Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations of the Middle East

SETTING THE SCENE FOR A NEW GULF

WAR: THE SAUDI-IRANIAN CONUNDRUM

A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ON THE SIMILARITIES AND

DIFFERENCES THAT MAKE UP THE INTRICATE SAUDI-

IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP

Name: Axel Xavier Patrice de Puteani Rigault Jørgensen

Student Nr: 11127821

First reader: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan

Second reader: Dr. Paul Aarts

Date: 24/06/2016

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It is a truism that almost any sect, cult, or religion will legislate its creed into law if it acquires

the political power to do so.

- Robert A. Heinlein.

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Chapter I. Introduction............................................................................................................8

1.2 Relevance of the research...................................................................................................10

1.3 Roadmap of the thesis.........................................................................................................12

Chapter II. Theoretical framework......................................................................................13

2.1 On realism...........................................................................................................................14

2.2 Neorealism and neoclassical realism..................................................................................15

2.3 Neoclassical realism in the context of Saudi-Iranian relations...........................................16

2.4 Variables that conform to neoclassical realist thought within the Saudi-Iranian framework

..................................................................................................................................................17

2.5 Conclusion to Chapter II.....................................................................................................22

Chapter III. Methodology......................................................................................................24

3.1 Process tracing....................................................................................................................24

3.2 Variables.............................................................................................................................26

3.3 Operationalization of variables...........................................................................................27

3.4 Data.....................................................................................................................................33

Chapter IV. Informative background relevant to the analysis..........................................39

4.1 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia............................................................................................39

4.2 The Islamic Republic of Iran..............................................................................................41

4.3 The importance of Bahrain.................................................................................................43

4.4 Conclusion to Chapter IV...................................................................................................45

Chapter V. Comparative analysis – Similarities..................................................................47

5.1 Support for regional proxies and groups.............................................................................47

5.2 Nuclear weapons.................................................................................................................57

5.3 Religion, a similarity or difference?...................................................................................61

5.4 Conclusion to chapter V.....................................................................................................68

Chapter VI. Comparative analysis – Differences................................................................70

6.1 Military spending................................................................................................................70

6.2 Ethnic nationalism..............................................................................................................77

6.3 Alliances to foreign powers................................................................................................80

6.4 Regime typology.................................................................................................................87

6.5 Collective memory..............................................................................................................92

6.6 Conclusion to Chapter VI...................................................................................................97

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Chapter VII. Conclusion........................................................................................................99

7.1 Conclusion..........................................................................................................................99

7.2 Implications......................................................................................................................103

7.3 Discussion and Further Research......................................................................................104

7.4 List of References.............................................................................................................107

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List of abbreviations

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council

IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

IRGC-QF: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - Quds Force

ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

KHA: Kata’ib Hezbollah

LeT: Lashkar-e-Taiba

NWFP: North-West Frontier Province

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

WMDs: Weapons of Mass Destruction

List of Maps and Figures:

Map 1. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Map 2. The Islamic Republic of Iran.

Map 3. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia vs Islamic Republic of Iran: a proxy war in the Middle East.

Figure 1. Saudi Arabian military expenditures 2011-2014.

Figure 2. Iranian military expenditure 2011-2012.

Figure 3. Saudi and Iranian military expenditures 2011-2014 compared.

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Map 1: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 2003.

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Map 2: The Islamic Republic of Iran. Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 2001.

Chapter I. Introduction

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On January 2nd 2016, Saudi authorities executed a prominent Shia cleric by the name of Nimr

Al-Nimr. The Sheikh, a vocal supporter of the 2011 Arab uprisings against the Saudi regime,

was among 47 people that the Saudi government put to death on terrorism charges.1 Sheikh

Nimr was a prominent and outspoken cleric who raised the issue of the marginalised and

oppressed Shia minority living in the Eastern province of the Kingdom.2 Immediately after the

sentence was carried out, the Iranian foreign ministry and other branches of the Iranian

government publically condemned the execution. The reason for the rapid Iranian response

was due to the fact that as the major Shia power in the region, Iran has taken on the role as

protector of the many Shia minorities in the Middle East.3

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been in a constant

power-struggle ever since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The execution of Sheikh Al-Nimr

has only served to once more revive Saudi-Iranian hostility and the animosity between the

two regional powers has reached new heights. The delicate situation seems to be rooted in

Sunni and Shia disputes, dating back to the foundation of Islam in the 7th century. The

struggle between the Sunni and Shia denominations only accentuates the ever-growing Saudi-

Iranian opposition. The Sunni-Shia divide, however, is but one of many variables that need to

be taken into account when presenting a comprehensive analysis of the antagonism present

between the Islamic Republic and the Saudi kingdom.

In more general terms, the two nations are entangled in a complex cold war when it comes to

regional hegemony and influence in the Middle East – a duel that began in1979.4 The

escalating rivalry is sustained by important geopolitical and ideological differences in foreign

and domestic policy. Iran, an Islamic Republic, which advocates commitment to the

revolutionary Islamic cause, is firmly opposed to the staunchly conservative absolute Saudi

monarchy, which prefers the preservation of the regional status quo. Both Saudi Arabia and

Iran’s ideological standpoints are firmly vested in a fusion of religion and politics, which

1 BBC 2016 “Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr: Saudi Arabia executes top Shia Cleric” available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35213244 02/01/2016, retrieved on 22/02/2016.2 BBC 2016 “Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr: Anger at execution of top Shia cleric” available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35214536 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35214536 02/01/2016, retrieved on 22/02/2016. 3 Terrill, W. Andrew (2011) “The Saudi-Iranian rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, p. 3.4 Idem, p. 1.

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serves to legitimise the two respective regimes, or the regimes’ policies.5 While the former

uses its Wahhabi doctrine to legitimise the rule of the House of Sa’ud, the latter is

unequivocally opposed to the monarchy as an institution.6 After all, the revolution toppled the

Iranian monarchy – the Pahlavi dynasty – and opened the route for the Islamic regime that has

been in power ever since. Including regime typology or religious creed, there are also many

other important differences that separate the two regimes, such as major alliances or historic

experiences, which also take part in increasing the levels of mistrust between them.

During the last decades, a variety of incidents that have only served to increase tensions

between Iran and Saudi Arabia have taken place. Amongst the most damaging of these are the

many proxy wars fought between the Saudis and Iranians in different theatres across the

Middle East. From Yemen to Syria, and from Bahrain to Lebanon, Riyadh and Tehran are

settling their disputes through proxies, and a large network of allied factions and groups. The

overt and covert support to respective proxies is only accelerating sectarian divisions from the

Arabian Peninsula to the Mediterranean, and is setting the scene for an ever-increasing

conflict escalation between the two states. The Iranian republic and the Saudi monarchy are

playing a balancing game in an effort to check each other’s growing power, and within the

framework of such a balancing strategy, a wide array of foreign and domestic policy

determinants come into play.

In the domain of international relations, hegemony – which is vital in the Saudi-Iranian

context – implies a state’s capacity for coercion (military strength), and a strong degree of

control and influence (ideological control) over the structures of the international, or regional

system.7 If two countries strive for regional hegemony, which is the case with Iran and Saudi

Arabia, it will automatically intensify the existing rivalry between these two. The quest for

hegemonic ascendance, very much in line with the theory that will be adopted for this thesis,

is what seems to be the foreign policy-apex for the Saudi and Iranian authorities – namely that

both countries strive to become the dominant power in the region.8

5 Bank, André, Richter, Thomas & Sunik, Anna (2013) “Long term monarchical survival in the Middle East: A configurational comparison, 1945-2012” German Institute of Global and Area studies, Hamburg, p. 176 Terrill (2011), p. 5. 7 Antoniades, Andreas (2008) “From Theories of Hegemony to Hegemony Analysis in International Relations” Center for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex, Brighton. p. 2 And Carranza, Mario E. (2010) “Reality Check: America’s continuing Pursuit of Regional Hegemony” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 31, No. 3, Routledge, Abingdon, p. 407.8 Terrill (2011), p. 1.

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This thesis will present, analyse, and investigate the many reasons for the ever-growing levels

of mistrust and resentment existing in the Saudi-Iranian relationship. This thesis’ starting

point will begin with the Arab uprisings in 2011, more precisely, with the March uprisings

against the Saudi-backed Bahraini monarchy. The reason being that Bahrain is at the heart of

the Saudi-Iranian political struggle. Not only is the island nation situated in the Persian Gulf,

between Saudi Arabia in Iran, the country is also ruled by a Sunni royal family in a

predominantly Shiite majority populated country.9 More importantly, the 2011 Bahraini

uprising is a perfect point of departure because Saudi-Iranian animosity greatly intensified

after Saudi Arabia sent troops to Bahrain in an effort to quell the peaceful protests, which

were led by the mostly Shiite populace.10

Although the thesis will use 2011 as a point of departure, it will also be building on events

and experiences dating back to the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 and

other historic phenomena, in order to deeply understand the root causes of today’s rivalry.

The Saudi-Iranian contest will, in the long run, become one of the most potent geopolitical

duels in existence due to the fact that Iran and Saudi Arabia are two different opposing

powers, with different belief systems, different political apparatuses and different opinions

regarding regional order. Although the duel remains a cold war as of this day, conflict is on

the horizon. Thus, my research question goes as follows:

How can we explain the increasing hostility between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the

Islamic Republic of Iran after 2011?

1.2 Relevance of the research

The research presented in this thesis will reflect the problems in the Saudi-Iranian

relationship, and the reasons for their growth. The underlying basis of the animosity

reverberated by both parties is rooted to literature on various political science genres, such as

international relations, Middle Eastern studies and comparative politics.

The increasing level of hostility between two regional leaders justifies the need for a careful

and effective study concentrated on unearthing how the negatives in the above-mentioned

relationship came to be. Although Saudi-Iranian relations have been frigid ever since 1979,

9 Wright, Robin (2001). Sacred Rage, the Wrath of Militant Islam Touchstone. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Publishers, p. 115. 10 Terrill (2011), p. 22.

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they have undoubtedly taken a turn for the worse in the last few years. As such, this research

will contribute to the debate that has been present in academic circles since the Islamic

Revolution. The debate on what constitutes the current hostility, however, is not constant or

on-going. Due to the fact that at times, the relationship has shown signs of betterment, the

debate can recede. By cause of recent circumstances that have explicitly impaired the

relationship once more, it is time to research the very foundation of the dilemma present. The

research underneath will not solely focus on explaining the reasons for current animosity,

such as the execution of Sheikh Al-Nimr, or the several other occurrences that have shaped

the relations since 2011. In order to fundamentally draw attention to the debate in its entity,

research variables that have yet to be fully appreciated in this case-specific context must be

evaluated. This research will add value to the current academic debate on the inter-state

rivalry, as it will present a scientifically comprehensive investigation of all variables taking

part in intensifying the Saudi-Iranian rivalry until present day. Authors and experts in the

field, such as Andrew Terrill (The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East

Security), Barry Rubin (Iran: The Rise of a Regional Power), or Matthew Levitt (Hizballah

and the Qods force in Iran’s shadow war with the West) all present systematic research in a

satisfactory manner, however, they do not necessarily target every aspect of the current

rivalry. While their research on certain aspects is categorical, purely centralising one’s

research on one topic does not present a fully systematic analysis of the root causes that make

up the current rivalry between the two regional powers. To the best of my knowledge, there

are few cases of cross cutting analysis comparing domestic and international similarities and

differences that together form the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Further reasons for the scientific

relevance of this thesis is based on the fact that it will present an international relations theory,

and demonstrate its method. It will build on theory that expresses reasons for domestic and

systemic variables to be taken into account when analysing an inter-state rivalry (Rose, 1998).

While other positivist theories explicitly scrutinise the state in the international environment

(Waltz, 1988), the theory adopted for this research will elaborate and enrich the justification

for the reasoning behind Saudi-Iranian hostility.

The social relevance of the on-going relationship between the two countries is paramount for

the larger Middle East. This is because in the current relationship, there are many variables

that are not only important for the two counties in question, but for many other countries

region-wide. Iran and Saudi Arabia embody so many characteristics that are creating conflict

in different Middle Eastern countries. Variables that the Saudis and Iranians use against each

other are often transfused to conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. Religious denomination,

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regime type, and support for radical organisations are all variables that create an insecure

political ground in these countries. The Shia-Sunni divide, which is firmly reflected due to

Saudi-Iranian tensions, is then reverberated in countries with uncertain and unstable ethnic,

sectarian and political platforms. For these reasons, civil war between different political

factions, between religious denominations, and between groups with different ethnic makeup

take root. Regional security and stability is tormented because of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry,

and as long as the two countries will be entangled in a cold war with such a wide array of

complex components, peaceful settlements in different regional conflict theatres will remain

an illusion. Conclusively, the cost of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is being experienced by large

segments of the Middle East.

1.3 Roadmap of the thesis

In my second chapter, the theoretical framework will be presented. It will thoroughly define

the theory that will be used in the context of the research question above. It will display and

develop an existing theory of international relations, and the rationale behind the choice of

this specific theory. The third chapter will introduce the methodological structure of the

thesis, before it presents the case-specific method that will be applied. This chapter will also

provide the thesis with a comprehensive operationalization of key variables that are included

that form the backbone of the analysis. The chapter will conclude by displaying the data and

the main sources of the thesis.

The fourth chapter will present a brief background of Saudi Arabia and Iran, including

Bahrain’s role in the regional duel between the two. The following chapters will be dedicated

to the main part of the thesis, which is the in-depth analysis of the causes, reasons and

motivations behind the increasing hostility between the two nations. The last chapter will

thoroughly conclude the vital attributes of the analysis, while comprehensively answering the

research question.

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Chapter II. Theoretical framework

In order to comprehensively answer the research question of this thesis, a thorough theoretical

framework, extensively explaining the various internal and external factors of Iranian and

Saudi foreign and domestic policies needs to be applied. The essence of the research question,

that is, the increasing hostility present in the current Saudi-Iranian relationship, needs to be

described, explained, and analysed.

In this thesis, one specific international relations theory, namely neoclassical realism will be

employed in order to describe the on-going hostility present in the Saudi-Iranian relationship.

Neoclassical realism, an offshoot of both classical realism and neorealism, is a theory that was

first introduced in 1998 by Gideon Rose,11 an American political scientist and the current

editor of Foreign Affairs.12 In the theoretical framework that will be presented underneath,

neoclassical realism will be defined and developed, in order to give the reader insight to the

backbone of the theory and the concepts involved. In order to do this, the theory will have to

be broken down into several pieces, and then reconstructed, in order to present a detailed

structure of the core of neoclassical realism. As we shall see, this theory is a fusion of

different types of realist thought. It combines both domestic and international structures into

its train of thought.13

Firstly, this chapter will present the reasons why I believe neoclassical realism’s distant

relation, namely neorealism, lacks certain theoretical factors and advantages in order to

comprehensively analyse the Saudi-Iranian power struggle. Secondly, the neoclassical

approach will be developed and defined underneath in order to give the reader insight in the

nature of the concepts involved and the functions they serve to the research question at hand.

The third part will associate neoclassical realism to the Saudi-Iranian relationship, thus

describing its importance and why this specific theory is relevant to such a case study.

11 Rose, Gideon (1998) “Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 146.12 Council on Foreign Relations 2016, “Gideon Rose” available at http://www.cfr.org/staff/b112 2016, retrieved on 01/03/2016. 13 Foulon, Michiel (2015) “Neoclassical Realism: Challengers and Bridging Identities” International Studies Review, University of Warwick, Coventry, p. 635-636.

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2.1 On realism

In order to fully appreciate the theoretical components presented by neoclassical realism, we

need to go back to its forefather, classical realism and its other variants, to accurately describe

their shortcomings, and the reason why the former holds more merit when it comes to the

analysis of the Saudi-Iranian conundrum.

In the Melian Dialogue, a passage in Thucydides’ work on the Peloponnesian Wars, a

statement that is considered archetypical in realist tradition briefly epitomizes the realist point

of view: “The dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they must”.14 In an

anarchic world, the powerful do what hey must to survive, while the weak are left with

nothing. On the global scene, realists thus assume that the very essence that drives a state is

survival. As the most predominant school of thought in international relations for several

decades, classical realism and its successor neorealism, present a distinctive thought on the

nature of the international system, diplomacy, war and peace. Realism assumes that the

struggle for power should be measured on the state level. This is derived from the above

point; that the international system is in a state of anarchy, and the state actors have to look

after themselves in a system where the only means of survival is power.

Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism presents a systemic-based level of analysis, where the only actors

with true power is the state.15 As Waltz himself states on neorealism: “A system theory of

international politics deals with forces at the international, and not at the national, level”.16

Whatever policy a state implements domestically is irrelevant in order to comprehend a state’s

national interests in the international system. This exact point is where Waltzian neorealism

breaks with Rose’s neoclassical realism.

Neoclassical realism does not directly disagree with the core assumptions of neorealism;

rather, it adds value to its theory in the form of including a domestic level analysis to the

systemic based approach advocated by Waltz. The difference lies within state behaviour,

which neoclassical realists believe is shaped, but not entirely commanded by systemic

incentives, because domestic factors also have a role to play in forging state behaviour.17

14 Martin Hammond (2009). Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 302.15 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1988) “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Volume 18, Issue 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge p. 618. 16 Ibidem. 17 Foulon (2015), p. 636-637.

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2.2 Neorealism and neoclassical realism

Neoclassical realist theory, although reasonably similar to former realist schools of thought,

presents a distinctive feature, which is absent in older forms of realism. As explained,

neoclassical realism holds, as its distant cousins, that the state is the major player in the

international system and that a state’s position in the international hierarchy is dependent on

its relative material power capabilities.18 Furthermore, neoclassical realist scholars also

assume realism’s core assumption, which is the anarchic state of nature in international

politics.19 On the contrary of neorealism, however, the neoclassical approach also takes into

account a state’s domestic factors, as a way of further explaining foreign policy decisions and

outcomes proposed by respective states in the international system.20

Scholars of international relations have often debated and criticised each other’s works, and

unfortunately, it rarely leads to compromise or academic agreement.

Although all theories present valid points, the theoretical differences between them cannot be

overwritten. Neoclassical realism, however, fuses theoretical assumptions taken from several

works. It is not solely a systemic theory, nor does it display strictly a domestic level of

analysis of foreign policy. It is however, a combination of both. For neoclassical realists,

“domestic politics affect how the government devises foreign policy in response to binding

structural incentives”.21

The interest of neoclassical realism is then to explain the behaviour behind approaches to

foreign policy, which according to its architect Gideon Rose, is a combination of the

international system, domestic factors, and the relationship between these two.22 It is a dual

approach, encompassing both systemic (international in this sense) and domestic variables on

foreign policy. It is, in other words, a theory that focuses on both the unit level (the state in

the international system) and the level underneath the unit level, that is, the domestic policies

of that state. It is a mix of offensive realism, arguing that systemic factors are always

dominant, and Innenpolitik, that focuses on the influence of domestic factors on foreign

policy.

18 Rose (1998), p. 146. 19 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959). Man, the State, and War. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, p. 232. 20 Rose (1998), p. 146. 21 Foulon (2015), p 635-636. 22 Rose (1998), p. 146.

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As Rose notes, “Understanding the links between power and policies requires close

examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented”.23

2.3 Neoclassical realism in the context of Saudi-Iranian relations.

In order to fully appreciate the diverse set of variables involved in the complex relationship

between Saudi Arabia and Iran, a theory focusing on systemic and domestic factors is key.

Neoclassical realism brings forth this option. Neorealism, although incredibly coherent when

it comes to explaining the international system from a systemic point of view, does not

present the opportunity of taking domestic politics into account.24 The reason for the

importance of domestic-level variables in this specific context is straightforward – several

Saudi and Iranian foreign policy factors are rooted in the specific domestic political arena.

The most potent example for both countries is religion. If we depart from Ayatollah

Khomeini’s stance on foreign policy, we notice that the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy

adheres to Islamic values and ideals. Islam, being a religion, is a socially constructed design,

which is firmly vested in the domestic arena of Iranian politics as the ideological basis of the

state.25 This means that religion, a domestic level variable, is at the basis of Iranian foreign

policy.

Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is like Iran’s, one that is heavily influenced by the country’s

dominant religious denomination. As the country’s modern history has predominantly been

shaped by the monarchy’s alliance with the Ulama and the Wahhabi order,26 it is

understandable that Saudi foreign policy is a product of its domestic, and specifically

religious factors. What does that mean for neorealist theory, which solely stands by a

systemic point of view and refuses to take domestic level variables into account in the

analysis of state behaviour?

Neorealism has severe shortcomings, because it would not by principle be able to explain how

religion, a domestic variable, could take up such an extensive role in explaining a country’s

foreign policy.

23 Idem, p. 147. 24 Baylis, John, Smith, Steven & Owens, Patricia (2014). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 106. 25 Juneau, Thomas & Razavi, Sam (2013). Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World. Oxon: Routledge, p. 6-7. 26 Bonnefoy, Laurent (2013) “Saudi Arabia and the export of religious ideologies” Policy Brief, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre/Norsk Ressurssenter for fredsbygging, Oslo, p. 1-2.

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Religion, however, is but one of several domestic components that are important

characteristics in Iranian and Saudi Arabian respective foreign policies. Domestic variables

such as different forms of nationalism, ethnicity and regime typology are other variables that

would be considered irrelevant for other realists, but that also take part in interpreting the

research question. This is the foremost reason why neoclassical realism, which does consider

domestic level variables, is a richer and more adapt theory when it comes to explaining the

increasing animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As Zakaria notes, “A good explanation

of foreign policy should not ignore domestic politics, or national culture or individual

decision makers”.27

Neoclassical realism thus provides more explanatory richness to the research question, than

what Waltzian neorealism would propose. As explained, however, neoclassical realism also

takes systemic factors into account. As Rose notes: “Its (neoclassical realism) adherents

argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by

its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power

capabilities. This is why they are realist”.28 In other words, systemic variables are still at the

core of the theory. The importance of these foreign policy variables in the Saudi-Iranian

relationship is critical. In order to gain an in depth examination of the external causes, driving

the mentioned relationship toward a hostile rivalry, neoclassical realism is the most logical

theoretical framework applicable. Neoclassical realism thus provides reason to analyse both

systemic and domestic policy variables, which gives will give the dissertation a more fertile

theoretical account of what is causing the animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Under the neoclassical realist umbrella, variables that directly influence the Saudi-Iranian

relationship need to be taken into account, in order to comprehensively describe the reasons

for the existing hostility. These variables are the outcome of the neoclassical realist theory

discussed above.

2.4 Variables that conform to neoclassical realist thought within the Saudi-

Iranian framework

27 Zakaria, Fareed (1992) “Realism and Domestic politics, a review essay” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, MIT Press, Cambridge, p. 197. 28 Rose (1998), p. 146.

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The segment underneath is not the methodological operationalization of the variables included

in this thesis, which comes later, but rather a short analysis of why these exact variables

embody neoclassical realism.

As neoclassical realism adopts a combination of systemic and domestic variables, which

translates to a theoretical merger of classical realism, neorealism and innenpoltik, we need to

look at both types of variables, and the manner in which these play a role in the relations

between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Let us firstly focus on the systemic variables.

2.4.1 Military spending, alliances and proxies

Neoclassical realist scholars, like previous realist thinkers, take a keen interest in power,

which is the backbone of its theory. Power comes in the form of relative power capabilities,

which in many cases can be translated into military capabilities. Military capabilities, whether

they are meant as an offensive or a defensive instrument, is the prolonged arm of power.

However, there are those who mean that comparing levels of military spending are not

definitive when it comes to measuring relative power. But it is not insignificant either. A high

level of military spending is in fact a gauge for, on the surface, analysing the way foreign

policy is implemented. If states increase their military budgets year by year, such as Iran29 and

especially Saudi Arabia,30 it points to an aggressive foreign policy. An aggressive foreign

policy correlates with realist thought, in which the only means for state survival is through

power.31 Furthermore, a different assumption that connects power, military strength and

military spending, which perfectly corresponds to the Saudi-Iranian relationship, is the

military expenditure-security hypothesis which states: “The greater the level of threat to a

state’s security, the higher the level of military spending”,32 something that is echoed by

Waltz. This hypothesis assumes that a state’s foreign policy is driven by state survival, which

is at the basis of realist thought.

29 Business Insider 2015, Ghasseminejad, Saeed “Iran’s military budget is going to get a huge boost from the nuclear deal” available at http://www.businessinsider.com/irans-military-budget-is-going-to-get-a-huge-boost-from-the-nuclear-deal-2015-10?IR=T 30/10/2015, retrieved on 23/02/2016.30 Financial Times 2015, Kerr, Simeon “Saudi Arabia to boost defence spending by 27% over five years” available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4f3b5708-0903-11e5-b643-00144feabdc0.html#axzz40zNHUDQY 02/07/2015, retrieved on 23/02/2016.31 Mearsheimer, John J. (2013) “Structural Realism” in Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja & Smith, Steve. International relations theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 73-78. 32 Castillo, Jasen, Lowell, Julia, Tellis, Ashley J., Munoz, Jorge & Zycher, Benjamin (2001) “Military Expenditure and Economic Growth” RAND, Santa Monica, p. 53-55.

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Conclusively, there is a clear correlation between neoclassical realism, relative power

capabilities, military power and military spending, which accentuates the need for applying

the latter as a variable for measuring the increasing hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

As part of military spending, we also need to consider the elephant in the room, which in the

Iranian-Saudi relationship, is nuclear weapons. This is especially relevant for Iran, who many

analysts believe have tried to acquire such weaponry in recent times.33

Nuclear weapons are not a variable in itself; as such they need to be categorized. As states use

huge amounts of capital in order to acquire such arsenals, they fall under the umbrella of

military spending. Nuclear capabilities according to Waltz, have changed how states

contributed to their own security, but that the introduction of nuclear weapons in the

international system has not changed the state of anarchy in which realists believe we find

ourselves.34 Although states that acquire nuclear armaments change their approach to power,

they do not change the structures of the international political order. Because nuclear weapons

are the culmination of power due to their enormous destructive capabilities, they act as a

guarantor of state survival, and as such are highly relevant for neoclassical realism, and

further, for this thesis.

