McMahon–Hussein Correspondence

The McMahon–Hussein Correspondence, or theHussein–McMahon Correspondence, was a series often letters exchanged from 14 July 1915 to 30 January1916,[1] during World War I, between Hussein bin Ali,Sharif of Mecca, and Sir Henry McMahon, British HighCommissioner in Egypt, concerning the political statusof lands under the Ottoman Empire. Growing Arab na-tionalism had led to a desire for independence from theOttoman Empire. In the letters Britain agreed to recog-nize Arab independence after World War I “in the limitsand boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca”, not in-cluding areas in which France had interests. This was inexchange for Arab help in fighting the Ottomans, led byHussein bin Ali.Later, the 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement between Franceand UK was exposed showing that the two countries wereplanning to split and occupy parts of the promised Arabcountry.In January 1923 unofficial excerpts were published byJoseph N. M. Jeffries in the Daily Mail[2] and copies ofthe various letters circulated in the Arab press.[3] Offi-cial excerpts were published in the 1937 Peel Commis-sion Report,[4] but the correspondence was first publishedin full in George Antonius's 1938 The Arab Awakening.Referring to the 25 October 1915 letter, Antonius wrotethat it is: “by far the most important in the whole corre-spondence, and may perhaps be regarded as the most im-portant international document in the history of the Arabnational movement... is still invoked as the main pieceof evidence on which the Arabs accuse Great Britain ofhaving broken faith with them.”[5]

1 The Damascus Protocol

Main article: Damascus Protocol

HenryMcMahon and Hussein bin Ali

On his return journey from Istanbul in 1915, where Faisalbin Hussein had confronted the Grand Vizier with evi-dence of an Ottoman plot to depose his father (Husaynbin Ali), he decided to visit Damascus to resume talkswith theArab secret societies al-Fatat andAl-'Ahd that hehad met in March/April. On this occasion, Faisal joinedtheir revolutionary movement. During this visit, on 23May 1915, he was presented with the document that be-came known as the 'Damascus Protocol'. The documentsdeclared that the Arabs would revolt in alliance with theUnited Kingdom, and in return the UK would recognizethe Arab independence in an area running from the 37thparallel near the Taurus Mountains on the southern bor-der of Turkey, to be bounded in the east by Persia and thePersian Gulf, in the west by the Mediterranean Sea andin the south by the Arabian Sea.[6][7]

Early in April 1914 Abdullah I bin al-Hussein (the secondof three sons of Sherif Hussein bin Ali) asked the BritishHigh Commissioner in Cairo what would be the Britishattitude if the Arab Ottomans revolted. The British re-sponse based on its traditional policy of preserving “theintegrity of the Ottoman Empire” was negative. How-ever, the entry of the Ottomans on Germany’s side inWorld War I on 11 November 1914 brought about anabrupt shift in British political interests concerning anArab revolt against the Ottomans.[8]

Following deliberations at Ta'if between Hussein and hissons in June 1915, during which Faisal counselled cau-tion, Sherif Husayn bin Ali argued against rebellion andAbdullah advocated action and encouraged his father toenter into correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon, theSharif set a tentative date for armed revolt for June 1916and commenced negotiations with the British High Com-missioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon.[6]

2 The territorial reservations

The letter from McMahon to Hussein dated 24 October1915 declared Britain’s willingness to recognize the in-dependence of the Arabs subject to certain exemptions.Note that the original correspondence was conducted inboth English and Arabic, such that various slightly differ-ing English translations are extant.

The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta,and portions of Syria lying to the west of

1

2 3 THE ARAB REVOLT

the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama andAleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, andmust on that account be excepted from the pro-posed limits and boundaries.

With the above modification and with-out prejudice to our existing treaties con-cluded with Arab Chiefs, we accept these lim-its and boundaries, and in regard to the terri-tories therein in which Great Britain is free toact without detriment to interests of her allyFrance, I am empowered in the name of theGovernment of Great Britain to give the fol-lowing assurance and make the following replyto your letter:

Subject to the above modifications, GreatBritain is prepared to recognize and support theindependence of the Arabs within the territo-ries in the limits and boundaries proposed bythe Sherif of Mecca.[9]

Declassified British Cabinet Papers include a telegramdated 19 October 1915 from Sir Henry McMahon to theSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Grey, re-questing instructions.[10] McMahon said the clause hadbeen suggested by a man named Muhammed Sharif al-Faruqi, a member of the Abd party, to satisfy the de-mands of the Syrian Nationalists for the independenceof Arabia. Faroqi had said that the Arabs would fightif the French attempted to occupy the cities of Damas-cus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, but he thought they wouldaccept some modification of the North-Western bound-aries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca. Faroqi suggestedthe language: “In so far as Britain was free to act with-out detriment to the interests of her present Allies, GreatBritain accepts the principle of the independence of Ara-bia within limits propounded by the Sherif of Mecca.”Lord Grey authorized McMahon to pledge the areas re-quested by the Sherif subject to the reserve for the Allies.

