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ROUGH DRAFT - NOT FOR CIRCULATION WITHOUT THE AUTHOR’S PRIOR CONSENT

International Session of the 54th Congress of the Business History

Society of Japan (BHSJ)

Merging methods and approaches: history, social science and business

historians

Sept. 28-30, 2018 (Kyoto)

Western Enterprise in Treaty Port East Asia: Thomas Blakiston and

the Hakodate Trade, 1861-83

Steven Ivings (Kyoto University)

Key words: Hakodate; Treaty Ports; Hokkaido; Ezo; Trade

Sitting in calm and deep waters, neatly tucked away from the sometimes perilous streams

of the North Pacific and Japan Sea, Hakodate was in some ways an obvious choice as a port

to be opened. It offered a suitable location for American whalers to call for supplies and

repairs as they ventured on voyages of plunder in the nearby seas, and a safe anchorage

for the naval ships of treaty powers. Despite the blessings of its physical geography,

however, Hakodate sat on the southern tip of Ezo (now Hokkaido), the thinly populated

Northern fringe of the Japanese realm, and thus offered only the prospect of a modest

trade. Yet in the decades that followed the port’s trade and population expanded rapidly,

transforming what was previously described by the British minister to Japan as “a long

fishing village” into a bustling port of over 50,000 by the mid-1880s.

This paper will argue that this expansion was not primarily a result of the opening of

Hakodate to international trade; rather, it was the opening of Hakodate’s hinterland

which allowed Hakodate to prosper, enhancing its existing role as a hub for the marketing

and distribution of Northern marine products throughout Japan. Moreover, the paper will

closely examine the struggles of foreign traders to make inroads into Hakodate’s principal

trades and seeks to give a face to foreign enterprise in nineteenth century East Asia. The

paper focuses in particular on the business activities of an individual British merchant,

Thomas Blakiston, who was one of the longest resident foreign traders in Hakodate.

Utilizing fragments of his correspondence with both the local Japanese authorities and the

British consulate in Hakodate the paper sheds light on how individual Western merchants

operated in the treaty port context and at the fringes of Northeast Asia.

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Introduction

In this paper I seek to achieve two aims. The first, is to provide some kind of answer to the

question of how significant the impact of the Treaty Port system was on East Asia. Most

studies on Treaty Ports, along with the so-called “Western challenge, Asian response”

literature more broadly, have focused their attention on boomtowns – Shanghai, Hong

Kong, Yokohama and Kobe in particular – or on political centres (Bickers and Henriot

2000; Partner 2018). This focus is not entirely mistaken, as events in such places left a

large imprint on their respective nation’s development economically, culturally and

politically, and, of course, as key “centres” of East Asian trading networks they were the

places where the energies of foreign powers and their merchants were most concentrated.

Nevertheless, their experience could hardly be said to be typical of the rest of the Treaty

Port network which consisted of over 50 ports at the end of the nineteenth century

(Phipps 2015, p. 8). The focus on the successful ports is an example of selection bias and

it has led to a perception that Treaty Ports were catalysts of modern transformation and

key drivers of economic growth (Bickers and Jackson 2016; Ennals 2004; Hoare 1994;

Ishii and Sekiguchi 1982).

In this brief working paper, I ask if the Treaty Port system was transformative

everywhere by deliberately focusing on a peripheral Treaty Port – reverse selection bias

if you like – in this case the port of Hakodate. Located in the northernmost part of the

Japanese realm, Hakodate was one of Japan’s first Treaty Ports having been “opened” in

1855. I argue that in Hakodate, Treaty Port status, though not a hindrance, was not crucial

to commercial development and the port’s growth. Instead, Hakodate was transformed

from what the British minister to Japan described as ‘a long fishing village’ in 1859 into a

bustling port of over 50,000 by the mid-1880s (Ivings 2017, p. 107), principally as a result

of regional integration in Japan and the greater efforts to colonize/develop Hakodate’s

hinterland, the island of Hokkaido (formerly Ezo).

Foreign trade in Hakodate was largely confined to intra-Asian trade and thus I offer

support to the works of Sugihara Kaoru, Hamashita Takeshi and others who stress the

growth of intra-Asian trade in this period and challenge the Western-centric “challenge-

response” literature (Akita 1996; Hamashita 1997; Sugihara 1996). However, whilst

supporting their conclusions, my research departs from theirs in that I maintain a focus

on Western enterprise. This is because my second aim is to give a “face” to Western

enterprise in more peripheral ports like Hakodate. The reason for doing this is simple; all

too often foreign merchants resident in Treaty Ports have been dismissed as a kind of

motely rabble of sub-imperialists or derided as “the moral refuse of European nations”

(de Goey 2015, p. 117). Yet despite this image, very few studies have examined their

business activities and their interaction with local authority, local merchants, and one

another. My aim is to rectify this oversight, not necessarily so as to rehabilitate their image

and save treaty porter face, rather because a closer look at their activities is, aside from

providing insight into the role of Western traders in nineteenth century East Asia, also an

effective means to understanding the growth of intra-Asian trade and to appreciate local

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agency in the Treaty Port context where the imperialism of free trade was upheld by

unequal treaties and the spectre of gunboat diplomacy.

Furthermore, my focus on Hakodate, a peripheral port where only a modest trade

emerged, is advantageous to my task of providing a closer look at individual Treaty Port

merchants. Somewhat counterintuitively, the small number of foreign traders who

resided in Hakodate means we have more documentation of their individual activities

than at other ports. This is because, just like at the bigger ports, Treaty Port status invited

or required the presence of foreign consuls and the local arm of central government, in

this case the Hakodate Governor (Hakodate Bugyō) and after 1869 a branch of the

Hokkaido Development/Colonization Agency (Kaitakushi). As is often the case with

historical research, the records of government bodies have survived much more

frequently than those of individuals. The records of merchants in particular are liable to

be destroyed overtime given the cost of storage, incidence of fire in nineteenth century

port towns, and the high rate of attrition among nineteenth century trading firms (Wilkins

and Schröter 1998). As a result, we have few surviving archives and thus studies of Treaty

Port-based firms, except that is for those that survived in some form until the present or

recent past (Ishii 1988; Sugiyama 1993). The lack of any company archives of Western

firms is as true of Hakodate as elsewhere, but as Hakodate only attracted a handful of

resident foreign merchants, the detail on each merchant’s activities covered in the

consular reports and the records of the local authority are striking when compared to the

equivalent at ports such as Yokohama. In the bigger ports consular staff only had the time

and resources to deal with major issues and commercial disputes that their country’s

merchants encountered. By contrast, in peripheral Hakodate, the consul was more or less

able to report on the business of each firm at length, providing a closer look at how

business was transacted in Treaty Ports, how conflicts manifested and were resolved, and

other interesting details about the characters behind the trade. Though we do not have a

full record of accounts for each firm, there are snippets and with the regularity and detail

of these sources approaching the everyday, a micro-history of Western merchant activity

in Treaty Port Hakodate seems possible.

