Mahoning County Bar Association the Supreme Court of hio ... Board of Commissione s on ... SUPREME COURT OF OHIO This case involves 20 counts of alleged misconduct against Respondent,

ORIGINALBEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

ONGRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE

OFTHE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

In Re:

Complaint against

Warren "Bo" PritchardAttorney Reg. No. 0008417

Respondent

Mahoning County Bar Association

Relator

11-0815Case No. 10-025

Findings of Fact,Conclusions of Law anRecommendation of th IFULEBoard of Commissione s onGrievances and Discip ne of MAY 1^ 20glthe Supreme Court of hio

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

This case involves 20 counts of alleged misconduct against Respondent, Warren "Bo"

Pritchard (0008417), who was admitted to practice law in 1982 and has no prior disciplinary

record. Respondent currently is serving an interim remedial suspension pursuant to Gov.Bar R.

V(5)(A), which the Supreme Court imposed on October 29, 2009.

The hearing panel in this case consisted of Patrick Sink, Janica Pierce Tucker, and panel

chair Paul De Marco, none of whom served on the probable cause panel for this case or resides

in the appellate district from which the complaint arose. The parties submitted stipulations of

facts and violations on January 5, 2011, and the panel heard testimony and arguments on January

13, 2011. David Comstock, Jr., Mahoning County Bar Association bar counsel appeared for

Relator. John Juhasz and Lynn Maro appeared for Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

{¶ 1} As to 18 of the 20 counts alleged in the amended complaint, the parties have

stipulated to a total of 83 disciplinary violations (attached). As to Count "Q," (Raub) the parties

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have stipulated that Respondent did not violate any disciplinary rules and that the count therefore

should be dismissed. As to the remaining count (Count "L," Catterson), the parties have

stipulated to most of the conduct alleged, but have not agreed that the stipulated conduct

constitutes a violation of any disciplinary rule, leaving that determination to the panel. The

parties also have stipulated to the dismissal of 37 other alleged rule violations spread across the

20 counts.

COUNT "A": MARGARET A. BURY

{9[ 2} From May through July 2009, Margaret A. Bury paid Respondent $1,350 to file a

bankruptcy petition. Respondent never filed the petition, failed to respond to Bury's inquiries

about her case, and never returned any portion of the money she paid him. Bury hired another

attorney to file her bankruptcy petition.

,. {1[ 3} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Bury violated Prof.

Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.15(d) (prompt delivery of client funds and full

accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of

unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed

these violations.

{9[4} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of alleged violations of Prof. Cond. R.

1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds that these

violations have not been established by clear and convincing evidence.

COUNT "B": GERALD CENNENO

{9[ 5} In April 2008, Gerald Cenneno retained Respondent to file a complaint for breach

of contract against a church and paid Respondent a $1,200 retainer. Respondent filed the

complaint in July 2008. After the church filed a counterclaim, Cenneno met with Respondent,

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who asked Cenneno for certain paperwork. Cenneno submitted the paperwork, which

Respondent promised. to file. Respondent never filed the paperwork and ceased all contact with

Cenneno, despite the latter's attempts to contact him throughout the remainder of 2008 and into

2009.

{y[ 6} In March 2009, the court granted the church a default judgment against Cenneno.

After the church's attorney notified Cenneno of the default, Cenneno attempted to reach

Respondent for approximately three consecutive weeks. When Cenneno finally reached him,

Respondent promised to talk to the magistrate and call Cenneno back later that day.

{'f[ 7} Respondent failed to contact Cenneno or return the latter's phone messages. On

occasion over the next several months, Cenneno was able to reach Respondent, who again

promised to talk to the magistrate but never did.

fl[ 8} In July 2009, Cenneno learned that Respondent had not requested relief from the

default judgment. After leaving more messages for Respondent and receiving no return phone

calls, Cenneno retained another attorney to seek relief from the default judgment entered against

him, but the court upheld the default judgment and scheduled a hearing on the church's damages.

{y[ 9} Respondent has not returned any of the funds that Cenneno paid him.

{9[ 10} The parties stipulated that Respondent's conduct regarding Cenneno's case

violated Prof Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness

in representation), 1.4 (keeping client reasonably informed), 1.15(d) (prompt delivery of client

funds and full accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon termination), and 1.16(e)

(prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that

Respondent committed these violations.

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{,}[ 11} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of alleged violations of Prof. Cond. R.

1.5 and 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds yhat these violations have

not been established by clear and convincing evidence.

COUNT "C": ESTATE OF STEVE YANCSURAK

{9[ 12} In 2009, while serving as counsel and court-appointed commissioner for the estate

of Steve Yancsurak, Respondent failed to attend two hearings despite the Columbiana County

Probate Court's orders to do so. The court found Respondent in contempt and a warrant for his

arrest was issued. The court ultimately ordered a recall of the warrant, but reported

Respondent's conduct to the Columbiana County Bar Association's certified grievance

committee, which referred the matter to Relator, since Respondent's office is in Mahoning

County,

{'l 13} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding the Yancsurak estate

violated Prof Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation). The panel

finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed this violation.

{y[ 14} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of alleged violations of Prof Cond. R.

1.1 and 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds that these violations have


COUNT "D": WILLIAM DiRENZO

{'}[ 15) Respondent represented William DiRenzo between 2003 and 2009. During the

time Respondent represented DiRenzo, he reached an agreement to sell DiRenzo property owned

by Respondent's mother. Title to the property was transferred to DiRenzo in 2004. Respondent

owned 17 acres of land nearby.

{9[16} Respondent later agreed to sell two of the 17 acres to Carol Fye for $60,000. Fye

paid him half the purchase price and sought to obtain a survey. While Fye waited for the survey,

a foreclosure action involving all 17 acres was filed against Respondent. On March 31, 2006, a

partnership consisting of DiRenzo, Michael Dockry, and another person signed an agreement to

purchase from Respondent the 15 acres Fye had not purchased. Attempts to secure financing for

the sale of the 15 acres were unsuccessful.

{'ff 171 A sheriff's sale for all 17 acres was scheduled for November 28, 2006.

{y[ 181 On that date, DiRenzo provided a deposit of $28,000, making the check payable

to "Michael Dockry," his partner, who previously shared office space with Respondent.

DiRenzo then obtained an official check from Sky Bank for $28,000 and delivered it to Dockry

as requested by Respondent. Respondent added $1,500 of his own funds, for a total of $29,500,

and sent Dockry to the sheriff s sale.

{lf[ 19} Fye attended the sheriff's sale with $15,000. Fye knew that Dockry was there to

bid on the property on behalf of Respondent. At the sale, Fye and Dockry agreed to pool the

funds in their possession to bid on the property. They were successful.

{y[ 20} After speaking with Respondent, Fye placed the property in her own name, with

the understanding that Respondent would continue to seek financing to purchase it. When he

could not, Fye kept the $29,500 that Dockry had brought to the sheriff s sale, considering it

repayment for the $30,000 she previously had paid to Respondent for the two acres. Fye thus

obtained title to the other 15 acres for $44,500, despite putting up only $15,000 of her own

money.

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{9[ 21} After Respondent informed DiRenzo that he could purchase Respondent's interest

in the property for $1,500, DiRenzo obtained a check for $1,500 and gave it to Respondent, who

cashed it on June 20, 2007.

{y[ 22} Despite the fact Respondent's client DiRenzo contributed a total of $29,500 to

secure the property, DiRenzo has nothing. to show for his contribution, Fye still holds title to the

property, and Respondent has been unable to secure a deed for DiRenzo or the partnership.

{y[ 23} Respondent testified that "a number of friends of mine joined a partnership to try

to get it refinanced." He admitted DiRenzo was not just his friend but also his client at the time.

He stated that he "tried to help Mr. DiRenzo get an attorney to represent him" after the fact, but

in effect admitted that came too late: "I should have sent each of them to another attorney to

review their position in those things." (Tr. 31)

24} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding DiRenzo constituted an

impermissible conflict of interest in violation of DR 5-104(A) (entering into a business

transaction with a client with different interests where the client expects the lawyer to exercise

his professional judgment to protect the client) and Prof. Cond. R. 1.8 (entering into a business

transaction with a client). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent

committed these violations.

{1125} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of alleged violations of DR 9-102 and

Prof. Cond. R. 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds that these violations

have not been established by clear and convincing evidence. The panel also recommends

dismissal of alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) and Pro£ Cond. R. 1.15 inasmuch Relator did

not present proof or any stipulation as to these alleged violations.

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COUNT "E": AMY AND JOSEPH DiDOMENICO

{y[ 26} In September 2007, Amy and. Joseph DiDomenico retained Respondent to file an

action on their behalf against a roofing company, agreeing to pay him an hourly fee. The

DiDomenicos paid Respondent an $850 retainer in 2007, followed by another $850 in fees

during 2008.

{y[ 27} Unbeknownst to the DiDomenicos and Respondent, another attorney already had

filed an action on their behalf against the roofing company (Case No. 1302). Unaware of that

case, Respondent filed another (Case No. 1478). When he learned of Case No. 1302 in July

2008, Respondent substituted for the other attorney and voluntarily dismissed the case about a

week later.

{'f[ 28} In September 2008, Respondent failed to respond to the court's request for a

status update in Case No. 1478, so the court dismissed it. Neither Respondent nor the

DiDomenicos received the status update request or notice of the dismissal.

{y[ 291 Over the next six months, the DiDomenicos had trouble reaching Respondent by

phone, so they stopped by his office on.March 6, 2009 and set up an appointment for the next

day. At the appointment, Respondent explained that he was going through a divorce and that his

files were disorganized. He promised the DiDomenicos he would attempt to reopen their case.

{y[ 301 Respondent filed a motion to vacate the judgment entry of dismissal twelve days

later, but because of trouble serving the defendant's counsel, the hearing on it was delayed until

August 14, 2009. Out of an abundance of caution, the DiDomenicos sent Respondent a certified

letter reminding him to appear, but the letter was returned unclaimed and Respondent did fail to

appear. Nevertheless, the magistrate judge scheduled a bench trial in 120 davs.

{9[ 311 In the meantime, Respondent received his interim remedial suspension and filed a

motion to withdraw based on it. The DiDomenicos' new counsel secured an order vacating the

dismissal and a new trial date. The case remains pending.

{9[ 32} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding the DiDomenicos

violated Prof. Cond. R.1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation) and 1.4(a)(3)

and (4) (keeping clients informed of case status and complying with reasonable information

requests). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed these

violations.

111331 The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of alleged violations of Prof. Cond. R.

1.1, 1.5, and 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds that these violations

have not been established by clear and convincing evidence.

COUNT "F": EVELYN SUE LORENT

{9[ 34} On Apri13, 2009, Evelyn Sue Lorent retained Respondent to provide her legal

advice regarding a probate matter and a possible bankruptcy, paid him $1,300, and provided him

the necessary paperwork. After furnishing Lorent a bankruptcy worksheet and developing a

strategy for weighing the benefits of bankruptcy, Respondent ceased working on the case and

Lorent could not reach him. Bankruptcy proved to be unnecessary, and another attorney handled

the probate matter.

{^[ 35} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Lorent violated Prof.

Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping

clients informed of case status and complying with reasonable information requests), 1.15(d)

(prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon

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termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and

convincing evidence that Respondent committed these violations.

{1( 36} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violations of Prof. Cond.

R. 1.1. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this violation has not been

established by clear and convincing evidence.

COUNT "G": CAROL HOVANES

{9[ 37} After a bank filed a foreclosure action against Carol Hovanes in August 2008, she

retained Respondent to represent her in the action and in a possible bankruptcy. Over the next

month, Hovanes paid him $1,600 in advance legal fees and $300 for a bankruptcy filing fee.

Respondent performed no meaningful work on the foreclosure case, never filed a bankruptcy

petition, and failed to respond to Hovanes's phone messages and requests for information.

Hovanes retained new counsel, who filed the bankruptcy petition, automatically staying the

foreclosure action. Respondent has not returned either the legal fees or the filing fee that

Hovanes paid him.

{1[ 38} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Hovanes violated Prof.

Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in

representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping clients informed of case status and complying with

reasonable information requests) and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds

by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed these violations.

COUNT "H": DUANE AND TRACIE CORLL

{9[ 39} Duane and Tracie Corll retained Respondent to file a bankruptcy petition and paid

him $1,300. Respondent filed the petition, but over time he became increasingly difficult for the

Corlls to contact and failed to submit the necessary paperwork, resulting in the dismissal of their

bankruptcy case. The Corlls are seeking new counsel to correct the deficiencies in Respondent's

handling of the case.

{y[ 401 The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding the Corlls violated

Prod. Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in

representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping clients informed of case status and complying with

reasonable information requests), 1.15(d) (prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting),

1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned

fees). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed these

violations.

{y[ 41} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof. Cond.



COUNT "I": TINA MARIE BENSON

{9[ 42} In July 2009, Tina Marie Benson paid Respondent a fee of $1,000 to file a

bankruptcy petition. Respondent provided her a receipt indicating a balance due of $350.

Respondent never filed the petition, never responded to Benson's attempts to contact or see him,

and never returned any of the fees she paid. Another attorney filed the petition for her and

secured the discharge.

{y[ 43} The parties stipulated that Respondent's conduct regarding Benson violated Prof.


client reasonably informed and complying with reasonable information requests), 1.15(d)


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{y[ 44} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof Cond.



COUNT "J": RICHARD BODENDORFER

111451 In October 2008, Richard Bodendorfer paid Respondent $750 to form a limited

liability corporation. After the Secretary of State's office twice rejected Respondent's attempted

filings, Respondent asked Bodendorfer for an additional payment of $250. Bodendorfer sent it in

February 2009, but Respondent took no further action on his behalf.

{9[ 46} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Bodendorfer violated

Prof. Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4)

(keeping client reasonably informed and complying with reasonable information requests),

1.15(d) (prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting), 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest

upon termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and


{y[ 471 The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof Cond.



COUNT "K": DARLENE BURMAN

{9f 48} In early 2009, Darlene Burman retained Respondent to assist her in administering

her late brother's estate. Without court approval, Respondent charged the estate $15,028 in fees

and costs before filing the inventory. The probate court determined that Respondent had almost

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completed the estate and that the amount he charged was less than he would have been entitled to

receive under the court's computation schedule. The court determined that Burman should retain

new counsel. Successor counsel completed the estate.

{1149} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Burman violated Prof.

Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation). The panel finds by clear

and convincing evidence that Respondent comniitted this violation.

{y[ 50} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violations of Prof. Cond.

R. 1.2, 1.4, and 8.4 in regard to Burman. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds

that these violations have not been established by clear and convincing evidence.

COUNT "L": JOYCE CATTERSON

{y[ 51} On January 20, 1997, Joyce Catterson was involved in an automobile accident.

'Thereafter; she retained Respondent to pursue a claim against the other driver. About a year

after Respondent filed her action, the defendant died, but his attorney inexplicably failed to bring

his death to the attention of the court or Respondent. Despite his non-disclosure, that attorney

was able to secure a dismissal of the case in March 2000, for failure to perfect service on the by-

then-deceased defendant. Literally the next seven years appear to have been consumed with

straightening out the tangled mess this dubious dismissal created, all to no decisive effect.

During that time, the parties engaged in motion practice and appeals regarding the dismissal, a

2003 reinstatement, and a second dismissal recommended by a magistrate in 2007. It appears the

trial court has never taken any action on the magistrate's decision. In February 2010, following

Respondent's interim remedial suspension, Catterson received notice that she would have a

reasonable time to secure new counsel.

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{^f[ 52} Relator contends Respondent violated Prof. Cond. R. 1.4 by not keeping

Catterson informed of developments between the time of the magistrate's decision and his

interim remedial suspension. While the Catterson case reflects poorly on the legal system in

general, we do not find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Prof. Cond.

R. 1.4 in handling that convoluted matter. He testified, without contradiction, that nothing

happened in the case during the period between the magistrate's decision and his interim

remedial suspension, that as a result there was nothing to tell Catterson, and that whenever he

"would run into her husband somewhere ... I'd tell him, you know, nothing is transpiring." (Tr.,

55-56) We know of no authority - and Relator has supplied none - suggesting that it is a

disciplinary violation for an attorney not to update a client on the status of his or her case when

in fact there is nothing happening in the case and therefore nothing significant to report. The

panel therefore recommends dismissal of this count in its entirety.

