „Towards a Western Balkans Battle Group - A Vision of Serbia’s Defence Integration into the EU 2010–2020“, Authors: Filip Ejdus, Marko Savković and Nataša Dragojlović, Belgrade Center for Security Policy, May 2010

208 Author is a teaching assistant and PhD candidate at the Faculty of political science, University of Belgrade


The European component of security integration – an unused possibility?

Following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, the Republic of Serbia continued its journey towards EU membership. This was confirmed most of all by the signing of the Stabilisation and Associa-tion Agreement (SAA) in April 2008, following which, in December 2009, the Interim Trade Agreement was unfrozen and the visa regime was liberalised. It is expected that Serbia will be granted the status of EU membership candidate in the first half of 2011. EU membership is a key foreign policy priority of the Republic of Serbia. The current government has placed EU membership alongside preservation of Serbia’s territorial integrity and regional coopera-tion as one of its three foreign policy priorities. At this stage of integration, harmonisation with European legislation is also a priority in other policy ar-eas. However, in contrast to almost all other Western Balkan states, with the exception of reforms in the areas of justice and home affairs which were pre-requisites for visa liberalisation, Serbia has so far made no significant effort to engage in security integration processes within the EU. This is especially true of the CSDP, which may be understandable at this stage in the integration process. Although, formally speaking, this could be postponed until full EU membership is gained; the authors of this text consider that it is in the national interest of the Republic of Serbia to begin participation in the CSDP as soon as possible.

The assertion that proactive participation in the CSDP is in the Repub-lic of Serbia’s national interest derives indirectly from the National Security Strategy adopted by parliament in October 2009. This document, which de-fines basic national interests in the field of security, states that “preservation of internal stability, the rule of law and the development of democracy and democratic institutions and integration into the European Union and other international structures have particular significance for Serbia’s development and progress.”209 The document also asserts that, “through her foreign policy, the promotion of cooperation with neighbouring countries and building joint capacity and mechanisms for resolving contradictions, disputes, and all types of challenges, risks and threats on the regional and global levels, the Republic of Serbia is contributing to the creation of a peaceful, stable and safe security

209 Republic of Serbia, Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti, October 2009, p. 13.


environment”.210 Likewise, the Strategy points out that “the Republic of Ser-bia supports and is committed to regional cooperation in the areas of joint training and deployment of elements of the security services in multinational operations, crisis management and border control”.211 Further, the document states that “through the process of European integration, the Republic of Ser-bia expresses its readiness to build the capacity and capability of the national security system, in accordance with the standards and obligations deriving from the European Security and Defence Policy.“212

Unfortunately, other strategic documents in the Republic of Serbia have not recognised this possibility as sufficiently important. The National Strategy of Serbia for EU Accession for Serbia and Montenegro, adopted by the government of the Republic of Serbia in June 2005, states that „Serbia will endeavour, as far as possible, to keep its foreign policy in line with the principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy“.213 However, this document does not even men-tion the European Security and Defence Policy. The National Programme for EU Integration, which was adopted by the government of the Republic of Serbia in 2008 states that “the Republic of Serbia is continuously promoting dialogue with the European Union and reforming its civilian and military capacities in order to be prepared, after attaining full membership to, among other things, take on the obligations arising from the European Security and Defence Policy and to participate in crisis management operations under EU leadership.”214 However, as the example of other states in the region make it clear, it is not necessary to delay integration into the CSDP until full EU membership has been achieved. In the final version of this document from December 2009, in an appendix by the Ministry of Defence, it is stated that “the Republic of Serbia is ready, through taking part in the activities of the European Security and Defence Policy, participating in the Partnership for Peace, and within the

210 Ibid, p. 11.211 Ibid, p. 16.212 Ibid, p. 16. Such strategic commitments were confirmed in Defence Strategy (2009)

The authors of this text consider it necessary to confirm and make concrete this commitment through the drafting and adoption of other strategic-doctrinary documents, which are currently being drafted, and for their adoption to be announced in the “National Integration Plan” before the end of 2010. These are the Strategic Defence Review, the Military Doctrine, the Long-term Plan for Defence Systems Development and the Medium-term Programs and Plans for Defence Systems Development.

213 Government of the Republic of Serbia, Nacionalna strategija Srbije za pristupanje Srbije i Crne Gore, Belgrade, June 2005, p. 43.

214 Ibid, p. 785.


framework of regional initiatives, to strengthen its own security, and through dialogue and cooperation contribute to peace and stability”.215 Likewise em-phasised is the Republic of Serbia’s readiness to intensify dialogue with the EU on issues relating to security and defence, once the SAA comes into force.

Despite these statements of at least half-hearted commitment, decision makers in the Republic of Serbia have until now been exceptionally passive when it comes to the CSDP. Until now, as far as is known to the authors of this paper, they have spoken in favour of Serbia’s possible participation in the CSDP on only a few occasions. The first was in November 2008, when the then Chief of Staff, Zdravko Ponoš, following a meeting with the head of the Military Committee Henri Bentegeat in Brussels, put forward a few ideas heading in this direction. On that occasion he announced that it was neces-sary for Serbia to develop cooperation within the CSDP framework, and po-tentially also in EU Battlegroups as well as that “in the military field it is pos-sible to go further than in other areas of EU accession” as it had been made “possible for our officers to take part in EU exercises as observers and for EU officers to receive invitation to attend Serbian Army exercises”216. Likewise, Ivica Dačić, the minister of internal affairs, indicated, firstly in April and later in July 2009, the possibility of the participation of the Serbian police in EU operations.217 The media in Serbia have not paid much attention to this theme, their attention being largely focussed on relations between Ser-bia and the EU. Besides this, with a few exceptions, experts have paid little attention to the problem of Serbia’s integration into the CSDP.218 Excepting a few academic seminars, this theme is still not being discussed in public or in the wider expert sphere.219 Finally, Minister of Defence Dragan Šutanovac

215 This document is revised periodically, meaning that this formulation could be changed in the near future.

216 Serbian Army, „General Ponoš na sastanku vojnog komiteta Evroatlantskog partner-stva”, See: http://www.vs.rs/index.php?news_article=219be3cc-0cfb-102c-ad2f-79b934d89d8d

217 RTS, 1 April 2009, „Srpski policajci u misijama EU“, See:h t t p : / / w w w . r t s . r s / p a g e / s t o r i e s / s r / s t o r y / 9 / S r b i j a / 5 3 2 7 8 /

Srpski+policajci+u+misijama++EU.html RTS, 2 July 2009, „Policija spremna za mirovne misije“, See:http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Društvo/71345/Policija+spremna+za+mirovne

+misije.html 218 One of the first to suggest that Serbia take a proactive stance in this area was Srđan Gli-

gorijević from the ISAC fund. See: Srđan Gligorijević, „Partnerstvo je moguće”, Evropski forum, November–December 2006, no. 11–12.

219 Civil servants from the Republic of Serbia have taken part in a series of courses about


started to strongly advocate participation of Serbia in CSDP missions in the second half of 2010 but so far no concrete progress in that direction has been made.220

The question, then, is whether Serbia must wait for full EU membership before it can begin to participate in civilian and military EU crisis manage-ment operations and in EU Battlegroups. Although a proactive approach in this area is not a formal obligation for a state which is not yet even a candi-date for membership, it would represent Serbian diplomacy’s trump card in the process of European integration.221 In addition, integration through the CSDP could partially compensate for opportunities lost through the decision to forego, temporarily or permanently, NATO membership. Finally, in this way Serbia can show it can be a constructive partner and can contribute to Europe’s security. As we have seen, this has on the whole already been recognised by other Western Balkan states, which have begun integration into the CSDP and already participate in EU missions. Likewise, even within the EU itself, there is a positive attitude towards Serbia’s inclusion in the CSDP. This is borne out by the words of the aforementioned General Bentegeat that „the European Union would very much appreciate it if Serbia joined EU peacekeeping operations“.222

It should be noted that at this stage of negotiations over Serbia’s member-ship, the EU will not insist on the CSDP, given that there are no inbuilt criteria or standards in this area for this phase of integration. In the previous waves of enlargement, coordination of defence system reform and defence integration

the CSDP run in cooperation with the defence ministries of Austria, Germany, Hungary and the European Security and Defence College.

See: ESDP Course open to Western Balkan states, http://www.eu2006.at/en/News/information/2905esvp.html

Likewise, in the NGO sector, several courses specialised for the ESDP were held, as for exam-ple by the ISAC fund and the Centre for Civil-Military Relations’ School for European Security. See: ISAC fund: http://www.isac-fund.org/lat/esdp.php; CCMR: http://www.ccmr-bg.org/Obra-zovanje/3158/Skola+za+evropsku+bezbednost+%282008-2009.%29.shtml

220 The Minister’s campaign started around the time when the Serbian version of this pu-blication was published in May 2010.

221 In the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the parties undertake to advance politi-cal dialogue in order to bring closer „the stances of the parties on international issues, including matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.“ However, the Agreement does not even mention harmonisation in the area of the CSDP.

222 „Srbija treba da se uključi u mirovne misije“, interview with General Henri Bentegeat. See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090619_Politika_Daily-Tereza_Boj-kovic.pdf


took place by means of NATO. Membership of this military alliance was suf-ficient for the European Union to accept that these former Communist states had carried out the necessary reforms in this area.223 However, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1st December 2009, will have a far-reach-ing effect on the EU’s ability to cope with the challenges of the 21st century, particularly in the areas of foreign and security policy.

If Serbia wants to speed up the process of European integration and make up for lost time, without doubt it must begin its security integration into the EU long before achieving full membership. One way to achieve this is to devel-op a Battlegroup with other Western Balkans states in the period from 2010 to 2020. By creating a common EU Battlegroup, the Western Balkan states would be making a symbolic gesture, not only of historic reconciliation between the region’s peoples, but also an indication of a new era in which the region has grown from a security burden for the EU into its security asset.

Advantages of and challenges to the Western Balkans Battlegroup

Why would Western Balkan states create a separate EU Battlegroup when they could simply collaborate within other existing EU Battlegroups, and thus avoid a whole series of complicated political, financial and technical challeng-es? There are a number of reasons why adopting just this type of regional ap-proach is in the interest of all the region’s states. First, the cultural and linguistic similarities which exist in the western Balkans would facilitate communication within WBBG. Linguistic interoperability is an exceptionally important factor for cohesion in international military integration. Thus, cultural and linguistic closeness, just as is the case in other EU Battlegroups, could be the connective tissue of effective functioning of WBBG too.

Secondly, participation in numerous regional initiatives, membership of the Partnership for Peace programme and acceptance of NATO standards will make these armies technically and organisationally interoperable. Although they have nationally tinted doctrines, the fact that several Western Balkans armies grew out of the former Yugoslav People’s Army (Serbo-Croat: Jugoslov-

223 Neutral states are, of course, exceptions to this. When Ireland entered the EC in 1973, the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy did not yet exist. Austria, Finland and Swe-den entered the EU in 1995. By then, the EU had already created the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, but not yet the European Security and Defence Policy. Cyprus and Malta, who entered in 2004, still have a rather limited role in the ESDP.


enska narodna armija – JNA) influences to some degree the similarity of train-ing. In addition, the Western Balkans armies use similar weapons and equip-ment, largely inherited from the JNA. Creating a common Battlegroup from Western Balkan states would require a functional division of labour, in which each state would develop their own “niche capabilities” alongside the combat elements. This would reduce costs and further improve the professionaliza-tion of the armed forces. However, in order to attain full interoperability, joint training and military exercises would undoubtedly be necessary. This would begin with participation in other EU Battlegroups, and only later with partici-pation in the common WBBG.

Thirdly, this kind of regional approach would contribute to the develop-ment of mutual trust between former belligerents. Just as the Franco-German brigade founded in 1987 symbolised a united Europe, so could the WBBG symbolise lasting reconciliation between the states and peoples of a Western Balkan region integrated into the EU. Moreover, this type of activity would contribute to the integration of defence industries in the region and the har-monisation of common modernisation programmes and weapons and equip-ment procurement. A shared experience in the area of defence policy would have a positive effect on the strengthening of trust both within the Western Balkans, and between Western Balkan states and the EU. A multinational EU Battlegroup consisting of former belligerents could provide an exceptionally powerful symbolic contribution to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. In this way, the EU would strengthen its position as a “soft superpower”, capable of transforming war torn regions into secure communities and “failed states” into successful democracies.

Of course it is necessary to keep in mind the potential difficulties of and challenges to formation of the WBBG. The first challenge is the still fresh memory of the conflicts during the break-up of Yugoslavia during the last de-cade of the twentieth century. The question arises of why armies which once fought each other would work together in one multinational battalion. How-ever, European experience shows that once reconciliation has been achieved on the political level, armies do not present an obstacle to cooperation. The second, seemingly much larger, challenge is posed by unresolved political problems and territorial disputes. Is it realistic to expect that states whose rela-tions are burdened with unresolved territorial disputes would decide to form an EU Battlegroup together? However, as the experience of European integra-


tion shows, it is much easier to solve interstate problems in an atmosphere of cooperation. It is possible to build trust through cooperation in defence, thus ending uncertainty, reducing security dilemma and banishing motives for re-visionism. Military integration in the western Balkans is part of the solution, not part of the problem.

The third problem is organisational and revolves around, first of all, the problem of the “lead nation” i.e. the problem of which state will lead the WBBG. For now it is difficult to believe that agreement can be reached over one of the two largest states in the region (i.e. Serbia or Croatia) being the „lead nation“. For that reason it would perhaps be best for Bosnia and Herze-govina to take that role, as in the meantime this option could be acceptable to all. However, if agreement cannot be reached, it would perhaps be possible to find, outside the region, a third state, acceptable to all and with relevant experi-ence of participating in EU Battlegroups. States which could be acceptable to the entire region could be Greece, Romania and Austria.224 Internal political resistance by right wing forces in the Western Balkans states could present another challenge in whose view taking part in peace enforcement operations could be unacceptable.

Each state in this multinational battalion would rely on its own special capa-bilities. Although at this moment it is only possible to speculate, we will set out some of the special capabilities which states in the region can rely on. Bosnia and Herzegovina could make use of its demining forces, proven to be successful, while Croatia could use the experience of its platoon of military police which is currently in Afghanistan. Members of the Macedonian Special Forces have experience of asymmetric warfare in Iraq, and could contribute to WBBG in this respect. In principle, the Serbian Army could aspire to contribute something in the region of the following: one infantry battalion, a military police platoon, a CBRN defence platoon, medical teams and a light field hospital. This list repre-sents structural elements similar to those already declared as part of the Serbian Army’s participation in the NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP).

Likewise, decision makers and planners must, among other things, during the implementation of the EU Battlegroup concept, deal with the question of

224 The inclusion of an extra-regional state to act as a lead nation would have its benefits but also costs. One of them is the loss of linguistic and cultural interoperability.


whether training will be conducted jointly or separately. For example, the train-ing for HELBROC was first conducted separately by the national contingents, so that at a later stage of training, the facilities of the Multinational Peace Support Operation Training Centre in Kiklis, Greece could be used. This model could be followed by the WBBG, with Serbia offering the capacities of its Military Acad-emy, its Centre for Peacekeeping Operations in Belgrade, and the capacities of its newly-built military base „South “ (also known as „Cepotina“).

Also highly important is the question of tactical and strategic transport. As mentioned above, EU Battlegroups should be able to be deployed up to 6000 km from their home region. In the case of HELBROC, this problem was re-solved through Greece’s armed forces supplying Antonov An-14 and Hercules C-130 transport aircraft. The region’s armed forces could address this problem jointly, and through concerted efforts and investments together with other EU states develop capabilities for tactical and strategic transport.

It is necessary to begin informal negotiations over the formation of WBBG as soon as possible. It is difficult to say how procedures for forming, training and certification of EU Battlegroups will look in a couple of years, given that the decision making procedure in the CSDP is undergoing a process of adjust-ment to the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon. Thus, the well known theory that the EU is a moving target for all states in the process of accession is true of both adjustment in this area, and of attempting to meet set standards.

In any case, until the formal founding of the EU Battlegroup, it is certainly necessary to successfully complete negotiations with the EU Military Com-mittee as well as talks with partners participating in the creation of the EU Battlegroup. Following this, the lead nation must be selected, and harmonisa-tion of standards for forming, training and certification of EU Battlegroups completed. In the following section, we will provide a four-phase road map for the formation of WBBG by 2020.

A road map for the Republic of Serbia’s inclusion in the CSDP 1. Preparation and observation phase (2010–2012)

For a number of reasons, 2010 is perfectly suitable for the commence-ment of the first phase. Firstly, the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1st De-cember 2009, opening the door for further enlargement of the EU. Relations


between Serbia and the EU improved when the decision on visa liberalisa-tion came into force on 19th December 2009, as well as the Interim Trade Agreement, which came into force on 1st February 2010. On 22nd Decem-ber 2009, Serbia filed a request for candidate status, and it is expected that this request will be granted in the first half of 2011. Besides this, Štefan Füle, the Czech Republic’s former ambassador to NATO and minister for Euro-pean integration was chosen as European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy. The Czech Republic strongly supports Serbia’s EU entry, and Commissioner Füle himself has on several occasions made clear his support for Serbia’s rapid Euro integration.225 The region’s other states can also expect an acceleration of European integration in 2010. Dur-ing 2011, Croatia could complete negotiations, and Macedonia begin them. Finally, the world economic crisis and the European monetary crisis have undoubtedly strengthened scepticism in certain European capitals towards enlargement proceeding any further than Croatia. The creation of WBBG will be the strongest card for the region’s states to play against such negative tendencies.

Spain, with whom Serbia has excellent diplomatic relations, holds the EU presidency for the first half of 2010, a period in which Serbia could complete all the preparatory work necessary for members of Serbia’s armed forces to be sent as observers in the ranks of the Spanish Battlegroup due to be „on duty“ in the second half of 2010.226 This process can continue in the second half of 2011, within the framework of the Greek Battlegroup HELBROC, which also bears the name „Balkan Battlegroup“. Greece and Spain, as members of the EU and NATO who have not recognised the in-dependence of Kosovo, and with whom Serbia has exceptionally good dip-lomatic relations, could become key partners for the long term in Serbia’s integration into the CSDP.

225 For example, the first delegation received by Commissioner Füle, at the beginning of February 2010, was that of the Republic of Serbia.

226 Miguel Ángel Moratinos, the Spanish foreign minister, visited Belgrade on 12 Decem-ber 2009, and the following day the Serbian Defence Minister announced that Serbia intends to take part in a UN mission to Lebanon, alongside a Spanish contingent, and that preparations for these activities will begin very rapidly. See: „Šutanovac o budžetu za Vojsku“, 13 Decem-ber, 2009, See: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=12&dd=13&nav_category=11&nav_id=398049


In the Preparation and observation phase the Republic of Serbia must aim its efforts in three directions. The first direction would be institutional prepara-tion for inclusion in the CSDP. This should be understood to mean all activities directed towards the building and strengthening of institutional and human capacity within the Ministry of Defence. It is particularly important to achieve full functionality of the organisational unit responsible for CSDP matters within the Serbian Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence, along with the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Finance Ministry, the Ministry for Economics and Regional Affairs and the Office for European Integration, is responsible for implementation of the activities of the Republic of Serbia in the area of European security and defence policy (a subgroup of technical group 31).

From an institutional viewpoint, it is necessary to create conditions for horizontal cooperation between these institutions. The appendix to the NPI (National Programme for Integration) written by the ministry of defence states that an institutional priority for 2010 is the creation of a department for Eu-ropean Integration and Regional Initiatives, which in the defence sector will concern itself with analytical and operational tasks in the area of cooperation with EU institutions. In addition, “having in mind the defined mission of the army, the Centre for Peacekeeping Operations of the Joint Operational Com-mand of the Serbian Army Headquarters has intensified its activities in prepa-ration for members of the Serbian Army to take part in multinational opera-tions.” Recognising the relevance of such a commitment, it is also desirable to form the core of a domestic element of personnel from EU missions based at Headquarters. Besides which, it would be desirable to develop a communica-tion strategy for Serbia’s EU accession in the area of the CSDP. Likewise, the process of education and training of Ministry of Defence employees in the field of the CSDP should be intensified. This process should focus on practical training, i.e. on the practice of EU/CSDP institutions, ministries and military headquarters of EU member states. Likewise, it is necessary to train officers and other officials who, on Serbia’s accession to the EU, would be seconded to EU military headquarters. For this reason, the annual educational plan for the Ministry of Defence and Serbian Army should include training related to the CSDP. The EU organises and carries out such training for both member and candidate states. It is also desirable to begin preparing a permanent military representative from Serbia to the EU Military Committee.


Furthermore, it is possible to begin equipping, training, preparing and cer-tification in preparation for Serbian Army forces to take part in EU Battle-groups. Parallel to this, the Serbian Army must reach full compliance with NATO standards and procedures. Finally, it is necessary to begin to include planned Serbian Army activities in EU Battlegroups in the Annual Plan for use of the Serbian Army and other defence forces in multinational operations. This way, the legal and technical prerequisites for Serbia’s inclusion in EU military operations, carried out with the help of NATO capacity, and within the frame-work of the Berlin Plus agreement, will be met.227

The second direction in which efforts must be directed in the initial phase would be towards achieving a series of political and military forms of cooperation with the EU. This relates above all to the establishment of regular consultations with the Political Security Committee, the EU body which manages the CSDP. This can be followed by initiating a “twinning” project, i.e. placing EU experts at the Serbian Ministry of Defence. As a rule, the user state chooses a partner from EU member states; this type of project contributes to achieving concrete operative results in the area of specific EU policies (in this case the CSDP). It would also be a good idea for the selected individuals to undertake internships in institutions in which they can observe the work of their colleagues engaged in tasks relat-ed to the CSDP. These internships should take place both in EU states and in regional states participating in this policy. Additionally, it would be de-sirable to begin regular consultative meetings with defence ministers of EU member states and of Western Balkans states under the auspices of the EU Military Committee, as well as to initiate contacts with EU Military Staff representatives. During this period it would be desirable to complete nego-tiations and sign a security agreement with the EU, enabling the exchange of confidential data between the Republic of Serbia and the EU.228 Finally,

227 This is in agreement with the NPI, in which the Minister of Defence says that „within the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, the Republic of Serbia is gradually fulfilling the commitments it had undertaken, and developing cooperation with the other members of this Programme. In 2009, the PARP Assessment came into force, listing 19 goals of partnership for the Republic of Serbia. It is planned that by 2012 the Republic of Serbia will have prepared the declared forces for engagement in operations within the Partnership for Peace programme.“ As the PARP document is not available to the public, it is not possible to judge whether these forces are also suitable for participation in EU crisis management operations or in Battlegroups.

228 State Secretary for Defence Dušan Spasojević talks of this in his interview with the newspaper „Danas“, „We have also initiated the conclusions of an agreement on secure proce-


it would be useful for the Defence Committee, and possibly the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Serbian parliament, to establish contact with the Subcommittee for Security and Defence (part of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee)229, as well as to begin sharing experience in the area of the CSDP with relevant parliamentary committees of the re-gion’s states.230 In this way, capacity building for democratic control of the Serbian Army’s participation in EU operations would be started in time. Finally, the domestic defence industry at this stage would already be able to begin to find a place in the plans of the European Defence Agency. The preparation and observation phase would be crowned with the placement of Serbian Army Forces on the duty roster of operational Battlegroups ac-cording to the decision of the EU Political and Security Committee, and on the suggestion of the EU military staff.

The third direction of activity in the Preparation and observation phase would be the opening of the political dialogue leading up to the creation of WBBG. In order for WBBG to be certified and deployed by 2020, it is necessary to begin talks about it in 2010. In the words of Terje Haaverstad, the Kingdom of Norway’s one time military attaché in Belgrade, „it is cer-tainly too soon for the realisation of this vision. However, this should not prevent decision makers in the Western Balkans from even now beginning talks about how this vision can be realised. Much time is required due to

dures for the exchange of confidential data with the European Union, which will enable us to engage in EU missions.“

See: http://www.mod.gov.rs/novi.php?action=fullnews&id=1968 Besides this, it is perhaps necessary to compare legal formulations of the region’s states for

dealing with the presence of foreign armed forces on their territory (e.g. joint exercises, manoe-uvres etc.) This applies to cases where it is necessary to hold joint exercises or training. Similarly, the exchange of confidential information should be regulated in an appropriate manner.

See: http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/vesti-dana/Sporazum-o-vojnoj-saradnji-Srbije-i-Hrvat-ske.sr.html

229 Related to this, it is certainly appropriate to follow the practice of other EU member states and appoint a representative from the Serbian parliament to the European parliament, at least on an informal basis. More on this at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/lang/en/pid/18/cache/offonce

230 One of the most effective forms of inter/parliamentary cooperation in this field, without doubt, will be to hold inter/parliamentary conferences (on a regular basis) to consider CFSP/CSDP matters, as foreseen in Article 9 of the Protocol of the Lisbon Agreement on the role of national representatives of member states. It is expected that representatives of candidate states will be invited to these meetings (e.g. COSAC).


great complexity, the investment required and the political issues which need to be resolved.“231

2. Adaptation phase (2013–2015)

In order to begin the second phase of planning and adjustment, two con-ditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, the Serbian Army must have at its disposal qualified forces, trained and certified to engage in EU Battlegroups. Secondly, political agreement must be reached with the EU over Serbia’s participation in some EU Battlegroups.

In this phase, Serbian Army units would be gradually adjusted to integra-tion in one of the existing EU Battlegroups. Due to NATO’s military action against Yugoslavia in 1999, and also the unresolved status of Kosovo, Serbian public opinion had become fairly sceptical when it comes to the Serbian Ar-my’s participation in multinational operations.232 For this reason, it is recom-mended that during the adjustment phase, the Serbian Army’s participation in EU Battlegroups is limited. This primarily means that only services not di-rectly involved in combat duties will take part.

Likewise, it would be desirable for Serbian Army units to be integrated into Battlegroups whose contributing states are militarily neutral (Sweden, Austria, Finland and Cyprus) or states which have not recognised the independence of Kosovo (Spain, Slovakia, Greece, Romania). The Republic of Cyprus is the only state which is both militarily neutral and has not recognised the inde-pendence of Kosovo, meaning that any military cooperation with this state within the HELBROC Battlegroup has a good chance of meeting with public approval. The Balkan Battlegroup will be on duty during the first half of 2014, which is an excellent opportunity for the participation of a Serbian contingent. This contingent could have up to 50 members from the ranks of the military police, demining teams, medical teams and, of course, staff officers.

During this phase, political preparations for the creation of WBBG must also be intensified. This question may be addressed through bilateral contacts

231 Online interview 13.10.2009232 For more on this, see: Miroslav Hadžić and Milorad Timotić, Javnost i vojska, Centre for

Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2006.


both with other states in the region, and with EU member states. If the idea is accepted, it will be possible to convene a regional conference at which it will be necessary to reach consensus on the creation of WBBG by 2020. It is desir-able to organise the regional conference in cooperation with Greece, who will hold the EU presidency during the first half of 2014. At this conference, as well as expressing general political will, a decision will be made as to which state will be the BG Point of Contact for coordination of planning and preparation of the Battlegroup, and also which state can play the role of „lead nation“. Ac-cording to existing procedures, the process of formally founding a Battlegroup begins at a meeting of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (or GAERC). Following this, defence ministers of the participating states sign a letter expressing the intention to offer the European Union the services of their fully operational Battlegroup by a given date.