Alliances are among the most fundamental components of international relations. For

neoclassical realists, just as for other realist schools, trough its fixation on state security and

power, alliances are critical. They enhance state security and are used by states as a response

to a change in the level of external threat.35 In the context of the hostility present between Iran

and Saudi Arabia, alliances play a vital part of the respective states’ foreign policies. This is

especially relevant for Saudi Arabia whose alliance to the world’s foremost superpower – the

United States – has lasted for decades. Even without mentioning Walt’s or Waltz’

bandwaggoning, balancing, buck-passing or chain-ganging, which are fundamental for realist

theories of alliances, it is deducible that alliances in general take up a considerable amount of

realism’s academic thinking. This confirms the importance of this variable in the on-going

Saudi-Iranian struggle, and its close relation to neoclassical theory.

33 Foreign Policy 2015, Allison, Graham “Iran already has Nuclear Weapons Capability” available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/03/iran-already-has-nuclear-weapons-capability/ 03/03/2015, retrieved on 24/03/2016. 34 Waltz, Kenneth N. (2000) “Structural Realism after the Cold War” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, MIT Press, Cambridge, p. 5. 35 Reiter, Dan (1994) “Learning, Realism and Alliances: the Weight of the Shadow of the Past” World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 490.

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In later years, there have been several concrete cases of so-called proxy wars being fought

between the two regional powers. In following the undefined rules of proxy warfare, neither

Saudi Arabia nor Iran have directly engaged one another, but have used confederates in order

to carry out such actions on each other’s behalf. Although the actors are different, along with

the methods, proxy war, just as interstate conflict, is a form of warfare. War is an outcome of

aggressive state policy, and is the apex of state survival and the echo of the maximisation of

power. War is always on the horizon and as such states are destined to fight them. Using a

Clausewitzian approach,36 realists believe that international politics is a struggle for power

between states and the culmination of high politics is war because of the self interested and

power seeking fashion in which states behave. War is a natural and unavoidable element of

the international environment. Proxy war takes a different form and is perceived differently,

but it is a form of war nevertheless. As warfare belongs to the structure of foreign policy, it is

a systemic variable for realists. As neoclassical realists follow the same principle guidelines

as other realists on this matter,37 the adoption of proxies and the usage of these in proxy war is

by its very nature an aspect that directly corresponds to a variable of interest for this research.

2.4.2 Ethnic nationalism, collective memory and regime type

As neoclassical realism is a fusion of different realist thought, many variables that would

otherwise be inadmissible under neorealism can be absorbed into the theoretical analysis of

this thesis. In relevance to the level of analysis, neoclassical realism presents the opportunity

of integrating ideational and domestic variables, as previously mentioned. In an effort to

demonstrate the relevance of the use of neoclassical realist theory, and invalidate other forms

of realism earlier, religion was exemplified as a domestic variable with excessive importance

for the formulation of Saudi and Iranian foreign policy. There are, however, other domestic

policy factors that also take part in the development of foreign-policy output. Ethnic

nationalism, collective memory and regime typology bear influence on this process.

Ethnicity is an identity-based factor that falls within the realm of neoclassical realism,

because it is rooted to the individual in society, which makes it a component of domestic

policy. Ethnicity is important, as it is a tool that can be used by policy makers in their

36 Howard, Michael & Paret, Peter (1976). Carl Von Clausewitz: On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 7. 37 Rathbun, Brian (2008) “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism” Security Studies Vol. 17, No. 2, Taylor & Francis, Abingdon, p. 296-297.

20

formulation of foreign policy. A vivid yet drastic example is how the Hitler regime used the

myth of the “Aryan race”38 as a tool to bread hatred against what he saw as non-Aryans, such

as the Jewish or the Slav peoples. In his foreign policy, ethnic hatred was then used to invade

large parts of Eastern Europe. When a state-duel thus opposes two (or more) countries that are

composed of mostly different ethnic groups, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, it can create

tensions that can further be used as an assertive foreign policy instrument. In essence,

ethnicity is a decisive element of domestic policy, and domestic policy variables fall under the

umbrella of neoclassical realism.

Ethnic nationalism interacts with the context of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the sense that is a

domestic and ideological factor that is often used is the construct of foreign policy.

Throughout history, ethnic nationalism has been used as a rallying cry to foster fervour and

pride in ones ethnic group or country. Because neoclassical realism adopts ideational concepts

into its theory, ethnic nationalism is a valid and significant variable that can act as a

determinant to foreign policy-making of states. This is the case for Saudi Arabia and Iran, and

it is thus a variable that increases the level of hostility between the two nations. Like religion,

it influences the systemic structure of the international scene, although it is rooted in the

domestic arena.

To analyse the Saudi-Iranian relationship without considering the respective regimes of both

countries would be an uphill battle. It is the regime that makes the policy, which is

implemented as foreign policy doctrine. As both Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s policies are deeply

rooted to ideology, and their ideological state apparatuses dominate society, it would be an

impossible task to investigate the levels of distrust between the two countries, when much of

it is fuelled by ideological differences advanced by the respective regimes. Neorealism and its

adherents would argue that a state’s regime type or its ideological standpoint ought to be

disregarded in order to understand the international system.39 As previously mentioned,

however, neoclassical realism confronts this fully systemic level of analysis and makes room

for domestic variables, such as regime type. As Zakaria notes: “A good account of a nation’s

foreign policy should include systemic, domestic and other influences”.40 In short, Zakaria

does account for domestic regime types in order to understand how foreign policy choices are

38 Bhopal, Raj S. (2014). Migration, Ethnicity, Race and Health in Multicultural Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 178. 39 Kaufman, Robert G. (2007). In Defense of the Bush Doctrine. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, p. 24. 40 Zakaria (1992), p. 198.

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shaped. Trying to understand the hostility in the Saudi-Iranian relationship without looking at

the regimes’ ideologies would be contrary to all reason. It is precisely because Saudi Arabia

and Iran’s regimes are deeply ideologically vested that it is crucial to consider it as an

explanatory variable in the research question’s context.

Collective memories of a nation’s past can be an instrument that politicians can use to enforce

a specific foreign policy. This historical narrative is vital to understand the underlying causes

of the duelling Saudi-Iranian relationship. Collective memory is part of political culture

because of its usage for political mobilization, and as such it acts as source of policy choice.41

Zakaria argues for the fact that the creation of a country’s foreign policy can include cultural

explanations.42 As collective memory is part of the cultural arena, its function becomes clear

in relevance to neoclassical realist theory, because culture is a domestic and ideational

variable. One of the most potent historical examples is taken from 1930s Germany. Adolf

Hitler constantly referred to the reasons why Germany lost the First World War and used

these reasons as a political mechanism, to attract people – especially war veterans – to his

cause. In other words, Hitler’s political platform was based, among others, on an historical

memory that Germany had experienced in the past. In itself, collective memory would be put

to use as an excuse for invading Poland (See Hagen: 2009: Mapping the Polish Corridor).43 In

short, collective memory of nations on certain events, experiences and incidents that breeds

mistrust and hostility is a determinant factor to analyse in relevance to this thesis.

2.5 Conclusion to Chapter II

The rationale behind the use of neoclassical realism in this thesis is meant to present a richer

and more diverse theoretical framework, than other forms of realism would for the same

research question. This theory is applied in order to maximise the explanations so to answer

the research question in the most coherent and scientifically probable manner. It is a single

approach, using neoclassical realism to explain the systemic and domestic variables that form

the foundation of the Saudi-Iranian relationship. In this manner, all factors relating to the

41 Brady, John S., Crawford, Berverly & Wiliarty, Sarah E. (1999). The Post-War transformation of Germany: Democracy, Prosperity and Nationhood. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, p. 25. 42 Zakaria, Fareed (1998). From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 18. 43 Hagen, Joshua (2009) “Mapping the Polish Corridor: Ethnicity, economics and geopolitics” Imago Mundi, The International Journal for the History of Cartography, Routledge, Abingdon.

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increasing levels of animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia will be demonstrated to present

a systematic and comprehensive analysis.

23

Chapter III. Methodology

The following thesis will be built on the basis of a qualitative methodological approach. In

order to explain the analytical framework that will be used in this thesis, comparison is key.

Thus the dissertation will take the form of a comparative case study. The reason for the use of

a qualitative and not a quantitative approach is because the former is better suited at gaining

awareness of elemental opinions, reasons and motivations. Furthermore, a qualitative analysis

serves at obtaining more pragmatic and a more realistic view of the current hostility present in

the Saudi-Iranian relationship, something that numerical data (i.e. quantitative analysis) does

not offer the thesis.

This case study will be constructed as an in depth examination of the factors that Iran and

Saudi Arabia respectively use in their approach to each other.

In general, comparative case studies “involve the analysis and synthesis of the similarities,

differences and patterns across two or more cases that share a common focus or goal”.44 This

is why a comparative case study is a preferred option when it comes to understanding and

comparing the contrasts and likenesses that establish the rivalry between the two opposing

regional powers. When it comes to the particular methods of this thesis, process tracing will

be employed as part of the methodological approach.

3.1 Process tracing

The aim of this paper is to acquire evidence that contributes the base for causal inference,

which will give credence to the research question. Process tracing is one of the most

fundamental tools of qualitative analysis.45 This method is defined as “the systematic

examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and

hypotheses posed by the investigator”.46

44 Goodrick, Delwyn (2014) “Comparative Case Studies” Methodological Briefs: Impact Evaluation 9 UNICEF Office of Research, Florence, p. 1. 45 Collier, David (2011) “Understanding Process Tracing” Political Science and Politics 44, No. 4, University of California, Berkeley, p. 823. 46 Ibidem.

24

According to Checkel, “Process tracing means to trace the operation of the causal

mechanism(s) at work in a given situation”47. As a qualitative method, data coinciding with

process tracing comes in the form of expert surveys, historical memoirs, documents, press

accounts, interview transcripts, and similar forms of data.48

Leading experts in the field, such as George and Bennett have coined process tracing as

“method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal

mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the

dependent variable”.49 On basic terms, using process tracing means to “trace the operation of

a causal mechanism in a given situation”.50 The goal of this method is to map the process of a

case; this serves at exploring the magnitude to which it corresponds with earlier, theoretically

derivative expectations about the structure of the mechanism.51 In the above statements, there

is one repeated word that is key – mechanism – more precisely, the tracing of causal

mechanisms. The latter is defined as “a complex system which produces that behaviour by of

the interaction of a number of parts”.52 The case study, such as the one that will be embarked

on in this thesis, will then have to identify those elements and cement the independent and

dependent variables together.

The comparative case that will be presented in this dissertation can take on different forms of

process tracing. The one that will be put to use is called explaining-outcome process tracing.

It serves at analysing how a specific cause (A) leads to a specific outcome (B).53

This method can be used when we have the following scenario; first, we know what B is,

namely the outcome. In the context of the research question B is then increasing hostility

between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, we do not know what A is, namely the cause,

which is to be investigated in the thesis. The goal is to perfectly explain why or how B, the

outcome, happened. To accomplish this, developing and solving the many factors that

contributed to B, will craft an acceptable explanation.54 In the comparative analysis of this 47 Klotz, Audie & Prakash, Deepa (2008). Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 116. 48 Bennett, Andrew & Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2015). Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 6. 49 Given, Lisa M. (2008). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc., p. 70. 50 Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005) “It’s the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics” Arena Center for European Studies, University of Oslo, Oslo, p. 6. 51 Ibidem. 52 Glennan, Stuart S. (1996) “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation” Erkenntinis, Vol. 44, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, p. 52. 53 Punton, Melanie and Welle, Katharina (2015) “Applying Process Tracing in Five Steps” Centre for Development Impact, the Insitute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, p. 2. 54 Ibidem.

25

thesis, the many factors and causes (A) that relate to the increasing hostility between the Gulf

giants (B), will be explained.

If there is a negative to be added to this sort of process tracing, it is that explaining-outcome

process tracing is case-centric. This entails that the reproduction of this method is not

necessarily generalizable to other case studies, as it only achieves relevant explanations for

the case under investigation.55 However, this process tracing method is still the most used

hitherto, and by reasons explained, is appropriate for the research of this thesis.

3.2 Variables

As explained in the theoretical framework earlier, there is a long list of variables that are

appropriate for a comparative case study such as this. These factors will be examined along

with the mentioned appropriate theory in order to thoroughly describe the augmented tensions

between Saudi Arabia and Iran going back to 2011, and historically back to 1979. Before

beginning to operationalize the different variables employed in this thesis, there is a need to

determine the dependent variable in the research question.

How can we explain the increasing hostility between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the

Islamic Republic of Iran after 2011?

The dependent variable in the research question is “increasing hostility”. By the use of the

many independent variables that will be presented underneath, the dependent variable will be

measured on different levels, all relating to the increasing hostility between Iran and Saudi

Arabia. The variables derived from neoclassical realism, which in this thesis, emphasise the

use of systemic, domestic and ideational factors as the threefold causes for foreign policy

output, will concentrate on the material and immaterial variables. Underneath, the

operationalization of all variables – that is the process of rigorously defining variables so they

become measurable56 – will be presented. The dependent variable “increasing hostility” is

without any doubt the most crucial variable of this thesis. This is what we want to monitor, in

order to examine how it is affected by the many independent variables relating to the thesis at

large. More straightforwardly it is dependent on other factors conferred to it.

55 Ibidem. 56 Eysenck Micahel W. (2015). AQA Psychology AS and A-level year 1. Sussex: Psychology Press, p. 320.

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3.3 Operationalization of variables

3.3.1 Systemic variables

Military spending

Time period: 2011-2015. For military spending, the analysis will span from 2011 to 2015, as

this is the most contemporary data available to us. Relevantly, 2011 was also the year of the

Bahraini protests, and the Saudi intervention that took place there. For nuclear weapons, the

time period is not as important as for conventional military spending, but because the United

Nations Security Council imposed its first round of sanctions on Iran in 2006, this is the

period that will be the starting point of this analysis. The measurement of this variable

includes occurrences and incidents up to the summer of 2015, as this was when Iran and

several world powers signed the nuclear agreement.

Military spending is an important asset to measure in relation to a state’s military prowess. In

neoclassical realist theory, military power is a factor determining a state’s relative power

capabilities in the international system. In black and white, the more capital a state uses on

military spending, the more powerful their military becomes. The more powerful a state’s

military machine is, the more power they have in the international system. Taking into

account that both Saudi Arabia and Iran are in a regional duel, they are both expanding their

respective fighting forces in order to increase their power, and to balance each other out. The

reason for the importance of this variable in light of increased hostility is then

comprehensible. The more money the two nations use on armaments and equipment, the more

they perceive each other as threat, and it thus serves the purpose of increasing the level of

hostility between the two. Another component of military spending comes in the form of

nuclear weapons purchases. Although neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia are in possession of

weapons of mass destruction, the acquirement of nuclear weapons into their respective

arsenals would most likely be disastrous. Because of its destructiveness, nuclear weapons may

very well be the most powerful symbol of state power that exists. Not simply in terms of

damage, but also in terms of leverage it brings to the states that obtain these. In later decades,

many believe the Iranian regime has been in the process of acquiring such weapons, although

they deny any such claims.57 Although it seems doubtful due to the recent nuclear deal struck 57 Foreign Affairs 2012, Waltz, Kenneth N. “Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability” available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get-bomb

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with the Iran,58 there is always a slight possibility. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has, in response

to an eventual nuclear-armed Tehran, also tried to obtain such weapons.59 The reason nuclear

arms are immensely significant when it comes to the research question’s dependent variable is

because a nuclear armed Iran, or a nuclear armed Saudi Arabia would be considered as a

substantial threat to the entire survival of the opposing state. As such, nuclear weapons in the

hands of Riyadh, or Tehran would be the upmost precedent for increasing hostility and

resentment between the two.

Alliances to foreign powers

Time period: 1930s - present day. The reason the 1930s is at the starting point of the

measurement of this variable is because this was the time when the Saudi-American alliance

was engineered. Because the alliance is still in existence, the measurement’s end point is set

to 2016.

When looking at the geopolitical aspect of power, having a deeply entrenched alliance to a

strong foreign government can have many perks. The stronger an ally state is, and the closer

the relationship between allies is, the more it enhances both allies’ power and prestige. The

power of two (or more) nations combined makes for a more dominant figure than what one

nation without allies would impress upon a third party. If it were ever to arise, the

fundamental element of any alliance, that is military assistance in case of conflict, can either

act as a detriment for a third party to take offensive action, or as a counterweight towards the

third party in case offensive action is taken. Alliances can affect increasing hostility between

nations. If an alliance is stuck between two governments, an enemy of the first state can

become an enemy of the new ally by default. The Iranian contempt of the both Saudi Arabia

and the U.S., who are allies, is a valid example of the mentioned case. Furthermore, an

alliance to a strong power may also be considered a threat to a third party in means of power

capabilities.

July/August 2012, retrieved on 11/03/2016 And The Atlantic 2012, Zenko, Micah “What will Iran do if it gets a nuclear bomb” available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/what-will-iran-do-if-it-gets-a-nuclear-bomb/253430/ 22/02/2012, retrieved on 11/03/2016.58 BBC 2016 “Iran nuclear deal: key details” available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655 16/01/2016, retrieved on 11/03/2016. 59 Nuclear Threat Initiative 2016 “Saudi Arabia, Nuclear” available at http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/saudi-arabia/nuclear/ March 2016, retrieved on 11/03/2016.

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Regional proxies

Time period: 1979 – present day. To present the most redoubtable proxies involved for Saudi

Arabia and Iran respectively, this measurement will span from the Islamic Revolution until

present day. This is due to the fact that it was after 1979 that Iran begun to fervently employ

groups and proxies as a foreign policy mechanism, which made Saudi Arabia take by

example, and adopted the same strategy. As of now, the respective proxies are more involved

and embraced than ever before, which explains the year of 2016 as the ending period for the

measurement of this variable.

In this thesis, although they fall under the same category of variables, I differentiate between

an official state alliance, and support, overt or covert, to groups, factions and even

governments. For example, when Iran started lending support to Hezbollah, Hezbollah was

solely a military faction, not a political party, nor the official representatives of the Lebanese

government.60 Giving support to foreign organisations, just as an alliance would, does

increase a state’s power in terms of leverage, military capability, and material force. This can

increase the level of hostility between two nations, if the third party (the organisation, the

faction) also opposes the interest of the rival. An historic example can be when the Soviet

Union, through the Comintern, lent support to various revolutionary communist parties all

over Europe, in an effort to overthrow the bourgeoisie and the ruling governments of the

respective countries.61

Within the framework of this variable, there can often be direct support for groups that engage

in proxy wars against an enemy state. The proxy variable would also serve within the

structures of neoclassical realism. As a proxy engages in terrorist activities, or directly in full-

scale open combat, their success or failure will rest on their power – military or other. As

relative power capabilities are the most crucial component of neoclassical realism, proxies are

a valid factor when it comes to explaining these explicit theoretical variables. In the frame of

reference of the research question, this variable definitely augments tension between states.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have been through their fair share of proxies in the recent decades,62

60 Levitt, Matthew (2013) “Hizballah and the Qods force in Iran’s shadow war with the West” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, p. 1, 2. 61 Encyclopædia Britannica 2016 “Third International” available at http://www.britannica.com/topic/Third-International 2016, retrieved on 09/03/2016. 62 Kagan, Frederick W, Majidyar, Ahmad K, Plekta, Danielle & Sullivan, Marisa Chochrane (2012) “Iranian influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq and Afghanistan” The American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War, Washington D.C., p. 9 and Al Monitor 2015, Geranmayeh, Ellie “Why Iran, Saudi Arabia keep locking horns on Syria” available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/iran-saudi-syria.html

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and these proxies may very well become the source of future conflict escalation between the

two Middle Eastern giants. Both countries are supporting either proxy groups used against

each other or proxies engaging in proxy wars throughout the region, and this shadow warfare

is the closest both countries have come to a direct military confrontation. This is why it is

crucial to emphasise the importance of this variable in the context of rising tensions.

3.3.2 Domestic and cultural variables

Religion

Time period: 1979 – present day. 1979 was the year that Ayatollah Khomeini took power in

Iran, and transformed Iran into an Islamic Republic, with religion as the apex of political

power. This is when the religious aspect of the current Saudi-Iranian rivalry took root. This

variable has been operated as a policy tool fervently ever since.

As a socially constructed cultural system, religion is one of the most influential and

historically significant variables to be measured in the following thesis. In the framework of

Iranian-Saudi rivalry, it is a decisive factor in both countries’ domestic and foreign policies.

Although this variable is extremely potent in light of the research question, the definition of

religion is rather hazardous. There are a wide variety of definitions of religion, from different

perspectives and researchers.63 The goal here, however, is not to define it, but solely to

characterise it into the context of the thesis. In this thesis, “religion” will be synonymous with

“Islam”, whether it is the Sunni or Shia denomination. The importance of religion for both

countries is observable by looking at their governments, their flags or their national mottos for

instance. Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy, governed by Islamic law,64 and on the

country’s flag, the Shahada, the Islamic creed, is inscribed.65 Iran is an Islamic Republic,66

while the country’s motto and flag inscription is the Takbir – the term describing “Allahu

Akbar”– meaning God is great in Arabic.67 In other words, one does not need to be an expert

18/09/2015, retrieved on 11/03/2016. 63 McGuire, Meredith B. (2002). Religion: the Social context. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, p. 8.64 Stenslie, Stig (2012). Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia: The Challenge of Succession. Oxon: Routledge, p. 9.65 Index Mundi 2015 “Saudi Arabia flag description” available at http://www.indexmundi.com/saudi_arabia/flag_description.html 30/06/2015, retrieved on 14/03/2016. 66 Linz, Juan J. (2000). Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 36. 67 Index Mundi 2015 “Iran flag description” available at http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/flag_description.html 30/06/2016, retrieved on 14/03/2016.

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to interpret that religion plays an imposing role for both states. The reason religion is

tremendously important in the thesis’s context however, is also due to the different

interpretations of Islam that opposes the two nations. While one is Sunni, the other is

predominantly Shia. This opposition is what personifies the bigger picture, namely the

hegemonic nature of the Iranian-Saudi struggle, and how respective versions of Islam are put

to use as a policy mechanism for both states.

Ethnic nationalism

Time period: Irrelevant, but culturally and historically, from the 7 th century-present day. The

measurement of this indicator will propose arguments that exhibit how ethnic nationalism is

used present day, as a policy tool for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. The reason the 7 th century is

the proposed starting period is because of the Arab-Islamic conquest of Persia, and the

subsequent ethnic rivalry that has lasted ever since.

Just as religion is arduous to measure, so is ethnicity. Different studies give different

definitions to ethnicity, just as the case with religion. In anthropology, ethnicity refers to “The

identification of a group based on perceived cultural distinctiveness that makes a group into a

people”.68 As religious sectarianism is common in the Saudi-Iranian relationship, so is ethnic

sectarianism. This is because of the fact that the Iranians predominantly belong to the Persian

ethnicity, while the Saudis are Arabs.69 Rather than being rooted to the political power divide,

however, ethnicity and ethnic resentment between Arab and Persian is rooted in history,

which goes back to the Muslim invasion of Persia in the 7th century.70 The Arab-Persian divide

is frequently embraced by to both states’ authorities, which only serves to increase hostility

between Riyadh and Tehran.71

The historian Robert H. Wiebe defined nationalism as the following: “Nationalism is the

desire among people who believe that they share a common ancestry and a common destiny to

68 Encyclopædia Britannica 2016, Robotham, Donald K. “Anthropology: the Study of ethnicity, minority groups and identity” available at http://www.britannica.com/science/anthropology/Special-fields-of-anthropology#ref839804 2016, retrieved on 14/03/2016. 69 The Economist 2012 ”Same old sneers: Nationalist feelings on both sides of the Gulf is as prickly as ever” available at http://www.economist.com/node/21554238 05/05/2012, retrieved on 14/03/2016. 70 Al Arabiya 2011, al-Zahed, Saud “Hatred of Arabs deeply rooted in Persians, says Iranian intellectual” available at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/09/170927.html 09/10/2011, retrieved on 14/03/2016. 71 Foreign Policy 2010, Limbert, John “Why can’t Arabs and Iranians just get along?” available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/01/why-cant-arabs-and-iranians-just-get-along-2/ 01/12/2010, retrieved on 14/03/2016.

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live under their own government on land sacred to their history”.72 This definition is fairly

neutral compared to other more political orientated definitions. Nationalisms of any kind,

especially the ethnic sort, are usually fervent in the realms of a state on state duel. Ethnic

nationalism is an instrument used on the masses to instigate public support for a certain

political cause. Ethnic nationalism, in regard to the rivalling circumstances between Tehran

and Riyadh, is a relevant and serious factor in need of scrutiny. It incites both ethnic and

patriotic fervour and does indeed augment a population’s animosity toward another country of

a different ethnicity. In the aftermath of the execution of Sheikh al-Nimr, angry mobs of

Iranians in the capital gathered outside the Saudi embassy to hoist their discontent,

encouraged by a nationalist rallying cry from the Iranian government.73 It is due to these

factors that it is vital to look at ethnic nationalism as a variable in this thesis.

Regime typology

Time period: 1930s – present day. The 1930s was the decade when the modern state of Saudi

Arabia was founded, and it subsequently when the formal alliance between the House of

Sa’ud and the Ulama was proclaimed. Because the Saudi and the Iranian regimes are still in

power, the measurement of this variable includes events that have taken place as recently as

2016.