COUNT "M"c JENNIFER AND GORDON COYIER

{9[ 531 In 2006, Jennifer Coyier retained Respondent to handle a step-parent adoption and

paid him $200. Respondent never filed the adoption petition.

{y[ 54} Coyier and her husband, Gordon, also retained Respondent to file a breach of

contract claim against a home improvement company. Respondent did so, but failed to perform

any other work on the case, which the court dismissed in September 2009.

{^[ 55} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding the Coyiers in 2009

violated Prof. Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness

in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping client reasonably informed and complying with

reasonable information requests), 1.15(d) (prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting),

1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned

13

fees). The parties also stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding the Coyiers in 2006

violated DR 6-101 (neglect of entrusted legal matter). The panel finds by clear and convincing

evidence that Respondent committed these violations.

111561 The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof. Cond.

R. 8.4 in regard to the Coyiers. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this

violation has not been established by clear and convincing evidence.

COUNT "N": EMIL FORISKA

{y[ 57} In January 2008, Emil Foriska retained Respondent to secure the reinstatement of

his Ohio driver's license. Respondent initiated but never completed the case and his inattention

resulted in its dismissal. Respondent also failed to respond to Foriska's attempts to reach him by

phone and mail.

{1158} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Foriska violated Prof.




termination), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of uneamed fees). The panel finds by clear and

convincing evidence that Respondent committed violations of Prof. Cond. R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3) and

(4), and 1.16(d).

{^[ 59} Because no evidence was presented with respect to fees Foriska paid, the panel

finds, despite the parties' stipulations, that the alleged violations of Prof. Cond. R. 1.15(d) and

1.16(e) have not been established by clear and convincing evidence.

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{y[ 60} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violations of Prof. Cond.

R. 1.1 and 8.4. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and finds that these violations have


COUNT "0": BETTY GARBACK

{y[ 61} In June 2009, Betty Garback retained Respondent and paid him $130 to transfer a

property interest. Respondent never completed the work, never responded to Garback's attempts

to contact him, and never refunded the money she paid him.

{1( 621 The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Garback violated Prof.




termination), and 1.1.6(e) (prompt return of unearned fees). The panel finds by clear and


{9[ 63} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof. Cond.

R. 8.4 in regard to Garback. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this


COUNT "P": SAED KHATIB

{9[ 64} In 2008, Saed Khatib retained Respondent to represent him in Khatib's separate

lawsuits against April Ramahi and Jamal Saed El-Makdah.

{y[ 65} Respondent entered his appearance in the Ramahi case four days before the

scheduled trial and immediately moved to continue it. When neither party's counsel appeared

for trial four days later, the court dismissed the Ramahi case without prejudice. Over the next

seven months, Khatib tried without success to contact Respondent by phone and mail to discuss

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the status of his case. He finally met with Respondent at his office on July 3, 2009 and asked

what it would take to refile his case. Khatib paid Respondent $200 to do so (in addition to $100

he previously had paid Respondent). Respondent never refiled the complaint, never responded

to Khatib's continual attempts to contact him, and never refunded the money Khatib paid him.

{'j[ 661 Respondent filed Khatib's complaint against El-Makdah on April 21, 2008. The

parties engaged in settlement discussions and briefing until the court granted El-Makdah's forum

non conveniens motion, dismissing the case without prejudice.

{'ff 671 The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct in handling Khatib's case against

Ramahi violated Prof. Cond. R. 1.1 (competent representation), 1.3 (reasonable diligence and

promptness in representation), 1.4(a)(3) and (4) (keeping client reasonably informed and

complying with reasonable information requests), and 1.16(d) (protecting client's interest upon

termination). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed

these violations.

{y[ 681 The parties also stipulate that Respondent's handling of Khatib's case against El-

Makdah did not violate any disciplinary rules and that these alleged violations should therefore

be dismissed. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that the alleged violations

involving Respondent's handling of Khatib's case against El-Makdah have not been established

by clear and convincing evidence.

COUNT "Q": TERRI RAUB

{y[ 691 In October 2008, Terri Raub paid Respondent $100 to draft a will. The parties

stipulate to the dismissal of this count because Respondent has completed the work. The panel

accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that the alleged violations regarding Raub have not

been established by clear and convincing evidence.

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COUNT "R": ARTHUR TITUS

{1[ 701 In July 2009, Arthur Titus retained Respondent and paid him $450 to transfer to

Titus the title to property that he had given to his late son. Respondent never completed the

work, never responded to Titus's attempts to contact him, and never refunded the money Titus

paid him.

{9[ 71} The parties stipulate thatRespondent's conduct regarding Titus violated Prof.






72} The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof. Cond.

R. 8.4 in regard to Titus. The panel accepts this stipulated dismissal and finds that this alleged


COUNT "S": CLYDE WEIMER

{9[ 731 In 2006, Clyde Weimer paid Respondent $1,900 to represent him in connection

with a potential claim. Respondent filed the complaint but dismissed the case voluntarily in

April 2009 and refiled it a month later. A notice to take Weimer's deposition was filed with the

court, but neither Respondent nor his client appeared for the deposition. Weimer subsequently

replaced Respondent with new counsel.

{^[ 74} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Weimer violated Prof.

Cond. R. 1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness in representation). The panel finds by clear

and convincing evidence that Respondent committed this violation.

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{T 751 The parties also stipulate to the dismissal of the alleged violation of Prof. Cond.

R. 1.1, 1.4, 8.4, and 1.16 in regard to Weimer. The panel accepts these stipulated dismissals and

fmds that these alleged violations regarding Weimer have not been established by clear and

convincing evidence.

COUNT "T": JOHN ZETTS

111761 In August 2009, John Zetts retained Respondent and paid him $550 to seek a

child support reduction. Respondent never completed the work, never responded to Zetts's

attempts to contact him, and never refunded the money Zetts paid him.

{9[ 77} The parties stipulate that Respondent's conduct regarding Zetts violated Prof.



(prompt delivery of client funds and full accounting), and 1.16(e) (prompt return of unearned

fees). The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed these

violations.

LACK OF MALPRACTICE INSURANCE

(cj[ 781 The parties further stipulate that, during the representations mentioned in their

stipulations, Respondent failed to advise the clients that he did not have legal malpractice

insurance and that each instance of this violated Prof. Cond. R. 1.4(c). Although the panel could

find no mention of these alleged violations in the amended complaint, the panel accepts the

parties' stipulation of these overarching violations as equivalent to an added charge as to which

Respondent knowinglv has made a binding admission. See Dayton Bar Assn. v. Landon, 108

Ohio St.3d 173, 2006-Ohio-546; Disciplinary Counsel v. Bowman, 99 Ohio St.3d 244, 2003-

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Ohio-3374. The panel finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent conunitted these

additional violations.

THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION

{9[ 791 Arriving at the appropriate sanction requires consideration of the attomey's

misconduct, the duties violated, the injuries caused, the attorney's mental state, and the sanctions

imposed in similar cases. Cleveland Bar Assn. v. McMahon, 114 Ohio St.3d 331, 2007-Ohio-

3673, ¶ 24. Before recommending a sanction, we also weigh the aggravating and mitigating

factors in the case, including not only those set forth in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations

Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on

Grievances and Discipline ("BCGD Proc. Reg."), but all factors relevant to the case. Cincinnati

Bar Assn. v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-4541, ¶ 40.

{lff 80} The parties have stipulated to the following six aggravating factors: (1) dishonest

or selfish motive (BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(1)(b)); (2) a pattern of misconduct{BCGD Proc. Reg.

10(B)(1)(c)); (3) multiple offenses (BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(1)(d)); (4) lack of cooperation in

the disciplinary process prior to the institution of formal proceedings (BCGD Proc. Reg.

10(B)(1)(e)); (5) vulnerability of and resulting harm to the victims of the misconduct (BCGD

Proc. Reg. 10(B)(1)(h)); and (6) failure to make restitution (BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(1)(i)). The

parties also have stipulated to the following five mitigating factors: (1) the lack of a prior

disciplinary record (BCGD Proc. Reg. l0(B)(2)(a)); (2) full and free disclosure of misconduct

(i.e., the stipulations) (BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(2)(d)); (3) Respondent's cooperative attitude

toward these proceedings after the filing of the formal complaint (Id.); (4) evidence of good

character and reputation (BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(2)(e)); and (5) Respondent's mental disability,

as determined by a qualified health care professional who found that it contributed to or caused

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his misconduct, that he has undergone a sustained period of successful treatment, and that

Respondent will be able to return to the competent, ethical practice under specified conditions

(BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i)-(iv)).

{9[ 81} The panel accepts these stipulated aggravating and mitigating factors and takes

them into account in considering the duties Respondent violated, the injuries he caused, the

attorney's mental state, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. Respondent repeatedly

violated duties to perform his clients' work competently, to keep them informed of the status of

their cases, and to return unearned fee payments or unused cost advances to them. His neglect of

these duties left many of his clients with profound legal difficulties to overcome and some with

potentially irreversible negative outcomes. Because Respondent had no malpractice insurance,

many of his clients have no genuine prospect for recovering their losses.

{182} As to Respondent's mental state, Dr. Nicholas Atanasoff, his treating psychiatrist,

submitted a report substantiating that Respondent suffered a major depressive disorder, that he is

in complete remission and no longer needs to be medicated, and that Respondent can resume the

competent, ethical practice of law. Paul Cami of OLAP testified that Respondent has been fully

compliant with his OLAP contract since signing it in November 2009.

A. The Parties' Positions on the Appropriate Sanction

{lf[ 83} Despite their stipulations as to aggravating and mitigating factors, the parties have

not agreed on a sanction. They agree that Respondent should be suspended, that he should

receive full credit for the interim remedial suspension he has served since October 29, 2009, and

that he should be ordered to fulfill the following seven requirements before being reinstated to

the practice of law: (1) he must provide proof of continuing mental health counseling and proof

that he is fully competent to return to the practice of law; (2) he must comply with all

20

requirements required by OLAP during the period of his suspension; (3) he must attend a course

in law office management approved by Relator; (4) he must comply with any and all mandatory

CLE requirements imposed by the Supreme Court; (5) he must pay the cost of this action as

required by the Supreme Court; (6) he must make a good faith effort to make full restitution to

his clients; and (7) upon reinstatement, he would be subject to a two-year probationary period,

during which he must (a) continue to abide by the foregoing requirements, (b) be monitored by

Relator, and (c) permit Relator to monitor his IOLTA.

{y[ 841 Despite these points of agreement, the parties disagree on the extent of the

suspension Respondent should be required to serve: Relator contends that Respondent's conduct

warrants an indefinite suspension, and Respondent argues for a two-year suspension.

B. The Panel's Recommendation on Sanction

85} The panel recommends that Respondent be suspended indefinitely. In making

this recommendation, we are conscious of the herculean strides Respondent has made in putting

his life back together. According to Paul Cami of OLAP, Respondent's compliance with his

OLAP contract has been not only consistent, it has been a model for other lawyers suffering from

depression and other incapacitating forms of mental illness. We also are conscious of the cases

(including those cited by Respondent) that suggest the Supreme Court has imposed two-year

suspensions (sometimes partially or completely stayed), as opposed to indefinite suspensions, in

instances where the Respondent had committed misconduct while in the throes of incapacity

(whether due to mental illness or substance abuse) and had been or was in treatment for it,

pursuant to an OLAP contract. See, e.g., Columbus Bar Assn. v. DiAlbert, 120 Ohio St.3d 37,

2008-Ohio-5218, ¶¶ 9-11; Disciplinary Counsel v. Blair, 128 Ohio St.3d 384, 2011-Ohio-767, ¶

21; Columbus Bar Association v. Ellis, 120 Ohio St.3d 89, 2008-Ohio-5278, ¶ 13; Disciplinary

21

Counsel v. Bowman, 110 Ohio St.3d 480, 2006-Ohio-4333, ¶ 39. But the instant matter cannot

reasonably be compared to those cases, given the sheer number of violations and victims

involved here. Respondent committed more than 80 disciplinary violations, harming at least 21

innocent victims, all of them clients whose interests he was bound to protect.. in some cases, his

conduct has subjected them to potentially irreversible legal hardships.

{J[ 86} This matter is also distinguishable froin those cases for two other reasons. First,

while much of Respondent's misconduct occurred during the time when depression brought on

by his marital problems and eventual divorce left him feeling overwhelmed and unable to attend

to his work - indeed unable even to leave his house for what seem like prolonged stretches - it

cannot be discounted that poor law office management also played a significant role. By the

time his marital troubles began, Responder,t had put and kept in place a case management system

that depended inordinately, indeed almost entirely, on the availability of his wife, who served as

his secretary, paralegal, and only assistant. As the number of clients affected here indicates,

Respondent's practice had become simply too large for a case management system that was

wholly dependent on the constant availability of his wife and that would.have faltered if she had

been rendered unavailable for a prolonged period, no matter what the cause.

11871 Respondent's clients had the right to assume he had established a case

management system with fail-safes that would permit him to carry on with their work despite the

temporary - or, as eventually occurred, the permanent - absence of his administrative assistant.

But the fact is he did not establish such a system. The design of this ill-conceived case

management system must be regarded as the product of conscious decision-making by

Respondent long before his marital troubles began. This fact is reason enough to distinguish the

cases cited above. It also is reason enough to require that he apply for reinstatement and in doing

22

so demonstrate compliance with stringent conditions calculated to ensure that in the future he

will adopt thoughtful case management procedures that are consonant with his workload and

have built-in safeguards.

{y[ 88} A second distinguishing feature of this matter is that Respondent committed other

misconduct that did not stem from either his poor case management system or his marital

troubles. By his own admission, for example, his conduct in the matter involving William

DiRenzo preceded his marital troubles and derived from his poor judgment in entering into

business dealings with a friend and client and in not making sure that DiRenzo had the benefit of

independent legal advice. His failure to advise clients he had no malpractice insurance preceded

his marital troubles, as did his failure to file the step-parent adoption for Jennifer Coyier.

{^[89} Stillothermisconduct-committedhy-Respondtntfits-arunsettlingpatterirofa -

different nature, equally separate from his depression: well into 2009, at a time when

Respondent contends he was either non-functional or minimally functional due to his depression,

he still was meeting with new clients, accepting money to do their legal work, failing to complete

the tasks entrusted to him, and retaining their money. The matters involving Evelyn Sue Lorent,

Betty Garback, Tina Marie Benson, Saed Khatib, and John Zetts all highlight this particular

feature of his misconduct, which cannot be characterized simply as a by-product of his

depression. If, as we believe Respondent plausibly contends, he was too debilitated to handle

legal work competently during the second half of 2008 and all of 2009, one naturally wonders

why he also was not too debilitated to accept new legal work and the money that came with it.

{J[ 901 For all of the above reasons, the panel concludes that an indefinite suspension is

appropriate.

23

{'f[ 911 The panel also recommends that, prior to reinstatement, Respondent be required

to demonstrate that he has fulfilled the following conditions: (1) he must provide proof of

continuing mental health counseling and proof that he is fully competent to return to the practice

of law; (2) he must comply with all requirements required by OLAP during the period of his

suspension; (3) he must attend a rigorous and comprehensive course in law office management

approved by Relator; (4) he must comply with any and all mandatory CLE requirements imposed

by the Supreme Court; (5) he must pay the cost of this action as required by the.Supreme Court;

(6) he must make full restitution to Bury, Cenneno, the DiDomenicos, Lorent, Hovanes, the

Corlls, Benson, Bodendorfer, Jennifer Coyier, Garback, Khatib, Titus, Weimer, and Zetts for any

unearned fees and unused cost advances, fulfillment of which must be certified by Relator;' (7)

Respondent shall not commit any further misconduct during the period of suspension; and (8)

upon reinstatement, he would be subject to a two-year probationary period, during which he must

(a) continue to abide by the foregoing requirements to the extent they are of a continuing nature,

(b) be monitored by Relator, and (c) permit Relator to monitor his IOLTA.

{y[ 921 Finally, the panel recommends that Respondent receive partial, not full, credit for

the interim remedial suspension served. Full credit would amount to about 19 months as of the

date of this report and could well amount to more than 24 months by the time the Supreme Court

acts on the Board's recommendation, in which event he would be immediately eligible to apply

I The panel cannot determine from the present record exactly how much of the following amounts paidby these clients to Respondent constitute unearned fees and unused cost advances: Bury ($1,350),Cenneno ($1,200), the DiDomenicos ($1,700), Lorent ($1,300), Hovanes ($1,900), the Corlls ($1,300),Benson ($1,000), Bodendorfer ($1,000), Jennifer Coyier ($200), Garback ($130), Khatib ($300), Titus ($450),Weimer ($1,900), and Zetts ($550). The correct amount that Respondent did not earn (or use, in the caseof cost advances) and should have returned to these clients may well be less than the total of thesepayments, $14,280. Because the panel simply cannot discern it, Relator is in the best position todetermine what constitutes fulfillment of this "full restitution" requirement and to certify to the Supreme

Court that Respondent has fulfilled this requirement.