Hakodate’s Growth, Trade, and Treaty Porters

The port of Hakodate is located on the southern tip of Hokkaido, the northernmost of

Japan’s so-called four main islands. Until 1869, Hokkaido was known as Ezo and formed

a somewhat ambiguously placed northern edge of the Japanese realm. At that time

Hokkaido was, for the most part, sparsely populated with Ainu people who practiced a

mixed economy of fishing, hunting and small scale agriculture. The main Japanese (often

referred to as Wajin in this context) presence on Hokkaido was to be found in the southern

Oshima peninsula which was the seat of the Matsumae domain who had since the late 16th

century maintained exclusive rights to trade with the Ainu, and to manage fisheries off

Hokkaido’s coasts. In practice, however, the Matsumae domain came to lease out these

fisheries to Japanese merchants for a fee, rather than manage them directly itself. As a

result, commercial fishing gradually expanded in Hokkaido creating a number of seasonal

fishing posts throughout the island which were worked seasonally by local Ainu labour

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and Japanese migratory labourers. This fishery system – known as basho ukeoisei in

Japanese – saw Japanese capital penetrate all parts of Hokkaido, often with sad

consequences for Ainu communities. It did not, however, lead to the emergence of sizeable

permanent Japanese settlements beyond the territory of the Matsumae domain. Instead,

this commercial expansion in Hokkaido saw a few villages in the Matsumae domain itself

expand as hubs for the marketing of the marine products of Hokkaido. Thus, despite the

commercial expansion, Hokkaido, beyond the Oshima peninsula, remained a land

ambiguously placed vis-à-vis the Japanese polity, it was ‘indisputably foreign but

nonetheless within the orbit of Japanese cultural and commercial interests’ (Walker 2006,

p. 40).

At the turn of the nineteenth century, with a population of approximately 2,500,

Hakodate was one of the larger fishing settlements in the Matsumae domain, but was

exceeded in size by Matsumae and Esashi (Hakodate-shi Shi Henshūkai 1980, Vol. 1 p.

403). However, as foreign, particularly Russian, ships began to frequent the area in the

late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, several incidents and a developing

territorial dispute with Russia prompted the alarmed Tokugawa government to attempt

to establish direct authority in the area. The main branch of Tokugawa administration in

Hokkaido was established at Hakodate in 1802 giving the village a new importance. In the

next half century, the energies that the Tokugawa government could (or choose to) devote

to its northern border area varied depending on domestic politics and its own financial

situation. Nonetheless, Tokugawa intervention in Hokkaido in the face of a perceived

foreign threat was a significant development for the region and Hakodate more

specifically. The village became home to garrisons belonging to various domains and

administrative buildings of the Hakodate Governor (Hakodate Bugyō) which swelled the

population to about just under 10,000 by mid-century and elevated its political and

commercial importance (Hakodate-shi Shi Henshūkai 1980, Vol. 1 p. 124). This newfound

status was further enhanced when the village was selected, alongside Shimoda, as one of

Japan’s first Treaty Ports in 1855.

Hakodate was acceptable as a Treaty Port for the Western powers, who had

scrambled to sign treaties with Japan in the 1850s, for a number of reasons. Chief among

them was that Hakodate was blessed with a deep and safe harbour that could provide ice-

free winter anchorage to naval ships, whalers and merchant vessels alike. Its location in

the Tsugaru straits provided such vessels access to both the Japan Sea and Pacific, and as

such its location was strategic in a military sense and for the purpose of plundering nearby

whale stocks. However, Hakodate and its hinterland’s peripheral location and small

population offered only limited immediate commercial prospects, but this remoteness

from the political centre also meant vulnerability and this, combined with rumoured

wealth in natural resources, made some Western powers interested in the prospect of

annexing the territory. For the Tokugawa regime, establishing a Treaty Port at Hakodate

allowed them to keep the potentially disruptive foreign presence far removed from the

main commercial and political centres. The vulnerability of the region, however,

prompted it to redouble its efforts to fortify the port and strengthen its presence in

Hokkaido, resulting in a construction boom in Hakodate from the mid-1850s onwards.

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The famous star-shaped Goryōkaku fortress was the most prominent of the construction

projects in this period.

Elsewhere, I have described the growth of the port and its trade across the period

1854-1884 (Ivings 2017) and so it does not make sense to repeat myself in detail here.

However, as a way of summary it is worth mentioning that there were, broadly speaking,

four distinct sub-periods in the first three decades of Hakodate’s Treaty Port era. The first,

1855-59, covers the period in which under “friendship” rather than commercial treaties

Hakodate was open as a port of call to ships of countries with which Japan had a treaty. In

this period, a limited number of men-of-war and whaling ships called at Hakodate, where

they were able to purchase a small number of goods, mainly provisions. Economic

exchange was limited to a kind of bazaar held in temple grounds under the watchful eye

of the Hakodate Governor.

In the second period, 1860-1867, the signing of commercial treaties meant that

Hakodate was now opened to international trade with foreign merchants, consuls, etc.,

allowed to reside in the port and trade “freely” there while enjoying extraterritorial

privileges. The town continued to expand but only a small foreign population emerged in

Hakodate. This foreign population included Westerners and a number of Chinese

merchants. As China did not have a treaty with Japan at this point, these Chinese traders

came as “Anglo-Chinese” which meant that they were nominally registered as “staff” with

British firms but often traded on their own account. Except for a brief boom in smuggling

cooper cash (Bytheway and Chaiklin 2016; Will 1968), which was undervalued in Japan,

Hakodate’s foreign trade was dull and mostly limited to the export of seaweed (konbu) to

Chinese ports. Given the small market size of Hakodate and its surrounding area, inbound

foreign vessels often found that demand for imports of Western products was virtually

non-existent. By contrast, native merchants carried a healthy trade in food products,

especially rice which could not be produced in Hokkaido at the time. Hakodate’s trade

grew from 0.27 million Mexican dollars in 1863 (the first year we have numbers) to 0.85

million in 1867 but this was hardly a significant level of exchange, accounting for no more

than 3% of Japan’s total trade in 1867. Furthermore, the trade was dominated by exports

which accounted for between 75 and 98% of the trade in this period. In turn, exports

consisted of very few products with seaweed accounting for 62.1% of exports in 1867,

and other marine products making up a further 22.5% (Calculated from the commercial

reports of the UK consul at Hakodate, UKPP various years).

The third period, 1868-1869, saw the peak in Hakodate’s foreign trade which was

directly connected to the outbreak of the Boshin War in Japan which ushered in the Meiji

regime. As one of few open ports at the time, Hakodate became one of the key points at

which domains, particularly northern domains, could import rifles, ammunition and other

military stores. In the closing phase of the Boshin War, Hakodate became the seat of the

final resistance to the Meiji regime—a 3,000 strong force led by Enomoto Takeaki which

held the port and surrounding area from late 1868 to mid-1869. The presence of this force

only added to the bonanza of selling military related material and the port’s trade peaked

at 1.7 million Mexican silver dollars in 1869. As a result, many of Hakodate’s resident

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Western merchants made considerable profit. Furthermore, for the first time the port’s

trade saw imports and exports almost balance with exports accounting for a low of 56%

of Hakodate’s overall trade. The trade became more diverse as well with the export share

of marine products (including seaweed) falling to a low of 40% in 1869 (Calculated from

the commercial reports of the UK consul at Hakodate, UKPP). As the reporting of

transactions in this period was disrupted by conflict, and because much of it was

deliberately conducted off-the-books, it is likely that the volume of trade, particularly of

military equipment, is understated. Whatever the case, the Boshin War period ushered in

a short-lived boom for foreign merchants, in what was to be the high point of the port’s

foreign trade.