In order to further measure the levels of hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia, we need to

take the regime type variable under consideration. Saudi Arabia, as mentioned previously, is

an absolute monarchy, while Iran is a theocratic republic, and they are both authoritarian.

They are unequivocally opposed to each other’s regime types. Ideologically speaking, Iran

advocates revolutionary deposition against the Gulf monarchies, first and foremost towards

the Saudi royal family.74 The Saudis, on the other hand, firmly oppose republicanism, as seen

in the last decades, in regional rivalries against Nasser’s Egypt, Yemen’s ex-republican

government and especially the Iranian republic. It is a contest about legitimacy of the ruling

governments, and the fundamental threat these opposing forms of government represent to

72 Johnson, Nuala C., Schein, Richard H. & Winders, Jamie (2013). The Wiley-Blackwell companion to Cultural Geography. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Publishers, p. 131. 73 BBC 2016 “Iran: Saudis face divine revenge for execution of al-Nimr” available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35216694 03/01/2016, retrieved on 15/03/2016. 74 United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer 2015, Molavi, Afshin “Iran and the Gulf States” available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-gulf-states August 2015, retrieved on 15/03/2016.

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one another. This is why regime typology is very influential in regard to the growing hostility

between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Historic experiences

Time period: 1979 – 2016. This variable will be measured from the starting point of the

Islamic Revolution, as this was the year that Saudi Arabia began to disapprove of and dislike

Iran, due to its new revolutionary regime. In the years following the revolution, several

violent incidents have taken place, which have increased Saudi-Iranian hostility. 2016 was the

year of the latest dramatic incident, when Saudi authorities executed Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr.

For both Saudi Arabia and Iran, there are certain events that have taken place that have helped

build the current resentment existing in their relationship. These historic experiences can be

translated into collective memory of the nations. Such incidents have in many cases assuredly

strengthened the gap between Iran and Saudi Arabia and have seen political leaders on both

sides take punitive action against each other in response. In this thesis, such historical

experiences will focus on the timeline after the Islamic Revolution. Such events range from

religious disputes over the pilgrimage to the Mecca, executions of public figures, Saudi

intervention in Bahrain, and others. These events have become collective memory that has

forever stained the already fragile Saudi-Iranian ties, and are thus critical in assessing the

research question.

3.4 Data

For such an extensive research project, a great many sources and academic references are

used. For the most part secondary sources will form the basis of the thesis. These will come in

the form of an extensive list of published journals, articles, books and other scholarly works.

This literature will mainly focus on events, facts and incidents that have taken place in the

context of the Saudi-Iranian relationship. Think tanks and research institutes such as the

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the German Institute of Global and Area studies,

the Strategic Studies Institute, the United States Institute of Peace and several others to will

give the thesis a robust academic and scientific substructure. For demographic data and

quantitative measurements the World Bank and the Stockholm International Peace Research

33

Institute will be among the sources put to use. The reason the data that will be adopted in this

thesis is robust and reliable is because is will build on academic literature on similar topics, or

on topic directly related to the research question. Think tanks and research institutes offer

their expertise on various topics and lay out policy recommendations for public servants and

other high-ranking public figures. Research by such organisations is then neutral, fact-finding,

relevant and scholastic. As the literature and data adopted in this thesis is mostly centralized

on such sources, it will be based on authentic forms of information, which will provide this

dissertation with the best possible and reliable knowledge on various topics surrounding the

research question proposed. Underneath, specific data for the different variables involved will

be presented.

3.4.1 Support for regional proxies and groups:

In order to measure this variable, sources forming the backbone of the research will come in

the form of both primary and secondary sources. When gathering research on specific Saudi

and Iranian proxies, a variety of resources are to be consulted, such as peer-reviewed journals

and think tank articles. Primary literature in the form of government records, such as

testimonies to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the U.S. Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence, from high-ranking political and military figures will be used. For

factual accounts, a few newspaper articles will present different incidents that are to be used

in the specific context. Lastly, WikiLeaks sources presenting exposed documents from

authorities and public figures will give this piece primary infallible proof relating to different

matters surrounding the variable.

3.4.2 Nuclear weapons

For the following variable, just as the case will be throughout this thesis, academically

reviewed articles will form the backbone of the research. Furthermore, in search of empirical

information, reliable news articles from the Financial Times, The New York Times and the

Wall Street Journal will present the proceedings. Lastly, different political and strategic

Institutes, such as the United States Institute of Peace and the National Institute for Public

Policy will present supporting evidence for the arguments presented.

34

The three mentioned newspapers above are internationally renowned and recognised for their

accuracy and journalistic integrity. The Financial Times primarily focuses on the world of

business and finance and is known for its precision and sincerity.75 The World Street Journal

is by circulation the most important newspaper in the United States. The newspaper is one of

the most reliable and fact-finding, and has dozens of journalistic prizes to show for it.76 The

New York Times collects, creates and distributes high quality accounts, and the newspaper’s

reputation is of reliable character, which produces honest, fair and truthful journalism.77

3.4.3 Religion

As one of the most vital indicators of this thesis, many different primary and secondary

sources are to be used for the measurement of religion. Other than several academic articles,

different books will be adopted as sources. These are to bring in the historical component of

religion for the two respective countries. Lastly, in order to use factual examples of

circumstances surrounding the religion variable, articles from Foreign Affairs, the Economist,

and Foreign Policy are to be employed. Foreign Affairs is among the most acclaimed journals

covering international politics and U.S. foreign policy. It is highly trustworthy and is often

ranked amid the most reliable and impactful think tanks on international relations.78 The

Economist newspaper displays authoritative reports and information on politics, business,

finance and international news.79 Foreign Policy is an award-winning news publication and

has since its foundation prominently been covering the world of global affairs. Its publications

and analysis has been a source of advice and understanding for political leaders, the academia,

business and finance, and presents the most vital news and concepts from foreign affairs

worldwide.80

75 Financial Times 2016 “About Us” available at http://aboutus.ft.com/corporate-information/ft-company/#axzz4BRenERWb 2016, retrieved on 13/06/2016. 76 The Wall Street Journal 2015 “Media Kit” available at http://www.wsjmediakit.com/products/newspaper 2015, retrieved on 13/06/2016. 77 The New York Times 2016 ”Standards and Ethics” available at http://www.nytco.com/who-we-are/culture/standards-and-ethics/ 2016, retrieved on 13/06/2016.78 Foreign Affairs 2016 “About Foreign Affairs” available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/about-foreign-affairs 2016, retrieved on 13/06/2016.79 The Economist 2016 “About Us” available at http://www.economist.com/help/about-us 2016, retrieved on 13/06/2016.80 Foreign Policy 2016 “Foreign Policy: A Trusted Advisor for Global Leaders When the Stakes are Highest” available at https://fpgroup.foreignpolicy.com/ 2016, retrieved on 13/06/2016.

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3.4.4 Military spending

For this variable, quantitative data will form the essence of the measurement. Primary sources

that present research on amounts, quantities, and finances allocated for military spending are

vital. This data will be produced from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

(SIRPI), and the World Bank database. SIPRI is a reliable and objective research institute that

focuses on conflict, arms control, armaments and disarmament.81 The organisation is among

the most esteemed and highest ranked think tanks within the world of political research and

will offer this variable transparent and solid evidence. Secondly, newspaper articles will

provide this piece with factual reports on the unfolding occurrences.

3.4.5 Ethnic Nationalism

The use of sources for ethnic nationalism will mostly surround primary literature in the form

of interviews. The English language version of the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya newspaper, The

Guardian Newspaper and Foreign Policy will all give examples of the animosity that is

reverberated through ethnic nationalist rhetoric. These different newspapers are reliable in the

sense that they offer different points of view on the variable proposed. Al-Arabiya News is

the English version of the original Arabic news agency, the principal daylong news station in

the Arab world, along side Al Jazeera. Its goal is to connect to the international reader to

strengthen the understanding of Arab politics, society and economies and offers ground-

breaking journalism from the region.82 Being an Arabic news agency with roots from Saudi

Arabia and based in Dubai, Al Arabiya is a sound source of data to analyse ethnic nationalism

from the Saudi point of view. The Guardian newspaper is among the oldest and most

respectable newspapers in the United Kingdom, and has achieved international recognition for

its neutral and fact-finding journalism ever since its establishment almost 200 years ago. The

newspaper is known for its defence of journalistic freedom, and its online edition amongst the

most read worldwide.83 Foreign Policy and its journalistic accuracy was described earlier.

In order to factually determine the roots of ethnic nationalism in the societies, secondary

sources such as academic articles and books will be employed.

81 SIPRI 2016 “About SIPRI” available at https://www.sipri.org/about 2016, retrieved on 13/06/2016.82 Al Arabiya 2016 “About” available at https://english.alarabiya.net/tools/about.html 2016, retrieved on 13/06/2016.83 The Guardian 2016 “History of the Guardian” available at http://www.theguardian.com/gnm-archive/2002/jun/06/1 2016, retrieved on 13/06/2016.

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The reason of the main focus on journalistic sources, and not scientific ones for this variable

is due to the fact that data and literature on Saudi Arabian and Iranian ethnic nationalism is

uncommon, and troublesome to find in English. Although works of the like exist in Arabic or

Farsi, literature in English on this variable is arduous to find. Written matter on nationalism in

Iran and Saudi Arabia is available in English, however, information on ethnic nationalism,

which is more suitable for this thesis, is harder to come by, hence the fixation on secondary

literature and journalistic sources for recounting events.

3.4.6 Alliances to foreign powers

For this variable, books on alliances will explain the foundation of the Saudi-American

alliance and the Iranian views on it, to give the reader an historic overview. Books such as

“American alliance policy in the Middle East”, “Sacred Space and Holy War: the Politics,

Culture, and History of Shi’ite Islam” and “Squandered opportunity, Neoclassical Realism

and Iranian Foreign Policy” will deliver valid accounts of the chronicle of historic events that

will benefit the measurement of this variable. These sources will recount reliable evidence of

the Iranian-American alliance and its downfall, and the Saudi-American alliance. Further,

articles and academic journals presenting credible accounts of episodes relating to this

variable will be utilized. Lastly, secondary sources analysing current events will be

appropriated.

3.4.7 Regime typology

Together with religion, regime type plays one of the most vital parts of the different variables

analysed and presented in this dissertation. Because of this, many primary and secondary

sources are employed for its measurement. United States-State Department reports on Human

Rights and Human Rights Practices will present factual details surrounding the regimes and

their political mechanisms. Such reports represent credible, fact-finding and objective

descriptions of internationally recognized political, social, civil, worker, and individual rights,

as declared by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.84 Secondly, primary sources taken

from the Saudi Embassy in Washington, and the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs will bring

about the layout of the various ministers and their roles. These sources will present 84 United States Department of State 2016 ”Human Rights Reports” available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2016, retrieved on 13/06/2016.

37

dependable facts taken directly from the Saudi government’s own Internet sites. Otherwise,

secondary sources from the International Affairs review, the Middle Eastern Journal, and the

German Institute of Global and Area Studies will be the supporting pillars of the

documentation used for this variable.

3.4.8 Collective memory

As for the data for the collective memory variable, a wide range of secondary newspaper

sources will be used, to recollect recent events that shook the relationship between Saudi

Arabia and Iran. Such incidents that took place less than a year ago are yet to be attributed

proper academic scholarly research, which is why I will focus on secondary sources in the

form of newspaper articles. I will be using English language versions of Iranian newspapers,

including Western news outlets, to find the most relevant statements, articles and examples to

promote the argument presented. At the beginning of this particular analysis, book sources

and peer-reviewed articles will introduce the meaning and usage of collective memory

relevant for the thesis. Lastly, WikiLeaks documentation will give the analysis a trustworthy

substructure.

Chapter IV. Informative background relevant to the

analysis

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In order to establish a framework for the reader, a short introduction on the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran is necessary. Although a few pages on each of the

countries is far from adequate to describe their complete histories, these pieces will focus on

the history that is relevant for the later analysis. For example, describing their respective

histories in regards to the Bronze Age, or their military histories in unnecessary. The short

paragraphs will instead bring up the historic narratives that will be a platform for later

discussion such as the founding of the modern state of Saudi Arabia in 1932, or Iran’s Islamic

Revolution of 1979. These are historic incidents that are relevant for the research question,

and hence, a short introduction of them is required.

Lastly, this chapter will introduce the Bahraini uprisings of 2011, due to the fact that it is the

point of departure of the research question proposed. The presentation of the Bahraini incident

in the framework of the thesis is paramount as its represents the inauguration of the re-

instigation of Saudi-Iranian animosity. The island’s strategic location, its sectarian landscape

and the country’s regime type has turned Bahrain into a covert battleground for the two

opposing rivals. The reason Bahrain is the focal point and not Yemen for example, is simply

because of the fact that the Bahraini uprisings took place in 2011. Yemen, however, only

became a fierce point of contestation between Saudi Arabia and Iran three years later in 2014,

when the Houthi rebels took control of Sana’a. Thus, when the Yemeni issue arose, Saudi-

Iranian tensions had already been re-instigated, making the Yemeni incident one of many that

have taken place after 2011.

4.1 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded by Abd al Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman Al

Faisal Al Sa’ud, also known as Ibn Sa’ud, in 1932, after a decade-long struggle to unite the

tribes of the Hijaz.85 The new King’s ability to control and successfully manage the complex

tribal and political structures of the region was largely due to his stature as the champion of

the Wahhabi religious order, and his reputation as a great tribal warrior.86

During the first few years of its existence, the kingdom was weak, fragile, and the its main

source of income was the annual, but volatile pilgrimage to Mecca.87 In a matter of years, 85 Aarts, Paul & Roelants, Carolien (2015). Saudi Arabia: A Kingdom in Peril. London: Hurst & Company, p. 8. 86 Cleveland, William L. & Bunton, Martin (2009). A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 231. 87 Wynbrandt, James (2014). A Brief History of Saudi Arabia. New York, NY: Infobase Publishing, p. 187.

39

however, the kingdom’s luck would change dramatically. In 1938, oil was discovered in the

Arabian Desert.88 In a few decades, this discovery would change Saudi society from a poor

and backward one, and transform it into one the wealthiest countries on the globe.

The first company to be granted oil concessions from the Al-Sa’ud government was Standard

Oil of California (SOCAL), which gave the American company exploration rights in 1933.89

The concessions were partly a product of financial hardship that the kingdom was going

trough in its early years, in part due to the great depression that was severely reducing the

number of pilgrims to Mecca.90 The newly founded state was in dire need of funds, and as

such, the concessions provided the government with a much-needed annual revenue. In later

years, the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) would become the first company to

strike oil in Dhahran in the Eastern province; a company that would later become the Saudi

Arabian Oil Company, also know as Saudi Aramco.91 The oil discoveries would transform not

only the kingdom’s political economy for the next eight decades, but also have a major

geopolitical impact, becoming the foundation of the Saudi-American alliance, which I will

come back to later in the thesis. Oil has moulded Saudi Arabia into a great economic power,

and has bolstered her political strength as well as being a major benefactor to the country’s

transformation into a regional power.

Domestically, Saudi Arabia is one of the most authoritarian societies in the Middle East, and

holds a grim record of criminal justice abuses, human rights violations and extensive dissident

suppression.92 Ever since its foundation in 1932, absolute monarchs reminiscent of the Kings

of the French Ancient Régime have ruled the country. Both fervently authoritarian and

religious, the Saudi Kings have ruled with an iron fist since Ibn Sa’ud’s rule. The House of

Sa’ud, with its extravagant number of royal family members – a number reaching a staggering

15 000 – 93 seems to be steadfastly entrenched within the political and economic power

structures of the country. The participation of the ruling family in the political realm means

that the dynasty has an absolute monopoly of power. All the important ministries are all safely

88 Grey, Mathew (2014). Global security watch: Saudi Arabia. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Publishers, p. 12-13. 89 Ibidem. 90 Wynbrandt (2014), p. 189. 91 Saudi Aramco Dimensions International 2015, Din, Jamsheed N. “A look back at the discovery that changed the kingdom” available at http://www.saudiaramco.com/content/dam/Publications/dimensions-international/Dimensions_Summer_2015/dimensions-international-summer-2015-full.pdf Summer 2015, retrieved on 17/03/2016. 92 Human rights watch 2014 “Human rights in Saudi Arabia” available on https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/saudi-arabia 2014, retrieved on 17/03/2016.93 The Economist 2014, Rodenbeck, Max “The Saudi Royal family: Palace Coup” available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/03/saudi-royal-family 14/03/2014, retrieved on 17/03/2016.

40

rooted within the al-Saud family.94 Since King Salman’s ascendency to the throne, however,

the relentless stability the monarchy has enjoyed for decades seems to be wavering.95

Plummeting oil prices, the Hajj tragedy, U.S. regional-withdrawal and most importantly, the

ever-growing hostile rivalry with Iran are among the many social, economic and political

crisis that the monarchy is faced with today.

4.2 The Islamic Republic of Iran

Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran, like its southern rival, was a monarchy. On the contrary

of Saudi Arabia, whose modern day statehood only came to be in 1932, Iran was a millennia

old kingdom. From the 1920s to 1979, the monarchy went through several turbulent periods.

Dynastic changes,96 an invasion,97 a democratic revolution, a foreign sponsored coup,98 and

finally the Islamic Revolution were among the many precarious events that forever changed

Iranian society and its political order.

In 1979, the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran had ruled on a discontinuous basis since 1925.99

Its Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had been in power since 1941,100 and was a ruthless and

authoritarian monarch, one of the many reasons for which he was deposed in the late 1970s.

After the Islamic Revolution, a radically new regime took power, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah

Khomeini.101 The Ayatollah, being the “Marja-e-Taghlid”, meaning “source of emulation”,

the Farsi definition of Grand Ayatollah and the highest religious authority,102 would

dramatically alter Iranian society and politics for the next decades.

94 Bank et al. (2013), p.16. 95 Foreign Policy 2015, Hannah, John “It’s time for the United States to start worrying about a Saudi collapse” available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/will-the-united-states-help-if-saudi-arabia-starts-to-fall-apart/?wp_login_redirect=0 07/10/2015, retrieved on 17/03/2016. 96 Daniel, Elton L. (2012). The History of Iran. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 136. 97 Rezun, Miron (1981). The Soviet Union and Iran: Soviet Policy in Iran from the beginnings of the Pahlavi Dynasty until the Soviet Invasion in 1941. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers BV, p. 365. 98 The Guardian 2013, Dehghan, Saaed K. & Norton-Taylor, Richard “CIA admits role in 1953 Iranian coup” available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup 19/08/2013, retrieved on 18/03/2016. 99 Daniel (2012), p. 136. 100 Dareini, Ali Akbar (1999). The rise and fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of former general Hussein Fardust. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, p. 40-41. 101 New York Times 1989, Anderson, Raymond H. “Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 89, the unwavering Iranian spiritual leader” available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/04/obituaries/ayatollah-ruhollah-khomeini-89-the-unwavering-iranian-spiritual-leader.html?pagewanted=all 04/06/1989, retrieved on 18/03/2016. 102 Moallem, Minoo (2005). Between Warrior Brother and veiled Sister: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Politics of Patriarchy in Iran. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 192.

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The revolution took the world by surprise, and in this sense emulated the French and the

Russian revolutions. For the foreign political observer, it was a cataclysmic event that rocked

the very foundation of monarchical governance in the entire Middle East. More importantly,

the Iranian revolution inaugurated the Islamic revival in the region.103 The deeply

ideologically rooted and revolutionary source of the revolution would dictate Iran’s foreign

policy for the next ten years.104 In the second year of its founding, the Islamic Republic was

plunged into a long and unexpected war with it’s neighbour, Iraq.105 Ironically, the Iraqi

invasion, which was meant to depose the clerical regime and its revolutionary leader,

Ayatollah Khomeini,106 only served at consolidating the revolution and strengthened the

Supreme Leader’s authority.107 After the war’s end in 1988, and Khomeini’s death in 1989,

the regime slowly liberalised, implemented reform and gradually opened up through the

respective presidencies of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami.108 The

presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, however, saw the return of a hardliner into office.

Since 1979, the position of Supreme Leader has been the most powerful figure in Iranian

politics. The current Supreme Leader – Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – exercises extensive power

and influence in all branches of Iranian politics, granting him authority over the executive, the

legislative and judicial branches of government, including the armed forces and the state-run

media.109 Just as his Saudi colleague King Salman, he is all-powerful within the political

realm. Although the Supreme Leader holds vast powers, the elected president leads Iran’s

executive branch.110 The parliament – the Majlies – is also an elected institution, albeit it is

weak and holds no true power compared to the Guardian council, the Supreme Leader, or the

103 Griffith, William E. (1979) “The Revival of Islamic Fundamentalism: The Case of Iran” International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1, MIT Press, Cambridge, p. 132 And Michel, Tom (2003) “Implications of the Islamic Revival for Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Asia” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, Vol. 3, No. 2, Continuum International Publishing Group, London, p. 71. 104 Amiri, Reza Ekhtiari and Ku Samsu, Ku Hasnita Binti and Fereidouni, Hassan G. (2011) “The Hajj and Iran’s Foreign Policy towards Saudi Arabia” Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 46, No. 6, Sage Publications, New York, p. 679.105 Terrill (2011), p. 1.106 BBC 2005, Hardy, Roger “The Iran-Iraq war: 25 years on” available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm 22/09/2005, retrieved on 18/03/2016. 107 The Brookings Institution 2013, Maloney, Suzanne “Iran surprises itself and the World: A new President may take this country in a new direction” available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2013/iran-surprises-itself-and-the-world-a# 09/11/2013, retrieved on 18/03/2016. 108 United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer 2015, Bakhash, Shaul “The Seven Presidents” available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/seven-presidents August 2015, retrieved on 18/03/2016. 109 Wright, Robin (2010). The Iran Primer: Power, Politics and U.S. Policy. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 11. 110 Milani, Mohsen M. (1993) “The evolution of the Iranian presidency: From Bani Sadr to Rafsanjani” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon, p. 83.

42

presidency.111 Generally, Iran is assumed be a theocratic presidential republic, but where the

ultimate decision making power lies with the Supreme Leader, not the president, nor the

parliament. The election of the current president Hassan Rouhani brought a show of renewed

hope of liberalisation at home, and reduction of tensions with regional rivals abroad, such as

Saudi Arabia.112 The execution of Nimr Al-Nimr on January 2nd by Saudi authorities,

however, was an unfortunate change of events that dramatically reignited Saudi-Iranian

tensions.

4.3 The importance of Bahrain

On February 14th 2011, large crowds of people assembled at the Pearl roundabout in Manama,

the capital of Bahrain, to peacefully hoist their discontent against the ruling Al-Khalifa

regime.113 The protests were taking place in the midst of the Arab Spring, which was rapidly

spreading throughout the Middle East. Five years later, the roundabout is no more, and there

is little evidence reminiscent of the largest protest movement in Bahraini history. The people

of Egypt and Tunisia managed to rid their countries of their dictators through protesting and

demonstration, Bahrain however, did not. The ruling Khalifa dynasty stayed in power by

violently ridding the capital of protestors, and by calling in for aid from outside. This aid

would come in the form of Saudi troops.114 The intervention bore significant political

motivation, rooted in a mixture of regime survival and sectarian domination.

The Khalifas, who have ruled Bahrain since 1783,115 are a Sunni royal family governing a

country in which the majority of the population is Shiite.116 When the protests began during

the Arab uprisings, the demonstrations were peaceful. The participants demanded more rights

from the government, because of the deeply social and economic inequalities present in

society.117 On the surface, there was no violence, nor was there any ideological or religiously

111 The United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer 2015, Farhi, Farideh “The Parliament” available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/parliament August 2015, retrieved on 18/03/2016. 112 Bakhash, 2015.113 Khalaf, Amal (2013) “Squaring the Circle: Bahrain’s Pearl roundabout” Middle East Critique, Vol. 22, No. 3, Routlegde, p. 265. 114 Nuruzzaman, Mohammed (2013) “Politics, Economics, and Saudi Military intervention in Bahrain” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 43, No. 2, Routledge, p. 363. 115 Albinkhalil, Yousif (2013). America and Bahrain Winter: Analysis of the USA and the Sunnis in Bahrain. Bloomington, IN: Xlibirs Corporation, p. 56. 116 Wright (2001), p. 115. 117 Gerges, Farwaz A. (2014). The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 332.

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motivated sentiment behind the demonstrations; they were, however, about social justice,

more rights and the end to discrimination. Shias and Sunnis were demonstrating hand in hand

although the majority were of the former denomination.118 The Saudi intervention, which

came in the form of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s peninsula Shield Force, crushed the last

remaining hopes of change in Bahraini society.119 It was the only country in which the Saudis

intervened during the Arab uprisings,120 expressive of the paramount importance of the island

in the larger duel with Iran. For the Saudis, the intervention was necessary for two strategic

reasons. The most obvious one was to make sure that the Al-Khalifa royal family stayed in

power. If revolutionaries would oust one Sunni royal family in the Gulf, it could transform

into a domino effect for the rest of the GCC members states, and it could threaten the Al-

Sa’ud rule in Saudi Arabia. The second reason behind the intervention was of a more

geopolitical nature, namely to make sure Iranian influence in Bahrain would be dismantled.121

The Bahraini situation epitomizes the growing Saudi fear of Iranian influence and power.

Saudi Arabia, a country that shares several similarities with Bahrain, was able to justify its

intervention because of these causes. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are both ruled by royal

families, and the royal families are both Sunni Muslim. Bahrain is a majority Shiite country,

while Saudi Arabia has a considerable minority of Shia Muslims living in its Eastern

province. In both countries, the Shias are discriminated against, and during the Arab spring,

the Shias protested against their respective regimes.