3 The Arab Revolt

Main article: Arab Revolt

The Arab Revolt had begun on false pretences. To gainthe Sherif’s help our Cabinet had offered, through SirHenry McMahon, to support the establishment of nativegovernments in parts of Syria and Mesopotamia, 'sav-ing the interests of our ally, France'. The last mod-est clause concealed a treaty (kept secret, till too late,fromMcMahon, and therefore from the Sherif) by whichFrance, England and Russia agreed to annex some ofthese promised areas, and to establish their respectivespheres of influence over all the rest... Rumours of thefraud reached Arab ears, from Turkey. In the East per-sons were more trusted than institutions. So the Arabs,having tested my friendliness and sincerity under fire,

asked me, as a free agent, to endorse the promises ofthe British Government. I had had no previous or innerknowledge of the McMahon pledges and the Sykes-Picottreaty, which were both framed by war-time branches ofthe Foreign Office. But, not being a perfect fool, I couldsee that if we won the war the promises to the Arabs weredead paper. Had I been an honourable adviser I wouldhave sent my men home, and not let them risk their livesfor such stuff. Yet the Arab inspiration was our main toolin winning the Eastern war. So I assured them that Eng-land kept her word in letter and spirit. In this comfortthey performed their fine things: but, of course, insteadof being proud of what we did together, I was continuallyand bitterly ashamed.T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) in his autobio-graphical Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 1922[11]

McMahon’s promises were seen by the Arabs as a formalagreement between them and theUnited Kingdom. LloydGeorge and Arthur Balfour represented the agreement asa treaty during the post war deliberations of the Councilof Four. On this understanding the Arabs established amilitary force under the command of Hussein’s son Faisalwhich fought, with inspiration from 'Lawrence of Arabia',against the Ottoman Empire during the Arab Revolt.[7] Inan intelligence memo written in January 1916 Lawrencedescribed the Arab Revolt as

beneficial to us, because it marches withour immediate aims, the break up of the Is-lamic 'bloc' and the defeat and disruption ofthe Ottoman Empire, and because the states[Sharif Hussein] would set up to succeed theTurks would be … harmless to ourselves…TheArabs are even less stable than the Turks. Ifproperly handled they would remain in a stateof political mosaic, a tissue of small jealousprincipalities incapable of cohesion (emphasisin original).[12]

The Arab Revolt began in June 1916, when an Arab armyof around 70,000 men moved against Ottoman forces.They participated in the capture of Aqabah and the sev-ering of the Hejaz railway, a vital strategic link throughthe Arab peninsula which ran from Damascus to Medina.This enabled the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under thecommand of General Allenby to advance into the Ot-toman territories of Palestine and Syria.[13]

The British advance culminated in the Battle of Megiddoin September 1918 and the capitulation of Turkey on 31October 1918.The Arab revolt is seen by historians as the first organizedmovement of Arab nationalism. It brought together dif-ferent Arab groups for the first time with the commongoal to fight for independence from the Ottoman Empire.Much of the history of Arabic independence stemmedfrom the revolt beginning with the kingdom founded by

4.3 Declaration to the Seven 3

Hussein. After the war was over, the Arab revolt had im-plications. Groups of people were put into classes basedon if they had fought in the revolt or not and what theirrank was. In Iraq, a group of Sharifian Officers fromthe Arab Revolt formed a political party which they werehead of. Still to this day the Hashemite kingdom in Jor-dan is influenced by the actions of Arab leaders in therevolt.[14]

4 Subsequent commitments

4.1 Sykes Picot Agreement

Main article: Sykes-Picot Agreement

The Sykes–Picot Agreement between Britain, France andRussia of May 1916 (made public by the Bolsheviks afterthe Russian Revolution) was exposed in November 1917showing that the countries were planning to split and oc-cupy parts of the promised Arab country.

4.2 The Hogarth Message

In January 1918 Commander David Hogarth, head of theArab Bureau in Cairo, was dispatched to Jeddah to de-liver a letter written by Sir Mark Sykes on behalf of theBritish Government to Hussein (nowKing of Hejaz). Themessage assured Hussein that

The Entente Powers are determined thatthe Arab race shall be given full opportunityof once again forming a nation in the world.This can only be achieved by the Arabs them-selves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allieswill pursue a policy with this ultimate unity inview.[15]

and with respect to Palestine and in the light of the Bal-four Declaration that

Since the Jewish opinion of the world is infavour of a return of Jews to Palestine and inas much as this opinion must remain a constantfactor, and further as His Majesty’s Govern-ment view with favour the realisation of thisaspiration, His Majesty’s Government are de-termined that insofar as is compatible with thefreedom of the existing population both eco-nomic and political, no obstacle should be putin the way of the realisation of this ideal.[15]

The meaning of the Hogarth message, and in particularwhether it modified the commitments made in the Bal-four Declaration is still debated,[16][17] although Hogarthreported that Hussein “would not accept an independent

Jewish State in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn himthat such a state was contemplated by Great Britain”.[18]

The secret Sykes–Picot Agreement did not call for Arabsovereignty, but the French and British agreement did callfor 'suzerainty of an Arab chief' and 'an international ad-ministration, the form of which is to be decided upon af-ter consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consul-tation with the other allies, and the representatives ofthe sheriff of mecca.[19] Under the terms of that agree-ment, the Zionist Organization needed to secure an agree-ment along the lines of the Faisal-Weizmann Agreementwith the Sharif of Mecca.

