JURISDICTION OF STATES COMPILATION OF PHILIPPINE CASES

TERRITORY

1. Magallona v. Executive Secretary TOPIC: Territory in International Law; Modes of Acquisition of Sovereignty over Territory

Treaties/Laws:

Republic Act No. 9522 - adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)

Art. I of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

RECIT-READY:

Pursuant to UNCLOS III which prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of

baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines, Congress enacted R.A. 9522 in 2009.

R.A. 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around

the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan

Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands

generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners are questioning the

constitutionality of R.A. 9522, contending that it reduces Philippine maritime territory

and violates Art. I of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, embodying the terms of the

Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties that Philippine territory embraces the islands

and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris. In

upholding the constitutionality of R.A. 9522, the Supreme Court held that baseline laws

(such as R.A. 9522) are statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit

with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. This gives

notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and

submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the

exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters, the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,

immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone, and the right to exploit the

living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf.

Also, UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,

enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional

international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through

occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on

the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms

to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

G.R. No.: 187167

Petitioner: Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, Akbayan Party-List Rep. Risa Hontiveros, Prof. Harry C. Roque, Jr., And University Of The Philippines College Of Law Students, Alithea Barbara Acas, Voltaire Alferes, Czarina May Altez, Francis Alvin Asilo, Sheryl Balot, Ruby Amor Barraca, Jose Javier Bautista, Romina Bernardo, Pagasa Buenaventura, Edan Marri Caete, Vann Dela Cruz, Rene Delorino, Paulyn May Duman, Sharon Escoto, Rodrigo Fajardo III, Girlie Ferrer, Raoulle Osen Ferrer, Carla Regina Grepo, Anna Marie Cecilia Go, Irish Kay Kalaw, Mary Ann Joy Lee, Maria Luisa Manalaysay, Miguel Rafael Musngi, Michael Ocampo, Jaklyn Hanna Pineda, William Ragamat, Maricar Ramos, Enrik Fort Revillas, James Mark Terry Ridon, Johann Frantz Rivera IV, Christian Rivero, Dianne Marie Roa, Nicholas Santizo, Melissa Christina Santos, Cristine Mae Tabing, Vanessa Anne Torno, Maria Ester Vanguardia, and Marcelino Veloso III Respondents: Hon. Eduardo Ermita, In His Capacity As Executive Secretary, Hon. Alberto Romulo, In His Capacity As Secretary Of The Department Of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Rolando Andaya, In His Capacity As Secretary Of The Department Of Budget And Management, Hon. Diony Ventura, In His Capacity As Administrator Of The National Mapping & Resource Information Authority, And Hon. Hilario Davide, Jr., In His Capacity As Representative Of The Permanent Mission Of The Republic Of The Philippines To The United Nations

July 16, 2011 Ponente: Carpio, J. FACTS:

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.

o This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),

codifying, among

others, the sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.

o The second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) was also not able to determine the breadth of the territorial sea.

o Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly 50 years, except for R.A. 5446 passed in 1968, correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, R.A. 9552 was enacted by Congress amending R.A. 3046, in order to be consistent with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).

o Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines

and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.

o Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners contentions o RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory and violates Art. I of

the 1987 Philippine Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties

o RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions

Respondents contentions o RA 9522 complies with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving

Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. o RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment

and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.

o Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

ISSUES/HELD:

Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional - NO

I. RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and

Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory

Baseline laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

o Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.

II. RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime

Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines

Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas

RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. Hence, it cannot be said that RA 9522 weakens the countrys claim over the said islands.

RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

o SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under

Presidential Decree No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:

o What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.

III. Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained

Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:

o Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

IV. UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of

Internal Waters

The Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is Dismissed.

ADJACENT MARITIME AREAS

2. People v. Tulin G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001 TOPICS: Custodial Investigation; Assistance by Counsel; ADJACENT MARITIME AREAS (In piracy) RELEVANT LAWS: Article 3, Section 12 of the Constitution; RA 7659; PD 532; Art 122 of RPC Plaintiff-Appellee: People Of The Philippines Accused-Appellants: Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Cecilio O. Changco, Andres C. Infante, Cheong San Hiong, and John Does Ponente: Melo, J. Summary: This was a story of piracy. They attacked in Batangas and brought the vessel to SG. They were brought up many constitutional issues such as inadmissibility of evidence due to absence of counsel, etc. So basically the issue here is the jurisdiction of the court because the trade of the stolen articles, supervised by Hiong, occurred in SG. But the court said that since this is piracy, it is a reprehensible crime against the world. The court also said that because the attack was made in the Philippine waters, they acquired jurisdiction. And the disposition of the cargo and its vessel, which he

Highlight

Highlight

participated in, was still part of piracy. Though conspiracy wasnt proved on his part, he was given a lesser responsibility, an accomplice.