24

for reinstatement. If all of Respondent's misconduct could be attributed to his depression, the

evidence from his treating psychiatrist Dr. Atanasoff that his illness is in complete remission

logically might have justified giving Respondent full credit for the interim remedial suspension,

given that his incapacity appears to have been the event that triggered the need for an interim

remedial suspension. But, as mentioned above, not all of his misconduct can be attributed to his

depression.

{II 93} As also mentioned above, depending on when the Supreme Court acts on the

Board's recommendation, giving Respondent full credit could make him eligible for

reinstatement as soon as, or almost as soon as, the effective date of an indefinite suspension

order. This result cannot be justified in this instance because, again, Respondent committed

significant misconduct not attributable to his depression and needs time to gain comprehensive

la-wo€fice management skills and to make restitution to his victims.2 Because the panel believes

the inisconduct not attributable to Respondent's depression would warrant actual suspension

time in its own right, the panel recommends that Respondent receive no more than three-fourths,

or 18 months, of credit (whichever is smaller) for whatever interim suspension time he has

served by the time the Supreme Court imposes a suspension. So, for example:

2 The panel is aware that the parties stipulated Respondent should only have to make a good faith effortat restitution prior to reinstatement and that both sides feel it would be difficult for Respondent to makefull restitution, given his current circumstances. In the Supreme Court's recent decisions imposingindefinite suspensions, however, requiring full restitution to victims (or, as the case may be,reimbursement of the Client Security Fund) prior to reinstatement appears to be the norm. See, e.g.,

Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 128 Ohio St.3d 317, 2011-Ohio-234, q 6; Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Gresley,

127 Ohio St.3d 430, 2010-Ohio-6208, '127; Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman, 127 Ohio St.3d 411, 2010-Ohio-

5990, 9157; Disciplinary Counsel v. Bandman, 125 Ohio St.3d 503, 2010-Ohio-2115, Q 20. See also Akron Bar

Assn. v. Mudrick, (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 621, 623 (where Respondent already had made partial restitution,

the Supreme Court ordered full restitution as a condition of reinstatement).

25

. if, by the time the Supreme Court imposes a suspension, 20 months have passed

since Respondent's interimremedial suspension, Respondent's credit for time

served would be limited to 15 months; and


since Respondent's interim remedial suspension, Respondent's credit for time

served would be limited to 18 months; and


since his interim remedial suspension, his credit for time served likewise would

be limited to 18 months.

This recommended formula is intended to ensure that Respondent serves a period of actual

suspension after the Supreme Court acts on the panel's recommendation, which would serve the

dual purpose of protecting the public and allowing him time to comply with whatever conditions

forxeinstatement the Supreme Court imposes. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 119 Ohio

St.3d.330, 2008-Ohio-3836, ¶ 22.

BOARD RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to Gov. Bar Rule V(6)(L), the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio considered this matter on April 8, 2011. The Board

adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Panel. However, based on a record

replete with serious misconduct, the Board recommends that Respondent, Warren Pritchard, be

indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with no credit for time served and that he pay full

restitution. The Board further recommends that the cost of these proceedings be taxed to

Respondent in any disciplinary order entered, so that execution may issue.

26

Pursuant to the order of the Board of Commissioners onGrievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio,I hereby certify the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law, and Recommendatio'ps as those of th^Board.

H W. ARSHABoard of Commissioners onGrievances and Discipline ofthe Supreme Court of Ohio

27

isefum #4t l3vttr# uf (llmMncisg'innersan (fimuttnr.m mai Disciplinm

of t4t ouprtme ltCrnu-t nf QDI#u

Complaint Against: }}

WARREN G. `Bo" PR1TCaASD }Registration Number 0008417 }296 North Canfield-Niles Road }Youngstown, Ohio 44515 }

} Case Ng 2010-025Respondent }

}}V.}

MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASS'N. }114 East Front Street, Suite 100 }Youngstown Ohio 44503 }

Relator }

STIPULATIONS OF FACTS

COME Now THE REI.AToIt, the MAHONING COiTNTY BAIi ASSOCIA-

TioN, and the Respondent, WARREN G. `Bo" PttrrCxARn, and stipulate

to the following in lieu of testimony touching such matters.

1

TASLE oF CoriTEE1VTs

I. Parties ..................................................4

II.Facts ....................................................4

A MaTgaret A Bury (Amended Complaint 114-10, 11291-298). ... 4

B. Gerald Cenneno (Amended Complaint 9[9[11- 30, 19[299-306). ... 6

C. Columbiana County Bar Asso©ation/Estate of Steve Yancsarak

( A m e n d e d C o m p i a i n t 9[Q31-34, 9[9[307-310) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

D. William DiR,en,b (Amended Coniplaint q9[3547, $9[311-314). .. 12

E. Amyand Joseph D iDomenico (Amended Complaint f(48-85, 315-

320) . ......................................... 16

F. Evelyn Suel-orent (Amended Complaint $186-89, 321-326)

.................................... .......22G. Caro1 Hovanes (Amended Complaint 9[9[90-104, 9[$327-331).... 24

H. Duane and Tracie Coril (Amended Complaint19(105-108, 332-338)

........................................ 27Tina Marie Benson (Amended Complaint 9[9[125-129, 339-344)... .. 31

J. Richard Bodendorfer (Amended Complaint $9[130-133, 345-350)

..............................................33K Darlene Bunnan (Estate of Ronald Papke) (Amended Coznplaint

9(9f 134-142, 11351-356) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

L. Joyoe Catfi,mon (Amended Complaint 11143-192, 9[$357-362). . 36

(Case No. 1999 CV 129) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

(Case No. 2002 CV 1468) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

M Jennifer and Goidon Coyier III (Amended Complaint 11193-204,

363370) .......................................44N. Emil Foriska (Amended Complaint 9[9[ 205-214, 9[9[370-376).. .. 47

0. Betty Garback (Amended Complaint 9[9[215-217, 19[377-382)

..............................................50P. Saed Khatib (Amended Complaint 11218-236, 11383-390). .... 52

2007 CV 3935 IDatib v. Ro,mahi :.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522008 CV G 00597 If{atib v. El Makdah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

2

Q. Terri Raub (Amended Complaint 11237-238, 391-396) ....... 56

R. Arthur Titus (Amended Complaint 9[9[239-242, 9[1397-402). ... 56

S. Ciyde Weimer (Amended Complaint 11243-265, 11403-408). .. 58

Case NQ 2006 CV 3691 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Case N° 2009 CV 1532 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

T. John Zetts (Amended Complaint 9[9[266-290, 11409-413). ..... 61

U. Lack of Insurance ................................... 62

III - DIsMIssAI.s .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

lV - AGGRAVATING ANI) MITIGATING FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

A. Aggravation ........................................66

B.Mtigation . . .......................................66

C. Otb.er rnu*iiAhmPnt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

D. Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

3

I. Parties

1. Relator is a local bar association which maintains a certified

grievance committee pursuant to Gov. BAR R. V, §3.

2. Respondent is an attorney at law and is duly licensed to

practice law in the State of Ohio. His bar registration number is

0008417.

3. Respondent's last known business address is 296 N. Can-

field-Nz1es Road, Youngstown, Ohio 44515. His current residence

address is 4531 Woodland, Apartment NQ 3, Youngstown, Ohio 44515.

4. Respondent was admiteed to the practice of law in Ohio on

May 5, 1982, and has been an attorney in good standing since that

date. The Respondent has no prior discipline.

II. Facts

A. Margaret A. Bury (Amended Complaint y[y[4-10,Q9[29X 298)

1. On May 27, 2009, grievant Margaret Bury ("Bury") met with

Respondent for the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition on her

behalf.

2. On that date, Bury paid a partial payment of $300.00 to the

Respondent. Thereafter, on June 20, 2009, she paid another $500.00.

to Respondent. (See, Eshibit A 1.) On July 1, 2009, Bury paid $250.00

toward the fees that the Respondent required to file the bankruptcy

and for the fee required by the United States Bankruptcy Court (which

was $299.00). (See, Estnbit A-2.) Bur/s total payment to Respondent

was to be $1,350.00.

3. Respondent requested that Bury produce paperwork that

would permit him to Sle the banlcmptcy on Bury's behalf. Bury

produced the requested paperwork, and Respondent advised her that

he would file the bankruptcy petition.

4

4. On July 18, 2009, Bury met with the Respondent for a final

meeting to review her case prior to filing the bankruptcy petition. Since

that meeting, Bury called the Respondent on numerous occasions. The

Respondent failed to return Bury's calls.

5. On August 17, 2009, Bury telephoned Respondent and

received a recording that the telephone line had been disconnected.

6. On August 21, 2009, Bury again caIled Respondent's phone

and received the answering machine. Bury left two messages. To date,

Bury has never received a telephone call from Respondent or anyone

on his behalf.

7. On May 26, 2010, Bury, represented by Robert T. Bricker,

Esq., 106 South Broad Street, Canfield, Ohio 44406, filed a Chapter 7

Voluntary Bankruptcy Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Northern District of Ohio (Youngstown), Case No.10-41986 kw,

and paid a filing fee in the amount of $299.00.

8. On September 22, 2010, a discharge was ordered by the

bankruptcy judge.

9. Respondent has failed to refund any portion of the fees for

legal services paid by her.

10. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes aviolation of Rule

1.1 (Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which

provides that:

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to aclient. Competent representation requires the legal knowl-edge, sM thoroughness, preparation reasonably necessaryfor the representation.

11. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes aviolation of: Rule

1.15(d) (Safekeeping Funds and Property) which provides that:

(d) Upon receiving funds or property in which aclienti... has an interest, a lawyer shaII promptly notify theclient or third person. Except as stated in this rule orotherwise permitted by law or agreement with the client...,

5

confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to theclient ... any fnnds... that the client... is entitled to receive.Upon request by the client..., the lawyer shall promptlyrender a full accounting regarding such funds ... .

12. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule

1.16(d) and (e) (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio

Code of Professional Conduct, which provides that:

(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable,to protect a client's interest The steps include giving duenotice to the client, aIlowingreasonable time for employmentof other counsel, delivering to the client aIl papers andproperty to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shallbe promptly delivered to the client. "Client papers andproperty" may include correspondence, pleadings, depositiontranscripts, eshibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.

(e) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.

B. Gerald Cenneno (Amended Complaint f[$11• 30,f9[299-306)

1. On or about Aprll 17, 2008, Gerald Cenneno ("Cenneno")

retained Respondent for a breach of contract case against St. Anne

LAranian Byzantine Catholic Church. Respondent agreed to represent

Cenneno for a retainer of $1,200.00, and stated that he would file the

complaint against the church in the Austintown court system (Mahoni-

ng County Area No. 4 Court). Cenneno paid Respondent the required

fee in three separate payments.

2. Respondent prepared and filed the complaint on July 1, 2008.

Service on the defendant was completed on July 7, 2008.

6

3. On August 8, 2008, the defendant fled a "Cross Complaint/

Counterclaim" against Gerald Cenneno and John Doe, partner in

Howling Acres Kennels and Lawncare as additional defendants.

4. Cenneno had not heard from the Respondent between the final

payment of the retainer and the receipt by Cenneno of the new

pleadings on or about August 11, 2008.

5. Cenneno then met with the Respondent, who stated that he

needed to turn in some paperwork. Cenneno broughtto the Respondent

the requested papers, and Respondent stated that he would file them

with the court.

6. Cenneno then never heard from Respondent again. Cenneno

caIled many times throughout 2008 and 2009. Many messages were left

with the Respondent. No messages were returned

7. Discovery was issued to the other parties by the defendant

church. Thereafter, a motion to compel discovery was filed on behalf of

the church on November 10, 2008.

8.. On January 7, 2009, motions for default judgment and for

sanctions were filed against the other parties on behalf of the defendant

church.

9. On February 24, .2009, a request for a case status was

forwarded to the Respondent.

10. On March 2, 2009, the court granted default judgment in

favor of defendant St. Anne Ukranian Byzantine Catholic Church and

against Howling Acres Kennels and Lawncare, Gerald Cenneno, and

John Doe, Partner in Howling Acres Kennels and Lawncare.

11. On Apri19, 2009, a certificate of judgment was issued to the

counsel for the church, which was Sled with the Court of Common

Pleas on May 18, 2009. (See, Exhibit B-1.)

7

12. On or about Apri120, 2009, Cenneno received a letter from

St. Anne's attorney stating that Cenneno and Howling Acres had lost

the case by default. Cenneno claims that they were never notified by

either the court or Respondent of anyhearing orrequirement to appear.

13. When Cenneno received the letter from the church's counsel,

Cenneno telephoned the Respondent for approximately three weeks

straight until Cenneno was finally able to reach Respondent.

14. Respondent stated that he was never notified of any oourt

hearing, and that other clients had been placed in similar circum-

stanoes by the courL Respondent stated he would talk to the Magistrate

and would call Cenneno back that day.

15. Respondent never contacted Cenneno, so Cenneno continued

to call Respondent several times the followingweek. Messages were left

with the Respondent's secretary. Respondent never retarned any of

Cenneno's telephone calls.

16. Cenneno continued to telephone Respondent until he again

reached him. At that time, Respondent stated that the Magistrate was

on vacation and that the Respondent would see the Magistrate and

take care of it.

17. Cenneno continued to contact Respondent many times, and

continued to leave messages requesting that Cenneno be informed as

to the status of the case.

18. After several months, Cenneno finally reached the Respon-

dent, and was once again informed by Respondent that he would have

to see the Magistrate. Respondent stated that he would call Cenneno

on Friday or by noon that Saturday. Respondent never returned

Cenneno's telephone caIl.

8

19. Cenneno telephoned the Austintown court at the end of July,

2009. Cenneno was then informed by the court staff that no pleadings

had been filed on his behalf, and that he should speak to his attorney.

20. As a result, Cenneno again attempted to telephone Respon-

dent, and left several messages with Respondent's daughter. Respon-

dent never returned these calls.

21. Thereafter, Cenneno continued to telephone Respondent

many times, and again did not receive a response.

22. On November 30, 2009, Attorney Charles Dunlap entered an

appearance on behalf of Gerald Cenneno and others, and filed a motion

to vacate the order of default judgment.

23. The Magistrate sustained the motion to vacate in an entry of

February 1, 2010. Objections to the Magistrate's Decasion were filed on

February 12, 2010.

24. On April 21, 2010, County Court Judge David D'Apolito

overruled the Magistrate's recommendation, and upheld the default

judgment in favor of St. Anne's Church and against Howling Acres and

Gerald Cenneno. The Court thereafter set the matter for a hearing on

damages.

25. As of the date of this stipulation, a hearing on the issue of

damages was set for December 17, 2010 and the docket reflects no

disposition as yet.

26. The conduct ofthe Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule


provides that:

A]awyer shall provide competent representation to aclient. Competent representation requires the legal lmowi-edge, s1ciIl, thoroughness, preparation reasonably necessaryfor the representation.

27. The conduct of the Respondent cronstitutes a violation o6 Rule

1.3 (Di7igence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides

9

that: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in

representing a client."

28. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation oF Rule

1.4 (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which

provides that:

A lawyer shall: ... 3. Keep the client reasonablyinformed about the status of the matter; ... 4. Comply assoon as practicable with reasonable requests for informationfrom the client.

29. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of

Rule.1.15 (d) (Safekeeping Fnnds and Property) which provides that:

(d) Upon receiving funds or property in which aclient... has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify theclient or third person. Except as stated in this rule orotherwise permitted by law or agreement with the client...,confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to theclient... any funds... that the client... is entitled to receive.Upon request by the client..., the lawyer shall promptlyrender a full accounting regarding such funds ... .


1.16(d) and (e) (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio

Code of Professional Conduct which provides that:

(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shaIl take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable,to protect a clienYs interest. The steps include giving duenotice to the client, allowing reasonable time for employmentof other counsel, delivering to the client aIl papers andproperty to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shaIIbe promptly delivered to the client. "Client papers andproperty" may include correspondence, pleadings, depositiontranscripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.

