Muslims in the Philippines Radicalization‐Contradictions 

Prof Yusuf Morales 

Muslims in the Philippines—their Radicaliza-tion and Contradictions, Philippine Copyright 2010 byYusuf Morales. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including pho-tocopying, recording or by any informational storage or retrieval system as compact discs - except for reviews - without written permission from the author / publisher

Published By:

Linus Multi- Media & Editorial Services

Pasay Road, San Roque Zamboanga City 7000

Philippines

E-mail: linomansantos@yahoo.com linomansantos@gmail.com

Printed in the Philippines

Muslims in the  Philippines 

Radicalization‐Contradictions 

 

By Prof Yusuf Morales

Frontispiece The Taluksangay Mosque (Superimposed on the Map of the Philipines)was built by Hadji Abdullah Maas Nuno in 1885 in the Village of Taluksangay,, Zamboanga. It is the oldest mosque in Western Mindanao. Taluksangay was the first center of Islamic propagation in the Zamboanga Peninsula

Preface There are plenty of researches and thesis as to the level and extent of why radicalization takes place. However, there is a dilemna as most research-ers are either Non-Muslim national security practi-tioners, or Muslims who are doing these researches for purely academic purposes. Although there are notable researches abroad, there is still a need to collate these re-searches on a local level inasmuch that local under-standing of the subject among scholars on the sub-ject needs to be updated as well as clarified. This work came as a response to an earlier work that I was commissioned to write; a Masters thesis in Islamic studies regarding the Islamicity of the actions of Filipino Muslim Radicals. As I felt that the material was primarilly a result of my re-search, I am using the materials obtained for a monograph that hopefully can be eventually be used as a book for later researchers. This work is dedicated to my teachers and spiritual guides, first is my mother who have taught me the love of reading and all those guides that fol-lowed, my family who is my inspiration, The Ahlol Beit (AS) and the Imam (ATFS), and the source of all light Allahu Taala.

Introduction: The study of Militancy has always been one of the focal points in researches currently around the world, spanning the fields of the social sciences both behavioral and sociological. Filipino Muslims has always been the object of attention since the creation of the Philippine state. They have begun to struggle with their identity whether to assimilate or to separate. This has been manifested on a global scale. This dilemma has been a result of a variety of other factors: The revitalization or reawakening of Islam on a global scale from both the Muslim countries as well as the First world coun-tries which has a notable number of Muslim migrants. The globalization of Islam with the entry of Technol-ogy and the Internet which further globalized the Um-mah or commonly known as the Islamic community has made interaction and the exchange of communica-tion more easy, propaganda and instruction more fluid. With the onset of the Philippine economic crisis early in the Marcos era ushered a new wave of labor migrations in the Middle East, which resulted to conversion of Filipino Overseas Foreign workers in the Middle East, to Salafi/Wahabbi Islam which was known to espouse radical fundamentalist tendencies. It is in these tide of events that we face a small proportion of Filipino Muslims who have become radicalized and espouse a distinct identity and form of Islam that has resulted in acts of violence and terror-ism. The researcher thus wishes to both understand

and unlock the realities behind the actions of these individuals and compare them with the Muslim texts and see if indeed their actions are allowed and sanctioned by the scholars of religion and Islamic law and provide suggestions if not solutions to the eventual resolution of this problem. The focus of this monograph While there are a number of Filipino Mus-lim armed groups and elements that are presently operating in the Philippines, this study focuses only on the Harakatul Islamiyah,otherwise known as the Abu Sayyaf group, the Rajah Sulaiman Movement and their ancillary political,military and other for-mations. The focus on these two groups is primarilly due to the unique nature of these organizations in comparison with the other major armed groups in the Philippines. The research will focus on the history of these groups, the evolution of their formations as well as their activities which will be examined if they are within the scope and ambit of Islamic Law. The researcher will utilize the investigative method employed by both the International Crisis group as well as the Center for Islamic Pluralism which look both at the institutional processes as well as the evolution of these processes and how these systems adapt in the Philippine Context. Most of the material obtained in the writing of this monograph is through following sources: (1)Library research work,(2)personal interview and

research with Muslim clerics, both by interview and access to their personal archives and notes(3)personal interview among the detained elements of the radical groups(4)personal interview among the MNLF and MILF leaders from whom the elements of the Muslim radical elements are believed to have been recruited and have taken inspiration from. This monograph begins with the basic defi-nitions of Islam, Shari'ah as well as the modes of conduct and the range and breadth of Shari'ah as a determining factor in the actions of the Filipino Muslim Radicals and their their perception as to the level of faith as well as our counter-arguments .

Chapter 2: Backgrounder All actions done by a Muslim generally are classified as whether they fall with the permissible (Halal) or the prohibited (Haraam), and are such reminded and taught as to the legality and legiti-macy of their actions within the Shari'ah. And as such we will first delve in the essentials of Muslim beliefs within Islamic law. Brief Introduction to Shari'ah and the Islamic essentials of Belief Sharia is a now a familiar term to Muslims and non-Muslims. It can often be heard in news stories about politics, crime, feminism, terrorism and civilization.

“While the Sharia may be defined in a vari-

ety of ways, no definition that seeks to do justice to medieval Muslim thought can do without the key concept of ahkam, rendered here as ‘categorizations.’ The Sharia is, first and foremost, the totality of divine ‘categorizations of human acts’ (al-ahkam fi’l af’al, al-ahkam al-‘amaliya). The medieval Muslims were in fact much more concerned with the explication of the concept of a divine categorization of an act than with the expli-cation of the concept of the Sharia as such. Indeed, in many of their most renowned writings one does not find any discussion at all of the later concept whereas discussions of the latter concept take up many pages . Frequently, rather than speaking sim-ply of the Sharia, Muslim scholars would speak of ‘Sharia categorizations’ (al-ahkam al-shar’iya).”

All aspects of a Muslim's life are governed by Sharia. Sharia law comes from a combination of sources including the Quran (the Muslim holy book), the Hadith (sayings and conduct of the prophet Muhammad) and fatwas (the rulings of Islamic scholars).

Many people, including Muslims, misun-derstand Sharia. It's often associated with the am-putation of limbs, death by stoning, lashes and other medieval punishments. Because of this, it is sometimes thought of as draconian. Some people in the West view Sharia as archaic and unfair social ideas that are imposed upon people who live in Sharia-controlled countries.

Many Muslims, however, hold a different view. In the Islamic tradition Sharia is seen as something that nurtures humanity. They see the Sharia not in the light of something primitive but as something divinely revealed. In a society where social problems are endemic, Sharia frees humanity to realize its individual potential. In Arabic, Sharia means "the clear, well-trodden path to water". Islamically, it is used to refer to the matters of religion that God has legis-lated for His servants. The linguistic meaning of Sharia reverberates in its technical usage: just as water is vital to human life, so the clarity and up-rightness of Sharia is the means of life for souls and minds. Throughout history, God has sent messen-gers to people all over the world, to guide them to the straight path that would lead them to happiness in this world and the one to follow. All messengers taught the same message about belief (the Qur'an teaches that all messengers called people to the worship of the One God), but the specific prescrip-tions of the divine laws regulating people's lives varied according to the needs of his people and time.

The Prophet Muhammad(God bless him and give him peace) was the final messenger and his Sharia represents the ultimate manifestation of the divine mercy.

"Today I have perfected your way of life (din) for you, and completed My favour upon you, and have chosen Islam as your way of life." The

Prophet himself was told that, "We have only sent you are a mercy for all creation."

Importance of following Islamic Law and Prac-tice to Muslims The Value and Importance of Shari'ah: Undoubtedly, there is a comprehensive Islamic philosophy underpining Sharia. And this is elucidated in the Holy Qur'an:

“For each We have appointed a divine law and a traced-out way. Had God willed, He could have made you one community. But that He may try you by that which He has given you. So vie one with another in good works. Unto God you will all return, and He will then inform you of that wherein you differ.”

For Muslims, life did not begin at birth, but a long time before that. Before even the creation of the first man. It began when God created the souls of everyone who would ever exist and asked them, "Am I not your Lord?" They all replied, "Yea."

God decreed for each soul a time on earth so that He might try them. Then, after the comple-tion of their appointed terms, He would judge them and send them to their eternal destinations: either one of endless bliss, or one of everlasting grief.

This life, then, is a journey that presents to its wayfarers many paths. Only one of these paths is clear and straight. This path is the Sharia.

Legal rulings

The Sharia regulates all human actions and puts them into five categories: obligatory, recom-mended, permitted, disliked or forbidden.

Obligatory actions must be performed and when performed with good intentions are rewarded. The opposite is forbidden action. Recommended action is that which should be done and the oppo-site is disliked action. Permitted action is that which is neither encouraged nor discouraged. Most human actions fall in this last category.

The ultimate worth of actions is based on intention and sincerity, as mentioned by the Prophet, who said, "Actions are by intentions, and one shall only get that which one intended."

How does one Live under Shariah? Sharia covers all aspects of human life. Classical Sharia manuals are often divided into four parts: laws relating to personal acts of worship, laws relating to commercial dealings, laws relating to marriage and divorce, and penal laws. God sent prophets and books to humanity to show them the way to happiness in this life, and success in the hereafter. This is encapsulated in the believer's prayer, stated in the Qur'an, "Our Lord,

give us good in this life and good in the next, and save us from the punishment of the Fire."

The legal philosophers of Islam, such as Ghazali, Shatibi, and Shah Wali Allah explain that the aim of Sharia is to promote human welfare. This is evident in the Qur'an, and teachings of the Prophet.

The scholars explain that the welfare of humans is based on the fulfillment of necessities, needs, and comforts.

Necessities Necessities are matters that worldly and religious life depend upon. Their omission leads to unbearable hardship in this life, or punishment in the next. There are five necessities: preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and wealth. These ensure individual and social welfare in this life and the hereafter.

The Sharia protects these necessities in two ways: firstly by ensuring their establishment and then by preserving them.

To ensure the establishment of religion, God Most High has made belief and worship obligatory. To ensure its preservation, the rulings relating to the obligation of learning and conveying the religion were legislated.

To ensure the preservation of human life, God Most high legislated for marriage, healthy eating and living, and forbid the taking of

life and laid down punishments for doing so.

God has permitted that sound intellect and knowledge be promoted, and forbidden that which corrupts or weakens it, such as alco-hol and drugs. He has also imposed preven-tative punishments in order that people stay away from them, because a sound intellect is the basis of the moral responsibility that humans were given.

Marriage was legislated for the preservation of lineage, and sex outside marriage was for-bidden. Punitive laws were put in placed in order to ensure the preservation of lineage and the continuation of human life.

God has made it obligatory to support oneself and those one is responsible for, and placed laws to regulate the commerce and transac-tions between people, in order to ensure fair dealing, economic justice, and to pre-vent oppression and dispute.

Needs and comforts Needs and comforts are things people seek in order to ensure a good life, and avoid hardship, even though they are not essential. The spirit of the Sharia with regards to needs and comforts is summed up in the Qur'an, "He has not placed any hardship for you in religion," And, "God does not seek to place a burden on you, but that He purify you and perfect His grace upon you, that you may give thanks."

Therefore, everything that ensures human happiness, within the spirit of Divine Guidance, is permitted in the Sharia.

What are the sources of Islamic Law or Shari'ah? The sources of Islamic Law or Shari'ah can be primarilly divided into two (2) major categories which are :

The primary sources such as the Qur'an and the Prophetic Sunnah and

derived sources which are the Ijma and the Qiyas

Primary sources of Islamic Law:

Tthe Qur'an

The Qur'an was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad gradually, over 23 years. The essence of its message is to establish the oneness of God and the spiritual and moral need of man for God. This need is fulfilled through worship and submis-sion, and has ultimate consequences in the Hereaf-ter.

The Qur'an is the word of God. Because of its inimitable style and eloquence, and, above all, the guidance and legal provisions it came with, it ensures the worldly and next-worldly welfare of humanity.

God Most High said, "Verily, this Qur'an

guides to that which is best, and gives glad tidings to the believers who do good that theirs will be a great reward." And, "There has come unto you light from God and a clear Book, whereby God guides those who seek His good pleasure unto paths of peace. He brings them out of darkness unto light by His decree, and guides them unto a straight path."

The Prophetic example (Sunna) The Prophet's role was expounded in the Qur'an, "We have revealed the Remembrance [Qur'an] to you that you may explain to people that which was revealed for them."

This explanation was through the Prophet's words, actions, and example. Following the guid-ance and the example of the Prophet was made obligatory, "O you who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger," and, "Verily, in the Messen-ger of God you have a beautiful example for those who seek God and the Last Day, and remember God much." The Prophet himself instructed, "I have left two things with you which if you hold on to, you shall not be misguided: the Book of God and my example."

The Derived sources of Law:

Scholarly consensus

The basis for scholarly consensus being a source of law is the Qur'anic command to resolve matters by consultation, as God stated, "Those who answer the call of their Lord, established prayer, and whose affairs are by consultation." Scholarly consensus is defined as being the agreement of all Muslim scholars at the level of juristic reasoning (ijtihad) in one age on a given legal ruling. Given the condition that all such scholars have to agree to the ruling, its scope is limited to matters that are clear according to the Qur'an and Prophetic example, upon which such consensus must necessarily be based. When es-tablished, though, scholarly consensus is decisive proof.

Legal analogy (Qiyas)

Legal analogy is a powerful tool to de-rive rulings for new matters. For example, drugs have been deemed impermissible, through legal analogy from the prohibition of alcohol that is established in the Qur'an. Such a ruling is based on the common underlying effective cause of intoxication.

Legal analogy and its various tools en-ables the jurists to understand the underlying rea-sons and causes for the rulings of the Qur'an and Prophetic example (sunna). This helps when

dealing with ever-changing human situations and allows for new rulings to be applied most suitably and consistently.

What are the basic principles of Sharia?

These are to see the will of God done on earth as it is in Heaven (as in the Christian Lord's Prayer). How can we possibly know this will? By study of the revealed scriptures and by choosing talented, intelligent and far-sighted merciful people of excellent character as our judges.

The whole principle of God's will is to bring about compassion, kindness, generosity, jus-tice, fair play, tolerance, and care in general, as op-posed to tyranny, cruelty, selfishness, exploitation etc. All the rules of Sharia are towards those ends.

The usual criticisms of Sharia - that it is so cruel as regards execution, flogging and cutting off hands - totally ignore all the extenuating circum-stances that would lead to these penalties not being applied. They are known as hadd penalties (pl. hudud), the extreme limit of the penalty. Thus, if a person was sentenced to having a hand cut off, he or she should not be sent to prison and/or be fined as well. People who regard these practices as cruel will never be persuaded otherwise, so Muslims usually leave that aside. Their point is that the cut-ting of the hand for theft is a very powerful deter-rent - Muslims care less for the callous and contin-ual thief than they do for the poor souls who are mugged and robbed and hurt by the thieves.

The Middle East is certainly not full of one-handed people - as any traveler would tell you. What we have lost here is the horror of dishonor that true Muslims still have. They would do any-thing rather than offend Allah, and they of course believe that Allah sees every single thing that is done - there are no secrets.

Even if you get away with something on earth, it has been seen and recorded and you will have to face judgment for it eventually, and the people hurt by your action will be recompensed.

Of course, if you do not believe in God, or a judgement, or a life to come, the whole system is quite meaningless to you. In Sharia law, if a thief could prove that he/she only stole because of need, then the Muslim society would be held at fault and made to supply that need, and there would be no hand-cutting. Most thieves would think twice be-fore risking a hand on mugging an old lady for her handbag!

Adultery

In the west, adultery has become so com-monplace because of sexual freedoms - all the em-phasis these days seems to be on finding sexual satisfaction; in Muslim societies, there is far less emphasis on sex - it is usually regarded as a weak-ness that can lead to all sorts of trouble. Family is far more important; the notion of a million unborn children per year being aborted , and single moth-ers, is abhorrent in Islam.

Murder

Sharia law for murder allows the death penalty , but is kinder than western law in one re-spect - after judicial judgment has been made, ap-peals are then allowed to the family of the mur-dered victims, and they are begged to be merciful. In Islam, it is always regarded as the height of mercy to forgive a murderer, even though one may have the right to take his/her life in reprisal.

The form of execution is not specified in Islam - i.e. it is not usually a stoning. Beheading used to be regarded as the quickest and most merci-ful way (as in Roman law, and the French guillo-tine); these days other methods may find approval. There are apparently far fewer executions in most Muslim countries than in the USA, for example. The penalty for adultery is open to debate. Most scholars will insist that the penalty as laid down in the Qur'an was 100 lashes, and there were various rules for regulating how lashes were to be given too. Other scholars maintain that the old penalty for adultery as laid down by the previous prophets was stoning (as in the Old Testament).

By New Testament times , The Prophet Jesus had the famous case where a guilty woman was forgiven and sent away, told only to sin no more.

In some Muslim societies, judges and populaces might stone out of mistaken belief that this was what Islam required.

In fact, Islam made it virtually impossible - to be sentenced to death for adultery, the couple had to be actually witnessed performing the physi-cal act by four people who were in a position to identify both parties without doubt; this virtually ruled out the penalty, since adultery is taken for granted as a secret act and something not done in public.

Resolving Individual rights vs needs of society?

Basically in Islam the needs of society al-ways come first, with the proviso that injustices should always be able to be taken to judges who are not corrupt. The old Arab system allowed any person, no matter how humble, to take his/her case to the highest in the land personally. Islam brings a very strong sense of justice, and care of the op-pressed and exploited.

Does Sharia make life easier or harder for the ordinary Muslim?

Much easier for those who strive to live the correct life pleasing to God and in kindness and peace with the neighbor; much harder for the one who is selfish, callous, cruel, exploitative, dishon-est etc.

There is virtually no sympathy for such people - unless they really are mentally ill, in which case they are not regarded as culpable in Sharia. All those before the age of puberty, or not

of sound mind, are not regarded as culpable.

Why has Sharia become a synonym for cruelty and lack of compassion?

