1. TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.YES
RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
2. Andaya vs. Abadia
3. Bayog vs. Natino
4. PNOC Shipping and Transpo vs. CA
5. Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corp
6. People vs. Magallanes
7. Denila vs. BellosilloSYNOPSIS
For failure to pay the stipulated rentals, the petitioner were dispossessed of their thirteen-hectare riceland which was ceded to them by way of a civil lease under a compromise agreement approved by the Court of Agrarian Relations. The writ of dispossession was issued by the Court of Agrarian Relations pursuant to said Compromise Agreement.
The petitioners impugned the order of ejectment contending that the Court of Agrarian Relations lacks jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution because by virtue of the compromise agreement they possessed the same as civil lessees not as agricultural tenants and therefore their ejectment falls within the competence of the proper municipal court. However, the owner-lessor argued that since the Compromise Agreement was the result of an agrarian case, there is no need for another action to enforce the same.
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; ONCE ACQUIRED, THE JURISDICTION OF COURT REMAINS UNTIL THE CASE IS TERMINATED. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case it continues to retain that jurisdiction until the case is finally terminated or complete remedy granted and such jurisdiction is not terminated by a decision approving an amicable settlement where the parties assumed that a writ of execution would be issued to enforce the stipulations thereof.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE WHO INVOKES THE COURTS JURISDICTION IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE SAME AFTERWARDS. It is not right for a party who had invoked the courts jurisdiction in order to secure a particular relief to deny afterwards that same jurisdiction so as to avoid a writ of execution.
3. JUDGMENT; COMPROMISE; RES JUDICATA; COMPROMISE IS ENFORCEABLE BY WRIT OF EXECUTION; EFFECT THEREOF. A compromise is a contract and an admission by the parties that it is a just determination of their rights. It has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata. After its approval by the court and its conversion into a judgment, it is enforceable by writ of execution, especially where it is specifically provided in the agreement that writs of execution shall issue to enforce its stipulations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRITS OF EXECUTION. The Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction to issue writs of execution to enforce a compromise agreement validly entered into between the disputants, ousting the possessors of the land in dispute.
D E C I S I O N
This case involves the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations to enforce a compromise whereby the three occupants of a riceland became civil lessees for two agricultural years. The lessees contend that they can be ejected from the said land only in an unlawful detainer action instituted in the proper municipal court.
On the other hand, the landowner contends that a new action is not necessary because the lower court, being vested with jurisdiction to render the decision based on a compromise agreement, has the power and authority to enforce it in the same case. The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On June 17, 1971 Cromwel Denila, Isidoro Gubatanga and Freddie Inayan filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations of Iloilo a complaint against the Beaterio del Santisimo Rosario de Molo, a corporation hereinafter referred to as the Beaterio, for the purpose of preventing the Beaterio from ejecting them from its thirteen-hectare riceland located at Zarraga, Iloilo. They claimed to be the tenants in that land since the second half of the agricultural year 1969-70 by virtue of written contracts of tenancy executed between them and Fernando Inayan, the alleged prior possessor of the land (CAR Case No. 2545).
The Beaterio averred in its answer that the land in question was part of several parcels of land which were leased to Fernando Inayan, the father of Freddie Inayan, for a five-year period ending on March 31, 1971. It branded Denila, Gubatanga and Freddie Inayan as mere dummies of Fernando Inayan who desired to continue his possession of the land after the termination of his lease. A portion of the land is occupied by the Sacred Heart Academy which is operated by the Beaterio.
The parties, assisted by their lawyers, entered into a compromise agreement dated March 24, 1972 which the lower court approved in its decision dated April 24, 1972.
Among the stipulations of the amicable settlement is that the Beaterio, without in anyway admitting that plaintiffs Denila, Gubatanga and Inayan are bona fide tenants or agricultural lessees, has agreed "to cede by way of civil lease (not lease tenancy nor agricultural lease)" to them certain sublots of the said land for two agricultural years, 1972-73 and 1973-74, or up to March 31, 1974. The rentals to be paid by the lessees are specified in the agreement. The issuance of a writ of execution in case of nonpayment of rentals is covered by the following stipulation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"g. That in case of failure on the part of any of the plaintiffs as civil lessees to pay in full the total annual palay rentals when due as above stipulated, corresponding to his own respective landholding, the civil lessor Beaterio shall have the right to terminate the civil lease granted to the defaulting civil lessee or lessees, and thereupon the said lessor shall also have the right to ask from this Hon. Court for immediate execution of the present Amicable Settlement in order to obtain possession of the sublot or sublots correspondingly held in civil lease by the defaulting lessee or lessees, aside from obtaining the payment of all the rentals due and payable. A writ of execution may also be granted to the defendant Beaterio in case the plaintiffs or any one of them should fail to pay the rentals for the past crop-year 1971-72 as provided in conditions (a), (b) and (c)."cralaw virtua1aw library
It was also stipulated that, unless the lease is terminated sooner, the lessees should deliver the possession of the said landholdings to the Beaterio not later than March 31, 1974.
In a motion for execution dated December 21, 1972 the Beaterio alleged that the three lessees (now the petitioners) failed to pay the rental