(e) A lawyer who withdraws &om employment shallrefund_promptly any part of a fee.paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.

10

C. Columbiana County Bar Associatfon/Estate ofSteve Yancsurak (Amended Complaint 9f9(3T-34,9ff307-3Z0)

1. Respondent was counsel and was appointed to be the

commissioner for the estate of Steve Yancsurak in the Court of

Common Pleas, Probate Division, of Columbiana County, Ohio. The

release for administration of the estate came before the court on May

14, 2009 pursuant to the court's orders of citation to show cause.

Appearing before that court was Donna Yancsurak, the applicant.

Respondent was also ordered to appear: Respondent failed to do so.

(See, Exhibit C-1.)

2. The court found that Respondent failed to appear for the last

two hearings and had been wamed that his failure to appear would

result in a finding of contempt and that appropriate sanctions,

including a warrant for his arrest, would be issued.

3. The court found Respondent in contempt of the court's order

for the Respondent's failure to appear for hearings and to timely

complete the release from administration form. A warrant was issued

for Respondent's arrest, declaring that upon apprehension, he was

subject to release upon posting a $2,500.00 recognizance bond with the

court; that he appear before the court as and when ordered for fnrther.

hearings; and that he advise the court at all times regarding his

cvrrent address apd mailfng address, as well as current telephone

number. A copy of the order was delivered to the Columbiana County

Certified Grievance Committee for further consideration. (See, copy of

Court's order of May 15, 2009 attached as Exhibit C-1 to the Amended

Complaint, and the Curfsbench warrant of May 15, 2009 attached as

Exhibit C-2 to the Amended Complaint.)

4. The Columbiana County Certified Grievance Committee then

forwarded the Court's order to Relator for further handling.

11

5. The Court has ordered a recall ofthe warrant, and has ordered

the payment of $45.00 in costs, which Respondent has paid. (See,

Exhibit (C-3).

6. The conduct of the Respondent wnstitutes a violation of Rule

1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides



D. William. D%Renxo (Amended Complaant 9[135-47,9If31I-314)

1. Respondent served as the legal counsel for grievant William

DiRenzo ("DiRenzo°) from at least October of 2003 through May 8,

2009.2. During the period that Respondent served as DiRenzo's

counsel, DiRenzo learned that the Respondenfs mother, Catherine

Pritchard, had property for sale on State Route 46 in Austintown

Township, Mahoning County, Obio.

3. Thereafter, Respondent, on behalf of his mother, reached an

agreement with his client (DiRenzo) for the purchase of one lot known

as Permanent Parce1480400158000. (See, Eshfbit D-4.)

4. The lot was sold and title was transferred to DiRenzo on or

about September 1, 2004. (See, Vol. 005471, page 1425, Instrument No.

2004 00037392, Mahoning County Recordex's records.)

5. Respondent owned the remaining 17 acres of land on State

Route 46.

6. Respondent later agreed to sell 2 acres of the 17 acres to Carol

Fye, for $60,000.00. Ms. Tye made two payments toward the purchase

price, $5,000.00 and $25,000.00, leaving a balance of $30,000:00.

7. Respondent advised Fye that a survey needed to be done to

divide out the two acres that she was purchasing.

12

8. While waiting for the survey work to be performed, a foreclo-

sure action, involving all 17 acres, was filed against Respondent.

9. On March 31, 2006, after the foreclosure had been filed,

DiRenzo entered into a partnership agreement, forming 46 Partners

with two other individuals, Mr. Doclay and Mr. Pancoe. (See, Exln'bit

D-5.) The purpose of the partnership was the acquisition of the 15 acre

parcel of land owned by Respondent on State Route 46, to be held for

development or resale by the partners.

10. On October 1, 2006, DiRenzo and the other partners signed

a purchase agreement on behalf of 46 Partners to purchase the 15 aere .

tract from Respondent. In fintherance of efforts of 46 Partners to

obtain financing, DiRenzo provided financial information for a state-

ment. of assets and liabilities on October 22, 2006. (See, Exhibit D-6.)

11. Respondent attempted to obtain alternate fmancing for

himself or for 46 Partners, to save the property from foredosure, but

was unsuccessful.

12. A sheriffs sale was scheduled for November 28, 2006.

13. On November 28, 2006 Ddi.enzo provided a deposit of

$28,000.00 for the purchase of property on State Route 46. Direnzo

made the check payable to "Michael B. Dockry." Dockry is an attorney

licensed to prad3ce law in the State of Ohio, is the current Austintown

Township Administrator, one of the partners in 46 Partners, and

previously shared office space with Respondent.

14. DiRenzo then obtained an official check (No. 3687217) from

Sky Bank in the amount of $28,000.00, and delivered the check to

Michael Dockry on November 28, 2006 as requested by Respondent.

(See Exhibit D-1.)

15. Respondent added $1,500.00 of his own funds, for a total of

$29,500.00, and sent Michael Dockry to the Sheriffs sale.

13

16. Carol Fye was also at the Sheriff sale, with $15,000.00.

17. At the Sheriffs sale, Doelny and Carol F'ye agreed to pool

their funds to bid on the property. Ms.F^ye knew Doekry was there on

behalf of Respondent and knew that Dockrybrought funds to bid on the

property on behalf of Respondent.

18. F!ye and Dockry joined their funds together and purchased

the property at the Sheriff sale.

19. After speaking with Respondent, Fye placed the property in

her name, with the understanding that Respondent would continue to

seek financing to purchase the property and the title issues would be

resolved later. When Respondent could not obtain additional financing,

Fye kept the $29,500.00 that Doakry had brought to the Sheriff sale,

considering it repayment ofthe $30,000.00 payment she previouslyhad

made to Respondent, since she had not received a deed for the two

acres. Fye thus obtained title over the entire 15 acre pareel, and

whether she holds two acres in constructive trust for DiRenzo is beyond

the scope of this proceeding.

20. After Respondent informed DiRenzo that he could purchase

whatever interest Respondent had in the property for the $1,500.00

that the Respondent had pooled with Dockry, DiRenzo obtained a

check in the amount of $1,500.00, that was payable to Respondent and

was delivered to his office.

21. This check was cashed by Respondent on June 20,2007. (See

Exhibit D-3.)

22. While the real estate matters were ongoing, Respondent and

DiRenzo were involved in legal proceedings croncerning the death of

DiRenzo's spouse.

23. According to the information received from the Mahoning

County Sheriffs office and DiRenzo's bank, the $28,000.00 check that

14

DiRenzo had delivered to Doclay was negotiated by Dockry at First

Place Bank on November 28, 2006. First Place Bank then issued a

check (No. 3003382) in the amount of $29,500.00 payable to the

Sheriffs Department on November 28, 2006. That check showed "46

Partners" as the remitter.

24. Fye purchased at a Sheriffs Sale on November 28, 20061and

that included what DiRenzo had believed would be his two acres of

land.

25. At the time of the SheriSs sale Fye made a deposit of

$44,500.00, $29,500:00 ofwhich came from "46 Partners" and $15,000.-

00 came from Carol F^ye.

26, To date, Fye remains the owner of the entire 17 acre parcel

of property. Respondent has been unable to secure a deed for DiRenzo

or for 46 Partners, and neither Respondent nor 46 Partners have

returned the money to DiRenzo.

14. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes violations of:

DR-5-104(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Limited

Business Relationship With A Client) which provides that:

A lawyer shall not enter in a business transactionwith a client if they have differing interests therein and iftheclient expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judg-ment therein for the protection of the client, unless the clienthas consented after full disclosure

and Rule 1.8 (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules) ofthe

Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shall

not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire

an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse

to a client"

15

E. Amy and Joseph DiDomenico (Amended Com-plaint ff48-85, 815-320)

1. On July 16, 2005, J & V Roofing and Home Improvement was

contracted to replace grievants Amy and Joseph DiDomenico

("DiDomenicos") roof because of its age and condition.

2. The DiDomenicos claimed that the roof replacement was

substandard and resulted in damages to their home. Thereafter, they

retained attorney Anthony Donofrio to file a complaint against J& V

for breach of contract, brea.ch of warranty, and violations of Ohio's

Consumer Sales Practices Act.

3. Mr. Donofrio did file a.complaint against J& V Roofing in the

Mahoning County Court Area No. 4 on August 30, 2007. (Case No.

2007 CVF 1302.)

4. Thereafter, the DiDomenicos decided to retain Respondent to

represent them in connection with their dispute against J& V. At the

initial meeting with Respondent on September 15, 2007, neither the

DiDomenicos nor Respondent were aware of the fact that Mr. Donofrio

had filed a lawsuit, numbered as Case No. 2007 CVF 1302.

5. Respondent agreed to represent the DiDomenicos on Septem-

ber 15, 2007. At that time the DiDomenicos paid a retainer fee of

$850.00.

6. On September 26, 2007, Respondent filed a complaint against

J& V Roofing in the Mahoning County Court, Area No. 4(Case No.

2007 CVF 1478 on that Court's docket). At the time of this filing, he

was unaware of the pending DiDomenico complaint in Case No. 2007

CVF 1302.

7. Respondent sent a letter to attorney Donofrio informing him

that Respondent had been retained and Respondent requested a copy

of Donofrio's file.

16

8. Upon receipt of Donofrio's file, Respondent became aware that

Donofrio had filed a complaint Case No. 2007 CVF 1302.

9. Respondent filed a notice of appearance in Case No. 2007 CVF

1302 on December 4, 2007. (See Exhibit E-1.)

10. Respondent was to perform work on an hourly basis. There

is no written agreement evidencing the hourly rate or other financaal

arrangements between Respondent and the DiDomenicos.

11. On January 27, 2008, the DiDomenicos paid Respondent

$250.00. Additional fees, in the amount of $600.00, were paid on July

19, 2008. The DiDomenicos elaim to have been told that fees paid on

July 19, 2008 were to cover witness/subpoena fees. Additional Court

costs of $20.00 were paid directly to Court No. 4 on June 30,2009. (See

Exhibits E-2, E-3, and E-4.)

12. On February 20, 2008, the case originally filed by Donofrio,

2007 CVF 1302, was called for a pretrial. Counsel for both the

DiDomenicos and J & V were present. The Court ordered that

discovery be eompleted in 90 days, and a dispositive motion deadline

was scheduled for 120 days thereafter. The trial to the bench was

scheduled for five months. The Court granted the plaintiffs' oral motion

to amend the compla.int. The motion to dismiss previously filed by the

defendant, which was set for a non-oral hearing, was continued pending

the filing of the amended complaint. The motion to dismiss asserted

that the defendants were not properly named in the complaint.

13. On May 7, 2008, the Court held another pretrial on th 2007

CVF 1302 case, and scheduled the c.ivil trial for Augast 8, 2008.

14. On May 9, 2008, the DiDomenicDs were to meet with the

Respondent at his office at 4:30 pm. Respondent did not appear for the

appointment at his office. The DiDomenicos sat at Respondent's office

17

parking lot for 45 minutes and then received a call from Respondent

eventually to cancel the appointment.

15. On July 23,2008, the DiDomenicos again contacted Respon-

dent and left a message. He did not return this call.

16 On July 28, 2008, the defendant's counsel in the 2007 CVF

1302 case fiied a motion to withdraw.

17. Because two lawsuits asserting the same c]aims against the

same party were pending and proceeding simultaneously, and there

were issues with how Mr. Donofrio named the defendant in 2007 CVF

1302, on August 6, 2008, Respondent voluntarily dismissed the 2007

CVF 1302 case without prejudice, pursuant to Oxio Civ. R. 41(A). The

Court closed its case on August 11, 2008. (See, Court docket, Exhibit

E-1.)

18. On August 7, 2008, the DiDomenioos contacted Respondent

to confirm the time and date of trial. At that time, Respondentinformed

the DiDomenicos that the orlginal Court date of August 8, 2008 was

cancelled.

19. On September 5, 2008, the Court forwarded a request for a

case status to Respondent for the sole pending case 2007 CVF 1478.

Not having received a response, the Court dismissed the case for failure

to appear and proceed, at plaintiffs' cost. Neither Respondent nor the

DiDomenicos received notice of either the hearing or the dismissal.

20. On September 11, 2008, the DiDomenicos telephoned

Respondent. Respondent's secretary said she would take a message and

have Respondent return the call. Respondent did not return the call.

21. On September 15, 2008, the DiDomenioos telephoned

Respondent and left a message. Respondent did not return this call.

22. On September 23, 2008, the DiDomenicos again telephoned

Respondent and left a message. Respondent did not immediately return

18

the call, but the DiDomenicros were able to reach Respondent by

telephone. When they did, Respondent stated that he was iIl and did

not have a secretary. In a second telephone conversation, Respondent

stated that he had a teenager at home who was ill and that he didn't

have a secretary anymore.

23. On March 6, 2009, the DiDomenioos stopped by Respondent's

office to ask if any progress had been made in refiling the case. An

appointment was scheduled for March 7, 2009.

24. On March 7, 2009, the DiDomenicos appeared at Respon-

dent's office for the scheduled appointsnent. At that time, they ques-

tioned Respondent regaxding his failure to appear at the prior hearing.

Respondent stated that he was going through a divorce, his wife had

left him, and his files were intentionally disorganized and/or tampered

with. Respondent advised that he would attempt to reopen the case.

25. On March 13, 2009, the DiDomenicos telephoned Respon-

dent. At that time, they left a message on his answering machine, but

did not receive a response.

26. On March 14, 2009, the DiDomenicos telephoned Respon-

dent. At that time, they left a message on his answering machine, but

did not receive a response.

27. On March 17, 2009, the DiDomenicos contactedRespondent's

office. At that time, they spoke to Respondent's son who advised that

he was acting as Respondent's secretary.

. 28. On March 19, 2009, Respondent filed a motion to vacate the

Court's judgment entry of dismissal of October 27, 2008. On the same

day, Respondent telephoned the DiDomenicos to advise that the

Magistrate was only in on Fridays. The Respondent advised that the

matter would proceed in front of the Magistrate, and he would make a

19

decision whether to reinstate the case or whether the DiDomenicros

would have to re-file the case.

29. On March 23, 2009, the Court gave notice to the parties that

a hearing on the motion would be scheduled for Apri124, 2009 at noon.

30. On Apri116, 2009, the D>Domenicos telephoned the Respon-.

dent to determine if he had sufficient paperwork to support their case.

Respondent returned the phone call and stated that the hearing was

non-oral and that the DiDomenicos need not appear.

31. In the judgment entry ofApri127, 2009, the Court noted that

the case had been caIled for a non-oral hearing on the plaintiffs' motion

to vacate the order of dismissal dated October 27, 2008. The Court

noted, however, that no attorney for the defendant had been served

with plaintiffs' motion, and therefore the Court continued the hearing

for 30 days.

32. On Apri130, 2009, Respondent was requested to bring $20.00

to the Court in order to permit service to proceed.

33. On June 24, 2009, the DiDomenicos telephoned the Court

Administrator, and at that time learned that the Respondent had not

paid the fee to perfect certified mail service:

34. At that time, the DiDomenicos called and spoke to the

Respondent's son who advised that Respondent was out of town and

that he would give him the message.

35. On June 29, 2009, the DiDomenicos went to the Court and

paid the $20.00 Court fee directly. (Respondent is not sure why this was

required, as service had already been made upon the defendant.)

36. Thereafter, the DiDomeni<ns called the Respondent several

times and received a busy signal at Respondent's office. They were not

able to leave a message on an answering machine.

20

37. On June 30, 2009, the Court scheduled a hearing on the

motion for August 14, 2009 at 9:15 a.m.

38. Successful service on the defendant was made on July 14,

2009.

39. On July 20, 2009, an attorney, James Wise, filed a notice of

substitution of counsel with the Court on behalf of the defendant.

40. On July 29, 2009, the DiDomenicos forwarded a certified

letter to the Respondent reminding him of the pending trial. The letter

was returned to sender unclaimed.

41. Respondent didnot appear for the Court's scheduled hearing

on August 14, 2009. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the

DiDomenicos call during Court to remind Respondent of the trial. The

DiDomenicos telephoned and reminded the Respondent that they had

forwarded to him a certified letter but received no response.

42. The Court treated the August 14 hearing as a pretrial, and

noted that discovery was to be completed in 60 days, and that dispositi

ve motions were to be filed in 90 days. The Court scheduled a trial to

the bench in 120 days.

43. On January 12, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to withdraw

based upon his interim suspension. This motion was granted by the

Court. This case remains pending.