4.3 Declaration to the Seven

Main article: Declaration to the Seven

In light of the existing McMahon–Hussein correspon-dence, but in the wake of the seemingly competingBalfour Declaration for the Zionists, as well as the publi-cation weeks later by the Bolsheviks of the older and pre-viously secret Sykes–Picot Agreement with the Russiansand French, seven Syrian notables in Cairo, from thenewly formed Party of Syrian Unity, issued a memoran-dum requesting some clarification from the British Gov-ernment, including a “guarantee of the ultimate indepen-dence of Arabia". In response, issued on 16 June 1918,the Declaration to the Seven, stated the British policy thatthe future government of the regions of the Ottoman Em-pire occupied by Allied forces in World War I should bebased on the consent of the governed.[20][21]

4.4 Allenby’s assurance to Faisal

On 19 October 1918, General Allenby reported to theBritish Government that he had given Faisal,

official assurance that whatever measuresmight be taken during the period of militaryadministration they were purely provisionaland could not be allowed to prejudice the finalsettlement by the peace conference, at whichno doubt the Arabs would have a representa-tive. I added that the instructions to the mili-tary governors would preclude their mixing inpolitical affairs, and that I should remove themif I found any of them contravening these or-ders. I reminded the Amir Faisal that the Allieswere in honour bound to endeavour to reach asettlement in accordance with the wishes of thepeoples concerned and urged him to place histrust whole-heartedly in their good faith.[22]

4 4 SUBSEQUENT COMMITMENTS

4.5 Anglo-French Declaration of 1918

Main article: Anglo-French Declaration

In the Anglo-FrenchDeclaration of 7November 1918 thetwo governments stated that

The object aimed at by France and theUnited Kingdom in prosecuting in the East theWar let loose by the ambition of Germany isthe complete and definite emancipation of thepeoples so long oppressed by the Turks andthe establishment of national governments andadministrations deriving their authority fromthe initiative and free choice of the indigenouspopulations.[23]

According to civil servant Eyre Crowe who saw the orig-inal draft of the Declaration, “we had issued a definitestatement against annexation in order (1) to quiet theArabs and (2) to prevent the French annexing any partof Syria”.[24]

4.6 Paris Peace Conference

Following World War I, the Paris Peace Conference washeld in 1919 between the allies to agree territorial divi-sions. It was a well known fact that France wanted a Syr-ian protectorate. At the conference, Prince Faisal, speak-ing on behalf of King Hussein, did not ask for immediateArab independence. He recommended an Arab State un-der a British Mandate.[25]

4.7 Independent Kingdom of Syria

On 6 January 1920 Prince Faisal initialed an agree-ment with French Prime Minister Clemenceau which ac-knowledged 'the right of the Syrians to unite to governthemselves as an independent nation'.[26] A Pan-SyrianCongress, meeting in Damascus, declared an independentstate of Syria on 8 March 1920. The new state includedportions of Syria, Palestine, and northern Mesopotamiawhich had been set aside under the Sykes–Picot Agree-ment for an independent Arab state, or confederationof states. King Faisal was declared the head of State.The San Remo conference was hastily convened, and theUnited Kingdom and France both agreed to recognizethe provisional independence of Syria and Mesopotamia,while 'reluctantly' claiming mandates to assist in their ad-ministration. Provisional recognition of Palestinian inde-pendence was not mentioned, despite the fact that it wasdesignated a Class A Mandate.France had decided to govern Syria directly, and took ac-tion to enforce the French Mandate of Syria before theterms had been accepted by the Council of the League ofNations. The French intervened militarily at the Battle

of Maysalun in June 1920. They deposed the indigenousArab government, and removed King Faisal from Dam-ascus in August 1920.[27] The United Kingdom also ap-pointed a High Commissioner and established their ownmandatory regime in Palestine, without first obtaining ap-proval from the Council of the League of Nations.