This perception may be the result of two things - ignorance of the reality of Sharia law, and much publicized cases where Muslims in positions of authority have been very poor Muslims, if not non-Muslims in Muslim disguise. For example, 100 years ago we had stories of awful Turkish sul-tans, and people being rushed to blocks to have their hands cut off etc. The media picks out certain cases and blows them up to make a big drama of them - they might pick on one particular murderer on death row in the USA and rouse everyone's feel-ings, but totally ignore all the others due to be exe-cuted that day!

A case like the Nigerian woman in danger of being stoned for adultery is a case in point. She might have been stoned by irate villagers, but on being taken into custody and judged by Sharia law she gets the opportunity to appeal and explain etc. In her case, if it is true that she was raped, she most certainly would not be sentenced to death. What interests me is who were the rotten people who brought the case against her anyway?

Incidentally the correct Islamic method of stoning according to Sharia was similar to that ad-vised by the Pharisees at the time of Jesus - the per-son was held fast in a fixed position, and a stone or rock that it took two men to lift (i.e. was heavier

than one man could lift alone) was to be dropped to crush the head - it was not someone tied to a post and rocks hurled at them, although this has been done in some cultures.

The point was that if someone really had to be executed, it was to be done swiftly, with as little torture as possible, and usually publicly so that no vindictive person could do further nasty things be-hind the scenes and get away with it.

Sharia should promote gender equality. In fact, the natural Islamic tendency is to always con-sider women as the weaker sex in need of care and protection, and come down hard on the men who allow their womenfolk to get into difficulties.

In countries where Sharia-based law is enforced, how are specific punishments decided on and who makes these decisions?

The Muslim countries that exercise Shari'ah Law are generally governed by Shari'ah courts that is supervised by both Judges and law-yers (muftis, hakeems and faqih's) that were trained and schooled in Islamic and procedural law, and the all the usual processes of a legal system are pre-sent in Shar'iah proceedings.

Chapter 3:

Islam and Shari'ah in the Philippine Context.

Historical development of ISLAM in the Philip-pines prior to 9-11 Islam has a long period of history in the Philippines, although not as long as the Middle East or South Asia but a significant one, dating four centuries back when Shariff Karimul Mak-dum, the first Muslim-Sufi Missionary trader came into the Philippines and settled in Simunul Island Tawi-Tawi. Then came the other six Shariff's who were from Hadramaut Yemen and gave birth to the Sharifite lineage present in the Southern part of the Philippines. It is notable to mention ironically that unlike common notion, Islam in the Philippines came through traveling businessmen who were Alawi-Sufi Muslims as well as Kiysaniyyah Shia's, both pluralist and moderate manifestations of Islam notably. The old Tarsilas and Kissah's document this by mentioning the of lineage Alawi missionar-ies in the Philippines. The natives were both impressed by the charm as well as the character of the businessmen eventually being married off to the daughter of the local ruler. The Sultanates of Sulu and North Borneo as well as the Sultanate of Maguindanao both are related to the Royal houses of North Borneo and Malaysia (all being the product of the Pre-Islamic

Shri Vishaya and Madjapahit empires as well as the intermarriages of the rulers of these areas). Upon the arrival of the western colonial-ists, notably the Spanish, the Portuguese, Dutch and other colonialist explorers who were both in guise of conversion,consumption and colonization; this brought to focus either the defense and demise of muslim communities. Among those caught and eventually de-stroyed communities were the areas of Rajah Su-layman in Tondo and Rajah Matanda as well as the community of Kagi Pulaku (commonly known name to the Maguindanons and called as Maas Pu-lun by the Tausugs) who was responsible for the Spanish retreat in 1521 under the command of Ma-gellan. The entry of the Colonialists ushered the Moro wars both during the three centuries Spanish occupation as well as the short-lived American oc-cupation and the Commonwealth republic. It is no-table that altogether this turn of collective events has led the Moro to a evolution of their conscious-ness from the very moderate and spiritual personal-ity that Sufi and Alawi Islam brought to a psyche that accepted war as a part of their personality...the Pathani Psyche. Acceptance of war as a cycle of life even-tually hardened the Moro Psyche and thus allowed the justification of Parang Sabil, Luwas Lungsad as religious mechanisms for the defense of Agama came into being. The traditional source of Ulama during this period was Malaysia and Indonesia, where

Pesantrens and Madrassahs existed and thus Ba-hasa was a standard religious textual language next to Arabic during these era, supplying a regular dose of Sunni Shafii-Sufi Islam prior to the Common-wealth period and thus extremism didn't manifest itself in those days. The first ingredient to the entry of extrem-ism in the country began in the Commonwealth era when the flow of Hajj pilgrims started to flow into Saudi Arabia who was gradually being penetrated by Salafi Islam due to the Saud Dynasty who was gathering its control over the Najd. The second ingredient was when Senator Damocao Alonto became ambassador to Egypt and opened the door to scholarships to Al-Azhar uni-versity. Since the Salafi Movement under Rashid Rida and eventually Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb was gaining sway, some of the scholars even-tually adopted the literalist interpretation of Wa-habbism, although a huge percentage went main-stream Sunni Islam. The biggest twist towards the entry of Salafi Islam in the Philippines was during the pe-riod of economic crisis during the Marcos era when we started to send OFW's en masse to the Middle East, where both Moros as well as converts to Is-lam where influenced by Salafi islam which was the prevalent form in the Gulf Countries where our OFW's were sent.

And since the globalization of the Islamic move-ment, both Islamic revolutionary liberation movements in the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation front as well as its splinter group the Moro Islamic Liberation front both derived inspi-ration from Islamic liberation movements world over it attracted a number of Salafi adherents who were part of global network of Militants. The evolution of Salaf inspired movements and groups which came out of both disgust from the MNLF and the inspiration from the MILF led to the formation of the Al-Haraqatul Islamiyyah and the Rajah Sulaiman Movement respectively. The Presidential Code 1083 also known as the Code of Muslim Personal Law

The codification of Muslim personal laws goes back in Philippine history to the prom-ulgation during the Sulu Sultanate of the Diwan Taosug as the principal personal law codex of Sulu. Around the middle of the eighteenth cen-tury, the Sultan of Maguindanao promulgated a more comprehensive codex, the Luwaran sa Magindanao. (Mastura 2005)

After the country became independent from the U.S. in 1946, several laws were passed that recognized certain aspects of Muslim per-sonal laws.

The Presidential Decree No. 1083, also known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, is a law that recognizes the legal

system of the Muslims in the Philippines as part of the law of the land and seeks to make Islamic insti-tutions more effective, codifies Muslim personal laws, and provides for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims. It was promulgated by then President Ferdinand Edralin Marcos on February 4, 1977.

This Presidential Decree creates Shari'ah courts tasked with the resolution of disputes that may arise under its provisions, and allows these courts to create Agama Arbitration Councils in ap-propriate instances. It creates the office of Juricon-sult in Muslim law, which has the authority to ren-der legal opinions on matters concerning Muslim law. It also recognizes five Muslim legal holidays and provides for their proper observance. It defines what constitutes communal property and customary contracts in accordance with Muslim law, and pro-vides for the effects of conversion to Islam . It also penalizes offenses and violations of its provisions.

Notably, PD 1083 provides only for Mus-lim personal laws, e.g. marriage, divorce, and suc-cession, and not for other Muslim laws. It specifi-cally recognizes the validity of divorce among Muslims, although divorce is not allowed between other Filipinos. It also recognizes polygamy in ac-cordance with Muslim law, such that persons mar-ried in accordance with its provisions shall not be liable for bigamy.

PD 1083 was notably one of the landmark successes of the Muslims to enable them to gain government recognition for their uniqueness as

well as recognition as equal members of Philippine Society. This statute provides provisions for Family and Personal Relations,Marriage, Inheritance and Wills, Contracts and other customary traditions as well as proceedural systems in implementing Shari'ah Law. This has been one of the best legal statutes enacted for Muslims. Unfortunately due to the changes of time as well as the migration and increase of Muslims re-siding in areas other than Mindanao, there was no succeeding legislation or executive orders mandat-ing the assigning of Shariah Courts outside of Mindanao, where a huge percentage of Muslims both Ethnic Muslims and Converts. This has added to the clamor of Salafi radi-cals as well as some Muslims who are in govern-ment that there is not much attention paid to imple-mentation of the provisions of PD 1083 as well as efforts to expand its coverage. Ironically, unlike other non-Muslim states that do not have parallel Shariah laws such as this one, as well as the high state of secularization of other Muslim states, implementation of Shari'ah should have been at a better situation in the coun-try, Muslims in the country have yet to fully maxi-mize the benefits of this statute as well as work for amendments in this law.

Republic Act 386 or the New Civil Code recognized marriages among Muslims and mixed marriages between Muslims and Christians. RA 394 recognized divorce among Muslims. RA 6268 extended the applications on Muslim marriages for

another ten years after the expiration of the 20-year period stipulated in RA 386.

In a survey conducted by Pilipina Re-sources Legal Center, Inc. (PLRC) on the Shari‘ah Law in the Philippines, the following trends were noted: 1) With respect to the Shari‘ah Courts, the wide gap between the actual number of existing courts against the number mandated by law; the failure to appoint judges even for the existing courts and the large number of undocketed cased or cases resolved by settlement. 2) Lack in physical court infrastructure and support facilities and court personnel. 3) Judges are working in various courts, wide gender disparity in the appointment of judges and that decisions are based on Qur’an, Sunnah and the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. 4) There is a low level of awareness on the nature and function of Shari‘ah courts among the Muslim community 5) Local government units do not appropriate budget for local Shari‘ah courts.

But for Dr. Barra, the problems of the present system of Shari‘ah Law are more funda-mental than issues of implementation. He asserts that the Code of Muslim Personal Laws cannot be considered Shari‘ah Law if we go by the classical definition of Shari‘ah. According to him, the Code is more of a human interpretation of the law (Fiqh) which is not eternal and not unchangeable while the Shari‘ah is the divine law, Allah’s commandments to man which is unchangeable and eternal. Since it is a Divine Law, the Shari‘ah cannot be subject to any

legislation. As part of Fiqh, the present Code of Muslim Personal Laws is merely a piece of legisla-tion with some aspects of Shari‘ah but it is by no means the Islamic Shari‘ah. Dr. Barra laments that Shariah terms are not used according to their original meaning but are abused under the present system. He observes that many Shariah lawyers or counselors do not even know the Koran. There are also conflicting provisions in the Constitution and national laws on one hand and the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Ideally in case of conflict between secular laws and the Islamic Law, the latter should at all times pre-vail among Muslims. But under the ARMM Organic Act for in-stance, in case of conflict between the Muslim Code and the tribal Code, the national law shall apply. It further provides that in case of conflict between the Muslim Code or the tribal code on the one hand and the national law on the other, the na-tional law shall prevail (Sec. 22, Art, VIII). Dr. Barra finds these provisions to be not in accord with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, which provide that in case of conflict between any provision of the Code and laws of general applica-tion, the Code as a special law shall prevail. (Art. 3, Title II, P.D. 1083). Dr. Barra further observes that in the absence of a provision in the Code ofMuslim Personal Laws that Shari‘ah judges and lawyers or counselors must be Muslims, it is now possible that non-Muslims may be admitted in the Shari‘ah bar or bench. This violates classical Islamic Law that

provides that The Shari‘ah must be exclusively ad-ministered by Muslims. While he admits that the present Code of Muslim Personal Laws is by no means a substitute for the Koran and the sources of Shari‘ah, Atty. Michael O. Mastura, who was one of the drafters of the Code, says that the Code must be judged with due consideration of the prevailing conditions when it was enacted. At the time it was enacted as it is today, the majority refused to understand the sentiments of Muslims that a more comprehensive Code could not have been enacted. When the Code of Muslim Personal Laws was enacted, the Civil Code provi-sions affecting Muslims were also about to expire that there was an urgent need for a legal system that will recognize the personal laws of Muslims. Had the Code not been enacted, Muslim marriages for instance, would not have been recognized. Thus, while the original draft of the Code was more comprehensive and complete, the all-Muslim drafters decided to scale its scope down to Personal Laws to insure its enactment and to avert a looming legal crisis where Muslim institutions would ceased to be recognized. The fact that the Code was enacted at all is already victory for the Muslims in the Philippines. Considering that the country refused and continues to refuse to understand the Muslims, Atty. Mastura opines that the best way is to adhere to the philosophy of gradualism where the enact-ment and implementation of Shari‘ah law may be done incrementally.

If the Code is a first good step for the Mus-lims in their quest to be governed by the Islamic Law, what should then be the succeeding steps for the Code of Muslim Personal Laws?

Atty. Mastura strongly warns against allowing the national legislature, largely composed of peo-ple who are ignorant of the Shari‘ah, amend the Code. He is alarmed at the growing interest of non-Muslims to things that are Muslims. Accord-ing to him, the Bangsamoro is not merely a sub-ject of research but must be involved in charting its future. He urges his fellow Muslims to assert their right and power over things that are right-fully theirs including the Shariah Law. Muslims must be actively involved in charting the course for Shariah Law in the Philippines to give mean-ing to their right to self-determination.

A look into the Paradigm of Islamic thought and its relationship with Radicalism Historical development of ISLAM in the Philip-pines prior to 9-11 Islam has a long period of history in the Philippines, although not as long as the Middle East or South Asia but a significant one, dating four centuries back when Shariff Karimul Mak-dum, the first Muslim-Sufi Missionary trader came into the Philippines and settled in Simunul

Chapter 4 :

Radicalism as an evolving force in the Fili-pino Muslim movements

Island Tawi-Tawi. Then came the other six Shar-iff's who were from Hadramaut Yemen and gave birth to the Sharifite lineage present in the South-ern part of the Philippines. It is notable to mention ironically that unlike common notion, Islam in the Philippines came through traveling businessmen who were Alawi-Sufi Muslims as well as Kiysaniyyah Shia's, both pluralist and moderate manifestations of Islam notably. The old Tarsilas and Kissah's document this by mentioning the of lineage Alawi missionaries in the Philippines. The na-tives were both impressed by the charm as well as the character of the businessmen eventually being married off to the daughter of the local ruler. The Sultanates of Sulu and North Borneo as well as the Sultanate of Maguindanao both are related to the Royal houses of North Borneo and Malaysia (all being the product of the Pre-Islamic Shri Vishaya and Madjapahit empires as well as the intermarriages of the rulers of these areas). Upon the arrival of the western colonial-ists, notably the Spanish, the Portuguese, Dutch and other colonialist explorers who were both in guise of conversion,consumption and coloniza-tion; this brought to focus either the defense and demise of muslim communities. Among those caught and eventually destroyed communities were the areas of Rajah Sulayman in Tondo and Rajah Matanda as well as the community of Kagi Pulaku (commonly known name to the Maguin-danons and called as Maas Pulun by the

Tausugs) who was responsible for the Spanish retreat in 1521 under the command of Magellan. The entry of the Colonialists ushered the Moro wars both during the three centuries Spanish occupation as well as the short-lived American occupation and the Commonwealth republic. It is notable that altogether this turn of collective events has led the Moro to a evolution of their consciousness from the very mod-erate and spiritual personality that Sufi and Alawi Islam brought to a psyche that accepted war as a part of their personality...the Pathani Psyche.

Acceptance of war as a cycle of life eventually hardened the Moro Psyche and thus allowed the justification of Parang Sabil, Luwas Lungsad as religious mechanisms for the defense of Agama came into being. The traditional source of Ulama during this period was Malaysia and Indonesia, where Pesantrens and Madrassahs existed and thus Ba-hasa was a standard religious textual language next to Arabic during these era, supplying a regular dose of Sunni Shafii-Sufi Islam prior to the Common-wealth period and thus extremism didn't manifest itself in those days. The first ingredient to the entry of extrem-ism in the country began in the Commonwealth era when the flow of Hajj pilgrims started to flow into Saudi Arabia who was gradually being penetrated by Salafi Islam due to the Saud Dynasty who was gathering its control over the Najd. The second in-gredient was when Senator Damocao Alonto be-came ambassador to Egypt and opened the door to scholarships to Al-Azhar university. Since the Salafi Movement under Rashid Rida and eventually Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb was gaining sway, ome of the scholars eventually adopted the literalist interpretation of Wahabbism, although a huge percentage went mainstream Sunni Islam. The biggest twist towards the entry of Salafi Islam in the Philippines was during the pe-riod of economic crisis during the Marcos era when we started to send OFW's en masse to the Middle East, where both Moros as well as converts to Is-

lam where influenced by Salafi islam which was the prevalent form in the Gulf Countries where our OFW's were sent. And since the globalization of the Is-lamic movement, both Islamic revolutionary lib-eration movements in the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation front as well as its splinter group the Moro Islamic Liberation front both derived inspiration from Islamic liberation move-ments world over it attracted a number of Salafi adherents who were part of global network of Militants. The evolution of Salaf inspired move-ments and groups which came out of both disgust from the MNLF and the inspiration from the MILF led to the formation of the Al-Haraqatul Islamiyyah and the Rajah Sulaiman Movement respectively. The dilemna of Islam in the current century. A look at trends within the Islamic traditions within today's backdraft. Fourteen centuries after the Prophethood of the last Messenger Muhammad (salawatullahi Alayhi), and after the formal closing of the gates of ijtihad of the four madhahibs within the Sunni Tradition, the evolution of Islamic Philosophical Thought, plus Colonialist and Post-colonialist thought, the evolution of shiite philosophical and intellectual trends and the evolution of an Islamic movement that culminated into the Salafi Ideol-ogy (Aquidatul Salaf as-Salih) has made many

inroads and debates within the islamic community. What Islam are we all aiming to achieve? This is a very much debatable issue, with each camp springing to memory ayahs and hadiths to determine his theological legitimacy, and to claim that the other group is either deviant (rawafid),idolater (mushrik) or unbeliever (mushrik). This has been the cause of more than sim-ply bloodshed and discord, and that this has been used against us in the colonial era to partition the Ummah as we see it. Currently we already are seeing the fruits of this dilemna. The damnation of other people who even believe in the same things we believe, only differring in details of practice and juridical rendering. But where do we all agree? All agree within the Ahlu Sunna wal Ja-ma'ah tradition, that the tariqahs, the sufi orders are part of the grand theological legacy left by our be-loved Prophet Muhammad (salawatullahi alayhi). The Major Shiite Traditions acknowledge Sufism to a certain extent. Calling it the interior manifesta-tion of Islam. A new theological countermovement coming from Saudi and initiated by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab currently known as Salafism and wahabbism by their detractors, argue it is one of the different manifestations of Kufr. One would then argue, in a Philippine Con-text, if Sufism is indeed a manifestation of Islam, why is it not being widely known or why is there information or publicity against it? Perhaps under-standing the underlying historical context would allow us to understand why we do not hear it.