44. On February 24, 2010, an attorney, Scott Cochran, filed a

notice ofappearance, motion to continue, and motion to oonvertthe trial

to a pretrial on behalf of the DiDomenicos.

45. These motions were granted. On July 1, 2010, Mr. Wise, on

behalf of defendant J & V Roofing and Home Improvement, filed a

motion to dismiss. A brief in response to defendanfs motion was filed

by Mr. Cochran on September 9, 2010. The matter was taken under

advisement by the Magistrate on October 1, 2010.

21 .

46. On October 14, 2010 the Magistrate granted the Plaintiffs

Motion to Vacate the Dismissal and denied the Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss. The trial Court adopted the Magistrate's decision and the case

was placed on the trial schedule.






1.4(ax3) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional

Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shall: ... Keep the client

reasonably informed about the status of the matter;" and "Comply as

soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the

client"

F. Evelyn Sue Lorent (Amended Complaint y[y(8&89,321-326)

1. On Apri13, 2009, Evelyn Sue Lorent retained Respondent to

provide her legal advice regarding the filing of a possible bankruptcy

and in relation to a probate matter.

2. Thereafter, Lorent met with Respondent on at least two other

occasions, the last of which was Apr.d 20, 2009.

3. Lorent paid to Respondent the total sum of $1,300.00, in three

separate payments. (See, Exhibits F-1, F-2, and F-3.) Lorent also

provided documents to Respondent necessary for him to review the

issues presented by Lorent.

4. Respondent fumished Lorent a bankruptcy worksheet form to

complete. Respondent developed a legal strategy that was designed to

weigh the competing interests of the filing of a bankruptcy against

Lorent's probate estate and life insurance issues.

22

5. Thereafter, Lorent attempted to contact the Respondent on

numerous occasions. Shewas unable to do so.

6. Lorent also forwarded a certified letter to Respondent

dismissing him as her counsel, but did not receive a response.

7. On September 21, 2009, Lorent filed a grievance with the

Mahoning County Bar Association because she had not heard from

Respondent in more than five months.

8. Respondent has failed to refund Lorent's payment for legal

services to be rendered by Respondent.

9. Lorent was involved in only one lawsuit concerning a medical

bill for her, not her deceased husband, a lawsuit that was filed in 2006.

10. No other lawsuits were filed against Lorent and Lorent did

not have to file bankruptcy.

11. Lorent's husband's probate estate was handled as a summary

administration by another attorney, Scott D. Hunter.




representing a client"


1.4(axs) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional




client."

15. The conduct ofthe Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule

1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) of the Ohio Code ofProfessional

Conduct which provides that:

Upon receiving funds or property in which a client..has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or

23

third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwisepermitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirmedin writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client... anyfunds... that the client... is entitled to receive. Upon requestby the client..., the lawyer shall promptly render a fuIlacxounting regarding such funds...

16. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes aviolation of Rule

1.16 (Declining or Terminating Represmtation) of the Ohio Code of

Professional Conduct which provides that: _

As part of the termination of representation, a lawyershaIl take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, toprotect a client's interest. The steps include giving due noticeto the client, allowing reasonable time for employment ofother cDunsel, delivering to the client all papers and propertyto which the.client is entitled, and cromplyingwith applicablelaws and rules. Cfient papers and property shall be promptlydelivered to the client. `Client papers and property' mayinclude correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts,exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other itemsreasonably necessary to the client's representation.

A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that hasnot been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.

G Carol Hovanes (Amended Complaint f9I90-I04,U327-33I)

1. On July 21, 2008, Bank of New York filed a complaint in

foreclosure against Carol Hovanes ("Hovanes").

2. The complaint was served upon Hovanes on or about August

11, 2008.

3. Thereaftes, Hovanes cnnsulted with the Respondent for legal

advice relating to the foreclosure action, though she did not want to

save the home from foreclosure.

4. In addition to stating that he would protect Hovanes' interests

in the foreclosure matter, Respondent also recommended to Hovanes

that she file bankruptcy.

24

5. To represent Hovanes, Respondent charged $300.00 for the

foreclosure case, which was paid on August 16,2008; thirteen hundred

doIlars in legal fees for the bankrnptcy, and three hundred dollara for

the bankruptcy filing fee. The fees and filing fee were paid as follows:

$500.00 on August 29, 2008; $500.00 on September 13, 2008 and

$600.00 on September 26, 2008.

6. After being retained in the foreclosure case, Respondent filed

a motion for leave to move or plead on behalf of Hovanes on or about

September 8, 2008. This motion was grant,ed by the Court on Septem-

ber 23, 2008. No other document has been filed by the Respondent in

the foreclosure case.

7. Hovanes continued to be pursued by her creditors.

8. Hovanes contacted the Respondent regarding the status of her

bankraptcy.

9. Respondent advised Hovanes that he had not filed her

bankruptcy. As indicated on the information packet furnished by

Respondent to Hovanes, Hovanes was required to complete a debt

counseling course prior to filing her banlmptcy. Respondent's form,

given to Hovanes, provided:

Note: You must complete a Pre-Bankraptcy EducationCourse and submit your certificate to our o$'ice iDrior to filingyour bankruptcy. This certificate is required by the U.S.Bankruptcy Court, ...

10. Hovanes then enrolled in a consumer credit counseling

course.

11. Hovanes did not complete the required course until July 2,

2009.12. Upon completion, Respondent and Hovanes completed the

bankruptcy forms, but Respondent failed to file them with the

bankraptcy oourt.

25

13. Hovanes attempted to contact Respondent regarding the

status of her bankruptcy and foreciosure cases. Hovanes made

numerous and repeated telephone caIls to Respondent, sometimes

calling every day. No telephone call was ever returned by the Respon-

cient.

13. Hovanes also forwarded a letter to Respondent requesting a

status report regarding her cases. Respondent did not reply to this

lettzr.

14. To date, Respondent has failed to keep Hovanes. informed

regarding the status of her foreclosure case, has not filed a banluuptcy

petition, and has failed to respond to any collection inquiry by attorneys

or debt collectors. Respondent has failed to return to Hovanes the

original fee, or any part thereo£

15. Hovanes secared new counsel to represent her in connection

with her bankruptcy petition, who filed a petition for Hovanes on

January 22, 2010.

16. On February 18,2010, a notice of automatic stay was filed in

the foreclosure case as a result of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

17. The bankruptcy has been completed and the case closed as

of June 30, 2010, and the debts have been discharged, including the

debt to Countrywide for the mortgage on Hovanes' home.

18. The conduct of the Respondent as set above constitutes a

violation of Rule 1.1 (Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional

Conduct which provides that "A lawyer shall provide competent

representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal

knowledge, skiIl, thoroughness, preparation reasonably necessary for

the representation."

19. The conduct ofthe Respondent constitutes aviolation of: Rule


26



20. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule


provides that: "A lawyer shall: *** 3. Keep the client reasonably

informed about the status of the matter; *** 4. Comply as soon as

practicable with reasonable requests for informatfon from the client."


1.16 (Declining or Termfnating Representation) of the Obio Code of

Professional Conduct which provides that: "(e) A lawyer who withdraws

from employment shall refund promptly any part of a fee paid in

advance that has not been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant

to Rule 1.17."

H. Duane and Tracfe Corll (Amended Complaint9[9[105:104 332-338)

1. In July of 2008, Duane and Tracie Corll ("Corlls") initially met

with Respondent. The purpose ofthe meeting was to discuss the Corlls'

financial status, and the potential filing of a bankruptcy petition on

their behalf:

2. Respondent informed the Cor1Ls that he would charge thexn a

fee of $1,300.00 for the bankruptcy case. The Corlls made an initial

installment payment at their first meeting, and by the end of August

2008, they had paid Respondent in fnIl.

3. During that period, the CorIls began completing information

forms fiunished by Respondent which was required for the bankruptcy

petition. The Corlls also took a credit counseling course which was

required prior to the filing of bankruptcy. Both the documents and

course work were completed by December of 2008.

27

4. However, because the CorAs were entitled to a tax refund for

tax year 2008 and had not provided everything to Respondent until

December 2008, Respondent advised them to wait to file their bank-

ruptcy.

5.. Over time, the Corlls had a more difficult time contacting

Respondent. When they were able to contact hnn again, Respondent

informed the Corlls that they needed to put the bankruptcy off until

after. they had filed their income taxes so that the refund would not be

lost to the bankraptcy estate. ,

6. At Respondent's suggestion, the Corlls waited to file their

bankruptcy. Though they filed their tax return before April of 2009, the

Corils are not certain when they filed.

7. ZYacie Corll spoke to Respondent in his office on May 19, 2009.

At that time, Trade asked again about filing the bankruptcy petition.

At that time, Respondent stated that he did not understand why it was

a problem because the Corlls were not paying any of their biIIs.

8. Following that conversation and the specific instructions by

Tracie that they wanted their bankruptcy completed, Respondent filed

the petition that same day (May 19, 2009).

9. The first hearing was scheduled on July 14, 2009 in the

bankruptcy oourt.

10. Respondent's bankruptcy client questionnaire advises his

clients that they wi71 need to produce income tax returns for Respon-

dent, and the form filled out by the Corlls indicated that they needed

to produce their 2006 and 2007 returns.

11. The Corlls had provided Respondent their 2006 and 2007

returns but not their 2008 returns.

12. Respondent contacted the Corlls the day before the bank-

ruptcy hearing to inform them that they needed their tax returns,

28

because Respondent's office did not have the returns to send to the

bankruptcy trustee.

13. The CorIls weren't able to retrieve their taxretarns before the

hearing and because of this fact the hearing was rescheduled.

14. A second hearing was scheduled on July 28, 2009. Respon-

dent failed to appear for this hearing. The bankruptcy court gave the

Corlls the option to go through with the hearing without Respondent

or to reschedule, and the Corlls chose to reschedule.

15. At the third hearing the baiilmiptoy was completed, except

for the post.hearing counseling. The Corlls completed the course but

could not deliver the paperwork to Respondent because they omxld not

contact him.

16. When the papers that proved the Corlls completed the

counseling were not turned in to the court, the court dismissed the case.

17. On October 3, 2009, the Corlls received a letter from the

United States Bankruptcy Court indicating that their case had been

dosed without discharge because the Corlls did not timely file a

statement ceiiafying completion of an instructional cwurse.

18. The Corlls bankruptcy petition has not been re-filed. While

the Corlls are seeking new legal oounsel to represent them in their

bankruptcy case, the Court records show that "If the debtor(s) subse-

quently file(s) the proper pleading, to allow for the filing of the

FSnancial Management Course Certificate, the debtor(s) must pay the

full filing fee."



provides that "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a

client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, sldll,

thoroughness, preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."

29

20. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of. Rule




21. The conduct ofthe Respondent constitutes a violation o£ Rule

1.4(W) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional

Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer sh.aIl: ... Keep the client

reasonably informed about the status of the mAtter;" and "Comply as


client." 22. The conduct of the Respondentoonstitutes a violation of: Rule

1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) of the Ohio Code of Professional

Conduct which provides that

Upon receiving funds or property in which a client...has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client orthird person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwisepermitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirmedin writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client... anyfunds.., that the client... is entitled to receive. Upon requestby the client..., the lawyer shall promptly render a fuIIaccounting regarding such funds... ,


1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio Code of

Professional Conduct which provides that:

As part of the termination of representation, a lawyershall take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, toprotect a client's interest. The steps include giving due noticeto the client, allowing reasonable time for employment ofother counsel, delivering to the clientall papers and propertyto which the client is entitled, and complying with applicablelaws and rules. Client papers and property shall be promptlydelivered to the client. 'Client papers and property' mayinalude correspondence, pleadings, depositaon transcripts,exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other itemsreasonably necessary to the client's representation.

A lawyer who withdraws from employment shallrefund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has

30

not been earned, except when withdrawal is pursuant toRule 1.17.

Tiata Marie Benson (Amended Complaint f$125-129,339-344)

1. At a time prior to the events here described, Respondent

completed a barkruptcy for Dustin Benson.

2. On or about July 15, 20009, 'lina Marie Benson met with

Respondent for purposes of filing a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy petition.

ltespondent advised Ms. Benson that she would have to pay the sum

of $1,350.00 for the bankruptcy. Ms. Benson paid Respondent the sum

of $1,000.00 on July 15, 2009, and Respondent provided a receipt to

Benson, indicating a balance due of $350.00. (Exhibit I-1.)

3. At that time, Respondent provided paperwork for Ms. Benson

to complete in order to file the banlrnptcy. Included in that packet was

a notice that Respondent would not file a bankruptcy until aIl legal fees

and filing fees were paid.

4. Ms. Benson completed the paperwork and attempted to contact

Respondent on numerous occasions by telephone.

5: Ms. Benson leftmessages onRespondent's answeringmachine.

Eventually, the phone either rang busy or indicated that it had been

disconnected.

6. Ms. Benson also attempted to contact Respondent in person at

his offioe and left letters for Respondent at his off'ice.

7. Ms. Benson was never able to meet again with Respondent,

and acxordingly did not furnish Respondent the balance of the fees or

the papers-neeessary for Respondent to prepare a bankruptcy petition.

8. Respondent failed to meet again with Ms. Benson.

9. Ms. Benson contacted a new attorney who filed a Chapter 7

Bankruptcy for $1,100.00.

81

10. The discharge was final in April of 2010.

11. Respondent failed to return phone calls and has failed to

return the money paid to him by Ms. Benson.

12. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule .

1.3 (Diligenoe) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides



13. The mnduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule

1.4(aX3) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional

Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer sha1L ... Keep the client

reasonably informed about the status of the matter;: and "Comply as


client."


1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) ofthe Ohio Code of Professional


Upon receiving fands or property in which a client...has an interest, a lawyer shaIl promptly notify the client orthird person. Escept as stated in this rule or otherwisepermitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirinedin writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the cfient... anyfunds... that the client... is entitled to receive. Upon requestby the client..., the lawyer shall promptly render a fullaccounting regarding such funds....


1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio. Code of


As part of the termination of representation, a lawyershaIl take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, to.rotect a_clie_nt's iaterest. The steps include giving due noticeto the client, allowing reasonable time for employment ofother counsel, delivering to the client all papers and propertyto which the client is entitled, and complyfng with applicablelaws and rules. Client papers and property shaIIbe promptlydelivered to the client: `Client papers and property' mayinclude correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts,

32

exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other itemsreasonably necessary to the client's representation.


J. Rich.ard Bodendorfer (Amended Complaint 9[$130•.

133, 345-350)

1. On October 14, 2008, Richard Bodendorfer paid Respondent

the sum of $750.00 to form a limited liability corporation. (See, Exhibit

J-1 attached to the Amended Complaint, receipt no. 340331.)

2: Respondent prepared the articles of organization and other

necessary documents for the formation of an LLC, Great Lakes

Communications, LLC; and, on October 15, 2008, a check in the

amount of $125.00 was issued from an suxount Payable to the Ohio

Secretary of State for the filing fee.

3. On October 20, Respondent received notice from the Ohio

Secretary of State that his Previously submitted filing was not .

acceptable because the chosen name was not available. (See, Exhibit J-

2).4. The same notice advised Respondent to contact Great Lakes

Communications, Inc., in Amherst, Ohio to obtain consent for use of the

name.

5. On October 31, 2008, Respondent sent a letter to Great Lakes

Communieations, requesting consent to use the name for the grievani's

purported LLC.6. On December 5, 2008, Respondent sent a follow-up letter to

Great Lakes Communications again requesting consent. Respondent

attempted to secure a waiver from the entity that had claim to the

name that Mr. Bodendorfer wished to use. Those efforts were unsuo-

cessful.

33

7. Respondent prepared new LLC documents with a new name

selected, and on January 30, 2009, Bodendorfer signed new articles of

organization with the new name of RDB Systems, LLC.

8. On Febrnary 4, 2009, the articIes were sent to the Ohio

Secretary of State with the requisite filing fee, but were rejected due to

changes in the Secretary of State's filing reqnirements (the office now

required that its form be used exclusively).

9. On or about February 6, 2009, the grievant sent, at Respon-

dent's request, an additional $250.00. Affter that date, Respondent took

no fiirFlier action on behalf of Mr. Bodendorfer.

10. The conduct of the Respondent oonstitutes aviolation oF Rule

1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conductwhich provides

that "A lawyer shaIl act with reasonable diligence and promptness in




provides that "A lawyer shall: ... 3. Keep the client reasonably

informed about the status of the matter; ... 4. Comply as soon as

practicable. with reasonable requests for information from the client."