4.8 The League of Nations Mandates

After the war, France and Britain continued to provideassurances of Arab independence, while planning to placethe entire region under their own administration.[28][29]

United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing wasa member of the American Commission to NegotiatePeace at Paris in 1919. He explained that the system ofmandates was simply a device created by the Great Pow-ers to conceal their division of the spoils of war, underthe color of international law. If the territories had beenceded directly, the value of the former German and Ot-toman territories would have been applied to offset theAllies claims for war reparations. He also explained thatJan Smuts had been the author of the original concept.[30]

At the Paris Peace Conference, US Secretary of StateLansing had asked Dr. Weizmann if the Jewish nationalhome meant the establishment of an autonomous Jew-ish government. The head of the Zionist delegation hadreplied in the negative.[31]

At the Conference of London and the San Remo con-ference in April 1920, the Allied Supreme Councilgranted the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia toBritain,[32] and those for Syria and Lebanon to France.In August 1920, this was officially acknowledged in theTreaty of Sèvres. Both Zionist and Arab representativesattended the conference, where they signed the Faisal–Weizmann Agreement,[33] a short-lived agreement forArab–Jewish cooperation on the development of a Jew-ish homeland in Palestine and an Arab nation in a largepart of the Middle East. The agreement was never imple-mented.

4.9 Lawrence’s post-war advocacy

Lawrence became increasingly guilt-ridden by the knowl-edge that Britain did not intend to abide by the commit-ments made to the Sharif, but still managed to convinceFaisal that it would be to the Arabs’ advantage to go onfighting the Ottomans. At the Versailles peace confer-ence in 1919 and the Cairo conference in 1921 Lawrencelobbied for Arab independence, but his belated attemptsto maintain the territorial integrity of Arab lands, whichhe had promised to Hussein and Faisal, and in limit-ing France’s influence in what later became Syria andLebanon were fruitless. However, as Churchill’s adviseron Arab affairs (1921–22) Lawrence was able to lobbyfor a considerable degree of autonomy for Mesopotamia

5.2 Arab interpretation 5

and Transjordan. The British placed Palestine, promisedto the Zionist Federation in 1917, under mandate witha civilian administration headed by Herbert Samuel, anddivided their remaining territory in the Middle East intothe kingdoms of Iraq and Transjordan, assigning them toFaisal and his brother Abdullah, respectively.[12][34]

5 Debate about Palestine

5.1 Debated sentences

“The consequences of interpreting McMahon’s 'wilayahs’as meaning 'Ottoman provinces’ are so disconcerting thatit was - and, to my mind, still is - difficult to believe thatMcMahon was intending to use the word in this sense inhis letter. This interpretation would force on us a choicebetween the two following alternative conclusions:(i) First alternative: McMahon was completely ignorantof Ottoman administrative geography. He did not knowthat the Ottoman vilayet of Aleppo extended westwardto the coast, and he did not know that there were no Ot-toman vilayets of Homs and Hama. It seems to me in-credible that McMahon can have been as ill-informed asthis, and that he would not have taken care to inform him-self correctly when he was writing a letter in which he wasmaking very serious commitments on HMG’s account.(ii) Second alternative: McMahon was properly ac-quainted with Ottoman administrative geography, andwas using the word 'wilayahs’ equivocally. Apropos ofDamascus, he was using it to mean 'Ottoman provinces’;apropos of Homs and Hama, and Aleppo, he was usingit to mean 'environs’. This equivocation would have beendisingenuous, impolitic, and pointless. I could not, andstill cannot, believe that McMahon behaved so irrespon-sibly”...The documents written by British officials, contesting theinterpretation of McMahon’s word 'wilayahs’ that wasmade by me and, before me, by the author of the ArabBureau’s History, all date from after the time at whichHMG had become sure that Britain had Palestine in herpocket... I do not think that Young’s or Childs’ or MrFriedman’s interpretation of McMahon’s use of the word'wilayahs’ is tenable. After studying Mr Friedman’s pa-per and writing these notes, I am inclined to think thatthe drafting of this letter was, not disingenuous, but hope-lessly muddle-headed. Incompetence is not excusable intransacting serious and responsible public business.”Arnold J. Toynbee in 1970, in correspondence with IsaiahFriedman[35]

The debate regarding Palestine derived from the fact thatit is not explicitly mentioned in the McMahon–HusseinCorrespondence, but is included within the boundariesthat were initially proposed by Hussein. McMahon ac-cepted the boundaries of Hussein “subject to modifica-tion”,[36] and suggested the modification that "portions of

Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs,Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab andshould be excluded." The Arabs and British disagreedover whether Palestine was meant to be one of those ex-cluded areas, each side producing supporting argumentsfor their positions based on fine details of the wording andthe historical circumstances of the correspondence.Jonathan Schneer provides an analogy to explain the cen-tral dispute over the meaning:

Presume a line extending from the dis-tricts of New York, New Haven, New Lon-don, and Boston, excluding territory west froman imaginary coastal kingdom. If by districtsone means “vicinity” or “environs,” that is onething with regard to the land excluded, but ifone means "vilayets" or “provinces,” or in theAmerican instance “states,” it is another alto-gether. There are no states of Boston, NewLondon, or New Haven, just as there were noprovinces of Hama and Homs, but there is astate of New York, just as there was a vilayetof Damascus, and territory to the west of NewYork State is different from territory to thewest of the district of New York, presumablyNew York City and environs, just as territoryto the west of the vilayet of Damascus is dif-ferent from territory to the west of the districtof Damascus, presumably the city of Damas-cus and its environs.[37]