The Philippines actually became Muslim by “Islam by Pressence”. Islam was a way of life for the Sharifite (Tassawuff) groups and Kiysaniyyah (Shia) groups that eventually got intermarried with the local rajahships. This in itself eventually be-came the manifestation of homegrown Islam. Antropologically speaking Islam is able to embed itself both in the consciousness of the peo-ple once it applies a process of indigenization, in which local non-Muslim attitudes, mindssts and mindframes are “Islamized”, in short... added an Islamic underpinning to it. This character has been manifested to both the marriage practices of “Kawin” and Aquiqah practice of “Paggunting”, where an indigenous element is present. This indi-genization is not only present in the Philippines but in other parts of South East Asia as well as other parts of the Muslim world. A new manifestation of Islam, dubbed by others as an extreme and perverse ideology in the minds of fanatics specifically, Wahhabi/Salafi ide-ology (although a minority fundamentalist religious cult fueled by petrodollars.) Yet underlying, ena-bling and exacerbating this threat of religious ex-tremism is a global crisis of misunderstanding.

All too many Muslims fail to grasp Islam, which teaches one to be lenient towards others and to understand their value systems, knowing that these are tolerated by Islam as a religion. The es-sence of Islam is encapsulated in the words of the Quran, "For you, your religion; for me, my relig-ion." That is the essence of tolerance. Religious

fanatics--either purposely or out of ignorance--pervert Islam into a dogma of intolerance, hatred and bloodshed. They justify their brutality with slogans such as "Islam is above everything else." They seek to intimidate and subdue anyone who does not share their extremist views, regardless of nationality or religion. While a few are quick to shed blood themselves, countless millions of others sympathize with their violent actions, or join in the complicity of silence.

This crisis of misunderstanding--of Islam by Muslims themselves--is compounded by the failure of governments, people of other faiths, and the majority of well-intentioned Muslims to resist, isolate and discredit this dangerous ideology. The crisis thus afflicts Muslims and non-Muslims alike, with tragic consequences. Failure to understand the true nature of Islam permits the continued radicali-zation of Muslims world-wide, while blinding the rest of humanity to a solution which hides in plain sight

.Why is this ideology so influential? Other than the financing that proseletizers of this creed, according to Sami Catovic, one of the Teachers at Al-Madina Institute, “Salafi Doctrine is so empow-ering. You just let them memorize a few verses and read a few books, they are told to go forward and teach. Imagine the impact.” Although Traditional Islam hasn't made a direct head-on response to this, there were actions to to mitigate the effects, but since Salafi doctrine has a clearcut definition of them and us, and the definitive delineation that if

you're not with us or don't do what we do you're considered non-Muslim, such a consciousness is seen dangerous. Considering the bloodshed that began with Abdulwahab when he teamed up with the Saud House and started removing traditionalists from Hijaz and embedding his version of Islam despite opposition from members of his own family who were acknowledged scholars of Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama'ah. So, one of the dangers with conversion is conversion is an extremely powerful experience. And Gandhi once noted about Mohammed (inaudible), an Englishman who became Muslim, he said he was that rare breed of man who was ca-pable of adopting a new religion without becoming a fanatic. So unfortunately it’s quite common for people who have strong conversion experiences to enter with a lot of zeal. And because of that, they’re susceptible at that period in their life to whatever ideas they happen to be exposed to at the time, believing them to be the sound ideas or prin-ciples of this new adopted religion. And the other very serious concern is in the prison population, because many of the people that adopt Islam within the prisons are coming from dysfunctional homes and already had criminal ten-dencies, and if they come into Islam and are ex-posed to an extreme form of Islam, which is very, very possible, [the German convert to Islam] being a good example of that, then I think it’s potentially extremely dangerous. So if we don’t have really well trained scholars in the United States that can

argue a sound orthodox and moderate Islam that preaches coexistence and also is able to be adaptive to the needs of modern society. I think that if we don’t do that, it’s going to really be a major prob-lem, I think, for a burgeoning population in the West. So I’ll leave it at that. We need to recognize the fact that Imams now must be more fluent with the discourse in the West and of modernization, with the very specific conditions that Muslims find themselves Today whether in the secular West or somewhere in a third world country. Because we are in need of ex-ceptional scholars other than having experiences and backgrounds of both the East and the West but also of recognizing that we do have unique condi-tions. In the Philippines there is a crisis of Islamic schol-arship. Although generally Islam is not huge mono-lithic monotonic ideological structure but a collage of interwoven cultural traditions interwoven with Islam as it is seen in the localities. Although indi-genization of Islam has occurred due to the more than four centuries here, there appears to be a strong undercurrent towards forcing the adoption of an alien face of Islam that has made a rather sig-nificant imprint by a vocal minority. Among the influx of scholars that have arrived here, there are those who come from India who graduate in what are called Darul Uloom that are based on the Indian model from Deoband that do provide a certain level of scholarship. But the scholarship tends to be very pro-vincial and limited in its scope, and certainly is un-

able in many ways to address a lot of the very so-phisticated problems that our community is facing as a minority community and a religious commu-nity. There are those that come from the local ma-drassahs that provide a semblance of theological education but highly influenced by who is financ-ing the madrassah. We also have graduates from Libya, Syria, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia who by varying degrees differ not only in the methods of academic discipline, but also try to imprint a version of Islam that is synonymous with where they were trained. What we are unaware that these Ulama has become political vehicles for Middle Eastern politics or something like that, which it often has been made into, unfortunately, because of theological gradu-ates bringing Middle Eastern baggage and other baggage. Traditionally Ulama in the Philippines come from Malaysia and Indonesia from Pesantren and Traditional Madrrasah institutions that have the same level of indigenization as the Filipino Mus-lims. It was in the 1960's when the process of de-indigenization occurred as a result of the Muslim Filipinos sending their children abroad for higher theological studies as well as those who come from the Middle East after finishing overseas work con-tracts carrying with them Arab Islam. As a result you see a collage of Islam in the Philippines, each particular mould seeking to imprint its own image.

The paradigm of fundamentalism and radicalism Islamic Fundamentalism

Singapore's religious rehabilitation group (RRG) defines the paradigm of Islamic fundamentalism as the belief in the accuracy and literal interpretation of the Noble Quran. It is an unembellished or plain acceptance of the Islamic creed without question or analysis.

This can be seen in several angles; first, there are those fundamentalists who view modernity as the enemy of the representation of evil and opposes modernity as expressed in contemporary western morals and social val-ues. These people in one way or another look into the golden age of Islam, imagining its pris-tine purity and wishes to return to it. There is a conflict and confluence of ideas in this angle: there are those who view it within the light of their own understanding and interpretation of how the pristine form of Islam is. Second, there are those who literally “go back to the beduin traditions of pre-Islamic Arabia and seek to acculturate “bedouin culture and traditions” to be part of the original pristine Islamic milieu that is Islam.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr in one of his in-terviews, said that modernity is the value sys-tem wherein the values is placed more in the individual need rather than on society. And as

our society becomes more involved in individual-istic tendencies and orientations, this is where Is-lamic fundamentalism is primarily against. Be-cause it values the society as a whole as important to the development of man and most vice versa.

That in the words of one khatib,he says, “the purpose of society is to make man more mu-taqqi and not man's role is to make society “mutaqqi”.

One must understand that all Muslims are fundamentalists but not all are extremists. Ah-tough, the RRG of Singapore may use such a defi-nition from a Western Perspective, one must un-derstand that the context of the word fundamental-ism focuses on the nature that Muslims who all basically share the same fundamental beliefs and practices.

Islamic radicalism and extremism Several scholars view Muslims in South-east Asia as being more moderate than their coun-terparts elsewhere in the world. More than any other Muslim community in the world, southeast asian muslims are known to be extraordinarily moderate in the practice of their religion and are tolerant of other people's religions.

Scholars agree that certain conditions im-pel southeast asia's moderates to turn radicals. Among the factors noted include:

Reaction to the resultant tension between tradition and modernity. As earlier mentioned, Islamism is a reaction of Muslims stemming from their inabil-ity to cope with Westernization. 2. Infusion of Saudi money and ideology into Southeast Asia through Mohamad Jamal Khlifa, Osama bin laden's brother in law

3. Consequences of the Afghan War,

4.Organized networks and sophisticated recruitment techniques of radicals Particular to the Philippines, meanwhile, include: Muslims' frustration over the continued non-resolution to the Bangsamoro problem (Lingga,2006); Anti-Muslim bias, which has re-sulted to lesser opportunities for Muslims (UNDP,2005); the presence of radical Muslims in Mindanao such as the members of the JI; govern-ment deep penetration agents who may unwit-tingly introduce militant ideas and methods to gain confidence of sources; and, CPP/NPA/NDF recruitment of muslims to be guerillas of the moro resistance and liberation organization.

Meanwhile, Rohan Gunaratna notes that the early years of the JI, in an effort to seek the additional funding for their cause, JI leaders Ab-dullah Sungkar and Abu Bakr Ba'asyir went to saudi arabia to establish contact with the muja-

hidin in Afghanistan. This opened the gateway for JI members to be politicized and radicalized – JI members were trained militarily and exposed to armed jihad (Gunaratna,2005)

According to Rabasa, there are several indicators of Islamic radicalism (Rabasa,2006).

1. A willingness to use or justify violence to attain religious and objectives;

2. Insistence in a form of government, such as an Islamic state or other non-sectarian form;

3. Preference for a political or legal orien-tation, such as the strict application of Islamic law; and,

A partiality against the rights of women and religious minorities, w/c would in-volve denying them of political rights. Education and advancement, or their basic freedom to worship.

Although radical groups – compared to extremist – may not advocate violence, they none-theless exhibit a lower tolerance for the beliefs of other people or cultures, which may in turn lower their reluctance to acquiesce or take part in the use of violence for Islamist ends (Rabasa, 2006).

Radicalism and violent extremism are re-lated but distinct phenomena. There are stages of radicalization that do not incorporate violence but

have the potential to lead individuals to violence (Rabasa, 2006).

The IPI view indicates a lesser threshold. It notes that being “radical” is the mere possession of extremist views and a willingness to use vio-lence in the pursuit of extremist, racist, or political objectives. They are those who advocate or use violence against the will of the larger social body or enforce the will on a social body (RRG, 2008).

Furthermore, a religious radical is an ex-treme, violent version of a religious fundamental-ist. Instead of opting for gradual change, a radical prefers a “more revolutionary strategy” for chang-ing society in the shortest time possible (Ramakrishna, 2006).

Terrorism

There is much debate on terrorism and when a violent act consist one. Terrorism is de-fined in a lot of ways by different people, varying mostly from a cultural perspective. However, there are two common points among the defini-tions. These are the causing of widespread or ex-traordinary fear among the populace and the ob-jective of coercion of the government to give in to the terrorist group's demands (Republic Act 9372 s. 2007).

Terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence for the purpose of inducing extreme fear.

Under this definition, terrorism is a tactic or strat-egy-- one that can be employed by a state, as well as by a sub-state, a non-state, or individual actors. This second subset terrorism activity is what gov-ernments and readers ordinarily have in mind when referring to terrorism. It excludes state sup-ported terrorism, which is addressed by the laws of war, international condemnation of repression, and other activities outside what is usually consid-ered to be counter-terrorism (Davis, et.al., 2009).

Usual characteristics of that type include (Hoffman, 1998)

1. The existence of a terrorist organization with a chain of command or cell structure;

2. Actual or imminent threats or acts of violence against noncombatants;

3. Intended repercussions beyond immediate tar-gets, and,

4. The pursuit of political goals.

Necessary requisites for the act of terror-ism include the sowing of uncontrollable fear for the purpose of achieving political purpose (RA 9273 s. 2007).

Radicalization Radicalization is the process of becoming a radical. It often occurs when ideology is power-ful enough to motivate and propel ordinary human beings into action. Jihadi ideologues and group leaders craft their ideology by interpreting, rein-terpreting or misinterpreting religion and politics (Gunaranta, 2005).

Radicalization is the process of wanting to engage in a terrorist act (Barret and Bokhain, 2002), which is spurred by:

1. Group socialization processes which assure in-dividuals that their chosen path is correct, build up socially-motivated courage, and help to dehuman-ize selected targets.

2. Expected rewards for participation in terrorism which does not only delve on heavenly gains of martyrdom, but also friendships and camaraderie solidified in the terror cell or organization, the social status derived from membership and finan-cial rewards.

Religious rewards include forgiveness of the martyr's sins, access to heaven and commun-ion with God, the ability to guarantee access to paradise for 70 relatives or friends, and the belief that the martyr will be greeted in heaven to enjoy the sexual pleasure of 72 virgins (Soibelman, 2004).

Participation in terrorist activity is also considered a fulfillment of a divine mandate. Membership in the JI, that called for self-sacrifice was seen as a “'no fuss' path to heaven”' as JI members believe that they could not be involved in any wrong as their leaders were noted to be quoting religious texts before any activity (Gunaranta, 2005).

Financial rewards are seen as the main recruitment incentive for the ASG, where money from kidnappings has led to an increase in the number of recruits, who “spanned the spectrum from out of work farmers to opportunistic youths looking to make 'a fast buck'' (Cragin et al., 2006).

3. A felt need to respond to grievances based on a strong sense of necessity which is a perceived duty to defend people or achieve revenge for ei-ther personal or collective wrong. Such need to respond stems from perceived alienation and dis-crimination, which may be social, economic or political in nature.

In the Philippines, individuals predisposi-tion to radicalism is attributed to discrimination factors with purported historical basis, such as economic neglect by the Filipino government, dis-possession of ancestral Muslim lands by Chris-tians, and attempts to forcibly assimilate Muslim communities into wider Catholic Philippine polity (Cragin et al., 2006)

4. A passion for change which might be religious (as in establishing an Islamic caliphate) or politi-cal 9as in revolution against repression).

According to a process framework of the New York City Police Department, individual or personal radicalization is a gradual process that goes through four phases:

1. Pre-radicalization, which consists of the in-dividual's personal situation before exposure to, and adaptation of the jihadi-Salafi Islam. Many leaders of radical groups began as unremarkable individuals. ASG leader Abdurajak Janjalani stud-ied in a conservative Catholic school; Erstwhile MILF leader Ustadz Hashim Salamat attended public schools; RSM Leader Hilarion “Ahmad” Santos was an Ilocanno from Pangasinan (Saez interview, 26 June 2009). 2. Self-identification is the phase where indi-viduals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, and gradu-ally veer away from their old identity, associate with like-minded individuals/groups whose ideol-ogy they adopt as their own. There are many fac-tors that facilitate this stage. In addition to the per-sonal expression of faith are other factors. For Janjalani, it was a sense of alienation because of his perception that the government was not doing anything to respond to the Muslim's request for self-determination. For Salamat, his conservative-ness was highlighted in his exposure to Islamic

culture and civilization during his education in Mecca. On the part of Santos, his spiritual awak-ening was a catalyst (Saez interview, 26 June 2006). Santos studied several religions but was drawn to Islam above all because of the beautiful passages in the Noble Qur'an 9Santos interview, 9 June 209). Indoctrination is the phase where belief are en-riched, where a person adopts jihadi-Salafi ideol-ogy and is convinced that the conditions exist to justify any action required to support and further the cause. It is actually a “turning point” when one becomes more alienated from his previous life and enters the “new life”. Janjalani was expected to wahabbism as he established ties with other muja-hideen as he established ties with other muja-hideen in the Middle East and Pakistan. For Salamat, it was his education at the Al-Azhar Uni-versity in Cairo, Egypt. Meanwhile, Santos' expo-sure to Islamists in Qur'anic centers in Saudi Ara-bia where he worked as an overseas Filipino worker (OFW) ensured that he imbibed the Salafi brand of Islam ( Saez interview, 26 June 2009). Jihadization is the phase where members of a cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-discipline and self-designate themselves as mujahideen. It is usually at this stage where personalities, who started remarkably organize organizations through which their avowed adherence to jihad would be realized. Thus, the establishment of the ASG, MILF, and

the RSM . ` Professor Sarlito Sarwono of the Center of Psychological Research, University of Indone-sia motes of a similar process. In this paper titled, “Analysis of Indonesian Terrorists”, Professor Sarwono says hat radicalization in wahabi-salafi Islamic pesantrens in Indonesia starts with a radi-cal teacher spotting potential mujahideen from among students who want only to learn normal Arabic schooling. These potential mujahideen are then separated from other students to attend more advanced classes.

Orientation Phase which normally takes around six months. During this phase , the stu-dents or “talib” are briefed on the general pre-cepts. There is much affirmation at this stage as the student is constantly assured that he is on the apth of becoming a full-pledged “mumin” (faithful believer) and that his continuance in the training will make him a hero or a leader.

The experience Phase during which the student is exposed to a series of lessons on why the world is “kuffar” ( unbeliever) and why it has turned its back on the beauty of Islam . This nor-mally takes another six months.

The Indoctrination Phase which is char-acterized by subtle brainwashing and indoctrina-tion. Islamic theory is merged with ideology. Stu-dents are eventually required to write articles and make stirring speeches on why the world is wrong

in abandoning the truth.

The Execution Phase which is post – orientation phase. After orientation and indoctrination, this students are generally put in a pre-operative trip or mission test where they implement what they have learned in their previous training or phases. This is where they are on mission test where they some-time link up with a terror group.