Having taken on the role as protector of Shiites in the Middle East, Iran was implicated in

Bahrain’s domestic affairs based on the majority’s religious sectarian identity.122

If the Khalifas were to be toppled, Iran would gain a strategic foothold, geographically

binding them to Saudi Arabia through the King Fahd causeway, which links the Saudi

mainland to the Bahraini archipelago.123 This would upset the current status quo, undermine

the legitimacy of the Gulf ruling families, and give Tehran a strategic edge over Saudi Arabia.

From a Saudi point of view, it would be utterly unacceptable and would be considered a direct

threat to the monarchy.

118 Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain 2015, Hacker, Sarah “Why Saudi Arabia crushed the democratic uprising in Bahrain” available at http://www.adhrb.org/2015/02/why-saudi-arabia-crushed-the-democratic-uprising-in-bahrain/ 12/02/2015, retrieved on 29/03/2016. 119 Gresh, Geoffrey F. (2015). Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime survival and the politics of basing. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 171. 120 Aarts & Roelants (2015), p. 111. 121 Gresh (2015), p. 171. 122 Nuruzzaman (2013), p. 369. 123 Mabon, Simon (2012) “The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi rivalry” Middle East Policy Council, Volume XIX, No. 2. Washington, p. 1.

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From an Iranian point of view, the anti-Khalifa protests were welcomed. The Saudi

intervention, however, was strongly condemned by the Iranian authorities and was at the

starting point of the ever-increasing rivalry between the two nations.124

The Al-Saud-Al-Khalifa demonization of Iran as the instigator of the protest in Bahrain

fuelled bad blood between Iran and the Gulf States, and the violent countermeasures taken by

the Saudi and Bahraini governments against the Shia population further bridged the gap

between them. Conclusively, the importance of the Bahraini uprisings and its aftermath is

highly significant for the framework of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. The uprisings were, from

Riyadh and Tehran’s point of view, a geopolitical and ideological battleground, in which

Saudi Arabia made the first strategic move. The future implications of the intervention,

however, will only inflame the levels of animosity and competition between the Saudis and

Iranians in the long run, and is a vital piece of the regional political puzzle.

4.4 Conclusion to Chapter IV.

In order to establish the groundwork for the reader, this chapter introduced three vital

elements of the thesis, namely a background on Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Bahraini incident.

While the two respective paragraphs on Saudi Arabia and Iran were brief, these were solely

meant to offer the explicit historical narratives of the nations that will be necessary for the

following comparative analysis. As such, they were purposely concentrated toward the

background of the current regimes, their policies, and their relation to the variables that will

be analysed underneath. The Bahraini protests and the ensuing Saudi military intervention is

vital in respect to the reader’s understanding of the modern-day trigger, which re-ignited the

hostility that today is more intense than ever before.

124 Mossallanejad, Ezat (2012). Religion and the cruel return of Gods. Toronto: Zagros Editions, p. 203.

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Chapter V. Comparative analysis – Similarities

As presented in earlier parts of this thesis, the goal is to understand the reasons for the

growing tensions between the Islamic Republic and the Saudi monarchy.

As described in the theoretical framework, there are many variables, both domestic and

systemic, that need to be compared in order to gain a broad understanding of various

incentives and motivations. The following in-depth analysis will target the similarities shared

by Saudi Arabia and Iran in the context of the research question. This will serve at

determining if the similarities shared lead to increased hostility between the regional giants.

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5.1 Support for regional proxies and groups

A strategy that emerged during the Cold War, the usage of proxies in conflict situations, or as

pieces in a geopolitical puzzle, has today become a mechanism fervently used when the costs

of interstate wars are to high.125 There are several definitions of what proxies are and what

their meaning entail. First of all proxies need to be defined in relevance to proxy war, and the

latter definition goes as follows:

“Proxy wars are the product of a relationship between a benefactor, who is a state or non-

state actor external to the dynamic of an existing conflict, and the chosen proxies who are the

conduit for the benefactor’s weapons, training and funding. In short, proxy wars are the

logical replacement for states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time

avoid engaging in direct, costly and bloody warfare”.126

During the last few decades, Iran and Saudi Arabia have both managed to tie various proxies

and groups to their purpose. Regionally, these proxies serve Tehran and Riyadh’s cause while

engaging in various clandestine activities. Usually, but not exclusively, these proxies are used

in an effort to destabilize each other. In recent years, a growing number of infractions and

illicit activities have been carried out by respective Saudi and Iranian proxies in regional

conflicts, or aimed directly at each other’s power apparatuses.127 It is a similarity shared by

both regional giants that is poised to escalate from indirect, to a direct conflict.

Iranian proxies

Due to the fact that Iran, unlike Saudi Arabia, is not allied to any great regional or global

power, support for proxy groups is essentially an Iranian trademark in the Middle East. Since

the Islamic Revolution, Iran has utilised a variety of proxies in different theatres of operations

in order to compete for influence regionally.128 There are four Arab capitals, in which one can 125 Foreign Affairs 2015, Beehner, Lionel “How Proxy Wars Work” available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-11-12/how-proxy-wars-work 12/11/2015, retrieved on 14/04/2016.126 Mumford, Andrew (2013) “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict” The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Vol. 158, No. 2, London, p. 40. See Also Loveman, Chris (2002) “Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention” Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 2, No. 3, Abingdon, p. 30-31. 127 Business Insider UK 2016, Bender, Jeremy “This map shows the brewing proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia” available at http://uk.businessinsider.com/map-of-saudi-and-iran-proxy-war-2016-1?r=US&IR=T 08/01/2016, retrieved on 14/04/2016.128 Foreign Policy 2015, Naylor, Seán D. “Will Cubing Iran’s Nuclear Threat boost its Proxies?” available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/20/will-curbing-irans-nuclear-threat-boost-its-proxies/ 20/07/2015, retrieved

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claim that Iran has a descent foothold, either through proxy groups or friendly governments.

These are Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Sana’a. Beirut and Southern Lebanon is home to

Tehran’s perhaps most redoubtable proxy, namely Hezbollah. The organisation, which was

founded in 1982 during the Lebanese civil war, has evolved from a Shiite paramilitary

organisation into a political party and humanitarian agency.129 These last decades, Iran has

sponsored Hezbollah with hundreds of millions of dollars annually.130 The group, dubbed a

terrorist organisation by the West, was in 2007 reported as “The most technically capable

terrorist group in the world” according to the U.S. Department of State.131 The group today

operates largely on behalf of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in the context of

operations outside Lebanon, and they receive training, indoctrination and funding from the

Quds force, the IRGC’s Special Forces unit.132 Hezbollah have been responsible for a wide

range of attacks and clandestine operations worldwide since its founding, most notably the

bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks and the French paratrooper Chasseur Regiment

base in Beirut in 1983; the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the

bombing of the Argentinian-Israeli Mutual Association in the same city two years later; the

Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and many other suspected plots and

assassinations.133 During the American occupation of Iraq, Tehran fervently put Hezbollah

operatives to use as a proxy force,134 and in more recent years, Iran has sponsored the group in

conducting open scale warfare in support of the Assad regime in Syria.135 In March 2016 at

the 145th congress of Arab Foreign Ministers, the GCC, spearheaded by Saudi efforts,

reaffirmed its decision to designate Hezbollah a terrorist organisation. A few weeks before

hand, Saudi media aired a news clip depicting footage showing a Lebanese Hezbollah military

adviser talking to Houthi rebels about organising both suicide and conventional military

attacks inside Saudi Arabia.136 As Yemen is a covert battleground between Iran and Saudi

Arabia, and Hezbollah is closely associated to Iran, it is comprehensible that Saudi Arabia

on 14/04/2016. 129 Caudill, Shannon W. (2008) “Hizballah Rising: Iran’s Proxy Warriors” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 49, 2nd quarter, National Defence University Press, Fort Lesley McNair, p. 128. 130 Testimony of Matthew Levitt to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2012) “Iran’s Support for Terrorism in the Middle East” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., p. 7. 131 United States Department of State 2008 “Country reports on terrorism 2007” available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf April 2008, retrieved on 14/04/2016. 132 Levitt (2012), p. 7. 133 The Henry Jackson Society 2012 “Timeline of Terror: A concise History of Hezbollah Atrocities” available at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Timeline-of-Terror_Membership-version_low-res.pdf 2012, retrieved on 15/04/2016. 134 Caudill (2008), p. 133. 135 Fulton, Will, Holliday, Joseph & Wyer, Sam (2013) “Iranian Strategy in Syria” The Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threat Project, Washington D.C., p. 6-7.

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views them as a threat, orchestrated by Iranian efforts. Hezbollah is then an Iranian proxy that

is active in inciting and advocating terrorist acts against, amongst others, Saudi Arabia.

In Damascus, Iran has close ties to the Assad ruling family, and has a vested interest in

ensuring the survival of the regime. If the Assad regime were to be toppled, it would severely

reduce Tehran’s ability to project power in the region; it would cut its supply routes to Beirut

and Hezbollah, and constrain Iran’s influence on what is now its Syrian proxy.

The close affiliations between Syria and Iran go back to 1979, and the alliance endures due to

the two authoritarian regimes’ shared strategic goals, and common traits. Ideologically,

however, the two regimes are sharply opposite to one another. The Assad regime is Baa’thist,

secular and socialist, while the clerical regime in Iran is deeply religious and opposed to

secularism.137 Other than strategic goals, the two regimes’ shared values come in the form of

Shiism. While Tehran’s regime portrays itself as the supporter and defender of Shias region-

wide, the Assad regime is Alawite, a Shiite sect, in a predominantly Sunni Muslim country.

As such, the alliance is sustained by religious similarities, and strategic intentions. Although

Bashar al-Assad may be ideologically opposed to Tehran, he is fully dependent on Iran for

military, logistical and financial support in order to stay in power.138

Ideologically, Saudi Arabia and Syria are even further apart than Iran and Syria. The Saudis

are firmly part of the anti-Assad coalition. The kingdom is a staunch provider of military and

financial assistance to anti-Assad groups, including Salafi and jihadi factions.139

Unsurprisingly, the relationship between Damascus and Riyadh is icy. Not only is Assad

ideologically opposed to the Saudi monarchy, but he is also a firm supporter of Saudi

Arabia’s arch nemesis, Iran. By fighting Sunni factions supported by Saudi Arabia in Syria,

Bashar al-Assad is indirectly opposing Saudi efforts, while at the same time inviting Iranian

influence, so solidly antagonistic towards Riyadh. These are the reasons the Saudis view the

Assad regime as a threat, and indirectly as a Tehran-sponsored proxy.

In Baghdad, Iran has supported a variety of proxy groups since the Iran-Iraq war, and since

the U.S. withdrawal the Tehran and Baghdad administrations have been closely affiliated.

136 Al Monitor 2015, al-Hatlani, Ibrahim “Gulf Pulse: How far will the Saudis go against Hezbollah?” available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/03/saudi-arabia-gcc-ties-iran-hezbollah.html 11/03/2016, retrieved on 15/04/2016. 137 The United States Institute of Peace, the Iran Primer 2015, Goodarzi, Jubin “Iran and Syria” available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-syria August 2015, retrieved on 15/04/2016. 138 Ibidem. 139 BBC 2015 “Syria Crisis: Where key countries stand” available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587 30/10/2015, retrieved on 15/04/2016.

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In essence, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the following ousting of its long time dictator,

Saddam Hussein, removed Iran’s most important regional threat. The removal of Saddam

Hussein from power then provided Tehran with a chance to adjust and develop its influence

within Iraq, its decade long archenemy. Through its various Shiite proxies, Iran arranged for,

and eventually managed to create a “Weakened, decentralized and Shia-dominated Iraq that is

incapable of posing a threat to Iran” according to former U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency

director Lowell Jacoby.140 Iranian proxies in Iraq number several loyal groups, such as the

Badr organisation, established in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war; Kata’ib Hezbollah, an offshoot

of the once Tehran-loyal Mahdi army; and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, another Shia paramilitary

group, which is today fighting on behalf of Bashar al Assad in Syria, under Tehran’s

request.141 Furthermore, former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, and current Prime

Minister Haider Al-Abadi are or were both part of the Dawa party, which has enjoyed Iran’s

guardianship for decades.142

Saudi Arabia deems Iraq to be a proxy of Iran on the basis of its majority Shiite population.

The kingdom believes Iraq is a threat to its national interest because the country exemplifies

the Shiite menace, demonstrated through Iranian-backed Shiites taking political control in an

Arab country, according to the Al-Monitor news agency.143 This is something Saudi Arabia

fiercely opposes, and blames Iran for.144 Furthermore, with many Tehran-friendly proxies still

active inside Iraq, which shares a 900 km border with the kingdom,145 the Saudis could be

worried of outside infiltration and acts of terrorism by such organisations, sponsored by

Tehran.

In Yemen, Houthi rebels, who are backed by Iran, are fighting for control of the country. The

impoverished society, which is situated along Saudi Arabia’s Eastern border, has experienced

upheaval and conflict ever since long time President Ali Abduallah Saleh stepped down

140 Testimony of Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2005) “Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States” Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Washington D.C., p. 51. 141 The Tower Magazine 2015, Daoud, David “Meet the Proxies: How Iran Spreads its Empire through Terrorist Militias” available at http://www.thetower.org/article/meet-the-proxies-how-iran-spreads-its-empire-through-terrorist-militias/ March 2015, retrieved on 15/04/2016. 142 United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer 2015, Eisenstat, Michael “Iran and Iraq” available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-iraq August 2015, retrieved on 15/04/2016. 143 Al Monitor 2015, al-Khadimi, Mustafa “Iraq Pulse: Could Saudi-Iraqi ties be key to defeating Islamic State?” available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/iraq-saudi-arabia-relations-extremism-isis-common-interests.html 09/10/2015, retrieved on 15/014/2016. 144 Ibidem.145 Al Jazeera 2014 “Saudi unveils 900 km fence on Iraq border” available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/saudi-unveils-900km-fence-along-iraq-border-201496154458789238.html 06/09/2014, retrieved on 15/04/2016.

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during the Arab uprisings in 2011.146 Demographically, the Yemeni population consists of a

majority of Sunni Muslims, and a minority of Shias, amounting to circa 56 and 44 per cent

respectively.147 This sectarian split is vital in understanding the current conflict, in which both

Iran and Saudi Arabia are deeply entrenched. In 2014, the Houthis, a Shiite militia, overran

government forces and took control of the capital, Sana’a, on the basis of demands of a

greater role in government.148 It is believed, although such accusations are rebuffed by Tehran,

that the Houthis act as proxy for Iranian interests in Yemen and on the Arabian Peninsula.149

Since Iran and the Houthis are both attached to the same religious denominations, and have

similar strategic interest concerning Saudi Arabia, they are natural allies. Recently, in an

interview with Reuters, a high-ranking Iranian official said that the IRGC-QF had deployed

several hundred military advisers to train Houthi fighters in Yemen. Further, he added that

accordingly, around a hundred Houthi fighters were receiving training by the Revolutionary

Guard Corps inside Iran.150 Since the conflict erupted, Iran has backed their proxy with

considerable logistical, financial and military means.151 Recently, Saudi Arabia and their GCC

allies seized several ships believed to be carrying Iranian arms to the Houthis. The Saudis

believe this is proof that Iran is definitively trying to gain a foothold in Yemen, using their

Houthi proxies.152 In a direct response to the growing Houthi gains, and the fear of Iranian

meddling in its sphere of influence, Saudi Arabia launched a premeditated invasion of Yemen

in March 2015.153 The Saudis will never accept a Tehran-friendly government on their

doorstep, which the Iranians could use as a base for further infractions aimed at Riyadh. As

such, they aim to crush the Shiite rebels and re-install the Saudi-friendly Sunni President Abd

Rabbuh Mansur Hadi at the government’s seat in Sana’a.

146 Durac, Vincent (2012) “Yemen’s Arab Spring – Democratic Opening or Regime Maintenance?” Mediterranean Politics Vol. 17, No. 2, Taylor and Francis, Abingdon, p. 161. 147 Bender, 2016.148 Los Angeles Times 2015, Bulos, Nabih and al Alayaa, Zaid “In Yemen, Houthi rebel missile strike kills dozens in Saudi-led force” available at http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-yemen-attack-20151215-story.html 14/12/2015 retrieved on 15/04/2016. 149 Reuters 2014, Bayoumy, Yara and Ghobari, Mohammed “Iranian support seen crucial for Yemen’s Houthis” available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215 15/12/2014, retrieved on 15/04/2016. 150 Ibidem. 151 Al Monitor 2015, ShahidSaless, Shahir “Iran Pulse: Does Iran Really Control Yemen?” available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/iran-yemen-houthis-axis-of-resistance.html 12/02/2015, retrieved on 15/04/2015. 152 The Wall Street Journal 2015, al-Omran, Ahmed and Fitch, Asa “Saudi coalition seizes Iranian boat carrying weapons to Yemen” available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-coalition-seizes-iranian-boat-carrying-weapons-to-rebels-in-yemen-1443606304 30/09/2015, retrieved on 15/04/2016. 153 The Huffington Post 2015, Al Makhzoomi, Khairuldeen “The Failure of Saudi Intervention in Yemen” available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/khairuldeen-al-makhzoomi/the-failure-of-saudi-intervention-in-yemen_b_8469744.html 11/12/2015, retrieved on 15/04/2016.

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For Saudi Arabia, the Yemeni theatre is probably the most potent conflict currently unfolding

in the larger regional power struggle with Iran.

Saudi proxies

The Saudi royal family looks at Tehran with suspicion, while the opinion of Saudi citizens

echoes that of their regime in regard to Iran. Phrases depicting Iran such as “monster”, “a

powerful hungry regime” and “ devil” are but some of many metaphors that reverberate when

Saudis describe their regional rival.154 When the Saudis criticize Tehran for proxy-support and

sponsoring terrorism, however, it seems rightfully hypocritical in light of Riyadh’s decade-

long continuous support for Sunni proxies region-wide.

The House of Sa’ud has a decade-long history of sponsoring proxy groups and governments

allied to their cause, instead of getting directly involved in any conflicts themselves. During

the Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia, fiercely opposed to the new clerical regime in Tehran fearing

for the royal family’s legitimacy and stability, financed Saddam Hussein’s invasion and war

effort.155 During the same period, in Afghanistan, the Saudis sponsored many different Sunni

Muslim Mujahedeen groups fighting the Soviet invasion. In Pakistan, the Saudis sponsored

the construction of Wahhabi madrasas around Baluchistan and the NWFP, which would

indoctrinate Taliban commanders such as Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani in the Jihadi

dogma.156 During the Lebanese civil war from 1975-1990, the kingdom frequently financed

Sunni-militias opposed to among others, Iranian backed Hezbollah.157

The Saudis have since the 1980s funded extreme Wahhabi movements worldwide, and this

sponsorship, it is believed, is the reason behind the extreme proliferation of Sunni-extremist

terrorism today.158 In a Wikileaks cable obtained by the Guardian newspaper in 2010, the

current Democratic nominee for the U.S. Presidency Hillary Clinton was quoted saying

“Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist

154 The Economist 2015 “Proxies and Paranoia” available at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21659759-kingdom-fears-resurgent-iran-sanctions-come-proxies-and-paranoia 25/07/2015, retrieved on 16/04/2016. 155 Fawcett, Louise (2013). International Relations of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 293-294. 156Moniquet, Claude (2013) “The involvement of Salafism/Whahabbism in the support and supply of arms to rebel groups around the World” Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brussels, p. 5-6. 157 The Economist, 2015.158 The Huffington Post 2015, Butt, Yousaf “How Saudi Wahhabism is the fountainhead of Islamist Terrorism” available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/saudi-wahhabism-islam-terrorism_b_6501916.html 20/01/2015, retrieved on 16/04/2016.

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groups worldwide”. The then Secretary of State further added, “Saudi Arabia remains a

critical financial support base for al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups,

including Hamas”.159

In later years, Saudi strategy has changed. From solely sponsoring and financing groups loyal

to Riyadh, the kingdom has effectively begun to involve themselves directly in neighbouring

countries, when they fear unrest is becoming uncontrollable. This tactic has developed as

conflicts have geographically materialized closer to the Saudi borders. In Bahrain in 2011, a

Saudi task force was deployed to crush the Shiite backed democratic uprising, and currently

Saudi Arabia are involved in both Yemen and Syria, countries either close to the Saudi

homeland, or directly neighbouring it. Meanwhile, the kingdom is continuing to sponsor anti-

Shiite and anti-Iranian proxies in the Middle East. In Syria, Saudi Arabia is known to have

sponsored both moderate, and more radical Jihadi factions, such as Jabhat Al-Nusra, Al-

Qa’ida’s affiliate in Syria.160 There are in fact theories evolving around Saudi sponsorship of

the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the most dangerous and zealot terrorist group in Syria

and Iraq. There is, however, little evidence that supports this claim, although private

donations from Saudi citizens to the organisation are known to have taken place.161 The Saudi

government is after all deeply entrenched in the American led coalition against the

organisation, and the Saudi government knows that ISIL is fundamentally opposed to the

kingdom’s policies. The question still remains, would the Saudi government prefer ISIL on

their doorstep, who follow the Sunni-Islamist Wahhabi doctrine, or an Iranian backed

government or proxy, most likely to adhere to Shia Islam? There is only one clear certainty in

regard to this question, which is that from a Saudi point of view it would be preferable not to

have to choose between any of the mentioned options. Still, there are signs that seem to point

to the fact that for the Saudis, Shiism is the worst of the two enemies. In the Saudi Cables

released by Wikileaks last summer, thousands of documents revealed a repetitive Saudi-

government pattern – an obsessive fear of Shiite expansion and influence in the Middle

159 The Guardian 2010 “US embassy cables: Hillary Clinton says Saudi Arabia ’ a critical source of terrorist funding ’ ”available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/242073 05/12/2010, retrieved on 16/04/2016. 160 The Independent 2015, Sengupta, Kim “Turkey and Saudi Arabia alarm the West by backing Islamist extremists the Americans had bombed in Syria” available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-crisis-turkey-and-saudi-arabia-shock-western-countries-by-supporting-anti-assad-jihadists-10242747.html 12/05/2015, retrieved on 16/04/2016. 161 Boghardt, Lori P. (2014) “Saudi funding of ISIS” Policy Watch 2275, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C.

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East.162 It is clear that Saudi sponsorship of Sunni extremist proxies correlates with their fear

of Shia influenced proxies sponsored by Iran.

A second point worth mentioning is the following; through their decade-long sponsorship of

the Wahhabi doctrine in the Middle East, and by financially backing organisations pledging

support to that doctrine, the Saudi monarchy has by default helped create Sunni terrorist

groups such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, several Pakistani terrorist organisations, and to an

extent the Islamic State.

Analysis

By tracing regional proxies of Tehran and Riyadh we notice similar tendencies. Iran and

Saudi Arabia are both supporting proxies that fundamentally oppose each other’s religious

affiliations, regimes, or bid for regional hegemony. When either of these states lends support

to such factions or governments, it increases their power in terms of military capabilities and

material force. The proxy sponsorship-approach gives them the power to dictate regional

policy by use of force, without getting personally involved in any conflict situations. When

Iran empowers Shiite groups or governments, it infuriates Saudi Arabia, whose regional

policy decrees the exact opposite. Accordingly, when Saudi Arabia accommodates Sunni and

Wahhabi factions, it upsets Tehran’s ability to enhance its influence regionally. By giving

support to proxies who obstruct each other, the Saudi-Iranian animosity increases severely.

Especially due to the fact that several of the empowered proxies on each side swear allegiance

to respective ideologies that mean to destroy the opposite benefactor. Hezbollah fervently

opposes the Saudi monarchy and is directly engaged in acts of terror against the Saudi state

such as 1996 Khobar attacks. Likewise, Saudi sponsored Wahhabi proxies are radically

hostile toward Shia Iran. As things stand, the practice of engaging in indirect warfare through

proxies is as close as Saudi Arabia and Iran are to a conventional military interstate conflict. It

is then clear that this strategy does in fact escalate the level of enmity present between the two

Middle Eastern rivals.

162 Al Monitor 2015, Mamouri, Ali “Iraq Pulse: Leaked Cables show Gulf leery of Shiite expansion” available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/gulf-fears-shiite-expansion-wikileaks-saudi-arabia-iran.html# 26/06/2015. See also Wikileaks 2015 “The Saudi Cables: Cables and other documents from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs ” available at https://wikileaks.org/saudi-cables/press 19/06/2015, both retrieved on 16/04/2016.

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As a material variable, and as a tool of foreign policy, proxies are intrinsically linked with the

adopted theory of this thesis. The empirical analysis above clearly shows that proxy groups of

Iran and Saudi Arabia play an important role in both countries’ foreign policy, and that these

proxies play a part in forming state behaviour, which complies with neoclassical realism.163

As an example, if Iran empowers one proxy in one theatre of conflict, the Saudis will likely

respond in kind and adopt the same mechanism to counter the Iranian proxy. As such, the

Saudi authorities’ behaviour is corresponded to the Iranian move, as the case would be in a

game of chess. An Iranian move on the geopolitical chessboard thus instigates Saudi

behaviour to respond in kind. Neoclassical realism also argues for the fact that relative

material power is one of the elemental criteria of a state’s foreign policy.164 As proxies are a

tool enhancing relative power capabilities – due to the fact that they add another dimension to

a state’s foreign policy choice and serve as an appliance of military means – their

endorsement by Tehran and Riyadh shows, through the research, that such a variable is indeed

conforming to neoclassical realism, and its train of thought. Following the parameters of

neoclassical realism, this variable clearly incites tension and augmented animosity between

the kingdom and the Islamic Republic.