5.2 Arab interpretation

The Arab position was that they could not refer to Pales-tine since that lay well to the south of the named places.In particular, the Arabs argued that the vilayet (province)of Damascus did not exist and that the district (sanjak)of Damascus covered only the area surrounding the cityitself and furthermore that Palestine was part of the vi-layet of 'Syria A-Sham', which was not mentioned in theexchange of letters.[38]

Supporters of this interpretation also note that during thewar, thousands of proclamations were dropped in all partsof Palestine, carrying a message from the Sharif Husseinon one side and a message from the British Commandon the other, to the effect 'that an Anglo-Arab agree-ment had been arrived at securing the independence ofthe Arabs.'[39]

5.3 British interpretation

The initial British position, from at least 1916, was thatPalestine was included from the land promised to Husseinas one of the non-wholly Arab areas of Syria to the westof Damascus. This became public knowledge only in re-cent years as a result of historians and scholars search-

6 6 INTERPRETATIONS OF FRENCH INTENTIONS

ing through the declassified files in the National Archives.In November 1918 the Political Intelligence Departmentof the British Foreign Office had drafted a confidentialmemorandum on the issue for the use of Britain’s del-egation at the Paris Peace Conference, which also con-cluded Palestine was included in the Arab area. The East-ern Committee of the Cabinet, previously known as theMiddle Eastern Committee, subsequently met on 5 De-cember 1918 to discuss the government’s commitmentsregarding Palestine. Lord Curzon chaired the meeting.T. E. Lawrence, General Jan Smuts, Lord Balfour, LordRobert Cecil, General Sir HenryWilson, Chief of the Im-perial General Staff, and representatives of the ForeignOffice, the India Office, the Admiralty, the War Office,and the Treasury were present. According to the minutesLord Curzon explained that Palestine was included in theareas as to which Great Britain pledged itself that theyshould be Arab and independent in the future.In the public arena, Balfour had come under criticismin the House of Commons, when the Liberals and La-bor Socialists moved a resolution 'That secret treatieswith the allied governments should be revised, since, intheir present form, they are inconsistent with the objectfor which this country entered the war and are, there-fore, a barrier to a democratic peace.'[40] In response togrowing criticism arising from the seemingly contradic-tory commitments undertaken by the United Kingdomin the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, the Sykes–Picot Agreement and the Balfour declaration[41] the 1922Churchill White Paper, took the position that Palestinehad always been excluded from the Arab area. Althoughthis directly contradicted numerous previous governmentdocuments, those documents were not known to the pub-lic at the time. As part of preparing this White Paper,Sir John Shuckburgh of the British Colonial Office hadexchanged correspondence with McMahon, and reliancewas placed on a 1920 memorandum by Major HubertYoung, who had noted that in the original Arabic text, theword translated as “districts” in English was “vilayets”, avilayet being the largest class of administrative districtinto which the Ottoman Empire was divided. He con-cluded that “district of Damascus”, i.e., “vilayet of Dam-ascus”, must have referred to the vilayet of which Dam-ascus was the capital, the Vilayet of Syria. This vilayetextended southward to the Gulf of Aqaba, but excludedmost of Palestine.While the British Government have held that the intent ofthe McMahon Correspondence was not to promise Pales-tine to Hussein, it has occasionally acknowledged theflaws in the legal terminology of the McMahon–HusseinCorrespondence that make this position problematic. Forexample, the weak points of the government’s interpreta-tion were acknowledged in a detailed memorandum bythe Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1939.A committee established by the British in 1939 to clarifythe various arguments observed that many commitmentshad been made during and after the war - and that all of

them would have to be studied together. The Arab rep-resentatives submitted a statement to the committee fromSirMichaelMcDonnell[42] which explained that whateverMcMahon had intended to mean was of no legal conse-quence, since it was his actual statements that constitutedthe pledge from His Majesty’s Government. The Arabrepresentatives also pointed out that McMahon had beenacting as an intermediary for the Secretary of State forForeign Affairs, Lord Grey. Speaking in the House ofLords on 27 March 1923, Lord Grey had made it clearthat, for his part, he entertained serious doubts as to thevalidity of the Churchill White Paper’s interpretation ofthe pledges which he, as Foreign Secretary, had caused tobe given to the Sharif Husain in 1915. The Arab repre-sentatives suggested that a search for evidence in the filesof the Foreign Office might throw light on the Secretaryof State’s intentions.

5.3.1 List of British interpretations over time

A list of interpretations by British politicians and civil ser-vants is below, showing the evolution of the debate be-tween 1916 and 1939:

6 Interpretations of French inten-tions

In the areas with Maronite, Orthodox, and Druze pop-ulations the Great Powers were still bound by an in-ternational agreement regarding non-intervention, theReglement Organique Agreements of June 1861 andSeptember 1864. During a War Cabinet meeting on pol-icy regarding Syria and Palestine held on 5 December1918, it was stated that Palestine had been included in theareas the United Kingdom had pledged would be Araband independent in the future. The Chair, Lord Cur-zon, also noted that the rights that had been granted tothe French under the terms of the Sykes–Picot Agree-ment violated the provisions of the Reglement OrganiqueAgreements and the war aims of the other Allies.[58] (Thepublication of the Sykes–Picot Agreement caused the res-ignation of Sir Henry McMahon.[59])In a Cabinet analysis of diplomatic developments pre-pared in May 1917, William Ormsby-Gore argued that:

French intentions in Syria are surely in-compatible with the war aims of the Allies asdefined to the Russian Government. If theself-determination of nationalities is to be theprinciple, the interference of France in the se-lection of advisers by the Arab Governmentand the suggestion by France of the Emirs tobe selected by the Arabs in Mosul, Aleppo,and Damascus would seem utterly incompat-ible with our ideas of liberating the Arab na-

7

tion and of establishing a free and independentArab State. The British Government, in au-thorising the letters despatched to King Hus-sein before the outbreak of the revolt by SirHenry McMahon, would seem to raise a doubtas to whether our pledges to King Hussein ashead of the Arab nation are consistent withFrench intentions to make not only Syria butUpperMesopotamia another Tunis. If our sup-port of King Hussein and the other Arabianleaders of less distinguished origin and prestigemeans anything it means that we are preparedto recognise the full sovereign independence ofthe Arabs of Arabia and Syria. It would seemtime to acquaint the French Government withour detailed pledges to King Hussein, and tomake it clear to the latter whether he or some-one else is to be the ruler of Damascus, whichis the one possible capital for an Arab State,which could command the obedience of theother Arabian Emirs.[60]

7 See also

• Pan-Arabism

• Anglo-Persian Oil Company

• T. E. Lawrence

8 Notes[1] http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/

IBS094.pdf p. 8.

[2] Sahar Huneidi (7 April 2001). ABroken Trust: Sir HerbertSamuel, Zionism and the Palestinians. I.B.Tauris. pp. 65–. ISBN 978-1-86064-172-5.

[3] Antonius, 1938, p.180: “In actual fact, the terms of theMcMahon Correspondence are known all over the Arabworld. Extracts have from time to time been officiallypublished inMecca by the Sharif Husain himself, and sev-eral of the notes have appeared verbatim and in full inArabic books and newspapers. It is open to any personwith a knowledge of Arabic, who can obtain access to thefiles of defunct Arabic newspapers, to piece the whole oftheMcMahon notes together; and that work I have done infour years of travel and research, from Cairo to Baghdadand from Aleppo to Jedda.”

[4] Report Of The Palestine Royal Commission, Chap. II.1,pp. 16–22.

[5] Antonius, 1938, p.169

[6] Paris, 2003, p. 24.

[7] Biger, 2004, p. 47.

[8] http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/IBS094.pdf p. 7.

[9] English version quoted in "Palestine: Legal ArgumentsLikely to be Advanced by Arab Representatives", Mem-orandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs(Lord Halifax), January 1939, UK National Archives,CAB 24/282, CP 19 (39)

[10] See UK National Archives CAB/24/214, CP 271 (30).

[11] Lawrence, T. E. (25 October 2015). Seven Pillars of Wis-dom & The Evolution of a Revolt (Complete Edition withOriginal Illustrations andMaps): Lawrence of Arabia’s Ac-count and Memoirs of the Arab Revolt and Guerrilla War-fare during World War One. e-artnow. ISBN 978-80-268-4556-0.

[12] Waïl S. Hassan “Lawrence, T. E.” The Oxford Encyclo-pedia of British Literature. David Scott Kastan. OxfordUniversity Press 2005.

[13] “Arab Revolt” A Dictionary of Contemporary World His-tory. Jan Palmowski. Oxford University Press, 2003. Ox-ford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.

[14] Khalidi, Rashid (1991-01-01). The Origins of ArabNationalism. Columbia University Press. ISBN9780231074353.

[15] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre-spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharifof Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex F.

[16] Friedman, 2000, p. 328.

[17] Kedourie, 2002, p. 257.

[18] Huneidi, 2001, p. 66.

[19] The Sykes–Picot Agreement : 1916, Avalon Project

[20] Friedman, 2000, pp. 195–197.

[21] Choueiri, 2000, p. 149.

[22] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre-spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharifof Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex H.

[23] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre-spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharifof Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex I.

[24] Hughes, 1999, pp. 116–117.

[25] DESIRES OF HEDJAZ STIR PARIS CRITICS; ArabKingdom’s Aspirations Clash With French Aims in AsiaMinor

[26] [Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920-1925, byTimothy J. Paris, Routledge, 2003, ISBN 0-7146-5451-5, Page 69]

[27] “Faisal I” A Dictionary of World History. Oxford Univer-sity Press, 2000.