The duration for radicalization is not definite and may vary from person to person. In 2008, the British MI-5 estimated that it took roughly 18 months on average for an individual to become radicalized enough to conduct an attack. Meanwhile, the process from radicaliza-tion to violence also happens by stages, some trig-gering a change beyond which there may be less chance of return, or for some, no return at all. This is the precisely the reason why some counter-terrorists experts firmly view that once a radical-ized individual crosses into violence, there is no point in trying to rehabilitate him and that any ap-pearance of rehabilitation will be deceitful and short-lived, i.e. De-radicalization or even disen-gagement are of no moment (Barrett and Bokhari, 2005). De-radicalization is a process that leads an individual (or group) to change his attitudes about violence – specifically bout the appropriate-ness of violence against civilians. It can be ideo-logical which results from a change in beliefs, be-havioral which emphasizes changes in actions , or

organizational which is a group level phenomenon that, if successful, would move the entire group away from terrorism (Noricks,2009). It may be voluntary (Personal decision) or involuntary (demobilization, incarceration or death) De-radicalization or the process of elimi-nating radicalism may be a long drawn process that would result into the willingness of key par-ticipants to turn state witness against his group, reduction in the number of potential recruits through media campaigns featuring former mem-bers, and reduction in size of violent groups through defections, among others. Since ideology can be powerful enough to motivate and impel men to act, to counter the threat posed by a group, its operational infrastruc-ture must be dismantled and its conceptual infra-structure eroded (Gunaratna, 2005). De-radicalization vs Disengagement These are two aspects of de-radicalization: de-radicalization proper and disen-gagement. Although used interchangeably, the IPI notes that de-radicalization and disengagement are distinct social and psychological processes. De-radicalization implies a cognitive shift, or a fundamental change in understanding, while disengagement refers to a behavioral change, which connotes the relinquishment of vio-lence.. it means leaving a group or changing one's role within it. De-radicalization is group-directed, while disengagement is more person-oriented.

In both cases, however, a cognitive open-ing must arise where a member/members become receptive to alternative views. There is a need to clarify the distinction between de-radicalization (attitudinal modifica-tion) and disengagement (behavioral modifica-tion). From most counter terrorism perspectives, disengagement, is more important than de-radicalization, since the former can occur without the latter (Horgan, 2008). Push and Pull factors (Garfinkel, 2007) There are certain push and pull factors that impact on the ability of a person to de-radicalize. Push factors are “negative circumstances or social forces that make continued membership in an organization unattractive.” These include criminal prosecution, parental or social disap-proval, counter-violence from oppositional groups, loss of faith in ideology or politics of group, discomfort with group's violent activities, disillusionment with group's leadership, loss of confidence, status or position in group, ejection from the group, exhausted from tension and uncer-tainty as a member of a targeted group, or in-creased activity in a “competing role,” for exam-ple, political activity that displaces the violent role. On the other hand, pull factors are “opportunities or social forces that attract an indi-vidual to a more promising alternative.” These

might include desire for a normal life, desire to establish a family and take on parental and spousal roles, other changing priorities, new employment or educational opportunities that could be under-mined if group membership were known, new role model or social group or newer, more compelling ideology or belief structure. The effect of push factors can be difficult to determine in advance (Bjorgo, 2006). Negative sanctions may lead more recent members to leave the group, but those same sanctions could also increase members' solidarity within the group as the group bonds together to meet outside threat. The latter is particularly at risk when a negative sanctions are not matched with positive incen-tives.

De-radicalization vs Counter-radicalization The CTITF defines de-radicalization as consisting of “programs that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them from violence. It further defines counter-radicalization as referring to “policies and programs aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path of terrorism. It is used broadly to refer a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programs specifi-cally designed to deter disaffected (and possibly

already radicalized) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists.” Jihad Probably among the most interpreted terms/concepts is that of jihad. However, it is also probably the most misinterpreted. We will refrain from citing the verses in the Noble Qur'an relevant to jihad. However, to provide some basis for discussion, the following definitions are presented: In Imam Raghib Al-Asfahani's Diction-ary of the Qur'an, jihad means a “struggle against a clear invading enemy, or against Satan by reject-ing evil desires, temptations and lust, or against nafs (Oneself) which is regarded as the higher ji-had.” Singapore's RRG defines jihad as the “utmost striving to achieve a desired goal or to abstain from despicable acts” (Mohamed, 2008). It further says that Islamic law opposes all uses of force except in the case of war or punishment of criminals in accordance with the Shari'a. Even in war, the infliction of violence on women and chil-dren is forbidden as is the use of force against ci-vilians. To al Qaeda followers, jihad is justifiable in order to defend the dignity and pride of the na-tion, a noble duty which had been neglected by the Muslim leaders. Moreover, complementary to ji-had is the belief in martyrdom. Al Qaeda's opera-tives firmly believe that Allah guides and rewards

those who sacrifice themselves for a noble cause. A noble death thorough martyrdom has been firmly embedded in their collective psyche. They view their acts as a sacrifice which is needed in order to achieve the goal of establishing the relig-ion of Allah on earth. Their struggle yields one of the two things: victory or martyrdom (Gunaratna, 2005). The word jihad literally means to strug-gle. It is often translated in English as the “holy war”, but that is not the the Arabic meaning. For war in arabic is harb, and fighting in qital (Emerick, 2002). There are two kinds of jihad: the lesser jihad (against evil) and the greater jihad (conquering one's self). Although there are other multiple and conflicting meaning to jihad, it is governed by certain conditions: it cannot be pre-emptive, it must be declared by a state or religious body, and it must not target civilians (Esposito and Moga-hed, 2007; Emerick, 2002). And on a humane level, it is but correct to straighten the notion that once information gathering ends, each arrested person's usefulness likewise comes to an end. Leaving a terrorist group may take a long time. And that disengagement may occur for the follow-ing reasons:

1. Personal trauma that includes combat experi-ence or the loss of a friend or colleague due to violent ideologies or hatred;

2. Disillusionment with the group's leadership; 3. . Stress due to staying with the group of con-

forming to their discreet ways; 4. Desire for a normal civilian life; 5. Competing social relationships or pressure by

family or friends. Former JI leader Abbas spoke of the first two reasons cited above (Abbas, 2006). At least two chapters of his book delve on what he called “falsehoods” and “heresies” perpetrated by Imam Samudra, who has been identified as the field commander of the Bali bombings in 2002 (Resa, 2003). Abbas had expressed remorse when he saw photographs of the Bali bombings, showing inno-cent civilians among the victims. Abbas said that jihad, as Islam provides, does not include causing harm, injury or death to civilians, but only on armed combatants (Abbas, 2006). The book “Who speaks for Islam?”, writ-ten by John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, pre-sents and discusses the results of the multi-year poll of the Muslim World conducted by The Gallup Global Institute from 2001 to 2007. The poll interviewed residents of more than 35 nations which are predominantly Muslim or have a domi-nant Muslim population (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007). The poll intended to obtain the views of

what the book calls the silent majority - the mod-erates – of Muslims worldwide on a variety of themes that includes among others, “What makes a radical?”, “Is there a clash of cultures; i.e. the West versus the Muslim world?” Two reasons why terrorist groups usually end. These are: a group decision to adopt non vio-lent tactics and join the political process through amnesty, peace talks or allowing leaders to seek public office; or, though the neutralization of key members of the group. The study further notes ways in which terrorist groups end: though police or military functions, splintering (competition with other terrorist groups; combining with oth-ers), politics (running for an elective office) and victory. Political scientists define radicalism as a trend to drastic reform. The history of radical movements stretches as far as the 19th Century with the Radicals in the United Kingdom who wanted to extend suffrage and reform the political system. In the 20th Century, Radicals in France and Italy were anti-clerical. The recent phenome-non of radicalism associated with the Muslims is driven by the events of 9/11 and the wave of bombings in key cities worldwide such as in Bali, Madrid, London, Taba and Amman as well as the rise of al Qaeda and its regional affiliates such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI) in Southeast Asia. The disturbing pattern of Islamic fundamentalism

or radicalism, and its undeniable link to the in-creasing lethality of attacks in the 1990s is a sign of a wider development in Islam. Islamic funda-mentalism or revivalism, a religious movement led to Islamic extremism—a violent movement to enforce Islam. Ideologically, the 18th Century Wahabbi Islam in Saudi Arabia and its more radical variant Salafism advocated by Sayyed Qutb are the main forces which shaped Islamic fundamentalism. Scholars and experts in Southeast Asia interchangeably use the terms ‘radical’, ‘militant’, and ‘extremist’ instead of ‘terrorist’. More signifi-cantly, the concept of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism, political Islam and terrorism are elu-sive to rigid definitions and usually employed in a pejorative or derogatory sense. Particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, these concepts have become ‘conflated and confused’. Muslims comprise 5% of Philippine popu-lation. Muslim communities are dominant in Western Mindanao, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Sulu. Thirteen out of 67 provinces have significant Muslim population. Radical movements in the Philippines are not limited to the Muslims. Established in 1969, the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA) aims to overthrow the government through protracted guerilla warfare. Although it mainly draws its membership from Christian communities, some of its bases are

believed to be located in Mindanao. The Univer-sity of the Philippines (UP) played a key role in the leftist movement in the early 70s. Radicalism in Muslim communities can be traced as early as the resistance of the sultan-ates of Sulu and Maguindanao against the Spanish colonization and American occupation. Persistent political marginalization and economic deprava-tion are some of the major factors, which pushed the Muslims towards secessionism. The rise of Islamic consciousness began with the establish-ment of the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) in 1968.

Although the goal of the MIM to form a separate Islamic state failed to gain popular support, it set the stage for a larger secessionist group to arise. In the same year, UP professor Nur Misuari formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Through its armed group, the Bang-samoro People’s Liberation Army, it started an armed insurgency guided by the goal of carving a separate Islamic state. The emergence of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984 under the leadership of Hashim Salamat under-scored the deepening Islamic consciousness among Muslims. The Purpose of this research is to define the Islamicity of the actions of the Radical Fili-pino Muslims and its effects on the Nation-state. The presence of radical elements in a community does not necessarily transform the entire community. Among a selected sampling of officers from the Armed Forces of the Philip-pines (AFP), the perception of a radical Muslim community ranges from passive members of the community from one end of the spectrum to radi-cal elements who actively engage in militant ac-tivities at the other end. The passive members need not necessarily share in the ideological un-derpinnings of the movement but may serve as conduits by keeping silent regarding extremist activities in the area. However, it is the justification for such militancy that gives them will power and the courage to do acts of terrorism and violence.

There are two notable Muslim groups that stood out in the radicalization of Muslim commu-nities in the Philippines in recent years. These are the Al Harakatul al-Islamiyah (AHAI), later to be known as Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Rajah Sulayman Movement (RSM). Based on the chronology of the various Muslim radical groups that have sprung up, radicalism has be-come increasingly extremist and Islamist in recent years. It is a known fact that the Harakatul Al-Islamiyah (also known as the ASG) is working increasingly with the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), militant converts to Islam based in Manila and northern Luzon, who are a vehicle for more experienced terrorist groups to move into the country’s urban heartland. As it pursues peace, the government needs a better security/human rights balance: improved police anti-terrorism capacity but also humane detention and speedier, more transparent prosecution of suspects. The RSM is the radical fringe of the Balik-Islam movement, literally “return to Islam”. Members call themselves “reverts”, not converts, for two reasons. First, they maintain that all hu-mans are born free of sin into Islam, but, misled by parents or guardians, may be brought up in other traditions. When they revert to Islam, they are cleansed of sin. Secondly, they argue that Is-lam was the country’s original religion, whose spread was forcibly reversed by Spanish colonial intervention.

A powerful symbol of this frustrated des-tiny is Rajah Sulayman, Muslim overlord of Ma-nila at the time of the Spanish conquest. What is notable to mention also here is that although the RSM has been of existence for almost two decade it has already been included among other terrorist organizations in the United Nations (UN) 1267 Sanctions list. This may be attributed to the high-profile bombing incidents that the RSM has engaged itself in in coordination with the Al-Harakatul Islamiyyah. Filipino workers returning from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are the most important source of adherents for the more ideological forms of activist Balik-Islam. Ahmed Santos, the RSM leader arrested in October, converted to Islam in 1993, and married into the top ranks of the ASG before RSM was formally established in January 2002, apparently to divert military attention from the Basilan-based ASG. In 2004 and 2005, members of his new group took part in two bombings in the capital region that reflected intertwined relationships be-tween the converts, the ASG who directly handled them, their Indonesian mentors and the MILF commanders who sheltered all three groups. Majority of the Overseas Foreign workers deployed in the Middle East were deployed in the Gulf Countries which were active promoters of Salafi Islam, notable were the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

OFW's who converted to Islam in these coun-tries as well as Muslim Filipinos who worked in these countries became highly influenced by this brand of Islam. The evolution of this movement and finding its way into the Philippine political and religious milieu presents both similar character-istics as well as uniqueness of the situation. Fili-pinos by nature like all Malays are deeply reli-gious as well as temperamental people, people who stand up strongly for their beliefs. One may consider that other than the fact that that those who are drawn towards Salafi Islam may come from diverse backgrounds, not only from the depressed, downtrodden and op-pressed classes, but also Muslims who because of their relative financial stability due to their work in the Middle East (OFW's), who have returned and saved enough money for their families, or those who have Ulama who are trained from the Middle East and funded by Salafi-oriented waqfs, or those who grew up under Salafi communities from Mindanao. Its particular world view can be under-stood by looking at the roots of this ideology in Islamic intellectual history and by realizing that its teachings have been marginal to and opposed

by mainstream Islamic thought.

Muslims in the modern period are either Sunni (90%) or Shi'iah (10%). The distinction pertains to a dispute over the spiritual and politi-

cal leadership of the Muslim community after the death of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).

In matters of politics, two principles are strongly identified with the Sunnis:

they are loath to declare fellow Muslims infi-dels, a practice called takfir;

they prohibit war against Muslim rulers, how-ever tyrannical these may be, so long as Islam remains the religion of state and Islamic law is enforced. Sunnis argue that adherence to these two principles is cru-cial in order to maintain social order and to avoid warfare amongst Muslims which might lead to the demise of Islam itself.

Osama bin Laden and his followers are Sunni Muslims of the Salafi branch. Salafism is a minoritarian tendency within Islam that dates back to the 9th century - under the name of Ahl al-Hadith - and whose central features were crystal-lized in the teachings of a 14th century Islamic scholar, Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).

Ibn Taymiyya's importance lies in that he was willing to hereticize fellow Muslims who did not share his views and, more important, he de-clared permissible war against Muslims rulers who did not apply the Shari'ah (he advocated war against the Mongols who had declared themselves to be Muslims but did not apply Islamic law).

Salafism's hallmark is a call to modern Muslims to revert to the pure Islam of the Prophet Muhammad's generation and the two generations that followed his. Muslims of this early period are referred to as al-Salaf al-Salih (the pious forefa-thers) whence the name Salafi. Salafism's message is utopian, its adherents seeking to transform com-pletely the Muslim community and to ensure that Islam, as a system of belief and governance, should eventually dominate the globe.

Salafis are not against technological pro-gress nor its fruits; they do, however, abhor all innovations in belief and practice that are not an-chored in their conception of the pristine Islamic age. They refer to such reprehensible innovations as Bid'a, a term of deligitimization in Islamic law or the Shari'ah.

According to the Salafis, Muslims can only be certain that they are not practising repre-hensible innovations if they adhere to a strictly literal interpretation of the sources of revelation, and those are the Qur'an and the Sunna (the Sunna is the practice of Prophet Mohammad and can be found exclusively in the canonical collections of accounts of his sayings and doings (hadith)).

Salafis claim to be the only Muslims ca-pable of providing this literal interpretation; all other Muslims would therefore be - to a lesser or greater extent - deviant innovators.

Another salient feature of Salafism is an

obsession with God's oneness while condemning all forms of polytheism (shirk) and unbelief (kufr).

Certain Sufi practices (Sufis are mystics of Islam), such as visiting the graves of the Sufi Masters, are condemned by the Salafis as dimin-ishing true belief in Allah .

The world, according to the Salafis, is unequivocally divided between the domains of belief (iman) and unbelief, and it is incumbent on Muslims to be certain that they remain in the do-main of belief.

This they can do only if they are Salafis. Nothing less than eternal salvation is at stake. The Salafi world view is rigid and Manichean. In its radical form Salafism leads to the practice of tak-fir. This is exactly what Osama bin Laden did, in his November 4 statement: Muslims who are not with him are, by definition, infidels.

The mantle of Ibn Taymiyya's teachings was most famously taken up by a movement in central Arabia in the 18th century. Known to its enemies as the Wahhabi movement, whose adher-ents called themselves the Muwahhidun (The be-lievers in the oneness of God). The Wahhabi's had a powerful reformist message and were able to galvanize the tribes of central Arabia into a power-ful military period.

So great was their zeal to focus all the belief and religious practices of fellow Muslims

on God alone, that the Wahhabis destroyed in 1805 tombs in Medina, including a failed attempt at destroying the cupola over the tomb of Prophet Muhammad.

Such excesses, including the declaration of fellow Muslims to be infidels whose blood could be shed, horrified the wider Muslim world leading the Ottoman Sultan to send an Egyptian military force and destroy the fledgling Wahhabi state. This was accomplished in 1818. The exam-ple the Wahhabi sect, however, left an indelible mark on the world of Islam and the like-minded would look to their experience as a model to be emulated.

King Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa'ud, commonly known as Ibn Sa'ud, the founder of the present Saudi kingdom, based his rule and conquests on Salafi doctrine, and this remains the ideology of Saudi Arabia today.

But Ibn Sa'ud realized quickly that em-bedded in this ideology was the potential for radi-cal extremism and he vanquished militarily his own radicals, otherwise known as the Ikhwan, in 1930.

The radical Salafis raised their heads again in November 1979 when one of their lead-ers, Juhayman al-Utaybi, led a revolt in Makkah that seized control of the Great Mosque for two weeks. As they had done in 1930, the Saudi au-thorities attacked al-Utaybi and his followers, kill-

ing every last one in a bloody battle in the Makkan sanctuary.