163 Foulon (2015), p. 636-637164 Rose (1998), p. 146.

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Map 3. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia vs Islamic Republic of Iran: a proxy war in the Middle East. Source:

Emmanuel Pène: Le Courier du Maghreb et de l’Orient 2015.

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5.2 Nuclear weapons

Later in this thesis, when contrasting differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia, military

spending will be compared. That case analysis, however, only represents military spending on

conventional weaponry, not nuclear weapons. Weapons of mass destruction, however, are not

part of conventional military spending. In this context, although conventional military

spending differs drastically, the acquirement of nuclear weapons stands at the same level for

both Saudi Arabia and Iran, due to the fact that neither nation posses any. As such, it is a

similarity shared by both nations.

The reason nuclear weapons is an important factor in determining levels of animosity is that

the possession of one would be a catalyst for increased threat levels on both sides of the

Persian Gulf. Of the two countries, it is believed that the Iranian regime is closest to acquiring

nuclear weapons as things stand.165 If such a day ever came to be, it is a categorical certainty

that Saudi Arabia would themselves acquire such devices to deter Iran, and to even the

unlevel playing field in order for the current status quo to be maintained. Nuclear weapons in

the hands of either of these states would certainly enhance the probability of a large-scale

regional war, and devastation on an unimaginable scale. At present time, however, to the best

of the international community’s knowledge, neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia has managed to

manufacture or purchase nuclear weapons. On this level, both countries are similarly

positioned. This does not mean that in the future, one, or both will not try to acquire weapons

of mass destruction.

Iran

Last summer, a nuclear deal was signed between Iran and several world powers, which will de

facto limit Iran’s capabilities to acquire nuclear weapons. The most vital points from the 159-

page treaty go as follows; the agreement requires Iran to give up almost its entire uranium

stockpile, which is needed to fuel a nuclear weapon. Iran will be able to enrich uranium, but at

very low levels, far under the threshold necessary to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran will also

have to give up two thirds of its centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium. Iran’s

plutonium production, which can be used to create an atomic weapon, will almost fully be

165 Schneider, Mark B. (2013) “Has Iran covertly acquired nuclear weapons?” Comparative Strategy, National Institute for Public Policy Vol. 32, No.4, Fairfax, p. 308-309.

57

shut down. Lastly, there will be frequent inspections by international monitoring agencies, in

order to verify if Iran is sincerely abiding to the terms set out by the treaty.166 In return, the

international community has already lifted a wide range of sanctions on the country. The

Iranian nuclear deal, however, only limits Iran’s nuclear options for up to 15 years. If Iran

decides to cheat its way out of the deal, with its current acquirement options severely limited,

it will still only take Tehran no more than 12 months to produce enough fuel to produce a

nuclear weapon.167 If the political establishment, more precisely, the conservative and

militaristic segments in the inner political circle decide to overrule Hassan Rouhani and the

more reformist public servants – which both the Supreme Leader and the IRGC theoretically

have the power to do –168 nuclear weapons, or at least a nuclear programme can once more

become a priority on Tehran’s agenda. During President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s time in

office, relations with the West and Arab countries were severely stretched due to the

President’s hard-line rhetoric and defence of the Iranian right to develop its nuclear

programme for peaceful purposes.169 If Hassan Rouhani’s successor were to be an

ultraconservative hardliner such as Mr Ahmadinejad, an Iranian nuclear programme could be

re-established. Only if Iran changes the very fundament of its ideological foreign policy

stance, which would mean abandoning the foundations of the Islamic Revolution currently

entrenched in society, can one hope for a permanent abandonment of Iranian nuclear hopes.

As long as the clerical regime remains in power, there is always a chance that at one time, it

will try to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Saudi Arabia

On the other side of the nuclear equation is Saudi Arabia, whose Prince Turki Al-Faisal –

Saudi Arabia’s former ambassador to Washington – recently warned the U.S. that his country

166 Financial Times 2015, Jones, Sam & Barker, Alex “Five key points of the Iran Nuclear Deal explained” available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/f7dab4ae-2491-11e5-bd83-71cb60e8f08c.html#axzz45hSyC1Sm 14/07/2015, retrieved on 13/04/2016 And The Washington Post 2016 “Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal” available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/ 14/07/2015, retrieved on 13/04/2016. 167 The Wall Street Journal 2015, Blasina, Niki “The Iran Nuclear Deal explained” available at http://www.wsj.com/video/the-iran-nuclear-deal-explained/BCDEC52C-E9F0-431C-A645-B6E6F00F6F50.html 09/02/2015, retrieved on 13/04/2016. 168 The United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer 2015, Nader, Alireza “The Revolutionary Guards” available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-guards August 2015, retrieved on 13/04/2016. 169 CNN 2005 “Iran is resolved to pursue nuclear program“ available at http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/09/17/iran.president/ 18/09/2005, retrieved on 13/04/2016.

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would be compelled to react in a similar manner if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon.170

High-ranking Saudi officials echoed the same message in the aftermath of the nuclear deal

with Iran. In 2008, Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum to the United States, which made it

clear the kingdom would not pursue uranium enrichment; eight years on, however, the Saudis

have vowed to match every nuclear technology Iran possesses.171 Although Saudi nuclear

technology is at an early stage, Saudi Arabia possesses the economic muscle, and the foreign

connections in order to achieve its nuclear goals. Through its tremendous oil revenues, and

the kingdom’s close affiliations to Pakistan, a regional nuclear power house, Saudi Arabia

does certainly have several options in regards to becoming a nuclear power if they so wish

it.172 The only sensible disincentive for Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons is their

alliance to the United States, a country that stands firm in its quest to halt the proliferation of

nuclear weapons worldwide. The Saudis, however, could clandestinely try to acquire such

capabilities behind Washington’s back like they did in the 1980s, when the kingdom managed

to purchase CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China.173 For the United States to believe that Saudi

Arabia would not try to acquire their own nuclear capabilities even if it would jeopardize the

Saudi-U.S. relationship would be to severely underestimate Saudi strategic, security and

political incentives. The driving forces in international politics is not friendship, but survival,

and survival comes before all else, something Washington should keep in mind. Furthermore,

with the current hostile climate that is unfolding in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia may even try to

procure nuclear weapons before Iran, in order to fundamentally shift the balance of power

between them, and to ensure the very survival of the Saudi nation state.

Analysis

Saudi Arabia will not stand on the sidelines if Iran were ever to re-launch its nuclear

programme. In all probability, Iran would act similarly if Saudi Arabia tried to surpass them

in nuclear development. The current arms race in the Persian Gulf would go from a

conventional to a nuclear level. The threat level for both countries would go from high to

170 The New York Times 2015, Sanger, David E. “Saudi Arabia promises to match Iran in nuclear capability” available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-promises-to-match-iran-in-nuclear-capability.html 13/05/2015, retrieved on 13/04/2016. 171 Fitzpatrick, Mark (2015) “Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the nuclear rumour mill” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 57, No.4, London, p. 105-106. 172 Ibidem173 Russell, Richard L. (2001) “A Saudi Nuclear Option?” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, London, p. 69.

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existential. History has proved that, in the framework of a rivalry, if one state acquires

WMDs, so will its counterpart. The United States and the Soviet Union procured their

weapons within a 4-year gap. Once India procured nuclear weapons, its arch-rival Pakistan

followed suit. Nuclear monopoly between rivals does not last long, and once they are both

armed with such destructive capabilities, war becomes an ever-growing possibility.

As of now, neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran posses such weapons. As the relationship between

the two grows icier, however, the acquirement of WMDs will remain on their respective

agendas. The acquirement of nuclear weapons by either of these states would send menacing

signals that could proliferate in an even greater threat level, and by default, an increased

degree of animosity and fear.

There are those such as neorealist Kenneth Waltz, that would argue for the fact that a nuclear

armed Iran would lead to balancing, in the context of an already nuclear armed Israel, and that

it would lead to long lasting stability.174 One can presume that Waltz would then also assume

that a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia, together with a nuclear-armed Iran would lead to stability,

in the light of the mutual assured destruction doctrine of deterrence. Neorealists, as presented

in the theoretical framework, however, categorically focus on systemic variables in

international relations, but in the context of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, variables such as

ethnicity, religion, forms of nationalism and regime type are seen as irrelevant. Because the

roots of Saudi-Iranian animosity are rooted to these domestic immaterial variables – which

will be analysed later in the thesis – nuclear arms would not lead to stability, but to insecurity,

which would enhance the chances of war. The animosity is so entrenched between the two

regional powers through these exact variables, which would prove neorealism incorrect, as

they do not take such variables into account. As such Tehran and Riyadh would not deter each

other, but rather use their nuclear capacities aggressively because of mutual hatred rooted in

societal domestic norms, and not solely in international ones. As domestic pressure has the

power to dictate state-policy in the international system for neoclassical realists, the

acquirement of a nuclear arsenal for either of these sides is indeed an option that cannot be

abandoned.

174 Foreign Affairs 2012, Waltz, Kenneth N. “Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability” available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get-bomb July/August 2012, retrieved on 13/04/2016.

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5.3 Religion, a similarity or difference?

For both Iran175 and Saudi Arabia,176 religion is a cornerstone of society and political life. In

both states, albeit the adherence to Islamic denominations differs, religion itself bears vast

significance. As explained in the operationalization of variables and concepts previously,

religion, in this thesis’ context, is synonymous with Islam. The role of Islam in Iran and Saudi

Arabia is a mutuality that both countries share. In such a framework, religion is a variable that

impacts the specific relationship between the two, but also the larger regional contestation for

influence in the Middle East.177 The manner in which religion is politicised and implemented,

however, is dissimilar. The most crucial fait accompli, when comparing Islam in Saudi Arabia

and Iran is that both rely on Islam for the legitimisation of the their respective regimes.178

Without it, none of the two regimes would have enjoyed the stability they have experienced

since they came to power in 1932 and 1979 respectively.

Iran

Before 1979, Iranian foreign policy was largely secularly oriented, while the Al-Sa’ud’s

advocacy for pan-Islamism set the two future rivals apart – they were not contending for the

same political ground. The Islamic Revolution’s introduction of religion in matters of politics,

however, activated the side-lined Shiite-Sunni rivalry, and let loose the sectarian nature of the

current Saud-Iranian struggle.179 The 1979 Islamic Revolution revived the role of religion in

Iran, which under the Pahlavi dynasty, had been suppressed and undermined by both Reza

Shah and his son, Mohammad Reza Shah.180 The coming to power of Ayatollah Khomeini

drastically altered the position of Islam in Iranian society. Presently, the role of religion in the 175 Moazami, Behrooz (2011) “Rethinking the Role of Religion in Iran’s History and Politics, 1796-2009” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 31, No. 1, Duke University Press, Durham, p. 71, 75. 176 Alsaif, Tawfiq (2013) “Relationship between state and religion in Saudi Arabia: the role of Wahabism in governance” Contemporary Arab Affairs Vol. 6, No. 3, Routledge, Abingdon, p. 376-377.177 Terrill (2011), p. 15. 178 Alsaif (2013), p. 376 and Olivier, Roy (1999) “The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran” Middle East Journal Vol. 53, No. 2, Middle East Institute, Washington, p. 201. 179 Foreign Policy 2015, Ghattas, Kim “The Blood Feud that drives the Middle East” available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/13/the-blood-feud-that-drives-the-middle-east-saudi-arabia-iran/ 13/11/2016, retrieved on 22/04/2016. 180 Jebnoun, Noureddine, Mehrdad, Kia & Kirk, Mimi (2014). Modern Middle East authoritarianism: Roots, Ramifications and Crisis. Oxon: Routledge, p. 63.

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country is largely similar to that envisioned and implemented by the Ayatollah after 1979.

The revolution itself, and thus, the entire post-1979 Iranian political machinery was

established on a twofold principle – religious and political legitimacy – which was embodied

by the late Ayatollah.181 From that time on, the state has incorporated and institutionalised the

power of the Ulama, the religious institution,182 accentuated by the all-powerful Guardian

Council, whose members are mostly selected by the Supreme Leader.183 To understand the

Islamic ideology advocated by the state, one must understand Khomeini’s concept of Vilayat-

e-Faqih, the doctrine stating that “The independent and just character of the Republic would

be protected through the leadership of a pious, just, courageous, capable and knowledgeable

jurist who would hold final, if not infallible authority in the political system”.184 This

approach is the foundation of Iran’s clerical rule, and hence the very fundament of Iranian

theocracy. As a country influenced and controlled by the religious establishment, the judicial

system of Iran is based on Shari’a law, which typifies the strict and orthodox religious nature

of the regime.185 As such, the judiciary sanctions amputations, flogging and stoning,

upholding to the Islamic penal code.186

The Islamic Revolution brought with it not only the revival of Shia Islam in Iran, but also a

region-wide Islamic revival, advocated by the Ayatollah. This, including revolutionary

advocacy, would be the driving force of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy.187 According to

Vali Nasr, the former senior advisor to the U.S. special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan,

Khomeini “made Islamic fundamentalism a political force that would change Muslim politics

from Morocco to Malaysia”.188 In foreign policy, religion is used as the mechanism to

enhance Iranian influence and power. Tehran unites groups and allies in the region by rallying

them to Shiism. As the theocratic republic sees itself as the protector of Shia Islam, it has

taken on the role of supporting, financing, and training Shiites in Arab countries, in the

revolutionary practice.189 Although Iran’s current President Hassan Rouhani seems a more

181 Roy (1999), p. 201. 182 Behrooz (2011), p. 71. 183 The United States Department of State (2007). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007, Volume I. Washington D.C., p. 1852. 184 Povey, Tara (2015). Social Movements in Egypt and Iran. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 75. 185 Schnorr, Michael (2005). Iran: Progenitor of the New Cold War. Bloomington: AuthorHouse, p. 75. 186 The United States Institute of Peace, the Iran Primer 2015, Ghamei, Hadi “The Islamic Judiciary” available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/islamic-judiciary August 2015, retrieved on 22/04/2016. 187 Amiri et al. (2011), p. 679. 188 Nasr, Vali (2006). The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 121. 189 The Economist 2015 “The long arm” available at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21640382-iran-doing-better-its-rivals-expanding-its-

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balanced and discrete leader than his predecessor, his prime aim in foreign policy remains the

same, namely the maximisation of Iranian influence in the Middle East – which has been the

essence of Iranian foreign policy since 1979.190 Ultimately, it is the Supreme Leader that has

the final say over foreign affairs, and this reflects the role of religion on Tehran’s foreign

policy.191 Although revolutionary fervour from the days of the revolution may be far-gone, the

essence of it remains; namely the advocacy for radical regime change in the Middle East, and

the installation of Iranian-styled theocracies.192 This point is partly were Saudi and GCC

states’ fear of Iran comes from. They dread this Iranian revolutionary dogma, because it

incites radical regime change that would see the Gulf monarchies loose power.

Saudi Arabia

The Middle East has a long tradition of using religious authority in the to effort to justify

policy decisions, and more importantly, to maintain the legitimacy of a specific regime.193

This is especially relevant for monarchical autocracies, such as the Gulf countries located on

the Arabian Peninsula. For the kingdoms on the peninsula, such justifications are notably

relevant, as this was the birthplace of Islam, which gives those regimes a geographical

rationalization for the regime-religion nexus. The country that predominantly epitomizes

regime legitimacy through religious justification is Saudi Arabia.194 Contrary from other Gulf

kingdoms, the House of Sa’ud did not establish the country’s religious institution, nor did it

inherit it – both elites, political and religious, cooperated in order to establish and ensure the

preservation of the state.195 Saudi Arabia is a deeply conservative and religious country, in

which Wahhabism is the predominant Islamic denomination. The term Wahhabism is named

after its founder, Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (1703-1792), and is a stern and puritanical

version of Sunni Islam. The goal of this ultraorthodox branch of Sunni Islam is to restore the

true Islam in the holy places of Mecca and Medina – a purification and revival of the 7 th

century version, advocated by the Prophet.196 Wahhabism advanced by Al-Wahhab, was,

influence-unstable 24/01/2015, retrieved on 22/04/2016.190 Shanahan, Rodger (2015) “Iranian foreign policy under Rouhani” Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sidney, p. 3. 191 Ibidem.192 Molavi, 2015. 193 Bank et al. (2013), p. 186. 194 Aarts & Roelants (2015), p. 15. 195 Alsaif (2013), p. 376. 196 Scruton, Roger (2007). The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 727-728.

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however, largely intolerant toward other branches of the religion, something, which is

reflected by looking at today’s extremely conservative Saudi state and society, or

Wahhabism’s grudge toward Shia Islam.

Although the early rulers of the House of Sa’ud supported the adherents of Wahhabism in the

18th century, the politico-religious alliance only materialized at the founding of the modern

kingdom in the early 20th century.197 In the 1930s, Ibn Sa’ud formally allied himself with the

Wahhabi Ulama, an event that would become the foundation for royal legitimacy in the

country, and one of the primary elements of regime survival. The union of the religious and

the political authorities is today the fundamental core of the Saudi state – the dogmatic

Wahhabi movement became mainstream because of it. The Ulama are the protectors of the

social and religious order, but have meanwhile relinquished all political power to the royal

family; this is the essence of the Wahhabi-Al Saud marriage.198 This alliance has since it was

struck, given the ruling elite the capability to transform political-regime fealty into religious

obligation and vice versa.199 This denotes the following – if a Saudi citizen is disloyal to the

policies set forth by the royal family, or is opposed to the royal family in any other way, it can

signify that he is also unfaithful to the Ulama’s policies. By way of explanation, if a citizen is

opposed to the House of Sa’ud, he is by default opposed to the legitimising source of the

regime, which is the Wahhabi establishment. As such, it becomes a combination of not only

political dissidence, but also of religious apostasy. In a country where Wahhabism is the sole

accepted state-recognised religion,200 opposition to the ruling authority can be synonymous

with capital punishment. This was recently observed with Ashraf Fayadh, the Palestinian poet

sentenced to death on apostasy charges, although the charges were later commuted to a

lengthy prison sentence.201 The more emblematic example was the execution of Nimr Baqir

al-Nimr last January. The politico-religious alliance is thus an authoritarian cycle that gives

the royal family the authority to oppress any regime dissidents with the blessing of the

powerful religious community. Because the Ulama possess free reins in matter of religious

jurisdiction, the religious establishment is influential in society. The highest-ranking religious

authority is the Majlis Hay’at Kibar al-Ulama, the Council of the Assembly of Senior

197 Crooke, Alastair (2015) “You Can’t Understand ISIS if You Don’t know the history of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia” New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1, Los Angeles, p. 60-61. 198 Al-Atawneh, Muhammad (2009) “Is Saudi Arabia a Theocracy? Religion and Governance in Contemporary Saudi Arabia” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5, Routledge, Abingdon, p. 721. 199 Alsaif (2013), p. 377. 200 Ibidem. 201 The Guardian 2016, Batty, David & Mahmood, Mona “Palestinian poet Ashraf Fayadh’s death sentence quashed by Saudi court” available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/02/palestinian-poet-ashraf-fayadhs-death-sentence-overturned-by-saudi-court 02/02/2016, retrieved on 25/04/2016.

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Scholars, which is the pinnacle of the religious establishment.202 It is directly in control of the

country’s religious institutions, and advises the royal family on matters of Islamic creed. As a

fervently religious nation, the Saudi state follows Islamic law – Shari’a is the only source of

political legitimacy as it serves as the kingdom’s constitution.203

Conclusively, just as the case is with Iran, religion and politics are firmly intertwined in Saudi

society.

When it comes to foreign policy, Saudi Arabia has usually been pragmatic and cautious. Since

2011, however, the country has drastically renewed its foreign policy agenda, in an effort at

containing the Arab uprisings, as seen in Bahrain.204 Since that time, Saudi foreign policy

intentions have been directed at thwarting Iran, and its growing foothold in the Middle East.

Like Iran, however, the kingdom’s foreign policy is dictated by the country’s religious

affiliation. The country has adopted a variety of characteristics to its foreign policy, ranging

from media usage, economic incentives, public diplomacy, realpolitik and Islamic

mobilisation.205 The latter incentive is firmly documented by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, stating: “Islam has been always the most important factor affecting the determination

of priorities of the Kingdom’s foreign policy”.206 Although the Saudi foreign policy agenda

may seem less radically endowed than that of its Iranian counterpart, it nonetheless adopts

religion as the primary basis of its diplomacy, which reflects the strong standing of Islam in

Saudi Arabia’s domestic political arena. Furthermore, Saudi foreign policy aims at advancing

the Wahhabi doctrine in the Muslim world and beyond. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does

indeed state that Saudi Arabia is “building mosques, and establishing Islamic civilized

centers”.207 In general, such places of worship indoctrinate its audience in the Wahhabi

doctrine, as a way of enhancing Saudi influence and spreading Wahhabism’s reactionary

message.208 In the Middle East, Saudi foreign policy is, by way of its support for Wahhbism,

202 Abir, Mordechai (1993). Saudi Arabia: Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 9-10. 203 Vogel, Frank E. (2012) “Shari’a in the Politics of Saudi Arabia” The Review of Faith & International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4, Institute for Global Engagement, Arlington, p. 18 and Aarts & Roelants (2015), p. 9 204 Ennis, Crystal A. & Momani, Bessma (2013) “Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi foreign policy strategies” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 6, Routledge, Abingdon p. 1130. 205 Idem, p. 1127. 206 Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016 “The foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” available at http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/KingdomForeignPolicy/Pages/ForeignPolicy24605.aspx 16/02/2016, retrieved on 25/04/2016. 207 Ibidem. 208 World Affairs 2015, Chosky, Carol E. & Chosky, Jamsheed K. “The Saudi Connection: Wahhabism and Global Jihad” available at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/saudi-connection-wahhabism-and-global-jihad May/June 2015, retrieved on 25/04/2016.

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spreading an ideology that directly fuels Sunni extremism. Such extremism is reverberated by

terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State. In its efforts to counter the advent of

Shiism promoted by Iran, Saudi Arabia is focusing its foreign policy on the sponsorship of

groups radically opposed to it, who adhere to extremism, and engage in terrorism as their

modus operandi. Wahhabism fused in Saudi foreign policy only serves at exacerbating current

Saudi-Iranian tensions, and fuels radicalism. Saudi sponsorship of Wahhabism further

increases the frigid Sunni-Shia divide in the region, of which vivid examples can bee seen

from Damascus to Sana’a.

Analysis

Having elucidated the stature of religion in Iranian and Saudi societies, it is apparent that

Islam is one of the most vital components of their respective domestic and foreign policy

agendas. In both states, religion bears significant magnitude on the community, the larger

population and especially the political apparatuses. Religion is dominating the political realm

to such an extent that the policies implemented are in alignment with religious inclinations,

whether it be from the Supreme Leader or the Council of the Assembly of Senior Scholars.

Another similarity that Tehran and Riyadh share when it comes to religious affiliation is the

way that Islam operates as the de facto guardian of the legitimacy of the regimes. For Iran,

religion was the source behind Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary vision, and he

implemented it as the raison d’être of the government. This is reflected in the power of the

Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is the Marja-e-Taghlid, the

undisputed religious hierarch. The Ayatollah has final say over executive, legislative, and

judiciary proceedings.209 In Saudi Arabia, the alliance between the religious establishment and

the ruling House of Sa’ud stands unbroken. The entire statehood of the country came to be

due to the close affiliations and cooperation between the Wahhabi order and the father of the

nation, King Ibn Sa’ud. The legitimising force behind the royal family’s uninterrupted hold on

power comes from the Ulama’s approbation, and the politico-religious pact struck between

these parties at the modern kingdom’s foundation. Lastly, Tehran and Riyadh adopt Islamic

values and attributes in their formulation of foreign policy. While one party advocates Shiism

and theocratic republicanism, the other sanctions an extreme version of Sunnism, serving to

protect the foundation of royal legitimacy. Both foreign policies provide for their respective

religious denominations to gain a larger swath of regional influence and are adapted to 209 Sadjapour 2015.

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counter one another. This is a catalyst for increased sectarianism, opposing the Shia and the

Sunni branches of Islam, which again escalates the animosity between the respective

denominations’ benefactors, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The religion variable is, however, one that contradicts itself. Although religion, i.e. Islam is a

common denominator between the regional giants, the religious creeds differ theologically

and historically, and have in later times become a source of furious contestation because of

geopolitical manifestations by opposing actors. Factually, Islam is indeed a similarity shared

by Iran and Saudi Arabia, but on the micro level, the denominations are radically used in

opposition to one another. As such, religion is also an elemental difference in the Saudi-

Iranian relationship. The respective denominations are adopted regionally in an effort to

reduce the political leverage enjoyed by the opposing side. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia

and Iran are enforcing the Shia-Sunni divide by employing tactics that strengthen their

specific creed, and diminish the contending one. It is an instigation of theological separation

used for respective Saudi and Iranian geopolitical gains. Although the ultimate confrontation

between the Saudis and the Iranians is for power, the ideological underpinning comes in the

form of historically rooted religious differences. The opposing political machineries in turn

hijack and employ these differences for their own benefit in order to maximise their grip not

only on domestic power, but also on influence and regional control. The respective

empowerment of Shiism and Sunnism, more precisely the puritanical Wahhabi version, is

setting the Middle East ablaze, and is the most far-reaching impetus for increasing hostility

between Riyadh and Tehran.

In his book, The Shia revival, Vali Nassr embodies the current religious divide found in the

Middle East, emphasised by the Saudi-Iranian rift: “The Shia-Sunni conflict is at once a

struggle for the soul of Islam – a great war of competing theologies and conceptions of sacred

history – and a manifestation of the kind of tribal wars of ethnicities and identities, so

seemingly archaic at times, yet so surprisingly vital, with which humanity has become wearily

familiar […] It is, paradoxically, a very old, very modern conflict”.210

As the first immaterial variable analysed in this thesis, the research above clearly shows that

religion in this framework plays several roles, most importantly, however, it is a variable from

domestic policy that is evidently put to use for achieving foreign policy endeavours for both

sides in the Saudi-Iranian cold war. Iran and Saudi Arabia both embrace the two branches of 210 Nasr (2006), p. 20.