3. Phase of advance participation, planning and preparation (2016–2017) During this phase, the Republic of Serbia can advance its participation in

Battlegroups by including other branches of the Serbian Army, such as infantry, artillery, transport aircraft and helicopter units. One of the most difficult chal-lenges in the phase of advanced participation will be winning public support in Serbia. This will be especially complicated if the EU Battlegroup in which Ser-bia is participating is used in implementation of an EU mission. There is a risk that, if the Battlegroup is used for a CSDP operation, the Serbian Army may suffer casualties. Professionalization of the Serbian Army, along with added investment in training those who will participate in the EU Battlegroup may reduce, but cannot entirely eliminate, this risk. For this reason, if events play out in this way, a strategy for communication with the public must be devised in time. A detailed plan for social care of casualties and their families must also be devised.

During this phase, planning for the creation of WBBG must be begun.233 With this aim it is desirable to continue dialogue with prospective contributor states. Special attention should be paid to politically sensitive issues, such as the decision-making process for Battlegroup deployment, the legal mandate and national responsibilities. This dialogue would be crowned by the signing

233 For a standardised guide to the creation of Battlegroups, see: Council of the European Union, Military Staff, EU Battlegroup Preparation Guide, Brussels, 8 September 2009.


of Memoranda of Understanding between the prospective contributing states. These documents can deal with the following matters: decision making on Bat-tlegroup deployment; consultation between contributing states during plan-ning and preparation for WBBG, as well as in the so-called stand-by phase following certification; command and control during operations in which the Battlegroup is involved; exercises and training; and other legal and financial matters. Alongside the Memoranda of Understanding, and based on them, Technical Agreements are also signed by the contributing states, defining how staff are placed within the Battlegroup structure and dealing with training and exercises as well as the use of the Battlegroup. If some issues remain unre-solved, alongside the Memoranda of Understanding and Technical Agreements, other multilateral or bilateral agreements may be concluded at this stage. This process is coordinated by the BG Point of Contact.

4. Phase of development of initial operational capacity and formation of the Western Balkans Battlegroup (2018–2020)

In this phase, Serbia would, together with other contributing states, con-tinue its preparation of WBBG. First, the development process for the WBBG package must be started. From this process should derive the composition and capabilities of the Battlegroup package, the so called ORBAT (Order of Battle), including national responsibilities. Similarly it is necessary to agree the standard operation procedure for the functioning of the WB Battlegroup. The BG Point of Contact is also responsible for planning training of WBBG force command. It is also necessary to establish a well coordinated decision making process over the use of WBBG, to be followed by participating states. It is desirable for this process to be carried out at maximum speed in order for WBBG to be able to comply with the foreseen timeframe for rapid deployment in a period of 5 to 10 days after a decision by the EU Council. It is necessary to develop a WBBG intelligence section, which would meet twice yearly. It would be good for these meetings to be attended by intelligence officers from other Battlegroups, if possible from the Battlegroup scheduled to be on duty alongside WBBG, as well as those due to be on duty in the six month periods before and after WBBG.

Training and exercises are key for successful certification. The BG Point of Contact coordinates the process of training, exercises and certification.


These must be in harmony with NATO procedures set for NATO Response Forces (NRFs). The training process consists of four levels: individual training, training of units, training of the BG core (the infantry battalion) and train-ing of the WBBG package. Interoperability and operational effectiveness are achieved through joint combined exercises. Participating states are responsible for Battlegroup certification, but it takes place in accordance with procedures agreed at the EU level. The European Union Military Committee is the organ which monitors the process of evaluation and certification of the Battlegroup. The BG Point of Contact is required, at least one month before WBBG is put on standby, to certify that its package meets the agreed Battlegroup criteria. Other EU member states may also be invited to observe the certification pro-cess, which would be particularly desirable given that WBBG will be largely or entirely composed of states which are not yet EU members.

This phase would be completed first with the placement of WBBG on stand-by during Finland’s presidency in the first half of 2020, and then on the EUBG roster during the next scheduled Coordination Conference. Thus, the Western Balkan states, upon entering the EU, would be showing much more than that they can provide security individually. The creation of the WBBG would be the best way to prove that they have overcome past conflicts, and are in a position to integrate their defence capabilities and so contribute to European security.


NATO after Lisbon: The Western Balkans in the Alliance by 2020

Dr Mladen Nakić234

NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in late 2010, aims to respond to new threats and challenges that will dominate the next decade. The Alliance has formally completed its post-Cold War transition and it is no longer just a classic defensive organization, as was cited in its earlier policy documents. Although NATO’s Article 5 remains the main pillar of the Alliance, global securi-ty engagement requires considerations of a “broader picture” of the world, rather than only within the Euro-Atlantic area of its member states. Special importance in changed international relations is increasingly given to various partnerships through which NATO can legitimately influence the security and stability of the international order. Regardless of the strength and power of its members, the Al-liance will not be able to play an independent role in the international political arena; therefore, partnerships with EU, UN, OSCE, but also with Russia and oth-er regional organizations and countries, are crucially important. In the next ten years, the area of South-east Europe should be defined in security terms, which means that all countries of the region could and need to be formally integrated into Euro-Atlantic political and security space.

234 Author is a Doctor of Science in the field of international relations and national security. He is currently Executive Director of the Centre for International Studies from Zagreb.


In sixty-one years of its existence, the Alliance has undergone various phas-es of development in international relations – from the Cold War to an attempt at creating a global partnership. Particularly challenging was the era marked by the Polish Solidarnost and the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which marked the beginning of the fall of communism in eastern Europe, which pre-ceded dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; what Putin termed „the greatest geopolitical disaster of the century“.

It was exactly the disappearance of its ideological and military opponent from the political scene in early nineties which was used by critics of the Al-liance to strengthen negative attitudes which brought into question its future existence and the expediency of its future mission.235 Although the Alliance gathers amongst its members a majority of the most developed and wealthi-est democratic countries in the world, it is continually facing new challenges, particularly in international relations, as well as those related to its own con-siderations as to how best to adequately respond to them.

War in the former Yugoslavia – the beginning of redefining new NATO’s mission

Discussions on the future of the Alliance were on-going internally and ex-ternally for almost the whole decade (1990-1999). Until 1995, critics of the Alliance used to bring into question the very purpose of NATO’s further exis-tence; whilst from the mid-nineties, this discussion was more focused on the future mission of the Alliance. The tragedy of the war in the former Yugosla-via – particularly the ethnic cleansing and genocide – demonstrated that, fifty years after the end of the Second World War, Europe was not ready and/or willing to prevent war on its own territory.

235 Theory of Balance of Powers starts from the fact that alliances stop growing in strength once their purpose is satisfied. Waltz, as a realist, is of the opinion that NATO is slowly heading towards its end, and though it is not the matter of day, that question could once again gain in its relevance in few years time. As the main reason, he states the fact that Europe accepted the U.S. hegemony, thus preventing the return to the balance of powers. Realists also believed that uni-polarity can not be very long-lasting, since a dominant state increasingly takes over ever more obligations and responsibilities, which over the time leads to its weakening. One can agree with that claim, given that unipolar order cannot remain stable for a long time because other countri-es do not feel safe. John. Ikenberry, America Unrivaled, Cornell University Press, 2002., p. 11,12.


The Alliance’s military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 1995, marked the beginning of NATO’s new mission. It was quite clear that the war in the former Yugoslavia did not pose a direct security threat to any of the Alliance’s members, and it soon became obvious that the sole task of defence was not sufficient given the changes in the international community. Bacevich recognises the fact that Clinton transformed NATO from a defensive organisa-tion into something which primarily needs to react externally, both politically and militarily.236 Collective security became the brand of the Alliance; how-ever, the definition of collective security became more a passive instrument of collective protection, rather than a concrete means for strengthening col-lective security on the European continent and further afield. As a matter of fact, what was at stake were the basic transatlantic values of member states and their common democratic traditions. Common values, which served as the basis for defining essential common interests are the only remaining thread connecting the Alliance’s member states, apart from ideological and military ones which emerged after the demise of communism, the break-up of the So-viet Union and the Warsaw Pact. As was the case with NATO’s intervention in BiH, the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was primarily about the protection of democratic values (individual and collective), and less about security threats to its very members. Actually, it was exactly there that the concrete post-Cold War transformation of the Alliance in the direction of the protection of com-mon values, primarily in Europe, and subsequently beyond the transatlantic sphere, started.

Washington - Lisbon – Washington

One of the guidelines of the Strategic Concept adopted in Washington in 1999 was strengthening of the Alliance’s available capacities for new mis-sions in response to new threats to its common interests and values. What they had in mind were regional conflicts, such as BiH and Kosovo. The trans-national threat of terrorism was only mentioned in the context of the threat from weapons of massive destruction. However, after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11th September 2001, international terrorism has become the key starting point in the development of all future guidelines and activities

236 Bacevich Andrew, American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, Harward University Press, Cambridge, 2002., p.75.


of the Alliance, as well as a subject of certain disagreements in the phase of joint decision-making. The terrorist attack on military and civilian targets in the U.S., conducted through the use of hijacked planes, opened-up dis-cussions within the Alliance about the system of collective defence and its mechanism for rapid response. For the first time in the Alliance’s history, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was justifiably activated, regardless of the fact that it was not a classical attack with conventional forces on one of its members. However, this also prompted discussions about the mode and conditions under which Article 5 can or should be invoked for the purpose of collective defence.

The new Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon reaffirmed the relevance and permanence f Article 5 as the pillar of collective defence. Bearing in mind un-conventional threats, not only to NATO’s member states, but to the broader Euro-Atlantic security environment, Article 5 and collective defence should be understood in terms of the protection of collective security, particularly in re-lation to terrorist threats, the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, as well as biological and chemical warfare. The use of Article 5 outside the territo-ries of the Alliance in terms of broader (preventive) collective security, should be made procedurally clearer in the phase of decision-making and concrete ac-tion, in order to avoid the situation which preceded the attack on Iraq in 2003.

Two main objectives are particularly important – a) security in Europe and North America – which should be the link with the „old“ or traditional NATO under Article 5 and b) security for Europe and North America, as well as for the countries with Western values that are not members of the Alliance. This is a „new“ NATO which promotes common values, with a particular emphasis on the importance of Article 4, i.e., the need for consultations or harmonisa-tion of opinions within the Alliance, and often with external partners. The fact that an Atlantic idea is the corner-stone of cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is very important for both.237

237 Brzezinski makes the importance of the Atlantic community of the U.S. and Europe even more visible by showing some indicators. 13% of the world population lives in NATO member states and/or Europe, but together they make 63% of the world GDP, in 2005 they produced the goods worth 27 trilion USD, and make 77% of total world military consumption. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance, Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower, Basic Book, New York, 2007., p. 188.


In the coming years, the Alliance should also demonstrate that it is some-thing more than a classical defence organisation. Safe-guarding Western val-ues, such as freedom, equality, joint democratic heritage, rule of law, etc., will be the starting point for the creation of global partnerships.

Through global partnership to the next decade

The EU and NATO are creating a new strategic partnership which will not remain within the boundaries of transatlantic space only. Should the term “partnership’ be understood in a broader sense of guaranteeing an efficient crisis-management system, the main issue is how to best respond to those cri-ses? Therefore, the purpose – as well as the objective of NATO’s future mis-sion – is not only its transatlantic connectedness, but rather the willingness and resoluteness on the part of democratic countries to protect their common security and democratic heritage.

Partnerships are of a multi-dimensional character and should not be re-duced to solely an institutional level of cooperation that other countries have with the Alliance. Should we take into consideration simplified institutional bonding, we can gain a wrong perspective of priorities, and even of the impor-tance of partnership ties. Therefore, we could first take the partnership with countries that are members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme as a preparation for their full membership in the Alliance. In the second circle of partnerships, we could put those members of PfP which do not have any as-pirations towards membership, but are taking part in the programme because of their own interests. Then, there is a partnership with other organisations of collective security, such as the UN and OSCE, which the Alliance will seek to strengthen. Last, the Alliance is also building security partnerships with coun-tries beyond the transatlantic region, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, as well as in the Mediterranean region.

Each of the stated forms of partnership have their weight and it would be difficult to rank them according to their importance. The current form of part-nerships with countries of Asia and the Pacific is most likely more important and concrete from the perspective of the fight against terrorism and other se-curity threats (for example,. in Afghanistan) than cooperation with aspiring countries within the PGP (BiH, Montenegro and Macedonia). However, the


notion of partnerships should be viewed in the context of harmonisation of a regional approach to a variety of security challenges. Whilst those challenges were particularly pronounced in the area of South-Eastern Europe and the Balkan peninsula, the emphasis was on the Alliance’s expansion towards focal points of potential crisis in Europe (BiH and Kosovo). At the moment, these challenges are focused on Asia (Afghanistan and Iraq), whereby the engage-ment of partner countries such as Australia and New Zealand is particularly appreciated.

Some particularly important partnerships the Alliance is keen to develop further are those with Russia and China. Regional partnerships – such as co-operation with ASEAN countries, dubbed by some as „Asian NATO“ – give additional importance to NATO-Russia-China relations.

The creation of a security community, as it was termed by Karl Deutsch some sixty years ago, was not a utopian objective; however, the time of its completion is not easy to predict. The creation of global partnerships, which will also emphasise NATO’s new Strategic Concept, is only one important stage down that road. Thus, the legal framework for the deployment of forces outside the territory of member states („out of area operations“) and NATO’s global arrangements have to be compatible with the continuation of develop-ing functional relationships between the Alliance and the UN and OSCE, as well as with other collective security actors whose activities are based upon international law. In the next ten years, the Alliance – in cooperation with other international key subjects – should be able to provide a clear response to an increasingly frequent question – whether NATO should become a global security alliance? Such an ambition was not demonstrated by a single member of the Alliance, as they took into consideration the reality of international rela-tions. The same could be the case for the decision that creating various forms of ad hoc „coalitions of good will“ should be practiced as a solution to global challenges and problems. In any case, the solution should be sought in coordi-nating the Alliance’s activities with those of the UN and other relevant collec-tive security organisations, based upon international law. That said, Article 51 of the UN Charter should not be used as a justification for preventive attacks.


Western Balkans in the Alliance by 2020

According to Art, NATO succeeded in its intention to become a respectable security organisation, with the objective of engaging in regional peace-imple-mentation and stability missions.238 In the mid-nineties, the former Yugoslavia served as a ground for redefining the Alliance’s future missions. This was the space where the legitimacy of allied engagement outside the territory of its member states was tested for the first time. At the same time, this was also the area where NATO acted militarily for the first time since its inception, given that during the Cold War military means were never used in fighting between conflicting parties, due to primarily to the strategic balance established be-tween the two blocks.

Although the situation in the region is stable, without the threat of potential outbreaks of conflict, long-term regional security is still to be defined. The key encouraging factor on that road are the Euro-Atlantic integration processes.

One excellent example is cooperation between Croatia, Albania and Mace-donia within the American-Adriatic Charter, also joined by BiH and Monte-negro, whilst Serbia has the status of an informal observer. BiH is one of the keys to regional security and also the most complex issue which still demands an adequate answer to. As a country which aspires towards NATO member-ship, BiH is faced with very serious problems. Despite being conditionally granted a Membership Action Plan (MAP), BiH did not succeed in regulating the ownership of state property, i.e., 69% of military real estate is not registered as the property of the central government, since this process has been blocked by the Republika Srpska, which halted the beginning of the Membership Ac-tion Plan for another year.

Macedonia fulfilled all the criteria for membership before the Bucharest summit in 2008, but it was not invited to join the Alliance at the summit in Strasbourg/Kehl due to its name dispute with Greece. The Greek veto to Mace-donian membership in the Alliance does not offer a clear perspective on a po-

238 Engagement in BiH demonstrates the transformation of NATO which, along its politi-cal dimension, puts into first plan its security, and only after that its defence dimension, which shows the very essence of its hitherto changed mission. Anton Grizold, A Reconceptualization of NATO’s Transformation: the Next Round, Šipan Yearbook 2006, Politička kultura, 2006., p. 40.


tential solution, whereby this issue has become an important internal political issue for Macedonia.

Montenegro was granted a Membership Action Plan in late 2009; however, it is now faced with insufficient public support, despite the implementation of its Communication strategy. An additional problem is the division between relevant political parties around the definition of strategic national interest, i.e., a political consensus on that issue is lacking. With candidate status for EU membership, Montenegro has opened a clear perspective for continuation of Euro-Atlantic integration.

Serbia’s National Assembly declared „military neutrality“, Serbia is a mem-ber of the Partnership for Peace programme and has recently opened its office in NATO HQ. Though no Serbian politicians (save for the Liberal-Democratic Party) have clearly spoken out about future membership in NATO, this topic is increasingly pertinent in the public sphere. At the moment, around 25% of citizens support Serbia’s membership in NATO, whilst a vast part of the population is still burdened with negative sentiments towards NATO. Taking into consideration the experience from 1999, this is still an excellent result. We should be reminded that at the beginning of the systematic public informa-tion campaign on the advantages of Croatian membership in NATO, only a slightly higher level of support was noted in Croatia. That only means that with an adequate communication strategy, it can be realistically expected that the citizens of Serbia will start to view their future through the prism of their own interests – security, economic and political – and less through their emotions.

What can countries of the region expect after Lisbon?

Though the „open door“ policy is not highly positioned on the Alliance’s agenda or in the newly drafted Strategic Concept, it is always emphasised as a matter of continuity. Article 10 of the Treaty remains relevant in terms of fa-cilitating the further expansion of the Alliance. On the other hand, a question which is imposed as a very objective one concerns the issue of the borders of further enlargement? Though particularly sensitive for the area of Asia, i.e., the former Soviet Union, the region of South-Eastern Europe also has its own sensitive geostrategic elements in relation to NATO’s enlargement. Despite the negative attitude of Russia towards Montenegrin accession to NATO member-ship and its attempt to preserve at least Serbia’s neutral status, developments in


the region are slowly but surely moving towards integration of the whole area into the transatlantic security system. By 2020, the security of the whole region could be defined through the membership of regional countries in NATO and, of most of them, in the EU. In that context, NATO enlargement in the region means continuation of the political-security project of stabilizing the Euro-pean continent.

Modernisation of NATO and the regions

NATO will remain the chief guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security. The new decade will not be spared from already familiar threats, such as terrorist at-tacks, the use of subversive weapons of massive destruction or nuclear prolif-eration, etc. NATO should not aspire to become the world arbiter and executor of its own verdicts. However, aspects of security threats jeopardising the mem-ber states of the Alliance and its population are diverse. Attention should be redirected from collective security – primarily implying the security of institu-tions – to the individual security of citizens, i.e., the population.

In these endeavours, a lot of room remains open for preventive actions which are frequently insufficiently represented in viewing all the causes of the aforementioned threats. Intervention should always remain a (last) resort, should all other preventive measures fail to attain the desired results. Anti-missile defence can also be one measure of prevention, if viewed in the context of further reductions of nuclear capacities.

Another important element is the continuity of the consensus principle in decision-making, as a guarantee to those less influential members that their voice will also be heard.

The continued development of partnership with Russia, and a desired start of institutional relations with China, are a challenge both for NATO and these countries. The problem of resolving the situation in Afghanistan is a common starting point for strengthening partner engagement, given that all parties have strong economic and security interests there. The expansion of mem-bership will remain pertinent in the next ten years, as well. It is likely that it will be more realistic in the south-east of Europe (Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, BiH and Serbia), rather than in front of Russia’s „courtyard“ (Ukraine and Georgia).


Some earlier policies of the great powers did not always bring the best out-comes for the people of our region. Bush Sr. did not want to entangle the U.S. in the war which led to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The same hap-pened with BiH and Kosovo, when he tried to leave these issues to Europe, even though he knew that Europe was neither ready nor prepared for them.239 Clinton, on the other hand, recognised the Balkans not only as very important to U.S. interests, but as an important element for the security of the broader region (Macedonia, Greece, Turkey and Albania).240

After twenty years marked with wars and tragedies, the area of the Balkan peninsula is on a good way to institutionally „returning“ to Europe. In the next five to ten years, South-Eastern Europe will have to be given a clear vi-sion of its political and security belonging within Europe, which implies re-solving several regional challenges that remain open. BiH needs to ensure its own functionality on equal grounds, both of its citizens and its constitutional peoples. Otherwise, NATO members will be faced with a serious job. Mace-donia and Greece have to resolve the name issue, because it is in the interest of all parties to continue with – i.e. , to complete – Macedonian integrations. Priština should, in the forthcoming talks with Belgrade, complete the process of international recognition of its independence and grapple with the serious challenges that lie ahead. Serbia has to finally extradite Mladić and Hadžić, regulate its relations with Kosovo and continue with reforms should it want to obtain candidate status for membership in the EU by the end of 2011.

Conclusion

The Alliance needed a new strategy for new times. Certainly, that strategy should not be only a piece of paper, but a sustainable strategy for the next ten years of the Alliance existing as an important international factor. The Con-

239 Unlike Bush Sr., who was not ready to engage in regional stabilisation endeavours, which also included BiH, Clinton saw there a very important interest of the U.S. foreign policy there, which resulted with the Dayton Peace Agreement. Radovan Vukadinović, US Policy in the South East Europe, Paper Prepared for ISA Conference, Washington, Feb. 1999.

240 Nuechterlein rightly asks a sensitive question of the use of American military power, thus stating the case of BiH, which should not be a vital American interest. Donald E. Nuechter-lein, America Recommitted, The University Press of Kentucky, 2001., p. 239. However, in the case with BiH, in addition to humanitarian, there was also the question of functioning of the world order and the stability of Europe, which indeed is declared American vital interest. The same can be applied to the case of Kosovo.


cept should combine previous key-points on collective defence being the main purpose of the Alliance, but also emphasise all necessary elements for its ef-ficient and legitimate performance in out-of-area operations. Article 4 should be given more importance, since consultations are directly connected with the attainment of a necessary consensus; the main decision-making principle within the Alliance.

The world has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, and NATO has changed accordingly. However, its main mission remains unchanged – from peacekeeping and stability to responding to new security threats, such as cyber-crime, energy security and piracy.

Members of the Alliance are aware that NATO has limited capacities. It is, therefore, important to set out priorities, define the main challenges and realistically assess all available resources. Partnership with other international subjects remains a key interest, both for the promotion of multilateral coop-eration, as well as for high-quality improvements in international security.


Experience of Montenegro on its path to Euro-Atlantic Integrations

Sanda Vučić241

In this paper, special attention is paid to the experience of Montenegro on its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, with a particular emphasis on the devel-opment of public support for Montenegro’s membership in NATO in the period since it gained its independence until today. In the second part of the text, recom-mendations for an effective communication strategy are provided in order to bet-ter inform the public about the Alliance, as well as the arguments generally cited in support of – or against – Montenegro’s full membership in NATO. The message of this text is that in the world of modern challenges, risks and threats, it is neces-sary to understand that no country is able to deal with the security challenges of the twenty-first century on its own; hence the need to strengthen capacities for joint action, both regionally and globally, and to be part of a security system that in return can act in everyone’s interest.

241 Author is a spokesperson of Euro-Atlantic Club of Montenegro


Having renewed its statehood in 2006, Montenegro decisively chose the path of Euro-Atlantic integration, which is also one of the main priorities of the Montenegrin Government. Accordingly, Montenegro assumed a series of obligations directed at the overall reform of its security system. Four years after the referendum on independence, it is not difficult to conclude that Montene-gro has remained faithful to its objective of joining NATO and the EU; as dem-onstrated by the excellent cooperation attained with all Western countries, as well as the reform processes undertaken in the security sector, intended to transform this former socialist system into one complementary with NATO standards applied by all member states, as well as by aspiring members. Only a Montenegro which is part of a safe and secure Alliance can guarantee security for future generations in the country and be a stabilizing factor in the region.

On its path towards membership in NATO, Montenegro has fulfilled a ma-jority of the requirements set. However, statistical data demonstrates an ex-tremely low level of awareness and understanding amongst citizens of Monte-negro on what Euro-Atlantic integration implies and what NATO actually is. According to surveys conducted by CEDEM242 in July 2010, 32% of population stated that they would vote for membership in NATO at a hypothetical refer-endum; 40.1% stated that they would vote against it, whilst 28% were indeci-sive. There are several reasons for this, though two major ones are a lack of in-formation on the current role and importance of NATO, and NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, whose integral part Montenegro still was at that time.

With the aim of informing citizens about the process of Euro-Atlantic inte-gration, the Government of Montenegro set up a communication team working on implementation of the Communication Strategy on Euro-Atlantic integra-tion. However, current implementation of the Strategy has not taken the desired course. The milestone in its implementation was a conference, entitled “Dialogue on NATO - joint efforts in raising public awareness in Montenegro”, organized by the Euro-Atlantic Club of Montenegro. Both representatives of parties in of-fice, as well as of those of the opposition, took part in this conference.

The conclusions attained through joint work during the conference were as follows:

• The Government should not have a monopoly over the process of Euro-Atlantic integration;

• The engagement of politicians, i.e., Members of Parliament, has to be

242 Centar za demokratiju i ljudska prava, see: http://www.cedem.me/


at a much higher level than it currently is. It is necessary to include all parties in the process and to present it as a state project, rather that of the Government or a certain individual;

• The objective of the Communication Strategy has to be the education of citizens, i.e., direct communication with citizens, since communication is a dialogue, not propaganda;

• Target groups have to be clearly defined and should also include the media, as an extremely significant partner in this process;

• The objective has to be clearly defined. It is necessary to establish a team of experts who will be at disposal of the media and citizens;

• Messages have to be concise, precise and understandable to ordinary citizens;

• In order to convey those messages to ordinary citizens as effectively as possible, it is necessary to use all available resources. One of recom-mendations is a far more comprehensive and intensive utilisation of the Internet, rather than only official sites of the Government and the Communication Team;

• Messages which are clear and which should be emphasised in the future are: guaranteed security; protection of territorial integrity (safeguard-ing of state borders); economic perspective (higher level of trust in the state, thus higher levels of foreign investment); being a part of a body gathering the most powerful democratic countries in the world, with an equal right to vote; professionalisation of the army, which means that only professionally trained and equipped soldiers will be sent to war;

• The Government should continue with the active promotion of these ideas, however, it is necessary to also include persons and institutions with credibility beyond the political sphere (e.g. economists, analysts, academics, experts in various areas, public personae – athletes, actors, singers, and ordinary citizens);

• Also, it is very important to understand that the very existence of an action plan for implementation of the Communication strategy is in-sufficient. What is more important is how that plan is going to be imple-mented, and who will conduct its implementation.

In addition to insufficient awareness and understanding on the part of the public and NATO’s bombing campaign in 1999, another argument frequently used is the prevalent perception of NATO as a solely military alliance. An ar-


gument which is also used is that Montenegro, as a full member of NATO, would have to send its troops to Iraq and Afghanistan to fight for the objectives of the U.S., Great Britain or any other great power, and not because of its own interests. There is also a financial aspect, whereby it is customarily claimed that membership in NATO would be far more expensive than it is presented to citizens.

