Lessons from the PastAuthor(s): Bernard WeinerSource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1995), pp. 319-321Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1448950 .

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COMMENTARIES

Lessons From the Past

Bernard Weiner University of California, Los Angeles

Nearly 40 years ago, Cronbach (1957) made an impassioned plea to merge the correlational (individual difference) and experimental (situational manipula- tion) traditions within psychology. This desire did not fall on deaf ears, particularly within the field of moti- vation. Indeed, three then-dominant approaches, which in part antedated the Cronbach publication, either al- ready had begun this pursuit or were soon to take up this challenge.

The most domineering of these conceptions was Drive Theory. Although Hullian psychology initially disregarded individual differences in the search for general laws of behavior, Spence and his colleagues, particularly Taylor, initiated a series of investiga- tions in which individual differences in generalized drive were predicted to interact with task associative complexity in determining performance (see, e.g., Spence, Taylor, & Ketchel, 1956). The measure of drive created by Taylor was the Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS), which consisted of anxiety-pertinent items from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.

Two additional theories within motivational psy- chology that combined individual differences with the study of process were part of the Expectancy x Value tradition. McClelland and Atkinson made use of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) to determine whether individuals should be classified as high or low in achievement needs (see Atkinson, 1964). They then examined interactions between motive strength and variables such as the probability of success as determinants of achievement striving. And, finally, building on his earlier formulations from a social learning perspective, Rotter (1966) distinguished between individuals on the basis of their perceptions of personal control, measured by the Internal-External Locus of Control Scale (I-E scale). Manipulations of environmental variables, such as reinforcement schedules, were anticipated to produce interactions when examining, for example, resistance to extinction.

Dweck, Chiu, and Hong, then, fit within a rich and fruitful tradition and are major contributors to this psychological outlook. They also regard individual dif- ferences as essential for the understanding of process and often explore interactions between these structures and some experimental manipulation. This historical continuity is important and advantageous inasmuch as each of the motivational approaches just briefly men-

tioned has made significant contributions to psychol- ogy and laid down important building blocks; yet each also had some flaws that in part contributed to its demise. In this commentary, I consider some of these shortcomings and the barriers that these prior concep- tions did not overcome, and then I relate these issues to mazes through which Dweck et al. also must traverse. My intention is to call attention to the past so we are not doomed to repeat it.

Individual Difference Assessment

Surely one reason for the decreasing interest in the McClelland-Atkinson legacy arises from questions about the TAT as a motive measure. Poor indicators of reliability, difficulty in administration, and question- able validity are charges that often have been made despite a lengthy research program fostering the devel- opment of this instrument. Similar difficulties of reli- ability and administrative impediments were less leveled against the objective MAS and I-E scales. Obviously, if life depends on interactions with struc- ture, then those individual difference structures must be carefully assessed.

Dweck et al.'s measure consists of three items, and the wording of the items overlaps greatly. One can almost conclude that the key individual differences are being measured with a single response, particularly in the intelligence domain where "reliability" is nearly perfect. I find it hard to accept that a more definitive measure was not sought and that "repeatedly rephrasing the same idea may lead to confusion and boredom." If so, then the entire individual difference area is in trouble!

In addition, only entity items, and not incremental items, are included in the scale. Inasmuch as Dweck et al. have created a domain-specific typology, this also seems questionable to me, particularly given the statement that "many [entity theorists] also endorsed items depicting ... incremental theory." In address- ing a similar issue, Rotter (1966) forced a choice between the two poles of his personality dimension. He did not include only internal or only external items, although he could have looked solely at en- dorsement of either subset. Although this response format creates its own problems, I wonder if Dweck et al. have considered alternative measurement ap- proaches.

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COMMENTARIES

Validity

Atkinson (1964) and other users of the TAT, and Rotter (1966) and other users of the I-E scale, related their measure to hundreds of other indicators. Many of these variables had little relevance to their (or any) theory, so that the empirical findings were hard to "understand." For example, it was reported that persons high in need for achievement preferred certain colors and made certain kinds of handwriting lines. This wa- tered down the theoretical contributions being made.

Dweck and her colleagues have not strayed from the fundamental meaning of an implicit theory and must be applauded regarding the logic of the predictions regard- ing helplessness (persistence), goals (choice), and so on. A high degree of relational fertility is being docu- mented. Given the success of the predictions, validation is being provided for the simple assessment procedure at the same time.