12. The c:onduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule


Conduct which provides that: "(d) Upon receiving funds or property in

which a client... has an interest, a lawyer shaIl promptly notify the

client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise

permitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirmed in writing,

a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client... any funds... that the

client... is entitled to receive. Upon request by the client..., the lawyer

shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such funds... ." ...

34




(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable,to protect a client's interest. The steps include giving duenotics to the elient, allowing reasonable time for employmentof other counsel, delivering to the client all papers andproperty to which the clientis entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shallbe promptly delivered to the client. 'Client papers andproperty'may include correspondence, pleadings, depositiontranscripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.


K Darlene Burman (Estate of Ronald Papke)(Amended Complaint y(2134-142, 9(f351-356)

1. Respondent was retained for the purpose of providing legal

assistance to Darlene Burman, the fiduciary of the estate of Ronald

Papke, Ms. Burman's brother.

2. Respondent opened the estate for Ronald Papke, deceased,

Case No. 2009 ES 151 on the docket of the Probate Court of Mahoning

County, Court of Common Pleas, Ohio. The application for authority to

administer the estate was filed on March 18, 2009.

3. Respondent charged the estate $15,028.00 in fees and cwsts

before he filed the inventory. Though these attorney fees were not

authorized by the Court in advance, after a review of the file, the

Probate Court determined that the estate had been nearly completed

by Respondent and that the amount of compensation he received

without court approval was less than what he would have been entitled

to under the court's computation schedule.

35

4. After meeting with the Fiduciary of the estate, the Court

agreed that the Fiduciary should retain new counsel and proceed with

the completion of the administration of the estate. The Fiduciary was

the sole beneficiary andtherefore the only interested party. Because the

compensation was in accordance with court guidelines, the Probate

Court did not file or seek any oourt imposed sanctions against Respon-

dent.

5. The estate was completed in due course by successor counsel.

6. The conduct of Respondent violates Rule 1.3 (Diligencz) of the

Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides that: "Alawyer shall

act with reasonable diHgence and promptness in representing a client"

L. Joyce Catterson (Amended Complaint g9[143-192,y(f357-362)

(Case No. 1999 CV 129)

1. On January 20, 1997 Joyce Catterson was involved in an

automobile accident. She retained Respondent to pursue a claim for her

injuries and damages sustained against the tortfeasor, Albert Roskos.

2. On January 19, 1999, Respondent filed a oomplaint in the

Mahoning County Common Pleas Court against Mr. Roskos.

3. The summons and the complaint were served upon the

defendant by certified mail. The mail was returned on or about

February 2,1999. On February 18,1999, an answer was filed on behalf

of the defendant. On that same date, defendant forwarded to the

plafntiff interrogatories and requests for produdaon of documents.

4. On May 5, 1999, the trial court sent a scheduling order, setting

pretrial, discovery, and trial dates.

5. On February 29, 2000, the court scheduled the matter for

mediation, which was to occur on March 21, 2000.

36

6. On March 9, 2000, defendant Albert Roskos died. His defense

counsel did not file a suggestion of death upon the record pursuant to

Civ. Rule 25.

7. The mediation did not take place, and was cancelled at the

request of Respondent, although no suggestion of death of Mr. Roskos

was filed prior to March 21, 2000. At that time, neither the Court nor

Respondent were aware that Mr. Roskos had passed away.

8. On May 17, 2001, Respondent filed a voluntary motion to

dismiss the case. Mrs. Catterson was present at the final pretrial when

the dismissal was filed.

9. On May 24,2001, the Court sustained the plainti$s motion to

voluntarily dismiss the case which had been filed by Respondent. The

court dismissed the matter without prejudice.

(Case No. 2002 CV 1468)

10. On May 16, 2002, Respondent re-filed the complaint against

Albert Roskos on behalf of his client, Joyce Catterson, stiIl without

having been notified by Mr. Roskos' counsel that Mr. Roskos had died.

11. On May 22, 2002, the court issued the summons and copy of

the complaint to the named defendant by certified mail. On May 28,

2002, the court noted a failure of service upon the defendant, as the

postal service was not able to deliver the complaint upon the deceased,

and was unable to forward the summons or complaint either. Respon-

dent was notified of the failure of service on June 3, 2002.

12. On June 19,2002, Respondent filed written instructions with

the clerk to issue the summons and complaint by regular mail. The

clerk reissued the complaint for service by regalar mail on June 24,

2002.

37

13. On June 28, 2002, the clerk again noted the failure of service

onAlbert Roskos, as the mailwas returned "undeliverable as addressed

- unable to forward".

14. On November 8, 2002, the courtissued a judgment entry that

the case would be dismissed on December 18, 2002 for want of

prosecution, based upon the plaintiffs failure to obtain service on the

defendant or apply for a default judgment. This notice was served upon

the Respondent on November 14, 2002.

15. On December 13, 2002, Respondent again filed written

instructions to the clerk A copy of the complaint was then mailed my

regular mail to the defendant Albert Roskos, in care of Ms. Albert

Roskos, at an address set forth in the written instructions. The

summons and complaint were issued by the clerk on December 20,

2002. The summons and complaint were again returned for failure of

service on January 10, 2003.

16. On April 21, 2003, a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs

complaint was filed by the defendant's counsel, who stiIl had not

disclosed to the Court that the defendant had died more than a year

earlier. In the motion to dismiss, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff

had failed to perfect service on the defendant, who was dead, despite

the Court's order, in the prior case, of November 8, 2002.

17. On May 1, 2003, the court dismissed Catterson's complaint

without prejudice pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Superintendence. A

copy of the court's judgment entry was forwarded to Respondent on

May 2, 2003.

18. On May 28, 2003, Respondent, on behalf of his client, filed a

motion to vacate the court's entry of May 1, 2003. The court ruled on

this motion on May 27, 2003, and agreed to vacate its prior order. The

court ordered defendant's counsel to substitute the proper party in the

38

action because Albert Roskos, the named defendant, was dead as of

March 9, 2000, approximately one year and three months prior to the

plaintffs motion for voluntary dismissal. The court found that the

plaintiff and the court should have been informed at the time of Mr.

Roskos' demise, and the fact that he could no longer be a party to the

action. The Court also noted that Mr. Roskos should have been

substituted by his estate through the proper representative of same.

Copies of this entry were forwarded to Respondent on May 31, 2003.

19. On June 3, 2003, the court again considered the motion of

Albert Roskos for dismissal of the complaint based upon the failure to

prosecute. Despite its order six days earlier, the court found the

defendant's motion to be well taken and dismissed plainti8s action in

its entirety. (As a side note, the trial judge at that time was suffering

from Alzheimer's disease.) This entry was forwarded to all counsel on

June 4, 2003.

20. On June 9, 2003, the plaintiff filed a request with the court

that its June 3 order be vacated and that the court require a substitu-

tion of party through the proper representative. The court agreed to

vacate its order of dismissal and again required that the defendant

substitute the proper party.

21. On June 2, 2004, the plainto' was granted leave to file a

suggestion of death on the record. The plaintiff was then instructed to

follow-up as directed or suffer a dismissal of the case for failure to

prosecute. The court overruled the defendant's motion to dismiss.

22. On July 28, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for reconsider-

ation, or in the alternative, cexi5fication pursuant to Ohio Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(B).

39

23. On Septeinber 29, 2004, a motion to continue the hearing

scheduled for October 1, 2004 was filed by Respondent on behalf of the

plaintiff.

24. On October 1, 2004, the court granted Respondent?s motion

to continue the hearing which had been scheduled that same day.

25. On November 26, 2004, the court considered the defendant's

motion for reconsideration and overruled it. In its entry, the Court

noted that counsel for the defendant had failed to file a suggestion of

death as required by Civ. Rule 15(E). The court noted that on July 2,

2004, the eDurt issued an entry finding that defense counsel stiIl did not

file a suggestion of death and therefore placed the responsibility upon

the plaintiff to file a suggestion of death and a motion for substitution

of parties. The plaintiff was granted ten days to file a suggestion of

death and proceed accordingly.

26. On July 25, 2005, the plaintiff filed a suggestion of death

upon the record.

27. On August 16, 2005, the oourt scheduled a mediation

conference for January 18, 2006.

28. On January 18, 2006, the mediation proceeded. (A report of

the mediator was filed on January 19,2006.) The plaintiff attended the

mediation, but was not permitted inside by Respondent. At one point,

the Respondent advised Ms. Catterson that they were unable to make

any headway, and that they were going to leave the courthouse. Ms.

Catterson was never advised of the strengths or merits of her case by

the mediator, plaintiffs counsel, or her own counsel.

29. Respondent also filed a motion to compel on January 18,

2006. This motion was opposed by the defendant on January 27,2006.

30. On March 27, 2006, the defendant filed a motion to oompel

responses to discovery.

40

31. On Apri117, 2006, a status hearing was to be held. Respon-

dent was unavailable and the hearing was rescheduled for May 25,

2006. This entry was issued to the parties on April 27, 2006.

32. On April 27, 2006, the court issued an order (this order is

missing from the Clerk's file).

33. On June 2, 2006, the court noted in an order that "By

agreement of the parties, counsel wiIl submit a judgment entry finding

a final appealable order within seven days." A copy of this judgment

entry was mailed to the parties that same day.

34. On July 6, 2006, the court entered a judgment entry finding

that:

This matter came before the court on defendant's motion tocertify this court's order of November 26, 2004 as final andappealable. Upon review of the current. status of this case, itis hereby ordered this court's 2004 order is certified as the .final appealable order as of the date of this judgment. It is soordered.

35. On July 20, 2006, Respondent filed a notice of appeal on

behalf of Ms. Catterson. This notice was filed in the Seventh District

Court of Appeals, and was assigned Case No. 2006 MA 105.

36. On August 16, 2006, the appellate court, sua sponte,

questioned the appealability of July 6, 2006 judgment modifying the

November 26, 2004 judgment entry. The November 26, 2004 judgment

entry denied a defense motion for reconsideration of an earlier order

placing an obligation on the plaintiff to file a suggestion of death of the

defendant and moving for a substitution of the proper party. The

Appellate Court noted that it appeared from the docket statement that

the issues for the appeal would not only be the proper commencement

of a civil action but also a statute of limitations issue. The court noted

that these matters could be properly addressed at the conclusion of aIl

proceedings in the trial court, and the parties were granted thirty days

to file jurisdictional statements regarding the appealability of an order

41

of the Common Pleas Court entered on July 6, 2006 modifying the

order of November 26, 2004.

37. On September 15, 2006, the defendant filed his jurisdictional

statement.

38. On October 6, 2006, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal

filed by Respondent for lack of an appealable order. Copies were mailed

to all counsel and to the trial court on October 10, 2006.

39. This case was then returned to the trial court.

40. On March 30, 2007, a notice to take the deposition of the

plaintiff was filed on behalf of the defendant.

41. On Apri120, 2007, the matter came before the trial court for

a final pretrial hearing. The court found that the parties had not

reached an agreement and scheduled the matter for trial on May 29,

2007.

42. On Apri127, 2007, the defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Civ. Rule 56. From the docket (only), it also

appears that a second motion was filed on May 7, 2007. Defendant

stated that. the action was originally commenced by the plaintiff on

January 19,1999. Plaintiffvoluntarily dismissed the complaint against

defendant on May 17,2001. On May 16,2002, the plaintiff re-iiled the

complaint. However, the defendant had died approximately fourteen

months earlier. As a result, the plaintiffwas unable to obtain service by

certified mail on May 28, 2002.

43. Thereafter, plaintiff was unable to obtain service by ordinary

mail on three separate attempts, due to the fact the defendant had

been deceased for approidmately two years. Defendant argued that

plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed based upon his failure to

prosecute the case, as well as the failure to commence a civil action

pursuant to the dictates of Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 3(A).

42

A.A. No response was filed by the defendant, and on May 23,2007

(sixteen days after the motion for summary judgment was filed), the

court found that there were no material facts in dispute and that the

defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The oourt

specifically found that since there had been no service of process

perfected against the defendant since the May 16, 2002 refiling of the

complaint, a civil action had not been commenced pursuant to the

dictates of Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 3(A). Additionally, the court

found that there had been a failure to prosecute the case. Therefore, the

Magistrate Judge granted the defendant's motion for suinmary

judgment. Copies of the judgment entry were forwarded to the parties

on May 24, 2007.

45. On May 29, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to continue and

request for an order for substitution.

46. On June 19, 2007, Respondent filed a notice of appeal in the

Seventh District Court of Appeals. The appeal was assigned Case No.

2007 MA 104.

47.. On July 11, 2007, the appeal was dismissed, sua sponte, for

lack of a final appealable order. The court held that the May 23, 2007

Magistrate's Decision was not a final order subject to review. Civil Rule

53(E) states the procedure in filing objections to a Magistrate's Decision.

There was no indication on the docket record that the court had taken

any action on the Magistrate's Decision. Copies of the July 11, 2007

judgment entry were mai'led to the attorneys, including Respondent, on

July 20, 2007.

48. OnJanuary 7, 2010, Respondentfiledhis notice of suspension

and motion to withdraw as counsel with the trial courL

49. On January 28, 2010, the court issued a judgment entry

noting that Respondent was presently suspended from the practice of

43

law on an interim suspension, and thereafter granted leave to Respon-

dent to withdraw as counsel for the plaintiff. The court fixrther granted

Ms. Catterson a reasonable time to secure substitute counsel. This

order was served upon Respondent and upon Ms. Catterson by the

clerk on or about February 1, 2010.

50. Mrs. Catterson says she was not informed of the develop-

ments of the case, but Respondent says that she was informed of the

case. Mrs. Catterson developed pancreatitis, and she informed

Respondent that the doctors were going to attribute that condition to

the accident, and Respondent was not prepared to proceed forward not

having the information relating to that causal connection. Moreover,

Respondent says Mrs. Catterson was present at the time that Respon-

dent put the dismissal on, which the docket reflects was at the time of

the final pretrial.

51. The parties do not agree as to whether there has been a

violation of Rule 1.4 (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional


reasonably informed about the status of the matter," and "Comply as


client"

M. Jennifer and Gordon Coyier III(Arnended Cvmplaint ff193-204, 383-370)

1. Jennifer Coyier retained Respondent to represent her in a

step-parent adoption in 2006.

2. Jennifer Coyier provided $200.00 to Respondent for the

adoption. Coyier provided Respondent with all of her originaUcertified

documentation to complete the adoption.

3. Respondent never filed the petition for adoption.

44

4. Respondent represented Mrs. Coyier in a pending case in

juvenile court where the issues were a claim for an increases in child

support and back child support, and the issue of the allocation of the

tax deduction was present at that time.

5. Respondent negotiated an agreement whereby the child's

father could take the tax deduction for previousyears, and he agreed

to consent to the adoption of Mr. Coyier, the child's stepfather.

6. Gordon Coyier retained new counsel to reverse the agreement

reached by Respondent.

7. No money has been refunded to the Coyiers by Respondent. .

8. In addition; Jennifer and Gordon A. Coyier III, retained

Respondent to represent them in connection with a contract dispute

with a home improvement company, Eneigywise Home Improvements,

Inc.

9. Respondent filed a complaint in the Youngstown Municipal

Court on behalf of Gordon A. Coyier III and Jennifer A. Coyier being

case no. 08-CVE-1240 on that Court's docket.

10. On May 6, 2008, defendants Energywise Home Improve-

ments, Inc. and Joseph Adams IV filed their answer to the Coyiei's

complaint.

11. A pretrial hearing was scheduled for Febraary 18,2009. This

hearing was continued at the request of the defendants, and resched-

uled for May 27, 2009.

12. On May 27, 2009, the civil pretrial was rescheduled for

September 2, 2009. Notice was provided to Respondent on May 27,

2009.

13. On September 2, 2009 the pretrial hearing proceeded. Neither

the Coyiers nor their counsel (Respondent) appeared.

45

14. Upon oral motion to dismiss raised on behalf of the defen-

dants, the plaintiffs' action was dismissed. A judgment was filed on

September 3, 2009 regarding this issue.

15: Respondent failed to advise the Coyiers of the dismissal of the

case. In fact, the Coyiers had no notification of any hearing in this

matter, and were unaware that the lawsuit had been terminated.

16. Subsequently, the Coyiers were sued by GE Money Bank, the

financing company related to the Energywise Home Improvements

transaction. This case was filed in the Youngstown Municipal Court

and was assigned case no. 10 CVF 170 on the docket.