However, NATO is primarily a political-military alliance and, as the most advanced system of collective security, it is an indispensable support to its members. Decision-making based on the principle of consensus is used with-in the whole Alliance, which means that all member states are included in the decision-making processes. One such example is Macedonia, which has fulfilled all the criteria required for full membership in NATO, yet whose ac-cession to the organisation has been blocked by Greece. Only once these two states resolve the issue around the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ on a bilateral basis will Macedonia will be accepted into membership. This example clearly demonstrates that the voice of a single country can influence whether certain decisions in the Alliance will be made or not.

Accordingly, NATO membership would enable Montenegro to – as an equal member of the Alliance – make decisions that are important for collective se-curity. Membership in the Alliance, not only for Montenegro, but for other countries in the region, is of the highest priority for their stability. Viewed from an economic perspective, by becoming a NATO member Montenegro would ‘open a door’ to foreign investors and, even more importantly, it would reduce the costs it would otherwise have to pay should it remain outside the Alliance.

A lack of obvious enemies in the military sense, as well as emerging threats and challenges, motivated Montenegro to organise its defence through coopera-tion with those partners that share the same values. Therefore, the Montenegrin Army has taken part in peace-keeping missions in Afghanistan, Liberia and So-malia, which only confirms that Montenegro managed to – within a relatively short period – professionalise and equip its army in accordance with NATO standards. That also means moving a step closer to membership in the Alliance. At this moment, the second contingent of the Army of Montenegro is located in the Hungarian base ‘Pannonia’ in the town of Pol-e Khomri in Afghanistan, whilst members of the third contingent have been sent to Hungary for training.

In a security environment susceptible to constant changes, NATO is also constantly reconsidering its priorities, tasks and structure. NATO’s new Strate-


gic Concept, which will enable the Alliance to face future security challenges, was developed for exactly that purpose. It is that kind of NATO that suits Mon-tenegro, which – with its modest political, and primarily military capacities – has to find adequate ways to satisfy its own security aspects and demands. Accession to NATO is a guarantee of foreign security and a good basis for strengthening the diplomatic influence of a country through its membership in the “club of selected ones”, particularly when we take into consideration the decision-making principles of the Alliance. Furthermore, accession also assumes compatibility with the process of Europeanisation, modernisation and democratisation of Montenegro, whose transition has been ongoing for too long regardless of the fact that accession processes to the EU and NATO, respectively, are diverse both in their length, as well as their substance. Mon-tenegro, led by its own state interest, would allow itself to attain two objectives with one process, i.e. to attain multiple gains and benefits.

It is necessary to understand that not a single country in the world is ca-pable of managing the security challenges of the twenty-first century on its own; therefore, it is imperative to strengthen capacities for joint action, both at the regional and global levels. Membership in NATO would give Montenegro the right to vote in all of the Alliance’s decision-making forums, and would im-prove the capacities of Montenegro to contribute to both national and regional security. Bearing in mind the difficulties in allocation of the budget, it is logical that nations can only benefit if the burden of defence is shared with other reli-able partners. NATO provides already established mechanism for joint coordi-nation of partners through the development of their strengths and specialised capacities for optimal utilisation of resources.

Given that the majority of opposition parties in Montenegro (more specifi-cally, all but one) recognise the importance of Euro-Atlantic integration, and taking into consideration the fact that Russia has changed its position towards Montenegro’s membership in NATO, what we need to do in the forthcoming period is to dedicate ourselves to providing high-quality and accurate infor-mation on what NATO is, what does it offer and what would Montenegro gain or lose with its membership in NATO, in order to – when the moment comes – through a referendum or in the Assembly, be able to make the right decision on whether it will become a member of the Alliance.

It is necessary to understand that accession to NATO is a lasting process, whereby nothing happens over night. Also, it is important to understand that the NATO does not want a Montenegro, or indeed any other country, which


has not fully satisfied the conditions for membership and does not enjoy the support of a majority of its citizens for fulfilling these conditions towards the Alliance. It is especially important to continue with reforms and to finalise the activities initiated – not because of NATO, nor anyone else, but primarily for our own sake and the future sake of our country.

When we talk about Serbia and its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, the Euro-Atlantic Club of Montenegro is of the opinion that neutrality, in this moment, is not the solution. Namely, Serbia is too important an actor – and I dare say, it is an engine of the whole region – therefore, the overall process of Euro-Atlantic integration will not make any sense should Serbia remain out-side the Alliance. All countries of the Balkans, embraced within NATO, are the guarantor of stability and security in the entire region.

It is, therefore, in the interest of Serbia to initiate the process of accession as soon as possible, since all those threats identified by the new Strategic Concept will not bypass Serbia. By considering all the positive and negative aspects of membership, it is important to particularly emphasise the guarantee of Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as the most important one.


The Western Balkans after NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010 and adoption of a new Strategic Concept

Prof. Dr Nano Ružin243

The new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in autumn 2010, marked a new epoch in the security field in Europe and the world, because it is the very first Concept designed to deal with the new global security threats and challenges of today, which has identified new security threats worldwide. But, what are its features? What does this document mean for NATO, for Europe, as well as for partners such as Russia, Ukraine or Georgia? The NSC is not solely focused on the Western Balkan countries, yet certain elements of this document, such as promotion of partnerships, the ‘open door’ policy, a common defence shield and other modern security threats which pose a real danger for all coun-tries of the continent, also have implications for the security of the Western Bal-kans. In this context, a question of the future status of countries in the region arises: Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Albania have already become members of the Alliance; Macedonia has candidate status since 1999; Montenegro received this status at the last summit, Bosnia and Herzegovi-na still has to fulfill additional requirements in order to acquire the MAP status, while Serbia is the only country in the region that does not have any pro-Atlantic ambitions.

243 Author is the Dean at the Faculty of Political Science, the University FON in Skopje, and the former Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia in NATO between 2001-2008


Threats, risks and challenges of the 21st century

The threats, risks and challenges the Alliance faces today are precisely defined and vary greatly in relation to those from the time of the Cold War. It is no longer considered that the territories and population of the Alliance mem-ber states could be the target of a large-scale traditional, conventional military threat. Contrary to this, threats to global security are now far more numerous and, among others, also include political instability, ethnic and religious rival-ries, wars for access to natural resources and wealth, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, genocide, large migration waves, organized crime, cyber-attacks and terrorism.

All these challenges to global security require that the Alliance finds answers through new forms of operations aimed at stopping a growing number of threats. This is exactly why the allies are resolved to continue with the trans-formation of their defence strategy. Recent experiences and lessons learned show that for the successful conduct of current and future operations, it is necessary to have resilient and interoperable forces, well-prepared, trained according to modern standards and deployable over larger geographical dis-tances.

In order to attain the goals that can be found in the document Com-prehensive Political Guidance, the Alliance, at the November summit in Lisbon, adopted its new Strategic Concept, which will guide NATO in dealing with security risks throughout the next decade. Within the frame of this document, “NATO-crats” focused on four topics: the relationship between NATO and the EU, new peacekeeping missions, the relationship between Russia and NATO, and NATO and global partnerships. However, what has in recent years caused the biggest stir is the issue of a missile defence shield.

The anti-missile system, whose main purpose is to provide basic protection for the citizens and territories of the Alliance members, occupies a significant place in the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept. According to the Secretary Gen-eral, Andreas Fogh Rasmussen, an anti-missile system is one of “central ele-ments of our defence.”244

244 Press conference held on 21st Novemeber 2010


Similar optimism and satisfaction with the consensus reached in Lisbon was expressed by the U.S. President Barack Obama. „The United States and our allies in NATO have achieved substantial progress today. I am happy to an-nounce that we have for the first time agreed to develop an anti-missile system that is powerful enough to cover the European territory of NATO and the United States.”

Attributes such as a historic and sensational summit were not granted solely thanks to a consensus over the anti-missile system, but also because of Russia’s participation at the highest level. After all, as well as at previous summits, and as it was emphasised on the occasion of NATO’s jubilee Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in 2009, the Alliance confirmed its commitment “to strengthening the dia-logue with Moscow within the NATO-Russia Council“, established in 2002 at the meeting of the Alliance in Rome, when the Rome Declaration was adopted. The Lisbon Summit in 2010 saw a notable warming of relations between Rus-sia and NATO. President Obama, who cancelled the anti-missile shield project in Europe, specifically in Poland, and the construction of a radar in the Czech Republic, deserves a lot of credit for such a positive development of these rela-tions. In the same context is the question of the Alliance’s further enlargement toward Georgia and Ukraine, i.e. granting them the status of the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which was not on the Lisbon Summit agenda. At the same time, the START agreement between Russia and the United States on reducing nuclear warheads entered its final stage, while Russia and NATO share com-mon concerns such as the war on terror and the fight against proliferation of nuclear weapons (Iran).

The new Strategic Concept evokes some of these elements. According to the document, NATO will “actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners”. Also, Barack Obama received signifi-cant support from his European allies regarding the rapid ratification of the U.S.-Russian agreement on nuclear disarmament, START245, which was signed in April 2010, but only adopted in December 2010 after on agreement was reached with Republican senators.

New START strengthens the Alliance and the entire European security, NATO-crats claim. It does not, therefore, come as a surprise that the Secre-

245 START - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty


tary General Rasmussen expressed his regret over „delay of ratification of the START agreement by the Congress”. Other than that, the new START provides for a 30% reduction in warheads by the two super-powers.

The overall architecture of the new Strategic Concept is based on an ambi-tion to create a safer and more predictable world. That is, indeed, the third axis of a historically significant Lisbon Summit of NATO. The new Strategic Concept would have to contribute to the “globalization of the Alliance de-fence capabilities“. In order to realise these ambitions in a time of great eco-nomic and financial changes, increased cooperation – together with a better use of resources independently of reduced budgets of NATO member states – is imperative.

Afghanistation

The second working day of the Summit was marked by the affirmation of a new exit strategy in Afghanistan, whose leitmotif is the transfer of security control to the military and police forces of Afghanistan by 2014. It is envis-aged that this process should take place in several stages; in accordance with that, it is stipulated that 37 – out of 238 regions – will by the end of 2010 come under the control of Afghan forces. The Alliance’s course of action is clear and, as the Secretary General Rasmussen said, it includes “the progress and prepa-ration for Afghanistation of Afghanistan, according to the principle step by step - region by region”. In the same context, a gradual withdrawal of ISAF246 will be conducted. France and Canada decided to withdraw their troops from more peaceful to less stable regions, while the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced that all British troops will be withdrawn from Afghani-stan by 2015. At the same time, the Netherlands, like most other partners, including the Republic of Macedonia, announced their withdrawal. The Alli-ance announced at least 35% of its assets and existing structures will be made available, in accordance with the Lisbon Declaration. On the other hand, it is planned that the Afghan army reaches 300,000 troops. Finally, the good news is that Russia will take part in resolving the Afghan crisis by using large trans-port helicopters.

246 ISAF – International Security Assistance Force


Alliance’s new Strategic Concept

Since the adoption of the last Strategic Concept in April 1999, at the time of the fierce NATO air-campaign against Serbia, significant changes in various parameters and subjects have occurred: the fundamentals of transatlantic se-curity structures have evolved, the number of NATO members has significant-ly increased, almost all American forces have been withdrawn from Europe and diverted to the Middle East and Asia, while parallel to these processes, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was established. The EU became a new strategic actor, while at the Summit in Bucharest in 2008, France also returned to the integrated military command and fully joined the Alli-ance again. After the terrorist attacks on New York on 11th September 2001, the Alliance activated Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and engaged in an anti-terror war in Afghanistan. At the same time, it launched a comprehensive transformation and reform of its own military structures – by creating NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and Response Forces – while part-nerships in NATO experienced a new rise and a new quality.

During the summit in Strasbourg/Kehl247, a call for the development of a new Strategic Concept was launched. Development of this document was con-ducted in three phases: reflective, consultative and final, with the expert team headed by Madeleine Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State during the Clinton government.

The new Strategic Concept confirms the Alliance’s commitment in facing new challenges and threats, and in crisis management and the stabilization of post-conflict situations in close cooperation with the UN and the EU. The new Strategic Concept is oriented toward a world without nuclear weapons, with the emphasis of the Secretary General Rasmussen that “as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.“

Among the six basic programme objectives presented in the introductory part of the document, the “open door” policy remains valid for all European de-mocracies which share the values of the Alliance and are interested in mem-bership of NATO. In the part related to the most important tasks and goals of the Alliance, the new Strategic Concept emphasizes about thirty points, in the

247 The summit was held on 3rd April 2009.


realisation of which NATO would take part. The main objective of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through the use of political and military means.

In the fourth point of the new Strategic Concept, the Alliance is focused on three fundamental tasks to ensure the safety of its population and territory:

1. collective defence, which means that NATO members will always assist

each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washing-ton Treaty;

2. crisis management, which means that the Alliance is the only force that has powerful political and military capabilities to address the full spec-trum of crises - before, during and after conflicts;

3. cooperative security, which means that the Alliance will engage active-ly to enhance international security through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations, in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.

The Alliance remains a unique forum for transatlantic consultations on all matters pertaining to security. In relation to the security environment, nine important points were singled out, the most important of which are: although the threat of conventional attacks on member states has been eliminated, con-ventional weapons should not be neglected; proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are a serious threat to stability and prosperity in the world; terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries and beyond; the threat and potential impact of ter-rorist attack increases if the terrorist were to acquire nuclear capabilities; each conflict within or outside the territory of NATO represents a threat to peace and stability of the Alliance; cyber-attacks, threats to transnational transpor-tation, supply networks and communications are on the increase, as well as to vital energy arteries that must be protected and secured in order to avoid economic and environmental disaster on a large scale; various technological innovations such as laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space can pose a serious threat to global peace. At the same time, climate change, sanitation risks, water scarcity, are all a serious threats to security and the environment.


In the area of defence – in case of aggression – the Alliance will protect the territory and population of its member states by activating Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which by no means implies that the Alliance considers any state as its enemy. The supreme guarantee of the security of the allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, the United King-dom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contributing to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies. To this end, the new Strategic Concept states that the Alliance will „maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both Article 5 responsibilities and the Alli-ance’s expeditionary operations.“ At the same time, the new Strategic Con-cept emphasises that „peace is indivisible and that the Alliance will seek active cooperation with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.“ The Alliance will also continue to deal with other types of threats, such as the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, cyber-attacks, international terrorism, etc.

In relation to crisis management, the new Strategic Concept states that all conflicts outside NATO can pose a direct threat to the security of the Alliance’s territory and population. Experiences from the Balkans and Afghanistan have shown that a comprehensive approach drawn from political, civil and military elements is necessary for successful crisis management. Certainly, the most efficient way to manage the crises is “to prevent them from happening“, and that’s exactly why the Alliance will engage with other international actors to encourage continuous analysis and assessment of the international develop-ments, in order to find possible ways to manage them. Even when conflicts come to an end, the international community still has to provide continued support and assist in creating the conditions for lasting stability.

Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons re-main essential goals of the Alliance. After great success in reducing the num-ber of nuclear warheads in Europe, it is now necessary to proceed with the creation of conditions for the further reduction of armaments. In this context, Russia has a very important role and should demonstrate greater transpar-ency regarding their short-range nuclear weapons. Otherwise, cooperation be-tween Russia and NATO is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security.248

248 Item 33, NATO’s new Strategic Concept, p.9


The Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) contributes to strengthen-ing international security, the defence of the Alliance’s values and operations, whilst at the same time serving as a certain preparation of aspiring states for their membership in NATO. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and PfP programme are central for the conception of Europe - free, whole and in peace. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept is committed to the develop-ment of friendly relations and cooperation with all countries of the Mediterra-nean, with a view to intensifying Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. The new Strategic Concept seeks to promote the process of consultations and military cooperation with the Ukraine and Georgia, taking into account the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of these two states. At the same time, the new Strate-gic Concept is trying to facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans and to ensure lasting peace, guarantee democratic values and facilitate regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations.

NATO is the unique case in history of an alliance which promotes greater efficiency and capability, while its own capacities depend on financial, military and human resources in performing its mission. Only such an Alliance will be able to cope with security threats of the 21st century.

The Western Balkans after the Lisbon Summit - November 2010

What is the meaning of the new Strategic Concept for the Balkans? Al-though the document does not specifically deal with the Balkans region, it still contains references to lessons learned in the Balkans and Afghanistan, while point 35 of the Concept suggests facilitation of Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim of ensuring lasting peace and development in the region. In addition to this suggestion, it is important that the new Strategic Concept confirms continuation of the “open door” policy for admission of new members, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

The geopolitical space of the Balkans, in a broader sense, includes the states of the former Yugoslav Federation, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Tur-key and Albania. In a somewhat more narrow sense, the geopolitical area of the Balkans includes all countries of the former Yugoslavia, excluding Slove-nia, with Albania.


As for the great Balkan group, Greece and Turkey have been NATO mem-bers for a long time; Hungary, together with Poland and the Czech Republic (Višegrad Group) joined the Alliance in the first round of expansion (1997-1999); Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria received an invitation to join the Al-liance, after the terrorist attacks against the U.S., at the Summit in Prague in 2002 (the so-called “Big-Bang”) within the informal group “Vilnus”; while Albania and Croatia received invitations for membership at the Summit in Bucharest within the Adriatic group, which was not the case with the third member of this group, the Republic of Macedonia.249 Other countries of the Western Balkans, apart from Serbia, have expressed their desire to join the Al-liance. Montenegro has received candidate status (a Membership Action Plan), Bosnia and Herzegovina is expecting the same, which is currently halted due to unresolved issues of property rights related to military assets. Serbia opted for neutrality, while Kosovo is still facing the process of international recog-nition, especially by those NATO members that still have not recognized its independence (Spain, Slovakia, Romania and Greece).

Republic of Macedonia between the Euro-Atlantic aspirations and scepticism

The Republic of Macedonia – which gained partnership status in 1995, i.e. a whole six years before Croatia – has spent the longest time in the Alliance “waiting room”. During 1999, it obtained candidate status (a Membership Ac-tion Plan), while today it is in the process of preparing its 11th Annual Mem-bership Action Plan.

On its way toward Euro-Atlantic integration, the Republic of Macedonia was the most obedient disciple of all Western Balkans member states: it in-tensified its reform process; it adopted the Ohrid Framework Agreement and thereby changed its Constitution; it declared a general amnesty for the Koso-vo Liberation Army fighters in 2001; it conducted strong decentralization, introduced bilingualism and university education in Albanian language, which resulted in the creation of a multiethnic society that is an example of a model of democracy for all Balkan peoples, but which the Balkan mentality still finds difficult to accept.

249 For a more detailed analysis, see Nano Ružin: “NATO vo sovremenite megjunarodni odnosi”, Skopje, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010


However, after the Greek veto on the Republic of Macedonia’s progress to full membership in NATO during the Bucharest summit in 2008, which was formally explained under the pretext of “bad (good) neighbourly relations” and, informally, as a dispute over the name, Macedonia was not invited to start accession talks. This consensual view of the Alliance caused great disappoint-ment, NATO-scepticism and a fatigue with the issue of NATO membership among the political elites of the Republic of Macedonia. It also had the effect of slowing down reforms and lead to a waning of ambition towards Euro-Atlantic integration; there was reduction of the military budget from 2.3-2.6% to 1.38% of GDP; circumvention of democratic processes; politicization of the admin-istration; increased control over the media; threats to political dialogue, in-tensification of populism and even a stronger shift towards antiquity in search of some other, more significant identity; commemoration of historical figures and a decline in pro-Euro-Atlantic mood.

For example, according to recent survey of public opinion, it was concluded that, despite the decline, the current public support is still sufficient to meet the conditions necessary to obtain an invitation for membership. However, when asked to choose between the official name of the country and respec-tive memberships in NATO and the EU, almost 70% of citizens have opted for preservation of the name at the price of not joining NATO and the EU. Given that synergy between candidacy for membership in NATO and the EU depends on the consensus of these institutions which support the Greek posi-tion of blocking Macedonia’s membership in both organizations, the problem with the name has become the main obstacle to Macedonia’s integration to the EU and NATO. Given that the current mood of both parties is clearly set and unchangeable (the Republic of Macedonia insists on a dual formula - namely, that Greece can use any name for the Republic of Macedonia, and other countries according to their affinities; while Greece insists on geographic specification, i.e. North, Upper or Vardar Macedonia, with a change of other elements such as language, alphabet, passports, etc.). All forecasts about rapid resolution of this semantic problem are rather sceptical, which reduces the chances of the Republic of Macedonia’s membership in the EU and NATO to an absolute minimum. The whole baggage could potentially bring the Re-public of Macedonia to a new political and inter-ethnic crisis, and the likely sobering of all those who are currently hampering Macedonian progress to the EU and NATO.


The Republic of Serbia, military neutrality or something else?

The Strategic choices of the Republic of Serbia in relation to NATO are quite different. After the fall of Milošević’s regime and NATO’s air-campaign in 1999, the question of the relationship between Serbia and the Alliance has gradually become more relevant, particularly with the strengthening of demo-cratic processes. From an external point of view, on the basis of the on-going debates and official position of the authorities, it is possible to note three levels of thinking about the relationship of Serbia with the Alliance: a) position of rejection b) position of neutrality and c) pro-Atlantic position.

a) The position of rejecting possible membership in NATO is based on at least three reasons - the first stems from the Milošević times when the Alliance bombed the positions of Bosnian Serbs in 1995, which had a profound effect on the course and final outcome of the war in the Krajina and Bosnia. That was fol-lowed by the large air campaign in 1999, Merciful Angel, when for the first time in its history, the Alliance broke its rule of non-intervention outside NATO’s zone. After these interventions, Serbia suffered huge human, financial, economic and other losses, also losing its territory - the province of Kosovo and Metohija. It is, therefore, understandable that any thought about potential membership in NATO is not acceptable to the wider public, nor to many among the political elites.

Another reason for rejection is the process Kosovo and post-Kosovo period, around which two opposing ideas are confronted. One concept, which resulted in the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Kosovo, was represent-ed by the international community backed by NATO. The main argument was that as the Albanians were the overwhelming majority compared to the Serbian minority, then the uncertainty – and financial and other forms of Kosovo’s de-pendence – threatened to escalate and spread crisis through the region accord-ing to the principle of connected vessels. The second concept, represented by Serbia, is one according to which Kosovo is part of Serbian territory and Ser-bian sovereignty, and its secession is contrary to international law, and whose independence will not be recognized by any Serbian government. During the process Kosovo, and during the post-crisis period, other members of the Alliance – save from four states – recognized Kosovo’s independence. It is, therefore, un-derstandable that the Alliance, which seized the territory of one state ipso facto, is an undesirable partner.


The third reason for rejection is related to bilateral relations between Ser-bia and Russia. Although Russia was not able to prevent the air-intervention against Serbia, and withdrew its peacekeeping forces from Kosovo, it has re-mained an important ally of Serbia, which has not recognized Kosovo’s inde-pendence. Russia is opposed to the further expansion of NATO toward its bor-ders, even when it comes to Serbia, which is geographically more distant from Russia than Romania, Poland and the Baltic countries. Russian diplomacy has, at least on two occasions, made clear to Belgrade that it opposes possible membership of Serbia in NATO. First, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, Aleksandar Konuzin, said “if Serbia decides to join NATO, Russia will formal-ly recognize the independence of Kosovo, because that military organization does not consider Kosovo to be an integral part of Serbia.” At the same time, the Russian Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, complemented his col-league from Belgrade in the same style, saying “Russians can not be more Serb than the Serbs themselves.”

b) The position of military neutrality as a foreign-policy option was the result of the three previously explained reasons of anti-NATO sentiment in Serbia. On 26th December 2007, the National Assembly of Serbia adopted the „Resolution on the protection of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia“, by which Serbia was pro-claimed a militarily neutral country. What does this strategy mean for Ser-bia? In the opinion of General Zdravko Ponoš, “militarily neutral countries do not have allies and such neutrality can cost a lot since, when faced with military threats, a neutral country has to be able to confront them on its own”. Other authors refer to the conclusions of the Hague Conference of 1907 and emphasize the importance of the principle of active neutrality. In this context, some authors believe that Serbia can advance its activities within the framework of the Partnership for Peace, as Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden and Ireland all do, but which would not necessarily lead to membership in the Alliance or active warfare against terrorism and without the use of force. Serbia could also be promoted as a neutral factor in the Balkans, by which all actions of Serbia – as a neutral state – would be lim-ited to crisis management, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian and non-military intervention.

However, some authors like Milan Pajević, believe that the idea of Serbia’s neutrality is an “outmoded option, since real and complete neutrality does no


longer exist in today’s world and is definitely not a realistic and sustainable solution for Serbia in the long run.”

c) The Pro-Atlantic position for membership in NATO is represented by several contemporary analysts, while among political parties, the chief ad-vocates of the pro-Atlantic strategy, with the objective of full membership in NATO, are the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), G17+ and the Serbian Re-newal Movement (SPO); regardless of the fact that two-thirds of the public do not support the pro-Atlantic option.

In their official view, the LDP states five reasons as to why it is necessary that the Republic of Serbia becomes a member of the Alliance: political, secu-rity, economic, reasons pertaining to political image and importance of the Re-public of Serbia, and unsustainability of the concept of military neutrality. With respect to security aspects, it emphasizes the fact that by acceding to NATO’s system of collective security, Serbia would ensure its security and defence and would have the most powerful countries as its allies. After all, the Republic of Serbia alone is not able to guarantee its security. When it comes to political considerations, the LDP believes that by the very act of accepting candidate status, the government commits itself to greater transparency, democracy and stability of institutions.

In mid-June 2010, representatives of G17+ and SPO supported the abroga-tion of the decision on military neutrality of the Republic of Serbia and ac-ceptance of the pro-Atlantic position, with the aim of membership in NATO. For its part, Serbian diplomacy, despite the improvement of bilateral relations with NATO which is taking place at the Embassy level, made it clear through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vuk Jeremić, that “Belgrade does not intend to take any steps which would lead to its binding with NATO or any other mili-tary alliance....[the] policy of military neutrality of Serbia will not be changed.” This thesis is supported by the statement that “membership in NATO is not a condition for membership in the EU”, although in the previous three rounds of the Alliance’s enlargement after 1989, that was the usual path to membership in the EU.

The Atlantic perspectives of other Western Balkans countries are hetero-geneous, ranging from those for which it is only a matter of time before they fulfill obligations under the Membership Action Plan in order to receive an invitation to start accession talks (Montenegro) at the next summit of the Al-


liance, to countries that, in anticipation of the Membership Action Plan, first have to resolve some internal issues (Bosnia and Herzegovina), or to gain in-ternational recognition by all NATO members in order to gain partner status (Kosovo).

Visions and obstacles

There is no doubt that the foreign policy orientation of the Western Bal-kans is pro-European and - with the exception of the Republic of Serbia – pro-Atlantic, as well. Between political ambitions and desires of the political elites on the one hand, and the reality and mood of the people in the Balkans on the other, there are more obstacles and barriers blocking or slowing down progress to membership in the EU and NATO. In this context, we will make a small comparative analysis between Serbia and Macedonia in terms of membership in NATO.