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Islam they adhere to, as the pinnacle of their respective foreign policies. As research above

showed, the Tehran-regime has since the revolution empowered various groups, governments,

and connections using Shiism as their primary foreign policy device binding them together.

This is the way Iranian influence is preserved and expanded. On the other hand, the Saudis

emphasize their branch of Sunni Islam as the apex of their foreign policy choices, as seen

through statements taken from the Saudi ministry of foreign affairs. As described in the

theoretical framework earlier, neoclassical realism stands by a domestic and systemic

approach to foreign policy, and for them “Domestic politics has a crucial influence on foreign

policy”.211 As an immaterial variable grounded in domestic politics, religion plays a critical

part in determining the foreign policy choices of the Saudi and Iranian governments, which

the above analysis has shown. Using neoclassical goggles, the findings overhead are then

appropriate, and accommodate to the theory because a domestic-level variable performs a

central role in explaining the two country’s foreign policy choices. Religion, in this case

Islam, is an intervening variable that contributes to power politics and thus the animosity and

rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

5.4 Conclusion to chapter V

The first point that is drawn from the above comparison between Saudi Arabia and Iran is that

similarities between the two do not lead to agreement or diplomatic neutrality. On the

contrary, similarities shared by both nations do in fact increase the hostility in the

relationship.

Support for different proxy groups is a foreign policy alternative that has befallen both Iran

and Saudi Arabia for several decades. The Islamic Republic has, ever since 1979, taken on the

role as the benefactor, and guardian of Shiism.212 The adoption of Shiite proxies in a foreign

policy has had the dual purpose of spreading Iranian and Shiite influence, and gaining a

political or strategic foothold in the region.213 Saudi Arabia, in the dual goal of countering

Iranian-Shiite influence and spreading its own, has supported proxy groups affiliated to a

puritanical and reactionary version of Sunni Islam. As the opposing proxies adhere to

radically different ideologies, just as their country-benefactors, it leads to a schism in both

211 Zakaria (1992), p. 198.212 Terrill (2011), p. 3. 213 Naylor, 2015.

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religious creed and political outlook – due to parties taking sides between Iran and Saudi

Arabia – that is rupturing the Middle East. In turn, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s animosity toward

one another increases dramatically, as the proxies doing their bidding are engaged in warring

activities against the opposing states.

As part of non-conventional military spending, nuclear weapons, or the lack of these, was

presented as a similarity between the aforementioned states. This sub-chapter conclusively

presented the importance nuclear weapons could have if any of the parties were to acquire

them. It would not only upset the relative balance between the states, but it would also

severely enhance the threat level, and as such increase the chances of war. The reason, it was

argued, for the fact that a nuclear armed Tehran and, or Riyadh would not lead to balancing is

due to underlying ideological, religious, and domestic differences that separate the countries.

The last similarity discussed in light of the increasing levels of hostility was religion. As one

of the most significant variable of this thesis, religion could be analysed in two ways; as a

similarity because of the dual Saudi-Iranian adherence to Islam, or as a difference, due to the

contrasting religious denominations – Sunni and Shia Islam – characterising the respective

countries’ belief systems. In summary, although the countries both adhere to Islam and the

religion is the linchpin of domestic and foreign policy, the religious differences are usurped

by both regimes at an effort to enhance their influence, and legitimize their respective

regimes. As a consequence, religious differences – so deeply rooted to the affairs of the states

– become a tool for geopolitical achievements, while all the while promoting the Sunni-Shia

divide region wide.

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Chapter VI. Comparative analysis – Differences

Having presented and analysed the similarities between the two countries above, focusing on

the differences is the second step of the comparison. As will be processed, there are more

differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran than there are similarities. This, however, should

not come as any surprise, due to the fact that both nations are rivals opposing each other on a

variety of issues.

6.1 Military spending.

Having presented military spending as an outcome of neoclassical realism, and having

operationalized it in the methodological chapter, we can compare this variable for Saudi

Arabia and Iran respectively.

Saudi Arabia

In 2015, the overall world military expenditure increased by one per cent compared to 2014.

Unsurprisingly, the United States and China were still the two dominant spenders on military

armaments on the globe. What came as a surprise, however, was that the country that came in

third spot was Saudi Arabia. The kingdom’s military expenditures rose by 5,7% alone in

2015, amounting to a staggering $87,2 billion spent on various hardware and weaponry.214

It comes as no surprise that two of the world’s superpowers are the leading spenders on

military material, but that a country of just over 30 million people, namely Saudi Arabia, was

the third largest military spender last year is astounding. Although Saudi Arabia does have the

economic capacity for such purchases, the falling oil prices have impaired the Saudi

government’s flow of revenue, but the monarchy still focused on strengthening its armed

forces. The Saudi military intervention in Yemen in 2015 against the Houthi rebels is an

important index as to why the kingdom chose to further its military spending that year.

Nevertheless, for such a small country, with such a moderately small population being the

third largest military spender on the planet seems unnecessary from an outsider’s point of 214 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016 “5 April 2016: World military spending resumes upward course, says SIPRI” available at http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2016/milex-apr-2016 5/04/2016, retrieved on 06/04/2016.

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view. The Saudi led intervention in neighbouring Yemen, however, is part of a more potent

cold war with Iran. The monarchy has long believed that the Islamic Republic is giving aid,

financial and military, to the Shia rebels fighting for control over the impoverished country.215

In this context, the Saudis thus increased their spending to acquire the best equipment on the

market, in order to oust the Houthis from Sana’a, as they see them as a threat influenced by

Tehran on the Arabian Peninsula. From 2011 to 2014, Saudi military spending has steadily

risen year by year. As explained earlier, 2011 was the year of the Arab uprisings, and more

relevantly for this thesis, the Bahraini uprisings, and the Saudi led intervention that took

place. The reasons for augmented Saudi military spending can then be justified through their

intervention, and the fears of upheaval spreading to the Saudi homeland. The overall trend of

increased military spending by Riyadh is a definitive sign that some form of conflict is on the

horizon, or at least that conflict-preparedness is high on the Saudi foreign policy agenda.

Due to a huge defence budget, encompassing around 25% of the country’s GDP,216 and until

2015, an ever rising military expenditure, the Saudi armed forces are well equipped and

technologically sophisticated which reflects the country’s relative power capabilities in terms

of military force. As long as Saudi Arabia focuses on expanding and modernising its armed

forces, Iran will surely take parallel steps as a way of balancing the threat of Saudi Arabia’s

growing military.

215 BBC 2015 “Yemen crisis: Who is fighting whom?” available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423 26/03/2015, retrieved on 06/04/2016. 216 Business Insider 2015, Moshinsky, Ben “Saudi Arabia spend 25% of its budget on its military – here’s what it has for the money” available at http://uk.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-spends-25-of-its-budget-on-its-military-2015-12 31/12/2015, retrieved on 06/04/2016.

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Figure 1. Saudi Arabian military expenditures 2011-2014. Source: World Bank 2016.

Iran

Iran’s military spending, on the contrary of Saudi Arabia’ s exponential growth in this

particular domain, has remained inflexible and stagnant during the last few years. Iran, which

has been under close scrutiny from the international community, the International Atomic

Energy Agency and the United Nations Security Council since the early 2000s has struggled

to import and purchase weaponry from abroad. This was due to the UNSC arms embargo

imposed on Iran, thorough several phases from 2006 to 2010.217 After the nuclear agreement

was reached last summer with Iran, economic sanctions were lifted. The conventional arms

embargo, however, remains in place for the time being, which is splitting the United Nations

217 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2016 “UN arms embargo on Iran” available at http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/iran 20/01/2016, retrieved on 06/04/2016.

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Security Council.218 In general terms, Iran has struggled with importing state of the art

weaponry, unlike its counterpart, Saudi Arabia. For several reasons, there is a lack of

available data when it comes to military spending for several Persian Gulf countries,

including Iran. The Islamic Republic’s military spending in 2015 thus varies according to

sources. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute puts Iranian military spending

in 2015 at around $10.3 billion.219 In his defence of the nuclear deal struck with Iran,

President Barack Obama announced in an interview with the New York Times last April that

Iran’s military budget for 2015 amounted to roughly $30 billion.220 Taking the mean of these

two numbers averages Iran’s military spending in 2015 to roughly $20 billion. Although this

is only an estimate, we can presume that Iran’s spending does not largely surpass the number

given by Obama, because of the many sanctions impressed upon Iran during the last ten years.

If $20 billion is the estimate, however, there are certainties to be drawn, in the comparison

with Saudi military spending.

218 Foreign Policy 2015, Parsi, Trita & Cullis, Tyler “The Myth of the Iranian Military Giant” available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/the-myth-of-the-iranian-military-giant/ 10/07/2015, retrieved on 06/04/2016. 219 SIPRI Fact Sheet 2016, Freeman, Sam P., Fleurant, Aude, Wezeman, Pieter & Wezeman, Siemon “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2015 ” available at http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf April 2016, retrieved on 12/04/2016. 220 The New York Times 2015, Friedman, Thomas L. “Iran and the Obama Doctrine” available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/opinion/thomas-friedman-the-obama-doctrine-and-iran-interview.html 05/04/2015, retrieved on 06/04/2016.

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Figure 2. Iranian military expenditure 2011-2012. Source: World Bank 2016

Analysis

For 2015, Saudi Arabia used $87.2 billion on military spending, while Iran used somewhere

between $10.3 and $30 billion. Mathematically speaking, Iran then used four to five times less

than its Saudi neighbour that given year. Conclusively, last year alone, Saudi Arabia

surpassed Iran’s military budget excessively. In order to understand the trend in Saudi and

Iranian military spending, and to understand if there is a pattern, we need to look at spending

during the last five years.

In 2011 and 2012, data for Iranian military spending is available, and its amounts respectively

to 2.4 and 2.2 per cent of Iranian GDP per year. From 2013 hitherto, data is unavailable. For

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the same two years, Saudi military spending amounted to 7.2 and 7.7 per cent respectively.

Indeed, by looking at the available statistical data, we notice a pattern, while Iranian spending

has remained stagnant in the period 2011-2012, Saudi spending increased. More importantly,

however, Saudi military expenditure as a percentage of their GDP was higher than Iranian

spending, the reasons for which have been explained above.

While Iran’s military expenditure has remained hampered by sanctions throughout the last

few years, Saudi Arabia has until now augmented its military budget year after year. It is a

worrying trend, which may set off alarm bells in Tehran. More importantly, these trends come

to prove Riyadh’s growing fears of the Iranian regime, and their growing involvement in

regional affairs, such as Yemen and Bahrain.

Meanwhile, because economic sanctions have been lifted, Iran has gained more room to

manoeuvre when it comes using otherwise frozen oil revenues held abroad, which can be used

to increase military spending. This will act as a deterrent to Iran’s rivals, such as Sunni

militant groups, Israel, and especially Saudi Arabia.221 Nonetheless, Iranian military spending,

their overall defence budget, and their weaponry lag far behind that of Saudi Arabia, and other

GCC states.

For neoclassical realists, explaining foreign policy choices and the behaviour of states is

crucial. Firstly, as foreign policy is driven by a country’s placement in the international

system and its material power capabilities, it is only logical to see Iran and especially Saudi

Arabia spend big on their militaries, as rational actors. Rational actors see power as a

necessity for survival, and knowing that a strong military is the prolonged arm of power, the

authorities invest in their militaries for the preservation and the lasting continuity of the state.

As such, they adhere to the realist side of neoclassical realism.222

Secondly, the decision makers’ perception of power, and what they bring to the definition of

power is also essential for this theory.223 For Gideon Rose, “Foreign policy choices are made

by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that

matter not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being”.224 Having

knowledge of how Saudi authorities and elites perceive Iran, taken from the Saudi Cables

221 Reuters 2014 “Iran to hike military spending despite lower oil prices, sanctions” available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-economy-idUSKBN0JL0H320141207 07/12/2014, retrieved on 12/04/2016. 222 Rose (1998), p. 146.223 Schmidt, Brian C. (2005) “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, Millennium Publishing House, London, p. 544.224 Rose (1998), p. 147.

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released by Wikileaks,225 it gives credence to the theory, and to research. The Saudi policy

makers who are in charge of foreign policy decisions increase military spending because they

fear a resurgent Iran, and the region-wide resurgence of Shiism, advocated by the Clerical

regime. As the research above has shown, for the Saudi decision makers, power is

synonymous with military spending. That is the reason the Saudi state uses disproportionate

amounts of its GDP on the military, as a means of deterrence.

According to the same results, Saudi Arabia – because they have the means to do so, and

because their leaders perceive military spending as a power- mechanism to deter Iran – spend

in order to safeguard the state.

Figure 3. Saudi and Iranian military expenditures 2011-2014 compared. Source: World Bank 2016.

225 Wikileaks 2015.

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6.2 Ethnic nationalism

Much of the current antagonism between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be traced back to the

underlying ethnic rivalry present in both societies. It is a duel that opposes the Persian to the

Arab peoples. On both sides of the Gulf, memoirs of respective anti-Arab and Anti-Persian

sentiment still stand strong amongst both everyday citizens and policymakers. Such sentiment

is still fervently called upon when issues and conflict arises between the two. The Arab-

Persian rivalry is not a contemporary phenomenon, on the contrary, this matter is of an

historic nature, and has lasted for many centuries. It is only in recent times that is has become

a source of growing controversy, which has made it part of the present-day power struggle

between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Iran

For Iran, the legacy of its past history, centred on pre-Islamic Persia, is still of vast importance

when it comes to describing the greatness of Persian culture, language and superiority.

Memories of celebrated Kings of old such as Cyrus the Great, Darius I or Xerxes are a source

of pride for most Iranians, who recognise the tremendous impact the Persian Empire once

swayed on the known world. This historical attachment, along with a sense of haughtiness,

serves to increase a notion of Persian self-pride, which on the negative side, increases ethnic

nationalism and resentment of the Arab neighbours to the South.226

When interviewed by Al Arabiya, Sadek Zibakalam, a high ranking professor at the

University of Tehran, openly spoke of Persian-Arab racism and the roots of it: “Whenever

Iran issues any fiery statement about our neighbors in the U.A.E, Qatar, or Kuwait, you can

easily detect that they revolve around a belief that Persians are superior. Listen to our foreign

minister, parliament speaker, or even mosque imams, and you will notice that derogatory tone

they use and which focuses on the racial and not the political superiority of Persians”.227

The professor further added that this form of ethnic hatred is historically rooted, and not

solely a product of the regional conflict currently unfolding, associating it to the Persian

defeat at the Battle of Al-Qadisiyyah in 636 AD and the subsequent Arab-Islamic conquest of

226 Foreign Policy 2010, Limbert, John “Why can’t Arabs and Iranians just get along?” available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/01/why-cant-arabs-and-iranians-just-get-along-2/ 01/12/2010, retrieved on 12/04/2016. 227 Al-Zahed, 2011.

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Persia.228 It was after this decisive battle, that the last Sassanid emperor, Yazdgird III, in a

letter to Umar Ibn Al-Khatab, the leader of the invading Arab armies, among other stated:

“While we laid the foundations of philanthropy and righteousness and kindness in this world

and held high the sign of Good Thoughts, Good Words and Good Deeds, you and your

ancestors were desert wanderers who ate snakes and lizards and buried your innocent

daughters alive (…) You, who have spent all your days in brutality and barbarity have now

come out of your desolate deserts resolved to reach, by the blade and by conquest, the

worship of God to a people who have for thousands of years been civilized and have relied on

culture and knowledge and art as mighty supports”.229

Historic evidence as presented above, was the inauguration of Persian-Arab prejudice. Not

only did the emperor slander and defame the Arab invaders by uttering such words, he also

pointed to the superiority of the Persians over the Arabs in terms of culture, language, and

civilization. These racial insults are still, today, reverberated by Iranians against Arabs.

As the Saudi-Iranian relationship grows ever colder, the Persian animosity toward Arabs is

translated from an historic phenomenon into a political and religious affair. Persian Anti-Arab

sentiment is taking on the form of anti-Sunni views. Reciprocally, Iranian antagonism toward

Sunnis stems from their antipathy toward Arabs.230 Persian ethnic nationalism, which

emphasises the country’s cultural, linguistic, and religious distinction from the Arab World,

incites a feeling of superiority231 that encourages the schism between the two ethnic groups,

and between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the larger scale. Persian prejudice toward Arabs thus

firstly stems from an historic narrative, and secondly from a politico-religious source.

Conveniently, the historic antipathy toward Arabs, which resonates in many Iranians, has

been transformed into a religious, and thus a political appliance, that serves to fuel the

animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia

Although Persian antagonism toward Arabs may be fervent, so is Arab antagonism directed

toward Iranians. Many Arabs believe that before the Arab-Islamic invasion of Persia, Persians

228 Ibidem. 229 Media with Conscience News 2015, Khan, Nasir ”Arab Conquest of Persia” available at http://mwcnews.net/focus/analysis/53672-arab-conquest-of-persia.html 19/08/2015, retrieved on 12/04/2016. 230 Al-Zahed, 2011. 231 Rubin, Barry (2006) “Iran: the Rise of a Regional Power” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 3, Herzliya, p. 142-143.

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were non-believers and pagans, and that it was the Arab that brought them the enlightenment

of Islam.232 A contemporary example of Arab superiority can take on symbolic forms, such as

when Arab nationalists refuse the description of “ the Persian Gulf ” and rather call that body

of water “the Arab Gulf ”.233 Symbolism aside, however, Arabs believe themselves to be have

ethnic supremacy, literally meaning they believe Arabs are ethnically superior to Persians.234

Anti-Persian rhetoric runs through the higher echelons of Saudi policy making. In October

2015, Saudi foreign minister Adel Al-Jubeir said that Iran was “an occupier of Arab lands in

Syria” due to Iran’s affiliations with the Bashar al-Assad’s regime.235 The fact that the foreign

minister highlighted Arab lands only serves to confirm that there is an ethnic underpinning

present between the Saudi Arabians and Iranians of Persian descent. Furthermore, this

statement highlights how politicians are using ethnicity as a political tool in an effort to

encourage ethnic divide. A few months prior, the Saudi state run TV-channel al-Ekhbariya

aired a documentary calling for the liberation of Ahwaz, a region in Western Iran with a large

proportion of Arabic speaking citizens.236 Yet another example of Arab rhetorical attacks

directed toward Iran.

Analysis

As described above, there are both soft and more bigoted attacks directed toward each other’s

ethnicities from both Arabs and Persians, which reflects the flourishing animosity in the

Saudi-Iranian relationship. In this context, ethnic hatred and propaganda is a convenient but

dangerous tool that can rapidly enflame an already frigid divide. Ethnic nationalism is thus

one of several characteristics that confirm that mutual ignorance on such an issue only

generates hostility. Deep rooted notions of ethnic superiority between individuals is not a

contemporary phenomenon, but the fact that it is being usurped by policy makers and the

leaders of the respective countries can transform it from shallow historic resentment into a

232 Limbert, 2010. 233 Rubin (2006), p. 143. 234 Parsi, Trita (2007). Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the U.S. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 42. 235 Reuters 2015 “Saudi says difficult to see role for Iran in Syria peacemaking” available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-saudi-idUSKCN0SD1SG20151019 19/10/2015, retrieved on 12/04/2016. 236 The Guardian 2015, Black, Ian “Iran and Saudi Arabia ramp up hostile rhetoric to new levels” available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/on-the-middle-east/2015/oct/23/iran-and-saudi-arabia-ramp-up-hostile-rhetoric-to-new-levels 23/10/2015, retrieved on 12/04/2016.

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catalyst for future military conflict – especially considering the fact that wars have been

started for a great deal less.

Ethnic nationalism, or nationalism in general, is a nonmaterial variable that affects the

relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran. According to the above analysis and the research

results, this historically rooted prejudice between Persian and Arab can be traced back to

neoclassical realism. This is because it is a domestic determinant that is used in the

formulation of foreign policy. In politics, states often depend on their ability to inspire their

populations in order to get it behind certain policy choices. Nationalism, or in this case, ethnic

nationalism is such a tool. Popular mobilization for a cause can be rooted to collective identity

– such as ethnicity – particularly when mobilization is opposed negatively to an adversary.237

As such, it stands by neoclassical realism, which takes a keen interest in different forms of

nationalism.238 It is the behaviour of the policy-makers vis a vis their historic adversaries, that

has helped form the enmity between the modern-day countries and their populations.

Because ethnic nationalism is a domestic-level variable, which is being adopted by Saudi and

Iranian authorities to form a collective negative image of each other, and is embraced as a

means to their foreign policies, the research can then legitimately conclude that ethnic

nationalism used in such a manner complies with neoclassical realism. Ethnic nationalism in

the framework of the Saudi-Iranian contest thus influences the foreign policy of the states

albeit it is grounded in the domestic arena.

6.3 Alliances to foreign powers

One of the more geopolitically oriented variables of this thesis - alliances - bears an

explanatory function for the research question proposed. Having a foreign powerful trustee

gives a respective state the space to politically manoeuvre, gain leverage and influence, which

it otherwise may have not had the chance to accumulate if not for the powerful ally. Henry

Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford

administrations, defined alliances as the following: “Formal instruments that insulate the

common interest, to the extent possible, from extraneous circumstances or domestic

pressures. They create an additional obligation to calculations of national interest. They also

237 Rathbun (2008), p. 303. 238 Ibidem.

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provide a legal obligation to justify common defense, which can be appealed to in a crisis.

Finally, alliances reduce – to the extent that they are seriously pursued – the danger of

miscalculation by the potential adversary and thereby inject an element of calculability into

the conduct of foreign policy”.239

Prior to 1979, the Saudi and Iranian monarchies were both, other than Israel, the United States

most faithful allies in the Middle East. The Islamic Revolution, and the subsequent toppling

of the Shah, altered that situation. From that point on, the United States went from being a

close ally, to a sworn enemy of Iran. Khomeini’s denunciation of the United States by the

Koranic moniker “The Great Satan”240 stemmed from the Pahlavi-U.S. alliance, to which he

was fervently opposed, and the Ayatollah’s wish to cast out American influence from Iran for

good.241 Meanwhile, the Saudis, watching the situation in Iran unfold with dread, grew ever

closer to the United States. The House of Sa’ud, worried of revolutionary sentiment spreading

to its own lands, sought to enhance its American alliance in order to assure the survival of its

regime.

Saudi Arabia

The U.S.-Saudi alliance took root during the 1930s, when Ibn Sa’ud welcomed American

enterprises to search for oil. In return, the United States became the unofficial protector of the

still fragile House of Sa’ud by deploying troops and installing military bases in the country.242

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the alliance materialized from a strategic point of

view, due to the Cold War. The profoundly religious Saudi state viewed Soviet interference in

the Middle East as a threat, because of the scare of communism; hence they believed a

strategic alliance to the American superpower, opposed to the Soviet Union, would be

beneficial for the kingdom, in an effort to terminate Soviet influence in the region.243 The

Saudi-American alliance was not purely a political one, but also related to petroleum, giving

239 Kissinger, Henry (2012). On China. New York, NY: Penguin Books, p. 363. 240 Milani, Abbas (2009). The Great Satan Myth. Washington: The New Republic, p. 26. 241 Wade, Nicholas (1979) “Iran and America: The Failure of Understanding” Science, New Series, Vol. 206, No. 4424, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, p. 1281 And Okruhlik, Gwenn (2003) “Saudi Arabian-Iranian Relations: External Rapprochement and Internal Consolidation” Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2, Washington, p. 116. 242 Foreign Affairs 2009, Ottaway, David “The King and Us: U.S.-Saudi relations in the wake of 9/11” available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2009-05-01/king-and-us May/June 2009, retrieved on 29/04/2016. 243 Miglietta, John P. (2002). American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, p. 199-202.

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the alliance a strategic economic angle. The Saudi petroleum industry was a critical

benefactor to the strong ties between the two nations. Oil has been the backbone of the Saudi-

American alliance, and has provided the U.S. market with inexpensive Saudi oil since the end

of World War II.244 For the House of Sa’ud, the American alliance has been one of the main

reasons for the long-ensured stability of the regime, and has safeguarded the sovereignty of

the Saudi state. From the 1950s to the 1970s, during the peak of Arab Nationalism, the advent

of regional republicanism and Arab socialism, monarchical regimes were toppled and

replaced throughout the Middle East. This turbulent period threatened the ruling foundation

and the power of the Saudi monarchy. Due to American military support, however, Saudi

Arabia was left untouched by Nasserite and Ba’athist interference or intrusion, as American

power acted as a buffer against it. The alliance then reduced the risk of miscalculation by

Saudi adversaries, which stopped them from entering into an eventual conflict with the

American-backed kingdom. As times have changed, however, the once healthy alliance has

taken a turn for the worse. Firstly, The recent discovery of large quantities of shale oil has

revolutionised the American energy sector and made it far less dependent on importing

foreign oil,245 the main American incentive behind the alliance. Secondly, the recently re-

emerged documentation about the Saudi government financing and supporting the 9/11

hijackers, which is soon to be released by the Obama administration, will in all probability

destroy the close relationship between the two parties.246 As things stand, the alliance is less

stable than its used to be, which brings up the following question; would the U.S. still lend

military support to Saudi Arabia if Iran were to potentially go to war with the kingdom? The

United States, which has warmed up to Tehran because of the nuclear deal struck in 2015,

would in all likeliness absent itself from such a conflict.