Yet one finds questionable predictions and find- ings where the "appropriate" direction of the results is arguable. This problem, I believe, also plagued some predictions from Drive Theory, thereby reduc- ing its credibility. For example, drive theorists con- tended that heightened drive should improve performance an easy task. But when the conception is closely examined, it is recognized that the opposite prediction also is logical if it is specified that com- peting responses will be brought above threshold by the heightened drive. Explanations then become post hoc and, as we know, "post hockery is a mockery." Let me examine some of the Dweck et al. findings that give me pause to wonder:

1. Hong and Dweck (1992) reported that entity the- orists had altered times to detection of ability words following failure. But what is to be expected-vigi- lance and faster reactions or defensiveness and slower reactions? Arguments can be made for either direction; I do not believe that Dweck et al. supply the answer in their article.

2. Dweck et al. state that for entity theorists "even a single failure, despite many prior successes, may be enough to govern their self-judgments." Yet it could be argued that entity theorists, given an initial high belief in personal ability, would be immune to the detrimental effects of later failure. After all, their self-perceptions should have been fixed by the prior experience.

This is a very key issue given their conception. What is needed are studies of how these structures change in the light of new information. Is it the case that for entity theorists, failure information leads to structural change quite quickly? If so, can this be reconciled within her general information?

3. A number of research studies are presented that suggest entity theorists more severely punish transgressions than do incremental theorists. In addition, the entity theorists focus on retribution, whereas incremental theorists are utilitarian or pragmatic in their outlook. However, it often is the case that principles of rehabilitation and general deterrence (sending observers a message) result in greater severity of punishment than does a princi- ple of retribution. For example, in the Faye caning in Singapore in 1994, the severity of the sentence was neither retribution nor based on strict liability, for erasable vandalism is not a serious crime. Rather, the principles of general deterrence and utilitarianism gave rise to the harsh sentence. These are complex waters, and given the transgres- sions they are examining, one could as well make the argument that incremental theorists will be more punishing than entity theorists, if the punish- ment is mediated by general world views of what is the purpose of reproof.

Psychological Theory

At various places in the article, Dweck et al. refer to their work as representing a theory or a model. When one examines the legacy left by Hull (1943), Atkinson (1964), and Rotter (1966), it is noted that they incorporated numerous constructs into their no- mological networks, each one related to the others. The constructs for Hull included drive, habit, and incentive; for Atkinson included motive, probability, and incentive; for Rotter included expectancy and reinforcement value; and for all three included still other fundamental building blocks.

To progress beyond a rich web of empirical rela- tions and to attain a rightful place near the throne, Dweck et al. will have to face the difficult challenge of creating an interrelated network of constructs in which implicit world views are critical but not alone. This is more than the specification of various envi- ronmental contexts that interact with the individual difference variable in producing some specific out- come. Rather, these additional constructs must also be considered fundamental and play roles in a variety of predictions. Then the work will have attained the status of a theory.

A Concluding Note

I have tried to outline some deficiencies I per- ceive in Dweck's et al.'s work by calling attention

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COMMENTARIES

to similar problems faced by prior motivational theo- rists who also combined the correlational and experi- mental traditions. I do this in the spirit of elevating this respected body of knowledge to the deserved level of some of forbearers. I do not generally set aspiration levels that are not attainable, so that the heights implicit in my discussion are indeed within the reach of the authors.

Note

Bernard Weiner, Department of Psychology, Uni- versity of California, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Ange- les, CA 90024-1563.

References

Atkinson, J. W. (1964). An introduction to motivation. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.

Cronbach, L. J. (1957). The two disciplines of scientific psychology. American Psychologist, 12, 671-684.

Hong, Y., & Dweck, C. S. (1992, June). Implicit theories as predic- tors qf self-inference processes. Paper presented at meeting of the American Psychological Society, San Diego.

Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles ofbehavior. New York: Appleton-Cen- tury-Crofts.

Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80(1, Whole No. 609).

Spence, K. W., Taylor, J. A., & Ketchel, R. (1956). Anxiety (drive) level and degree of competition in paired-associates learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 52, 306-310.

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