Facts

In March 2, 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with kerosene, gasoline, and oil, worth P40.4M was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel was suddenly boarded by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco (Emilio), older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco (Cecilio). They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel.

Loyola ordered 3 crewmembers to paint over, the name "M/T Tabangao" and PNOC logos of the vessel with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras.

The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results.

March 9, 1991 the ship arrived in SG to wait for another vessel, which failed to arrive. With this, they went back to the Philippines and arrived on March 20

March 28, 1991 "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to SG's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it.

March 30, 1991 Emilio ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo and the transfer was completed.

April 8, 1991 "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea

April 10, 1991 the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed

April 12, 1991 the Chief Engineer and the members of the crew, called PNOC to report the incident. The crewmembers were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation, and to NBI where they executed sworn statements.

Tulin, Hiong, and Cecilio were arrested in separate days in Batangas.

Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.

October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of PD No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, and the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." They said that they merely worked for Libo-on as crew of the vessel.

Cecilio categorically denied the charge. But he testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio.

Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, and was later employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, and owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

Hiongs story was a long one. But basically, he acted as the broker of the pirates in Singapore. He was the ship agent for the sale of the cargo in SG. He did not join the actual piracy, hence, he was only convicted as an accomplice. (See ruling 4)

Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel.

Issues/Ruling:

(1) What are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial? PROCEEDINGS ARE STILL VALID BECAUSE THERE WAS A VALID WAIVER OF RIGHTS MADE BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Tulin, Loyola, Infante, and Cecilio narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of them.

In the course of the proceedings, TC discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar.

However, the record reveals that a manifestation was executed by accused-appellants February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer

Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer

During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same

They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (2) What are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation? EVIDENCE OBTAINED IS INADMISSIBLE.

In this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

(3) Did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy? NO, THERE ARE WITNESSES, AND THEIR ALIBI WOULD NOT SUFFICE

The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, and the said discharge of the cargo for the price of $500K on March 29 and 30

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony.

TCs evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect

Conspiracy issue was resolved by saying that even though they had different tasks, as long as the accused all had the same objective, each would be liable as if everyone had participated in all the acts (Criminal Law, really)

(4) Did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Hiong?

Hiong argues that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters under PD No. 532 because it was superseded by RA 7659

He reasons out that PD 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the RPC, and PD 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters.

He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of PD 532 must be omitted such that PD 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas RA 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.

RA 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under PD 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law.

All the PD did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations.

As regards the contention that the TC did not acquire jurisdiction over Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters

Although PD 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, PD 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters.

It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of PD 532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?

TC found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing that Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure and that his act was indispensable to it.

But the finding by the TC that Hiongs participation was one, which aided or abetted Emilio and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under PD 532 was upheld

The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal. Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility.

The record discloses that Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo. He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services. He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port

Dispositive Portion

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.

SO ORDERED. Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS & ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES (i) CRIMINAL AND CIVIL JURISDICTION

3. Govt of USA v Purganan TOPIC: Exceptions to the general rule that right to bail in extradition is not available;

Extradition request must comply with extradition treaties.

TREATIES/LAWS:

G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

Petitioner: GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the DOJ

Respondents: Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, RTC

Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.:

SUMMARY: The Govt of USA requests for the extradition of Jimenez, who is the subject

of an arrest warrant in the USA for charges such as tax evasion, conspiracy to defraud

the US Govt, etc. Jimenez filed a petition in the RTC that he be granted a hearing re:

application of an arrest warrant. This was granted by the RTC. After hearing, the RTC

directed the issuance of an arrest warrant and allowed him to post for bail. USA

contends than an extraditee does not have the right to bail. The SC held that as a

general rule, right to bail is not granted to an extraditee. Extradition cases are sui

generis and does not fall under a criminal procedure. Constitutional rights are only

relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. There is no such

determination in an extradition case hence the constitutional right to bail cannot be

invoked by an extraditee. However, after being taken into custody, potential extraditees

may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the

burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community and

(b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The SC did not rule

w/n he is entitled to bail. Rather, it ordered the extradition court (RTC of Manila) to

continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in

accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.