However, it is important to know two fea-tures that distinguish the official Salafism of the Saudi kingdom from the teachings of these radical Salafis. The Saudis believe that: 1) war against an Islamic ruler is not permitted, and 2) declaring fellow Muslims to be infidels is also not permit-ted. For this reason, the Saudi minister of Islamic Affairs stated on October 19, in the aftermath of the WTC attacks, that "obedience to Islamic rulers is obligatory for Muslims."

A principal reason radical Salafis like Osama bin Laden advocate violence against the Saudi state and the United States relates to the presence of US troops on Saudi soil. By permit-ting this, Osama says the Saudis are no longer ad-hering to Islamic law and consequently war against them is permissible.

Osama bin Laden bases his claim about the illegality of the presence of US troops on a statement of Prophet Mohammad in which the Prophet says: "Expel the polytheists from the Arabian peninsula."

Literally understood, the injunction is clear. Non-Salafis, i.e., the vast majority of Mus-lims, disagree with Osama's judgement. The non-Salafis counter with another statement of the Prophet in which he says: "Expel the Jews of Hi-jaz from the peninsula of the Arabs."

The reference to the Jews is to be read as a synecdoche (for non-Muslims: Hijaz is a region of Arabia and this second Prophetic statement nar-rows the more general first statement. In other words, non-Muslims are permitted to reside in Arabia, but not in Hijaz, the region of the twin sanctuaries of Makkah and Medina.)

Such differences in abstruse legal opin-ions, however, do not explain Osama bin Laden's massive appeal among Muslims today. It is his genius at manipulating images and symbols, as well as his ability to tap into a wellspring of legiti-mate Muslim and Arab resentment of US foreign policies, that explains his success. Muslims live under the yoke of authoritarian regimes - regimes that have succeeded in destroying the fabric of traditional Muslim education and networks of knowledge and socialization.

Most Muslims therefore do not appreciate or understand legal arguments like the one stated above. What Muslims react to enthusiastically is Osama's role as a leader and symbol of Muslim resistance to domestic and western oppression. This reaction is fuelled by a century of arguments promoted by the Arab regimes that all the prob-lems of the Arab and Muslim worlds are due to foreign intrigue, and are not because of any poli-cies or actions of the Arab and Muslim leaders themselves.

This reasoning explains, for example, the

eagerness with which so many Arabs and Muslims have accepted the conspiratorial theories that the attacks of September 11 were the work of Jews and Zionists.

Thus far, moderate Sunni Muslims have been reluctant to condemn Osama bin Laden in light of the events of September 11. This is a con-sequence of the quiescent political culture Sunnis subscribe to: pointing fingers at fellow believers might lead to a state of chaotic disorder they fear most.

Moreover, the present conflict involves unbelievers and Muslims prefer not to air their differences in public. Another reason for this con-spicuous silence is that moderates feel the evi-dence Osama bin Laden in the attacks has not been provided by the US government.

Finally, the fear of violent retaliation by the radical Salafis has kept many silent. Moderate Muslims, many of whom have been and continue to be oppressed by Arab and Muslim govern-ments, do exist and must be encouraged to take centre stage. We can take heart from the fact that most Muslims have not heeded Osama's call to kill innocent Americans wherever and whenever they find them.

In short, the battle being waged today is at heart an internal Islamic one and may take a very long time to end. It is part of a larger battle about the very nature of Islamic society and politics, and

one in which there are many sides (moderate Mus-lims, state-sponsored Muslims, radical and moder-ate Salafis, secular nationalists, and Shi'ah .

Chapter 5

Islam in Manila and the Origins of the Al Harakatul Al Islamiyah and the Rajah Sulay-

man Movement Only about 10 per cent of Manila’s Mus-lims are believed to be converts. The rest are mostly migrants from the south who tend to con-gregate in ethnic enclaves around mosques, mar-kets and cemeteries. The influx of Muslim born refugees from Mindanao’s endemic conflicts, which crested in the late 1970s, reestablished a significant Islamic presence in Manila for the first time in four centuries. As recently as the 1950s, a small group of converts who approached the Philippines’ sole Muslim senator at the time, Domocao Alonto, seeking help in organising Friday prayers, were confronted by the “sad fact” that Manila was with-out a single mosque. This group, known as the Believers in Islam from the Island of Luzon (Muhminin al-Islam Fil Balad il-Luzon), was founded in 1953 by a former Catholic, Imam Mu-hammad al-Lauhi de Leon. It had about 50 mem-bers by 16 March 1956, when, at the senator’s residence, the “very first Jumaah Prayer after about 400 years of foreign domination was held in full congregation in Manila, where practically

every trace of anything Islamic had been eradi-cated”. The prayer was led by Ustadz Ilyas Ismail of the Indonesian embassy. Efforts by the Muslim Association of the Philippines (Musaphil) to establish a permanent site for worship bore little fruit until July 1964, when a small lot was acquired that became the nucleus of today’s Islamic Centre in Quiapo. A rudimentary mosque built by residents was renovated in 1975, and again in the early 1980s, by which time a flood of mainly Maranao migrants from the Lanao provinces of Mindanao had increased the settlement’s Muslim population to about 25,000, including many transients. Its Golden Mosque on the north bank of the Pasig River, built with Saudi and Libyan funds, now serves Manila’s best-known Muslim community. Eventually This gave rise to a number Muslim communities in Metro Manila, most nota-ble are the areas of (a) Maharlika Village, estab-lished by Imam Khusin, Tausug immigrant, (b) Salam Compound in Tandang Sora , Islamic cen-ter at Globo De Oro Quiapo as well as the Golden Mosque Cultural Center in Quiapo Manila. The Economic crisis that followed in the world eventually sent our OFW's to the Middle east where it leads us to the gradual conversion of OFW's into Salafi Islam, the school of thought that is practiced in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The evolution of the Militant Salafi organiza-tions in the Philippines. The creation of the Al-Harakatul al Islamiyyah (to be subsequently referred to as the ASG) in 1989 by the late Abdurajak Janjalani manifested a more extreme interpretation of the teachings of Islam and intolerant to other faiths or even to what it considers as lax interpretations of the Quranic teachings by fellow Muslims. The ASG personifies the teachings of the Salafi /Wahabbi school of thought originating from Saudi Arabia and clearly shows the influence of Salafi political thought of which has a strong orientation of the political thought of Sayyid Qutb. A 1996 videotape of the late Abdurajak Janjalani, the latter revealed the objective of the Al Harakatul Al-Islamiyah—the Islamization of the whole Philippines. In the said tape, he was quoted to have said “Islam must govern not only in Sulu, but in the whole world. This is the objec-tive of the Islamic movement. As for us, Allah permits, this will become a cause with our blood and soul we must be able to get Mindanao and let Islam govern. It is incumbent upon us to also in-clude Visayas and Luzon to be governed by Islam. Even the entire Philippines, as mandated by Al-lah.” The ASG has standing plans to conduct ter-rorist activities in Metro Manila and Zamboanga City. The ASG has been able to influence and infiltrate a substantial number of barangays in Mindanao from where it taps its members and

supporters. The Balik Islam The Balik Islam refers to the various groups of Muslim converts, a loose conglomera-tion of Christians who converted to the Islamic faith based on the concept that Filipinos used to be Muslims or pagans baptized and converted by Spanish colonizers or missionaries. There is no discernible pattern on the state of mind, educa-tional background and social status of people who converted to Islam. However some of the factors that attracted them include access to employment in Islamic countries, quest for purity and abhor-rence of materialism and perceived immorality of secular society. Among the identified venues for recruit-ment are overseas Islamic centers, mosques and Islamic schools or madaris. The Balik Islam is vulnerable to penetra-tion by extremist groups which sow radicalism among the converts. This is how the Rajah So-laiman Movement came to being. Rajah Sulayman Movement (RSM) The RSM was founded by Muslim con-vert Hilarion Santos III alias Ahmad in 2001. San-tos was an OFW in Saudi Arabia in 1992 where he was converted to Islam and became a member of the Islamic Society Call and Guidance (ISCAG) when he returned to the country in 1993. The RSM is the underground armed wing of the Fi-

Sabilillah Dawah and Media Foundation Incorpo-rated (FSDMFI), which Santos founded in 1995 to propagate Islam. On the other hand, the apparent legal front of the FSDMFI is the Balik-Islam Unity Congress (BIUC), which was set up in 2003 and which was headed by Michael Abrera aka Mik-hail, to organize and mobilize the Muslim con-verts in the country. The RSM represents another transforma-tion in the type of Muslim and even Islamic radi-calism as compared to the ASG, the MILF or the MNLF. It has brought the struggle of the various Muslim radical groups outside of Mindanao and into Christian-dominated areas such as here in the capital, Manila. It has also changed the demo-graphic profile of Muslim radicals in the Philip-pines from Muslim-born Mindanao-based radicals to Christian converts to Islam who reside outside of Mindanao and in urban areas. Since the 1990s, there had been a noted significant increase in the number of Muslim con-verts in predominantly Christian areas. Locally, this is called the Balik-Islam movement, a loose conglomeration of Christian converts to the Is-lamic faith based on the concept that Filipinos need to revert to Islam since our ancestors, who were either Muslims or pagans, were baptized as Catholics by the Spanish colonizers.

The new converts have displayed impres-sive zeal and piety. While the majority of the Balik-Islam do not pose a threat to the coun-try,being regular Muslims and who are trying to eke out an existence and means of livelihood; the existence of radical groups, such as the Rajah So-laiman Movement, (RSM) does as they actively propagate the existence of an Islamic state and the Salafi Political thought that encourages them to break laws of the state. The RSM is the newest among the list of radical Muslim groups and regarded as the most radical Balik-Islam group in the country today. It is believed to have been established in 2000, although its existence became known to authorities only in 2002. RSG aims to lead the Islamization of the whole Philippines beginning with the establishment of Muslim communities in Luzon. The RSM is decentralized and, at the same time, compartmentalized making it flexible and, hence, difficult to detect. The RSM is com-prised mainly of Islamic front organizations and loose cell groups with members distributed throughout Luzon. It is believed to have five cells operating in Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Metro Manila, Southern Tagalog and the Bicol Region. Thus far, the RSM has 22 identified mem-bers, several of whom were arrested during the 2002 raids in Tarlac and Pangasinan. However, most of the arrested were released for lack of evi-

dence or were allowed to post bail. The RSM is headed by Hilarion Santos III (alias Ahmad Islam Santos). He was arrested on 26 October 2005 in Zamboanga City. Santos established the madaris that were raided in Tarlac and Pangasinan and he also man-aged the Fi-Sabilillah and Dawah Media Founda-tion Incorporated (FSDMFI), a non-government organization based in Quezon City. The FSDMFI was established in the early 1990s by Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. The financial and logistical support of the RSM are being channeled to the organization by its members who are entrenched among the differ-ent charitable Islamic NGOs. It uses its Islamic front organizations to channel funds through per-sonal couriers or electronic transactions, espe-cially those coming from foreign sources. Following government counteraction op-erations against the ASG, authorities uncovered the RSM’s linkage with foreign personalities be-longing to Islamic NGOs, the ASG, the MILF and the Jemaah Islamiyah, particularly slain member Fathur Roman al-Ghozi who purportedly sought refuge at an RSM cell after his escape from the PNP detention cell in July 2003. Al-Ghozi also directed RSM members to launch attacks in Metro Manila in May 2002, a plan that was foiled as a result of the arrest of RSM members earlier that month.

It must be noted that the separate raids on the FSDMI office and a suspected terrorist lair in Quezon City in March 2004 unravelled the RSM’s planned terrorist operations in the Metropolis and the extent of its connections with the ASG. The most notorious of those arrested was ASG mem-ber Alhamser Manatad Limbong (alias Kosovo) who, along with Redendo Cain Dellosa, was re-sponsible for the bombing of Super-Ferry-14 in February 2004. Kosovo underwent training on demolition and other terror tactics in Central Min-danao under JI instructors. Further revelations by captured Muslim converts bared that the RSM is linked to ASG member Gamal Baharan (alias Tapay) who, along with RSM-turned ASG member Khalid Trinidad, was involved in the 2005 Valentine’s day bomb-ing in Makati City. Remarkably, the RSM has been effective in conducting operations because of the members’ ability to easily assimilate with the populace. They talk, move and behave like Christians and resi-dents of Luzon that render them less conspicuous and difficult to track. In conducting terror attacks, the RSM has been joining forces with the more experienced groups, such as the MILF and the ASG, utilizing their expertise to ensure greater chances of success. In fact, the RSM employs urban bombing operations in coordination with the ASG and some MILF elements in Luzon, apparently in support of jihad activities in Mindanao.

There is increasing linkage between and among the various Muslim radical organizations within the country and with actors from outside the Philippines. These are manifested in two com-plementary fronts, namely: armed Muslim radical groups (MNLF/MBG, MILF, ASG, RSM) and non-armed Islamic organizations who support them and propagate the ideas of Islamic extrem-ism. They take place simultaneously and mutually help each other to realize the final objective of building an Islamic order. It is for this reason that there are collaborations among al-Qaeda, JI, SPSGs and the Islamic NGOs on personal and/or ideological grounds. Al-Qaeda’s activities in the Philippines since the 1980s have been apparently confirmed by the reported presence of its members in SPSG lairs providing training or money to SPSG leaders directly or through Islamic NGOs. Among the organizations that have been formed or used to propagate the tenets of extremism or to finance the training/logistical needs of the SPSGs are the In-ternational Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), Islamic Studies Call and Guidance (ISCAG), Muslim World League (MWL), Mercy Founda-tion of the Philippines Incorporated (MFPI), Is-lamic Dawah Council of the Philippines (IDCP), World Assembly of Muslim Youths (WAMY), and the Fisabilillah Media Public Service Incorpo-rated (FMPSI). Most of these organizations are identified with Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s

brother-in-law, who was in the Philippines several times in the past. Moreover, some of the organiza-tions that are being manipulated by the extremists, such as the Rabitatul Mualimin, World Islamic Dawah Council (WIDC) and the IIRO, are sub-committees of the OIC and get their funds from the latter. What should be stressed here is that al-though these organizations are legally compliant with government directives, it would be noted that certain individuals who are part of these institu-tions and are part of the al-Qaeda machinery are the ones that clandestinely funnel funds without the express knowledge and permission of the head agencies concerned.

Chapter 6

The Evolution Leading Acts of terrorism con-

ducted by Radical Filipino Muslims

In August 1995, Santos set up his own organisation, the Fi-Sabilillah Da'wah and Media Foundation, with the help of another ISCAG offi-cer, Abdullah Gacuan. Its stated objective was to “propagate the true essence of Islam and to correct misconceptions about Islam and Muslims”. Santos bought airtime to broadcast his views on regular radio and television slots and published a newspa-per. These activities allowed him to establish contact with MILF leaders Salamat Hashim and

Al-Haj Murad and to weave an increasingly intri-cate web of personal and organisational contacts into a firm support base. At its foundation was an important Balik-Islam kinship alliance with the Abu Sayyaf Group. Santos’ ties with the ASG were likely substantial by January 1999, when he took a sec-ond wife, also a convert,named Nurain (formerly Loraine) Dongon, from Cagayan de Oro City in northern Mindanao. One of Nurain’s three sisters, Zainab, is married to ASG leader Kadaffy Jan-jalani, while another, Amina, is the wife of Jan-jalani’s secondin- command, Jainal Antel Sali, alias Abu Solaiman. Furthermore, a brother, Jaffar Dongon, is probably the ASG operative identified by one of the Valentine’s Day bombers as Abu Tarik. At the same time as marrying into the top ranks of the ASG, Santos consolidated his Arab connections, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca in March 1999,working with the Islamic Wisdom Worldwide Mission (IWWM) from June 1999, and becoming a “business partner” of the MER-C International foundation in March 2000. These relationships with organizations established by close associates of Mohammad Ja-mal Khalifa, a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden and head of the IIRO in the Philippines between 1988 and 1994, boosted Santos’s stature and ac-cess to funds, which he used to expand Fi-Sabilillah’s Purdue Street office into a four-storey Islamic Centre.

Santos was joined in 2001 by a shadowy but significant figure with his own Saudi and ASG connections, Sheikh Omar Lavilla. Formerly known as Reuben Lavilla, an Ilonggo convert with a degree in chemical engineering from the Univer-sity of the Philippines, he had recently returned from Russia, where he is said to have taken part in the Chechen jihad, possibly marrying a local woman. Of particular value to Santos were La-villa’s qualifications as a graduate of the Islamic University of Medina, where he specialised in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and hadithic science, re-portedly mastering all four Sunni schools of law. Lavilla lectured regularly to groups of about twenty followers at Purdue Street, emphasizing the theme of shirk (idolatry) and the struggles against oppression of Muslims around the world. He drew heavily on the “sword verses”of surah al-Anfal and al-Tawbah, and compared Jews to“animals who rape and steal”. Santos’ ties with the ASG were further reinforced by Lavilla who was Khadafi Janjalani's classmate,having trained alongside Janjalani at the Darul Imam Shafi’ie academy in 1992. This institution, set up in Marawi City in 1989 by Khalifa’s IIRO, provided religious instruction combined with military and explosives training at the MILF’s Camp Busrah in Butig, Lanao del Sur. Lavilla and Janjalani may have received instruction in bomb-making directly from Wali Khan Amin Shah, a close associate of bin Laden’s

and a key personality in Ramzi Yousef’s terrorist cell in Manila in 1994-1995. But police interest in Santos seems to date only from November 2001, when complaints of persistent gunfire on his family property in Anda, Pangasinan, led a local judge to issue a search warrant. The closing off of the property to fisher-men, who had always crossed it to reach the shoreline, had also aroused local suspicions, as did Santos’s eviction of the tenants and unusual com-ings and goings at all hours of the night. When municipal police raided the prop-erty early on the morning of 27 November 2001, they found about twenty young men sleeping in a temporary building and two pistols licensed to Santos. No resistance was offered, and the police made no arrests,but the suspicious activity contin-ued and came to the attention of provincial and national police intelligence. An incident in a Tarlac City bus station on 1 May 2002 led authorities back to Anda. Two men, Khalid Trinidad and Dexter Mayuno, were in-volved in a confrontation with police, who re-ported shooting Trinidad dead and seizing hand-guns and grenades from the pair. Under question-ing, Mayuno pointed to the Santos property and a second site in San Clemente, Tarlac, as training camps of the previously unknown RSM. Over the next three days, teams using dogs recovered four assault rifles, two shotguns,

two pistols, 22 rifles and fragmentation grenades, three Claymore mines and other bomb parapher-nalia from the sites. Officials found an obstacle course, foxholes, outposts and bullet-pocked tar-gets on the Anda property. Six men were arrested in Anda and two in San Clemente, about 100 kilo-metres to the south. Santos was apparently in the early stages of an attempt to emulate the MILF’s training sys-tem in Mindanao, after participating with four other converts in a “special training course” at Camp Busrah six months earlier. Two of the RSM detainees – all released on bail after being charged with illegal possession of firearms and explosives – described a 45-day program of Arabic and Is-lamic study in Anda, and physical and martial arts training, followed by more advanced instruction in guerrilla tactics and bomb-making, at the San Clemente site. According to another of the Anda suspects interviewed by Crisis Group, explosives training had not yet begun when the camps were broken up, but plans for an operation of some sort in Tar-lac City or Manila were underway in San Clemente. Members of this cohort, which included Khalid Trinidad, Mayuno, and probably five other men reported to have fled the scene of the Tarlac City shooting, may have been on a test mission involving vehicle theft and kidnapping. Led by Lavilla, who left Anda days before the raid, the RSM training program drew a mixed bag of converts, not all of whom were aware of its

full implications. Santos, who had inherited the Anda property following his grandfather’s death in 1996, presented it to some of his Fi-Sabilillah followers as a utopian retreat where they could farm and practice an Islamic lifestyle free of the surrounding society’s corrupting influences. This had special appeal for the landless and for converts shunned by their families or ex-periencing other forms of alienation. But docu-ments recovered at Anda revealed that some mem-bers of a first batch of fifteen recruits “backed out upon learning the true mission of the group”. According to one Anda trainee, the imme-diate objective of the RSM, formally established at the Purdue Street compound on Santos’s return from Camp Busrah in early January 2002, was to divert military attention from the Basilan-based ASG. Preparations for unprecedented U.S.-Philippine joint “Balikatan” exercises in the ASG stronghold began in October 2001, with U.S. Spe-cial Forces deploying to the island in February 2002. The RSM may have been planning a di-versionary strike in the northern Philippines with the help of JI operative Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, who was arrested in Manila on 15 January 2002. Santos must have temporarily scaled back his offensive ambitions after this major blow but several of his Anda trainees would resurface in actual or attempted bombings later. On 13 October 2002, Santos presided as

amir [leader] over the first Balik-Islam Unity Congress (BIUC). According to a senior Philip-pine counter-terrorism official, no more than twenty or 30 of the 100 delegates had militant leanings but Santos was acclaimed as a victim of “discrimination” and “crucifixion” by the broad-based gathering that included two Muslim con-gressmen. That support was indicative of a defensive structure of interlocking advocacy organizations that RSM members, including Santos until late 2005, have been able to use to shield themselves from police. Santos’s arrest was undoubtedly a major blow to the RSM but since it appears that his seven close associates detained at the same time did not belong to the original Anda core group, we should assume two things: first, that the RSM has continued to attract new blood, and secondly, that the surviving members of the original cohort are at large and potentially dangerous. In 2004 and 2005, converts have carried out two bombings in the capital region that reflect the close ties they enjoy with the ASG, which di-rectly handled them, their Indonesian mentors and the MILF commanders, who sheltered all three groups. The first attack, on 27 February 2004, re-sulted in the sinking of an inter-island ferry,SuperFerry 14, with the loss of 116 lives. It was the worst act of maritime terrorism in recent memory. The ASG claimed responsibility, and the

self-confessed perpetrator, Redondo Dellosa, was arrested four weeks later. The second, on 14 Feb-ruary 2005, killed four bus passengers in Manila’s Makati business district and was coordinated with blasts in Davao and General Santos cities in the south. The Makati bomber, Angelo Trinidad – like Dellosa, a convert to Islam – admitted his guilt, as well as his ties to the ASG and JI. The story of how these alliances emerged shows the complexity of terrorist networks in the Philip-pines. The Al Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah (or erstwhile Abu Sayyaf Group-ASG) The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has been known as one of the more important terrorist groups operating and posing a serious threat in the Philippines in Southeast Asia. Founded in 1991 by Abdurrajak Janjalani, a veteran of the Afghan Mu-jiheddin and colleague of Osama bin Laden, the group quickly rose to prominence as a lethal ter-rorist organization committed to the establishment of an independent Islamic state. With funds from Saudi charities adminis-tered by bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, the ASG grew quickly. The group focused its terrorist, assassina-tion, and kidnapping efforts on sectarian targets. Yet, following the plot led by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to blow up 11 U.S.jetliners and assassinate the Pope, Khalifa’s

and the ASG’s roles were uncovered. Khalifa was unable to return to the Philip-pines, and while his charities remained open, they were unable to support the larger Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the ASG as they had in the past. The ASG was further weakened by a number of arrests and the death of their founder in December 1998. The group quickly degenerated into a number of violent, though hardly political, kidnappers. The group gained international notoriety in 2000 with high-profile raids on diving resorts in Palawan and Sipidan, Malaysia, which led to the deaths of several tourists, including Americans. The 2000 kidnapping of the Burnhams, along with the group’s previous connections with al Qaeda, were the the cassus belli for the U.S. military to re-engage in the Philippines following the Sep-tember 11, 2001, attacks by al Qaeda. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo pledged close support for Operation EN-DURING FREEDOM, and with that came consid-erable military assistance and training, beginning in early 2002. U.S. forces provided training and intelligence support for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, while U.S. naval engineers engaged in popular civic action campaign in Basilan. The ASG struck back in October 2002, detonating a bomb that killed a U.S. Special Forces Officer. Since then, it dramatically cut back on its kidnappings, while at the same time

began to engage in a systematic campaign of ter-rorism. In partnership with the Rajah Sulayman group, they had initiated a series of terrorist opera-tions among them was February 2004, operatives blew up a SuperFerry out of Manila, killing 194 people. On Valentine’s Day, 2005, with the RSM, they executed a triple bombing across three cities. ASG members have engaged in a number of other attacks while several others have been disrupted. Why the sudden shift back to terrorism? It was the confluence of internal and ex-ternal factors. Internally, there was a change in leadership within the organization. Abu Sabaya and Ghalib Andang, the leaders most responsible for the kidnappings, had been killed and captured, respectively. This allowed Khadaffy Janjalani, the younger brother of the group’s founder, to con-solidate his leadership and bring the organization back to its roots. The ASG was also trying to benefit from the ongoing peace process between the GRP and the MILF. The ASG began to search for hardline members of the MILF, who were sure to reject an autonomy agreement with the government. Other factors were also at work. In 2002, the leaders of al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), were reeling from a number of ar-rests of operatives that had occurred around the region. That year they decided to forge closer ties with the ASG and invited them to begin training with JI within the MILF’s camps in Mindanao.

The ASG readily agreed. While the MILF publicly denies the relationship with both the ASG and JI, a number of arrests in the Philippines, Malay-sia, and Indonesia of key JI suspects confirms that the training of JI recruits in Mindanao has continued. Moreover, in a number of terrorist incidents that have transpired in the past 2 years, it has been all but im-possible to differentiate between the groups: JI mem-bers provide training to MILF and ASG members in MILF camps. Members of the MILF and ASG engage in joint terrorist operations. Despite their denials to the contrary, considerable evidence suggests that the MILF continues to coddle JI and ASG members. However, as the MILF is currently engaged in a peace process with the GRP, the Philippine gov-ernment continues to give them the benefit of the doubt and has resisted pressure from the United States to follow a harsher line against them. The ASG remains of concern for a number of reasons. The first is their willingness to engage in in-discriminate violence against civilian targets and the increases in their technical capacity. On two occa-sions now, JI blueprints for larger truck bombs have been discovered. The second is their public call for greater sectarian violence. This is very much in line with JI’s strategy of fomenting sectarian violence in the Malu-kus and Sulawesi, Indonesia, where a fragile peace is holding. This also ties in with the ASG’s original

strategy that they followed in 1991-95. Third, the ASG has taken advantage of the Balik Islam (Christian converts to Islam) networks. Converts have played a role in every major or attempted attack in the past year. The use of con-verts has extended JI’s reach beyond Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago into Luzon and and the Visayas, greatly broadening the battlefield. Finally, the ASG has been built upon the original charitable and non-government organization (NGO) networks established by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa that have remained stubbornly resilient to counter-terror operations. Key dates in the ASG's evolution as an

organization April 4, 1991 -Grenade attack in Zamboanga City kills two American evangelists August 1921 - Bombing of MV Doulos May 20, 1991- Killing of Italian priest Fr. Sal-vatorre Carzedda in Zamboanga City August 10. 1992 -Bombing of building in Zambo-anga resulting in 2 deaths and 40 other casualties (from Christian missionary ship) January 17, 1993- Kidnapping of two Spanish nuns in Sulu March 18, 1993-Kidnapping of a Spanish priest Nov 14, 1993 -Kidnapping of an American mis-sionary December 26, 1993 -Bombing of a cathedral in

Davao June 10, 1994-Bombings in Zamboanga kill 71 peo-ple April 4, 1995- Attack on Ipil resulting in 53 deaths, 48 wounded, and the destruction of 17 commercial buildings While the ASG remains a very small organi-zation, its willingness to employ terror and develop close working ties to other terrorist organizations which allow it to leverage its strength are troubling. In particular, analysts and policymakers should take the threat of the ASG seriously for three reasons: 1) Improvements in ASG technical capacity to conduct terrorist attacks; 2) Stated ASG interest in fomenting sectarian violence, and; 3) Adept ASG penetration of Balik Islam networks and recruitment of Christian converts to engage in terrorist acts. While the reorientation of the ASG has Kha-daffy Janjalani imprimatur, it raises questions of whether exogenous factors are at work. Has the ASG been “activated” by the JI or al Qaeda? Who is pay-ing for the materials? Has the JI stepped up training of ASG members? Have there been financial inducements for the ASG to engage in terrorist acts? Some evidence suggests that these connections have been rekindled and that JI sees the ASG for the first time as a reli-able partner. In October 2000, hostages who escaped from their Abu Sayyaf captors asserted that two Yemenis were in the camp advising the Abu Sayyaf in Sep-

tember and October.90 One ASG defector stated that four foreign instructors (three Afghans and a Syrian) were in the ASG camp in Tugas, on Sulu Island. A PNP intelligence report stated that “In 2001, Asraf Kunting, member of the ASG shurah, was sent to Malaysia to fetch four al Qaeda operatives who trained the Abu Sayyaf on explosives.” This was partially corroborated by several ASG suspects detained in October 2002 who re-vealed that Khadaffy Janjalani hosted two Middle Eastern operatives in September 2001. These opera-tives conducted training for a month before traveling to Malaysia. Abdul Mukmin Edris revealed that two al Qaeda members, a Yemeni (aka Azzam) and an Arab (aka Sunawa), were in Basilan in September 2002. An Indonesian crew member of a tug boat hijacked by Abu Sayyaf members off Jolo in June 2002 identified several Yemenis who attended a meeting with ASG leaders in Patikul, Sulu, on May 3, 2003. They were accompanied, according to his testimony, by Abu Sophia, the nom de guerre of Ahmad al-Ghozi, the brother of the late Fathur Roh-man al-Ghozi, a senior Indonesian JI operative who was the group’s emissary in the southern Philippines and liaison to the MILF. What makes the Al-Harakatul Islamiyah draw its members is that it feeds on the disguts of the younger cadres of both the MNLF and the MILF, calling the peacetalks a “sell-out”, and that the peace talks were nothing but a buy-out option for the senior

cadres of both the MNLF and the MILF and thus drawing from their ranks more determined members and recruits. Their partnership with the JI, Al-Qaeda and the RSM groups has made its power more felt and its range more wider. After the intensive military operations against the ASG in 2007,, the AFP confirmed the death of Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sulaiman (Jainal Antel Sali, Jr.) as a result of this military of-fensive. However, despite the death of its key leaders and the reduction of its strength, the AFP still consid-ers the ASG as one of the major “terrorist threats” in the Philippines because of its continuing “intent” and “capability” to wreak havoc. The current leadership of the ASG is being led by by Yasser Igasan, a more militant and aggres-sive leader who analysts believe can reinvigorate the Islamic fundamentalist struggle of the ASG. Coming from the ranks and drawing from his previous experinces in his meberships in different Moro organizations, Igasan’s wide experience in community organizing and resource mobilization, serious Islamic training and education, and strong linkages with the Islamic militants in the Middle East and the rouge elements of the Moro National Libera-tion Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) can make him the “reincarnation” of the ASG founder, Abdurajak Janjalani. Making him one of the most dangerous terrorist ringleaders in the world today.

The table in the succeeding page documents the most recent activities of the Al-Harakatul al-Islamiyah also known as the ASG.

Recent Activities by the Abu Sayyaf:

2007 January 17 - Abu Sayyaf leader, Abu Sulaiman is killed in a gun battle against the Philippine Army in Jolo. July 11 - Eight Filipino government soldiers were killed, nine others injured and six missing following a gun battle against Abu Sayyaf soldiers, supported by armed villagers in the southern island province of Basilan, according to a military source. August - The military said it lost 26 soldiers and killed around 30 militants in three days of fighting on the volatile island of Jolo, in the beginning of month. The heaviest toll occurred after militants ambushed a military convoy.

2008 January 17 - Abu Sayyaf militants raided a convent in Tawi-Tawi and killed a Catholic missionary during a kidnapping attempt.[50] February 14 - Failed assassination plot of the Presi-dent of the Philippines, Gloria Arroyo. June 8 - ABS-CBN Journalist Ces Drilon and her TV Crew kidnapped. 10 days later they were released after families paid a portion of the ransom. September 23 - A mid-level leader of the Abu Sayyaf

group and a follower surrendered to the Marine Bat-talion Landing Team-5 (MBLT-5) in Sulu province. Colonel Eugenio Clemen, chief of the 3rd Marine Brigade, identified the bandits who surrendered as Hadjili Hari and Faizal Dali, his son-in-law. 2009 January 15 - Three Red Cross officials, Swiss An-dreas Notter, Filipino Mary Jane Lacaba and Italian Eugenio Vagni were kidnapped. Andreas Notter and Mary Jane Lacaba were released four months later.Eugenio Vagni is released six months later on July 12 (Manila time). April 14 - Abu Sayyaf soldiers have executed one of two hostages they took during a raid on a Christian community in Lamitan City in Basilan on Good Fri-day, the military said. The body of Cosme Aballes was recovered Sunday by Marines who are pursuing the bandits. The bandits were with members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and of kidnap for ran-som groups. Aballes and Ernan Chavez were taken by at least 40 Abu Sayyaf, rogue M.I.L.F. rebels and KFR elements when they raided Sitio Arco in Lami-tan City. On their way out, the kidnappers shot dead a resident, Jacinto Clemente. The kidnappers are still holding Chavez, Estrella said the bandits raided Sitio Arco to disrupt the Christian activities during the Lenten season and to extort. Marines are pursuing the kidnappers in the outskirts of Lamitan City. Including Chavez, Estrella said, the Abu Sayyaf is holding seven hostages in Basilan, including three teachers

kidnapped in Zamboanga in January. May 18 - Abu Sayyaf gunmen in Basilan beheaded a 61-year-old man who was abducted from this city about three weeks before, the police said July 12 - Italian Red cross hostage Eugenio Vagni has been release. August 12 - A group of Abu Sayyaf soldiers and members of the M.I.L.F. abush a group of A.F.P. (Armed Forces of the Philippines) soldiers as they conducted a clearing operation in the mountains of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan. 23 A.F.P. soldiers were killed in the engagement, 20 of which were members of the Philippine Marines Corps. In addition, 31 Abu Say-yaf soldiers were killed in an initial body count. The figure is likely to rise. September 21- A.F.P. overrun a camp in the south belonging to the Abu Sayyaf, killing nearly 20 mili-tants, the authorities said. 5 A.F.P. were wounded. September 29 - Two United States soldiers are killed in Jolo, near the town of Indanan, by Abu Sayyaf soldiers.[58] October 14 - An Irish priest is kidnapped from out-side his home near Pagadian city in Mindanao. He is still missing. November 9 - A school teacher in Jolo was captured on October 19 and beheaded by Abu Sayyaf soldiers.[60] November 10 - Abu Sayyaf soldiers captures several Chinese and Filipino nationals in Basilan

2010 January 21 - Suspected Abu Sayyaf militants deto-nated a bomb near the house of a Basilan province mayor. One teenager was injured February 9- ASG kidnapped 2 Malaysian Chinese in Sabah and brought them to Tawi-tawi, hostage crisis ongoing

Foreign linkages of Muslim Filipino Radicals The relationship between the Muslim Fili-pino Radicals started in 1985 when the leader of the Darul islam/Negara Islam Indonesia Zulkarnain made a bilateral agreement with the Muslim Filipino Radi-cals in Pakistan (before the JI formally broke away as a group) concerning training in Afghan Mujahidin Military Academy in Saddah. The relationship continued to grow as the two groups waged Jihad together in Afghanistan. Ne-gara Islam Indonesia members in Afghanistan intro-duced themselves as Filipinos to locals and Arab Mu-jahedin in Afghanista, with exception to certain AQ leaders such as Abdullah Azzam,Abu Burhan and Umar Abdurahman who knew that they were Indone-sians. After Afghanistan, in 1993 the Jamaah al-Islamiyah was born with the objective of the estab-lishment of an expanded Islamic caliphate in South-east Asia and begun to send Military trainors to es-tablish military training camps in Mindanao. From there,the journey and travel of JI trai-

nors and recruits in Southern Philippines begun. The relationship between JI and the Filipino Muslim Radicals was based on trust, communal spirit and brotherhood (assabiyah wa ukkhuwah) and thus was a sort of spiritual bound and thus no written docu-ments could be found or traced as this was already established prior during their time in Afghanistan. With the passage of time, the JI trainors led by Muhammad Nasir Bn Abbas who was the head of Mantiqi 3 which covers Sabah, Malaysia, Southern Mindanao Philippines, North Sulawesi and Kaliman-tan areas in Indonesia have exchanged visits between these training facilities. Nasir Abbas elucidates that JI trainees were undergoing military orientation and training while the Filipino Muslim Radicals was futhering their quest and struggle for self determination. The Hudaybiyah Military Training Camp was established in December 2004 in Mindanao and was named after the famous treaty between the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and the Quraish that ap-peared disadvantageous to Muslims at that time. The name was chosen as a reflection of the status of struggle of Filipino Muslim Mujahideens. A Filipino Mujahideen once remarked that everyone that cleared new land could claim it as his won. Thus, a JI operative came to Mindanao and opened the Hu-daybiyah site, which now belongs to JI. The Muslim Filipino Radicals never ques-tioned JI's assertion of ownership of the camp and respected the rules and boundaries of the camp re-

garding guests. The JI Markaziyah also gave funding support for the provision of barracks.