Both countries emerged from the former Yugoslav Federation, which – as a leader of non-aligned movement (1960-1980) – was a prominent opponent of the politics of blocks and membership in political-military pacts (the War-saw Pact and NATO) during the Cold War. Therefore, the political elites who came to power in Serbia and Macedonia in the early-nineties, in absence of a credible foreign policy orientation, turned to Tito’s strategy. In the Republic of Macedonia, President Gligorov affirmed a strategy of equidistance in the first half of the nineties, which is a kind of neutral politics, while Milošević, due to NATO’s intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, preserved a non-aligned foreign policy.

The Republic of Macedonia joined the general trend of pro-Atlantic orien-tation of other post-communist countries only later, by acceding to the Part-nership for Peace programme (1995) and approaching candidate status by ac-cepting to develop an Action Plan for Membership in 1999.

On the other hand, the air-campaign against Serbia and the “process Koso-vo” had a strong effect on anti-NATO mood among the population of Serbia (about 70% are opposed to membership in NATO). In contrast, the role of NATO in crisis management in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001, as well as striving for a greater degree of security through membership in the Alliance, increased the Euro-Atlantic mood of Macedonian citizens to 85-90%. How-ever, contrary to aspirations and ambitions, diplomatic failure in Bucharest in


2008 reduced the popularity of the Alliance. Despite the recent pro-Atlantic mood, which is still about 70%, when asked to choose between membership in NATO (or the EU) and the name of the country, 20% of surveyed citizens refused to vote, while nearly 70% of them voted for protection of the name and non-membership in NATO and the EU. On the other hand, this percentage is even higher among ethnic Macedonians, while opposed to them, more than 95% of ethnic Albanians give preference to membership in NATO rather than to the name issue.

In terms of status within the Alliance, both countries have their missions at the ambassadorial level, i.e. their Heads of missions; both are members of the Part-nership for Peace, while the Republic of Macedonia also received the Mem-bership Action Plan. The Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia, both conducted social reforms (market economy, multi-party system, liberal democracy), as well as reforms of their armed forces (higher transparency in adoption and spending of the military budget, civilian control of armed forces, professionalization of the army). Serbia almost took the same path as the Re-public of Macedonia in terms of reforms and reduction of their armies, which in the past were characterized by the Soviet organizational model. Military reforms were carried out in synergy with experts from NATO, whereby the Partnership for Peace had a significant role.

If we would try to summarize parallel relations between Serbia and Mace-donia, we would come up with some paradoxical conclusions.

Namely Serbia – which was the target of the air-campaign and lost part of its territory due to that campaign (Kosovo) – is not interested in membership in the Alliance, regardless of intensive reforms undertaken in the defence sec-tor, precisely, in cooperation with NATO. The Republic of Serbia is not inter-ested in the status of a candidate country, nor the MAP, but should it decide to receive MAP status and become a NATO member, it will succeed in a rela-tively easy way compared to Macedonia. In contrast, the Republic of Macedo-nia, which for over 11 years (since 1999) has been aspiring to membership in the Alliance, and which after the crisis in 2001 adopted the Ohrid Framework Agreement, changed its constitution and political system, conducted decen-tralization, ensured proportional representation of other ethnic communities in the administration, and successfully fulfilled the requirements envisaged by the Action Plan for EU membership, has transformed from a ‘user’ to an


‘exporter’ of security by sending 4% of its armed forces to peacekeeping mis-sions of the Alliance. However, even with the huge pro-Atlantic mood of the population, the Republic of Macedonia can not receive an invitation to join NATO unless it changes its constitutional name.


Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO - the importance of the new Strategic Concept

Dr Armin Kržalić250

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) defined accession to the European Union and NATO as the objective of its foreign policy. Defence reforms undertaken in BiH in 2004 were seen as important steps on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integra-tion. The reform of the defence sector started with the entry into force of the new BiH Law on Defence and Law on Service in the Armed Forces of BiH, but the first major milestone was on January 1st 2006, when BiH’s defence institutions assumed command over the respective entity Ministries of Defence and military command, and started applying a new single budget for the defence sector. All these efforts in the realm of defence reforms have resulted in BiH’s membership in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Membership Action Plan. When it concerns the future and the new Strategic Concept, it is very important that NATO will preserve its open door policy, which means that BiH can become a full member once it fulfils all democratic criteria. In order to meet the conditions for full mem-bership in the European Union and NATO, BiH will have to make an additional effort in order to translate the declarative views of politicians – as expressed in their political statements – into concrete achievements that will bring to all the benefits of membership.

250 Author received his PhD at the Faculty of Criminology and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo. He is also the author of a book Privatna sigurnost, as well as of a significant number of research papers on security and security-related developments, particularly those pertaining to human security. He is currently employed in the Centre for Security Studies of BiH as the Project Director.


Introduction

Looking at the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter, BiH), one can say that it is intrinsically linked to the security and prospects of its im-mediate environment, the region, Europe and the international community as a whole. Therefore, integration into the regional, European and Euro-Atlantic structures of collective security is considered a priority area for BiH. On the positive side – and what has proved to be good thus far – is the fact that BiH understands and accepts the concept of military security as the cornerstone of its long-term military strategy.

By defining its priorities in the area of foreign policy in the document of the Presidency of BiH in 2003, BiH identified accession to the EU and NATO as one of its main objectives. The stalemate recently noted in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration leaves a dilemma as to whether these determinants of foreign policy are still valid. the significance and impact of NATO’s new Strategic concept adopted in Lisbon on 19-20th November 2010 on the policy of BiH will be explored in the text below.

1. Road of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO

Historical facts show that membership in NATO is the main milestone for those countries that aspire to membership in the EU. Therefore, almost all countries in the region want to join both NATO and the EU. Croatia and Al-bania are members of NATO, BiH, Macedonia and Montenegro are members of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and also want membership in NATO and the EU, while Serbia is in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, and wants to become a EU member.

When it concerns the road of BiH toward NATO – i.e., the gradual transfor-mation of its defence sector – we can say that it set its course and was built largely under the auspices of NATO and the OSCE. This process moved from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of members of the separate armed forces within BiH, to building confidence and promoting democratic principles in the security sector. The number of members of the military – of what once used to be warring parties – that during the war amounted to about


400,000, was reduced to approximately 150,000 by mid-1996,251 and in subse-quent years, i.e. during the period 2001-2002, was further reduced to 30,000 eligible members.

It is important to note that the military initially functioned as three sepa-rate structures, with the Croatian Defence Council, the Army of the Republika Srpska and the Army of BiH. Later, the Croatian Council of Defence and the BiH Army united to form the Army of the Federation of BiH. Entity authority over the military structure was preserved until the major reforms in this sector were undertaken in 2003.

Gradual progress in relation to military issues, which took place under the aus-pices of NATO and the OSCE, led to a change in political dialogue regarding the future defence system of BiH. The political decisions that ensued demon-strated the clear commitment of the political circles to join collective defence systems.

In July 2001, the Presidency of BiH brought a conclusion, and sent it to the Secretary General of NATO, whereby they expressed the readiness of BiH to accept the obligations and rights of the family of mutually equal Euro-Atlantic nations, and to contribute actively to collective security. Also, the Presidency of BiH clearly expressed their commitment to the inclusion of BiH into the processes of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and the PfP programme, as well as to implementation of necessary defence reform and reorganization of its armed forces.252

An existing defence system, which was inadequate, could not respond to these stated political goals, and it became apparent that it would have to undergo cer-tain changes. To this disproportionality between political determination and re-ality, one should also add the amount of budget that was spent by the military structure, which was not in-line with the economic capacity of the country.

Despite the proclaimed political objectives of political parties, a real agree-ment within the internal political elite could not be achieved, which subsequent-

251 Bonn International Center for Conversion (2003), “Turning Soldiers into a work force, Demobilisation and reintegration in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brief 26 , p.9.

252 Džemal Najetović (2007), “Geopolitički položaj BiH u euroatlantskim integracijama Za-padnog Balkana”, DES, Sarajevo, p.195.


ly prompted the intervention of the High Representative. The occasion used for that necessary intervention was the “Eagle” affair in October 2002, when it was established that a military company from the Republika Srpska was selling weapons to Iraq, which at that time was under UN sanctions and an embargo on arms sales. Using the powers granted by the Dayton Peace Agreement, the High Representative persisted in his requirement that state institutions provide command and control over the military sector. To that end, he made a decision to establish the Defence Reform Commission (hereinafter, DRC), the purpose of which was to offer recommendations for improving the defence sector.

The legitimacy for the DRC was found in four provisions of the Constitution of BiH and one of them, i.e., article II, paragraph 5, provides that the state will assume the responsibilities that are necessary to preserve the sovereignty, territo-rial integrity, political independence and international personality of BiH and that institutions may be established, as necessary, to carry out such competencies.253

These authorities were used to create legal requirements for the adoption

of the new Defence Law of BiH, which was proposed by the Commission, together with amendments to the Entity constitutions, laws on defence, the Law on the Army of the Republika Srpska. In addition to this draft legislation, the Commission also proposed a new Law on the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the legislative framework for a new Ministry of Defence at the state-level. This framework has included amendments to the Law on the Council of Ministers and the Law on Ministries, and a proposed decision of the Presidency of BiH to transfer jurisdiction from the Standing Committee on Military Matters to the new Ministry of Defence.254

Perhaps the most significant recommendations of the Commission were relat-ed to the establishment of supreme command by the state, tasked to deal with defence issues. A single defence structure of BiH was adopted, with a feasible division of responsibilities between state institutions and entities. According to it, the Presidency of BiH acts collectively in performing the command and control of the Armed Forces of BiH in peacetime, crisis or war.

By provisions of the Law, the Department of Defence was established at the state level. The Minister became a full member of the Council of Ministers

253 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina254 Defence Reform Commission (2003), “Put u partnerstvo za mir”, Sarajevo, Bosnia and

Herzegovina


with the right to vote, and was appointed in the same way as other state min-isters. The Minister acted in the chain of command for military operations, known as the operational chain of command, and the chain of command for manning, training and equipping the armed forces, known as the administra-tive chain of command. Entities still made an important contribution to the defence of BiH. They continued performing administrative functions of man-ning, training and equipping the Army of BiH and the Army of the Republika Srpska, respectively. Each entity had its defence ministry, headed by the min-isters, who were now responsible to the state Minister of Defence. Important responsibilities were given to the national Parliamentary Assembly, and were based on the principles of democratic civilian control over armed forces, trans-parency in planning and development of the defence budget and the need for fiscal constraints for defence sector, which were to be established by political authorities in a democratic manner. The key among the proposed reforms in the sphere of democratic control was the establishment of a Joint Commission for Defence and Security Parliamentary Assembly of BiH.255

The defence reform in BiH undertaken in 2004 were marked as important steps on the path toward Euro-Atlantic integration. Both the political leader-ship and the public justly expected that the international community would decide to reward BiH for such significant results by inviting it to the PfP. Un-fortunately, these expectations were not met. At the NATO Summit, held in Istanbul in June 2004, the progress was welcomed, yet the heads of states and governments of the North Atlantic Council urged BiH to again achieve further progress towards the creation of a single military force. It was stressed that BiH needs to undertake systemic reforms that would allow it to fully cooperate with the Hague tribunal, and to quickly start with strengthening the national level of command and control by transferring the authorities of the entity min-istries of defence and command to the appropriate state defence institutions.

All this contributed to the need for the High Representative to react again in a political environment frowning at further reforms to the defence system. Es-pecially vocal criticism came from the Republika Srpska, whose leadership was not willing to transfer further responsibilities to the state level, given that the invitation for membership in the PfP was not received, though it was promised to them as a reward for pursuing these reforms.

255 For further details, see: http://www.parlament.ba/komisija/1/0/32.html


However, using the support of the Management Board of the Peace Imple-mentation Council (PIC) in BiH, in December 2004 the High Representative decided to extend the mandate of the DRC.256 The new recommendations of the old DRC were based on two fundamental changes: the creation of a single defence structure and a single military force under the fully-functional state command and control, and reorganization of the Armed Forces of BiH to meet the criteria in the realms of foreign, defence and security policy, and particu-larly in relation to collective defence and security.

In order to more clearly portray the image of reforms achieved under the man-date of the DRC in 2005, I will present some of the most important results at-tained during the one-year long negotiations.

In the area of command and control, a single chain of command was es-tablished. It starts from the Presidency of BiH, where decisions are made by consensus, to the Minister of Defence, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the Operational Command and Support Command Commander, and through them to their subordinate elements. The Ministry of Defence, together with the Joint Staff, is responsible for policies and plans. Operational Command, Support Command and their subordinate elements are responsible for the im-plementation of plans and policies issued by the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Staff, in accordance with the laws and regulations. The BiH Parliamentary Assembly retains its responsibility for parliamentary oversight of defence insti-tutions in accordance with the Law on Defence from 2003.257

Changes in recruiting and reserve composition are related to the fact that the new Armed Forces of BiH are exclusively made-up of professionals. The re-cruiting system was abolished on 1st January 2006, as well as the liability of recruits in the case of mobilization (40 years in the RS and 60 years in the Federation). Official records on recruitment and other documentation related to military service, which were previously kept in municipal offices of the en-tity Ministries of Defence, have now been transferred to civilian municipal authorities, so that all evidence on trainings and other official documents that could be required by citizens would be easily available. The passive reserve consisting of 60,000 troops (40,000 in the Federation and 20,000 in the RS),

256 See: http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=33874257 Zakon o odbrani Bosne i Hercegovine, Official Gazette of BiH, No.88/05


was also abolished on 1st January 2006, and the new active reserve – which will consist of 50% of the total number of actice composition – will be created over the next few years.

The system of regiments of the AFBiH was established as a military force com-patible with NATO. There are three infantry regiments which are each respon-sible for the maintenance and protection of military heritage and identity of units they derive from, i.e. components of the Army of BiH and the Croatian Defence Council of the former armies of the Federation, and the former Army of the Republika Srpska. Other, smaller branches of the Armed Forces of BiH, such as engineers, signals and artillery, are organized into individual regiments and are composed of units assigned to three brigades as a support.

The size of active composition of the AFBiH has been reduced by elimi-nating temporary positions engaged to work on activities pertaining to train-ing, recruitment management and stand-by reserves. The size of the AFBiH is about 10,000 professionals, and consists of three manoeuvre brigades, one brigade for tactical support, and one aviation brigade, that are all under the control of the Operational Command. Each of the three manoeuvre brigades consists of three infantry battalions; one from each of three new infantry regi-ments. Each manoeuvre brigade has its support branches, such as artillery, engineers, signals, etc.

The AFBiH belong to BiH, and they reflect the composition of BiH as a state of three constituent peoples and others. The three constituent peoples are equally represented at all senior levels of decision-making, starting from the Presi-dency, to the Operational Command and Support Command. The Defence Minister, Chief of Joint Staff, Commander of the Operational Command and Commander of the Support Command each have two deputies, whose respon-sibilities are defined by law. He and his deputies can not belong to the same constituent people. The Presidency of BiH is responsible for determining the level of national representation in the military, taking into consideration the Constitution, laws, the last census, operational readiness, manning, morale and cohesion of the armed forces.

Functions that were previously performed by the entity Ministries of Defence and military commands were either taken over by the Ministry of Defence, i.e. the Joint Staff of BiH, or were transferred to new departments for personnel,


logistics and training and doctrine of the Command for Support.The entity Ministries of Defence and military commands were abolished on 1st January 2006. Since then, a single defence budget was set-up at the state-level and de-fence spending has been reduced by 55% compared to 2002.

Implementation started with the BiH Law on Defence and Law on Service in the Armed Forces of BiH entering into force;258 however, the first milestone was 1st January 2006, when the defence institutions took over the entity Minis-tries of Defence and military commands and started applying the new, unified defence budget.

All of these activities, as well as many others completed by the BiH authori-ties in the intervening period, contributed to BiH being invited to join the PfP at the NATO Summit in Riga on 29th November 2006, together with Serbia and Montenegro. On 14th December 2006, by signing the Framework Docu-ment in Brussels, BiH formally acceded to this programme.259

Despite these achievements in the defence sector, some authors are of the opinion that the defence reform did not fulfil expectations, particularly in relation to the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security260. Some of them, therefore, emphasise that the laws thus passed were in fact copies of old communist laws on defence and armed forces of the former Yugoslavia, and that their provisions are often incompatible with the basic principles of human rights, freedom and international hu-manitarian law.261

However, despite these criticisms, by joining the Partnership of Peace, BiH managed to achieve one of its foreign policy goals. The defence sector can be seen as the most advanced social sector, where the first institutional step – re-flected in the formal inclusion of BiH in the official Euro-Atlantic structures – was made.

258 Zakon o službi u Oružanim snagama BiH, Official Gazette BiH, No. 88/05259 Džemal Najetović (2007): Geopolitički položaj Bosne i Hercegovine u euroatlantskim inte-

gracijama Zapadnog Balkana, DES, Sarajevo, p.198.260 See: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/73222 261 Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, (2006), “Security sector reform in Bosnia and

Herzegovina: The role of the international community”,International Peacekeeping, 13:1, p. 28-42


BiH’s membership in PfP opened a new chapter in defence reform, which is now reflected in increased cooperation with international forces and the fulfillment of obligations that membership in the PfP assumes. Another proof of BiH’s progress in defence reform has been reflected through its take-over of responsibilities from EUFOR, i.e. in obtaining the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces in terms of mine clearance, control of military movements and control of movements of weapons and equipment, warehouse inspections and other related military activities.

In the first year of its participation in the PfP, BiH succeeded to realize all

objectives set within the framework of this programme. Thus, in 2007, the first presentation document of BiH for PfP was made, security agreements with NATO and the PfP agreement on the status of foreign military forces were signed and the questionnaire on Planning and Review submitted.

Cooperation pertaining to the Individual Partnership Program was realised in 17 areas of cooperation through 42 events, while in 2008 that number in-creased to 155 events in 23 areas of cooperation. In 2009, a similar pace of cooperation continued, which – to a certain extent – was redefined in relation to what was previously planned, due to the effect of the world recession which also affected the Ministry of Defence.

As a result of such a choice within the defence sector, NATO further strength-ened BiH’s path towards full membership by establishing the Individual Ac-tion Plan of Cooperation (IPAP), which is often called the first-class partner-ship. As a further boost to the efforts of BiH in defence sector, at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO upgraded its cooperation with BiH to a higher level, i.e. the level of Intensified Dialogue.

The next step before full membership in NATO is related to accession to the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is the final step in the process of reforms; requiring comprehensive changes not only in the defence sector, but also in other segments of society. BiH submitted its application for member-ship in the MAP in late-2009, but NATO officials did not respond to it favour-ably. Their decision was probably influenced by BiH’s failure to fulfil the obli-gations related to implementation of the agreement on use and management of movable and immovable property, which – together with a delay in deciding on how to resolve the issue of surplus weapons and ammunition – has delayed reform, but which is the key requisite for its continuation.


This situation has prompted politicians in BiH to make further efforts in order to meet obligations related to the MAP. Accordingly, and after several visits of high international officials, the BiH Presidency made a decision on destruction of surplus ammunition, and at its 44th session, held on 14th April 2010, gave approval for engagement of the AFBiH infantry units as support to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.262

The proclaimed position of BiH’s political leadership – regarding international obligations of promoting peace and security in the world – was very positively received by NATO member states. After that, and thanks to lobbying efforts on the part of Turkish diplomatic representatives on the eve of the informal meet-ing of NATO defence ministers in Tallinn, Estonia, the ministers concluded that BiH has made significant reform progress since the date it submitted its application for the MAP. Thus, at a meeting in Tallinn, on 22nd April 2010, they decided to invite BiH to the MAP, and authorized the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to accept the first Annual National Programme of BiH once the issue of immovable military property is resolved.263

Such conditional accession of BiH to the MAP is certainly very important for further reform of BiH’s in defence sector, yet it again leaves room for in-ternal political disputes. Hence the Serb member of the Presidency, Nebojša Radmanović, already commented that by imposing such conditionality, NATO is putting additional pressure on the Republika Srpska.264 Namely, the conditionality of NATO which is related to the immovable military property, specifies that the identified assets that will serve the future needs of the de-fence structure must be registered as the state property of BiH, and will be used by the Ministry of Defence. The previous position of the RS representa-tives was that the property should be registered as the property of the entity in which it is located, and should be assigned to the Ministry of Defence of BiH for use. Therefore, one can hope that a necessary political agreement will be achieved in due course which will allow the full membership of BiH in the MAP.

262 For further information, see http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/zaklj/sjed/1/?cid=14601,2,1

263 For further information, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_62811.htm?selectedLocale=en

264 For further information, see http://www.vijesti.ba/politika/10060-Radmanovic-Uvjet-prijenosu-imovine---novi-pritisak-Srpsku.html


Looking at this process, we can see that BiH has made a huge step for-ward in reforming its defence structure. From a mere recipient of international military assistance, it reached a level where its armed forces – by taking part in peace-keeping missions – now contribute to peace-building and security in the world. It is obvious that the reforms, which were conducted under the watchful scrutiny of the international community, has given positive results and that the defence sector now continues its reform path to improve its in-teroperability with NATO forces.

2. NATO’s new Strategic Concept

First, it should be noted that NATO adopted a very significant document at the Summit held in Lisbon on 19-20th November 2010. Many experts in this area, who were chaired by the former U.S. State Secretary, Madeleine Albright, were engaged to work on the development of this document. The very docu-ment, NATO’s new Strategic Concept, provides guidance for the next period of action.

Globally, collective defence remains the main instrument of cooperation for the next ten years, with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction ac-companied by new threats like piracy, cyber-attacks, missile attacks and oth-ers. Also, what is important to note is the agreement on deployment of a mis-sile shield with Russia, as well as the agreement on enhancing cooperation; i.e. the agreement that NATO and Russia will no longer regard each other as enemies.

In the words of the Secretary General, Rasmussen, NATO will maintain its “open door” policy, allowing all countries that satisfy the given criteria and aspire to membership to become full members. We can say that this statement has encouraged those forces in BiH who are working towards the attainment of full membership in NATO. But why have we singled out this sentence only?

First, NATO’s decision to preserve its “open door” policy is very important, as it means that BiH may indeed become a full member once it meets all demo-cratic criteria. Another important aspect is NATO’s confirmed commitment to BiH’s accession to the MAP, once it fulfils the condition of officially registering military assets that are to be used by the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of BiH. Besides, the shift in NATO’s cooperation with Russia is also con-


sidered as an important development, which will positively affect attitudes of citizens of both Serbia and the Republika Srpska regarding the issue of NATO membership. The Serbian Defence Minister, Dragan Šutanovac, in his inter-view of 1st December 2010, gave positive remarks on Serbia’s potential acces-sion to NATO and noted difficulties in implementing the neutrality for which Serbia opted. Certainly, the position of Serbia has a significant impact on the citizens of the Republika Srpska, so this could be the way to overcome some oc-casional friction in BiH related to its admission to NATO, and announcements of a referendum in the RS regarding possible membership in NATO.

In addition, the Strategic Concept will probably have a significant influence on the formulation of the document of BiH Defence overview by 2020, that is currently being developed at the Ministry of Defence.

When it concern the European defence policy, it can be said that it has not been promoted enough in BiH, nor in other countries of the Western Balkans, which makes the relation of institutions toward this area rather inert. The Eu-ropean defence policy is not included in the current negotiations between the EU and BiH, and that sphere of cooperation is on the margins of other policies.

What is interesting is that the elements of foreign policy are in BiH pres-ent through the operation of EUFOR military mission (the mission has about 1,400 soldiers and its mandate has been extended until 2011), the EUPM po-lice mission and the EU Special Representative. Given the presence of these forces, BiH institutions are working with them and gradually reaching the giv-en standards. EUFOR has started with trainings of our troops, while EUPM is providing a lot of assistance to our police forces in achieving best practice in police work and cooperation with law enforcement authorities.

Instead of conclusion

The “open door” policy in the next ten years, advocated by the new Strategic Concept, provides a unique opportunity for BiH to achieve its objectives per-taining to areas of foreign affairs and security. What is necessary, however, is to make an additional effort in order to translate the declarative views of poli-ticians into concrete achievements that will bring the benefits of both NATO and EU membership.


Analyzing political activities of the parties in power, one has the impression that the complex social system of BiH was being used as a limiting factor on its way towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. An increasing resort to the mechanism of entity voting in the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and demands for greater power for entity parliaments, significantly slowed down the progress of BiH towards Euro-Atlantic structures.

Such developments in the political arena brought to a stalemate even the in-ternational community which – encouraged by the progress in reforms made in the period between 2000 and 2005 – decided to reduce its interference in BiH political life. Therefore, in June 2006, the PIC even announced its plan to close down the Office of High Representative within one year, and thus relin-quish the Bonn powers.

However, the assumption of full responsibility by national authorities for their future and the future of BiH citizens did not quite evolve in the expected direction, nor according to estimates of the international community. BiH moved from the phase of peace implementation to the phase of Euro-Atlantic integration, but as it has turned out, that was not enough to establish a func-tional and viable state community.

We saw that the overall reform of the security sector in BiH was conducted with the strong support of the international community. It is a fact that not a single reform could have been completed without the intervention of inter-national officials, particularly the High Representative, in one way or another. What has remained as incomplete – and which is now a challenge for further construction of security system – is an insufficiently strong promotion of con-stitutional reform, i.e. the non-inclusion of achieved reforms into the consti-tutional arrangement.

Such a status of the reform processes – which are not as yet a formal legal-constitutional category or, as is the case with police reform, negotiations have been postponed until political compromise on the new territorial constitu-tional structure is found – is simply leaving more room for the attained re-forms to be jeopardised.

Therefore, it is still quite bold to state that all ethnic structures in BiH share a unique and honest attitude toward internal and foreign policy, i.e. that they are truly oriented towards building a modern democratic state. The external


factor, represented by the presence of the international community in the po-litical life of BiH, certainly keeps a minimum social coherence on issues of strategic orientation, i.e. foreign, defence and security priorities.

Also, one should not lose sight of the current political situation which could influence possible future choices and dilemmas. As is known, the Alli-ance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the strongest political party in the RS, has continually advocated the demilitarization of BiH. In recent years, it has undermined the efforts BiH achieved through its defence re-form. Such an approach has probably been strongly influenced by the deci-sion of the Serbian political elites to declare military neutrality and not to consider membership in NATO – but rather only membership in the EU - as a political option. Over the course of time, even other political parties in the RS have gradually started adhering to this position. Though not official-ly presented to authorities at the state level, such opinions are increasingly more present in the statements of politicians to the media. Certainly, such attitudes both in Serbia and the RS require considerably more attention from the international community, as well as a serious consideration of attitudes that can be very important for the region’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

Such divergence in attitudes toward membership in NATO, which is pres-ent in the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska, could be a stumbling block for further progress toward full membership.

The impact of neighbouring countries’ policies on BiH could further com-plicate this issue, should this tendency continue in the future. The position of favouring EU military activities and slowing down the progress towards inte-gration into NATO could open a domestic political front, which would not be viewed very favourably by the international community.

A similar scenario has already been implemented in recent years in rela-tion to the budget of the defence forces. Although all political parties declara-tively supported BiH’s accession to NATO, constraints on the military budget significantly hampered any progress. The approved defence budget has only been sufficient for operational functioning of defence structures, and only a negligible part satisfies the needs for the modernization of equipment and in-teroperability with NATO forces.