FACTS:

Highlight

Highlight

Pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty, USA sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo.

The SFA transmitted the documents to the SOJ for appropriate action.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila. o The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a

petition for his extradition.

The validity of the TRO was assailed by the SOJ. o The Court dismissed the Petition of the SOJ but reconsidered and reversed its

decision. o It held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the

evaluation stage of the extradition process. o This Resolution has become final and executory.

The USA, through the DOJ, filed with the RTC the appropriate Petition for Extradition. o It alleged that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the US

District Court for the Southern District of Florida. o The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges:

conspiracy to defraud the US, tax evasion, wire fraud, false statements and illegal campaign contributions.

o In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest.

Jimenez filed before the RTC an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that the application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.

RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing.

The USA manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. o Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he

be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. o The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing. o The court issued an order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest

and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P 1M in cash.

After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

MAIN ISSUE: W/N the Court committed GADALEJ in allowing Jimenez to post for bail

YES. (Please see sub-issues)

SUB-ISSUE/HELD 1: W/N the present petition was filed prematurely in the SCNO.

The SC can take cognizance of cases where exceptional circumstances are present.

The SC has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the RTC and CA, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and it entertains direct resort in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same.

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, the SC deem it best to take cognizance of the present case.

Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

Five Postulates of Extradition

(Not sure how important this is, but just in case he asks)

The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on extradition.

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent.

Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime. a. Through the facilitating of the arrest and the custodial transfer of a

fugitive from one state to the other. b. Extradition is the only regular system that has been devised to return

fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law.

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused 3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

a. It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.

b. Constitutional rights are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee.

c. It is summary in nature. d. The rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of

evidence under less stringent standards.

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

e. Quantum of evidence a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.

f. Court may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

g. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith (pacta sunt servanda) 5. There Is an Underlying (presumption) Risk of Flight

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES (If youre in a hurry, read the summation!!!)

SUB-ISSUE/HELD 2: W/N Respondent is Entitled to Notice and Hearing Before the

Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest? NO.

USA contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition.

Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. o That there is no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the

issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.

Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states: SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of

Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of

the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to

answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a

warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any

where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the

immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the

ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after

having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the

presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest,

if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney

having charge of the case. (Emphasis ours)

1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law

Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments.

Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate.

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage.

The court is expected merely to get a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from the records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice.

In point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that probable cause did exist.

In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word hearing is notably absent from the provision. o Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law

could have easily so provided. o It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are

summary in nature. o The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable

interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.

As argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape.

Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.

2. On the Basis of the Constitution

Even Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

Highlight

There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

SUB-ISSUE/HELD 3 (IMPT!!!): W/N Respondent Entitled to Bail? NO, unless he falls

under the exception.

Jimenez maintains that Art III Sec. 13 of the Constitution secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited. o Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses

punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

USA claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.

SC: Agree with USA.

The Consti provision on, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the ROC, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. o It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do

not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. o It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case

like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

His Right to due process is NOT violated. o His detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not

amount to a violation of his right to due process. o Jimenez will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the

extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. o It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the

extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those

proceedings could be completed, which hindered the court from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws.

His invocation of due process now has become hollow.

The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14[67] of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here.

Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

GR: bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.

However, the SC believes that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees.

E: After a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing o (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to

the community; and o (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances

including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

The exception is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for

the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail.

(1) Alleged Disenfranchisement and (2) Anticipated Delay o While his extradition was pending, Jimenez was elected as a member of the

House of Representatives. o He claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000

residents. o In People v. Jalosjos, the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement

argument stating that the voters elected him with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action.

o It must be noted that even before Jimenez ran for and won, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition.

o His constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative.

o Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case.

o SC is not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings but this is another matter that is not at issue in this case.

o Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

Highlight

academic.

Not a Flight Risk? o Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. o he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has

not fled the country. o That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he

will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied.

In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.

Summation (by the SC)

1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.

2. xxx 3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in

which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. xxx

4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.

5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a)

there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.