Based on speculation, there are three likely scenarios that could unfold. The first would be

that the Americans honoured their commitment, and actively contributed to the Saudi war

effort by deploying troops in their aid. This seems unlikely to happen, however, as the U.S.

government is already fighting the Islamic State, and more importantly, is uninterested in

getting entangled in another Middle Eastern theatre after its experiences in Iraq and

244 Ottaway 2009. 245 Financial Times 2015, Crooks, Ed “The US shale revolution” available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/2ded7416-e930-11e4-a71a-00144feab7de.html#slide0 24/04/2015, retrieved on 30/04/2016. 246 The New York Post 2016 “Obama may finally reveal secret Saudi connection to 9/11” available at http://nypost.com/2016/04/24/obama-may-finally-reveal-secret-saudi-connection-to-911/ 24/04/2016, retrieved on 30/04/2016.

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Afghanistan.247 The second option would be that the Americans would imperfectly support

their ally, by sending logistical support, but not deploying troops, other than small contingents

of Special Forces. This would be a half-hearted attempt at honouring the defence agreement

once struck with the Saudi monarchy, but it would mean not deploying conventional armed

forces on the ground. The third option is perhaps the one that seems the most relevant as

things stand; The U.S. may condemn the aggressing party, but rather than taking up arms in

defence of the monarchy, it would prefer to act as a mediator to reduce tensions and find a

diplomatic solution to an eventual conflict.

The reason for the probability of the latter option is rooted in the domestic compartment of

American politics. The United States, although abiding to the neorealist handbook for

decades, have since they pulled of Iraq, preferred to – if not absolutely necessary – not to get

embroiled in new Middle Eastern conflicts that involves putting America lives at risk or boots

on the ground. In fact, the domestic pressure from the political and civilian arenas in the U.S.

would not allow for a new American intervention or conflict in the Middle East, something

echoed by President Obama in an interview with the Atlantic Magazine in 2015.248 Due to the

fact that it is domestic pressures that would deter the American President from re-entering a

new conflict in that region, this speculative option is based on neoclassical realism, in which

domestic politics take part in forming state behaviour and foreign policy decisions.249 As such,

because of the American domestic political arena, it is unlikely that the U.S. would in fact

support Saudi Arabia in a war with Iran.

Although these are probabilities, it is impossible to tell for certain what an eventual American

response would be if an Iranian-Saudi war did take place. What can be drawn from these

speculative alternatives is that any sort of aggressive or pro-Saudi American involvement in

such a crisis, because of their linkages to Saudi Arabia, would inflame Iranian tensions

towards the United States. The very fact that the existing alliance between Saudi Arabia and

the U.S. is still, on paper, active, would increase Iran’s hatred against Saudi Arabia, because

of their alliance to the U.S.

247 Foreign Policy 2016, Walt, Stephen M. “The United States Should Admit It No Longer Has a Middle East Policy” available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/29/the-u-s-should-admit-it-has-no-middle-east-policy-obama-cold-war-israel-syria/ 29/01/2016, retrieved on 30/04/2016. 248 The Atlantic 2015, Goldberg, Jeffrey “Look…It’s My Name on This: Obama Defends the Iranian Nuclear Deal” available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/obama-interview-iran-isis-israel/393782/ 21/05/2015, retrieved on 2/05/2016.249 Foulon (2015), p 635-636.

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In theory, the Saudi-American alliance is detrimental to Iran’s power and influence, because

although their relationship seems jolted, it is still a powerful appliance for Saudi foreign

policy, and until broken, it will serve at deterring Iran. The strength of the alliance was echoed

by Adel Al-Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister, in an interview with the Washington post last

year: “When push comes to shove, this relationship is unshakable”.250 In the aftermath of the

very recent allegations of Saudi government-involvement with the 9/11 perpetrators, White

House officials told the press that the President “Cleared the air” with King Salman on an

official meeting in Riyadh.251 If the official proclamations by Saudi and U.S. executives

reaffirm the dual commitment to the alliance, it is a sign that for the time being, Iran ought not

to provoke any of the mentioned parties. Iran is a more rational actor than what its ideological

premise set it out to be, in the aftermath of the revolution. As such, the American alliance to

the kingdom still holds dissuasive power over Iran, who may not be willing to risk a conflict

with the Saudis, in fear of American support. This is where the element of calculability set

forth by Kissinger comes into play; American power serves at minimising Iranian diplomatic

missteps against the kingdom that could lead to an eventual conflict.

Iran

Contradictory to Saudi Arabia, Iran is not allied to a strong global power such as the United

States. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has struggled to re-integrate itself into the

community of nations due to its anti-western revolutionary dogma and its support for Shiite

terrorist groups.252 The very fact that the Islamic Revolution advocated anti-Americanism253

contributed to the extensive rupture between Tehran, Washington, and to an extent, most U.S.

allies. During the time of the Shah, however, Iran was considered extremely close to

Washington. As with their Saudi colleague, Iran stood dear to policy makers in the United

States, in part due to the Cold War, and the context of Soviet regional intrusion.254 The

250 The Washington Post 2015, DeYoung, Karen “Officials: Saudi led action relied on U.S. intelligence” available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/officials-saudi-led-action-in-yemen-relied-heavily-on-us-intelligence/2015/03/26/6d15302c-d3da-11e4-8fce-3941fc548f1c_story.html 26/03/2015, retrieved on 02/05/2016. 251 CNN 2016, Gaouette, Nicole, Liptak, Kevin, Kosinski, Michelle & Robertson, Nic “White House: Obama ’ cleared the air’ with Saudi Arabia” available at http://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/20/politics/obama-saudi-arabia-tensions/ 21/04/2016, retrieved on 02/05/2016. 252 Cole, Juan (2005). Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam. London: I.B. Tauris & Co, p. 173-174. 253 Wise, Krysta (2011) “Islamic Revolution of 1979: the Downfall of American-Iranian Relations” Legacy, Vol. 11, No. 1, Article 2, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, p. 1. 254 Miglietta (2002), p. 93-94.

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American-Iranian alliance was strategically significant for the wider regional dynamics in the

larger Middle East. In Mohammad Reza Shah, America had a trustworthy ally, who had the

power and weaponry – purchased in excessive quantities from the U.S. – to act as regional

policeman against anti-U.S. influence.255 The extravagant amount of arms purchased from

their U.S. ally transformed the Iranian armed forces into the world’s fifth most advanced in

technological terms.256 This blank check policy introduced by the Americans became the

backbone of the alliance – the permission for the Shah to purchase any weapons he desired,

short of nuclear arms, from the United States.257 The strength and constancy of the alliance

made Jimmy Carter, former U.S. President, proclaim the following statement in a speech

directed to the Shah in January 1978: “Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an

island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world”.258 A year later, the Shah

had fled Iran, and slogans such as “Marg bar Amrikâ”,259 meaning Death to America,

exemplified the downfall of the alliance, and the new regime’s anti-American rhetoric. The

close affiliations between the Shah and The U.S. had a detrimental effect for the Shah’s

popularity. A considerable section of the Iranian public condemned the Shah as a puppet of

the United Stats because of the extensive power Washington enjoyed over the Iranian

government.260 It was the Western-American influence inside Iran that acted as one of the

instigators to the revolution, and the legacy of anti-Americanism in the country.

Analysis

Although Iran has enjoyed some diplomatic affinities with other nations since the revolution,

none of these have been to a superpower, nor have they been as entrenched as the Saudi-

American alliance. The fact that Iran does not maintain the guardianship of a powerful outside

trustee is a disadvantage to its foreign policy. Firstly, Tehran does not have the ability to

acquire state of the art weaponry through a modern and well-equipped ally, unlike pre-

revolutionary times, when they did purchase a great deal due to their American connection.261

255 McGlinchey, Stephen (2013) “Richard Nixon’s Road to Tehran: the Making of the U.S.-Iran Arms Agreement of May 1972” Diplomatic History, Vol. 0, No. 0, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 3. 256 Juneau, Thomas (2015). Squandered opportunity, Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press p. 82. 257 McGlincey (2013), p. 1. 258 Clawson, Patrick & Rubin, Michael (2005). Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan p. 87. 259 Bromberger, Christian (2013). Un autre Iran: Un ethnologue au Gilân. Paris: Armand Colin, p. 18. 260 Wise (2011), p. 1. 261 McGlincey (2013), p. 1.

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The following reason being the aforementioned arms embargo on the country that is still in

effect. Secondly, in foreign policy, Iran does not have the same coercive diplomatic

capabilities as the Saudis possess. Because of American support, Saudi Arabia does in theory

retain more diplomatic leverage in international affairs than Iran. Lastly, the absence of a

powerful ally leaves Iran vulnerable in terms of deterrence capabilities – the lack of a strong

military supporter in case of conflict. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, can at least hope for

some form of military support if they were ever to instigate, or be victim of an attack. The

reason the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United States displeases Iran is due the fact

that, firstly, Iran is an ideological opponent of both Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Secondly, the very factor that Saudi Arabia has a powerful ally, who is also opposed to the

Iranian regime, only exacerbates Iranian sentiments of displeasure towards the mentioned

Saudi ally. Lastly, because Iranian levels of distrust and animosity toward the oil rich

kingdom are significant, those feelings are translated toward the United States, because of

their close relationship to an Iranian ideological enemy.262 In order to illustrate this, an historic

narrative can be adopted. When the Empire of Japan attacked Pearl Harbour in 1941, Japan

became a wartime enemy of the United States. As the Japanese government was allied to

Nazi-Germany, they too became, because of their Japanese alliance, a wartime enemy of

America. One country’s resentment of another can effortlessly generate equally to an ally of

the adversary state.

These are the reasons why an alliance to a foreign power, which is the case with Saudi Arabia,

has a detrimental effect on the current Saudi-Iranian relationship, and leads to a higher level

of enmity between the regional competitors. At this time, because of the American-Iranian

rapprochement in light of the nuclear deal struck last summer, and America’s recently

strained relations to the kingdom, it seems Tehran has replaced America as the Great Satan

with Saudi Arabia.

The results from the research on alliances above proposed that firstly, Saudi Arabia’s relative

power capabilities, international leverage, and diplomatic vigour is more potent than what

Iran enjoys, due to the Saudi’s alliance to the United States. In international affairs, alliances

are the dominant channels through which states expand and increase their security,263 a foreign

policy philosophy Saudi Arabia adheres to. As a variable rooted in the international scene,

and not the domestic one, alliances are part of the systemic-oriented neoclassical realist

262 Okruhlik (2003), p. 116.263 Reiter (1994), p. 490.

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perspective. An Alliance, such as the Saudi-American one, is clear proof that the notion of

increased power and survival, through allies, is something Saudi authorities have long stood

by, a research-result that complies to the mentioned theory.

For neoclassical realists, threat perceptions – which can be behind a country’s choice of

allying with another – is combined of two notions; a country’s relative material power shapes

threat perception, but threat perception is also formed by the behaviour of authorities and

elites.264 Saudi Arabia’s alliance to the U.S. conforms to both of these approaches. For the

latter, an example can be given. As the onset of Arab Socialism and Ba’athism was unfolding

in the 1950 and 1960s, the Saudi authorities looked at the unfolding revolutions across the

Arab world with dismay. The leaders of the state perceived the level of threat to be high, due

to the fact that Arab monarchies were being toppled from Egypt to Iraq. Because of this threat

level, they grew closer to the United States in order to assure the protection of the Al Sa’ud

rule, and the survival of the monarchy. The same happened after the Islamic Revolution in

1979. The behaviour of Saudi authorities became decisively anti-Iranian, because the

authorities perceived the mentioned regime as increasing the threat level against the kingdom,

to which one of the responses was to re-affirm their American alliance.

For the Iranians, who lost all major allies after 1979, the neoclassical realist argument also

stands fast. If relative power partly drives threat perception, and thus state security, it is

normal to understand that Saudi Arabia’s increased power resulting from the American

alliance was seen as a threat from Tehran’s point of view.

The results gathered from the analysis thus confirm the importance of the alliance-variable not

only for the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, but also its linkage to the neoclassical realist point of view.

6.4 Regime typology

The difference in regime type is one of the most essential explanatory characteristics of the

on-going Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Saudi Arabia is an Islamic absolute monarchy, where the King

and the royal family are all-powerful in political life. Post-revolutionary Iran is a theocratic

republic, with a complex political format, in which the members of the political leadership, all

vetted by the clergy before assuming political command, control the formal power

structures.265 Ideologically, these regime types are fervently opposed to one another, as the

political officials in the countries respectively hope for the deposition of the opposing regime.264 Rose (1998), p.150-151.

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The regimes advocate contrasting foreign policies, contrasting belief systems, contrasting

ideological motivations and support radically different agendas for regional hegemony. The

rivalry is characterized by the various differences of opinion in matters of policy, ideology

and religion. The respective regimes are the driving forces for the enduring hostility, and are

as such the prime cause for very tense opposition that exists today between Iran and Saudi

Arabia.

Saudi Arabia

The ruling House of Sa’ud has been in control of the political apparatus of the kingdom since

the country’s modern foundation in 1932. In the monarchy, it is the King, Salman bin

Abdulaziz Al Saud, who is the head of state and the head of government.266 The monarchy is

hereditary, which entails that the ascendants to the throne must be lawful male descendants of

the country’s first King and founder, Ibn Sa’ud.267 As an absolute monarchy, Saudi subjects

have no say in who governs the state, implicative of the authoritarian and undemocratic nature

of the government. Political power is firmly vested in the royal family, who enjoy the total

monopoly on the governing offices of the state.268 This includes the most important ministries

such as ministry of the interior, finance, and defence, which are under the control of

Muhammad bin Nayef, Ibrahim Abdulaziz Al-Assaf, and Mohammad bin Salman

respectively.269 One of the few ministers who is not an actual member of the House of Sa’ud

is Adel Al-Jubeir, the minister of foreign affairs, currently the only non-family member to

ever hold the post.270 The centralisation of political power in the hands of the members of the

ruling family has effectively enhanced the kingdom’s internal stability for decades. In

essence, king Salman and his cabinet, mostly composed of his own family members,

epitomizes King Louis XIV of France’s saying, “L’Etat, c’est moi” – The State, it is I.271 The

265 United States Department of State 2013 “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: Iran 2013 Human Rights Report” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Washington D.C., p. 1. 266 United States Department of State 2015 “ Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Saudi Arabia 2015 Human Rights Report” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Washington D.C., p. 1.267 Ibidem.268 Bank et al. (2013), p. 16. 269 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington D.C. 2016 “About Saudi Arabia: Ministers With Portfolio” available at https://www.saudiembassy.net/about/Biographies-of-Ministers.aspx 2016, retrieved on 04/05/2016. 270 Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016 “Minister of Foreign Affairs” available at http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/aboutMinistry/Minister/Pages/Biography.aspx 2016, retrieved on 04/05/2016. 271 Rowen, Herbert H. (1961) “L’Etat C’est Moi: Louis XIV and the State” French Historical Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, Duke University Press, p. 83.

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huge number of royal family members, both inside and outside the corridors of government,

confirms how deeply the House of Sa’ud is rooted to Saudi society. More importantly, the fact

that so many prominent political appointees are part of the royal family characterises the

reason why the endurance and stability of the monarchy has surpassed that of many other past

Middle Eastern royal houses. As for all autocratic regimes, the apex of the Saudi political

agenda is power, more concretely, ensuring the rule and longevity of the regime. As a

conservative monarchy, the Saudi state opposes any and all dissent toward the government,

and its human rights record is dire.272 The monarchy is especially vigilant against those who

oppose it on political grounds, and wish for regime change. This is precisely where the Saudi

fear of Iran derives from – Ayatollah Khomeini’s outspokenness against the monarchy as a

political institution in itself.

Iran

The Iranian regime is, unlike Saudi Arabia, a republican state. It fuses republican values, such

as a strong presidency, with a theocratic injection, where religion is the de jure ideology of the

state. Just as the case is with its southern neighbour, Iran is an undemocratic state. Although

presidential elections do take place, the all-powerful Supreme Leader must approve the

candidates beforehand, and the power apparatus fervently manipulates the electoral process.273

As such, candidates and future presidents are aligned with the regime’s fundamental

ideological premise. The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is the most powerful individual in

the country, reverberating the concept of Vilayat-e-Faqih – “rule by the Jurisprudent”, and

holds the last word on all matters of politics, law, and the military.274

The Iranian constitution outlines Shia Islam as the model for society, and at the core of the

revolutionary doctrine, anti-monarchical sentiment is the linchpin.275

Pre-1979 relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran were to an extent, cordial. The driving

force in the relationship was the dual Iranian and Saudi shared interest in the maintenance and

protection of the respective royal houses.276 Because the regime typology in both states was

272 State Department, 2015.273 State Department, 2013. 274 Ibidem. 275 The United States Institute of Peace, the Iran Primer 2016, Glenn, Cameron “Iran V Saudi Arabia: Government & Ideology” available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/jan/04/iran-v-saudi-arabia-government-ideology 04/01/2016, retrieved on 05/05/2016. 276 Jahner, Ariel (2012) “Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf” International Affairs Review, Vol. XX, No. 3, Elliott School of International Affairs, Washington, p. 39.

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the same – monarchical autocracies – the regimes had a joint platform on which to build their

relationship. As described by Henner Fürtig, director of the German Institute of Global and

Area Studies, “the common interest in fighting socialist and radical-nationalist influences in

the Gulf region, in ensuring a stable flow of oil and gas, and in increasing wealth through

exports, united Iran and Saudi Arabia till the end of the 1970s”.277 Additionally, at the time,

sectarian tensions were not an issue,278 due to the fact that although Iran was mostly Shia, the

Shah never emphasized a religious discourse in his foreign or domestic policy. When the

revolution toppled the Shah, it drastically altered not only the close affinities between Riyadh

and Tehran, but also the entire regional balance of power. The new Iranian regime, led by the

Ayatollah, was seen as a unique and unfamiliar threat to the ruling Arab royal houses of the

Gulf. For years, these monarchies’ ideological enemy was republicanism intertwined with

Arab nationalism and socialism.279 The Iranian regime proposed an entirely new, radical and

revolutionary ideology that the region had never before seen. Iran was the first country in

modern times to embody a mixture of Islamic and republican values into government.280

Although the region had experienced republicanism interlaced with socialism, theocratic

republicanism was indeed revolutionary. The fundament of Khomeini’s ideology was the

application of religion as the political nexus of the state, not socialism, nor simply

republicanism. The reason the House of Sa’ud felt directly threatened, was not simply due to

the toppling of a fellow monarch, but that the new regime justified its rule through a religious

rationale.281 This endangered the entire basis on which the Saudi state was erected, namely the

branding of Saudi Arabia as the true Islamic state, through its marriage to the Ulama. This

threatened to off-balance the entire political platform that the Saudi regime relied on for

survival. Suddenly, Riyadh had a religiously ideological rival that also claimed its legitimacy

on Islam that contested the Saudi claim of royal legitimacy through a similar manifesto. The

coming to power of the Ayatollah in Iran instigated a struggle for Islamic legitimacy, because

both states claimed religious leadership in the region.282

277 Fürtig, Henner (2007) “Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US Policy” Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 4, Washington, p. 628.278 Jahner (2012), p. 39. 279 Mann, Joseph (2012) “King Faisal and the challenge of Nasser’s Revolutionary Ideology” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5, Abingdon, p. 749. 280 Moslem, Mehdi (2002). Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran. New York, NY: Syracuse University Press, p. 31. 281 Moazami (2011), p. 71. 282 Okruhlik (2003), p. 115.

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Analysis

The Islamic Revolution was a political earthquake, which forced the Saudis to change their

entire foreign policy outlook from anti-socialist and anti-Baathist to anti-Shiism, on which the

Iranian regime was claiming its legitimacy. Furthermore, the kingdom recognized the

undermining effect of the Iranian regime’s excessive advocacy for exporting the revolution to

the rest of the Gulf countries.283 The ideology set forth by the father of the revolution,

Ruhollah Khomeini, was fiercely anti-monarchical, it set to implement clerical power in

politics, and was deeply populist, which were all factors exceedingly opposing the kingdom’s

political system and domestic politics.284

In essence, the coming to power of the theocratic regime in Iran and the Saudi response to it

re-instigated the centuries-old sectarian battle within Islam between Sunni and Shia.

Regime typology is the variable that sets forth one side of the ideological explanation for the

increasing levels of animosity in the Saudi-Iranian relationship. The differences in the

respective regime types that make up Saudi Arabia and Iran’s political platforms is the

catalyst for maximizing the entire regional rivalry. When the countries where both monarchies

before the revolution – although variables that in post revolutionary times have negatively

affected the relationship between them were still present – they were sympathetic to one

another’s regime. After the revolution, however, the regimes utilised religious differences,

ethnic nationalism, foreign alliances and regime-specific proxies in an effort to undermine one

anther, all because of the highlighted differences in their regimes’ ideologies, that became

apparent after 1979.

Confirmed from the research above, the regime differences that became apparent after the

Islamic Revolution are pivotal in order to understand the separation – political and ideological

– which today exists between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The analysis does present evidence of

why the results found conform to neoclassical realism. According to the theory, the domestic

political arena of the state is vital as an explanatory tool to explain the foreign policy of states,

and hence, the Saudi and Iranian foreign policy choices used to outmanoeuvre one another.

As regime typology is a variable that is grounded to domestic politics, this variable becomes

relevant for neoclassical realism, because it takes both internal and external determinants into 283 Kechichian, Joseph A. (1999) “Trends in Saudi National Security” Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 2, Middle East Institute, Washington, p. 233-234. 284 Wehrey, Fredric, Karasik, Theodore W., Nader, Alireza, Ghez, Jeremy, Hansell, Lydia, and Guffey, Robert A. (2009) “Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy” RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, Santa Monica, p. 3.

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account when analysing foreign policy.285 The fact that regime type does take part in

formulating foreign policy is reverberated by Fareed Zakaria, who states “a first cut theory

can be layered successively with additional causes from different levels of analysis focusing

on domestic regimes, bureaucracies, and statesmen”.286

As the research on this particular topic has demonstrated, regime typology plays a

fundamental part in the explanation of the animosity between the countries, and hence the

aggressive foreign policies these states adopt against each other. The research also

demonstrated that as neoclassical realism sets out, regime typology is indeed a necessary

element to analyse in order to successfully describe and explain the foreign policies that

respective states practice in the international environment.

6.5 Collective memory

In the context of the regional duel between Iran and Saudi Arabia, collective memory plays a

vital role in laying the basis for sentiments of animosity and mistrust between the two

different peoples, and the two different governments. Historic occurrences that have left

unhealed wounds are many in this case-specific study. In a politico-sociological framework,

historical memory translates to the collective comprehension that a specific group of people

shares about prior events that this group distinguishes as having formed its current cultural,

economic, political and social status and identity.287 Experts in this particular field stress that

groups affected by collective memory: “vary radically in size and complexity, ranging from

nations and ethnic or religious groups to local communities and families (…) The control of

collective memory by nation-states and their constituent social and cultural institutions has

increasingly been challenged by changes in ethnic constitution of nations, continuing anti-

colonial struggles, shifts in religious orthodoxy and globalisation”.288 Between Iran and Saudi

Arabia, collective memory has helped create variations in their distinct foreign policies.

Previous negative historic memories has aided in building a platform that the countries’

governments politicize in order to attract the population to get behind certain policy choices.

285 Rose (1998), p. 146. 286 Zakaria (1992), p. 197. 287 Davies, Eric (2005). Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 4. 288 Weedon, Chris and Jordan, Glenn (2012) “Collective memory: theory and politics” Social Semiotics, Vol. 22, No. 2, Routledge, Abingdon, p. 143-144.

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The memory of such incidents, have after 1979, been implemented as a policy tool,

particularly by the clerical regime in Tehran.

In post-1979 Iran, there are certain historical memories that have left a deep mark on the

population and the government’s negative viewpoint of Saudi Arabia. The fact that from the

very beginning of the revolution, Saudi Arabia was fully opposed to the unravelling events

that were taking place across the Gulf is still remembered by Iran.289 Although the overall

level of scepticism between the nations has been ever-present since the revolution, there are

particular episodes that have enforced the bad blood in the relationship during the last four

decades. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Saudi Arabia was the strategic wartime ally of

Saddam Hussein, and the prime financial benefactor of the Iraqi war effort.290 Echoing Saudi

and other gulf monarchies fears of the new Iranian regime, the Secretary General of the Gulf

Cooperation Council at the time, Abdullah Y. Bishara, recognized the newly established

theocracy’s pursuit of regional hegemony as the single most important threat for the stability

of the gulf monarchies.291 Saudi Arabia, being the largest and most important actor on the

peninsula, took the lead in indirectly ensuring the Iranian regime would be toppled, through

the sponsorship of Iraq’s government and armed forces. For the Iranian authorities, this was

the first sign that Saudi Arabia was, if not the primary military adversary, at least the primary

ideological one. Saudi support for the Iraqi invasion, and the following 8-year long war with

Iran left the latter with a feeling of deep hostility and bitterness toward the monarchy. It

would become a negative collective grievance for the Iranians that they have yet to forgive, or

forget.

The Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, holds a pivotal role in the bilateral ties between Iran and

Saudi Arabia.292 In 1987, demonstrations by Iranian pilgrims in Mecca led Saudi security

forces to violently suppress the protests, leaving 275 dead, and a further 303 wounded Iranian

pilgrims.293 This incident was the most politically potent in a series of damaging events that

had began in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution. Riyadh immediately blamed Tehran for

the violent clashes that took place that day, for undertaking the effort to seize the Grand

Mosque, in order for the pilgrims to advocate the Ayatollah as the commander of the entire

289 Terrill (2011), p. 5-6. 290 Karsh, Efraim (2009). Essential Histories: War and Conflict in Modern Times, The Iran-Iraq War. New York, NY: The Rosen Publishing Group, p. 67. 291 Rich, Ben (2012) “Gulf War 4.0: Iran, Saudi Arabia and the complexification of the Persian Gulf equation” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 23, No. 4, Routledge, Abingdon, p. 472. 292 Amiri et al. (2011), p. 679. 293 Idem, p. 680.