In the fourth period, 1870-1884, the trade of Hakodate returned to the pattern

established before the Boshin War. Exports regularly exceeded 90% of trade in this period

with China-bound marine products again dominant. As the foreign trade of Japan as a

whole continued to expand, Hakodate’s was relatively stagnant, fluctuating between a

modest 0.4 and 0.9 million Mexican silver dollars. In this period, the Western merchants

who had come to Hakodate in the 1860s went out of business one-by-one so that by the

mid-1880s there were essentially none left. Chinese merchants, who made up 34 of 41

foreign traders and their staff in Hakodate in 1883 (Hakodate-ken 1885, pp.104-105),

continued their marine product export business but they too faced increased competition

from Japanese merchants who sought to remove the Chinese merchant middlemen and

trade directly with China on their own account. Yet whilst Hakodate’s foreign trade

remained in the doldrums the town itself had expanded rapidly in terms of population

and commerce as a result of the Meiji government’s efforts to colonize Hokkaido, and

more broadly speaking, to foster domestic integration. The dissolution of the Matsumae

domain and the freedom to settle the Hokkaido hinterland had further accelerated

commercialization throughout the island with the result that the fruits of this enterprise

(principally marine products such as herring fertilizer, fish oils, etc.) passed through

Hakodate on the way to large domestic markets down south. In the Meiji period Hakodate

consolidated its position as the main hub for the trading and distribution of Hokkaido

produce and boomed on the back of a rapidly progressing domestic trade rather than as

a direct result of its Treaty Port status. By 1884, total domestic trade at Hakodate stood

at just over 15 million Mexican silver dollars according to the records of the British consul.

In the same year, foreign trade stood at less than a thirtieth of this level (UKHC 1885). The

boom in Hokkaido’s domestic trade saw the population of its commercial and distribution

hub skyrocket. From an estimated 19,000 residents directly after the Boshin War in 1869,

Hakodate’s population approached 50,000 by the mid-1880s (Hakodate-shi Shi

Henshūkai 1980, Vol. 1 pp. 125-127).

From the bird’s eye view of trade statistics, the foreign trade of Treaty Port

Hakodate was clearly only a minor part of the port’s rapid expansion in the second half of

the nineteenth century. However, whilst Treaty Port status may have mattered little in

the commercial sense, what could be said of the treaty porters? Who were they? Why did

they come to Hakodate? How did they manage businesses in the Treaty Port business

environment and seek to maintain or expand them in what was with hindsight an

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evidently failing trade? How does the above sketch of Hakodate’s history as a Treaty Port

change when we take into consideration their individual experiences? In the next section,

I seek to address such questions by focusing on the case of Thomas Blakiston, a British

merchant who long resided in the port. The focus on Blakiston here is merely for the sake

of space as existing documentation allows for further enquiry into some of the other

foreign merchants resident in the port such as British merchants Alexander Porter and

Alfred Howell, ship’s Captain John Will who occasionally tried his hand as a trader, and

compradors-cum-shipwrights Bewick and Thompson; American merchant-consul Elisha

Rice, and merchants Fletcher & Wilkie; Danish merchant-consul John Duus and his

brother Henry, Prussian/German merchant consul Gärtner, and compradors Schulter and

Strandt; etc. Going forward, I intend to examine in detail the trading activities of several

of these merchants, but for now it should suffice to make a few general comments on them

before looking into Blakiston’s activities in more detail.

Firstly, I would like to stress that the vast majority of this group had a China

connection both prior to and during their stay in Hakodate. Many had worked in Western

trading houses in Chinese Treaty Ports, or, as in the case of Alex Porter, they had worked

for the Chinese Maritime Customs. Duus, it seems, had spent most of his youth in Macao,

Canton (Guangdong) and Hong Kong where his father had been a trader and eventually

became Danish consul. These links were important as the China market was the one that

mattered for Hokkaido produce. Many of these individuals came to Hakodate and other

Japanese ports to strike it out as independent traders, anticipating a boom in the newly

opened Japanese ports where they hoped a windfall would await the first pioneers to

enter the market. Whilst pursuing their own trade, part of their portfolio was to act as

agents for the major Western trading houses in China – Jardine Matheson & Co, Dent &

Co., Lindsay & Co., etc. – who were unwilling to invest directly in minor ports such as

Hakodate. These Chinese connections are also likely to be the main reason why Western

treaty porters employed Chinese in their staff or were willing to cooperate with Chinese

merchants so as to provide cover for independent Chinese commercial activity much like

was the case in China itself (Abe 2018; Hao 1986). As there was no treaty between China

and Japan in the 1850s and 1860s, Chinese traders simply had to register with Western

merchants as they were not allowed to reside or trade in Japanese ports, excluding

Nagasaki where a long-standing trade took place.

The second point I would like to stress is the flexibility of merchant nationality in

the context of Treaty Port society. As already mentioned, Chinese merchants made up the

majority of foreign residents in Treaty Port Hakodate. Their presence was made possible

by their willingness to register as British or American, etc., or as the “staff” of British or

Americans firms, etc. The lack of a treaty between the Qing and Tokugawa regimes

rendered their presence as “Chinese” essentially illegal, but they were able to operate as

“Anglo-Chinese”. Western merchants must have been more than happy with such

arrangements as it allowed them to serve as agents for Chinese firms in securing real

estate and providing shipping services which would command a fee, and because

collaboration with Chinese traders provided access to upstream Chinese markets beyond

the reach of Western merchants who were only able to bring their wares to other Treaty

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Ports. Nationality was also just as changeable for Western merchants as it was for Chinese,

in what was clearly a ‘cosmopolitan bourgeoisie’ (Jones 1987). Some merchants initially

came as Americans, as at the time the only established consul was that of the US, only to

switch to British registration as soon as the UK consulate was established in Hakodate.

Likewise, John Duus, whose mother was British and father was Danish, and who had been

born in Calcutta and spent most of his youth in Chinese ports, first came to Hakodate as a

British merchant but soon switched allegiance to Denmark once the opportunity to

become the Danish consul arose. Ata time when nationality was beginning to really mean

something for business in the West, the cosmopolitan milieu of Treaty Ports in East Asia

persisted and for much longer and so it was not always the case that adjectives like

“British” or “Chinese”, etc., were particularly meaningful for merchants (Davenport and

Jones 1989, p. 113). If advantage could be gained from switching national affiliation,

merchants often did and rarely was documentation required to do so between Western

countries at least.

This brings me to the final point I would like to stress about Hakodate’s treaty

porters: the blurred line between consul and merchant. Save for the British and Russian

consuls, who were supposed to be professional diplomats and thus were not allowed to

engage in mercantile activity, the main business which the consuls of the United States,

Denmark, France, Portugal, and Prussia/Germany had to look after was that belonging to

the consuls themselves. Many merchants applied to be consul or commercial agent for

various nations because a consular position provided a direct line of communication to

the local authorities and thus helped them to protect their commercial interests more

effectively. British Merchant Alfred Howell, for example, long represented Portugal at

Hakodate even when no Portuguese merchants or vessels ever appeared to have called at

port—likewise Blakiston briefly became the Hawaiian consul. In his dealings, Howell

pushed his interests upon the authorities using both the British consul which applied

pressure on his behalf as he remained a British subject, and using his own office as the

Portuguese consul.

Thomas Blakitson and the Hakodate Trade until 1868

Thomas Wright Blakiston was one of the most prominent of Hakodate’s foreign merchants

having resided in port for most of the period 1863 to 1883. An adventurous explorer with

a passion for hunting, fishing and collecting bird specimens, he is better known in Japan

for his contributions to the study of ornithology and zoology. Far less attention has been

given to his trading activities as his firm did not survive him nor did he leave behind an

archive. Nevertheless, thanks to his own semi-scholarly publications, the British consular

reports, records of the Hakodate Bugyō, and approximately 300 of his letters that survive

in the Hakodate City Library, Hokkaido University Library Northern Studies Collection,

and Hokkaido Prefectural Archive, there is plenty of scope for enquiry.

Thomas Wright Blakiston was born in 1832 in Lymington (Hampshire), a small

town on the Southern coast of England known for producing sailors and smuggling. He

was the second son of Major John Blakiston, himself the second son of an aristocratic

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family with landholdings and interests in the northeast of England and Northern Ireland,

which had a strong tradition of military service, producing several knights of the realm

and even a few members of parliament. After his education in Southsea, Thomas Blakiston

joined the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich where he became attached to the Royal

Artillery in 1851 and was dispatched to several locations in England, Ireland and then

Nova Scotia, before being sent to participate in the Crimean War (1853-56). In the Crimea,

Blakiston served with distinction but appears to have grown disillusioned with military

life having lost a brother in the conflict. Upon his return from the Crimean conflict he

joined an expedition led by John Palliser to explore the Rocky Mountains of Western

Canada in 1857-58 at a time when Britain and the United States were engaged in a race

westward to chart and occupy land (Belich 2009). Blakiston played a prominent role in

the expedition taking observations of meteorological conditions (a mountain in the south-

western corner of Alberta bears his name as a result) and published a well-received

account of the expedition upon his return to Woolwich. Having re-joined his regiment in

Woolwich, Blakiston was next despatched to China in 1859 to serve in the Second Opium

(or Arrow) War. In Canton he took command of a detachment of artillery but was soon

again involved in an exploratory mission which set out from Shanghai in February 1861

to chart the Upper Yangtze. The mission lasted five months and managed to get

approximately 800 miles from Shanghai charting areas hitherto little known to

Westerners until it had to turn back having encountered areas disturbed by the Taiping

rebellion (Cortazzi 1999, pp. 52-54).

In order to write up his account of his exploration of the Upper Yangtze Blakiston

decided to take leave from his regiment and to put China behind him. It was the summer

of 1861 when he boarded a ship bound for Hakodate on which the mate was a Dundee-

born Scot named John Will who would later serve as a ship’s captain for Blakiston’s firm

(Will 1968, pp.28-29). Blakiston himself describes how he made a snap decision to go to

Hakodate and that he desired to get away from the hustle and bustle of Chinese Treaty

Ports and escape the stifling summer all together:

“Two or three nights in succession rendered sleepless from the partiality

of China mosquitoes for white blood, and the intense heat of a Shanghai

July, caused me to decide on migrating to cooler regions. With European

residents in the Celestial Empire, Japan has a peculiar charm. A voyage of

a few days in some well-found steamer on a trading voyage, places the

merchant - wearied by constant attention to business relieved by little

relaxation save boating on the Canton river, listening to the military band

at Hong Kong, or a promenade on the bund at Shanghai—in a new world.

His ears are relieved from the constant clashing of brass gongs and

explosions - of mammoth crackers; he gets clear of the hum and buzz of

garlic-odoured Chinese crowds, in Chinese or semi-Europeanized cities;

he hears no longer the peculiar jargon known and understood as Canton-

English, and he finds himself among a quiet, unassuming, and industrious

race […] He is in a beautiful and diversified country, where the garden-

like minuteness of the cultivation even exceeds that of some parts of

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China, but where, at the same time, some parts are left in the wildest state

of nature. Then the dwellings, public buildings, roads, and even the

people themselves, are so different, that his former associations are

dispelled, and he devotes himself to seeing and enjoying to the fullest

extent the little known country, and people. Transport could then be had

to the ports of Nagasaki and Yokohama but my object was to get cool. As

luck would have it, there was a vessel on the point of leaving for Hakodate,

the third and little-frequented port opened to foreign trade by our treaty

with Japan, and situated on the northernmost island, Yezo. The barque

Eva was to sail on the following morning, and so I had but just time to

procure a few things, including a tolerable supply of powder and shot,

and get myself, bag and baggage, on board.” (Blakiston 1883, pp.1-2)

His first impression of Hakodate and its economy was as follows:

“On my arrival at Hakodate, I was at once made aware of the principal

occupation of the inhabitants, and the consequent trade of the place, by

the all-pervading stench of dried fish and seaweed; in the streets, in the

houses, on the mountain side, everywhere the same scent haunted me of

fish, shell-fish, and sea-weed, fresh, drying, and dried. Even like the

eternal cocoa-nut oil in Ceylon, the food, the water, and everything one

touched, seemed to be scented in the same manner. At every fishing

village on the coast, the shingle is strewed with fish in different stages of

decomposition, and kelp is hung out on poles; while oil is extracted from

a certain small fish and put up in tubs for market” (Blakiston 1883, p.5)

Despite the smell, Hakodate seems to have been to Blakiston’s liking and he stayed there

for three months, finishing his work on the Upper Yangtze before returning to Britain via

Shanghai. The abundance of marine products passing through Hakodate and the richness

of Hokkaido’s fisheries had not escaped Blakiston’s notice, but it was the island’s timber

which really caught his attention as a business opportunity. At the time the prospects for

trade in China and Japan seemed promising and some of the port towns were expanding

rapidly, so the vast and largely untapped timber reserves of Hokkaido appeared well-

suited to supply timber for the construction of the building works of East Asia’s expanding

ports. Blakiston’s time in Nova Scotia, Hudson’s Bay and exploring Western Canada meant

he was aware of how lucrative the timber trade could be, and that he had some knowledge

of such enterprise.

Upon his return to Britain, Blakiston published his account of the Upper Yangtze

exploration and was decorated by the Royal Geographical Society with a Royal Medal for

it. Blakiston also got married and began to make preparations to return to Hakodate for

the purposes of establishing a saw mill there. For this purpose, he needed capital and so

agreed to act as manager of the West Pacific Co. (of which sadly little is known) who had

decided to run three ships in the Far East under Blakiston’s management and on board

which the machinery for the saw mill was shipped to Japan. It was at this time that John

11

Will began working under Blakiston and he was on board the ship that transported the

saw mill machinery to Hakodate, arriving in May 1864, having come via Malaya and Hong

Kong where they had transported coal and rice. At Hakodate they “discharged all the saw

mill machinery and boilers and the balance of the Newcastle coal” then a few weeks later

began transporting hardwood timber to Shanghai (Will 1968, p.38).

Blakiston had, together with his wife, Emily Sutton, set out earlier than the ships

and travelled overland across Siberia to reach Hakodate. It is unclear why he made such

an arduous journey, but it may have been a combination of his love for exploration and a

desire to scout other sources of timber or business potential in the Russian Far East for

the trade that he was seeking to pioneer. Whatever the reason, Blakiston reached

Hakodate for the second time in the second half of 1863 and immediately sought to lease

land and storehouses to conduct his business (BL 17 October 1863). The trip appears to

have taken a toll on Blakiston’s wife, however, and she soon returned to her family in

London never to return to Hakodate—she separated from Blakiston a few years later. At

first Blakiston appears to have had a favourable relationship with the local authorities and

when the saw mill equipment arrived he contacted the Hakodate Governor to let it be

known that they would welcome government observers. His letter was as follows:

“Sir, I have the honor to state for the information of His Excellency the

Governor of Hakodadi that two European Engineers have arrived by the

Barque “Akindo” for the purpose of erecting our saw-mill. Should His

Excellency think fit to place any government mechanics on our works for

the purpose of learning steam machinery under their direction, I shall

take care that every opportunity is afforded them for doing so. I wish it

also to be understood that there will be no hindrance to any Japanese

visiting or inspecting our saw-mill; and I hope that His Excellency the

Governor will do me the honour of inspecting the mill when it shall be

ready to commence work, which I will duly inform you of.” (BL 21 May

1864)

With what is considered to be the first steam-powered saw mill in Japan up and running,

Blakiston, on behalf of the West Pacific Co., began to process timber and export it to China.

As Captain John Will recalled, “For the next two years we traded between Hakodate and

ports in China, from Chefoo [Yantai today] in the north to Hong Kong and Whampoa [the

Huangpu district of Guangdong today] in the South. At Hakodate we loaded square timber

or planks after the saw mill got started” (Will 1968, p. 39). Though we do not have

Blakiston’s accounts, the timber trade with China though still modest showed

encouraging early signs in its first years. The Taiping Rebellion was raging in China and

with foreign gunboats frequenting its harbour Shanghai offered protection for those

uprooted by the bloody conflict. This influx of population from the surrounding country

generated a building boom in Shanghai and it is evident that Blakiston’s timber business

benefited from this in its early years.

12

The early signs were that demand in the China market would live up to

expectations, but despite such promise Blakiston’s trading activities encountered several

problems, more or less from the outset. One of these was the lack of demand for Western

or Chinese produce in Hakodate on account of the port and its surrounding area’s small

population, something which all foreign merchants tended to groan about. Merchant

vessels in ballast made no profit for their owners and so without a regular cargo which

could be carried to and sold in Hakodate, overall profitability must have been marginal or

negative. Eventually, as John Will’s memoirs make clear, the solution was to make calls at

other Japanese ports such as Nagasaki and Yokohama on the return voyage from China.

In these ports miscellaneous Chinese and Western produce could be sold and Japanese

produce could be procured to be sold in Hakodate. As rice could not yet be produced in

Hokkaido it became the main product carried by Western merchants to be sold in

Hakodate, albeit more often than not it was traded by Japanese merchants. Increasing the

number of ports to the regular route of Blakiston’s ships reduced the speed at which

voyages could be made between Hakodate and China, but it did ensure that fewer ships

went to sea without a cargo to trade. In this way the business quickly diversified into

providing shipping services to other merchants.

Finding a cargo to run to Hakodate was not the only problem that Blakiston faced

in his fledgling business. His effort to establish a profitable timber trade also faced the

problem of maintaining a regular supply of timber for export. In spite of Hokkaido’s

extensive forests, Blakiston encountered several obstacles in acquiring timber from the

surrounding area. Chief among these were the changable attitude of local authorities

towards the use of forestry resources and the non-fulfilment of contracts by Japanese

parties with whom Blakiston had entered into agreements to supply his saw mill. In 1864,

Blakiston had been able to procure a supply of timber from local suppliers relatively freely,

however, local concerns emerged that the speed at which the steam-powered saw mill

went through timber would lead to rapid deforestation and would raise the price of

firewood for the inhabitants of Hakodate. The result of these concerns was that in late

1864 the Hakodate Governor implemented new regulations restricting the felling of “large

sized” trees in the southern part of Hokkaido and so in 1865 Blakiston found himself

unable to contract with anyone to supply local timber for his saw mill. He wrote to the

Hakodate customs house to complain about this difficulty and rather than take an

aggressive tone he was careful to argue that the idea that his business affected the price

of firewood was a false one. He wrote:

“I take the liberty of addressing you on a subject of some importance to

the trade of Hakodadi, more particularly in that branch in which I am

engaged, namely the cutting and exportation of timber. Previous to last

year [1864], much valuable hardwood timber was cut on the mountain

near Hakodadi and brought on for sale, but during that year certain

regulations came into force, and still continue, which prohibit the

cutting of large sized timber. These regulations have prevented

contacts being made with persons desirous of cutting timber from the

mountains […] from whence it is easily rafted to Hakodadi. […] It is

13

obliged as a reason for the restrictions that the cutting of large timber

tends to raise the price of firewoods and charcoal at Hakodadi, but I

believe that such an idea is erroneous […] For instance a person wishes

to cut firewood or wood for charcoal only, he naturally selects smaller

trees on account of their being less labour required in felling such, the

young trees are now exclusively being cut, instead of being allowed to

grow to full size, while those of full growth fit for valuable timber

remain standing […] It appears to me that if any regulations are made,

they should be to prevent the cutting of small trees, but allow that of

large ones, in which case the lower parts would be converted into logs

for sale at Hakodadi while the branch and smaller parts of the same

trees would serve for firewood and charcoal, and the profit derived by

the wood-cutter on the large timbers would tend any materially to

reduce the price of firewood and charcoal. […] I may further state that

the timber most in demand for exportation is oak, a wood any little used

of Japanese so that the cutting could have but little effect upon the price

of timber generally. Moreover, since existing regulations have been in

force the price of firewood and charcoal instead of falling, has actually

risen, because the wood-cutters have not been able to make my money

by the sale of large timber as before. I am at present desirous of entering

into contract for the ensuing season for timber from near Mobitsze,

Tobitsze, Kikonai and the vicinity of Hakodadi, but am unable to do so,

because the mountains people are prevented by the existing

regulations for cutting such timber as I require and I have therefore the

honour to request that you will be good enough to bring the subject of

this letter to the notices of His Excellency the Governor in the hope that

he will give the matter his serious consideration with a view to rescind

the regulations at present in force which have shown are so prejudicial

to the timber trade of this port, and are our benefit to the inhabitants of

Hakodadi.” (BL 8 September 1865)

The treaties in which Treaty Port’s like Hakodate were established contained a clause that

stated that subjects of treaty powers were allowed to reside in the port but were not

allowed to travel far beyond its immediate vicinity [approx. 39 kilometres in any direction

was permitted]. Furthermore, they included no provision by which foreigners could own

or gain licence to directly extract natural resources such as timber, coal, marine products,

etc. This meant that foreign firms were dependent on Japanese partners or suppliers for

the items they sought to trade or else they needed a special arrangement with the

government which might, for example, contract with foreign firms in order to benefit from

foreign expertise. Whilst this did happen on occasion in coal mining, an industry in which

Japan’s technical level was clearly behind the international standard, in the felling of

timber no such arrangement appears to have emerged. Thus whilst Blakiston, with his

steam-powered will, was at an advantage in the processing of timber into planks of wood

for construction, he was at a disadvantage in the actual procurement of raw materials. In

14

the end pressure from the British consul promptly led to the removal of most of the

restrictions of which Blakiston complained, and so he was again free to enter into

contracts with local suppliers again, however, this did not prevent the government from

using alternative tactics to limit the supply of timber for the saw mill. Blakison’s letters to

the custom house, Hakodate Governor and British Consul over the next two years contain

several complaints against local suppliers for failing to deliver the contracted amount of

timber and against the government for doing little or nothing to enforce these contracts.

Blakiston and the British Consul accused the custom house officials of “great

neglect” in the carrying out of justice (RHG 13 June 1866) and suspected that they even

encouraged Japanese suppliers not to fulfil contracts or enter into them altogether. Most

of Hakodate’s trades were more or less under the control of a handful of wealthy

government-licensed trading houses which foreign merchants labelled monopolies. As

these houses owed their wealth to their government links, it was relatively easy for the

local authorities to exert pressure on them so as to restrict business with foreign traders.

In late 1865, unable to get a regular supply of timber, Blakiston decided to out manoeuvre

such barriers put up by the government and Hakodate’s main trading houses by

forwarding 700 ryo to a petty Japanese merchant who was short of funds. The said petty

merchant would then be able to secure a government tender to fell 2,700 cedar trees on

Hakodate Mountain, 2,000 of which he would then supply to Blakiston’s saw mill at a fixed

price by the end of November 1865. According to the agreement, in the event of non-

fulfilment, Blakiston would be entitled to all 2,700 trees.