6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

7. xxx 8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility

arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

9. xxx 10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed

to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED xxx The RTC of Manila is directed to

conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the

spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our

Extradition Law

4. Govt of Hong Kong v Olalia [consti2 digest c/o Charlemagne Chavez]

G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

Petitioner: Govt of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by DOJ

Respondent: Olalia is the RTC judge that granted bail; Munoz is a prospective extraditee

Petition for Certiorari

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

OhSHNAP: Juan Antonio Munoz was wanted in HK. He was arrested here in the

Philippines. He applied for bail which was initially denied but was granted by Judge

Olalia on reconsideration. A petition for certiorari was filed in the SC where the court

Highlight

Highlight

held that Judge Olalia did not err. Extradition is not a criminal proceeding but is an

administrative proceeding. Although the court in Puruganan ruled that bail only applies

to criminal proceeding, the decision was revised taking into consideration the various

treaty obligations of the Philippines in international law that uphold human rights.

Among the rights involved is the right to liberty. Although our extradition law does not

provide a grant for bail to an extraditee, it neither prohibits an application for bail.

Extradition proceeding is sui generis and partakes of an administrative nature. However,

extradition bears all the earmarks of a criminal proceeding. A potential extraditee may

be detained and arrested. While the Philippines must honor its extradition obligation to

HK, it should not diminish Munozs right to life, liberty, and due process which are

guaranteed not only by the constitution but also by the various international covenants

to which the Philippines is a party. Thus, Munoz is entitled to bail, provided that he

proves with clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk. Case was

remanded to the trial court to see if there is clear and convincing evidence that Munoz

is not a flight risk.

FACTS:

An Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons was entered

into by the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter PHL) and then British Crown

Colony of Hong Kong (hereinafter HK) which took effect in 1997.

Private respondent Munoz was charged in HK for 3 counts of accepting an

advantage as agent and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrest

were issued by HK court against Munoz in 1997 and 1999 and if convicted, faces jail

term of 7 to 14 years for each charge

Upon receipt of request for provisional arrest by PHL through the DOJ, the NBI filed

with the RTC an application for provisional arrest and the same was granted in Sept

23, 1999. On same date, NBI agents arrested and detained Munoz.

Initially, Munoz filed with the CA a petition questioning the validity of the order of

arrest in which the CA declared such as void. But, the SC reversed this and declared

the order of arrest valid. This decision became final and executor in April 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as Nov 22, 1999, HK has filed with the RTC of Manila a petition

for extradition of Munoz. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by Munoz.

Judge Bernardo, Jr. (a.k.a Mr. NBA Fantasy) denied the petition for bail but upon

reconsideration, Judge Olalia granted bail subject to certain conditions on Oct. 30,

2001.

An urgent motion to vacate the order was denied by Judge Olalia, hence this instant

Petition.

o Petitioner HK contended that Judge Olalia committed GADAJEL and that there is

nothing in the constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee

has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceeding

o Private Respondent maintained that right to bail extends to prospective

extraditee and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged

deprivation of liberty

ISSUES: (1) Whether the right to bail extends to a prospective extraditee (considering

that extradition is an administrative case and right to bail involves criminal cases).

HELD: YES, Case Dismissed

RATIO:

The court has previously ruled in Govt of USA v. Puraganan that the constitutional

provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings; it is available only in

criminal proceedings. The SC in that case reasoned:

o The use of word conviction in the constitution applies only to persons arrested

and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. Court does not render a

judgment of conviction in extradition

o The right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favour of every

accused before judgement. The presumption of innocence is not an issue in

extradition thus it follows that right to bail is not contemplated

HOWEVER, the court took note of the current trends in international law which

gives primacy on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.

o There is growing importance of the individual in PIL

o Higher value is given to human rights in the international sphere

o There is corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights

in treaty obligations

o There is the duty of the courts to balance the rights of the individual under our

constitution and the law on extradition on the other.

THUS, the court in light of the various international treaties re-examined the ruling

in Puragan.

o First, deprivation of liberty is not limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in

admin cases such as deportation and quarantine have likewise been detained.

o Second, Philippine jurisprudence prior to Puragan has not limited the exercise to

bail to criminal proceedings only. There have been cases where right to bail was

granted in admin cases mostly deportation proceedings.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should

not also be allowed in extradition cases.

o The court applied the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which the

constitution says is part of the law of the land

o Also, the right of an extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of

various treaty obligations of PHL. What is important is that the right to liberty

must not be impaired.