17. GE Money Bank sought payment for unpaid funds relating

to the transaction which should have been addressed in the original

Energywise Home Improvements case. Subsequently, the Coyiers

settled with GE Money.Bank for the total sum of $1,200.00.



provides that: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a

client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,

thoroughness, preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."

19. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes violations of

DR-6-101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Failing to Act

Competently) which provides that: "A lawyer shall not: ... Neglect a

legal matter entrusted to hfm" and Rule 1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio

Code of Professional Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shaIl act

with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."


1.4(a)93) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional


reasonably infonned about the status of the matter;" and "Comply as

46

soon as practicable with.reasonable requests for information from the

client."


1.15 (Safekeeping Funds and Property) ofthe Ohio Code ofProfessional


Upon receiving funds or property in which a client..has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client orthird person. Eacept as stated in this rule or otherwisepermitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirmedin writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client... anyfnnds..: that the client... is entitled to receive. Upon requestby the client..., the lawyer shall promptly render a fullaccounting regarding such funds...




As part of the termination of representation, a lawyershall take steps, tothe extent reasonably practicable, toprotect a client's interest. The steps include giving due noticeto the client, allowing reasonable time for employment ofother counsel, delivering to the client all papers and propertyto which the client is entitled, and complying with applicablelaws and rnles. Client papers and property shall be promptlydelivered to the client. 'Client papers and property' mayinclude correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts,exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other itemsreasonably necessary to the client's representation.


N. Emil Foriska (Amended Complaint I9[ 205-214fy(370-376)

1. Emil Foriska retained Respondent on January 9, 2008 for the

purpose of reznstating his Ohio driver's license. Mr. Foriska's license

had been suspended as a result of an issue involving the Common-

wealth of Pennsylvania.

47

2. Thereafter, on or about February 6,2008, Respondent filed an

action in the Mahoning County Court, Area No. 4. The civil action was

filed against the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. Service was completed

on or about February 14, 2008.

3. The court scheduled the matter for a hearing on or about May

7, 2008. On May 7, 2008, Respondent appeared with his client in court.

At that time, the trial judge informed the parties that he had questions

regarding the County Coures jurisdiction to hear the allegations. The

court filed a judgment entry indicating that: "Case to be reset in thirty

days for a status hearing. Counsel to investigate what this Court can

do or whether this matter must be transferred to Common Pleas Court.

Counsel to provide documentation to the Courv

4. Thereafter, the matter was rescheduled for a hearing on

August 27, 2008. On that date, Respondent again appeared and

requested a continuance for thirty days to investigate whether the

County Court had jurisdiction. The matter was rescheduled for October

8, 2008.5. On October 8, 2008, the Judge transferred the matter to the

Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas. The trisl judge did not

believe that he had authority to take any action as the plaintffs

driver's license had expired,

6. The Clerk of Courts for Mahoning County Court No. 4 then

transferred the entire file to the Clerk for the Court of Conunon Pleas

in Mahoning County, Obio. Upon receipt, the Common Pleas Court

Clerk forwarded a letter to Respondent adv9sing that he would have to

pay $200.00 for the filing fee in that court. The fee was never paid to

the Clerk of Courts, and the matter remains without a docket assign-

ment in the Common Pleas Court.

48

7. Thereafter, Mr. Foriska began caIling Respondent to find out

what was occurrin g with respect to his case. Respondent informed Mr.

Foriska that he had not been able to obtain a hearing date in Youngs-

town (Common Pleas Court).

8. Mr. Foriska continued to telephone Respondent. For more than

three months, Respondent failed to return any of Mr. Foriska's

telephone calls or respond tawritten letters that Mr. Foriska had left

in Respondent's mailbox.

9. hbentnally, Mr. Foriska was unable to contact Respondent

because his telephone voice-mail recording stated that the electronic

mailbox was full, and subsequently indicated that the telephone was no

longer in service.

10. Respondent has failed to return or respond to Mr. Foriska's

communications, and has failed to cause Mr. Foriska's driver's license

to be reinstated.

11. The conduct of the Respondent oonstitutes a violation of Rule





1.4(a) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which

provides that: "A lawyer shall: ... 3. Keep the client reasonably

informed about the status of the matter; ... 4. Comply as soon as

practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client.°'




(d) Upon receiving funds or property in which aclient... has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify theclient or third person. Except as stated in this rule orotherwise permitted by law or agreement with the clieat...,

49

confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to theclient... any funds... that the client... is entitled to receive.Upon request by the client..., the lawyer shall promptlyrender a fuIl aecounting regarding such funds... .

14. The conduct of the Respondent cwnstitutes a violation of Rule



(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable,to protect a client's interest. The steps include giving duenotice to the client, allowing reasonable time for employmentof other counsel, delivering to the client all papers andproperty to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shallbe promptly delivered to the client. 'Client papers andproperty' may inelude correspondence, pleadings, depositiontranscripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.


0. Betty Garback (Amended Complaint 1$215-2I7,9[1377-382)

1. In June of 2009, Ms. Garback retained Respondent following

the death of her husband in 2005. Specifically, Ms. Garback paid

Respondent the sum of $130.00 on June 8, 2009 with the understand-

ing that Respondent was going to transfer back a life estate so that she

apply for the Homestead Exemption which Ms. Garback needed prior

to January of 2010.

2. Thereafter, Respondent failed to complete the work or

otherwise respond to any telephone calls or other communications by

Ms. Garback. To date, Ms. Garback has not heard from Respondent.

3. On November 16, 2009, approximately five months after

retaining Respondent, Ms. Garback went to the firm of Johnson &

50

Johnson to complete the requested legal work. Ms. Garback paid

Johnson & Johnson the sum of $150.00 to complete the unfinished

work.

4. Respondent has failed to refnnd any money to Ms. Garback.





. 6. The conduct of the Respondent constitut,es a violation o£ Rule


provides that: "A lawyer shall: ... 3. Keep the client reasonably

informed about the status of the matter;" and "4. Comply as soon as

practicable with reasonable requests for information from the client."




(d) Upon receiving funds or property in which aclient... has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify theclient or third person. Except as stated in this rule orotherwise permitted by law or agreement with the client...,confnmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to theclient... any funds... that the alient... is entitled to receive.Upon request by the client.., the lawyer shall promptlyrender a fnll accounting regarding such funds... ."




(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably praeticable,toprotect a client's interest. The steps include giving duenotice to the client, allow_ m.-g- reasonable time for emp oymentof other counsel, delivering to the client all papers andproperty to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shaIlbe promptly delivered to the client. "Client papers andproperty" may include correspondence, pleadings, deposition

51

transcripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.


P. Saed Khatib (Amended Complaint U218-23G,919f383-390)

2007 CV 3935 Kha,tib v. .Ramahi:

1. Saed Khatib retained an attorney, Dennis DiMartino, to

represent him in connection with a property dispute against April

Ramahi. Mr. Khatib alleged that the defendant vacated the premises

owned by him, and at that time removed the home's fnrniture, fixtures,

appliances, and dishes. He further aIleged that she converted his

property to her own use, and failed or refused to pay him.

2. Mr. Di1VIartino filed a lawsuit against Ms. Ramahi in the

Mahoning County Common Pleas Court on or about October 19,2007.

(Case No. 2007 CV 3935.) The case was continued on several occasions.

3. On April 14, 2008, the Court set a discovery schedule, and

further scheduled the trial of the case for December 9, 2008. Thereafter,

Mr. Khatl retained the services of Respondent to represent hun.

4. Respondent filed a notice of appearance on December 5, 2008.

On that same date, he also filed a motion to continue the December 9,

2008 trial date.

5. The Court did not rule on the motion to continue, but called

the matter for trial on December 9, 2008. Neither counsel for the

plaintiff nor the defendant appeared at the trial. As a result, the Court

dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The dismissal was without

prejudice.

52

6. The docket for the case refleets that on December 11, 2008, the

Clerk sent the dismissal order by regular mail to Khatib, Saed do Mr.

Dennis DiMartino, 6004 Market Street, Boardxnan, Ohio 44512, as

apparently the Clerles office had not yet noted Respondent's notice of

appearance filed six days previously; and, to April Ramahi, do Carmen

Lamancusa, 414 N. Jefferson Street, New Castle, PA 16101.

7. FoIlowing the dismissal of the action in December of 2008, Mr.

Khati b telephoned the Respondent regarding. the status of his case. Mr.

Khatib did not receive a response.

8. In May of 2009, Mr. Khatib obtained from the Clerk a copy of

the dismissal entry.

9. From May to July 2009, Mr. Khatib continued to telephone the

Respondent regarding the status of his case. Respondent did not return

any of these telephone calls.

10. On July 2, 2009, Mr. Khatib forwarded another letter to the

Respondent. Again, Respondent did not respond to this letter.

11. On July 3, 2009, Mr. Khatib went to the Respondent's office

with the dismissal entry to speak to Respondent, who indicated that he

was never notified of the dismissal by the Court.

12. W. Khatib asked the Respondent what he would have to do

to rectify the situation. Respondent stated that he would have to re-file

the complaint in the Common Pleas Court. Therefore, on July 3, 2009

Mr. Khatib paid Respondent $200.00 in order to re-file the cATnplaint.

13. W. Khatib left the meeting with the understanding that the

complaint would be re-filed. From July 3 to August 30, 2009, Mr.

Khatib attempted to telephone Respondent re garding the status of the

case. Respondent failed to return any of his telephone calls.

14. On August 30, 2009, Mr. Khatib traveled to the Respondent's

office, and placed a letter in his mailbox regarding the status of the

53

case. Mr. Khatib also traveled to Respondent's house on that same

date.

15. At Respondent's residence, Mr. Khatib met the Respondent's

son who stated that his father was ill. Nonetheless, Mr. Khatib asked

Respondent's son for his file and a for refimd of his money. Respon-

dent's son stated that he would inform his father of the request.

16. From September 2 to October 15, 2009, Mr. Khatib continued

his efforts to contact the Respondent, mostly through telephone calls.

The Respondent failed to answer any of the requests left for him.

17. As of Apri113, 2010, Respondent has failed to return any of

the money ($300.00) paid to Respondent to handle his case, has failed

to respond to the status requests by Mr. Khatib, and has failed to re-file

the cromplaint on Mr. Khatib's behalf, nor has Khatib sought other

counsel.

2008 CV G 00597 Khatib v. El-Makdah

18. On April 21, 2008, Respondent filed a forcible entry and

detainer complaint against Jamal Saed El Makdah. This case was filed

in the Mahoning County Court, Area No. 2, and is case 2008 CV G

00597 on that Court's docket. El Makdah retained an attorney, Eric

Johnson, to represent him.

19. The case was continued several times, during which

Respondent and Mr. Johnson engaged in numerous and lengthy

settlement conferences, until a motionfor dismissalwas filed by counsel

for the defendant on October 23, 2008.

20. The case was caIled for review on November 3, 2008. At that

time, the Court noted that the defendant had previously filed a motion

to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens. The Magistrate found

the motion to be well taken, and ordered the case be dismissed without

prejudice at plaintiffs cost.

54

21. On October 4, 2008, the judgment entry of dismissal was

signed by Judge Joseph Houser. Mr. Khatib was present at the hearing

when the case was dismissed.

22. Respondent has not refunded any of the $700.00 paid to him

for this case and contends that all of it was earned.

23. With regard to Case No. 2008 CV G 00597, Respondent's

conduct does not violate the Code of Professional Conduct.

24. With regard to Case No. 2007 CV 3935 Khatib v. Rdmahi:

The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violatiori of Rule 1.1

(Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides

that: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.

Competent representation requires thelegalknowledge, slull, thorough-

ness, preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."

25. With regard to Case No. 2007 CV 3935, the conduct of the

Respondent constitutes a violation o£ Rule 1.3 (Diligence) of the Ohio

Code of Professional Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shall act

with reasonable diligence and pramptness in representing a client."

26. With regard to Case No. 2007 CV 3935, the conduct of the

Respondent constitutes a violation o£ Rule 1.4(a) (Communication) of

the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer

shall: ... S. Keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the

matter; ... 4. Comply as soon as practicable with reasonable requests

for information from the client."

27. With regard to Case No. 2007 CV 3935, the oonduct of the

Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule 1.16 (Declining or Terininat-

ing Representation) of the Ohio Code of Professionat Conduct which

provides that:

(d) As part of the termination of representation, alawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably practica ble,to protect a client's interest. The steps include giving duenotice to the client, allowing reasonable time for employment

55

of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers andproperty to which the client is entitled, and complying withapplicable laws and rules. Client papers and property shallbe promptly delivered to the client. `Client papers andproperty' may include correspondence, pleadings, depositiontranscripts, exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, andother items reasonably necessary to the client's representa-tion.

Q. Terri Raub (Amended Compla.int 11237-238, 391-396)

1. On October 25, 2008, Thomas Raub oontacted Respondent for

the purpose of drafting a will. Mr. Raub paid to Respondent the sum of

$100.00. (A copy of the receipt for $100.00 is attached to the Complauit

as Exln'bit Q-1.)

2. Thereafter, Respondent completed a will and Mr. Raub

executed the same.

3. The wiIl has been delivered to Mr. Raub.

4. The parties agree that this count should be dismissed.

R. Arthur Titus (Amended Complaint 9f9(239-242,y(9(397-402)

1. On July 25, 2009, Arthur E. Titus retained Respondent to

assist hun in cornnection with a probate matter.

. 2. Approximately three years earlier, Mr. rEtus gave a 16 foot

fishing boat, 6 hp motor, and trader to his son, Gary Lynn Titus.

3. Subsequently, Gary passed away, leaving only his parents as

heirs. Arthur Titus sought to have Respondent retitle the boat, motor,

and trailer in his name so as to permit Mr.l4tus to then transfer the

title to his son in law, Wilbur Wilson.

4. Mr. OYtus provided the necessary paperwork to Respondent to

effectuate the transfer, and paid to Respondent the sum of $450.00.

56

5. Thereafter, Respondent failed to take any action on Mr. Mtus's

behalf; and, has retained the papers relevant to the ownership of the

boat

6. Respondent has failed to return any telephone calls or letters

from Mr. Titus.

7. This matter has been resolved by a successor counsel, but

Respondent has not refunded any money to Mr. Titus.

8. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violati(m of Rule




9: The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule

1.4(a)(3) and (4) (Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional

Conduct which provides that: "A lawyer shaII: ... Keep the client



client"

10. The conduct ofthe Respondent constitutes a violation of Rule

1.15 (SafekeepingFunds and Property) of the Ohio Code of Professional


Upon receiving funds or property in which a client...has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client orthird person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwisepermitted by law or agreement with the client..., confirmedin writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client... anyfunds... that the client... is entitled to receive. Upon requestby the client..., the lawyer shall promptly render a fullaccounting regarding such funds...




57

As part of the termination of representation, a lawyershaII take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, toprotect a client's interest. The steps include giving due noticeto the client, allowing reasonable time for employment ofother counsel, delivering to the client all papers and propertyto which the client is entitled, and complyingwith applicablelaws and rules. Client papers and property shall be promptlydelivered to the client. `Client papers and property' mayinclude correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts,exhibits, physical evidence, expert reports, and other itemsreasonably necessary to the client's representation. A lawyerwho withdraws from employment shall refund promptly anypart of a fee paid in advance that has not been earaed,except when withdrawal is pursuant to Rule 1.17.

S. Clyde Weimer (Amended Complaint 9ljr243-265;I9j403-408)

Case Ng 2006 CV 3691

1. Clyde Weimer retained Respondent for the sum of $1,900.00.

Mr. Weimer paid Respondent as follows:

•:September 8, 2006 $200.00 (balance owed under the $800.00 agreement)

•September 15,2006 $500.00

•Aprt124, 2008 $200.00

•September 15,2009 $1,000.00

2. This money was paid in connection with a potential claim

against Charles Herrholtz and James Herrholtz, Sr.

3. On September 21, 2006, Respondent Sled a complaint against

Charles Herrholtz and James Herrholtz, Sr. on behalf of his client,

Clyde Weimer. Successful service was completed by October 6, 2006.

4. On October 10, 2006 an answer was filed on behalf of the

defendants by Attorney Dennis Haines.

5. On February 26, 2008 the first pretrial was held. The court

ordered that all discovery by the plaintiff be completed by August 1,

2008, and the names and addresses of expert witnesses with a report

of their testimony be disclosed to defendant before August 1, 2008.

Dispositive motions were to be filed by October 1, 2008. The case was

58

referred to mediation on September 19, 2008. A final pretrial was

scheduled for January 9, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. before Magistrate Sarisky.