[28] Federal Research Division, 2004, p. 41.

[29] Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 57.

8 8 NOTES

[30] Project Gutenberg: The Peace Negotiations by RobertLansing, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Com-pany. 1921, Chapter XIII 'THE SYSTEM OF MAN-DATES'

If the advocates of the system intended toavoid through its operation the appearance oftaking enemy territory as the spoils of war, itwas a subterfuge which deceived no one. Itseemed obvious from the very first that thePowers, which under the old practice wouldhave obtained sovereignty over certain con-quered territories, would not be denied man-dates over those territories. The League ofNations might reserve in the mandate a rightof supervision of administration and even ofrevocation of authority, but that right wouldbe nominal and of little, if any, real valueprovided the mandatory was one of the GreatPowers as it undoubtedly would be. The al-most irresistible conclusion is that the pro-tagonists of the theory saw in it a means ofclothing the League of Nations with an ap-parent usefulness which justified the Leagueby making it the guardian of uncivilized andsemi-civilized peoples and the internationalagent to watch over and prevent any deviationfrom the principle of equality in the commer-cial and industrial development of the man-dated territories.

It may appear surprising that the GreatPowers so readily gave their support tothe new method of obtaining an apparentlylimited control over the conquered territo-ries, and did not seek to obtain completesovereignty over them. It is not necessary tolook far for a sufficient and very practical rea-son. If the colonial possessions of Germanyhad, under the old practice, been dividedamong the victorious Powers and been cededto them directly in full sovereignty, Germanymight justly have asked that the value of suchterritorial cessions be applied on any war in-demnities to which the Powers were entitled.On the other hand, the League of Nations inthe distribution of mandates would presum-ably do so in the interests of the inhabitantsof the colonies and the mandates would beaccepted by the Powers as a duty and notto obtain new possessions. Thus under themandatory system Germany lost her territo-rial assets, which might have greatly reducedher financial debt to the Allies, while the lat-ter obtained the German colonial possessionswithout the loss of any of their claims for in-demnity. In actual operation the apparent al-truism of the mandatory system worked in fa-vor of the selfish and material interests of thePowers which accepted the mandates. Andthe same may be said of the dismembermentof Turkey. It should not be a matter of sur-prise, therefore, that the President found littleopposition to the adoption of his theory, or,

to be more accurate, of the Smuts theory, onthe part of the European statesmen.

[31] 'The Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pi-chon’s Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 27February 1919, at 3 p. m.', United States Departmentof State Papers relating to the foreign relations of theUnited States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Vol-ume IV (1919), The Council of Ten: minutes of meetings15 February – 17 June 1919, Page 169

[32] (Biger 2004, p. 173)

[33] http://www.mideastweb.org/feisweiz.htm

[34] “Lawrence, Thomas Edward, 'Lawrence of Arabia'" ADictionary of Contemporary World History. Jan Pal-mowski. Oxford University Press, 2003.

[35] Arnold Toynbee and Isaiah Friedman (1970). “TheMcMahon-Hussein Correspondence: Comments and aReply” (PDF). Journal of Contemporary History. 5 (4):185–201. JSTOR 259872.

[36] The Arab-Israeli Conflict

[37] Schneer 2010, p. 66-67.

[38] Biger, 2004, p. 48.

[39] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre-spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharifof Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex A, para-graph 19: “The contention that the British Governmentdid intend Palestine to be removed from the sphere ofFrench influence and to be included within the area ofArab independence (that is to say, within the area of futureBritish influence) is also borne out by the measures theytook in Palestine during the War. They dropped procla-mations by the thousand in all parts of Palestine, whichbore a message from the Sharif Husain on one side and amessage from the British Command on the other, to theeffect that an Anglo-Arab agreement had been arrived atsecuring the independence of the Arabs, and to ask theArab population of Palestine to look upon the advancingBritish Army as allies and liberators and give them everyassistance. Under the aegis of the British military author-ities, recruiting offices were opened in Palestine to recruitvolunteers for the forces of the Arab Revolt. Throughout1916 and the greater part of 1917, the attitude of the mil-itary and political officers of the British Army was clearlybased on the understanding that Palestine was destined toform part of the Arab territory which was to be consti-tuted after the War on the basis of independent Arab gov-ernments in close alliance with Great Britain.”

[40] No Peace Basis Yet, Balfour Asserts, 21 June 1918

[41] Zachary Lockman “Balfour Declaration” The OxfordCompanion to the Politics of the World, 2e. Joel Krieger,ed. Oxford University Press Inc. 2001.

[42] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre-spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharifof Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex C.

[43] Friedman, 2000, p.292; FO 371/6237 (1921), file 28E(4), volume 1, pages 110-12

9

[44] John Quigley (6 September 2010). The Statehood ofPalestine: International Law in the Middle East Conflict.Cambridge University Press. pp. 11–12. ISBN 978-1-139-49124-2.