Renouncing the decision to join NATO, under the guise of meeting Europe-an requirements for EU accession, could become a future topic on the political horizon. From the point of the international community, this act would cer-tainly have multiple negative effects for BiH. International actors invested a lot of financial resources and efforts in the process of defence sector reform, and such political diversion from the agreed course would send a very negative message about the credibility of our country. Such a decision would especially be negatively received by the U.S. and some major NATO member sates, such as Great Britain or Turkey, which also invested most in this sector.


Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Dr Miloš Šolaja265

Bosnia and Herzegovina, like other post-socialist countries of SEE, linked its transitional path to the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In order to attain that objective, political consensus was achieved and a series of reforms set by NATO and the EU implemented. Defence reform was completed by establishing a common defence system and joint army. Owing to a series of changes, the visa regime for travelling to the Schengen zone countries was abol-ished. What hinders BiH’s path toward security and economic integration is the absence of internal sovereignty and functioning of the constitutional and political system, as well as internal instability. Although it is clear that BiH will not com-plete the integration process unless the competencies of international institutions are transferred to domestic ones, adequate conceptions regarding this are still missing. Lacking the internal consensus on substantial issues and a clear concep-tion of the transition from international organizations to domestic institutions, BiH finds itself at the door of the Membership Action Plan, since membership is conditioned by decisions whose adoption is still far away. In the meantime, new security initiatives have emerged, as well as intensified engagement of Russia and Turkey in the region.

265 Author is the Director of the Centre for International Relations in Banja Luka


Fifteen years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, the political status and the internal organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter, BiH) are still causing a number of political concerns. A majority of political subjects have doubts regarding the basic concept of BiH, both in terms of its internal de-sign, as well as in terms of the international relations that the country itself should be building. Uncertainties and ambiguities are present in the process of Euro-Atlantic and European integration, despite the political agreement of almost all institutions and political actors regarding the steps of BiH in that direction. The “constituent elements of BiH - two entities and three nations”, disagree about the elementary basis of the constitutional order and political system. Concerning BiH’s internal organization, the concepts of the respective political actors differ from centralist to separatist. This has significantly slowed down the development of internal processes and the establishment of a stable and secure internal institutional framework; a precondition for creating a sys-tem of values, and the fulfilment of standards, necessary for the acceptance of BiH into security and economic associations. The declarative orientation and vacuous rhetoric in relation to integration processes are no longer sufficient as an indicator of BiH’s perseverance with these very processes.

Blocking the establishment of institutions during the process of implement-ing the results of elections held in early October 2010, shows a complete con-ceptual confusion of a political system essentially premised on three national constituents that are trying to institutionalise positions and achieve political power through the complex use of constitutional and electoral legality, and political legitimacy, determined by a certain nationality and national interests. In the meantime, especially in the context of the pre-election campaign in the Republika Srpska, Euro-Atlantic scepticism and anti-NATO rhetoric contin-ues to intensify. Such retrograde attitudes raises the question of how to recon-cile this new political approach and the institutional-legal framework which set BiH on its road to Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO?266

On 24th April 2010, BiH received an invitation to the Membership Action

Plan (MAP) at the NATO ministerial meeting in Tallinn, Estonia. The invita-tion, however, has been conditioned by the need to attain necessary agreement between the entities on the use of a number of sites and facilities that are im-portant for the functioning of the Army of BiH. This conditionality raised a

266 Article 84 of the Law on Defence of BiH, Security Policy of BiH


dilemma as to whether BiH had indeed become a member of MAP, or whether it shall become one once it meets the given precondition. Politicians and rep-resentatives of those institutions that are firmly committed to membership in NATO argue that BiH is a part of MAP, while those who demonstrate a certain restraint towards NATO claim otherwise. Therefore, the dilemma of whether BiH is a member of MAP or not is still pertinent.

This conditional invitation is one of the last steps in rounding the Euro-pean space as a single security space within a framework in which NATO represents the unique system of European security; where community se-curity is the result of a qualitative transformation from individual to col-lective security. The road from the post-Cold War creation of a single se-curity system to the process of BiH’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures has been marked by two parallel processes: post-socialist transition in the countries of Eastern Europe and geopolitical changes, wars and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, which was no longer “a symbol of differences in the communist world”, nor was it needed as a “buffer zone”, and was therefore classified by the western political doctrines as a country of (South) Eastern Europe.267

At the time of the Balkan wars during the last decade of the twentieth century, NATO had appeared with the concept of expansion. The Alliance’s participation in the war in BiH was a change in the principle of collective defence “out of area”, according to which NATO is not supposed to act outside its area. Since cooperation with missions of the United Nations in 1992, to the bombing of positions of the Army of Republika Srpska in 1995, NATO has gone from supporting humanitarian operations to openly offensive military operations. That was interpreted by many as a violation of Article 5 of the Treaty, which is the basis of its unity in defence, but also “the exit outside its territory (territories)“, which indicated another new feature of NATO which will appear in the future. In addition to building the European security system, NATO’s global objectives have also become conspicuous. This was proved through NATO’s key role in implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and peace-implementation in BiH. From 20th December 1995 to date, NATO has played a key role in maintaining the internal stability of BiH. By positioning itself in the Balkans, the Alliance

267 Susan Woodward: Balkan Tragedy, Filip Višnjić, Belgrade, p. 108.


has had one of the most important roles in the strategic pre-positioning of global relations. “The United States did not observe the interests in relation to the Balkans in the same way as the European allies did, so they engaged their political potential and military power in 1995 when they estimated that the differences in relation to BiH may jeopardize the very existence of NATO”.268 It was important for the United States that their troops took part in the peacekeeping operation, because that allowed them to preserve their primacy in European security, which made the „peace-enforcement in the Balkans only a second-rate motivation”.269

The wars in South-Eastern Europe, at the time when new post-Cold War international relations were being forged, brought a new perspective on the implementation of NATO’s Strategic Concept and establishment of a collec-tive security system in Europe. The military-strategic concept shifted towards “out of area” military intervention, thanks to which NATO - as a military alli-ance – gained the opportunity to take over the mandate for peace-implemen-tation and peace-keeping which had previously been the exclusive concern of UN armed forces. In pursuing the concept of expansion, NATO had to define when and how were the former socialist countries to be given the status of members.

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) provides intensive individual dia-logue between NATO and candidate countries, with a focus on the creation of assistance programs for these countries. The principle of cooperation is the project of each country, respectively, adopted and implemented every year by each of them. The annual national programme pertains to five areas: politics and economy, defence and military, financial resources, security and legal is-sues, which are all updated annually. These reports serve as the basis for dis-cussions between the North Atlantic Council and candidate countries. “MAP is not, however, simply a check-list for aspiring countries to fulfill, and partici-pation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership Decisions to invite aspirants to start accession talks are taken by consensus among NATO mem-ber countries and on a case-by-case basis”.270 Countries of the “first round”

268 Kori Schake: „NATO and the Balkans Challenge: An American Perspective“, p. 351. in „The Strategic Triangle“, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stepehen F. Szabo and Samuel F. Wells Jr., pp. 351-369.

269 Ibid, p.351.270 NATO Handbook, Brussels 2006., p. 197.


that were accepted to MAP in 2004, spent four years in MAP; Albania spent eight, Croatia seven, while Macedonia – after ten years – has still not become the member of the Alliance.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that endured a difficult internal conflict and is still under the direct supervision of the international community, has undergone a challenging road to conditional membership in the MAP. The transformation of its defence system started with the introduction of the DRC (Defence Reform Commission), and this reform is considered to be perhaps the most successful of all reforms in BiH. Out of 419,000 members of two armies, BiH now has a unique system of defence and a single army, which also included the changes necessary for its membership in the Partnership for Peace and the continuation of Euro-Atlantic integration. The number of troops was reduced through several stages, a single Ministry of Defence was estab-lished, one army was organized and the defence budget unified. Institutional mechanisms of democratic control over the defence sector were established, as well as transparency in planning and budgeting, and the basis for the par-ticipation of BiH representatives in peace operations was created. In the docu-ment of the Defence Reform Commission, entitled “The Path to Partnership for Peace”, the Commission proposed as a “long-term goal BiH its membership in NATO”, with recommendations for BiH to also join the Membership Action Plan (MAP).271 An opinion on membership in NATO entered the Law on De-fence of BiH, where Article 84 specifically binds “the Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency, and all de-fence subjects within their respective constitutional and statutory authority, to conduct the necessary activities for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s membership in NATO”.272 By adoption of the Law, an institutional framework for defence re-form was completed and the navigation for membership in NATO set. Defence reform in BiH began with the fear of its rejection in the Republika Srpska, although it was clear that the establishment of a unified defence system was a condition for the country’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures and its closer cooperation with NATO and the EU.

Political confirmation of such an attitude came through the statement of presidents from 12 parliamentary parties on 18th February 2004, “wishing to

271 See: http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/Partnerstvo-za-mir-sr.pdf272 See: http://www.oscebih.org/documents/8286-eng.pdf


accelerate the implementation of reforms in BiH, and in order to meet all re-quirements necessary for successful completion of the SAA, which opens the venue for EU membership, as well as necessary conditions for accession to the PfP and ultimately to NATO”.273 The political will of BiH to join the process of Euro-Atlantic integration – with the ultimate goal of joining NATO – was completed by the Declaration on the strategic orientation of the Republika Srpska in the defence system of Bosnia and Herzegovina274 and the Conclu-sion of the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska.275 BiH has since moved towards Euro-Atlantic integration with full capacity which, similar to the ear-lier experiences of Eastern Europe, is set as a necessary stage in the process of European accession. NATO has been accepted in the institutions of BiH as an indisputable common form of European security built after the Cold War. In that respect, the security of BiH had a paradigmatic value of comprising successful conflict resolution in an ethnically diverse society after the internal armed conflict.

Defence reform, successfully carried out, was the basis for an invitation into the Partnership for Peace (PfP). BiH’s membership in PfP was of a great sig-nificance for the internal security and unity of the country, as well as for its international relations through which, as a country with unstable internal rela-tions, BiH needed to participate on equal terms. Euro-Atlantic integration was thus set as a very important internal political issue. Membership in the PfP does not exhaust all potential for Euro-Atlantic integration. “The essence of the PfP programme is the partnership formed individually between each Partner country and NATO, tailored to individual needs and jointly implemented at the level and pace chosen by each participating government.”276 At the Washington summit in April 1999, “significant initiatives were launched to increase the op-

273 Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, House of Representatives, No. 01-50-180/04. of 18 February 2004

274 Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska, No. 63. of 4 July 2005, pp. 2-5. Declaration re-fers to demilitarisation as an ultimate objective, whilst membership in NATO is only indirectly treated, though it is not rejected, stating that BiH as a member of „Partnership for Peace, politi-cal wing of NATO and the European Union, would be equal partner, stable subject and example of building democratic society following a tragic war“.

275 Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska, No. 82. of 8 September 2005, pp. 1-2. „National Assembly of the Republika Srpska requires from the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to verify at competent institutions of NATO an on-going reform of the armed forces of BiH as the final phase of structural reform, which will enable engagement of BiH military in NATO“.

276 NATO Handbook, Brussels 2006. p. 197


erational dimension of the PfP and the involvement of Partner countries in PfP decision-making and planning.”277 PfP was expanded by a number of elements related to the inter-operability of partners and NATO, through strengthening of cooperation in joint activities. At the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, held in late November 2006, BiH, together with Serbia and Montenegro, was invited to join the PfP. The partnership agreement was signed in December of the same year.

Although Montenegro and BiH expressed their political will to join the MAP immediately, the slow pace of implementation of political and economic reforms did not allow for a quick decision to be made to include both coun-tries. In order to maintain an active attitude towards NATO integration, the Alliance has applied a formula from the beginning of the enlargement process, called “Intensified Dialogue.” That was supposed to mean that the communi-cation, as well as monitoring, will continue and intensify, not only in terms of obligations defined by the PfP, but also in terms of those processes defined by the Membership Action Plan.

MAP has a much wider dimension than it appears at first glance, when it seems that its sole objective are Euro-Atlantic integration. Assuming that integration does not include only military or defence systems by themselves, but rather governments in all their aspects and their socio-economic environ-ment, the MAP is set as the key internal process of social change which leads to accession to NATO, “as the key political actor in the Balkans, whose imperative is expansion”. The aim of this strategy is the development of security capacities under conditions of democratic civilian control in each Balkan country, and a possible transformation of NATO’s unique role in individual areas, from secu-rity forces to the development of security forces.278 That sets three priorities for the international community: establishment of the Stabilisation and Accession process and the Membership Action Plan, as basic guidelines of evolution in the region and an adequate rationalization of its presence in-line with interna-tional requirements and priorities; second, the campaign of the international community, primarily in BiH and Kosovo, to eliminate political-criminal or-ganizations as the largest threat to internal and regional stability; and the re-construction of the international presence in order to eliminate independent leadership of the political processes by ad hoc structures, particularly in BiH and Kosovo, and the transfer of responsibilities to the permanent European

277 NATO Handbook, Brussels 2006. p. 198.278 „The Balkans“, Report of an Independent task Force Sponsored by the Council od Forei-

gn Relations - Centre for Preventive Acton, Council on Foreign Relations, 2002., p. 29.


or local institutions.279 Therefore, the international community has defined an approach by which its intensive presence is established around the process of EU accession and the Membership Action Plan. At the time of defining the process of stabilization in the Balkans, the concept of collective security devel-oped by NATO – as the European security system – took precedence over the consensual concept developed within the EU or the universal concept devel-oped within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or within global security, as with the concept of the United Nations.

In June 2009, the Presidency of BiH made a decision on applying for mem-bership in the MAP, which the Presidency member, Željko Komšić, handed over on 2nd October 2009. “Allies have agreed that Bosnia and Herzegovina joins the MAP as soon as some progress in the reform process is perceived”.280 The stability of BiH is still dependent on the presence of international actors: the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the mission of NATO, EUFOR, the OSCE. The process of membership in the MAP, which should be complet-ed by membership in NATO, has not as yet been formally challenged in BiH. However, in numerous public statements of some political representatives of the RS, it was questioned through the dilemma of whether BiH should become a member of NATO, and claims that such a decision requires the confirmation of the RS population through a referendum. “The Serb Democratic Party (SDS) announced today that a decision on possible NATO membership can only be made by the citizens of the RS in a referendum.”281 Insistence on a referendum on NATO membership, launched by the political right wing in the Republika Srpska, can be found in the statement of the then Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, of November 2010, that BiH has to implement constitu-tional changes as a prerequisite for Euro-Atlantic integration. Such an attitude was interpreted in the RS as an attempt at forcing through changes of BiH’s internal structure, which provoked reactions from all political powers in the RS, and from which a conclusion was consensually drawn that the RS will not accept changes to the existing internal composition of BiH – which includes the territorial-political division and change of Dayton constitutional arrange-

279 Idem280 See: http://www.skupstina.me/cms/site_data/novo/informacija%20o%20prijemu%20

u%20MAP.pdf 281 See: http://www.24sata.info/vijesti/politika/25831-Srpska-demokratska-stranka-smije-

biti-zrtva-kratkorocnih-interesa-SNSD-.html


ments – in order to achieve full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures as the ultimate goal.

Potential membership in NATO has wide public support in the Federation of BiH (FBiH), yet very small support in the RS. While in the FBiH, 88% of surveyed citizens completely support BiH’s membership in NATO, and only 9% of them partially, in the RS only 30% of surveyed citizens support – with 64% are absolutely opposed to – NATO membership.282 The political opposi-tion in the RS is taking advantage of these results in order to set the question of future BiH membership in NATO and to link it to the possible accession of Serbia to the Alliance.

In addition to low public support in the RS – the main source of which can be found in the recent past and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and particularly because of NATO’s intervention against the Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia - increasingly frequent and stronger advocacy of a new European security system coming from Russia seems to have influenced the change in political orientation. The insistence on a referendum on NATO membership was one of the reasons the new Law on Referendum and Civic Initiatives was adopted in the RS, which excluded the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration from other referendum questions, while strong anti-Euro-Atlantic sentiments still remain.

Regardless of the criticism coming from Banja Luka and the attempt to shift these questions into the realm of the general citizens’ right to a referendum, no one brought into question the application of BiH for MAP. Given the fact that the MAP is considered as practically a first step towards NATO, it can be concluded that all sides will in the long-run orient themselves towards it as their ultimate goal. On that path, the political elites in the RS will have to deal with the issue of public support for NATO membership, as one of conditions pertaining to demo-cratic support for the membership in the Alliance, which will then be reviewed by the North Atlantic Council. All political elites in BiH will have to deal with three important processes if they are to meet the requirements set forth:

1. Issue of implementation and evaluation of annual plans in five areas

282 Ipsos: Public opinion in BiH, 2010, prepared for the National Democratic Institute, April 2010, p. 14.


envisaged by MAP, which is fully consistent with the obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. By satisfying the com-mitments from MAP, a country does not solely attain the conditions necessary for it to be invited to membership. This is also a certain trans-formation which brings each aspiring country substantially closer to fulfillment of the requirements necessary for the EU accession;

2. Issue of political system reform and social reforms in general, without which it is impossible to expect the closure of the OHR, departure of the international forces maintaining peace, and accountability on the part of domestic institutions and their representatives, as well as inde-pendent functioning of the political system.

3. Resolving the issue of 69 military sites as a condition set by the NATO Council,283 which is associated with the overall resolution of the prob-lem of state property.284 The very problem, and different approaches to addressing it in terms of state assets, goes to the very essence of BiH as a political community. It is already clear that extensive discussion on key issues will also include the issue of state property as part of overall public discussion concerning the forthcoming constitutional changes, as a basis of social consensus that would enable the long-term stability of the country.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was “conditionally” invited to MAP, which de facto

does not imply membership, but is rather a skilful political barrier whereby domestic political actors are expected to demonstrate their political will and readiness, as well as the culture of consensus, especially when it comes to “pro-spective military sites”. The agreement in this field should indicate whether Euro-Atlantic integration will be retained as the basic political orientation, and whether this process will be used to address particular political agendas of cer-tain political subjects. The willingness to achieve consensus on MAP will also

283 „MAP has been granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina today, but with conditions, a clear condition attached to the implementation of the Membership Action Plan“, stated NATO’s spokesperson Apatthurai at the press conference on Thursday, after the meeting of Foreign Mi-nisters of NATO, according to Reuters. See: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/47282/BiH-primljena-u-Akcioni-plan-za-clanstvo-NATOa-/print

284 Communiqué of the Peace Implementation Council: „Objective one - Acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of the Issue of Apportionment of Property between State and other levels of government: It is now time for political leaders to build on the progress they have made in other areas and to take the lead and to reach an agreement on this matter that enables the State to conduct its constitutional responsibilities“. See: www.ohr.int/print?content_id=41879,


serve as a guideline for achieving a consensus on constitutional reform, which is a key precondition for assuming responsibility for the situation in BiH. On the day when BiH was invited to MAP, it looked as if BiH was waiting for the October elections and a new delay to finding solutions, at least judging by the words of the Foreign Minister, Sven Alkalaj: “There were three clear condi-tions - destruction of surplus ammunition and arms and destruction of mov-able military property, new contributions to ISAF mission, i.e., in Afghanistan, and the third one - to officially register 69 sites as state property for use by the Ministry of Defence. The prior requirement is that the first cycle begins once those 69 sites are officially registered.”285

Willingness to achieve progress in resolving the issues of state property and military issues tells a lot about the willingness of political elites to bring BiH closer to Euro-Atlantic and European integration. The reform of defence sys-tem is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, because the process of integra-tion assumes participation of the state as a whole, with all institutions and capacities in accordance with political and other conditions. If there is no in-ternal social consensus, it is difficult to expect rapid reform and social changes in that direction.

The new Strategic Concept adopted by NATO at the Lisbon summit in 2010 found BiH entangled in two important processes. The first is the redefinition of global security challenges, whereby BiH cannot be recognized as an indica-tor of important international events, which – to some extent – was the case during the 1990s. The other is the need for internal self-definition of the state framework established at Dayton in 1995 and of the internal changes which should identify the new relation of the international community towards BiH. In 2010, the EU started implementing the Lisbon Treaty as a kind of constitu-tional settlement which imposed the need for (re)defining the EU’s common foreign policy as a systematically under-developed political principle and po-litical mechanism. In an effort to establish the mechanisms, both politically and institutionally, to define and manage the EU’s foreign policy, BiH is im-portant as a place where policy approaches are tested, as well as providing the EU with the opportunity to achieve initial success, as already happened in the early nineties when it was transformed on the basis of the politics of the Euro-

285 See: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/47282/BiH-primljena-u-Akcioni-plan-za-clanstvo-NATOa-/print


pean Economic Community.

Since the peace implementation in 1995, the international community tried several different concepts in post-war state-building efforts in BiH, which were based on direct participation and unlimited executive powers of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Events in the global context, compounded by the economic crisis in 2008, slowed down both the internal processes in BiH and those that are bringing the country closer to the Euro-Atlantic and European integration. The complex composition of the country allows for a pronounced role of the nation, and national opinion, in defining policies of the political system and the political parties, as representatives of the respective national communities. The crisis of global institutions and retrograde internal processes in BiH have reinforced aspirations of certain political elites and po-litical parties for authoritarian political and economic solutions, which also re-ceived significant support from national public opinion. Thus, socio-economic processes are moving BiH away from security and economic integration, de-spite the proclaimed goals and policies, and are demonstrating that they are not oriented towards future visions of the country, but rather towards popu-list objectives of preserving power as the main objective of the political elites. Intra-national discussion on BiH’s political, economic and social problems is presented as a national betrayal, with the debate among political representa-tives of national communities being exclusively reduced to the question of es-tablishing institutions and authorities, rather than dealing with developmental programmes and concepts.

NATO’s new Strategic Concept, Russia’s new initiative for collective secu-rity, strengthening the presence of certain countries, like Turkey, in the Bal-kans, redefining the EU’s foreign and security policy, redefining the concept of European security, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, all start from the necessity of resolving the focal crisis points in Europe. It is exactly the region of south-east Europe that is currently the greatest source of security challenges. Instability in the southern Balkans (southern Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania), is growing and transforming into open security challenges, particularly through an increasingly more open emphasis on the Albanian national question and the issue of autonomy for Sandžak, as advocated by the Bosniak ethnic minority. Open problems in the Balkans are also fuelled by economic and financial crisis in Greece, widespread criticism of corruption in Bulgaria and Romania, Serbia’s treatment of non-recognized


Kosovo, corruption scandals in Croatia and, above all, regional criminal net-works.

BiH is confronted with complex requirements for achieving stability and security as a prerequisite for further progress towards Euro-Atlantic and Eu-ropean integration. In order to succeed, BiH has to opt for political stability should it want to move from its current position towards economic and social development. The main steps in that direction will be to achieve an internal consensus between national and political representatives without the direct role of the international community, i.e., attainment of compromise on many issues and of a basic internal consensus on several elementary political issues. Chronologically, the primary obligation is to arrive at an agreement on con-ducting a census, which has been scheduled for 2011, but which has already sparked numerous debates and got bogged down in unsuccessful agreement. Another, even more important process, is changes to the Dayton “octroyed” constitution, which is the product of international negotiations, and the es-tablishment of a subsequent political system based on social consensus. Given the fact that neither the government nor ministries alone enter the process of European integration, but rather societies organized in state institutions and through corresponding relations, BiH is facing the elementary process of establishing a political system and institutions, capable to carry out inter-nal changes and implement those processes which would ultimately lead the country towards Euro-Atlantic and European integration.


The Impact Of the new Strategic Concept and the European Security and Defence Policy on the “Security architecture of South-East Europe”

Dr Arshim Çela286

Strategic policy documents concerning security, defence and the millitary are one of the indicators on how the security sector coordinates its activities in the future. Albania is, by its constitution, a parliamentary republic, so the tasks and responsibilities of the Albanian parliament in the area of security and defence are reflected in democratic oversight and accountability. Having completed “the NATO membership phase”, Albania should now undergo a new phase of devel-opment of its defence strategy. In accordance with the new Strategic Concept, it has to conduct a reassessment of its financial and human capacities, as well as an analysis of commitment arising from the participation in NATO international missions. Accordingly, Albania will have to be more accurate in its assessment of real, recognized and credible risks and threats, given that states themselves are the object of security institutions and activities. A review of major defence and security doctrines is necessary, not because of obligations imposed by NATO membership, but also due to geopolitical changes in the region. Serbia’s pursuit of EU membership is quite a significant fact in that regard.

286 Author is a retired Colonel, currently employed at the Institute for Democracy and Mediation in Tirana, Albania


I am very honoured to have this opportunity to deliver a speech at this well-organized conference, where the spirit of understanding and democratic de-bate prevails. All participants, from our country and neighbouring countries, express the same concerns and share the same vision regarding the impact of NATO’s new Strategic Concept on our region.

Seen as a whole, it seems that the new Strategic Concept does not pose any

problems for countries of the region, regardless of whether they are NATO members or partners. The priorities of the new point of view regarding future security threats and risks appear as if they are primarily related to the interests of major European and world actors.

In any case, the countries of South-East Europe can not just have a quick glance at the Lisbon document; first, because this document also cites the ob-ligations of countries of the region, and, second, because we are all gathered here today to exchange ideas and opinions concerning our common challeng-es, both current and future.

From an official point of view, the Republic of Albania clearly expressed its message at the Lisbon Summit, and as a NATO member-state, its obligations derive from this and other legal documents which regulate NATO’s activities. What I will state here is mostly a free and open vision of a civil society insti-tute, i.e,. the Institute for Democracy and Mediation in Tirana. Our Institute – before, during and after the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept – un-dertook several initiatives regarding the understanding of issues pertaining to security and defence, as well as the necessity for structuring and restructuring of security institutions based on well-drafted documents. Due to our history within the framework of relations with NATO and other countries, and due to the complexity of being a small country, Albania has in most cases adopted clichéd documents instead of formulating simple, real and tangible things on its own.

Accordingly, I think that my country will have to be more accurate in its assessment of real, recognized and credible risks and threats, given that states themselves are the object of security institutions and activities.

The same thing can be stated even for the anticipation of future risks and planning. All these will help us to clearly define our responsibilities for the


respective fields of action, thereby ensuring a harmonious separation. The ad-mission of global slogans on real risks and threats into the public sphere will make it more difficult for the government and state actors not to draw political points through overly-ambitious engagements, which sometimes are beyond our very capacities and capabilities.

Internal coherence and soundness of the Strategic Framework

The set of documents which belong to the strategic policies concerning security, defence and the military are, among others, one of the indicators of how the security sector aims to coordinate its activities in the future. Given the fact that Albania is, by its constitution, a parliamentary repub-lic, the tasks and responsibilities of the Albanian parliament in the area of security and defence are reflected in democratic oversight and account-ability. On the other hand, taking into account the hierarchical structure of security institutions, the government is obliged to implement this stra-tegic doctrinaire framework throughout all relevant ministries and agen-cies287.

It should be stated that the division of tasks and roles between the legis-lative and executive powers in the fields of security and defence is already consolidated through a series of law and practices. Under the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, the Albanian parliament is the highest legislative body from which all other institutions derive their legitimacy. Therefore, in the case of Albania, the duties and functions assigned to the parliament can be strengthened to ensure effective oversight and professional civilian con-trol over the army and security structures, as well as to guarantee better co-ordination and use of financial resources to the benefit of national security.

In this context, the Parliamentary Security Committee could expand its expert advisory network not only with full-time professionals, but with inde-pendent experts, when dealing with security and defence related issues or the strategic doctrinaire framework. Although it seemed that after 2000 and 2004, when the security strategies were adopted, a significant control and operation-al lead was given to the parliament by increasing the powers of its Security

287 Law No. 8417, of 21st October 1998, for the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania (Official Journal No. 28, 1998, p. 1073


and Interior Affairs Committee, events in the village of Gërdec in 2008, which became an important landmark for security and strategic issues in Albania, demonstrated that the government gained control and even more power over the fundamental security institutions.

Such an approach raised concerns on the part of Albania’s security partners in the West, which were reflected in the draft law on changes with respect to the responsibilities of the Albanian intelligence service288.

On the other hand, despite the fact that the current law clearly defines the advisory role of the National Security Council, which is attached to the Presi-dent of Republic, the existence of an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs as an advisory body close to the Prime Minister creates a “hidden insti-tutions rivalry”, instead of helping in improving the coordination of activities between state security institutions.

For this reason, the overall coordination and cooperation of security insti-tutions in ensuring a comprehensive strategic doctrinaire framework remains one of the primary tasks of the State. Preparation of these strategic documents has to pass through a professional assessment of CRT (“Challenges, Risks and Threats”), which should ensure as broad participation of institutions and stake-holders assigned to their practical implementation as possible.

It would be a sign of coherence if, in the process of preparation and imple-mentation of these strategies, the involvement of experts from various institu-tional actors expands. It is evident that there is a certain degree of soundness in the structures of democratic security and defence forces oversight (mainly in parliamentary and governmental structures), as well as the involvement of civil society in drafting and implementing these strategies. This role is yet to be improved and will be discussed below.

The Constitution clearly defines the roles and basic security concepts of the country. They are founded on peace, good neighbourly relations and active participation in collective defence structures. Therefore, these notions have paved the way to the general principles which support the strategic doctrinaire framework.

288 For more information, see Albanian newspapers during the period February-April 2010


However, the existing laws should still provide more information regarding the process of drafting and approving various strategic documents. In such a way, it would be possible to also include experts and NGO representatives, which would not leave the whole process to the discretion of state security in-stitutions only. Thus, the legitimacy of the process would be further strength-ened and necessary support from the general public obtained.

Risk Analysis Results

The documents of the national security and defence strategy, respectively, should ascertain that the core concept of the security strategy is mainly centred on “respect of the rule of law” and the “integration approach”289. National securi-ty and military strategies, as well as defence policy documents, have defined the challenges, threats and risks following a top-down approach, which implies that the relevant security institutions were not receptive to a more comprehensive approach (i.e., to measure in advance the public perception of threats and risks). As a result, the challenges, threats and risks are in these documents ranked on three levels – local, regional and global – lacking a clear prioritization and differ-entiation.290 Therefore, in the case of the National Security Strategy, the criteria related to the local level was pursued as a priority, rather than a comprehensive approach which would seek to build on a detailed classification of these.

Security strategies and the doctrinaire framework at the local level iden-tify four categories of threats and risks for Albania: organized crime, terrorism, natural disasters and problems of transition. In the case of organized crime, this notion refers to various forms of illegal trafficking, primarily drugs, hu-mans, conventional weapons, etc. In the case of Albania, special emphasis was placed on internal security, illegal migration (e.g. Albanian immigrants in oth-er countries) or the uncontrolled settlement of population within the country.

289 See Law No.9322 of 25 November 2004 “On approval of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania”(Official Journal No. 98, 2004, page 6697) and Law No.9858 of 27 December 2007 “ The adoption of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania” (Official Journal No. 184, 2007, p. 5802).

290 For an analytical review of the document of the National Security Strategy and percei-ved threats, see also: Sotiraq Hroni, Gjen.Let(in release) Pellumb Qazimi: View from Albania-Study on assessment og regional security and Challenges in the Western Balkans, Istvam Gyar-mati and Darko Stančić (eds), DCAF (Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), 2007, p.57.


However, what can also be found in the National Security Strategy are vague and insufficiently elaborated notions perceived as risk-terms such as “public opinion misinformation” or “insufficient development of education, science and culture”. With respect to threats and challenges to regional security, it is impor-tant to mention that the National Security Strategy and the military have been influenced by historical heritage and the geo-strategic importance of the coun-try as key factors in determining the security environment. In this context, the national security document has clearly defined that the “destabilization of the region through the revival of desires for fulfilling exaggerated nationalistic proj-ects and the development of trans-national ethnic conflicts, represents a threat to the security of the Republic of Albania.291

On the other hand, both documents have officially acknowledged a convic-tion on the part of policy-makers that the neighbours are not the major threat to regional security, but that the threat rather has an internal origin, such as political instability, weak economy and organized crime. In the case of Albania, the so-called “Albanian national issue” is set as one the top priorities among the strategic security objectives and suggested that the “Albanian national issue is going to be achieved through European and Euro-Atlantic integration”. So, Al-bania seems to be more focused on issues of Europeanisation by avoiding any nationalistic approach and seeking a solution for “Albanian issue” within the framework of its future membership in NATO and the EU.

Meanwhile, in the first survey regarding security threats and NATO inte-gration, conducted by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in April-May 2007, respondents were asked to rank threats on a risk evaluation scale ranging from 1 to 6 (the highest number indicates the highest risk). They ranked threats in the following order: corruption (4.6); poverty and economic stagnation (4.4); the failure of democratic reforms (3.64).292 These four ele-ments were considered even more of a threat to national security than external factors, like terrorism, regional conflicts, and so on.

291 Kastriot Islami (former Albanian Foreign Minister 2003-2005) National Security at the context of regional risks and threats (Proceedings of the International Conference): “On the development of the national security strategy”, Tirana , 21 September 2007, organized by the IDM and DCAF

292 Besnik Baka: Albania: Threats and perceptions of security ÇËSHTJE TË SIGURISË SECURITY ISSUES, Quarterly Journal, No 11 , Published by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation, Tirane 2009, pp. 74-90.


In this way, a clear definition of CRT at national, regional and global level remains incomplete, particularly within the national security strategies doc-uments. Only a “map of risks and threats”, based on clear criteria, can help determining the most holistic basic concept for the national security and de-fence strategies. Differentiation and prioritization of CRT should necessarily be associated with other aspects, rather than traditional security concepts such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. Adhering to these concepts, the national security strategy has lost the opportunity to be designed within the human security framework.

From the viewpoint of CRT classification, both security documents simply follow an order of geographical distribution of risks (global, regional or local). However, each of them lacks a definition of the scale and intensity of these in the short, medium and long term. Being in the same region and facing almost the same threats, the countries of southeastern Europe or, as otherwise used, the Western Balkans, may not have different visions regarding the impact of NATO’s new Strategic Concept. As demonstrated during this conference, de-spite different political relationships between the countries of the region and NATO, the common and obvious concern for the region is peace, and a secure and stable environment. Opinions expressed by experts from civil society, re-search institutions of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Re-publika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc., generally agree that security-related issues are both national, as well as regional issues.

Strategies vs Strategic Defence Review

For the main political and institutional actors in Albania, a periodical re-view of the fundamental security document of the Republic of Albania, known as the “National Security Strategy”, is necessary and legally obligatory. This review raises a lot of concerns mainly due to the dynamics in the security en-vironment either at the local, regional or global level. Albania’s strategic docu-ments have not changed since 2007. The most frequent reviews of military strategy (2002, 2005 and 2007) were accelerated only due to the country’s pro-spective membership in NATO.

The last review of the defence strategy document was conducted nearly two years before Albania became a fully-fledged member of NATO on April 3rd


2009. This document remains in effect and has not been subject to any reviews as yet, given that it also refers to the Ministry of Defence strategy for the period from 2007 to 2013. It became an important guiding document to the armed forces in their effort to meet the objectives foreseen in the strategic doctrinaire framework. This latter framework facilitated the invitation at the Bucharest Summit, on 3rd April 2008, for the Republic of Albania to become a member of NATO.

Having completed “the NATO membership phase”, and taking into con-sideration that Albania became a full member of the Alliance, it should now undergo a new phase of development of its defence strategy. In line with the new Strategic Concept, Albania is required to conduct a reassessment of its financial and human capacities, as well as an analysis of the commitments aris-ing from participation in NATO’s international missions.

Albania estimates that the review of defence and security documents is a

process dictated not solely by obligations deriving from NATO membership, but also by geopolitical changes in the region. Serbia’s approximation towards EU membership is, I believe, quite a significant fact in that regard.


The Future Security Concept of Serbia

Milan Karagaća293

We are witnessing disputes on a daily basis on whether membership in NATO or the position of military neutrality would be better for Serbia. When it comes to that issue, we are divided into patriots and traitors, Euro-enthusiasts and Euro-sceptics, even NATO mercenaries and those others. However, all this seems to be serving the function of daily political interests, rather than the serious formula-tion of a vision and concept of Serbia’s security. Security is exclusively or predom-inantly reduced to the military and defence, whilst other, extremely important, segments of security remain neglected. Serbia’s relationship towards NATO is pri-marily the issue of foreign policy, hence it has to be viewed in the overall context of foreign policy, because it is the state issue, rather than solely military one. These are some of the key reasons for absence of serious discussion on the future security concept of Serbia. Without serious discussion which does not accept nor reject anything a priori, no optimal nor state-responsible solutions can be found. In any case, Serbia cannot lead the politics of double standards in relation to the European Security and Defence Policy and NATO, particularly taking into consideration their compatibility.

293 The author is a retired Colonel, and also the member of the Forum for International Relations of the European Movement in Serbia.


Serbia in search for its future security concept – Options and Fiction

When the declaration on Serbia’s military neutrality was formulated, and then also adopted in the Assembly, no one asked for a referendum on that issue. Now, proponents of neutrality insist on the referendum on the issue of NATO membership. As Minister Šutanovac said, “if Ataturk had to organize a referendum, he would have never carried out reforms”, or “if Vuk Karadžić asked for a referendum on how to spell words, we would not have had a mod-ern alphabet nowadays”. Thus, the political elite was elected, they took over responsibilities, and they must have enough courage to make even those deci-sions that will not necessarily be liked by everyone.

Debate on the future security concept cannot, and must not, be reduced to quiz-riddles as to whether we like NATO or not; whether we want member-ship in the organization or not; whether it will bring some electoral points or not, but rather whether NATO is, or whether it can be, the framework for Ser-bia’s optimal security concept. What is prevalent here is a simplistic approach which reduces security exclusively or predominantly to the military and de-fence, whereby very important segments of state security, such as energy, en-vironmental, information, social, economic and human security, as well as the safety of citizens from all forms of threat are entirely neglected. This assumes a system of networked security at the state level, with active participation of all governmental and non-governmental actors, not just the military and police.

Serbia is exposed to the greatest number of global and regional risks, threats and challenges, as well as to some specific risks that many other countries do not face. Being a country of the Balkans, the central European and Danubean area and of Europe, most of Serbia’s strategic goals and vital national interests, including its legitimate interests in Kosovo, are achieved in the real environ-ment in which the EU and NATO determine political, economic and security framework. This has to be the starting point for any serious and responsible national consideration of Serbia’s interests in its relations with the EU and NATO.

Modern challenges, risks and threats require that concept to be reliable, long-term, safe, efficient, inter-operable, but also rational and economically optimal. An objective which must constantly be striven for is a secure Serbia


in a better region, a secure region in a better Europe, and a secure Europe in a better world, just as it was formulated by the European security strategy.

This is why Serbia has to very carefully and responsibly formulate a vision for its own security for the 21st century and to arrive to a strategic concept as a long-term and sustainable project of state and national security. As a small country, Serbia can choose between several well-known strategic options:

a. neutrality or non-aligned engagement;b. security partnerships and initiatives;c. collective security within the UN;d. cooperative security within the OSCE;e. Ad-hoc alliances;f. solidarity within the EU, and;g. collective defence and partnership within the framework of NATO.

How to find the best concept? By dealing with it seriously. We could start with a simple quantification and comparison of the effectiveness of each option with respect to any modern challenge.

Armed neutrality is, for now, the official option. All relevant factors of Serbia’s geo-strategic position are placed in a rank of small countries in the world, with all additional security risks arising from such a status. It is exposed to the greatest number of global risks and, to some, even more than many other countries.

A decision on military neutrality primarily implies that the state decides whether it is ready and able to confront the threat itself, or whether it will have allies. Neutrality implies that the state has no military allies, which means that it must have its own adequate army which – with its number and equipment – would be able to face-up to the challenge, which would only then be an argu-ment for the recognition of such astatus by others. For a country to be neutral, it must pursue a neutral foreign policy that is internationally accepted as such. Serbia certainly can not refer back to a history of pursuing a neutral foreign policy. One can not say that Serbia avoided participation in military conflicts, nor would it be reasonable to expect it to be neutral in some future military conflicts in which its interests could be threatened.


The neutrality of Serbia is not internationally recognized – neither tacitly nor expressively – nor is it realistic to expect that to happen. On the other hand, even the key requirements of military neutrality have not been met, such as:

• favourable relation of the subjects of international relations towards the proclaimed neutrality;

• appropriate geo-strategic position of the country;• stable internal security situation;• ability to develop autonomous defence capabilities;• developed and stable economy;• high GDP;• declaration of the state to opt for that status;• acceptance, recognition and granting of such status by third countries;• special or specific historical context of compelling reasons.

These requirements speak volumes for themselves that Serbia’s neutrality is just a fiction, and not a serious option. Justifying its commitment to neutrality by saying that the Serbian people were the biggest victims in Europe during the twentieth century; that Serbia is the most suitable connection between Europe, Asia, Middle East and Mediterranean, located in the sensitive area of south-east Europe, where a variety of strategic interests are interwoven, is actually the strongest argument against military neutrality, especially if we do not want to experience such suffering ever again.

It is only when we compare Serbia with some of the European countries that are neutral, that we come to an argument which does not favour neutrality, given that Serbia’s citizens would have to pay much more while their safety would still not be completely guaranteed. In 2007, Austria had a military bud-get of $2,263 billion, which is $278 per capita, or $57,148 per soldier; Fin-land had a budget of $2,758 billion, or $527 per capita, or $94,130 per soldier. For the same year, Serbia had a budget of $578 million, or $80 per capita, or $12,500 per soldier per year. According to that, Austria had $336 billion of GDP, Finland $213 billion, and Serbia only $54 billion.

It is, therefore, quite clear that such a budget allocation for defence needs is too expensive for Serbia. If we were to compare it with Austria, we would have


to allocate 4.2% for defence in order to reach a GDP outlay equivalent to that of Austria. Given that Serbia’s position in terms of security is far more complex in comparison with any of these countries, it would mean that a neutral Serbia would have to have a far more numerous and better equipped armed forces. What should be taken into account is that a huge sum of money would first have to be allocated in order to reach the current level of equipment of the armed forces of, for example, Austria.

The physiognomy of contemporary threats, risks and challenges, and the possibility to successfully counter them whilst being nearly entirely surround-ed by NATO and EU members, clearly demonstrates that Serbia’s military neu-trality is an inadequate, inefficient and economically exhausting option. Specu-lation that Serbia should theoretically be able to join the EU whilst staying out of NATO – as some countries such as Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Malta and Cyprus have done previously – and that EU membership is a solid guaran-tee of security, since the EU has an autonomous common security and defence policy, are basically well placed; however, only if we ignore the fact that Serbia is neither geographically, nor in any other sense, Austria or Finland.

An alliance with another country or group of countries implies the will-ingness of that country or group of countries to assume an obligation to con-tribute to the stability of Serbia. Under the condition that Russia and NATO find themselves in a state of confrontation, which at the moment does not look likely, a military alliance with Russia would lead to a significant increase in risk for the very security of Serbia and its citizens, as it would reduce cooperation with the North-Atlantic Alliance that surrounds it.

A changeable alliance is clearly not acceptable, nor tolerable for small coun-tries, since only great and regional powers can afford such a “luxury”.

Security partnership and initiatives are considered primarily in a regional context, but they themselves are not sufficient, and neither is an exclusive reli-ance on collective security under the UN or cooperative security within the OSCE.

Collective defence and partnership within NATO is an option that deserves special attention. Namely, for the sake of its own security, Serbia’s interest in NATO is much greater than vice-versa; whilst the interest on the part of the


Alliance to improve its relations with Serbia stems from the fact that Serbia is a real and unavoidable factor in the Balkans, and it is therefore much better if Serbia is part of the solution, rather than a problem.

Historical legacy, insufficient knowledge on and understanding about NATO, as well as manipulation by political parties and media, are three key determinants of our current relationship with NATO. They are also obstacles that deserve a serious discussion. As a result of these, today we have a wrong approach to the whole question, by treating this – primarily foreign policy issue – as an issue pertaining to domestic politics, where the emotional dom-inates over the rational, and which is perceived more as an issue of values, rather than a security issue. A serious approach requires a consideration of what NATO actually is, in which ways it has transformed thus far, in which direction it is heading, what is our present relationship and what is NATO’s perception of the future?

After the Cold War, NATO found itself in a process of transformation, the final result of which is still an open question. It is likely that NATO will be transformed from a collective military alliance under American leadership into a security community of democratic nations, multilaterally connecting their military capabilities. It would be a security-political organization, whose primary military functions would consist of facilitating the formation of ad-hoc coalitions, while the Alliance would have constructive relations with its neighbours, especially Russia, which - in the long run – would be able to ac-cede to this community or to achieve very close ties with it. Such “OSCE-isa-tion” of NATO would also be compatible with the UN, since NATO would respect decisions of the Security Council in preserving peace.

Which direction this transformation will take, primarily depends on how much stronger the unilateralist tendencies of U.S. politics will become, for how much longer European influence in the U.S. will continue to decline, and fi-nally, it will depend on the future of European security and defence policy and the commitment of Europe to more forcefully emphasise its individuality.

It is not entirely ruled out that the acronym NATO – “No Activity, Talking Only”, as it was frequently translated in the 1990s – could in the future acquire a new meaning, i.e. Now Almost Totally Obsolete. NATO has come a long way in the process of change and transformation; it is not what it was ten years ago,


nor will it in ten years be what it is today, as it is still in the process of trans-formation from a collective military alliance to an open security community. Accordingly, it is time Serbia accepted that even Serbia itself is not what it was ten years ago, and that in ten years it will be different, and hopefully, much better than today.

Considerations of relations between Serbia and NATO are mostly dominated by emotions, not arguments, which - from the point of national and state in-terest – is an irresponsible resort to divisions “for” and “against”, of “patriots” and “non-patriots”, those who care about “national dignity and identity” and those who do not understand the “soul of our nation”. Bearing in mind the very unfortunate heritage from the past, any qualification of guilt other than being mutual would be irresponsible and would not lead to constructive discussion, though it remains indisputable that NATO indeed bombed Serbia.

However, that the whole story is much more about domestic political ma-nipulation is proved by the fact that immediately after the changes ensuing from October 5th – namely, only two years after the bombing – Serbia already established very successful cooperation with NATO in conflict prevention and resolution in southern Serbia, as well as in March 2004, in stopping the po-grom and violence against Serbs in Kosovo.

Along with that, we started probing, expressing our intentions and seeking support for as speedy progress towards Euro-Atlantic integrations and NATO as possible. Therefore, within a short period we moved from confrontation to dialogue, while only three years after the bombing, i.e. in late April 2002, the Supreme Defence Council, chaired by Dr Vojislav Koštunica, sent recommen-dations to the federal government to initiate the process of joining the Part-nership for Peace (PfP). We saw an expansion in cooperation with individual member states and the Alliance itself; we insisted on being admitted to the PfP as quickly as possible, with the vision to move forward to full membership in NATO, only to remember at one point that, alas, we were bombed.

By the end of 2003, we normalised relations with NATO and signed agreements on bilateral cooperation with more than 20 countries. Until mid-2004, about 800 military and civilian personnel from within the defence system were in-cluded in various training programs, courses, seminars, conferences and other activities abroad, while over 200 officers acquired knowledge of foreign lan-


guages (English, German, French, Italian, Greek) in accordance with NATO standards. The costs, amounting to over €2 million, were borne in most part by NATO member states, as well as some other countries, including Switzerland.

Intensive cooperation in all fields resulted in Serbia’s accession to the PfP

without mentioning Mladić as a precondition, which previously had been an insurmountable obstacle. It is interesting to note that those individuals who are currently most opposed to normalisation of relations with NATO, were during the period from 2001 to 2007 in leadership positions in the FRY, i.e. Serbia.

How consistent is it if any talk about NATO is rejected by the argument that NATO bombed us, yet when it comes to membership in PfP or in the EU, which both gather those very same countries, we do not seem to mind? Of course, one can not simply forget the past and facts, however, constant insistence on this, combined with the misuse of that argument for political campaigns, is useless and leads nowhere. It would be wiser to look towards the pragmatism of other countries, including Serbia itself; already in 1951, we normalised relations with Germany – a country which was in 1945 levelled to the ground by the U.S. and British air forces – and which already in 1955 became a member of NATO, the Alliance in which the U.S. and UK were the leading powers. Has the joint resolution of crisis in southern Serbia in 2001 not been the best example of successful cooperation between Serbia and NATO in conflict prevention in Presevo Valley? Or in March 2004, when NATO stopped the pogrom and violence against Serbs in Kosovo?

It is exactly these experiences that should provide the best evidence of the positive aspects of NATO membership, because if Serbia had at the time been a member of the PfP and NATO, the bombing would not have happened. In-stead, we would have been in a position to exclude this possibility as a pressure factor in the negotiations. This is exactly what one should have in mind when thinking about the future. It is better to sit at the negotiating table than to be served on the menu, it is better to be someone who is talking than someone who is being talked about; in a word, it is always better to be a subject rather than object. Obviously there have been some changes on our side, as now we are angry at them for “creating a NATO state” in Kosovo, and now we cannot forget nor forgive the bombing, although we had already forgiven, and even withdrawn our complaint against NATO countries.


In fact, it was during unsuccessful rounds of negotiations on Kosovo in 2007 that the era of increasingly vocal confrontation with NATO and the EU began. Some political parties, politicians, public figures and the media have once again started pointing out that NATO bombed Serbia; we have a media revival of memories from 1999, with an emphasis that “NATO is snatching Kosovo away, having occupied the part of our sover-eign territory, NATO is now implementing the Ahtisaari plan and creating a NATO state on our territory”. At the same time, Euro-Atlantic integra-tion is increasingly becoming an unwelcome concept, that is occasionally even deleted from earlier documents. All of this has been used as an ex-cuse against membership in NATO, while it actually reflects our relation towards the EU.

Somewhat more convincing is the explanation that from 2000-onwards, Serbia was indeed involved in a political process of integration to NATO but that, after recognition of Kosovo’s independence by a number of NATO mem-bers that were ultimately engaged in the formation of the Kosovo Security Force, a new political reality emerged. Given that not all NATO member states recognized the independence of Kosovo, the question that arises is why is it that we do not see as problematic Serbia’s membership in the EU, given that all but five of its members have recognised Kosovo’s independence?

That this is nothing more than intra-party political sophistry – one that leads people into a kind of trilemma – is illustrated by the fact that Serbia moved from its original commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration to a declara-tion on military neutrality adopted by the National Assembly, without a single mentioning of neutrality in the National Security Strategy. Such inter-party squabbling does nothing but mislead the people.

In November 2004, the “Defence Strategy of Serbia and Montenegro” was adopted, whereby one of the main objectives was membership in the Partner-ship for Peace and NATO. In the “Strategic Defence Review”, which was adopt-ed on 7th June 2006 at the collegium of the Minister of Defence, the following was stated: “Vital security and defence interests are: defence of the Republic of Serbia, cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration, accession to the EU and other international organizations and institutions, building of trust, security and stability in the region and the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo and Metohija.”


“The basis of the defence policy of the Republic of Serbia is made of its Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation, and commitment to actively participate in the process of cooperation and joint activities with other countries and subjects of international relations, in building of global, re-gional, and national security” and “developing and promoting partnerships with the system of collective security, and with neighbouring and other countries”.

The declaration of the National Assembly of 26th December 2007, stated that, “due to the overall role of NATO, starting from the illegal bombardment of Serbia in 1999 without authorisation of the Security Council to Annex 11 of Ahtisaari’s rejected plan, which stipulates that NATO should be the final au-thority in independent Kosovo, the National Assembly has decided to declare the neutrality of the Republic of Serbia in relation to all present military alli-ances, unless it is decided differently in a referendum.”

Then, the “National Security Strategy”, adopted in late-2009, does not men-

tion neutrality but rather says that the “defence policy affirms the system of cooperative security, integration into European and other international secu-rity structures and participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace”, as well as “achieving interoperability with defence systems of these countries“, and that it will “build the capacities and capabilities of the national security system in ac-cordance with standards and obligations deriving from the European Security and Defence Policy.”

Relations between Serbia and NATO have gone through several phases, starting with mutual recognition, confrontation and hostility, through dia-logue and normalisation of relations, to cooperation. These relations are cur-rently rather ambivalent, because as a member of the PfP, Serbia is officially seeking to promote cooperation to the degree of obtaining candidate status whilst, on the other hand, there is an intensive anti-NATO campaign based on a perception of NATO framed in a Cold War mind-set. This campaign, of course, revives the media-warmed pique due to the bombing of Serb positions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and aggression against Serbia in 1999. It is insisted that it is because of that “people have a psychological barrier and aversion to-wards membership in NATO”, although at one point in time that was not the case, even though the memory was much fresher.


NATO as an option is not necessarily a destiny, but it is Serbia’s reality. NATO is an environment which significantly affects its overall security, po-litical and international position, notwithstanding the absence of Serbia when these issues are being discussed. A responsible approach towards the future implies a response to the key question of whether, and in which way, our secu-rity would be more firmly guaranteed, at what economic and possibly political price, and what are the advantages and possible negative consequences of each option, including partnership with NATO, as well as membership in the Alli-ance? In that sense, it is possible to already respond to few dilemmas.

• By Serbia’s membership in the Alliance, its security would immediately increase by the very elimination of hostility with NATO, and particu-larly because Serbia would become a part of a collective defence system, i.e. of a powerful political and security partner organization, and equal partner to other members and our neighbours.

• Decisions made at NATO influence the global, European and regional security, as well as the security of Serbia, regardless of whether Serbia is a member of the Alliance or not. However, if Serbia were a member, NATO would not be able to make decisions that, directly or indirectly, could have negative consequences for Serbia’s security, since all deci-sions are made unanimously.

• By joining the Alliance, Serbia’s international position would be strengthened because the leverage of its foreign and security policy would be stronger, and it would also be more attractive for foreign in-vestment, which would enable faster economic development.

• Opening up opportunities not only for modernization and conversion of the military industry, but also for manufacturing and the sale of con-sumer goods in a market that includes over 900 million people, and whose major consumer is the military. Modernization and equipping of one’s own armed forces is economically more tolerable than neutrality, which is far more expensive and provides less security.

• Should Serbia remain outside NATO, all benefits thus stated will be lost, since Serbia would be surrounded by members of the Alliance, and it would be in an inferior position in every aspect, because funds for maintaining Serbia’s security would be far more limited than the funds Serbia would otherwise have as the part of the Al-liance.


• Given that Kosovo is always used as an emotional excuse, one must ask in which way will Serbia be safer and how it will be easier to resolve the Kosovo issue, or to “defend and restore the full sovereignty of Serbia” more effectively, if our relations with our environment are tense, rather than normal and friendly, due to our position of neutrality. In fact, it is necessary to ask how detrimental it is to prove our commitment to neutrality by hostility to NATO, while at the same time both KFOR and EULEX are deployed in Kosovo.

• Fear that Russia would become Serbia’s enemy is unfounded, because Rus-sia is not in hostile relations with NATO, nor with its individual member states. The most recent warming of relations between Russia and NATO will also influence a more positive perception of NATO in this country.

• Claims that Serbia’s membership in NATO could harm the strategic interests of Russia, thereby bringing into question Russia’s political (Kosovo and Metohija) and economic (energy supplies) support, are also unsubstantiated. It is questionable whether Russia considers Ser-bia as strategically important. Russia supplies energy to NATO member states and, as it concerns Kosovo, this issue will certainly be resolved through Russian support for dialogue.

• It is already out of place to ask whether by joining NATO Serbia would indirectly recognize the legitimacy of the military intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999, and of all decisions on Kosovo’s final status that are in conflict with its interests.

• A danger that Serbia would be exposed to greater risks and new trans-national and asymmetric threats, such as international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, is also another excuse. Dangers exist regard-less, and Serbia has no aspirations to send its intervention contingents anywhere within NATO missions. As things stand at the moment, it seems that NATO is no longer going to do the same in the same form, as it is clear to everyone that peace cannot be made by war, but rather by its prevention.

Although it is obvious that NATO is the most reliable concept, while neutrality is only a fiction and political platitude, it still does not mean that Serbia should rush into NATO and that constructive discussion should be obstructed, but rather that every option should be thoroughly reviewed and that nothing should be rejected in advance, nor forced.


Rejection of NATO by referring to patriotism is nothing more than a mask of resistance to the European path of Serbia’s modernization. On the other hand, uncritical efforts regarding Serbia’s accession to NATO by some NGOs, which at the same time unconditionally justify the bombing of Yugoslavia, ac-tually serve as the best anti-NATO campaign.

Along with opening a dialogue with Kosovo and unblocking the process of EU accession, it seems that conditions for a dispassionate, serious and well-argued debate on Serbia’s relations with NATO are finally created. If we were in NATO, the format of negotiations over Kosovo would probably be quite different. Had we, from the early 1990s been in NATO, what happened to us probably would not have ever happened; if we joined NATO then, there would have been no reason for NATO to intervene here in such a brutal way.

Patriotism is not proved by a sheer repetition of how NATO bombed us, but rather by finding a framework and concept which will guarantee Serbia and its citizens the safest and most secure life, even if it that means an alli-ance with NATO. In addition, NATO-Russia relations and the trend of their development does not prevent us from choosing NATO as an option; quite the opposite. Moreover, if we support all our neighbours in their pursuit for membership in NATO, as our president stated during his visit to Montenegro, why wouldn’t we support ourselves in the same way? If Serbia’s interest stands above everything else, that should be the criterion for choosing the best con-cept which would ensure the realization of these interests.


New NATO and New Serbia: What to do with neutrality?

Dr Mihajlo Basara294

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, it became clear that Ser-bia lacks the critical mass necessary for reforms. The great hopes aroused by the October 5th proved to be only a temporary compromise on the upheaval which melted in ideological regression and inexhaustible party squabbling for power. To make Serbia’s path even more difficult to pursue, these internal negative ten-dencies were accompanied by NATO’s support to an independent Kosovo, which has additionally strengthened the anti-NATO mood in Serbia, and made Serbia’s road towards the EU more challenging. By pushing for Kosovo’s independence, a number of security risks in the region with national, ethnic and religious roots have increased, whilst Serbian reaction through the Resolution on neutrality re-flects more its weakness, rather than a rationally grounded strategic decision. Despite these negative trends, some hope can be gained from the fact that Serbia’s European orientation has, in the same period, become irreversible. It also sug-gests that the political elites and parties understand that both security and devel-opment strategies has always come in the same package. Therefore, the only rea-sonable option would be a single security umbrella with neighbouring and other countries with whom Serbia has the most extensive level of economic exchange and, with whom it shares common values.

294 Autor is a retired Colonel


Two negative evolutions

Since 5th October 2000 – when the hopes of Serbia’s citizens for the pos-sibility of change and a more prosperous future were awakened – until to-day, the world has changed, our regional environment has changed, and so has Serbia. Following a deep economic crisis whose seeds were planted in the centre of the modern democratic world, democracy – as an exemplary social and state model – has lost its former reputation. The region has not become more secure in the post-war period, while security threats and risks became even more numerous and serious. Solutions which brought wars to an end (such as the, Dayton Peace Agreement and the Kumanovo Agree-ment), did not bring complete pacification to the Serbian side (nor to other sides), neither did post-war mobility and a reorientation towards peace-time reconstruction. The self-proclaimed declaration of independence of Kosovo is a “new” issue for Serbia, which has stifled its progress and accession to European democracies. Finally, Serbia does not have a consensus on a single strategically important issue for its development, with questions of national and state reaffirmation remaining open. These developments are actually a negative evolution of the process which started on October 5th with great hopes and expectations.

Since 2000, NATO also underwent a negative evolution, bearing in mind 9/11 and actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.295 Attempts at transforming it-self from a military to a political organisation (and the other way around, even branding itself as a political-military organisation), when required, did not bear fruit. Its clumsiness in dealing with complex civilian-military tasks has annoyed politicians, and its military impotence, despite its technologi-cal superiority, has annoyed politicians, military and the military industry alike. The number of civilians and soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of NATO and coalition troops who died in combat, the invis-ible results in the quest for international terrorist networks, and humiliation due to the inhumane treatment of prisoners, have all been sufficient for citi-zens of western countries (who were previously well-prepared through their state propaganda to support all these actions, as well as NATO’s bombing of Serbia) to – following the triumph felt after their victory in the Cold War – more seriously question NATO’s functionality. Experts asked the very same

295 See Transatlantic Trends Key findings 2010; (2010_English_Key.pdf); p.15 and 16.


question immediately after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, however, that is never sufficient to prompt anything more than a pensive looks on the face of politicians.

A look at NATO from Serbia, like all other aspects of globalisation and tran-sitional reforms, suffers from multiple and often irreconcilable perspectives and interpretations. The most prominent interpretations have identified the so-called “two Serbias”. The “First” Serbia defeated NATO in an unjust war which broke out without any responsibility on the part of Serbia, whilst the “other” Serbia finds that the entire responsibility for the bombardment of Ser-bia lies with Serbian politics, which was, just as well, also fully responsible for the collapse of Yugoslavia and its war-time break-up. Their arguments are charged with a quantity of emotions that is rather inappropriate for this sphere of politics and political means, and particularly for pursuing an analytical ap-proach.

According to this division, the “two Serbias” look alike; each creating self-justifying coherent doctrines (the real and ideological inheritance of socialism) about Serbia’s history and future. In the view of the former, Serbs are eternal heroes, whose patriotism has never been disputed (although the very collapse of Yugoslavia demonstrated the opposite), whilst the latter have a “theory” on the indisputable guilt of Serbs for the war and their permanent inability to modernise. Holders of these ideologies, understandably, seek a (rational) gain for their political positions. Politically and existentially, they are quite well-off, and as social psychology teaches us, emotions are easy to arouse amongst the masses, but very difficult to quench. Given that Serbia is both a post-war and defeated society, political processes are just as charged with emotional content as was the case at the beginning of the dissolution of the self-managed Yugo-slavia.

By taking advantage of popular feelings, political parties continue, as they did back then, to secure power with their populist (usually extreme and irra-tional) approach, at the expense of national political interests and rationale. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, it became clear that Serbia did not possess the critical mass necessary to conduct reforms. October 5th was noth-ing but an anti-Milošević coup, which was exactly the worst possible result of Serbia’s attempt to undertake reform. The scope and fate of post-October


Serbia, as Hannah Arendt pointed out in relation to the fate of revolutions,296 was determined by the very regime which was brought down by the “revolu-tionaries” of October 5th. After NATO imposed peace, Serbia – as was only to be expected – continued the war with itself. Not a single day passed between 5th and 6th October 2000, and the new elite which assumed power (and which was believed by a large number of citizens to be a new democratically-oriented force) reverted back to old ideologies. Minor attempts to respond to promises and new responsibilities (for example, to the Hague Tribunal) resulted in the assassination of the leading reformer, Zoran Đinđić.

This internal conflict, apart from differing interpretations of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Serbian path to integration into modern economic and political currents, also acquired new themes. A number of taboos from the time of communism were now reopened, whilst history was re-valued and revised; not, however, as a consensus on the need for its re-evaluation, but rather as a new schism. As the elites persevered uncompromisingly in this black and white Serbia, and day-to-day life continued with its usual pace, interpretations of the elite remained static and no longer correspond-ed to reality. To make everything even more difficult, these negative internal tendencies have been accompanied by NATO’s support to an independent Kosovo (Declaration of Independence, announced in December 2007, of-ficially declared on 17th February 2008), which reinforced anti-NATO senti-ment in Serbia and ultimately determined the reform path of Serbia towards the EU.

It was only the split within the Serb Radical Party on its pro-European wing (publicly declared after Nikolić’s statement in September 2008 that the Radi-cals were going to vote in the Serbian National Assembly297 for the adoption of Stabilisation and Accession Agreement with the EU298), and the remaining part of the SRS, which threw light on some estimates from within the party that the electorate was actually more ready for reform (i.e. more rational) than the political elites themselves. A large anti-European glacier cracked and got caught in the rapids now moving quickly towards the EU, thus resuscitating the hope of October 5th.

296 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, „Filip Višnjić“, Belgrade 1991, p. 136297 See: http://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narodna_skup%C5%A1tina_Republike_Srbije 298 See: http://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sporazum_o_stabilizaciji_i_pridru%C5%BEivanju


Contribution of NATO to anti-NATO sentiment amongst Serbian citizens

Regional security has been undermined by the unilateral declaration of in-dependence of Kosovo, declared under the auspices of the U.S. and EU. That is the main reason why at present Serbia cannot mobilise public support for accession to NATO. It is not even about persuading the opposition about that idea or redirecting inherited sentiments, but it rather comes down to expect-ing Serbia to move closer to a military alliance which was the source of aggres-sion and which supported its territorial fragmentation. But who insisted on the speedy recognition of Kosovo, why was the policy “standards before status” launched, as if it was not only too obvious that it was unattainable, and even-tually deserted? These questions are even more pertinent since Serbia would have been satisfied with formal sovereignty and an open path to the EU, whilst for Kosovo itself this would have been a quicker and less demanding ways towards achieving the same objective. In those circumstances where the ben-efits of EU membership would become more conspicuous, a new referendum on Kosovo’s independence would likely be more acceptable for Serbia. At the same time, a presumption that should the Balkans be left to itself, without the supervision of either NATO or the EU, the likelihood of renewal of war politics of the Balkan countries would be realistic and predictable. By supporting an independent Kosovo, this assumption gained even more substance.

Let’s look at the most frequently cited reasons for supporting an indepen-dent Kosovo:

• military establishment in Kosovo (including Camp Bondstill), which guarantees protection of U.S. interests in the Balkans;

• change the geopolitical balance in the Balkans by strengthening Al-banian statehood and believing that such a change would counteract Serbian-Russian domination;

• economic interests in material and human resources (coal mines and cheap labour);

• huge recruitment potential for military interventions around the world; • control of future oil and gas routes from the Caucasus region and the

Middle East; • protection of human rights of Albanians who were not able to continue

co-habitation with Serbs in Serbia; • NATO’s credibility.


Whichever of these claims – or all of them together – were close to the truth, support to the unilateral declaration of independence leaves a number of se-curity issues unresolved and creates additional new ones. During Milošević’s time, the importance of Serbia’s geopolitical position and its geopolitical role were customarily exaggerated. Explanations for the decisions of the West were reduced to condemnation of the imperialistic behaviour by the victorious side in the Cold War and their forays towards the East. It was believed that Ser-bia, with its geopolitical position, ethnic borders and uniting objectives, was the main obstacle; therefore, the fragmentation of Serbian territory, and the creation of small states with mutual tensions, was the best way to control this geopolitical area. Support to the independence of Kosovo adds even more ma-terial to the proponents of such a thesis.

By pushing for the independence of Kosovo, a number of security risks in the region – rooted in state, ethnic and religious reasons – have increased. Serbia’s neighbours were forced to decide against their own security inter-ests in the region. Under the tip of the ice-berg, a number of already open or latent Albanian-Serbian, Albanian-Macedonian, Albanian-Montenegrin, Albanian-Greek, Serbian-Macedonian, Serbian-Croatian, Serbian-Montene-grin, Serbian-Bosniak, Greek-Macedonian and other security risks have now been set in motion. Looking ahead, it is difficult to expect that demographic growth of the Albanian population can be quickly restrained by the economic and democratic development of the Albanian minority in Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece, respectively, which also implies a slow pace of prog-ress in regional security. This painful inheritance maintains tensions of the trauma previously experienced in relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

The redefinition of borders and the use of forced multiculturalism has been the experience of Serbs, as well as the path to uncertainty, which started with the rejection of co-habitation with Serbia in Yugoslavia (multiculturalism was not even mentioned at the time). In the process, further double standards were simply impossible to avoid given the ethnic variety of all the new states. Whilst the untenability of a multicultural Yugoslavia was supported, a multicultural Bosnia and Herzegovina has been insisted upon; a multicultural Serbia has been shunned, yet a multicultural Kosovo was supported.


All these threats are accompanied with „modern“ threats which make the lives of people in Serbia, as well as in other countries in this part of the world, quite miserable. What I have in mind are terrorism, organised crime, environ-mental threats, uncontrolled use and proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, industrial accidents, human and organ trafficking, insti-tutional failures etc. A number of threats has thus been enlarged compared to the situation and process in which Serbia’s territoriality would remain un-scathed.299

What to do with neutrality?

On 26th October 2009, the National Assembly of Serbia adopted the Strategy on National Security, the Strategy on National Defence and legislation on Mili-tary counter-intelligence and security Agency, Laws on military, labour and material duties and civil service, on deployment of the army in multinational operations outside Serbia. The resolution on military neutrality of Serbia of 26 December 2007 was touched upon many times during the debate, however, the term “neutrality” was not specifically used in one single sentence in the Strategy of National Security nor in any other act thus adopted. Opposition parties voiced their discontent at the very session, by saying that the governing majority has been trying to bring the country into NATO, by doing „what they are told to do“ by the EU and NATO.

299 “For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event” (UNDP 1994, p. 22). Common issues that spark concerns, including in Serbia, are the security of employment, incomes and health care, and a healthy and safe environment. (UNDP 1994, p. 22). The UN has identified six clusters of thre-ats that the world needs to be concerned about now and in the decades ahead (United Nations 2004): economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; inter-state conflict; internal conflict, including civil wars; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. According to a 2005 survey, although Serbians do not perceive organized crime as a threat to personal security, they see it as a threat to their society as a whole. About 74% of the respondents said that Serbia cannot become prosperous without staunching organized crime and corruption (SMMRI 2005). Combating organized crime will depend on concerted regional cooperation, since organized crime groups, just like powerful multinational companies, take full advantage of economic libe-ralization and the progressive opening of many frontiers. The adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, a global instrument to fight organized crime, is a histo-ric step forward in the fight against this threat.“ Taken from the Report on Human Development in Serbia 2008., p.156. (Serbia_NHDR-2008-Src.pdf)


In the National Security Strategy, the section entitled „Basic orientation of national security policy“, second paragraph, stipulates that the „Republic of Serbia is committed to respecting international law, strengthening the role of the United Nations, OSCE and EU (NATO is not listed among these organisa-tions, as is the case with, for instance, the National Security Strategy of Mon-tenegro) and to create mechanisms for maintaining security in the world, with equal respect for the interests of all countries, nations and ethnic groups. Ac-cordingly, it does not consider, in advance, any state or alliance hostile.“ In the same section, it is also stated that the Republic of Serbia is determined never to recognise the decision of the provisional institutions of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija on the unilateral declaration of indepen-dence; that it will largely harmonise its foreign and security policy with the positions and activities of the EU; it will build the capacities and capabilities of the national security system, in accordance with the standards and obligations deriving from the European security and defence policy; that its accession to the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme confirms its contribution to the common democratic values and strengthening of regional security and „emphasises its belief “ that the active and meaningful cooperation of all coun-tries of the Western Balkans with NATO and Partnership for Peace member countries is the road to permanent stabilization and prosperity of this region.

Further on, acceleration of the process of European integrations was defined as one of the strategic priorities of Serbia’s foreign policy. It is important to ob-serve that the historically close and extensive links and strategic partnership with the Russian Federation in the domain of energy are put in the same con-text, followed by an emphasis on the importance of restoring the tradition of good relations with the United States, continuation of the deepening of close ties with China, India and Brazil, as well as with the Non-Aligned Movement member states. Finally, in the section „Defence Policy“, it is decisively stated that „Defence policy promotes the concept of cooperative security“. Serbia, with its defence policy, will contribute to upholding protection of its national inter-ests, as well as to the preservation of peace, „with the improvement of relations with the related institutions of the collective security system and the neighbour-ing and other countries“. The term neutrality was not mentioned, yet the term seems to be quite well-developed, at least in the National Security Strategy. The former government influenced adoption of the Resolution on neutrality, which was politically implemented and exploited by the current Government.


As far as it is known, the idea of neutrality originated from the Democratic Party of Serbia, which adopted the Declaration on military neutrality of Serbia on 18th October 2007.300 Two months later, the National Assembly of the Re-public of Serbia adopted the Resolution on the Protection of Sovereignty, Ter-ritorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia, which de-clares that „Serbia will remain neutral to all present military alliances unless it was decided differently in a referendum“. In mid-February 2008, Kosovo simply declared independence. The public, divided as ever, relied on black and white interpretations – was it a realistic concept or a relict of non-aligned sentiments and its abuse by the most vociferous critics of the communist heritage?; has it only had instrumental value (the Resolution was adopted two months prior to the self-declaration of independence)?; neutrality refers to the ambivalence of values; what are the similarities and the differences in comparison to other neutral countries in Europe?; between which options of neutrality is Serbian neutrality?; who will respect Serbian neutrality without international agree-ment?; how are we to exert any influence regarding the Kosovo issue whilst surrounded by NATO member states?; can Serbia become member of the EU without prior membership in NATO (which was the path of all transitional countries that are NATO members today)?; neutrality is not economically vi-able, as it will discourage foreign investment301?; security sector reform will stagnate or will be completely terminated; it will not be possible to continue with standardisation and professionalisation of the Army, and so on.

These are all legitimate questions, however, there are many more questions which have remained insufficiently dealt with or which were entirely ignored. For instance, from the point of ideological orientation, how is it possible that a right-leaning party from Serbia (not only one, though the DSS was the chief initiator), in today’s Europe which is predominantly governed by political par-ties of the right, is rejecting NATO?; what does the neutrality of Serbia mean in the context of Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with Russia supporting Serbia’s case by saying that Kosovo and Metohija should remain an integral part of Serbia (with consequences reaching to the „small Yugoslavia“

300 See: http://www.dss.org.rs/ 301 In the publication of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, entitled „Business and

Security“ (Belgrade, 2009), the text of T. Karaulac „Country risk, foreign direct investments and NATO“ shows that it is difficult to claim that the very membership in NATO has positive corre-lation with foreign direct investment, particularly in those countries that conducted all reforms and acquired both EU and NATO membership at the same time.


and the Republika Srpska)?; what is the European concept of security and will the EU be able at all to convey it?; what is the purpose of Serbia’s non-govern-mental sector?, etc. Following the adoption of the Resolution, some of these issues were under discussion at the divided Assembly and amongst the public, also divided, and some of them can be responded to by a thorough reading of the Resolution itself.

The Resolution was adopted as a political reaction to hints of the self-decla-ration of Kosovo’s independence. Serbia is aware that military responses were finalised in 1999, although it is a legitimate right of any country to use it, should the territorial integrity of that country be jeopardised. With that Resolution, Serbia proclaimed its neutrality to all present military alliances, by which it declared that temporarily („unless it was decided differently in a referendum“) it did not want to join NATO.302 Such a formulation demonstrates that its very initiators and adopters do not believe that this will be a permanent, solid and self-understandable decision. The Resolution mostly emanates weakness and the lack of rationally-grounded strategic orientation. The real dilemma and problem of Serbia since 1991 has been to overcome its conflicting heritage and irrational decisions. That heritage was always in the essence of every new deci-sion or new stumbling block.303 In that sense, the Resolution is only the out-come of a series of events, where the most prominent irrational choice was the decision to start a war with NATO, after which all political successors had to struggle with its consequences. As a sequence of these facts, February 2008 did not bring anything unusual. Serbia had a very limited choice, and perhaps it is not wrong to say that it did not have any choice at all. Serbia refused to accept an independent Kosovo, it is still fighting for diplomatic and legal solutions, whilst at the same time it has continued political cooperation with all mem-bers of NATO and other countries around the world, especially those which

302 Although all parallels with neutral European countries are made at the expense of Ser-bian neutrality, one could say that neutrality itself is a product of a security situation (post-conflict, potential conflict, like in other cases) in which Serbia found itself, understandably, not without its own contribution.

303 After the fall of Berlin Wall, support of Serbia to a self-managed community of Yugoslav peoples shows that even communism is better than the national break-up, especially the one of self-managed states, which is why Serbian national corp cared more about Yugoslavia than the others. The idea to, despite the powerful victors of the Cold War, create new Serbian borders with military means, was irrational. After this decision, which can be “justified” by the surge of history into contemporary politics, all subsequent decisions were mostly the act and sin of political elites, with very little of irrational, and a lot of selfish interest.


supported its territorial integrity. There was no discussion about withdrawal from the Partnership for Peace (PfP) – which is a mechanism of NATO – with an emphasis that, for now, PfP remains an adequate level of cooperation with NATO.

It should also be mentioned that relations between the former adversaries in the Cold War have not remained without traces of heritage, whereby it is difficult to discern interests from the shadows of irrational reasoning. Whether Eastern Europe is still under protection or whether it needs to be protected?; whether its citizens feel threatened by Russia or is this threat deliberately in-duced from the political sphere?; does Russia possess and does it demonstrate its sufficiently changed profile and pro-democratic face which could help her to eliminate the fear and reminiscence of old threats amongst its western neigh-bours?; whether it is wise to equate Nazism and communism in order to attain „reconciliation“ of values? On the other hand, at the end of the Cold War it was agreed that NATO was not going to expand eastwards. Russia also need more reassurance. Halting NATO’s further expansion towards the East could be a test of confidence which would primarily be welcomed by Russia, i.e. this would im-prove relations between Europe and Russia. That would be the real termination of the Cold War, since this heritage is burdensome for all actors. What is not often seen by the public in Serbia is that both Serbian and European – or should we say, the Western side – still have inherited presumptions which, in combina-tion with their respective interests, reflect misunderstanding and mistrust.

What ensues from these remarks is the question whether military neutral-ity is realistic and viable, an option or fiction? Does it accelerate or slow down the democratisation of Serbian society? There is no single decisive answer; but many answers in a conditional „if...then“. Neutrality can be a practical policy, which it is at the moment. Finnish neutrality could serve as a good model. Therefore, should Serbia continue with social reforms with the ultimate objec-tive of EU membership, at the same time demonstrating credible democratic potential, the EU will keep its door open. Serbia is today surrounded by neigh-bouring countries that are either already in NATO or will soon be. In addition, the developmental orientation of transitional countries towards the EU was almost by rule realised through membership in NATO.

Global integration is achieved across national borders and the same goes for Russia, too. Conflict between the former Cold War enemies could potentially


grow and expand, although the logic of mutual interdependence, as well as the transition of Russia towards becoming a democratic society, does not envis-age such a trend. Namely, conflicts between democratically-ordained societies are less likely. Should the conflict grow, the politics of neutrality will also be less possible. Yet it is difficult to believe that the EU would engage in serious security conflicts with Russia because of US interests and the American policy towards Russia. Europe refused to do that even during the Cold War. The EU no longer needs the same kind of protection it had during the Cold War, de-spite some attempts to portray the situation as such and justify the anti-missile shield. Economic realities of the EU and Russia are brought closer by their strategic views, which makes the possibility of a new chasm between them even less likely. The countries of the former Eastern block are slower to notice these changes, given that they suffer from an inherited fear and understand-able vulnerability of their legal states and democratic orders. Serbia is Russia’s traditional friend (though more cultural and political than economic). It does not fear Russian imperialism and possesses the experience of equality with Russia. Therefore, in the context of Serbia’s accession to the EU and its rela-tions with Russia, it will always appear as if Serbia and Russia are much closer to each other than Serbia and the EU countries. Yet, the level of economic exchange is still a more realistic parameter for evaluating relations with both.

In short, should the Cold War-style NATO enlargement cease (the anti-missile shield is a test, according to Lavrov), we can expect a better under-standing of the European security space, where Russia features as one of the European countries. Should the current security issues and security inheri-tance – European and Serbian – prevail, military neutrality will increasingly become a relict. However, should a gap – between Serbia and Europe, or Rus-sia and Europe, for instance – become deeper, military neutrality may become political option.

Security and development strategy come in one package

The question which arises here is one about the speed of Serbia’s accession to Europe in light of its security concept. Serbia lost a lot of time and, finally, an irreversible decision on accession to the EU is an important Rubicon to cross. Whether Serbia has already crossed it by the announcement of the SNS (Serb Progressive Party) that they have become pro-European party (or is that


yet another political game?), we cannot as yet know. Under the pressure of years of conditioning and imprinting of blame, claims that the alternative to EU membership is a relapse into wars, social anarchy, and the threat that or-ganised crime and corruption take over institutions and harness any reform, now fall short. Waves of world economic crisis and an awareness that it was rooted in the greed of financial capital which is smothering a large number of countries – especially those that are small – now make the hardly-attained pro-European majority increasingly reluctant. In this context, military neu-trality (or, more correctly, indecisiveness) has slowed down progress towards membership. The greatest benefit which Serbia could be given by the EU is its understanding of the situation and a clear separation of the accession process from the Serbian policy towards Kosovo and NATO membership. And again, with the hope that the Serbian elite undoubtedly take the country in the direc-tion of Euro-Atlantic integrations.

Why Euro-Atlantic? Principally because one security umbrella with neigh-bours and countries with which the level of economic exchange and economic life is most intensive (60% with the EU) is the only reasonable way to secure stability and development. It is, therefore, very positive that the majority in Serbia acknowledge that without a European orientation, it will not be possible to survive in political life. Security and development strategies always used to come in the same package.

As complicated as the experience of Serbia with the West in the past 20 years might have been, Serbia (and Russia) is still developing the same Europe-an social values.304 Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia states that „the Republic of Serbia is a state of Serbian people and all citizens who live in it, based on the rule of law and social justice, principles of civil democracy, human and minority rights and freedoms, and commitment to European prin-ciples and values“. Article 2 of the new Strategic Concept for Security and De-fence by members of the North-Atlantic Alliance, adopted in November 2010 in Lisbon, stipulates that „NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human

304 „Respect of human dignity, freedom, democracy, rule of law, respect of human and mi-nority rights, pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity, non-discrimination, equality between men and women“ are the values stated in the EU Constitution (later replaced by the Lisbon Treaty). FABUS, Novi Sad, p. 28.


rights and the rule of law“. Article 38 refers to the same: „Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common es-sential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve“.

Without European standards, which serve as the instrument for attaining

those values, such a path is impossible. Isolation is also impossible. Even if some political option opts for it – though it is highly unlikely in Serbia - it would soon be modified or even toppled down. Such deeper logic dictates that the strategy of development of society should be connected with the form of the protection of that strategy,305 which would only enable the country to reduce the space for various Montgomeries and Konuzins, whilst its citizens would become more aware of the value of their own choice.

305 NATO and the EU are covering, i.e. protecting the same values by different means. They would probably be impossible to develop or to protect through the history of the Cold War without NATO. France could withdraw from NATO’s military component, but not from the political one, since it could not abandon its developmental social strategy.


Euroatlanticism and Creation of „Security Community“ in the Balkans

Prof. dr Predrag Simić306

The civil war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s was the first serious crisis in Europe after the Cold War. The crisis in the U.S. and the EU, meanwhile, “has opened the first serious debate on foreign policy and international relations after the Cold War”307 and influenced the evolution of the main institutions of European and Euro-Atlantic security, primarily, the European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).308 While early at-tempts of mediation on the part of the EC/EU in the former Yugoslavia brought only partial results, NATO’s combat operations – the first in the organization’s history – were conducted in 1995 and 1999 right here in the Balkans. Pressure from the EU and NATO terminated the civil war in Yugoslavia, but this area has remained a potential crisis point due to the legacy of war, open ethnic and border disputes, and mutual mistrust between the successor states of the former Yugoslavia.

306 The author is Professor at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Belgrade307 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hedrickson, America and Bosnia, National Interest, Fall

1993, p. 14.308 „Dynamic changes in the Balkans in the nineties also gave the ground for development

in Europe and to the way in which we study international phenomena today”, Emilian Kavalski, Extending the Euroepan Security Community – Constructing the Peace in the Balkans, Extending the Euroepan Security Community – Constructing the Peace in the Balkans, Tauris Academic Studies, London and New York 2007, p. 3.


One consequence of the dissolution of, and war in, the former Yugoslavia was the fragmentation of the region and the creation of new states which have remained burdened by the consequences of war and the disintegration of the former common state. Countries of the region were lagging behind due to the legacy of the Cold War division of the Balkans, which in the last half of the 20th century was divided between NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Non-Aligned movement and self-isolated countries. Hence the Balkans can be referred to more in geographic terms, rather than as a region connected with economic, social, political and other links.309 Even the commitment of all of these coun-tries to join the EU, and most of them to join NATO (except Serbia), does not automatically imply their willingness to restore mutual relations and cre-ate regional institutions. Moreover, the European orientation of the Yugoslav republics in the early 1990s was more driven by a desire to “escape from the Balkans” and connect with the developed part of Europe, whilst emphasising their mutual differences and hostility.

These were some of the reasons why major initiatives towards the renewal of regional cooperation in the Balkans came from without. For the EU and NATO, fragmentation and crises in the region became obstacles to its integra-tion into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Early attempts at restoring regional ties (for instance, the Royaumont Initiative, SECI, etc.) all had lim-ited results. The EU, therefore, after the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, began systematic efforts in this direction within the frame of the so-called regional approach to the Western Balkans.310 These efforts on the part of the EU were given full swing only after NATO’s military intervention against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, when the Stability Pact in South-East Europe was established at the EU summit in Cologne. The common stand taken at European summits in Zagreb (2000) and Thessaloniki (2003) was that all Western Balkan countries could be admitted into the EU if they fulfilled the required conditions. The prospect of membership and the requirement on the part of the EU pertaining to regional cooperation have contributed to the restoration of mutual connections and the relatively rapid development of regional relations, starting from cooperation in the field of infrastructure, the fight against organized crime, the removal of tariff and non-

309 For more details, see: Predrag Simić, Do the Balkans Exists?, in Dimitriou Triantaphilou (ed.), The Southern Balkans, Perspectives from the Region, Chaillot Papers, No. 46, ISS, Paris 2001, pp 17-36.

310 Former Yugoslav republics, except Slovenia (joined the EU in 2004), plus Albania.


tariff barriers. and the development of economic and military cooperation, mainly within the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.

The Western Balkans is now surrounded by the EU and NATO members and is one of the few areas on the political map of Europe not fully incor-porated into European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Despite the cessation of armed conflict, this area is still burdened by a number of problems which make the probability of their integration into the EU (except Croatia) unlike-ly. In addition to the legacy of war and incomplete transition of their economic and political systems, these countries continue to be burdened by ethnic ten-sions, unresolved territorial disputes, migration problems, underdeveloped infrastructure, corruption and organized crime. A particular problem is the areas that are still under international protectorate. The commitment of these countries to EU accession and, in most cases, membership in NATO, opens the possibility of building a new security architecture; not only in the region of the Western Balkans, but the Balkans as a whole. In addition to continuing and deepening the region’s economic integration, the need to create a so-called security community in the Balkans – which would serve as a framework for resolving inter-state disputes and integration into the EU and NATO – is fre-quently emphasized.

Security Communities

The concept of a ‘security community’ was introduced in the late 1950s by the American Professor Karl Deutsch in his book, “Political community and the North Atlantic area”.311 In short, security communities define regions or groups of countries that have voluntarily waived their right to resolve mutual disputes by force and where the likelihood of violence, i.e., a war, is minimal or impossible. According to Karl Deutsch, “a security community” is “a group of people, which has become integrated.” He refers to integration as the “at-tainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.”312

311 Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Or-ganization in the Light of Historical Experience, Greenwood Press Publishers, New York 1957.

312 Ibid, p. 5.


By “sense of community”, Deutsch means “a belief amongst individuals in the group that they attained an agreement on at least one of the issues: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’”.313 Such a change involves resolving social problems through institu-tionalized procedures and without resort to physical force on a large scale. A security community is, therefore, a community where there are, “real assur-ance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. If the whole world was inte-grated into a security community, wars would be automatically excluded”314, concludes the author.

Karl Deutsch in his book identified two types of security communities. The first type are so-called ‘amalgamated communities’, whereby two or more in-dependent units connect into a common and broader unit, within which a certain form of shared power arises. Such examples are the United States and, perhaps also, the former Yugoslavia – which, according to the definition of this author, could be designated as a failed security community, since it disap-peared during the civil war. The second type are so-called ‘pluralistic security communities’, in which smaller units retain legal independence and separate governments. Deutsch identified such a community in North America be-tween the U.S. and Canada. Pluralistic security communities are more com-mon, and as examples of this type we could specify the Euro-Atlantic area, which incorporates NATO, the European Union in Europe, ASEAN in Asia and Mercosur in South America.

Although the theory of Karl Deutsch emerged in the late 1950s, it gained its full influence only after the Cold War, when his ideas were further de-veloped by social constructivists, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, in their book “Security Communities”.315 According to Adler and Barnett’s view, security communities, as well as all other types of human commu-nities, are distinguished by three characteristics. First, community mem-bers share a common identity, values and meanings. Second, community members have many-sided and direct relations. Third, communities ex-hibit some kind of long-term interest of the community members or even

313 Ibid314 Ibid315 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge University

Press, Cambridge 1998.


altruism: “long-term interest arises from the knowledge of the other with whom you interact while altruism may be interpreted as a sense of obliga-tion and responsibility.”316

Adler and Barnett state that security communities should be built gradu-ally: an emerging community corresponds with the basic needs of peace-ful change, while a mature security community is characterized by the col-lective security mechanisms, as well as by supranational and transnational elements. In contrast to Deutsch, Adler and Barnett distinguish between tightly- and loosely-integrated communities. Following in the footsteps of these ideas, some other authors talk about ‘inter-state security communities’ (between which a war is not possible) and ‘comprehensive security commu-nities’ (in which even civil war is not possible). Communication and transac-tions between countries lead to what Emanuel Adler calls the »socialization« and building of a new common identity, on which the solidarity of members of the security community rests. According to Adler, this means that “na-tional politicians must accept new meanings and interpretations of reality, as they are created in intellectual, bureaucratic and political circles, due to which they must change their interests, abilities and/or willingness to con-sider new courses of action.”317

The role of international organizations in the Balkans

In the theory of social constructivism, “socialization” is one of the most important ideas through which individual actors create identities and ideas that govern their behaviour. This idea, meanwhile, has also been accepted by the constructivist theory of international relations318, which perceives interna-tional institutions as social institutions around which the identities, ideas and expectations of their members are built. According to American authors, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, socialization in international relations usu-ally occurs after wars and other major crises, in conditions of great social and

316 Ibid, p. 31.317 Emanuel Adler, Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International

Relations and Their Progress, in Adler and Crawford, eds., Progress in Postwar International Re-lations, p. 52.

318 See, for example: Nicholas G. Onuf, Constructivism: A User’s Manual, in: V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf, and P. Kowert (Eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY 1998, pp. 58-78.


political turmoil and when the domestic institutions are more willing to accept external influence.319 An example of this is post-war Europe, which accepted the Marshall Plan, creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and of the idea of early European communities, even though its previous lega-cy pointed to a different direction. As a result of the process of “socialization”, modern Europe emerged, gathered around the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance.

Even though, according to constructivist views, international organiza-tions and institutions arise as a result of this process, they may also be its drivers. Many Anglo-Saxon authors today see confirmation of this in changes that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War, where these changes were driven by the EU, NATO or the OSCE.320 Following this log-ic, some authors believe that the EU and NATO could play a similar role in the creation of a security community in the Balkans.321 According to such a view, the following three assumptions are required. First, that would imply the creation of preconditions, i.e., factors that can incite regional actors to start approaching each other through technological advances, demographic, eco-nomic and environmental changes, an external threat and changed notions of “social reality”. Second, structural and procedural factors that lead to develop-ment of the security community are important, such as factors of power and knowledge. Power factors can also be external (in this particular case, the EU and NATO) and internal (in the form of new political elites).

Knowledge relates to new ideas, such as liberal democracy, civil society, the rule of law, and human rights, which all encourage the development of mutual trust and a sense of community amongst regional actors. They are expected to intensify various forms of mutual communication and exchange, starting from economic to social, security and political. The third assumption is a con-

319 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, Inter-national Organization, Vol. 44/1990, pp. 283-315.

320 However, in debates on the role of international institutions, the realists dispute their importance in triggering those changes in countries which reduce the risk of the use of armed force. See, for example: John J. Mersheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions; Inter-national Security, Winter 1994/95, pp. 5-49.

321 For example: E. Kavalski, Suzette Grillot et al., Developing Securty Community in the Western Balkans: The Role of EU and NATO, Paper prepared for the EUSA Tenth Biennial In-ternational Conference May 17-19, 2007, Montréal, QC, Canada, Srđan Vučetić, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution, Southeast European Politics, October 2001, pp. 109-134.


tinual action on the part of international factors in the direction of creating a security community. By “promoting the development of a shared definition of security, proper domestic and international action, and regional boundaries, social learning encourages political actors to see each other as trustworthy. Also it leads people to identify with those who were once on the other side of cognitive divides.”322

Seen from a constructivist perspective, the contemporary Balkans seeming-ly fits into this model: the region has gone through a decade of violent conflict in which the former joint state disappeared, whilst successor states and their societies are burdened with post-conflict trauma, their economies fragmented and the political elites mutually opposed. However, certain assumptions for the process of reconciliation and the creation of a security community in the region exist: it is emphasised that NATO’s two military interventions (1995 and 1999) terminated armed conflicts, that the political scene was abandoned by the main protagonists of these conflicts, and that all of these societies have undergone the process of transition by following, to a lesser or greater extent, the same principles and values of liberal capitalism.

In addition to Slovenia – which was the only former Yugoslav republic to become a member of both the EU and NATO – Croatia and Albania became NATO members in 2009, whilst Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Her-zegovina have been included in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). To some extent, the only exception is Serbia, which declared neutrality; although it is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, an associate member of NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly and is very active in military co-operation with its neighbours. All Western Balkan countries have concluded Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the EU and some have started talks on future membership. The most advanced is Croatia, which is currently finalizing accession negotiations with the Union.

In the mid-1990s – after the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Her-zegovina (BiH) was signed – the EU adopted a policy towards the Balkans which was a part of its broader policy towards Central and Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unlike the first and second generation

322 Adler and Barnett, A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, in: Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, p. 45.


of “Europe Agreements”, stabilisation has been set as a precondition for these countries in order to join the EU. The policy of “stabilization and association” has two main instruments: a regional approach and a policy of conditional-ity. The regional approach to the so-called countries of the Western Balkans aims to build a regional economic and security community, whilst condition-ing means that these countries now have the opportunity to become members of the leading western institutions, i.e., the EU and NATO. The condition for that is a process of “socialization”, which would make them more compatible with the values, goals and practices underlying the European and Euro-At-lantic community. The view that the improvement of relations and regional cooperation in the Western Balkans is a precondition for successful integra-tion of these countries into the EU has become the official policy of the EU in relations with all of them: “Regional cooperation is also a specific requirement under the stabilisation and association agreements, which are already in place with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Croatia.....Regional co-operation is therefore a cornerstone of the EU’s policy framework for the west-ern Balkans.”323

For its part, NATO’s policy in the region has relied on its peacekeeping mis-sions, two of which are completed (in BiH and Macedonia), whilst the mis-sion in Kosovo (KFOR) has been prolonged; on receiving new countries as members and through activities within the PfP programme. On the basis of this, the Adriatic Charter was signed in 2005, which enabled the creation of the Adriatic Group, gathering Croatia, Albania and Macedonia as a sort of re-gional alliance within NATO. This policy has, after 2000, brought some results: the number of regional initiatives, organizations and projects has increased, economic and political relations between the Western Balkans countries have clearly improved (especially between the three formerly leading Yugoslav re-publics: Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia) and many barriers to the free circulation of people and goods in the region have been removed.

It should, however, be noted that the development of regional cooperation is a result of relations of each country with the European Union and NATO, respectively. Moreover, even some serious territorial disputes that have threat-ened to undermine the newly-created balance in the region (for example, the

323 See: The Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans: A Policy Priority for the Euro-pean Union, European Commission, Brussels 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/nf5703249enc_web_en.pdf.


Piran Bay dispute between Slovenia and Croatia) were resolved by direct dip-lomatic intervention of the leading members of NATO and the EU. Probably the greatest progress in building a security community in the Western Balkans was noted between Serbia and Croatia over the past few years. In a series of highly symbolic manifestations of reconciliation and regional cooperation, the presidents of both countries indicated the possibility of creating a regional community in this area which would be compatible with the EU and NATO. However, the progress in relations between Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia has not been followed with adequate progress in Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina and some other areas of the Western Balkans, where the situation remains un-changed or has even deteriorated.

During the last decade, a significant change in the form of NATO’s presence and its role in the Western Balkans occurred. After military interventions in 1995 and 1999, NATO assumed peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herze-govina (IFOR, subsequently SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR). The peacekeeping mission in BiH was an undoubted success, given that ever since the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed and NATO forces deployed, there was no single armed conflict or casualty of combat operations. This mission left BiH in 2004, after which it was replaced by the EU’s limited forces. The NATO mission in Kosovo was met with a far more complicated situation, with many more armed attacks against the Serb population, also including attacks and large-scale eth-nic cleansing in March 2004, which KFOR managed bring under control only with great effort and a significant number of casualties. However, in this case, only NATO’s robust military presence prevented the continuation of armed conflict from the late 1990s and the continuation of ethnic cleansing.

A change in relations between Serbia and NATO came in April 2001, with the outbreak of a revolt by Albanians in the Preševo Valley. Although at first it seemed as if the scenario of Serb-Albanian conflict from 1998-1999 was to be repeated, the representatives of the new government in Belgrade (Nebojša Čović and Goran Svilanović) contacted the then NATO Secretary General, George Robertson, after which the Serbian security forces and KFOR (i.e., NATO) jointly stopped the actions of Albanian paramilitary forces, the so-called Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa (LAPBM). As a result of this cooperation, a so-called Ground Safety Zone – from which the LAPBM was acting – was established, while Serbian forces took over control


of the administrative border with Kosovo from KFOR. Although this episode renewed trust between Serbia and NATO, the next step in mutual convergence occurred as late as 2007, when Serbia requested and received membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme.

“The turnaround in relations between NATO and Belgrade is probably the most spectacular security-related development to have taken place in the former Yugoslavia since the Kosovo campaign in 1999”, noted NATO expert, Robert Serry.324 Accession of the Western Balkans countries into the PfP, as well as the accession of Croatia and Albania to NATO, strengthened the posi-tion of this organization in the Balkans and has also ensured a long-term influ-ence on security sector development in all countries of the region, including the scope and structure of their national armed forces, their interoperability and joint military exercises, etc.

Strong external pressure on the development of regional cooperation in the Balkans prompted some analysts to question the motives behind these efforts. International mediators in crises, in addition to a general interest in contribut-ing to resolving problems, often have some special, public or hidden interests. For some analysts of the EU and NATO’s policies in the Balkans, their motives are, amongst other things, also hidden in the desire to enhance their own le-gitimacy. So, for example, Philipp Borinski believes that NATO uses the pos-sibility to achieve a “double expansion” in the Balkans, i.e., to simultaneously achieve “expansion in geographic terms, as well as in terms of its role which, if successfully achieved, would contribute to the prestige of the organisation«.325

The role of the EU is interpreted in a similar way: “only by stabilising the Bal-kans, the EU can make its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) more convincing and present itself as an important geopolitical factor.”326

Analysis of the effects of the EU’s and NATO’s efforts to encourage regional cooperation in the Balkans over the last decade shows that, in addition to the results achieved, it has also had some unexpected consequences. Despite the

324 Robert Serry, NATO’s Balkan Odyssey, NATO Review, 2003. Source: http://www.nato.int/docu/ review/2003/issue4/english/art3.html.

325 Philipp Borinski, NATO Towards the Double Enlargement: The Case of the Balkans, Re-vue d’intégration européene, 24/2002, pp. 113-136.

326 Milada Anna Vachudova, Strategies for European Integration and Democratization in the Balkans, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 4/2004, pp. 92-105.


desire of all Western Balkans countries to become members of the EU, it does not automatically affect improvement in their mutual relations.327 Similar to the 1990s, each of these countries is interested in its own accession to the EU, even if that does not increase the chances of their neighbours achieving the same. Some researchers estimate that “attempts on the part of individual coun-tries to accelerate the process of EU integration have resulted in weakened cooperation at the regional level.”328

Moreover, membership in the EU is sometimes used as a means to resolve some territorial or other disputes with neighbours by blocking their accession to the EU. Accession of a divided country, Cyprus, into the European Union before this dispute was resolved between the Greek and Turkish ethnic com-munities on the island, was seen in the EU as a strong warning that something similar should not be repeated in the case of the Western Balkans. The EU and the U.S., learning from this experience, reacted strongly in the border dis-pute between Slovenia (EU member) and Croatia (candidate) which, at least temporarily, was removed from the agenda; though the dispute between its other member, Greece, and Macedonia, over the name of this former Yugoslav republic, remains an obstacle in relations between the EU and NATO, on the one hand, and this country, on the other. Contrary to expectations, such data indicates that regional cooperation initiated from the outside does not neces-sarily lead to improvements in trust amongst the countries of the region, nor to the prospects of creating a permanent “security community”.

These problems are even more conspicuous when it comes to NATO’s influ-ence in the Balkans. For example, this issue faces strong resistance in Serbia due to NATO’s role during the civil war in Yugoslavia and, in particular, its military intervention against the Republika Srpska in 1995 and Serbia in 1999. For a large part of Serbian public, NATO remains an opponent and an organi-zation that committed war crimes against Serbs (bombing of Radio-Television Serbia, the destruction of a passenger train in Grdelica gorge, bombing of a bridge in Vladičin Han, the use of cluster bombs in Niš, the use of missiles

327 In 2007, the South East European Barometer conducted a public opinion survey in the Western Balkans countries on the attitude of their citizens towards the prospects of their neighbours’ future accession into the EU, which demonstrated a significant lack of interest in this issue. South-East Europe Barometer, Public Opinion Compared in 7 Countries.

328 East-West Parliamentary Practice Project (EWPPP), Legislatures and Citizens: strengthe-ning democratic institutions and civil society in the Western Balkans, http://www.ewppp.org/pro-grammes/western_balkans.php.


with depleted uranium, etc.). Although the negative attitude towards NATO has somewhat declined in recent years owing to the role of KFOR in Kosovo and Metohija (especially in March 2004), support to negative attitudes towards NATO’s role in the Balkans comes from countries that are strongly opposed to its further enlargement (Russia and some of the Arab countries). On the other hand, for other former Yugoslav republics and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, membership in NATO is a guarantee of their independence and security from threats that are still primarily perceived as coming from Serbia.

Conclusion

Endeavours to condition the progress of the countries of the region in their relations with the EU and NATO through normalization of relations between the Western Balkans countries and the development of regional economic, po-litical and security cooperation has borne some results. Undoubted progress has been made in the renewal of economic relations and the free flow of goods between Western Balkan countries, especially within the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA). At present, Slovenia and Croatia are amongst the largest investors in Serbia and other former Yugoslav republics, though their markets are still relatively closed to investors from the Western Balkans. Sig-nificant progress and cooperation has also been attained between internal af-fairs institutions and judicial authorities in the fight against organized crime, as well as in some other areas.

Over ten years after the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, relations between these countries are stable, though not completely normalized. The biggest obstacle to the creation of a regional community remains the prob-lem of Kosovo, whose status is still open. Kosovo is not only an unavoidable problem on Serbia’s path towards the EU, but also an obstacle to the stability of the entire southern Balkans. On the other hand, even sixteen years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still more of a mechani-cal connection of the three peoples living in it, rather than a community with a certain perspective. Even relations between the two largest former Yugoslav re-publics, Serbia and Croatia, which in the last decade saw significant progress, remain burdened with the legacy of civil war. Confirmation of this has been provided by the recent events in Croatia following the verdict of the Interna-tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on two Croatian


generals, which led to a wave of protests across the country and a certain cool-ing of relations between Zagreb and Belgrade. The problem of refugees and internally displaced persons from the war-affected areas is still pending.

The ruling elites and public opinion remain divided over the recent past, as well as over the causes and consequences of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. That is confrmed, amongst other things, by the very fact that the interpretation of recent history in the Western Balkans is still fundamentally different and that it is quite unlikely that joint history textbooks will be written soon. Recent polls show that a high degree of ethnic distance between the in-habitants of the former Yugoslavia still exists. National identities remain firm-ly rooted in negative stereotypes about “the other”, “oriental” and “Western cultural heritage”, whilst neighbours are still seen as “historic enemies” rather than partners in the creation of a new European and regional identity. Thanks to pressure from outside, Western Balkan societies have accepted the idea of modernization, which is generally identified with “Europeanization”, i.e., Eu-ropean and Euro-Atlantic integration, though there is still strong resistance to the creation of a common regional identity with a Yugoslav or Balkan prefix.

This phenomenon is not, however, unknown in the European Union itself. In Spain, the Catalans and Basques, put their local and even their European identity before their sense of belonging to Spain. In Belgium, the Flemish and Wallonians put their respective identities before their belonging to Belgium. In the UK, Scottish, Welsh or Irish identities are given priority over the Brit-ish identity. Even in France, the cradle of civic national identity, according to which the citizens of a country identify themselves with it, it is not uncom-mon that, for example, the inhabitants of Brittany, place their Breton and Eu-ropean identity above their belonging to the French nation. Neighbours are, through such a lens, seen as opponents or what is in Anglo-Saxon anthropol-ogy referred to as a “constitutive other”, which is perceived as a threat leading to national homogenization. Experience of two world wars and the post-war development of European identity has largely absorbed, but not eliminated, ethnic differences.

Three armed conflicts in less than a century (1870-1871, 1914-1918 and 1939-1945) between the major European nations, France and Germany, have over the last fifty years led to the creation of European communities and the


collective European identity, as well as to the new vision of a shared history, whereby these conflicts are interpreted as “European civil wars”, while pejora-tive descriptions of the other nation have disappered from both languages.329

This process, however, lasted for a very long time and was under the influ-ence of joint institutions created after World War II such as, for example, a joint institute for writing history textbooks (Internazionale Schulbuch Institute in Braunschweig) or a common media organization (Franco-German TV chan-nel “Arte”). In the Western Balkans, similar attempts such as creation of a joint “Commission for Truth and Reconciliation” has not yielded results, though some approximation within the triangle of Serbia-Croatia- Bosnia and Her-zegovina, in the field of media and art has been noted, and to a much smaller extent, between Serbs and Albanians.

In short, over the last decade the EU and NATO have invested great effort to stop the spiral of civil war in the former Yugoslavia and have launched the process of reconciliation, regional cooperation and new forms of community sense in the Western Balkans. Relying on the common desire of all societies in the region to become part of European and Euro-Atlantic structrures and thus “escape from the Balkans” and from the logic of “Balkanization”, these efforts have brought some results, especially regarding the development of a European identity amongst the Balkan peoples. The results, however, are largely absent when it comes to developing a regional identity, which is still strongly influenced by negative stereotypes, the legacy of war and the logic of “Balkanization.” Moreover, the problems of the EU and, especially, the global economic crisis, which has strongly affected the Balkan countries in recent years, have weakened the impact of the EU and NATO, and led to a substantial decline in the mood of these societies to join them.

Opinion polls indicate that the percentage of support for the EU in Serbia is at its lowest in the last ten years, whilst in Croatia – following the verdicts for Gotovina and Markač – it has dropped to only 42%. The percentage of sup-

329 That is, for example, present in the recent historiography and in a joint French-German history textbook (Histoire/Geschichte, L‘Europe et le monde depuis 1945, Klett & Nathan, Paris Stutgart 2007), as well as in the art projects funded through EU funds, such as the film “Merry Christmas”, which in 2007 was a European candidate for the Oscars Award. It is, however, im-portant to emphasise that in Germany today, there are increasingly less people learning French language, and vice-versa.


port for membership of some of these countries in NATO is at a much lower level, even in countries included in the MAP (Membership Action Plan), such as Montenegro. In addition, the impact of the EU and particularly of NATO in the Western Balkans in recent years has also faced competition from new regional actors, some of whom are strongly opposed to further Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans.


NOVA Srbija, novi NATO : vizija budućnosti za XXI vek : zbornik tekstova / [urednici Mirjana Kosić, Milan Karagaća ; prevod Mirjana Kosić]. - Beograd : TransConflict Serbia : Forum za etničke odnose : Klub 21, 2011 (Beograd : Digital ArtCompany). - 382 str. ; 21 cm

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