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Muslim world.294 The killing of hundreds of Iranians left Iran with deep sentiments of hatred

against the Saudis, which was reverberated by the Ayatollah himself, saying, “Even if it were

possible to forgive Saddam Hussein, it would never be possible to forgive Saudi Arabia”.295

When the most trusted political and religious official, the Supreme Leader, officially hoisted

such discontent aimed at Saudi Arabia, it is no wonder that the Hajj incident of 1987 left such

deep memories in the Iranian population’s psyche. A more detailed verbal attack was

launched by the Iranian speaker of Parliament, who would later become president of the

Iranian republic, Hassan Rafsanjani, who declared, “Iran must uproot the Saudi rulers and

divest the control of the shrines from them (…) The martyr’s blood must be avenged by

burning the roots of Saudi rulers in the region (…) The Saudi rulers have chosen an evil path,

and we will send them to hell”.296 In essence, the fervently zealous Iranian political machinery

collectively condemned the Saudis through a war of words. In hindsight, the Iranian response

did not only pour gasoline on an already flaming relationship, but it also accelerated the

complete and utter break up of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations in 1988 – which were not be

reopened for three years.297

In 2015, four years after the Saudi-GCC intervention in Bahrain had renewed Saudi-Iranian

tensions dramatically, a similar incident to the 1987 Hajj disaster took place in Mina, a

neighbourhood in Mecca, during the annual pilgrimage.298 Although the exact number varies

according to sources, it is presumed that over 2400 people were killed during the stampede.299

The Saudi government, including health minister Khalid Al-Falih, blamed the pilgrims

themselves for not adhering to the rules and safety regulations set out by the authorities,

instead of accepting any responsibility for the thousands of dead.300

294 Ibidem. 295 Ismael, Tareq Y. and Ismael, Jacquelines S. (1994). The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East. Gainesville, FL: The University Press of Florida, p. 306. 296 Gaub, Florence (2016) “War of words: Saudi Arabia V Iran” European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, p. 2. 297 Amiri et al. (2011), p. 681. 298 The New York Times 2015, Almukhtar et al. “How the Hajj Stampede Unfolded” available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/24/world/middleeast/mecca-mina-stampede-hajj-maps.html 25/09/2015, retrieved on 06/05/2016. 299 Associated Press 2015, Gambrell, Jon “AP count: Over 2400 killed in Saudi hajj stampede, crush ” available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/3a42a7733a8b476889bb4b7b3be3560e/ap-count-over-2400-killed-saudi-hajj-stampede-crush 10/12/2015, retrieved on 06/05/2016. 300 The Daily Mail 2015, Robison, Julian and Tomlinson, Simon “Horror at the Hajj: At least 700 people are crushed to death and hundreds injured in stampede during Muslim pilgrimage in Mecca just two weeks after crane collapsed and killed 109” available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3247269/At-310-people-crushed-death-450-injured-stampede-Muslim-Hajj-pilgrimage-Saudi-Arabia.html 24/09/2015, retrieved on 07/05/2016.

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Iranian authorities reported that at least 90 of their citizens were killed during the ensuing

panic and scatter, and hastily condemned the Saudi regime. According to the Islamic Republic

News Agency, Ali Khamenei declared a three daylong mourning for the Iranian dead, and

urged Saudi Arabia to take responsibility for the tragedy.301 Meanwhile, the Fars News

Agency reported that hundreds of protestors gathered outside the Saudi embassy in Tehran

during the following days to hoist their discontent at the irresponsibility of the Mecca-policies

that left so many pilgrims dead.302 Last autumn’s unfortunate accident in Mina is yet another

example of an incident that, if it has not already, will become part of collective Iranian

memory. Such events are bound to leave deep psychological scars that, with the current

rivalry at its peek, will only aggravate the divide. The most recent cataclysm for increased

hostility – in a series of decade long episodes that have turned the Iranian people against the

southern kingdom – was the execution of Nimr Baqir al-Nimr this January. The execution

triggered the worst diplomatic crisis in decades between the kingdom and the Islamic

Republic. As the news of the execution of the Shia cleric spread to Iran on January 2nd, angry

crowds of Iranians stormed, ransacked, and set the Saudi embassy in Tehran on fire.303 As a

response, the Saudis broke off all diplomatic relations with Tehran yet again, while other

GCC countries followed suit.304 The Supreme Leader officially warned the Saudis that they

would face “Divine revenge” for the crime of executing the cleric.305 Khamenei’s connotation

on divine suggested that it was not up to Iran to punish Saudi Arabia, but up to God – a

religious underpinning serving to emphasize the severity of the Saudi government’s deed.

The Iranian president opted for a more politically correct and measured statement, stating that

the execution was “A blatant violation of human rights and Islamic values”,306 while

promising that the assailants that ransacked the Saudi embassy would be brought to justice.

The Iranian defence of the Sheikh, however, retained an important political undertone. Nimr

al-Nimr was in fact not a close friend of the regime in Tehran. In a classified Wikileaks cable

301 Islamic Republic News Agency 2015 “Iran declares a 3-day nat’l mourning over Mecca deaths” available at http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81772069/ 24/09/2015, retrieved on 07/05/2016. 302 Fars News 2015 “Iranian Stage Protest against Saudi gov’t over Mina Stampede” available at http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940705001345 27/09/2015, retrieved on 07/05/2016. 303 Bloomberg 2016, Nasseri, Ladane “Who Was the Cleric Saudis Executed and Why His Death Matters” available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-03/who-was-the-cleric-saudis-executed-and-why-his-death-matters 03/01/2016, retrieved on 07/05/2016. 304 The Atlantic 2016, Calamur, Krishnadev “How the Execution of a Shia Cleric is Roiling the Middle East” available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/saudi-iran-execution-kuwait/422628/ 05/01/2016, retrieved on 07/05/2016. 305 BBC, 2016. 306 Press TV 2016 “President Rouhani: Saudi sectarianism behind execution of Sheikh Nimr” available at http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/01/03/444310/Iran-Saudi-Arabia-Rouhani-Nimr-execution/ 03/01/2016, retrieved on 07/05/2016.

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from 2008, U.S. officials reported that the Sheikh outspokenly distanced himself from the

Tehran regime and their aggressive anti-American rhetoric. Further, Nimr al-Nimr criticized

Saudi authoritarianism, and the right of the Saudi-Shia community to request foreign

assistance if it were to be involved in a conflict with the Saudi authorities.307

As such, it seems that the Iranian government, because the Sheikh was Shiite, used this as an

justification for hammering home their anti-Saudi message, when, the fact that the Sheikh was

not openly amicable toward the clerical regime, was left out from public discourse.

This political manipulation proves that – although grievances in the form of collective

memory takes place regularly in the Saudi-Iranian context – the truth is often changed to suit

a political agenda. This, however, does not change the fact the kingdom seriously aggravated

the current relationship between Tehran and Riyadh by executing a respected Shia cleric and

regime-critic. Iranians will remember the death of Nimr al-Nimr, and it will continue to be

adopted as a mechanism by Iranian authorities in an effort at destabilizing the Saudi regime.

As proved, historic occurrences and politics of remembrance is a definite factor of increased

animosity between Iranian and Saudi authorities and peoples.

There is a plethora of empirical evidence displaying how various historical occurrences and

collective memories have exasperated tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Starting with

Saudi support for the deposition of the Iranian regime in 1979, to the recent execution of

Sheikh Al-Nimr, the Iranian regime has time and again used instances of negative collective

memory to accentuate their animosity against the Saudi authorities. The analysis shows that is

part of the regime’s strategic culture in foreign policy. Emphasising how policy choice and

policy-behaviour is shaped by collective memory,308 does resonate with the regime’s

approach, as seen in the analysis of the variable. For neoclassical realism, the formulation of a

country’s foreign policy can include cultural explanations, as argued by Zakaria.309 It is within

the cultural realm that collective memory operates.310 Knowing that neoclassical realism

includes a domestic level of analysis into its theory, and that the domain of culture is integral

in the domestic political sphere, the outcome of the research thus conforms to the adopted

theory. Conclusively, this immaterial variable, which is domestically rooted, does both play a

307 Wikileaks 2008 “Meeting With Controversial Shi’a Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr” available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08RIYADH1283_a.html 23/08/2008, retrieved on 07/05/2016. 308 Longhurst, Kerry (2004). Germany and the use of force. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 22. 309 Zakaria (1998), p. 18. 310 Brady et al. (1999), p. 25.

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role forming Iranian animosity against Saudi Arabia, and secondly, shapes the policies

decided upon by the clerical regime, in respect to the kingdom.

6.6 Conclusion to Chapter VI

As expected, the differences present in the Saudi-Iranian relationship are many, more

importantly, however, they all widen the diplomatic gap between the countries. In other

words, the differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran, both domestically and in foreign

policy, create a sense of deep mistrust and hostility.

The passage on conventional military spending contrasted the different amounts spent by Iran

and Saudi Arabia on various armaments and military equipment. As the research

demonstrated, Saudi Arabia has over the last few years entirely outspent Iran in the military-

domain. The Saudis, fearing a resurgent Iran, together with conflict involvement Bahrain and

Yemen, was in 2015 the world’s third largest spender.311 Iran, on the other hand, hampered by

years of sanctions and arms embargoes have not had the same opportunity to acquire weapons

at the same pace as its Saudi counterpart.312 Iran, however, in response to the kingdom’s

spending, will begin to re-arm as economic sanctions have been lifted. Conclusively, the arms

race is a duel that increases fear and, and hence, the hostility in the relationship.

Ethnic nationalism, reverberated by the Persian-Arab rivalry, is a variable that clearly incites

enmity between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The respective sentiments of superiority promulgated

by the Persian and Arab populations, and by the respective government representatives is

enflaming the political power-struggle. The ethnic duel on both sides of the Gulf is adding yet

another layer of resentment into the complex and aloof relationship.

An important difference between Saudi Arabia and Iran is alliances. While Saudi Arabia is

closely affiliated to the American superpower, Iran is not anymore, nor is it allied to any other

major power. The Saudi-U.S. alliance, although it is not as firm as it used to be, has granted

the Saudi state a sense of security and room to manoeuvre in the Middle East. Iran, however,

whose ideological revolutionary premise dictates anti-Americanism and resentment toward

most of the Gulf monarchies, is firmly opposed to both members of the alliance. Iran, lacking

the same level of leverage in international affairs that the Saudis enjoy, is forced to adjust its

alliance-policy from important international actors, to proxies.

311 SIPRI, 2015. 312 SIRPI, 2016.

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A variable deeply connected to the growing hostility in the Saudi-Iranian relationship is

regime typology. This stems from the politically, religiously, and ideologically opposed

absolute monarchy and theocratic republic. The fact that both regimes claim their legitimate

survival on the same denominator – Islam – and strive for the same political ground, has led

to a re-instigation of the inactive Sunnia-Shia sectarian battle. The Islamic Revolution’s

advocacy for monarchical deposition, and its spread of Shiism has led the Saudis to actively

promote Wahhabism, anti-Shiism, and combat Iranian influence by any means at their

disposal. The regimes’ encouragement of opposing political dogmas is the pinnacle of the

rivalry, and hence, of the lasting state of resentment present between the two rivals.

The last variable abiding to the Saudi-Iranian hostility presented was historical occurrences.

This variable was especially centred on Iran, and the historic attachment their government has

put in various incidents that have shaped the unfavourable view of the Saudi kingdom.

Different incidents, all having the common benefactor of violence or casualties, have forged

an irreparable barrier that separates Iranians and Saudis on several issues. The memoirs of

collective memory present in the Iranian populations psyche, has then been manipulated and

adopted to suit the Iranian policymakers’ agenda; an effort at turning the Iranian population

against Saudi Arabia.

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Chapter VII. Conclusion

The following section will be dedicated to the summary of the most fundamental facts of this

thesis. The conclusion will rightfully formulate a coherent answer to the research question

devised. Lastly, the conclusive chapter will end by a short discussion on the future of Saudi-

Iranian relations, including a short paragraph on further research on this topic.

7.1 Conclusion

This thesis has presented, analysed and examined the many factors that have led or are still

leading to a strong degree of hostility between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom

of Saudi Arabia. There is a wide array of causes for the increasing animosity between the two,

and as this thesis has argued, these originate from, and are influenced by, both national-

domestic and international politics. The proposed findings embody the foundation of

neoclassical realism – the theory that has been adopted as the primary academic and analytical

approach to the written dissertation. Shortly summed up, these are the following – that in

order to fully understand state behaviour, and as such foreign policy outcomes, both systemic

incentives and domestic factors need to be incorporated.313 In relation to theory, the variables

presented represented either systemic or domestic impetus for Iran and Saudi Arabia

respectively. Having analysed the research question and the many variables using neoclassical

realist lenses, we notice there are both systemic and domestic factors that influence the

relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The determinants from the domestic level

included religion, ethnic nationalism, regime typology and lastly, collective memory. The

systemic variables came in the form of support for proxies, military spending, nuclear

weapons and alliances.

In order to concretely examine these variables, a comparison between the two states, their

policies and their motivations was advanced in the comparative analysis. Firstly, a chapter

313 Rose (1998), p. 146.

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consecrated to the similarities between the regional competitors was put forth. This included

three variables, namely support for regional proxies, nuclear weapons, and religion – the latter

of which can be described dually as a similarity and a difference. Secondly, a chapter

dedicated to the differences in the relationship between the two was presented. This included

conventional military spending, ethnic nationalism, alliances to foreign powers, regime

typology and collective memory. Looking at similarities and differences combined, there is

one main conclusion to be drawn – whether they are systemic or domestic, material or

immaterial – as the research on these variables determined, all share the same attribute of

augmenting the level of animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

At the beginning of the thesis, the following research question was advanced:

How can we explain the increasing hostility between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the

Islamic Republic of Iran after 2011?

In the way of concretely answering the research question in an abridged fashion, the following

answer is proposed:

The increasing hostility between the Saudi monarchy and the Islamic Republic can be

explained by various differences, to which are attributed a wide range of politico-ideological

features that presently serve at reinforcing the rift, the contrasts and the overall conflicting

contest between the two countries. As was set out in the thesis, there are a variety of reasons

for the ever-growing hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Some of the explanations are

rooted historically to the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its aftermath, while others are of a

more contemporary nature. The 2011 Bahraini uprisings and the ensuing Saudi military

intervention reignited the sidelined tensions between the rivals. The Saudis instigated the

intervention for the dual purpose of protecting the Bahraini Sunni royal family, and, more

importantly, to ascertain that any Iranian influence on the island would be broken. The

Bahraini incident epitomizes the current duel between the kingdom and the republic, namely a

battle for power, religious creed, regime survival, legitimacy, and of course, influence and

leadership in the Middle East. Having analysed the differences and the similarities in the

realms of foreign and domestic policies, there is one general conclusion to be drawn –

although the domestic political arenas differ in Iran and Saudi Arabia – when it comes to

foreign affairs, both countries strive for the same political landscape, albeit with different

means to achieve it.

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Domestically – the regimes, their political and ideological culture, religious doctrine,

ethnicity, and collective memory – differ. In international affairs – military spending,

adoption of radically different proxies, major alliances, and strategic collaboration – are

among the measures employed to achieve their foreign policy ambitions.

The national-domestic processes and structures dictate the foreign policy behaviour of the

respective states. This confirms neoclassical realist logic, in which state behaviour is shaped,

but not fully directed by systemic incentives, due to the fact that domestic policy factors also

forge state behaviour.314

The essence of this thesis is that, firstly, it is the ideologies of the regimes that are to blame

for the Saudi-Iranian duel. One can say that the respective regimes are the centrepieces of this

equation, and that all other involved variables act to strengthen and empower the bitter

hostility, but without the differing ideologies of the regimes, these variables may not have

independently had an effect in increasing the animosity. The differences in regime type, and

the ideologies these regimes swear allegiance to, have re-instigated the 1400 year old

theological rift between the two major branches of Islam. The fact that Iran is the only major

Shiite country in the region, and Saudi Arabia sees itself as the leader of the Sunni-Arab

world, the actions of the two regional leaders set an example of sectarian divide that is

reverberated in the entire region, because of respective advocacy by Tehran and Riyadh for

different denominations rooted in the respective policy apparatuses. Today, conflicts opposing

different Sunni and Shia groups – from Damascus to Sana’a – are related to the larger Saudi-

Iranian power contest. The regimes in Saudi Arabia and Iran are usurping religious

differences for the betterment of their respective geopolitical benefits.

The analysis of the variables proposed in this thesis offers the following research

explanations:

When it comes to proxies, the research has shown that these are adopted as an instrument for

augmenting one’s national interest, with the benefit of not having to directly engage one’s

own forces in conflict situations. These proxies are linked to its benefactor through religious

creed, ideology and antagonism toward the rival.

When it comes to the acquirement of nuclear weapons, the research has shown that although

neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia possesses such capabilities, the current hostility in the Gulf, and

the constant threatening climate in which the countries find themselves, could in the future

314 Foulon (2015), p. 636-637.

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lead to a nuclear armed Tehran and Riyadh. This may not necessary lead to nuclear balancing,

but to augmented fear and resentment.

When it comes to religion, the research has shown that the difference in religious affiliation –

Sunni and Shia – is exasperated by the respective regimes in order to benefit their own

interests and draw groups and loyal factions to their cause. Secondly, it showed that both

regimes are entirely dependent on their interpretation of religious legitimacy to stay in power.

In order to maximise their grip on political power and to gain regional influence and

domination, Saudi Arabia and Iran are usurping religious contrasts, which contributes to

regional contention between the two denominations and sectarian violence all throughout the

Middle East.

When it comes to military spending, the research has shown that as Saudi Arabia outspends

Iran on military armaments, it leads to increased levels of enmity between the two nations. As

the kingdom has spent relentlessly on military means, Iran – now that the economic sanctions

against the country have been lifted – will themselves begin to spend larger amounts on their

military, leading to a regional arms race.

When it comes to ethnic nationalism the research showed that authorities often call upon this

historic difference between Arab and Persian when conflicting situations arise between them.

On both sides of the Gulf, respective anti-Arab and anti-Persian rhetoric is flagrant, which

leads to increased contempt for the opposing ethnic group, and that group’s religious

denomination.

When it comes to alliances to foreign powers, the research showed that only Saudi Arabia still

posses a strong and powerful ally, while Iran, due to the revolution, are left with none.

Further, while the Saudis have more diplomatic leverage in international affairs because of

their affiliations to the United States, Iran must rely on its many proxies region wide, which

does not offer the same bargaining power. Lastly, because Iran is an ideological enemy of the

United States, the Saudi alliance to the U.S. has proven to embitter Iranian animosity toward

the Saudi regime.

When it comes to collective memory, the research has shown that, since the Islamic

revolution, Saudi policies and deeds – from the 1987 Mecca incident, to the recent execution

of Sheikh Nimr – has severely aggravated Iranian animosity toward the kingdom. These many

episodes of violence, often involving Iranian fatalities, have in turn been adopted by the

Tehran regime as an instigator for increased anti-Saudi policies and feelings.

When it comes to regime typology, the research has shown that the clerical regime in Iran and

the absolute monarchy in Riyadh are the main instigators of the animosity that is today

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reverberated between the two countries because of the ideologies they each swear allegiance

to. The political and religious ideologies they adhere to differ and go up against in contest

against one another. The regimes grasp foar the leadership of the Islamic world and contend

to become superior then their rival in order to achieve this. In their bid, they arrogate religious

legitimacy and they divide the region on ideological and religious grounds, which is

partitioning the Middle East into two camps. This is the main instigator for not only increased

levels of hatred between the regimes, but this is also demolishing an already divided region.

7.2 Implications

The goal of this thesis was – through a thorough investigation of factual evidence and

processes – to get to the root causes of the increasing hostility that today exists between the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In light of international politics,

the Saudi-Iranian conundrum is a very relevant but also complex affair. The reason the

research on this particular issue is necessary is because the duel is the most immediate and

serious of its kind in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran are both regional leaders, whom

neighbouring countries, by religious affiliation, or ideological standpoint, look up to. The two

countries are meant to set an example and a standard for foreign policy behaviour in

international affairs. As the two rivalize, they instigate measures meant at thwarting and

checking each other’s power and influence. Because they are regional leaders, this incitement

of tensions is reverberated throughout the region by different actors, taking by example the

methods and outlook that the Saudis and Iranians use in their conflict against each other.

Thus, the Saudi-Iranian relationship, and the Sunni-Shia rivalry, which accentuates the

present animosity, is indirectly advocated for and advanced throughout the Muslim world.

This is why, firstly, the Saudi-Iranian hostility, and secondly, this thesis, contributes to the

academic debate on inter-state rivalries in the Middle East, the reasons for their outbreak and

longevity, and the reason for its importance for the understanding of the political turmoil in

the region.

As proven throughout the paper, there are several causes behind the increase of hostility.

Every variable scrutinized explains a different aspect of the rivalry, whether they are

grounded in foreign policy or domestic policy, they all give different reasons to the same

conclusion. Moulded together, these explanations demonstrate how deeply the rivalry goes,

and how well entrenched these case-specific factors are to Saudi Arabia and Iran.

103

The distinct contest is to the greatest extent possible, about power. In order to achieve

dominance over the other, and hence, become more powerful than the opposite party, the two

countries have adopted mechanisms that are detrimental for the whole Middle East.

Geostrategic aspirations are more important than sectarian pre-eminence, but the latter is one

of the appliances embraced by both regimes in order to maximise their options in regard to

dominating their rival. It is a form of asymmetrical and irregular conflict, not in the original

meaning of the word, but meaning that instead of actually engaging militarily, they simply use

ideologico-religious mechanisms to destabilize one another. By doing so they undermine the

unstable sectarian, political, and ethnic platform of the region for their own benefit.

As long as the two countries usurp these many issues, a peaceful and diplomatic resolve will

remain unattainable. In the Middle East, any conflict resolution will remain a delusion upon

any less condition than a political détente is instigated between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The

current animosity fuelled by the rivalry obstructs any hope of a settlement in regional

conflicts such as Yemen, or Syria, in which both countries have a lot to lose if their proxies do

not succeed. Conclusively, the regional stability of the Middle East is fully dependent on the

Iranians and Saudis laying aside their differences, and burying the hostility in their

relationship. As the rivalry has dramatically escalated in later months, however, the countries

are closer to setting the scene for yet another Gulf war, more than they are likely to strive

toward a peaceful and cooperative outcome.

7.3 Discussion and Further Research

Due to the narrow extent of this thesis, there are a variety of other avenues that could have

been explored if the time and space allowed for it. In hindsight, I believe that there are aspects

that could have been approached in a different manner, something that leaves lots of room for

future research on this particular topic.

Demonstrating the negatives of a rivalry is always the clearest and most elementary way of

gaining awareness of the causes of it. In this thesis, that is how I chose to approach the

research question. I do believe, however, in order for such a topic to be more in depth, I

should also have looked at the cases where the Saudis and Iranians actually agree, even

though these may be far and few between. To present not only the elements that sustain the

bad blood in the relationship, but also those elements on which the countries could build a

platform for future cooperation and diplomatic partnership, would have demonstrated a more

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comprehensive picture of the Saudi-Iranian relationship. The fact that I solely aimed my

attention at the adverse predispositions that fuel the hostility, however, is in line with the

realist-centric view, which I employed as my theoretical framework – in international affairs,

only the powerful and selfish win through, and power is the ultimate means of survival.315 I do

believe, however, that a dual theoretical interpretation could have been employed, such as a

neoclassical realist and a liberalist point of view, something that would have shed more light

on not only the cons but also the pros of the relationship.

When it comes to the variables involved, I do believe I could have processed a few more that

come into play in light of increasing animosity. In retrospect, I noticed I did not approach a

subject that can be seen as an important explanatory variable, rooted to economics, namely

oil. Saudi Arabia and Iran are two of the most important oil producing states in the world, and

this gives them a great deal of power, when it comes to both dominating and controlling the

complex arena of petro economics. Not only is this variable intrinsically linked to, for

example, the U.S.-Saudi alliance, but also the underlying foundation of Saudi wealth and

power today. It would have been appealing to evaluate the impact of oil-politics in regards to

the Saudi-Iranian conundrum.

Another point of self-criticism is my non-usage of Arabic and Farsi language sources. As I do

not speak any of the mentioned languages, I could not use any of these. In order to interpret

regime-loyal media, it would have been advantageous to use such sources directly, which

would have given me a primary source, and not a translated or English version, leaving me

with a less accurate description while decreasing the reliability. Even though English versions

of the primary Saudi and Iranian news outlets do exist, I do not feel they give the exact same

connection, or bring out the same reactions as the primary-language versions.

Lastly, I do not hope that because my research was focused on the variables increasing

animosity, that what I have presented can be interpreted as incitement of warmongering or a

call to arms. I simply wanted to thoroughly analyse how a neutral point of view could

factually explain why the countries are at each other’s throats. This research was never aimed

at offending, or inciting further tension, simply presenting an in-depth analysis of the

problems surrounding the rivalry, something which future research could possibly investigate

in order to find a solution to the current Saudi-Iranian enmity.

315 Rose (1998), p. 146.

105

This thesis does indeed leave room for further research on the particular topic evoked. This

state on state rivalry is so complex and so vitally important for the future of the entire Middle

East. It is a cold war that, because of the many fragile and inflammable variables involved,

could rapidly escalate to a hot war. Not only would this most probably involve most of the

countries in the Middle East, it would also affect the world’s oil markets negatively, and most

importantly, it would usher an era of death and destruction on an horrific scale. It is a

necessity to research this topic in even more detail, in order to ensure that a large-scale

military conflict never takes place between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

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