This scheme turned out to be a big mistake as the petty merchant, inexperienced

in such an undertaking, soon ran out of funds. By the end of December, Blakiston claimed

that only 1100 out of the 2000 trees had been delivered. In February 1866, having lodged

a complaint and received no definitive response, Blakiston sought to take the remainder

from the mountain on his own account, where he met with interference and the logs felled

in this way were hauled away to the Government dockyard. After the intervention of the

British Consul, the custom house recognized Blakiston’s agreement and thus rights to the

remaining trees, but this victory meant little in concrete terms. Blakiston was only able to

obtain 1,712 of the 2,700 trees he was entitled to and was unable to recover the 700 ryo

he had initially forwarded to the petty merchant, Shōkichi. Suspecting foul-play on the

part of the government, who he claimed “had prevented the contractor from cutting the

full amount”, Blakiston attempted to recover his losses from the government, albeit to no

avail (RHG 19 June 1866). Lesson learned, Blakiston sought to bypass the Hakodate

merchants and governor by engaging the Nambu domain on the other side of the Tsugaru

strait to supply him with timber from the late summer of 1866 onwards. This must have

added to costs a little, but as Nambu was more or less beyond the control of either the

Hakodate merchants or governor, Blakiston was at least able to procure a more reliable

supply.

Over the years 1866 and 1867, Blakiston took a less confrontational approach

towards the local government and mercantile community, managing to cultivate

relationships with them by providing shipping services for the export of marine products

15

from Hakodate to other Japanese ports and China, as well as importing southern produce,

such as rice and fresh fruit and vegetables, to Hakodate. Enterprising up-and-coming

Japanese merchants such as Yanagida Tōkichi, who went on to play a big role in the early

Meiji-period development of Eastern Hokkaido (Okuda 2008, pp. 52-57), were quick to

realize the benefits of engaging foreign merchants for shipping services, particularly in

perishable goods. At the time Western ships, both steam and sail, surpassed Japanese

coastal vessels (kitamaesen) in terms of speed, ability to travel far out to sea and ride out

bad weather, giving Western merchants an advantage in providing reliable shipping

services to merchants seeking to transport a cargo between treaty ports in Japan, to China,

or beyond. The advantage held by Western merchants in shipping did not last long,

however, as in the 1870s Japanese firms such as Mitsubishi already began to offer

competition having acquired, and in some cases built, their own Western-style steam and

sail ships. Moreover, whilst Western and Chinese merchants were only able to visit Treaty

ports, Japanese firms faced no such restrictions allowing them to more directly reach

markets or sources of bulk export items. Nonetheless, in the mid-to-late 1860s and early

1870s, Blakiston was able to tap into a niche and his letters suggest that the bulk of his

business, as with most Western merchants in Hakodate, involved the export of marine

products (particularly kelp) to Shanghai and Nagasaki. The cargo would typically include

some traded on his own account as well as that traded on the account of other merchants,

Western, Chinese and Japanese alike. Yanagida Tōkichi in particular is known to have

chartered ships from Blakiston on several occasions (BL 27 December 1867).

Though Blakiston was yet to make a big success of his mercantile efforts in

Hakodate the stabilization of his activities in 1866-67—a time otherwise characterized by

financial instability for many Western enterprises in the Asia—gave Blakiston the

confidence to establish Blakiston Marr & Co. in March 1867 together with James Marr.

Very little is known of James Marr, who was very much the junior partner of the venture,

expect that he was from Scotland, had graduated from the University of Aberdeen, and

spent some time in China before coming to Hakodate in 1866. Marr had acquired some

knowledge of Japanese allowing him to handle some of the day-to-day dealings and

oversee the Japanese staff of the newly established frim which continued to “act as agents

at this port for the West Pacific Co Limited” and was described by Blakiston as “general

and commission merchants” (BL 25 March 1867). At this time, Blakiston still saw the main

potential of Hakodate and its surrounding area to be in its forestry and rather than

wrangle with the government Blakiston sought to deal with them directly in an attempt

to obtain a reliable source of timber. He approached them with the following proposition:

“Should the government be agreeable to deliver timber at Hakodadi, I am

prepared to enter into large contracts with them for a certain term of years,

or year by year as the might consider advisable. At the present time I can offer

for timber to be cut during next winter […] Or I would agree to take delivery

of timber at the mouth of rivers along the coast […] this port has superior

advantages for receiving timber for Nippon and for shipping to foreign ports

besides the demand for sawn timber in the town itself. Could a regular and

large supply be depended on here, heavy contracts to deliver timber might

16

be made with government and private parties in China, and as the

comparative cheap and superior qualities of Yesso timber become more

known the demand would increase. At the ports of Yokohama, Osaka, &

Nagasaki (without reckoning only native ports) a certain amount of Hakodadi

timber is necessary.” (BL 4 June 1867)

In the same proposal, Blakiston went beyond seeking a supply of timber, he also mooted

the idea of a new saw mill to be established and run as a joint-venture in collaboration

with the Hakodate governor, which was of course the local branch of the Tokugawa

government. Blakiston concluded the proposal stating that, “besides attending to the saw

mill and timber trade, I should be agreeable to give my advice and assistance in any

military or other government works for the development of the resources of Yesso [i.e.

Hokkaido], for, having the intention of residing permanently in the country, I have its

interests at heart” (BL 4 June 1867). At this point, Blakiston had put his previous

antagonism towards the government-political merchant control of commercial activity

aside and sought to get in on the act himself by cultivating a relationship with officialdom.

This approach continued as Blakiston attempted to get involved in the promising

Iwanai coal mine development which was on Hokkaido and within reach of Hakodate. In

a precursor to the early-Meiji period government employment of “foreign experts” (oyatoi

gaikokujin) the Tokugawa government employed a British engineer, Erasmus Gower, to

examine the Iwanai coal stream and advise them on its exploitation. Knowing Gower

personally, Blakiston was aware of the potential of this mine and sounded out the

government on the potential of exporting Iwanai coal to China. Blakiston was all too aware

that a shortage of coal was often felt by steamers in East Asia as there were no large-scale

coal mines being exploited in the region at the time. Costly imports from Europe made

coal expensive and with the growth in intra-Asian trade the shortage was likely to

intensify. Blakiston knew that if Iwanai proved to be viable there was an excellent

business opportunity to be had to diversify his business as his firm was well placed to link

Hokkaido coal with the principal market in Shanghai. In September 1867, Blakiston

offered the inspection services of a coal dealer, Mr Rice, based in Shanghai who was

visiting Hakodate and that “should there be any coal ready at Iwanai, it might perhaps

meet the views of H[is]. E[xcellency]. the Governor if the schooner “Khanki” went to

Iwanai and took a load to China for trial […] Mr Rice being well known to me you may

safely rely on any information he may give the government concerning the prospects for

the sale of coal in China” (BL 21 September 1867).

Blaksiton seems to have had his efforts frustrated by the government which by this

time was on the verge of collapse as the political situation turned against the Tokugawa.

The Shogun effectively resigned his government in November 1867 and the political

intrigue that followed this eventually led to the outbreak of civil conflict, known as the

Boshin War, that started in the southern part of Kyoto in late January 1868 and later

spread to the Kanto area and then the northeast of Japan. Blakiston’s immediate hopes of

collaboration with the Tokugawa regime’s local government in Hokkaido were thwarted

17

and frustrated, but the armed conflict in Japan also provided opportunity to Western

merchants.

Boshin Bonanza, Meiji Frustration, 1868-1883

It is evident from the British consular reports of Hakodate that Blakiston, like many

foreign merchants based at Hakodate and other treaty ports, anticipated and attempted

to profit from the emerging conflict in Japan (Sugiyama 1993). Supplying arms, selling

ships, and conveying the troops of desperate domains around the northeast of Japan,

which saw some of the most intense fighting, were to offer Hakodate-based Western

merchants a risky but lucrative business opportunity. The consular reports detail some of

these activities, including an order placed Blakiston with French firm Fabre Boeme & Co.

for 50 cases of rifles (FO262-146 Sept. 28-29, 1868) and the chartering of Blakiston Marr

& Co.’s ships to convey troops and weapons of the Nambu, Akita and Shonai domains from

Hakodate to their home territories as the Meiji government established its presence in

Hakodate (FO262-146 Sept. 27, Oct. 7 & 10, 1868).

The Meiji government sent a small contingent to occupy Hakodate prior to its

capture of the northeast. This was achieved without active resistance in June 1868,

however, the Meiji government’s hold on Hakodate was tenuous and it was powerless to

disrupt the activities of Northern domains with a strong presence in Hakodate from

acquiring arms as one by one they rescinded their neutrality in the Boshin War and joined

the alliance of northern domains which rejected the Meiji government. In helping these

domains flee and arm themselves, Blakiston’s firm was aiding a would-be enemy of the

Meiji regime. As the British consul remarked this “annoyed the authorities here very much”

but Blakiston was certainly not picking sides in Japan’s civil war at that point, and he was

soon taking on charters from the Meiji government. As the war in the Northeast of Honshu

developed favourably for the Meiji government many of the domains that had initially

resisted soon switched sides. Somewhat ironically in late November 1868, one of

Blakiston Marr & Co.’s ships transported Nambu troops back to Hakodate at the request

of the Meiji government in order to garrison the port which it felt was under threat

(FO262-146 Nov. 28).

The Meiji government’s fears were not unfounded as in December 1868 the

remnants of the former Tokugawa regime’s navy, led by Enomoto Takeaki, broke rank

rather than surrender to the Meiji regime. After picking up some of the troops of the

defeated northeastern domains at Sendai, this party of around 3,000 troops took

Hakodate and Southern Hokkaido by storm. Indeed they occupied the area until finally

being defeated militarily by the Meiji government in June 1869 in what is known as the

Battle of Hakodate. During the seven month long occupation of the port by Enomoto’s

force Blakiston certainly did take sides. According to John Will’s memoirs the ships of

Blakiston Marr & Co. helped the troops of the Meiji government and its supporters flee

Hakodate when Enomoto’s force arrived and thereafter regularly sent ships to Aomori. At

Aomori they picked up timber even though the port was not open and most likely relayed

intelligence about the situation in Hakodate as Aomori was the port in which the Meiji

18

government mustered its force to retake Hakodate after the winter had passed (Will 1968,

p. 49).

Blakiston himself stayed in Hakodate during the conflict and did not board, as

foreign residents were advised to do, the foreign men-of-war sent by Britain and France

to observe the conflict and protect foreign property. Blakiston and his ships’s captain John

Will witnessed the battle on shore. Blakiston never wrote about the conflict, but Captain

Will did, and he describes he describes Blakiston’s calm during the evidently dangerous

naval battle and sense of assurance that he would nor his property would be in the line of

fire (Will 1968, p.54). Having visited the Meiji forces pre-battle military HQ on several

occasions, Blakiston must have made sure they knew where his property and the military

targets were. Other evidence that Blakiston may have been relaying information to the

Meiji forces gathered in Aomori, across the Tsugaru straits is provided by the long-serving

US commercial agent to Hakodate who somewhat jealously reported to the US minister to

Japan in the capital that:

“I have reliable information that Captain Blakistone (sic), late of the

English Artillery, and resident here, for important services rendered as a

spy while this place was held by Enomoto’s government received from the

present Mikado Government ($1,000) one thousand dollars, (2,500)

twenty five hundred piculs of rice, and a free pass all expenses paid to visit

any part of this island, an extensive trip on the strength of which, he has

just returned. Under the “favoured nation” clause of Treaty cannot any

other power claim the same right and privilidge (sic) to explore the island?”

(USCR Jan, 24, 1870)

The Boshin War had clearly provided a short-term bonanza for many of the Western

merchants located in Hakodate. They found their shipping services in high demand and

could convey troops at exorbitant rates and they were finally able to sell high value

Western products—albeit arms and military stores—rather than simply convey lower

value perishable and dried marine produce between East Asian ports.

The legacy of the Boshin War period was not, however, a positive one. As the

Japanese civil war which ushered in the Meiji government proved to be short lived, the

demand for weapons plummeted and many of the customers—principally domains—

during the conflict proved to be short of funds in peacetime regardless of whether they

had supported or resisted the Meiji. Moreover, many of the contracts simply turned bad

as the domains which had purchased weapons and ships, etc., were effectively dissolved

in late August 1871 as the Meiji government replaced them with newly-established

prefectures in what was a major reorganization of local government. Blakiston found

himself among the chorus of Western merchants hounding their consuls and the Japanese

authorities over the next decade to redeem funds advanced to former domains or to claim

outstanding payments on contracts concluded with now defunct bodies, in most cases

with little success. Blakiston had sold a steamship, Kanga no Kami, to the Akita domain

(not to be confused with the prefecture) but struggled to redeem remaining payments and

19

thus sought redress from the Meiji government by arguing that it was ultimately

responsible, arguing that “although the steamer “Kanga no Kami” was purchased

nominally by the Akita Government, she has been always employed in the Imperial [i.e.

Meiji] Government service and consequently holding the Government of Japan

responsible for all the just claims against the vessel, we request you will take immediate

steps for the payment of this account” (BL 31 August 1868). Blakiston was able to get

some redress in this case but it appears to have put a strain on his relationship with the

Meiji government which was itself in a fragile financial position in its early years. Perhaps

as a result, an agreement which Blakiston claimed to have made with the Meiji

government to export coal from Iwanai broke down. In this case Blakiston laid another

complaint and continued to seek compensation for over a decade but to no avail (BL 18

August 1869; 28 July 1873; Sep 1878).

Many other bad accounts were left unsettled and Blakiston was a regular in the

consular court over the next decade. Business largely returned to its pre-Boshin War

norm with a portfolio of marginal exports of timber and wooden planks and providing

shipping services for Japanese and Chinese marine products merchants based at

Hakodate. There was also the occasional charter from the Meiji government in

transferring colonial settlers to remote parts of Hokkaido and Sakhalin, carrying Iwanai

coal to the Sado island gold mine, and to salvage the occasional shipwreck in remote

corners of Hokkaido all of which proved lucrative if irregular (Will 1968, pp.64-73). Sadly,

James Marr died in May 1871 in Hakodate, where he is still buried, having contracted an

unknown illness. He was just 29 year of age at the time. Though thereafter Blakiston was

without a partner, the firm officially continued to bear Marr’s name after his death.

Whether his partner’s death or the shipwreck of one of the firms ships in October 1872

had an impact or not is unclear, but in a letter in late 1872, Blakiston appeared resolved

to disposing of his property in Hakodate and leaving the port altogether (BL 11 November

1872).

This did not materialize and Blakiston continued to have a good relationship with

Yanagida Tōkichi regularly exporting the latter’s kelp to Shanghai (BL 20 November

1872), but several of his attempts to secure kelp and timber from other sources to trade

on his own account turned out for the worse. In July 1873 Blakiston was actively pursuing

six plaints, besides the coal dispute with the government, to recover funds totalling

upwards of 54,000 ryo which had been forwarded to Japanese merchants to procure these

items (BL 28 July 1873). Prior to this Blakiston had contracted with the Kaitakushi, the

Meiji government’s Colonial/Development Office in Hokkaido, to deliver a saw mill to

Ishikari near the new capital of Hokkaido, Sapporo. Whilst government contracts were in

theory more secure, the ship carrying the equipment was delayed and damaged in a storm

along with the saw mill equipment. As a consequence the equipment for the saw mill

arrived damaged in March 1872 when it had been due in October 1871 (BL 7 March 1872).