[45] National Archives, CAB 24/68/86, British Commitmentsto King Husein, Political Intelligence Department, For-eign Office, November 1918

[46] ‘Memorandum on British commitments to King Hus-sein’. Peace Congress file, 15 March 1919. The NationalArchives, London. Ref: FO 608/92.

[47] National Archives, CAB 24/72/6, The Settlement ofTurkey and the Arablan Peninsula, British Commitmentsto King Husein, Political Intelligence Department, For-eign Office, 21 November 1918

[48] Walter Reid (1 September 2011). Empire of Sand: HowBritain Made the Middle East. Birlinn. pp. 71–75. ISBN978-0-85790-080-7.

[49] Palestine Papers 1917–1922, Doreen Ingrams, page 48and UK Archives PRO. CAB 27/24.

[50] Friedman, 2000, p.294; F.O. 371/5066, E. 14959/9/44,“Memorandum on Palestine Negotiations with the Hed-jaz,” by H[ubert] W. Y[oung], dated 29 November 1920

[51] British White Paper of June 1922, The Avalon Project atYale Law School.

[52] National Archives CAB 24/159/6 17 February 1923

[53] House of Lords debate, HL Deb 27 March 1923 vol 53cc639-69

[54] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre-spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharifof Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, enclosure to An-nex A.

[55] House of Lords debate, HL Deb 20 July 1937 vol 106cc599-665, Viscount Samuel: “Speaking to him of LordGrey’s speech, I said I wished to write to him on the sub-ject, and he said he could tell me facts that I could com-municate to Lord Grey. He gave me, quite unofficially,this note dated April 12, 1923”

[56] Friedman, 2000, p.292; FO 371/14495 (1930)

[57] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre-spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharifof Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL.

[58] See UK National Archives CAB 27/24, EC-41.

[59] See CAB 24/271, Cabinet Paper 203(37).

[60] See UK National Archives CAB/24/143, Eastern Report,No. XVIII, 31 May 1917.

9 References• Biger, Gideon. (2004). The Boundaries of ModernPalestine, 1840–1947. London: Routledge. ISBN0-7146-5654-2

• Choueiri, Youssef M. (2000). Arab Nationalism: AHistory. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-631-21729-0

• Cleveland, William L. (2004). A History of theModern Middle East. Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-4048-9 (see pp. 157–160).

• Federal Research Division (2004). Syria: A CountryStudy. Kessinger Publishing. ISBN 1-4191-5022-7

• Friedman, Isaiah (2000). Palestine, A Twice-Promised Land. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 1-56000-391-X

• Hughes, Matthew (1999). Allenby and British Strat-egy in the Middle East, 1917–1919. London: Rout-ledge. ISBN 0-7146-4920-1

• Huneidi, Sahar (2000). A Broken Trust: HerbertSamuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920–1925.IB Tauris. ISBN 1-86064-172-5

• Kedourie, Elie (2000). In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth:The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its In-terpretations, 1914–1939. London: Routledge.ISBN 0-7146-5097-8

• Mansfield, Peter (2004). A History of the MiddleEast. London: Penguin. ISBN 0-14-303433-2 (seepp. 154–155).

• Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2006). ContemporaryPolitics in the Middle East. Blackwell Publishing.ISBN 0-7456-3594-6

• Paris, Timothy J. (2003). Britain, the Hashemitesand Arab Rule, 1920–1925: The Sherifian Solution.London: Routledge. ISBN 0-7146-5451-5

• Schneer, Jonathan (2010). The Balfour Declaration:The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. RandomHouse. ISBN 978-1-4000-6532-5.

10 External links• The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence at theJewish Virtual Library.

• The 1937 Peel Commission on the McMahon cor-respondence and the “Arab Revolt”

10 10 EXTERNAL LINKS

McMahon–Hussein Letter 25 October 1915

“Districts” according to the McMahon letter and their administra-tive category in the Ottoman Empire

11

Emir Faisal’s party at Versailles, during the Paris Peace Confer-ence of 1919. At the centre, from left to right: Rustum Haidar,Nuri as-Said, Prince Faisal, Captain Pisani (behind Faisal), T. E.Lawrence (known as “Lawrence of Arabia”), unknown, CaptainTahsin Qadri.

Minutes of the Paris Peace Conference 1919. The correspon-dence was described by David Lloyd George as “the Treaty withthe Arabs”

1918 British Government map entitled “Map illustrating Territo-rial Negotiations between H.M.G. and King Hussein”

The interpretation of the British Government changed between1918 and 1922. The left hand page is from CAB 24/68/86,November 1918, whilst the right hand page is from the ChurchillWhite Paper of June 1922

12 10 EXTERNAL LINKS

Cmd 5974 Report of a Committee Set up to Consider CertainCorrespondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif ofMecca in 1915 and 1916

13

11 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

11.1 Text• McMahon–Hussein Correspondence Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McMahon%E2%80%93Hussein_Correspondence?oldid=

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