Chapter 7:

Answering a question: are the actions of these Radicalized Filipino Muslims in violation of Is-

lamic Law?

The Activities of the Al Harakatul Al_Islamiyyah and the Rajah Sulayman Movement from both a personal and social viewpoint As discussed in the previous chapters, it can be seen that the actions of Radical Filipino Muslims belonging to both the Al Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah (described also in this research as the ASG) and the Rajah Sulayman movement can be primarilly divided into two sections: First, actions that they do in a personal sense (ibadah) in which like other Muslims, their actions of worship conform to Islamic teachings and laws. These actions like Prayer, Fasting, Zakah and other primarilly Ibadah issues may be directly described as Islamic in Nature. However, their acts of violence against soci-ety clearly are against both the tenets of Islam, moral-ity and humanity which will be discussed later in the section pertaining to the position of the Ulama re-garding terrorism and their opinion on its prohibition. This misinterpretation of Islam is best seen in one school of thought in islam, the Salafi-Wahabbi which is predominantly preached in Saudi Arabia.

Looking at the cross-section of Militants and their religious orientations, a huge cross-section of them are adherents of the Salafi Doctrines which pre-sents a very radical and different perspective. The worldview of Salafi Islam can be best described as bipolar taking its inspiration from Say-yid Qutb. What is ironic is that since radical Shariah as seen in the light of Salafi Islam teaches that Muslims pay low regard to western secular law, it often be-comes a justification for inciting and justifying social disregard and lack of respect of such laws, thus re-sulting in severe anti-social actions like terrorist ac-tions in the guise of fulfilling “divinely ordained du-ties as part of Jihad”. The main ideology behind Radical Salafi docttrine is the principle of Jihad which is the corner-stone of Islam, against non-muslims and apostates. According to counter-terrorism author Dale C. Eik-meier, “ideology”, rather than any individual or group, is the "center of gravity" of al Qaeda and re-lated groups, and the ideology is a "collection of vio-lent Islamic thought called Qutbism ." He summarizes the tenets of Qutbism as be-ing:

A belief that Muslims have deviated from true Islam and must return to “pure Islam” as originally practiced during the time of the Prophet.

The path to “pure Islam” is only through a literal and strict interpretation of the Qura and

Hadith , along with implementation of the Prophet's commands.

Muslims should interpret the original sources individually without being bound to follow the interpretations of Islamic scholars.

That any interpretation of the Quran from a his-torical, contextual perspective is a corruption, and that the majority of Islamic history and the classic jurisprudential tradition is mere sophistry.

What is notable among the radical Salafi's is a worldview in the words of Bernard Lewis as “Islam has had an essentially political character from its very foundation to the present day. An intimate associa-tion exists between religion and politics,between power and cult,marks a principal distinction between Islam and other religions. In Traditional Islam and also in its resurgent fundamentalist form God is the sole source of sovereignty. God is the head of state. The State is God's state. The army is God's army. The treasury is God's treas-ury, and the enemy, is God's enemy” Former National Security Adviser Jose Almonte says that this is more of an effect than a cause. Their actions primarily are an expression of their rebellion over their inability to keep pace with modernity and the sociological ability to adjust with modernity as a way of life. Ulamas position regarding the Radical Militant Filipino Muslims as glanced from their fatwas and

statements: Muslims in Egypt has expressed, such acts of vio-lence have nothing to do with Islam as a religion. The Muslim religion promotes peace, brotherhood and justice, the committee quoted the Sheik of Al-Azhar, Sayyid Muhammad Tantawy, as saying in a state-ment. 'It is better to make individuals accountable for their own actions rather than hold a religion like Is-lam accountable,' the statement said."

The envoy of Libya accused the group of inhumanity and violating the tenets of Islam by hold-ing innocent people. Abdul Rajab Azzarouq, former ambassador to the Philippines, criticized the kidnap-pers for holding people who have nothing to do with the conflict. The hostage-takers should not use relig-ion as a reason to keep the hostages isolated from their families, he said.

Sheikh Yusuf Qardawy in Qatar has de-nounced the kidnapping and killings committed by the Abu Sayyaf towards civilians and foreigners, as-serting that they are not part of the dispute between the Abu Sayyaf and the Philippines government.

He stated that it is shameful to commit such acts in the name of the Islamic faith, saying that such acts produce backlashes against Islam and Muslims worldwide. It is known that Qaradawi supports the rights of Muslims in Philippines.

Qaradawi spoke of the importance of educa-tion in the life of Muslims, stating that educational

institutions in the Muslim world should review their educational philosophy in order that it may reflect Islamic values aiming to create pious Muslims good to themselves and non-Muslims as well.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) condemned the Sipadan kidnapping and of-fered to help secure their release. OIC Secretary Gen-eral Azzedine Laraki who represents the world's larg-est Islamic body, told the Philippine government he was prepared to send an envoy to help save the hos-tages and issued a statement condemning the rebels.

"The Secretary General has pointed out that this operation and the like are rejected by divine laws and that they are neither the appropriate nor correct means to resolve conflicts," the statement said.

In reality, there are lots of fatwas and other statements issued which condemn attacks on innocent civilians.

Unfortunately, these declarations are largely ignored by newspapers, television news, radio news and other media outlets for the simple reason that negative news sells.

The problem is not that condemnations do not exist; it is that they are not well publicized in the media. Allie Shah wrote in the Star Tribune in Minnneapolis, MN:

"The fact is that many prominent Ameri-can Muslim groups have clearly and

publicly denounced acts of terror in the name of Islam as barbaric, heinous and just plain wrong. Though they relig-iously send out press releases and e-mail statements after every attack, somehow their message doesn't seem to pene-trate." 1

Two of the largest Muslim groups in the U.S. -- the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) regu-larly issue statements. However, they rarely appear in local newspapers, on TV or radio.

Allie Shaw continues:

"Last fall, CAIR launched a national petition drive as part of a campaign by Muslims called 'Not in the Name of Is-lam.' To date, nearly 700,000 Muslims have signed the petition condemning terrorism committed in the name of Is-lam, and many newspapers have covered the petition drive. As part of the same campaign, CAIR also created and paid for public service announcements set to air on television stations nationwide....."

"If all that wasn't enough, last Thursday the Fiqh Council of North America is-sued a fatwa, or religious ruling, against terrorism and extremism. Endorsed by

more than 100 U.S. Muslim authorities, the fatwa boldly and unequivocally for-bids terrorism and admonishes those who commit terrorist attacks....."

"The lengthy fatwa continues with refer-ences to the Qur'an that support the rul-ing. It may not be enough to dissuade a minority of extremists hellbent on de-struction, but it is the right thing to do."

"In the meantime, we will continue to react with the same shock and dismay and, yes, anger, at the misguided people who continue to show no regard for hu-man life. And we'll continue to speak out against terrorism in the hopes that some-one is listening."

In response to major loss of life in terrorist attacks in Iraq; London, England; and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt during 2005-JUL, Muslim leaders in the U.S., England and the rest of the world have is-sued fatwas and numerous other statements con-demning random acts of terrorism. A sampling is shown below.

Applicable texts from the Qur'an and Sunnah:

Perhaps the most commonly cited passage from the Qur’an, Islam’s revealed text, in opposition

to killing states: "Whoever kills a person [unjustly]…it is as though he has killed all mankind. And who-ever saves a life, it is as though he had saved all mankind." (Qur’an, 5:32)

Other applicable passages of the Qur'an and Sunnah were cited by the Fiqh Council of North America in their fatwa against terrorism issued on 2005-JUL-28:

Do not be people without minds of your own, saying that if others treat you well you will treat them well, and that if they do wrong you will do wrong to them. Instead, accustom yourselves to do good if people do good and not to do wrong (even) if they do evil." (Al- Tirmidhi)

We made you to be a community of the middle way, so that (with the example of your lives) you might bear witness to the truth before all man-kind." (Qur’an, 2:143)

Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) on 2005-MAY-22:

The Society issued the following statement condemning terrorism:

Not In the Name of Islam "We, the undersigned Muslims, wish to state clearly that those who commit acts of terror, murder and cruelty in the name

of Islam are not only destroying inno-cent lives, but are also betraying the val-ues of the faith they claim to represent. No injustice done to Muslims can ever justify the massacre of innocent people, and no act of terror will ever serve the cause of Islam. We repudiate and disso-ciate ourselves from any Muslim group or individual who commits such brutal and un-Islamic acts.

We refuse to allow our faith to be held hostage by the criminal actions of a tiny mi-nority acting outside the teachings of both the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. "As it states in the Quran: 'Oh you who believe, stand up firmly for justice, as wit-nesses to God, even if it be against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be against rich or poor; for God can best protect both. Do not follow any passion, lest you not be just. And if you distort or decline to do jus-tice, verily God is well-acquainted with all that you do'." (Quran 4:135)

Sayyid M. Syeed, Secretary General of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) issued the following statement:

ISNA joins American Muslims around the country in expressing their shock, sadness, and outrage in response to re-cent findings that British nationals were responsible for the horrific terror attacks in London last week. These attacks not only violated Islamic principles that for-bid the taking of any innocent life, but betrayed Islamic teachings that members of a community have a duty and obliga-tion to protect, safeguard and uphold the laws of that community.

ISNA condemns this breach of trust and senseless act of violence, and stands with its fellow American citizens united against any such tendencies in the Mus-lim community in this country and in the world, and committed to the protection, security, and well being of the citizens of To those who seek to divide us through fear or hatred, we will not allow the voices of hate to defeat the voices of unity and goodwill. We send our contin-ued prayers and condolences for the family members and all those affected by these deplorable acts.

Muslim Students Association-National on 2005-JUL-23:

Muslim Students Association-National issued a statement on 2005-JUL-23, on behalf of young Muslim leaders across the U.S. It said:

"This afternoon, the world witnessed a second terrorist attack on London. In light of these hostile events, we Muslim American students and youth stand united in condemning all acts of terror and the burgeoning war on ideas. We refuse to remain silent while others claiming to represent Islam preach an ideology of hatred.

Islam does not tolerate the use of terror-ism for any purpose, regardless of who the aggressors are and what their justifi-cations might be. This sensitive time calls for solidarity not only for the peo-ple of London but for the international community, regardless of race or faith, to oppose the evil of terrorism.

"As part of this campaign, the Muslim Students Association-National, a coali-tion of Muslim student organizations in universities across America and Canada and a constituent of the ISNA, has

pledged to be steadfast in combating this ideology of hatred. MSA-National Presi-dent Mohamed Sheibani said, 'Muslim students across the country condemn today's attacks in London and all terror-ism irrespective of its motivation or per-petrator. We believe that these attacks are cowardly and barbaric and we call upon all people of conscience to stand with us in speaking out against these crimes against humanity.' "The voice of American Muslim youth is essential at this tenuous time, and we will rise to the occasion of making our values heard. It is our duty to work for the cause of our future, and we will do so with a noble vision. We seek to culti-vate a culture of pluralism, tolerance and coexistence for the advancement of all people. "This ongoing campaign is currently endorsed by Muslim student organiza-tions and communities in over 30 indi-vidual universities across the nation...."

Figh Council of North America on 2005-JUL-28:

The Fiqh Council of North America issued a fatwa on 2005-JUL-28. It states, in part:

"Islam strictly condemns religious ex-tremism and the use of violence against innocent lives. There is no justification in Islam for extremism or terrorism. Targeting civilians' life and property through suicide bombings or any other method of attack is haram – or forbidden - and those who commit these barbaric acts are criminals, not 'martyrs'. In the light of the teachings of the Qur'an and Sunnah we clearly and strongly state:

All acts of terrorism targeting civil-ians are haram (forbidden) in Islam.

It is haram for a Muslim to cooper-ate with any individual or group that is involved in any act of terrorism or violence.

It is the civic and religious duty of Muslims to cooperate with law enforcement authorities to pro-tect the lives of all civilians.

We issue this fatwa following the guid-ance of our scripture, the Qur'an, and the teachings of our Prophet Muhammad -

peace be upon him."

This fatwa was sponsored by Council on American-Islamic Relations, and the Islamic Society of North America. It was endorsed by 145 U.S. Mus-lim groups, leaders and institution as of 2005-JUL-28.,

The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) released TV public service announcements (PSAs) for TV titled "Not in the Name of Is-lam." Like the online petition drive with the same name, the PSAs attempt to dissociate the faith of Is-lam from the violent acts of a few radical, extremist Muslim terrorists. The PSAs are available online in several languages and formats: English (mp3 and video formats),Arabi and Urdu (mp3 formats)

Almost a dozen Muslim leaders from South Florida joined Altaf Ali, Florida's executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), at a news conference to declare that there is no justification for violence and that their religion promotes peace.

The group plans to release a public service announcement titled "Not in the Name of Islam." It is designed to "disassociate the faith of Islam from the violent acts of a few Muslims." CAIR plans to put up billboards that read: "Islam Condemns Terrorism."

A look at recent Global Muslim opinion would show that even the bar of Muslim opinion do not support actions of the Radical Salafis particularly terrorist actions as well as negative perceptions toward non Muslims. A Sunday Times survey taken in UK shortly after the 9/11 attack "revealed that 40% of British Muslims believe Osama bin Laden was right to attack the United States. About the same proportion think that British Muslims have a right to fight alongside the Taliban.

A radio station serving London's Pakistani community conducted a poll which 98% of London Muslims under 45 said they would not fight for Brit-ain, while 48% said they would fight for bin Laden."

A 2004 Pew survey revealed that Osama bin Laden is viewed favorably by large percentages in Pakistan (65%), Jordan (55%) and Morocco (45%). In Turkey as many as 31% say that suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable.

A 2005 Pew Research study that involved 17,000 people in 17 countries showed support for terrorism was declining in the Muslim world along with a growing belief that Islamic extremism repre-sents a threat to those countries. . A Daily Telegraph survey showed that 6% of British Muslims fully supported the July 2005 bombings in the London Un-derground.

Most recent polls and surveys done in many of prominent Muslim countries show that the balance of forces in the world of Islam has shifted dramati-cally against al-Qaida's global jihad and its local manifestations. Here are seven examples:

Gallup conducted tens of thousands of hour-long, face-to-face interviews with residents of more than thirty-five predominantly Mus-lim countries between 2001 and 2007. It found that - contrary to the prevailing percep-tion in the west that the actions of al-Qaida enjoy wide support in the Muslim world - more than 90% of respondents condemned the killing of non-combatants on religious and humanitarian grounds

The not-for-profit group Terror Free Tomorrow carried out a public-opinion survey seeking to establish why people support or oppose extremism; it found that fewer than 10% of Saudis had a favourable opinion of al-Qaida, and 88% approved of the Saudi authorities pursuing al-Qaida operatives

In Pakistan, despite the recent rise in the Tali-ban's influence, surveys of public opinion do not bode well for al-Qaida and its allies. A poll conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow in Pakistan in January 2008 tested support for al-Qaida, the Taliban, other militant Islamist groups and Osama bin Laden himself, and found a recent drop by half. In August 2007,

33% of Pakistanis expressed support for al-Qaida; 38% supported the Taliban. By Janu-ary 2008, al-Qaida's support had dropped to 18%, the Taliban's to 19%. When asked if they would vote for al-Qaida, just 1% of Pakistanis polled answered in the affirmative. The Taliban had the support of 3% of those polled .

Pew surveys in 2008 show that in a range of countries - Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Leba-non, and Bangladesh - there have been sub-stantial declines in the percentages saying suicide-bombings and other forms of vio-lence against civilian targets can be justified to defend Islam against its enemies. Wide majorities say such attacks are, at most, rarely acceptable .

The shift has been especially dramatic in Jordan, where 29% of Jordanians are recorded as viewing suicide-attacks as often or some-times justified (down from 57% in May 2005). In the largest majority-Muslim nation, Indonesia, 74% of respondents agree that terrorist attacks are "never justified" (a sub-stantial decline from the 41% level to which support had risen in March 2004); in Paki-stan, that figure is 86%; in Bangladesh, 81%; and in Iran, 80%.

A poll conducted in Osama bin Laden's home country of Saudi Arabia in December 2008

shows that his compatriots have dramatically turned against him, his organization, Saudi volunteers in Iraq, and terrorism in general. Indeed, confidence in bin Laden has fallen in most Muslim countries in recent years

In Iraq, people of all persuasions unanimously reject the terror tactics of "al-Qaida in Meso-potamia". An ABC News/BBC/NHK poll revealed that all of those surveyed - Sunni and Shi'a alike - found al-Qaida attacks on Iraqi civilians "unacceptable"; 98% rejected the militants' attempts to gain control over areas in which they operated; and 97% op-posed their attempts to recruit foreign fight-ers and bring them to Iraq

Current Policies both from neighboring countries in relation to our national framework and responses

towards Terrorism and minimizing casualties. The issues of addressing radicalism and mili-tantism can be best seen in both the best practices in other countries as well as in relation to our existing framework and response to this issue. Both Indonesia and Singapore has adopted deradicalization programs that has met success in their countries, governments initiatives. One of the projects that which we may be able to see a broader relationship as well as correlate our among them are Prisons-based initiative wherein

inmates are rehabilitated through religious counseling by clerics as well as enhancing family and commu-nity support system in Indonesia. This has been ef-fective as it was able to enlist help of former JI mem-bers as well as their aid in convincing others to de-sist from participating in these terrorist activities. Singapore also has a simmilar program as well as a preventive program by the state which en-courages non-militant expressions of Islam that is supported by Ulama educated from Al-Azhar, Egypt. Notable also is that both countries use com-munity and educational standardization programs to ensure that their madarris conforms to the standards of Mainline Sunni Islam which is non-militant and pluralist in nature. To address the threats of terrorism in the Philippines, the Philippine government formed the Inter-Agency Task Force Against International Ter-rorism on 24 September 2001 under the direct super-vision of the Office of the President. This Inter-Agency Task Force aimed to coor-dinate intelligence operations and to facilitate the identification and neutralization of suspected terrorist cells in the Philippines.

To freeze the financial assets of international terrorists, the Philippine Congress decisively passed the Anti-Money Laundering Act on 29 September 2001. President Arroyo also announced on 12 Octo-ber 2001 its 14-pillar approach to combat terrorism. 14-pillar approach to combat terrorism. -Designate Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Secutiry as the lead anti-terrorism body. -Seek to undertake/consolidate intellience projects. -Call on the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to address terrorist violence. -Holds accountable all public and private or-ganization abetting terorirsm. -Seeks regional consensus and cooperation especially with Indonesia and Malaysia in the war against terrorism. -Anticipates legal issues and concerns. -Pursues Christian-Muslim dialog and seek to promote ecumenism. -Call for greater vigilance and concrete meau-ers against all possible terrorist supplies, ma-terials and finances.

-Mobilizes disaster coordination efforts in the event of catastrophic attack. -Secure critical infrastructure. -Protect overseas workers and seeks their im-mediate transfer if need. -Seek the integration of the global terrorist threat in the AFP-PNP modernization pro-gram. -Ask for media responsibility , and -Seek to address the socioeconoc and political roos of “perceived fanaticism and irrational violence. Source: Memorandum Order NO. 37 dated 12 October 2001

Through the Operation Center of the Cabinet Over-sight Committee on Internal Security (COCIS) the Philippine government formulated the National Plan to Address Terrorism and its Consequences as Annex K to the National Internal Security Plan (NISP). The Philippine government approved the NISP on 26 No-vember 2001 through Memorandum Order 44. The COCIS was tasked to implement the na-tional anti-terrorism plan by involving all national government agencies, local government units (LGUs), and the private sectors in the campaign.

But the Philippine government abolished the COCIS in October 2004. The task of managing and implementing the anti-terrorism plan was then trans-ferred to the ATTF, which was originally formed on 24 March 2004 under the COCIS. The ATTF is now operating under the Office of the President with the Executive Secretary as the Chair. The ATTF is now based in Malacanang Palace in Manila. The ATTF aims to establish an extensive anti-terrorism information system and accelerate in-telligence fusion among all intelligence units in the Philippines in the identification of terrorism person-alities, cells, groups, and organizations in various LGUs. It also aims to conduct an extensive informa-tion drive at both national and local levels “to prepare the public and all stakeholders to get involved in the national anti-terrorism campaign.” With the creation of ATTF, the Philippine government adopts the 16-point counter-terrorism program to operationalize the 14-point anti-terrorism policy of the national government. (See Box 2) 16-Poiont Counter Terrorism Program -Supervision and implementation of police and actions against terrorism. -Intellegence coordination. -Internal focus against terrorism -Accountability of private corporation and per-sonalities.

-Synchronizing internal efforts with global out-look. -Legal Measures. -Promotion of Christian-Muslim solidarity. -Vigilance against the movement of terrorist and their support, equipment, weapons and funds. -Contigent plans -Comprehensive security plans for critical infra-structures. -Support for overseas Filipiono workers. -Moderniazation of the Armed Forces of the PHilipines an the Philippine National Police. -Media Support. -Political, social and economic measures -Ensuring the accountabilityof local and national government in cleansing the government of ter-rorist and criminal coddlers -Strengthening the peace process Source:Anti-Terroristm Task Force Ac-complsihmente report.June 2004 As counter-legal measure, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed into law the Human Secu-rity Act of 2007 on 6 March 2007. More known as the Anti- Terrorism Law, it imposes 40 years of im-prisonment to convicted terrorists with no parole. To dispel the fear that the proposed law may be used against human rights, it provides provision for the compensation of P500,000 a day for victims wrongly

arrested by the police. It also provides provision for the protection of com-munication between the media and their sources, doc-tors and clients and other safeguards that aim to pro-tect the rights of individuals. The Philippine anti-terrorism law also establishes the Anti-Terrorism Council chaired by the Executive Secretary. The Council is mandated to assume the responsibility for the proper and effective implementation of the anti-terrorism policy of the Philippines. The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) serves as the Secretariat of the Council. The Council is also tasked to formulate and adopt com-prehensive, adequate, efficient, and effective anti-terrorism plans, programs, and counter-measures to suppress and eradicate terrorism in the country and to protect the people from acts of terrorism. Specifi-cally, the Council is mandated to perform the follow-ing functions:

1. Formulate and adopt plans, programs and counter-measures against terrorists and acts of terror-ism in the country; 2. Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate acts ofterrorism in the country and mobilize the entire nation against terrorism proscribed in this Act; 3. Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution

of all persons accused or detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and other offenses punishable under this Act, and monitor the progress of their cases; 4. 4. Establish and maintain comprehensive data-base information systems on terrorism, terrorist ac-tivities, and counter-terrorism operations; 5. Freeze the funds property, bank deposits, place-ments, trust accounts, assets and records belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9160 otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended; 6. Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who give vital information leading to the apprehension, arrest, detention, prosecution, and con-viction of person or persons who are liable for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; 7. Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and assistance of other nations in the struggle against international terrorism; and Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the Court of Appeals and regional trial courts in Manila, Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro City, as the case may be, to handle all cases involving the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terror-ism and all matters incident to said crimes. Aside from the national anti-terrorism law, the Phil-ippines is also a party to at least twelve international

terrorism related Conventions and Protocols, includ-ing the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism signed in January 2007

Chapter 7. Summary Conclusion and recommendations

Summary:

The Al Harakatul Al-Islamiyah and the Rajah Sulayman movement can be seen as radical move-ments that are a anathem to Nationhood, both gaining inspiration from separatist and Islamist movements both local and abroad, among them the Jihad in Af-ghanistan, the separatist movement in Chechnya, as well as other Islamist independence movements across the globe, this is unavoidable because of Glob-alization, events elsewhere strongly influence other groups as all events and information are readily avail-able and easily shared, both correct information as well as propaganda. As gleaned from It must be understood first that these Muslim radical groups practice a radical and militant form of Salafi Islam and thus, implement a highly literalist interpretation of scriptures and teachings of Islam. Both of these groups strongly relate to the experiences of the Muslim revolutionary and secces-sionist movements in the country as well as take ex-

perience from the other revolutionary groups such as the CPP-NPA-NDF where a significant percentage of members of the Rajah Sulayman movement origi-nally came from. The actions taken by these two groups are strongly drawn from a heavilly literalist interpretation of Salafi-Qutbist Islam which is bi-polar and very dogmatic in nature and views non-adherents as either heathen or non-believers (kaafir/mushrik). Although both of these groups have been heavilly damaged due to strong government intitia-tives and Military operations in order to dislodge them, due to the highly ideological nature of these groups, where religion is strongly fused with ideol-ogy, they will still be a constant threat to national security although making no significant dent on the Nationhood of the Philippines. Both from a Islamic legal perspective and Common Muslim opinion, the actions of Filipino Muslim radical groups can be said to be divided into two dimensions and the Islamicity of their actions can be determined from these two angles: From a Ibadah (personal actions) perspective wherein these Radical Muslims perform personal acts of worship like Salah, Dua and other major religious duties as imposed by Shari'ah, their acts do not vio-late Islamic Law From a Muammalah (Transactional, person-person) perspective, when their actions with Non-Muslims involve bodily harm like actions that are

terrorist nature such as Suicide bombings, killing of civilians, kidnappings, beheading and other inhuman acts, these actions are not in consonance with Islamic law and therefore are against Islam. It is clear from both the texts (the Qur'an and Hadith), as well as the consensus of the Islamic scholars and the majority of the Muslims that such terroristic actions of these Muslim radicals are both against Islamic Law and the secular laws of the state and those who call others to join these groups must be strongly admonished to stop themselves from do-ing so. The government may have to provide alter-native policies to prevent this from happening. Among them a review of the present government policies on Muslim integration

Recommendations: This monograph recommends the following initia-tives: That in order to counteract the effects of Salafi Islam in the Philippines, which fuels the recruitment of members into both the Al Harakatul Al-Islamiyyah and Rajah Sulayman movement, the government must activeley encourage more moderate Islamic schools of thought to be propagated in the Philippines like Sufism, Risale Noor Movements, Lahore Ahmadiyah Islamic Movement as well as other pro-

gressive and moderate schools of thought. Enslist the active involvement of the religious sector, as well as other Muslim scholars and teachers, in the propagation and interpretation of the moderate school of Islam. Inclusion of standardized Islamic concepts and precepts must also added. The government strongly implement the NISP provi-sions of Law as well as improve its internal security framework. In order to further improve its effective-ness, the active participation and integration of Mus-lims can best help this program, as well as creating initiatives that discourage Muslims from adapting the Salafi school of thought. Making Islamic studies a mandatory course for all Military and Police officers so as to ensure that they understand and are able to effectively identify who are the Muslim radicals in the country, as well as mandating the Office on Muslim Affairs to actively support Moderate Schools of Islamic thought. Amending the Presidential Decree 1083 , “The Code of Muslim Personal laws” in order that it can adjust to the pending needs of the Muslims. Active initiatives that support integration of Muslims into mainstream society. By ensuring greater empow-erment for the moderate majority of the Muslim com-munity.

• These programs must evolve into a synchronized national strategy that will involve all sectors of soci-ety. We can learn from the experiences of other countries like Singapore and Indonesia by adopting their strate-gies and adjusting them to the local context.

Bibliography: Scriptural references: • Al-Hilali, Muhammad T, Translation of the Holy Qur'an in the English Language. Madinah,Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Fahad Complex. • Ali, Maulana Muhammad, Translation of the Holy Quran, Anjuman Isharat Ahmadiyah Lahore Trust Inc, OHIO USA Scholarly Books:

Abuza, Zachary Militant Islam: Crucible of Ter-ror (2003), London, UK: Lynne Reiner Pub-lishers, Inc.

Armstrong, Karen, “Islam: A Short History” . London Phoenix Press,2000

______________, “ The Battle for God: A His-tory of Fundamentalism”. New York: Ran-dom House, 2000

Dr. Ahmad al-Raysuni. Imam al-Shatibi’s Theory of the Higher Objectives and Intents of Is-lamic Law [Washington, DC: The Interna-tional Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005], p. xii.

Bealey,Frank ,” The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science “(Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, Inc),(1999)

Code of Muslim Personal law. PD 1083, Shariah Training Institute , Office on Muslim Affairs, 2008

Banlaoi, Rommel, ‘Radical Muslim Terrorism in the Philippines’ in Andrew Tan (ed), Hand-book on Terrorism and Insurgency in South-east Asia (London: Edward Elgar Publishing, Limited);

Banlaoi, Rommel C. War on Terrorism in South-east Asia (Manila: Rex Book Store Interna-tional, 2004.

Benjamin, Daniel et.al, “The Age of Sacred Ter-ror,”, New York : Random Publishers

Bruce Hoffman (1998), Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press)

Bruce Hoffman (1993), Holy Terror: The Impli-cations of Terrorism Motivated by a Reli-gious Imperative (Santa Monica, California: RAND).

Lewis B, “The Political Language of Is-lam”,London,Glenn, 1988

Moghahed, Dalia and Esposito, John, “Who Speaks for Islam?”, New York : Gallup Press, 2007

Ramadhan, Tariq, “The Messenger: The Mean-ings of the Life of Muhammad”, London : Penguin Books, 2007

Rauf, Azur, “History of Islam. Lahore :Ferozsons Inc. 1993

Nicolas Le Quesne, `Islam in Europe: A Chang-ing Faith` Time Europe, 24 December 2001, 44

Monographs and Digests: PHILIPPINES TERRORISM:THE ROLE OF MILITANT ISLAMIC CONVERTS. Asia Report N°110 – 19 December 2005, International Crisis Group Reports

Inter-Agency Anti-Terrorism Task Force, “Government Response to Terror-ism” (undated).

Banlaoi,Rommel C, “THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP AND TERRORISM IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIP-PINES SEVEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: THREAT AND RESPONSE”PIPVTR Monograph No. 2, September 2008

Lewis, Bernard "Islamic Terrorism?" , Terror-ism: How The West Can Win. Edited by Netanyahu, Benjamin, Farrar Straus Giroux, 1987,

Articles: “ARMM ROUNDTABLE SERIES”, Center for Autonomy and Governance • Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung ,Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, No. 8 March 5, 2004 Garcia, Joel S., “Review of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Accord: A 'Sine Qua Non' to the GRP-MILF Peace Process, 2006. http://

strategicresearchinstitute.blogspot.com/search?q=joel+s+garcia International Crisis Group (ICG) (02 March 2005), ‘Understanding Islamism’, Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37 (Cairo/Brussels).

Dalpino, Catharin (July 2002), ‘Second Front, Second Time: Counter-Terrorism and US Pol-icy Toward Southeast Asia’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 346

Agustin, Carlos L,”STATE OF RADICALI-ZATION IN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES.” Paper presentation on the Regional Conference on The Radicalization of Moslem Com-munities in Southeast Asia Mandarin Oriental Hotel, Makati City, Philippines ,1 December 2005

Abuza, Zacharia, BALIK-TERRORISM:THE RETURN OF THE ABU SAY-YAF. Strategic Studies InstituteSeptember 2005

Eikmeier, Dale C. “Qutbism, An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism”, ^ a b [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07spring/eikmeier.htm

Allie Shah, "Those who accuse Muslims of silence aren't listening very well," Star Tribune, Minneapolis, MN, 2005-JUL-31, at: http://www.startribune.com/

"ISNA denounces terrorism in the name of Islam," Islamic Society of North America, 2005-MAY-22, at: http://www.isna.net/

"ISNA Condemns Role of Nationals in Ter-rorist Bombings in London," Islamic Society of

North America, 2005-JUL-14, at: http://www.isna.net/

"Muslim Youth Across America Unite Against Ideology of Hatred," Islamic Society of North Amer-ica, 2005-JUL-23, at: http://www.isna.net/

"U.S. Muslim religious council issues fatwa against terrorism," Islamic Society of North Amer-ica, 2005-JUL, at: http://www.isna.net/

"Fiqh Council of North America Issues a FATWA AGAINST TERROR," Islamic Society of North America, 2005-JUL-28, at: http://www.isna.net/

Morales, Roque Santos, “Renaissance, Re-vival, Renewal, and Reform, Paradigms of Islamic thought and their relationship towards radicalization of Muslims”.2009

Morales, Roque Santos, “Islamic Pluralism as a tool for understanding others”, Theories and Practices of Interfaith Dialogue in the Philippines conference papers, 24-26 April 2008, Delasalle Uni-versity Manila.

Susan R. Miller, "Muslim PR campaign re-jects terror, extremism," Palm Beach Post, 2005-JUL-30, at: http://www.palmbeachpost.com/

"A Year After Iraq War - Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists". Sur-vey reports. The Pew Research Center. 2004. http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206. Retrieved 2006-06-25.

"Bin Laden more popular with Nigerian Muslims than Bush". News. Daily Times of Pakistan.

2003. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_11-7-2003_pg4_6. Retrieved 2006-06-25.

"Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics". Pew Global Attitudes Project. Pew Research Center. 2005. http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248. Retrieved 2006-06-25.

^ King, Anthony (2005). "One in four Mus-lims sympathises with motives of terrorists". News. Telegraph Group Limited. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/07/23/npoll23.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/07/23/ixnewstop.html. Retrieved 2006-06-25

“Local Government Response Against Ter-rorist Threat in the Philippines: Issues and Pros-pects” (Paper prepared for presentation at the 12th International Conference of the East and Southeast Asia Network for Highly Performing Local Govern-ments organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Local Government Development Foundation, Rendezvous Hotel, Singapore on 2-3 December 2004).

Unpublished Manuscripts: • Estino-Jairi Fainur,” Misuari's Ideology: A criti-cal Inquiry on the islamicity of MNLF Ethnic Ori-

ented Pagluwas-Lungsad (struggle), Masters' Thesis, University of the Philippines, April 2007 • De Guzman, Luisa C. Flores, “Towards Develop-ment of a Prisons-Based De-Radicalization Program for Persons Implicated in Terrorism: A Case Study” Unpublished Masters thesis, National Defense Col-lege of the Philippines, 2009 • Mochtar I. Matuan, “The Maranao Migrants in Metro Manila”,Master’s thesis, University of San Carlos, Cebu, 1983 • Morales, Roque Santos, “Islamic Resurgence, A Catharsis of a Paradigm undefined”, Unpublished Research Monograph in IS 161, University of the Philippines, 2004 Umpar, Anna Liza P. “The Rajah Sulayman Move-ment and its national Security Implications” . Unpub-lished Masteral Thesis. National Defense College of the Philippines, Quezon City, 2008. Selected Interviewees: • Abang Monico, (May 20,2009).LTCOL,Special Operations Team, AFP (interviewee) • Abdulghani Sammy (24 June 2009) • Abubakar, Yusuf (25 June 2009) • Jones ,Sydney, International Crisis Group (8 January 2010, 5 December 2008, 6 November 2007) Selected AHAI and RSM detainees