Eventually some months later the Kaitakushi agreed to take over the equipment but only

after a protracted and frustrating dispute about responsibility for the damages caused in

transit.

20

Blakiston again found himself in conflict with the local authorities in the summer

of 1873, when the local arm of the Kaitakushi successfully petitioned the British consul,

Richard Eusden, to try Blakiston at the consular court. Initially, the charge of murder was

mooted but in the end Blakiston was tried for manslaughter following the death of one of

his servants—referred to simply as Kihachi. The servant had been found dead after a

dispute with Blakiston over the theft of his rifle. Blakiston had several alibis and was

cleared of manslaughter, but was charged for assault (a charge he admitted to) having

beaten Kihachi quite severely over the theft. The court ruled that Kihachi appeared to

have committed suicide in the hours after the assault had taken place (UKHC June-July

1873). Blakiston avoided prison and got away with a fine of 500 Mexican silver dollars

paid to Kihachi’s family, but the ordeal must have distracted from his business and

affected his reputation locally. In mid-1873 Blakiston found himself without a partner,

having recently lost a ship, and severely short of funds as a result of several unfulfilled

contracts. The whole affair had further tainted his relationship with the Meiji government

and his trust in the British consul was also no longer a given.

TO BE CONTINUED/COMPLETED (approx. 4 pages)

Blakiston Marr & Co. promissory note dispute with the central government 1874-

75. Blakiston orders promissory notes to be made in Frankfurt due to a shortage

of funds Japanese government objects when it finds out about the scheme UK

consul and minister backs the Japanese government removal of the promissory

notes at Blakiston’s own expense.

Running the Aomori-Hakodate (Sei-Kan) shipping route for 8 months before being

elbowed out by a Kaitakushi backed rival.

1874 staff list makes clear that the saw mill was no longer in operation. In 1875

Blakiston Marr & Co. fall in to rent arrears in another dispute with the local

government.

Acting as a front for independent Chinese business - “the Chinese whom we

transact business for live on no. 2 lot foreign concession, on which we pay rent to

the Japanese government” (UKHC 8 November 1875)

Late 1870s Blakiston becomes more focused on his pursuits in zoology and

ornithology, producing several papers and a collection of birds which he later

donates. His business remains mostly confined to charter, and left in the hands of

his staff or friend Henry Snow (Snow 1910, p.124). He helps finance a friend’s

(Henry Snow) venture in sea-otter hunting in the Kuril Islands but never directly

gets involved in the risky but lucrative activity [Snow 1910, p.121].

Leaves Hakodate in 1883 not a particularly wealthy man; travels across the

American West with long-term friend Edwin Dun [advisor to the Kaitakushi and

later US Minister to Japan] and marries Edwin Dun’s elder sister, settling in the

United States (Dun, pp.74-75). Dies in San Diego in 1891 aged 58.

21

Concluding Remarks

Transformations? (political, social, commercial)

Hakodate itself was transformed in the period examined here but as Blakiston

admitted that this was not a result of foreign trade and Western enterprise, for him

“the growth and modernization of Hakodate can only be attributed to the

advantages it possesses as a mercantile base for Yezo [Hokkaido], and the

enterprise and intelligence of its citizens stimulated by the infusion of the ideas of

new Japan” (Blakiston 1883, p.8). Treaty port status may have increased the

political importance of Hakodate, but ultimately the growth of the town was a

result of increased trade with other Japanese ports and the colonization of

Hokkaido which created goods to be traded at Hakodate.

Treaty Ports: China, the West and Hokkaido

What foreign trade that did emerge was almost solely in the exportation in

Hokkaido marine products to China. Much of this trade was in the hands of Chinese

and Japanese merchants, with Western traders like Blakiston providing

cover/protection and shipping services for independent Chinese traders.

Hakodate’s foreign trade was strictly intra-Asian trade [link to Sugihara,

Hamashita, etc.] and thus it made sense that the treaty porters in Japan had been

treaty porters in China.

In some ways the treaty port system based on extraterritoriality and residence

rights in trading enclaves, rather than promoting and protecting the activities of

Western merchants actually acted as a non-tariff barrier to prevent their economic

penetration (Sugiyama 1988, pp.52-55). Western merchants in Hakodate were

dependent on Japanese merchants to procure export items and then Chinese

merchants to market them upstream from ports like Shanghai, Ningbo, etc.

Characteristics of treaty port based Western enterprise; Blakiston Marr & Co.

success or failure?

“British merchant houses in the Far East assumed the name of agency houses … [in

which] intimate local knowledge was united with the maintenance of close links

with Britain—or, rather, the home port (London, Glasgow, Liverpool, or

Manchester) …. the agency houses were a dynamic economic movement that were

in the vanguard of exploitation of global opportunities” (Chapman in Wilkins and

Schröter 1998, p.204) in the case of Blakiston the link with the home port

appears weak, and as beyond the saw mill equipment nothing was imported

directly from or exported to the UK. Blakiston Marr and Co. were headquartered

in Hakodate, had a primarily Japanese staff, provided shipping services to Japanese

and Chinese treaty ports and traded with the same ports. Was it a British firm or a

Japanese one?

Wilkins’ concept of “free standing companies” which she considered to be the most

common form of British investment overseas in the 19th century, these were

founded 'to conduct business overseas, much of which, unlike the American model,

22

did not grow out of the domestic operations of existing enterprises that had

headquarters in Britain' (Wilkins quoted in Jones 2000, p.51). This

characterization would have been true of West Pacific Co. but not for Blakiston

Marr & Co. Although Blakiston Marr & Co. was unable to generate long term

success in its trading activities it did endure for two decades. Blakiston may have

not left Hakodate a particularly rich man, however, his business was successful

enough for him to be able to pursue his interests and satisfy his hunger for

adventure. His account of Hokkaido written as he was leaving the port does not

strike the reader as full of regret, bitterness or even much thought of what might

have been.

Blakiston as an agent of imperial expansion

Treaty ports and those who came to them are thought of as semi-colonial space

where the activities of treaty powers, mercantile or otherwise, undermine the

sovereignty of the host society/nation. Blakiston’s disputes with the Japanese

government and merchants alike, which were heard at British consular courts, are

evidence of this, as is his financing of Henry Snow’s Sea-otter hunting venture in

the Kuril Islands. Yet on the other hand, indirectly, Blakiston also contributed to

the expansion of Japanese imperial power over its vulnerable northern periphery

in Hokkaido by assisting the Meiji regime in the Boshin War, transporting colonial

settlers, and in conveying Hokkaido produce to China and other Japanese treaty

ports, thereby helping integrate the region’s commerce to an extent hitherto never

seen. Blakiston did not do these things alone, but he did, perhaps unwittingly, help.

23

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Archival Materials

BL Blakiston Letters

英商武烈幾士頓来翰編 [Hakodate City Library, Hakodate]

HUNSC Hokkaido University Northern Studies Collection

北海道大学北方関係資料室 [Hokkaido University, Sapporo]

RHG Records of the Hakodate Governor

26

箱館奉行所文書 [Hokkaido Prefectural Archive, Sapporo]

RK Records of the Kaitakushi (Hokkaido Development Agency)

開拓使文書 [Hokkaido Prefectural Archive, Sapporo]

UKPP United Kingdom Parliamentary Papers [Online]

UKHC United Kingdom Hakodate Consulate [National Archives of United

Kingdom, London]

USCR United States Consular Reports [Online]