6. On or about September 19, 2008, Respondent cancelled the

mediation which had been set by the court.

7. On January 9, 2009, the parties consented to the Magistrate

presiding at the jury trial of the case.

8. On April 17, 2009, a motion to continue the trial which had

been scheduled for Apri121, 2009 was filed by Respondent. The motion

reeited that Mr. Weimer had been out of the County and unavailabie

for the months Febraary, March and part of Aprfl due to a family

illness. Respondent was told by the Court that the case would not be

continued and that his only option was to, dismiss the case voluntarily.

Respondent thereafter on Apri122, 2009 fiied a motion to dismiss the

case pursuant to Civ. Rule 41(A). The court ordered the matter

dismissed without prejudice, granting the p]ainti$'one year to re-file the

complaint pursuant to Ohio's Savings clause. A copy of this judgment

entry was served by the clerk upon the parties on May 7, 2009.

Case N° 2009 CV 1532

9. On May 5, 2009, Respondent, on behalf of Clyde Weimer, re-

filed the complaint against defendants Charles Herrholtz and James

Herrholtz, Sr.

10. Successful service was again made on both defendants, and

an answer to the complaint was filed on June 1, 2009.

11. On June 12, 2009, the case was transferred from Judge

Krichbaum to Judge Sweeney, the original trial judge presiding overthe former case.

12. On August 3, 2009, discovery was forwarded by the defen-

dants to the plaintiff. A notice of service was Sled by the defendants onthat date.

59

13. A notice of plaintiffs deposition was also filed on behalf of the

defendants on August 26, 2009 (which the elerk docketed in Case No.

2006 CV 3691).

14. On September 11, 2009, a copy of a hearing notiee was sent

by the court to all parties by regular mail.

15. On September 11, 2009, the deposition of plaintiff was to be

taken. Neither theplaintiffnorhis attorney appeared for the deposition.

See, Exlu"bit S-1.

16. On September 18, 2009, a motion to compel discovery, to

deem matters as admitted, and to compel plaintiffs attendance at a

deposition and for payment of expenses, request for hearing, and an

affidavit of counsel were filed by the defendants. However, this motion

was apparently never filed (or docketed) in Case 2006 CV 3691.

17. By December 2, 2009, the plaintiff had retained new counsel.

A notice of appearance was filed on his behalf by another attorney, R.

Allen Sinclair.

18. On January 15, 2010, an order was issued by Magistrate

Sarisky. The order stated that the matter would be set for a jury trial

before the Magistrate, and that it would be held on June 8, 2010 at

9:00 a.m.

19. The Court docket reflects that the case was scheduled for jury

trial on October 12, 2010.

20. The Defendants in the case filed a motion for summary

judgment, which was overruled by the Magistrate on November 24,

2010, and the triai court has granted the Defendants leave to object to

the magistrate's decision until December 15, 2010.

21. The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violatioit of Rule


60



22. Relator agrees to dismiss the charged violation of Rule 1.1

(Competence) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct.


(Communication) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct.


(Misconduct) of the Ohio Code of Professional Conduct.

25. Relator agrees to dismiss the charged violation of Rulel.16

(Decl^n^ or Terminating Representation) of the Ohio Code of

Professional Conduct.

T. John Zetts (Amended Complaint f1266•290,y[9(409-413)

1. On August 3, 2009 John Zetts retained Respondent to seek a

reduction in child support paid to Mr. Zetts' 25-year-old daughter, who

has a disability.

2: After reviewing the facts of the case, Respondent informed Mr.

Zetts that he would file a motion with a view to obtaining a reduction

in Mr. Zetts' support payments. Because Respondent believed that the

daughter was reoeiving social security disabifity, the chances of

reducing success were good.

3. Mr. Zetts paid to Respondent the sum of $550.00 for the legal

services.

4. Thereafter, Mr. Zetts attempted to contact Respondent

approximately ten times by leaving messages on his telephone

answering machine. Respondent has not returned any of Mr. Zetts'

telephone caIls.

5. Respondenthas not performed the servioes to whichhe agreed,

nor has he refunded Mr. Zetts' payment of $550.00.

61

6: The conduct of the Respondent constitutes a violation of: Rule






provides that.

A lawyer shall: ... 3. Keep the client reasonablyinformed about the status of the matter; ... 4. Comply assoon as practicable with reasonable requests for informa-tion from the client.




(d) Upon receiving funds or property in which aclient... has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify theclient or third person. Except as stated in this rule orotherwise permitted by law or agreementwith the client...,confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall promptly deliver tothe client... any funds... that the client... is entitled toreoeive. Upon request by the client..., the lawyer shallpromptly render a full accounting regarding such funds...

9. The conduct of the Respondent constitntes a vioJ.ation of Rule


Professional Conduct which provides that


U. Lcick ofInsurance

1. Throughout his representation of the grievants set forth in

these stipulations, Respondent failed to advise the clients that he did

not have legal malpractice insurance.

62

2. The failure to advise the grievants regarding his lack of legal

malpractice insurance or his failure to have them aclmowledge the lack

of insuranc.e tbrough proper notification constitutes a violation of Rule

1.4(c) of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.

III - DisNUSSats

1. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Margaret Bury,

the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[293 (Rule 1.3, Diligence),

294 (Rule 1.4, Communication), 295 (Rule 1.5, Reasonable Fees and

Expenses), and 296 (Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not

established by clear and convincing evidence and therefore are

dismissed.

2. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Gerald Cenneno,

the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[303 (Rule 1.5, Reasonable

Fees and Expenses) and 304 (Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are

not established by clear and convincing evidence and therefore are

dismissed.

3. The parties agree that as to the grievance of the Columbiana

County Bar Association, the allegations of disciplinary violations in

9[9(308 (Rule 1.1, Competence), and 310 (Misconduct prohibited by Rule

8.4) are not established by clear and convincing evidence and therefore

are dismissed.

4. The parties agree that as to the grievance of William DiRenzo,

the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[313 (DR 9-102, Preserving

the Identity of Funds and Property) and 314 (Misconduct prohibited by

Rule 8.4) are not established by dear and convincing evidence and

therefore are dismissed.

5. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Amy and Joseph

DiDomenico, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[316 (Rule

63

1.1, Competence), 319 (Rule 1.5, Reasonable Fees and Expenses), and

320 (Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established by clear

and convincing evidence and therefore are dismissed.

6. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Evelyn Sue

Lorent, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1322 (Rule 1.1,

Competence) are not established by clear and convincing evidence and


7. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Duane and Trade

Corll, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1338 (Misconduct

prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established by dear and convincing.

evidence and therefore are dismissed.

8. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Tina Marie

Benson, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1342 (Misoonduct

prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established by clear and convincing


9. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Richard

Bodendorfer, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1348 (Miscon-

duct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established by clear and convincing


10. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Darlene

Burman concerning the Estate of Ronald Papke, the allegations of

disciplinary violations in 9[9[353, (Rule 1.4, Communication), 354

(Misconduct proln'bitedby Rule 8.4), 355 (Rule 1.2, Scope of Representa-

tion and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer), and 356

(Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4), are not established by clear and

convincing evidence and therefore are dismissed.

11. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Joyce Catterson,

the allegations of disciplinary violations in 11358 (DR 6-101, Failing to

Act Competently and Rule 1.1, Competence), 359 (DR 6-101, Failing to

64

Act Competently and Rule 1.3, Diligence), 361(Misconduct prohibited

by Rule 8.4), and 362 (Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4), are not

established by clear and convincing evidence and therefore are

dismissed.

12. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Jennifer and

Gordon Coyier III, the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1369

(Misconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established by clear and


13. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Emil Foriska,

the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[371 (Rule 1.1; Compe-

tence), and 374 (14Iisconduct prohibited by Rule 8.4) are not established

by clear and convincing evidence and therefore are dismissed.

14. The parties agree that as. to the grievance of Betty Garback,

the allegations of disciplinary violations in 1380 (Misconduct prohibited

by Rule 8.4) are not established by dear and convincang evidence and


15. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Saed Khatib, the

allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[387 (Misconduct prohibited by

Rule 8.4), and 388 (Safekeeping of Funds) are not established by clear

and convincing evidence and therefore are dismissed

17. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Terri Raub, the

allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[9[392 (Rule 1.3, Diligence), 393

(Rule 1.4, Ccanmunication), 394 (Miseonduct prohibited by Rule 8.4),

395 (Rule 1.15 Safekeeping of Funds and Property), and 396 (Declining

or Terminating Representation) are not established by clear and


18. The parties agree that as to the grievance ofArthur Titus, the

allegations of disciplinary violations in 1400 (Misconduct prohibited by

65

Rule 8.4) are not established by clear and convincing evidence and


19. The parties agree that as to the grievance of Clyde Weimer,

the allegations of disciplinary violations in 9[1404 (Rule 1.1, Compe-

tence), 406 (Rule 1.4, Communication), 407 (1Vfisconduct prohibited by

Rule 8.4), and 408 (Rule 1.16, DediningorTerminatingRepresentation)

are not established by dear and convincing evidence and therefore are

dismissed.

IV - AGGRAVATiNG AND MITIGATING FACTCRS

The Following Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Are Applica-

ble as Set Forth in Section X of the Rules and Regulations Governing

Procedure on Complaints and Hearing Before the Board of Commis-

sioners on Grievances and Diseipline of the Supreme Court:

A. Aggravation

1. Dishonest or selfish motive.

2. A pattern of misconduct.

3. Multiple offenses.

4. Lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process prior to the

institution of formal proceedings against the Respondent.

5. Vulnerability of and resulting harm to victims of the miscen-

duct.

6. Failure to make restitution.

B. Mitigation

1. The absence of prior disciplinary record.

2.Respondent's fnll and free disclosure toDisciplinary Board (as

set forth in these stipulations).

3. Respondent's cooperative attitude toward the proceedings after

the institution of the forxnal complaint.

66

4. Character and reputation as set forth in letters of reference

and testimony.

5. Mental disability, on the basis oE

a. Mental disability by qualified health care professional.

b. Determination that the mental disability contributed to,

or caused the misconduct.

c. A sustained period of successful treatment

d. A prognosis that the attoxney will be able to return to

competent, ethical practice under specified oondilaon.

C. Other punishment

1. Respondent is serving an interim suspension, during which he

has treated with OLAP.

D. Punishment

The parties do not agree on the length or severity of the

punishment, but do parties jointlyrecommend to the Board of Commis-

sioners that the Respondent shall be readmitted to the practice of law

only after he:

1. Provides proof of continuing mental health counseling and

proof that he is fizlly crompetent to return to the practice of law.

2. Compfies with aIl requirements required by OLAP during the

period of his suspension.

3. Complies with any and all mandatory continuing education

requirements imposed by the Supreme Court.

4. Attends a course in law office management approved by the

Mahoning County Bar Association.

5. Pays the cost of this action as required by the Ohio Supreme

Court.

6. Makes a good faith effort to make restitution to the clients.

67

JAN-04-2011 11:63, CS+W Co. LPA 330 746 4926 P.02

r^ eet fwth above; that he be subject to xuonitaring by

Relator dumg` the pavbationary period; and, that Iais IOLTA acecaunt

sBall also be s4ect to review by the Relator during the grobationar,y

V4U7A5),1Bar Counsel100 Federal Plaaa Ebst, Suite 926YoungstownjOhio 44503Telephone: ($30) 746-5645

ItONALD E.BarP.O. Baoc 48 8Y Ohio 44515

e: ( 0) 797-0088

77

^?-Iw

27081WeatttO ° a146

oimxlevard, Suite 4Olô 445120.758-7700

Couivsa. R^roivnErr

,^̂ /^ ^• ii

WAIUM G o!' PxirarMRespondent

Cti1lOkJ6J^tMIMtdMf# e 7^99^ ku Mwla.wptl

68

TOTAL P.02

Ne.f= t4t iuttb of Cvmtnissiunuersun (Grieumnces atud Bistiptine

of #4r Ouprerite (gmtr:E rrf (94inComplaint Against:

WARREN Bo P.R1TCHABURegistration Number 0008417296 North Canfield-Niles RoadYoungstown, Ohio 44515

Respondent

V.

MAHONING COiIIdTY BAB, ASS'N.114 East Front StreetYoungstown Ohio 44503

Relator }

NoTIcE To CoRRF.Cr REcoRD

COMES NoW THE PARTEE9, and give notice of correction of the

record by requesting that pages 67 and 68 of the stipulations, filed

contemporaneously herewith, be substituted for those that were

p)viously subn3itted at the time of the record hearing. The corrected

pages make no substantive changes whatsoever but simply correct the

record so that it reflects the parties' stipulations. The version of the

stipulations previously submitted contained electronic formatting errors

that caused the submitted version not to be an accurate reflection of

the stipulations. Substitution of the enclosed pages 67 and 68 will cause

the record to contain an accurate reflection of the parties'_stipulations.

This was discnssed at the record hearing on this matter.

JUMN BJUNdR • ATIOBNEYM'I.IW . LYNIVMApO • M17MOt8pf0[MNE[b.2459 9oa1 wwreovw"D.s^, . Youxosrowx.OxwIM614y^Teuwlox& 33o96&7700 • PMAMO8.350.96B.f7sf

Respectfully submitted,

LYN# IVIARO N°'005& Schoenike Co.

7081 West Boulevard, Suite 4Youngstown, Ohio 44512-4362Telephone: 330.758-7700Facsimile: 330.758.7757COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

ÂVm C. COMS'roCx, Jk-'(0040145)Bar Counsel .100 Federal Plaza East, Suite 926Yo , Ohio 44503Telephone: 746-5643

`'oÎ P^4 (aA^. C 611-4)RRONALD E. SLIPSffi (0014404)Bar CounselP.O. Box 4338Youngstown, Ohio 44515Telephone: (330) 797-0086COUNSEL FOR RELA.TOR

(kMbDPoJBd\(SvillPrifdudB 8468\Pleadioge\NaBmmrrece rewrdwpd t Mer 19,2011

JuxNB.J^ • Arnouu6x.vM Iww • L»mAeew • Sfnxo 88exovmaCO.

24597081 WreeeBUmBrMn,8wte4 •YCUBasrowB,OmoM6IR.4569 2

44^vsuN& 868A66.7766 • B^ 368.75&7757

4. Character and reputation as set forth in letters of reference

and testirnony.

5. Mental disability, on the basis of:

a. Mental disability by qualffied health care professionai.

b. Determinataon that the mental disability oontributed to,

or caused the misoonduet.

c. A sustained period of successful treatment

d. A prognosis that the attorney will be able to retarn to

competent, ethical practice under speeified condition.

C. Of;her punisbnent

1. Respondent is serving an interim saspension, during which be

has treated with OLAP.

D. Punishment

The parties do not agree on the length or severity of the

punishment, but do parties jointly recommend to the Board of Commis-

sioners that the Respondent shall be readmitted to the practice of law

only after he:

1. Provides proof of oontinuumg mental health counseling and

proof that he is fully mmmpetent to return to the practice of law.

2. Complies with all requirements reqnired by OLAP dnring the

period of his suspension.

3. Complies with any and all mandatory centinuing education

requirements imposed by the Supreme Court,

4. Attends a course in law office managexnent approved by the

Mahoning Connty Bar Association.

5. Pays the oost of t1iis action as required by the Ohio Supreme

Court

6. Makes a good faith effort to make restitution to the clients.

67

7. Upon reinstatement, Respondent is or should be subject to a

two year probation.ary period, during which he must cmtinuewith the

requirements set forth above; that he be subject to monitoring by

Relator during the probationary period; and, that his IOLTA aocount

shall also be subject to review by the Relator duzing the probataonary

period.

lv=).^^^^Bar Counsel100 Federal Plaza East, Suite 926Youngstown, Ohio 44503Telephone: (330) 746-5643

pj."Ê.

!, SRONALD (^'1"°`4404)Bar CounselP.O. Box 4338Youngstown, Ohio 44515Telephoae: (330) 797-0086

05214670ft West Boalevard, Suite 4Younggtown, Ohio 44512Telephone: 330.758-7700COiJNsEI. FOR RESSPONDENT

WnRREnr G. "Bo" PxrUHnxnRes,pondent

cMtohJBMM11P1¢dortl a 24596tpiSBVl Mu Ei9 wTOC.wpa

68

Documents

Mahoning County Bar Association the Supreme Court of hio ... Board of Commissione s on ... SUPREME COURT OF OHIO This case involves 20 counts of alleged misconduct against Respondent,