Extradition is the removal of an accused from PHL with the object of placing him at

the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or govt to hold him

in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution

of a penalty imposed on him under penal or criminal law of the requesting state.

o It is a right of a foreign power created by a treaty

o It is NOT A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING even if the potential extraditee is a criminal

in another state

o IT IS SUI GENERIS tracing its existence on treaty obligation between states

It is neither a trial nor a civil action. It is merely administrative in character.

While ostensibly administrative, extradition bears all earmark of criminal process.

o Potential extraditee is subject to arrest, prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced

to transfer to the demanding state

o Extradition is characterized by (a) deprivation of liberty and (b) the means

employed to attain purpose of extradition is the machinery of criminal law

Records show that Munoz was arrested on Sept 23, 1999 and remained

incarcerated until Dec 20, 2001, a period of over 2 years without having been

convicted of any crime. This is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to

liberty by any standard!

While the Philippines must honor its obligation under the extradition treaty, it

should not diminish a potential extraditees right to life, liberty and due process

which are guaranteed not only by the constitution but also by international

conventions to which the PHL is party thereto.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,

neither is there a prohibition. Constitutional provision on due process however

guarantees this right.

o Since this is not a criminal proceeding where there is a presumption of innocence

and that in extradition proceedings, there is a presumption that an extraditee is

a fugitive from justice, Munoz (the prospective extraditee) has the burden of

proof of showing that he is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

o An extradition proceeding being sui generis the standard of proof required is

clear and convincing evidence which is below proof beyond reasonable doubt

but above preponderance of evidence.

Thus Munoz must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk

and will abide with all the orders and processes of extradition court.

WHEREFORE, case DISMISSED and REMANDED to trial court to determine if Munoz is

entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence

(ii) IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION

5. Sanders v. Veridianio TOPIC: Jurisdictional Immunity

G.R. No. L-46930

Petitioner: DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR

Respondent: HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First

Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS

J. Cruz

Doctrine: Official acts of agents of another state(provided that they are granted

immunity) are covered by such priviledge; In order for a state to be sued it must consent

to it.

RRV:

Rossi and Wyers are game room attendants, they were regular employees but were

reverted to part time employees. Rossi and Wyers appealed such decision which was

granted and order a reinstatement of the two. Sanders wrote a letter to Moreau who

was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, explaining his grievance to the

decision. Before a grievance meeting was commenced, a letter was sent, purportedly

from Moreau, ordered the reversal of the decision. Rossi and Wyers filed a case for

damages in the CFI. The issue is whether Sanders were acting in official capacity which

grants them immunity. The court ruled in favor or Sanders, it reasoned that the letters

written were within his official capacity. He was to report to his superior about

personnel under his supervision. Assuming arguendo that it was not, he had the right to

react to criticisms impugned directly upon him.

Facts:

o Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services

director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City, while Moreau

was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base.

o Respondents were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special

services department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and

the latter in 1969. They were informed that they are now just part time

employees. They protested to the U.S. Department of Defense which ordered

their reinstatement to full-time status with back wages.

o Sanders sent a letter to Moreau disagreed with this recommendation and

reported that Responders tend to alienate their co-workers and were difficult

to supervise.

o Before the grievance hearing was was started, a letter purportedly coming

from Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic

Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the

private respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence

therewith, but this was signed by Moore, by direction.

o Respondents filed a case in the CFI for damages. Sanders and Moreau filed a

motion to dismiss arguing that the court has no jurisdiction because the said

acts were performed in the discharge of their duties.

o The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered a writ of

preliminary attachment to the properties of Moreau. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners were acting official capacities which merits them the grant of

jurisdictional immunity. YES

Ratio:

o The mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his

personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of

the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity.

The mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate

him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a

personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.

Baer v. Tizon, Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, United States of America v.

Ruiz, consistently held that the US has not consented to be sued and

the suit could not prosper because the acts complained of were

covered by the doctrine of state immunity

o In the present case that the acts of the petitioners were performed by them in

the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services

department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel,

including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work

assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters.

It is not disputed that the letter Sanders had written was in fact a

reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more

information regarding the case of the private respondents.

Even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in

reacting to the hearing officer's criticismin effect a direct attack

against him-that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic

form of supervision.

o Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to

conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of

the United States government

As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the

scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the

petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts.

There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot

prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable

has given its consent to' be sued.

The SC , in a line of cases, upheld the doctrine of state immunity as

applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states

sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts.

It would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.(Parties in this case were Americans and Naval Base employees)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977, August 9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs.